![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() E-print/Working paper (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 97 (9 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() E-print/Working paper (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 73 (28 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Review of Industrial Organization (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 96 (4 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in R&D Management (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 184 (1 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Research Policy (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 135 (3 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Family Business Review (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 76 (2 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in PLoS ONE (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 108 (2 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Research Policy (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 206 (10 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Applied Economics (2018), 50(12), 1324-1341 Detailed reference viewed: 237 (6 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Research Policy (2018) Detailed reference viewed: 293 (3 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Industry and Innovation (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 126 (6 UL)![]() Berge, Laurent ![]() ![]() in Academy of Management Proceedings, 2017 (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 109 (8 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in R&D Management (2016) Detailed reference viewed: 150 (1 UL)![]() ; ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in European Economic Review (2016) Detailed reference viewed: 188 (7 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Research Policy (2015) Detailed reference viewed: 156 (5 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Industry and Innovation (2015) Detailed reference viewed: 132 (2 UL)![]() Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Applied Economics Letters (2015), 22(10), 843-847 Detailed reference viewed: 138 (2 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Review of Industrial Organization (2015), 46(2), 183-204 Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration, which can result in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search ... [more ▼] Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration, which can result in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. We show that - depending of the type of collaboration partner and the size of the company - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and can, hence, hinder knowledge production. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from antitrust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 213 (8 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Strategic Management Journal (2014) Extant literature holds that firm acquisitions create value through innovation if the knowledge bases of the acquirer and the target complement each other. Little is known about the value that patents ... [more ▼] Extant literature holds that firm acquisitions create value through innovation if the knowledge bases of the acquirer and the target complement each other. Little is known about the value that patents associated with a target’s knowledge convey to the acquirer, i.e., their value in securing market exclusion and freedom to operate in R&D. We argue that such property rights hold preemptive power allowing firms to capture the value from combining complementary technologies and to realize gains from trade in strategic factor markets. Our results for a sample of 1,428 acquisitions indicate that—controlling for technological value—acquired preemptive power is an important determinant of the acquisition price, particularly when the acquirer is technology intensive and acquired patents are highly related to the acquirer’s knowledge base. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 432 (135 UL)![]() ; Hussinger, Katrin ![]() in Research Policy (2014) Detailed reference viewed: 315 (127 UL) |
||