Two models of critique of metaphysics: Kant and Hegel

in Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy (2022)

Kant's supposed realism about things-in-themselves

in Serck-Hanssen, Camila (Ed.) Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress ‘The Court of Reason’ (Oslo, 6-9 August 2019) (2021)

The Drive to Society in Kant's Philosophy of Biology

in Kisner, Manja (Ed.) The Concept of Drive in Classical German Philosophy: Between Biology, Anthropology and Metaphysics (2021)

Entendimento: juízos, categories, esquemas e princípos

in Immanuel Kant. Conceitos fundamentais (2020)

Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic nonconceptualism

in Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy (2020), (12), 173-190

In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The ... [more ▼]

In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist. [less ▲]

Der antike pyrrhonische Skeptizismus / Aus dem Deutschen ins Ukrainische übersetzt von Volodymyr Abaschnik

in Antike und Universitätsphilosophie. (2019)

ARGUMENTS FOR NON-CONCEPTUALISM IN KANT’S THIRD CRITIQUE

in Verifiche (2019), XLVIII(1), 1-24

I argue that in his aesthetics, Kant puts forward arguments that help to answer the question of whether he is a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist. The current debate on Kantian conceptualism and non ... [more ▼]

I argue that in his aesthetics, Kant puts forward arguments that help to answer the question of whether he is a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist. The current debate on Kantian conceptualism and non-conceptualism has completely overlooked the importance of Kant’s aesthetics. There are two candidates for non-conceptuality in Kant’s aesthetics. First, non-conceptual content plays a crucial role in aesthetic evaluation. Second, non-conceptual content has a systematic explanatory function in the theory of aesthetic creation of the genius of art. Accordingly, my argument proceeds in two steps: In first analyse the role of non-conceptual content in aesthetic evaluation, i.e., Kant’s claim that aesthetic experience is cognition of a special kind that does not bear on conceptual activities. In then look at the role of non-conceptual content in the genius’s creation of artwork. I argue that art production does not imply conceptual activity and therefore seems to count as a second systematic instance of Kantian non-conceptualism. If my argument is correct, then Kant’s aesthetics implies non-conceptualism with respect to aesthetic evaluation but does not in any objective sense with respect to aesthetic creation. [less ▲]

Der Raum ist kein empirischer Begriff. Zu Kants erstem Raumargument

in CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS. International Journal of Philosophy (2018), 7

„The paper discusses Kant’s first argument from space in the „Critique of pure Reason”. It argues that, contrary to what parts of the literature have claimed, the argument provides convincing reasons for ... [more ▼]

„The paper discusses Kant’s first argument from space in the „Critique of pure Reason”. It argues that, contrary to what parts of the literature have claimed, the argument provides convincing reasons for the view that in order to locate objects in space outside us we must already presuppose the idea of space such that it cannot be borrowed from the objects perceived in space. The paper shows how the argument can be made transparent not only by clarifying Kant’s usage of “distinct from” and “ausser uns” but also by retracing its main idea back to the 1768 essay “Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of Regions in Space” and its incongruent counterparts argument. [less ▲]

Philosophy as a Kind of Scepticism

in Machuca, Diego (Ed.) Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (2018)

I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology ... [more ▼]

I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) that is supposed to overcome untrue types of cognition in order to promote “absolute knowing.” In Section 3, I debate Hegel’s more advanced view according to which genuine skepticism must be construed as dialectic. [less ▲]

Philosophy of Religion

Book published by de Gruyter (2018)