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Showing results 1 to 20 of 36
   Explaining free will by rational capacitiesHofmann, Frank  in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 29 (2 UL)Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: when the time is ripe to actualize one's epistemic potentialHofmann, Frank in Ratio (2021), 34(4), 277-285 Detailed reference viewed: 17 (2 UL)Moral status and teleofunctional kindsHofmann, Frank Presentation (2021, November) Detailed reference viewed: 27 (1 UL)Experts, specialists, and recommendations: comment on Grundmann on expertiseHofmann, Frank Presentation (2021, August) Detailed reference viewed: 24 (0 UL)Two norms of intention: a vindication of Williamson's knowledge-action analogyHofmann, Frank in Acta Analytica (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 45 (4 UL)Freiheit und Unfreiheit in der Sklaverei - eine philosophische AnalyseHofmann, Frank in Binsfeld, Andrea; Ghetta, Marcello (Eds.) Sklaverei und Identitäten. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 19 (1 UL)Some reflections on the flow of knowledge in digital historyHofmann, Frank Diverse speeches and writings (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 44 (1 UL)Is evidence normative?Hofmann, Frank in Philosophia (2020) This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the ... [more ▼] This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen on whether having evidence is sufficient for having a normative reason for belief and another one from S. Street. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 72 (4 UL)Reflexionen über Corona und die ökologische Situation des MenschenHofmann, Frank Article for general public (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 33 (1 UL)Discussion Note on The Rationality of Perception (Siegel)Hofmann, Frank ; Orlando, Andy in Grazer Philosophische Studien (2019), 96(2), Detailed reference viewed: 34 (1 UL)Norm reasons and evidentialismHofmann, Frank in Analysis (2019), 96(2), Detailed reference viewed: 36 (1 UL)Krankheit in Denkfiguren: Eine Normative UntersuchungHofmann, Frank in Figurationen von Krankheiten (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 24 (2 UL)Problems of epistemic and practical consequentialismHofmann, Frank Presentation (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 29 (0 UL)E=K and nonepistemic percpetionHofmann, Frank in Logos and Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology (2018), IX(3), 307-31 Detailed reference viewed: 37 (0 UL)How to know one's experiences transparentlyHofmann, Frank in Philosophical Studies (2018) Detailed reference viewed: 105 (2 UL)Evolution and Ethics: no Streetian debunking of moral realismHofmann, Frank in Croatian Journal of Philosophy (2018), 18(3), 417-432 Detailed reference viewed: 29 (0 UL)Could robots be phenomenally conscious?Hofmann, Frank in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 129 (4 UL) Tatsachen, Fakten und SachverhalteHofmann, Frank in Schrenk, Markus (Ed.) Handbuch Metaphysik (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 62 (0 UL)The Role of Consciousness For Epistemic AgencyHofmann, Frank Presentation (2015, December 04) In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran ... [more ▼] In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran, and others. At the same time, his conception of rational capacities as powers at the personal level saves our epistemic agency against worries that Hilary Kornblith has put forward. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 133 (2 UL)Virtue and knowledgeHofmann, Frank Presentation (2015, November 11) The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities ... [more ▼] The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities, the norm of excellence (or 'virtue') applies to doxastic action as well as any other rational action. An argument is presented to the effect that the knowledge norm is the right norm of belief. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 101 (4 UL)
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