Quand les e-pétitions influencent-elles la décision politique ? Une analyse du système de pétitions électroniques de la Chambre des députés du Luxembourg

in Participations (2021), 3(28), 177-202

Dans cet article, nous présentons l’une des premières analyses à étudier de manière systématique les facteurs expliquant le degré d’appropriation par un gouvernement des demandes exprimées dans les e ... [more ▼]

Dans cet article, nous présentons l’une des premières analyses à étudier de manière systématique les facteurs expliquant le degré d’appropriation par un gouvernement des demandes exprimées dans les e-pétitions qui lui sont soumises. Cette analyse se base sur l’ensemble des e-pétitions ayant obtenu les 4 500 signatures requises pour donner lieu à un débat public à la Chambre des députés du Luxembourg. Les hypothèses testées pour expliquer les variations dans le niveau d’appropriation des e-pétitions par le gouvernement ont été : 1) la compatibilité avec l’agenda du gouvernement, 2) la compétence du gouvernement pour traiter les e-pétitions en question, 3) la nature consensuelle (ou non)de l’e-pétition, 4) le nombre de signatures en sa faveur, 5) sa visibilité médiatique, et 6) le statut de son initiateur. Conformément à nos attentes, nous avons observé que les probabilités qu’une e-pétition soit prise en considération par le gouvernement sont liées à essentiellement trois facteurs : 1) la compatibilité avec l’agenda du gouvernement, 2) la compétence du gouvernement et 3) l’accord du gouvernement avec les revendications des pétitionnaires. Les autres facteurs, tels que le soutien populaire ou médiatique de l’e-pétition, sa thématique ou bien les coûts de sa réalisation, apparaissent peu significatifs. [less ▲]

Deliberative constitution-making in Luxembourg

Scientific Conference (2021, February 26)

Luxembourg is a small constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Since its 1868 ratification, the Constitution of Luxembourg has been amended 35 times, so the document resembles more and more a ... [more ▼]

Luxembourg is a small constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Since its 1868 ratification, the Constitution of Luxembourg has been amended 35 times, so the document resembles more and more a patchwork quilt of basic institutions. Yet the past twenty years have seen a consensus amongst Luxembourg’s constitutional players on the need for modernization, motivated by the desire for a more coherent constitution. Article 114 vests the Chamber of Deputies with the power to initiate and to approve constitutional amendments in a two-step process. This has several consequences for deliberation. First, it is largely restricted to political elites because formal amendment powers rest solely with the Chamber. Second, there is little to no empowered maxi-public deliberation unless the Government supports a citizen consultation. Following the 2013 parliamentary elections, the new Government planned a two-part referendum on constitutional reform in summer 2015 and in winter 2015. The first referendum was intended to seek popular input on four proposals which voters rejected by large margins, and the second referendum was later scrapped. Nevertheless, this reform process has seen some participatory and deliberative experiments. For the purposes of the present COST Action, three events are of interest. First, charged by the Chamber of Deputies, the UL’s Parliamentary Studies Research Chair at organized in May 2014 CIVILEX, a citizens’ forum modelled along the lines of a 21st century Town Meeting to discuss each of the four referendum questions. Researchers found that group discussion sometimes produced significant shifts in opinion between the pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires. Furthermore, once experts had cleared up certain misunderstandings, citizens ably discussed the referendum proposals. Despite these largely positive experiences, this deliberative experiment remained an isolated experiment and was not renewed during the campaign leading up to the June 2015 referendum. Second, given the first referendum results, the Chamber made a renewed effort in 2015 to involve citizens in the constitutional reform process, so it collected proposals via a new web portal - www.ärvirschléi.lu (Your Recommendation) – and subsequently held a public hearing with those who had initiated proposals. The process yielded some participatory and deliberative outcomes, including the elaboration of several constitutional amendments. For instance, Chamber members reached consensus on strengthening the rights of children and of animals compared to their original text. Nevertheless, the webportal was not developed as an online deliberative forum and saw limited, self-selected participation. Consequently, though this was the only concrete involvement of citizens in the constitutional reform, it was the least deliberative of the three exercises. Third, since the Government had still planned to call a second referendum to vote on the constitutional reform as a whole, the Chamber again tasked the Chair with gauging public opinion. So, in July 2016, the Chaire organized CONSTITULUX, a new citizens’ forum to discuss the entire draft constitution. Citizens i.) raised pertinent questions, ii.) identified short- and long-term concerns and iii.) suggested improvements to the draft articles. One striking output was that participants were more supportive of the proposed constitutional reform. Like CIVILEX, it generated little concrete action from the Government. Moreover, the incidental and experimental nature of these events again meant that there was little maxi-public engagement. Following the draft constitution’s abandonment in November 2019, it remains to be seen what the future holds for deliberative democracy and constitution-making in Luxembourg. [less ▲]

Deliberative constitution-making in Luxembourg

Scientific Conference (2020, October 22)

Luxembourg is a small constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Since its 1868 ratification, the Constitution of Luxembourg has been amended 35 times, so the document resembles more and more a ... [more ▼]

Luxembourg is a small constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. Since its 1868 ratification, the Constitution of Luxembourg has been amended 35 times, so the document resembles more and more a patchwork quilt of basic institutions. Yet the past twenty years have seen a consensus amongst Luxembourg’s constitutional players on the need for modernization, motivated by the desire for a more coherent constitution. Article 114 vests the Chamber of Deputies with the power to initiate and to approve constitutional amendments in a two-step process. This has several consequences for deliberation. First, it is largely restricted to political elites because formal amendment powers rest solely with the Chamber. Second, there is little to no empowered maxi-public deliberation unless the Government supports a citizen consultation. Following the 2013 parliamentary elections, the new Government planned a two-part referendum on constitutional reform in summer 2015 and in winter 2015. The first referendum was intended to seek popular input on four proposals which voters rejected by large margins, and the second referendum was later scrapped. Nevertheless, this reform process has seen some participatory and deliberative experiments. For the purposes of the present COST Action, three events are of interest. First, charged by the Chamber of Deputies, the UL’s Parliamentary Studies Research Chair at organized in May 2014 CIVILEX, a citizens’ forum modelled along the lines of a 21st century Town Meeting to discuss each of the four referendum questions. Researchers found that group discussion sometimes produced significant shifts in opinion between the pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires. Furthermore, once experts had cleared up certain misunderstandings, citizens ably discussed the referendum proposals. Despite these largely positive experiences, this deliberative experiment remained an isolated experiment and was not renewed during the campaign leading up to the June 2015 referendum. Second, given the first referendum results, the Chamber made a renewed effort in 2015 to involve citizens in the constitutional reform process, so it collected proposals via a new web portal - www.ärvirschléi.lu (Your Recommendation) – and subsequently held a public hearing with those who had initiated proposals. The process yielded some participatory and deliberative outcomes, including the elaboration of several constitutional amendments. For instance, Chamber members reached consensus on strengthening the rights of children and of animals compared to their original text. Nevertheless, the webportal was not developed as an online deliberative forum and saw limited, self-selected participation. Consequently, though this was the only concrete involvement of citizens in the constitutional reform, it was the least deliberative of the three exercises. Third, since the Government had still planned to call a second referendum to vote on the constitutional reform as a whole, the Chamber again tasked the Chair with gauging public opinion. So, in July 2016, the Chaire organized CONSTITULUX, a new citizens’ forum to discuss the entire draft constitution. Citizens i.) raised pertinent questions, ii.) identified short- and long-term concerns and iii.) suggested improvements to the draft articles. One striking output was that participants were more supportive of the proposed constitutional reform. Like CIVILEX, it generated little concrete action from the Government. Moreover, the incidental and experimental nature of these events again meant that there was little maxi-public engagement. Following the draft constitution’s abandonment in November 2019, it remains to be seen what the future holds for deliberative democracy and constitution-making in Luxembourg. [less ▲]

Luxembourg: Political Developments and Data in 2019

in European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook (2020)

Du grand débat à la grande débacle

in Forum für Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur in Luxemburg (2019), 393

A gradualist path toward sortition

in Gastil, John; Wright, Erik Olin (Eds.) Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative Governance (2019)

Conventional wisdom holds that building democracy takes time. Deliberative democracy will likely prove no exception. To that end, this chapter will explore one possible path towards more deliberative ... [more ▼]

Conventional wisdom holds that building democracy takes time. Deliberative democracy will likely prove no exception. To that end, this chapter will explore one possible path towards more deliberative institutions and decision-making in the form of Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a Sortition Chamber. Our thesis is that deliberative innovations, notably a sortition chamber, require a gradualist approach to implementation. While other authors in this volume may take for granted that some form of sortition chamber will be institutionalized and focus instead on design questions, we probe the necessary conditions preceding institutionalization. To support this thesis, we shall make an argument comprising four main claims. 1.) Sortition is a promising deliberative innovation. 2.) A strong, unaccountable deliberative device like sortition may delegitimize citizen deliberation and future deliberative innovations, in particular a sortition chamber. 3.) A weaker deliberative device like citizens’ consultation is effective though often blocked by a lack of institutional footing. 4.) Citizens’ consultation, once proven to be effective and regular, opens one path towards enhanced deliberative innovations like the sortition chamber. Claim 1.) will not be developed here beyond the point that a sortition chamber’s “hybrid legitimacy” may allow it to overcome critiques addressed to one-shot, single-issue consultative or 1 empowered mini-publics which may lack institutional footing1. Such mini-publics face multiple challenges: significant social or political uptake, electoral accountability, capture by interests, political redundancy, representativeness, biases, frames2. If a sortition chamber prima facie meets or precludes these different critiques, it represents a striking contribution to democratic innovations beyond mini-publics. That said, we must work out claims 2.), 3.) and 4.) in individual sections below. While examples in 3.) and 4.) will mainly be drawn from the European Union, we maintain that this argument is broadly applicable at local, regional national and transnational levels. We argue that, if institutionalizing consultative mini-publics is desirable and feasible at the EU level, it will be all the more so at other levels throughout the decision-making process’ different stages. [less ▲]

Luxembourg: The permanent downfall of Luxembourg’s dominant party?

in De Sio, Lorenzo; Frankin, Mark N.; Russo, Luana (Eds.) The European Parliament Elections of 2019 (2019)

Media Pluralism Monitor 2017: Luxembourg

Report (2018)

Media Pluralism monitor 2016: Luxembourg

Report (2017)

Luxembourg

in European Journal of Political Research (2017), 56