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Showing results 1 to 20 of 22
   E=K and nonepistemic percpetionHofmann, Frank  in Logos and Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology (2018), IX(3), 307-31 Detailed reference viewed: 13 (0 UL)How to know one's experiences transparentlyHofmann, Frank in Philosophical Studies (2018) Detailed reference viewed: 62 (2 UL)Could robots be phenomenally conscious?Hofmann, Frank in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 94 (4 UL) Tatsachen, Fakten und SachverhalteHofmann, Frank in Schrenk, Markus (Ed.) Handbuch Metaphysik (2017) Detailed reference viewed: 37 (0 UL)The Role of Consciousness For Epistemic AgencyHofmann, Frank Presentation (2015, December 04) In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran ... [more ▼] In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran, and others. At the same time, his conception of rational capacities as powers at the personal level saves our epistemic agency against worries that Hilary Kornblith has put forward. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 99 (2 UL)Virtue and knowledgeHofmann, Frank Presentation (2015, November 11) The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities ... [more ▼] The presentation defends a fullblooded, 'thick' virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. If we think of beliefs as under the control of rational agents, by means of their rational capacities, the norm of excellence (or 'virtue') applies to doxastic action as well as any other rational action. An argument is presented to the effect that the knowledge norm is the right norm of belief. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 75 (4 UL)Intentionalism and disjunctivism about perceptionHofmann, Frank Presentation (2015, September 16) Detailed reference viewed: 78 (0 UL)Non-conceptual knowledgeHofmann, Frank in Philosophical Issues (2014) Detailed reference viewed: 136 (4 UL)Perceptual justification and non-conceptual perceptionHofmann, Frank Presentation (2014, September 26) Detailed reference viewed: 66 (1 UL)The structuring causes of behavior: Has Dretske saved mental causation?Hofmann, Frank ; in Acta Analytica (2014), 29(3), 267-284 Detailed reference viewed: 108 (3 UL)Gettier for JustificationHofmann, Frank in Episteme (2014), 11(3), 305-318 Detailed reference viewed: 100 (1 UL) Seeing oneself through the eyes of othersHofmann, Frank ; in Philosophia Naturalis (2013), 50 Detailed reference viewed: 66 (1 UL)Was ist Analytische Philosophie?Hofmann, Frank in Protosociology: An International Journal and Interdisciplinary Project (2013) Die metaphilosophische Frage, die ich hier beantworten möchte, lautet: Was ist Analytische Philosophie? Die Antwort lässt sich meines Erachtens in drei Schritten entwickeln. Zuerst kann man ... [more ▼] Die metaphilosophische Frage, die ich hier beantworten möchte, lautet: Was ist Analytische Philosophie? Die Antwort lässt sich meines Erachtens in drei Schritten entwickeln. Zuerst kann man charakterisieren, was Philosophie ist. Dann kann man bestimmen, wodurch sich Analytische Philosophie auszeichnet. Und schließlich kann man sagen, was eine historisch gewachsene Form von Analytischer Philosophie ist. Der Begriff von Analytischer Philosophie, der sich aus den ersten beiden Schritten ergibt, ist ein systematischer, nichthistorischer. Der dritte Schritt führt dann auf die jeweiligen historischen Formen oder Gestalten von Analytischer Philosophie. Vorausschicken möchte ich, dass Ansgar Beckermann in seinen Arbeiten „Muss die Philosophie noch analytischer werden?“ (2007), „Analytische Philosophie“ (2008) und „Einleitung“ (2004/2012) die Dinge schon weitgehend ins richtige Licht gerückt hat. Nur an einigen Stellen scheint mir noch Klärungsbedarf zu bestehen. Das eine oder andere lässt sich noch etwas zugespitzter und deutlicher sagen. Dies will ich im Folgenden versuchen. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 75 (7 UL)In defense of strong virtue epistemology: how to explain success by abilityHofmann, Frank Presentation (2013, September 30) Detailed reference viewed: 67 (1 UL)Bildung als SelbstbestimmungHofmann, Frank Article for general public (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 35 (0 UL)How Gettier helps to understand justificationHofmann, Frank Scientific Conference (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 15 (0 UL)Three kinds of reliabilismHofmann, Frank in Philosophical Explorations (2013), 16(1), 59-80 I distinguish between three kinds of reliabilism for epistemic justification, namely, pure reliabilism, evidential reliabilism, and reasons reliabilism, and I argue for reasons reliabilism. Pure ... [more ▼] I distinguish between three kinds of reliabilism for epistemic justification, namely, pure reliabilism, evidential reliabilism, and reasons reliabilism, and I argue for reasons reliabilism. Pure reliabilism and evidential reliabilism are plagued, most importantly, by the generality problem, and they cannot deal adequately with defeater phenomena. One can avoid these problems only by jettisoning the idea of process reliability. The truth connection – which is essential for any kind of reliabilism – has to be provided in an altogether different way, namely, by means of facts in the world which serve as objective reasons (or evidence). So, as reasons reliabilism says, a justified belief has to be anchored in an objective reason which speaks in favor of its truth. Only in this way can intuitions about defeaters be preserved and explained. And reasons reliabilism can avoid the generality problem. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 46 (2 UL)Epistemic virtues and valuesHofmann, Frank in Henning, Tim; Schweikard, David (Eds.) Knowledge, Virtue, and Action (2013) Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue ... [more ▼] Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue epistemologists like John Greco and Ernest Sosa have proposed: knowledge is true belief from epistemic virtue. I reconstruct the master argument which subsumes the epistemic case under the general case of success from virtue. Five accounts of (epistemic) virtue are presented and discussed critically. The result is that only the fifth account – the refined dispositionalist account of virtue, based on an idea of J.J. Thomson – is viable, for the purposes of accounting for the surplus value of knowledge along the lines of the master argument. However, there is at least one remaining question, namely, of why success from virtue has surplus value in general. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 118 (15 UL)The epistemic role of experienceHofmann, Frank Presentation (2012, June 12) Detailed reference viewed: 45 (0 UL)The generality constraint - vertical, not horizontalHofmann, Frank Presentation (2012, May 06) Detailed reference viewed: 47 (0 UL)
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