![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 29 (2 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Ratio (2021), 34(4), 277-285 Detailed reference viewed: 17 (2 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Presentation (2021, November) Detailed reference viewed: 27 (1 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Presentation (2021, August) Detailed reference viewed: 24 (0 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Acta Analytica (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 45 (4 UL)![]() ![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Binsfeld, Andrea; Ghetta, Marcello (Eds.) Sklaverei und Identitäten. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 19 (1 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Diverse speeches and writings (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 44 (1 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Philosophia (2020) This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the ... [more ▼] This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen on whether having evidence is sufficient for having a normative reason for belief and another one from S. Street. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 72 (4 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Article for general public (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 33 (1 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() ![]() in Grazer Philosophische Studien (2019), 96(2), Detailed reference viewed: 34 (1 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Analysis (2019), 96(2), Detailed reference viewed: 36 (1 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Figurationen von Krankheiten (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 24 (2 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Presentation (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 29 (0 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Logos and Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology (2018), IX(3), 307-31 Detailed reference viewed: 37 (0 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Philosophical Studies (2018) Detailed reference viewed: 105 (2 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Croatian Journal of Philosophy (2018), 18(3), 417-432 Detailed reference viewed: 29 (0 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 129 (4 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() in Schrenk, Markus (Ed.) Handbuch Metaphysik (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 62 (0 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Presentation (2015, December 04) In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran ... [more ▼] In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran, and others. At the same time, his conception of rational capacities as powers at the personal level saves our epistemic agency against worries that Hilary Kornblith has put forward. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 133 (2 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() Presentation (2015, November 11) The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities ... [more ▼] The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities, the norm of excellence (or 'virtue') applies to doxastic action as well as any other rational action. An argument is presented to the effect that the knowledge norm is the right norm of belief. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 101 (4 UL) |
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