![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Topoi (2022) The paper argues that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant develops two anti-sceptical strategies. In the Fourth Paralogism (CPR A) he believes himself able to refute the sceptic by demonstrating that ... [more ▼] The paper argues that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant develops two anti-sceptical strategies. In the Fourth Paralogism (CPR A) he believes himself able to refute the sceptic by demonstrating that external perception is immediate. This strategy is rather unconvincing. In the Refutation of Idealism (CPR B) Kant promotes the material dependence of inner sense on outer sense. I show that Kant’s argument for material dependence has been widely overlooked, even though it is the strongest argument against external world scepticism he develops, since it anticipates mental content externalism while preserving transcendental idealism and empirical realism. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 18 (0 UL)![]() ![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Kant - ontologie et métaphysique: sources, transformations et héritages (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 46 (1 UL)![]() ![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 64 (0 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Immanuel Kant 1724–2024. Ein europäischer Denker, (2022) Detailed reference viewed: 44 (0 UL)![]() Hofmann, Frank ![]() ![]() in Cahiers le portiQue (2022), 19 Detailed reference viewed: 17 (3 UL)![]() ![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Illetterati, Luca (Ed.) The Relevance of Hegel’s Concept of Philosophy: From Classical German Philosophy to Contemporary Metaphilosophy (2021) Hegel’s major claim is that true philosophy provides the complete rational cognition of the absolute. Since by definition the complete cognition of the absolute cannot be cognitively exceeded, true ... [more ▼] Hegel’s major claim is that true philosophy provides the complete rational cognition of the absolute. Since by definition the complete cognition of the absolute cannot be cognitively exceeded, true philosophy itself must account for the completeness claim. There are three places in particular where Hegel develops this claim: in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in the Science of Logic and in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. I explore the different ways in which Hegel elucidates the rational, non-circular explication of how to philosophically conceive of the complete comprehension of philosophy itself, i.e., his philosophy of philosophy or metaphilosophy. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 203 (8 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Serck-Hanssen, Camila (Ed.) Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress ‘The Court of Reason’ (Oslo, 6-9 August 2019) (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 211 (5 UL)![]() ![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Kisner, Manja (Ed.) The Concept of Drive in Classical German Philosophy: Between Biology, Anthropology and Metaphysics (2021) Detailed reference viewed: 116 (1 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Kant Yearbook (2021), 13 Detailed reference viewed: 132 (5 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Kant Yearbook (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 111 (1 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy (2020), (12), 173-190 In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The ... [more ▼] In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 123 (3 UL)![]() ![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Immanuel Kant. Conceitos fundamentais (2020) Detailed reference viewed: 68 (3 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in International Yearbook of German Idealism (2019) It is almost beyond doubt that Hegel’s thought bears rationalist traits. The question, however, whether or not Hegel can count as a rationalist, is controversial. This contribution argues that although ... [more ▼] It is almost beyond doubt that Hegel’s thought bears rationalist traits. The question, however, whether or not Hegel can count as a rationalist, is controversial. This contribution argues that although Hegel is a rationalist in the wide sense, he is not in the narrow sense of the word. This is not a trivial observation. For in numerous places of his work it seems as if Hegel holds implicitly onto the central rationalist theorem, according to which the principles of thought are the principles of the possibility of things themselves. Hegel’s idealism of absolute rationality yet claims to have overcome this theorem and hence rationalism in the narrow historical sense by rationalist means. The paper examines and critically assesses this claim with respect to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 180 (12 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Verifiche (2019), XLVIII(1), 1-24 I argue that in his aesthetics, Kant puts forward arguments that help to answer the question of whether he is a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist. The current debate on Kantian conceptualism and non ... [more ▼] I argue that in his aesthetics, Kant puts forward arguments that help to answer the question of whether he is a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist. The current debate on Kantian conceptualism and non-conceptualism has completely overlooked the importance of Kant’s aesthetics. There are two candidates for non-conceptuality in Kant’s aesthetics. First, non-conceptual content plays a crucial role in aesthetic evaluation. Second, non-conceptual content has a systematic explanatory function in the theory of aesthetic creation of the genius of art. Accordingly, my argument proceeds in two steps: In first analyse the role of non-conceptual content in aesthetic evaluation, i.e., Kant’s claim that aesthetic experience is cognition of a special kind that does not bear on conceptual activities. In then look at the role of non-conceptual content in the genius’s creation of artwork. I argue that art production does not imply conceptual activity and therefore seems to count as a second systematic instance of Kantian non-conceptualism. If my argument is correct, then Kant’s aesthetics implies non-conceptualism with respect to aesthetic evaluation but does not in any objective sense with respect to aesthetic creation. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 226 (2 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Synthese (2019) Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the ... [more ▼] Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 192 (12 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Antike und Universitätsphilosophie. (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 31 (2 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() Book published by De Gruyter (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 129 (5 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS. International Journal of Philosophy (2018), 7 „The paper discusses Kant’s first argument from space in the „Critique of pure Reason”. It argues that, contrary to what parts of the literature have claimed, the argument provides convincing reasons for ... [more ▼] „The paper discusses Kant’s first argument from space in the „Critique of pure Reason”. It argues that, contrary to what parts of the literature have claimed, the argument provides convincing reasons for the view that in order to locate objects in space outside us we must already presuppose the idea of space such that it cannot be borrowed from the objects perceived in space. The paper shows how the argument can be made transparent not only by clarifying Kant’s usage of “distinct from” and “ausser uns” but also by retracing its main idea back to the 1768 essay “Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of Regions in Space” and its incongruent counterparts argument. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 160 (6 UL)![]() Heidemann, Dietmar ![]() in Machuca, Diego (Ed.) Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (2018) I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology ... [more ▼] I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) that is supposed to overcome untrue types of cognition in order to promote “absolute knowing.” In Section 3, I debate Hegel’s more advanced view according to which genuine skepticism must be construed as dialectic. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 427 (12 UL) |
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