Hegel’s Philosophy of Philosophy

in Illetterati, Luca (Ed.) The Relevance of Hegel’s Concept of Philosophy: From Classical German Philosophy to Contemporary Metaphilosophy (2021)

Hegel’s major claim is that true philosophy provides the complete rational cognition of the absolute. Since by definition the complete cognition of the absolute cannot be cognitively exceeded, true ... [more ▼]

Hegel’s major claim is that true philosophy provides the complete rational cognition of the absolute. Since by definition the complete cognition of the absolute cannot be cognitively exceeded, true philosophy itself must account for the completeness claim. There are three places in particular where Hegel develops this claim: in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in the Science of Logic and in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. I explore the different ways in which Hegel elucidates the rational, non-circular explication of how to philosophically conceive of the complete comprehension of philosophy itself, i.e., his philosophy of philosophy or metaphilosophy. [less ▲]

Kant and Neo-Kantianism

in Kant Yearbook (2020)

Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic nonconceptualism

in Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy (2020), (12), 173-190

In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The ... [more ▼]

In this article I respond to objections that Matías Oroño, Silvia del Luján di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martínez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist. [less ▲]

Kant and the forms of realism

in Synthese (2019)

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the ... [more ▼]

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits. [less ▲]

Aeshetics

Book published by De Gruyter (2019)

Der Raum ist kein empirischer Begriff. Zu Kants erstem Raumargument

in CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS. International Journal of Philosophy (2018), 7

„The paper discusses Kant’s first argument from space in the „Critique of pure Reason”. It argues that, contrary to what parts of the literature have claimed, the argument provides convincing reasons for ... [more ▼]

„The paper discusses Kant’s first argument from space in the „Critique of pure Reason”. It argues that, contrary to what parts of the literature have claimed, the argument provides convincing reasons for the view that in order to locate objects in space outside us we must already presuppose the idea of space such that it cannot be borrowed from the objects perceived in space. The paper shows how the argument can be made transparent not only by clarifying Kant’s usage of “distinct from” and “ausser uns” but also by retracing its main idea back to the 1768 essay “Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of Regions in Space” and its incongruent counterparts argument. [less ▲]

Philosophy as a Kind of Scepticism

in Machuca, Diego (Ed.) Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (2018)

I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology ... [more ▼]

I present the arguments Hegel puts forward in favor of this rather challenging account of skepticism. In Section 2, I discuss the celebrated conception of “self-fulfilling skepticism” of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) that is supposed to overcome untrue types of cognition in order to promote “absolute knowing.” In Section 3, I debate Hegel’s more advanced view according to which genuine skepticism must be construed as dialectic. [less ▲]

Philosophy of Religion

Book published by de Gruyter (2018)

Diskursivität und Einheit des Bewusstseins bei Kant

in Kant-Studien (2017)

Im ersten Abschnitt des Beitrags wird der Zusammenhang von Kantischer Begriffslehre und Theorie des transzendentalen Selbstbewusstseins transparent gemacht. Die Einheit des Bewusstseins, so wird die ... [more ▼]

Im ersten Abschnitt des Beitrags wird der Zusammenhang von Kantischer Begriffslehre und Theorie des transzendentalen Selbstbewusstseins transparent gemacht. Die Einheit des Bewusstseins, so wird die Rekonstruktion dieses Zusammenhanges ergeben, gründet in der Theorie des diskursiven Begriffs. Die dabei herausgearbeitete Konzeption der diskursiven Identität wird dann im zweiten Abschnitt anhand des dritten Paralogismus der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft mit dem Begriff der personalen Identität kontrastiert, um zu zeigen, warum der auch hier bestehende konstitutive Zusammenhang zwischen kognitiver Einheit und Identität des Bewusstseins zu keiner spezifischen Erkenntnis hinsichtlich des Bewusstseins führt. Während die transzendentale Deduktion die Theorie nichtzeitlicher, logischer Einheit und diskursiver Identität der transzendentalen Apperzeption entfaltet, thematisiert der dritte Paralogismus das mentale Phänomen kontingenter, temporaler Einheit und damit personaler Identität. Über die prinzipiellen Bedeutungsunterschiede dieser beiden Konzeptionen von Einheit und Identität im Bereich des Mentalen ist Klarheit zu schaffen. Der Schlussteil widmet sich einigen naheliegenden Einwänden gegen den in diesem Beitrag entwickelten Interpretationsvorschlag. Insbesondere wird eine Kritik an der hier verteidigten Diskursivitätsthese diskutiert, derzufolge die Einheit des Bewusstseins in der Diskursivität des Verstandes bzw. Begriffs und nicht umgekehrt die Diskursivität des Verstandes bzw. des Begriffs in der Einheit des Bewusstseins gründet [less ▲]

De quelques questions récentes dans les recherches kantiennes

in Grapotte, Sophie (Ed.) Kant et les penseurs de langue anglaise (2017)