THE CAPACITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITHIN EU MULTILEVEL ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF THE BANKING UNION’S SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (SSM)

Doctoral thesis (2018)

This dissertation offers a deep political science insight into the functioning of the EU new multilevel administrative system governing the micro-prudential supervision of credit institutions operating in ... [more ▼]

This dissertation offers a deep political science insight into the functioning of the EU new multilevel administrative system governing the micro-prudential supervision of credit institutions operating in the Single Market. It aims to explain the conditions affecting the formal top-bottom compliance expectation within this multilevel system. In doing so, it engages in the institutional analysis of the organisational and operational design of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). [less ▲]

The Politics of Delegation in European Banking Union: Building the ECB's supervisory oversight capacity

in Journal of Contemporary European Research (2017)

The nature and scope of the European Central Banks’s (‘ECB’) oversight mandate over the supervision of smaller and medium banks by national supervisors has been one of the most debated aspects of the ... [more ▼]

The nature and scope of the European Central Banks’s (‘ECB’) oversight mandate over the supervision of smaller and medium banks by national supervisors has been one of the most debated aspects of the newly created European Banking Union. In particular, the issue whether the ECB should influence already established national supervisory practises and standards was not immediately straightforward. This paper applies the Principal-Agent (‘PA’) approach to explore the extent of the ECB supranational agency governing the supervisory oversight policies in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’). Notably, one of the important features of the SSM institutional design is the contractual incompleteness of supranational delegation. The ECB has been granted discretion to fill-in the agency contract concluded with the Member States. A brief analysis of the practical operationalization of the ECB oversight role suggests that the ECB could exploit this contract condition to pursue own policy goals (agency hold-up problem) and situate itself in “bureaucratic drift” vis-à-vis the Member-State principals. However, under slightly relaxed Principal-Agent assumptions which assume proactive role of the agent in reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis its principal, it is also possible that the ECB managed to influence the Member States’ stance, and, in doing so, exercised effective bureaucratic entrepreneurship. [less ▲]

The clash of European concepts regarding central bank independence: The Franco-Germanic (“Latin-Teutonic”) dispute on the ECB’s role during the euro crisis

in Milenkovic, Marko (Ed.) European Union and Legal Reform 2013 (2015)

The global financial crisis – which, in the European Union, has further transformed into the EU sovereign debt crisis (the euro crisis) – has shaken the foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union as ... [more ▼]

The global financial crisis – which, in the European Union, has further transformed into the EU sovereign debt crisis (the euro crisis) – has shaken the foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union as established in 1992, particularly regarding the stabilising role of the European Central Bank (ECB). As a result, two blocks of countries emerged: the first consisted of the northern eurozone countries (less affected by the crisis), which advocated for strict ECB independence and the continuation of its limited price stability mandate (“the Teutonic block”); the second included the southern eurozone countries, which suffered great difficulties in acquiring financing for their public debts and called for the ECB to take a more politically active role. This paper argues that such contradictory approaches are inevitable in a heterogeneous entity like the European Union (specifically, the eurozone) and need not necessarily undermine the future of the eurozone as a whole. Indeed, the 50 years of European integration led by the Franco-Germanic engine indicate that such different standpoints are nothing extraordinary. The remaining challenge is to transform them into ‘productive tension’ to keep the European project on the move. [less ▲]

Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: The Construction of a Credible Watchdog

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2015), 53(s1),

Does the institutional design of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and its first assessment of systemically important bank stability bolster the credibility of supranational banking ... [more ▼]

Does the institutional design of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and its first assessment of systemically important bank stability bolster the credibility of supranational banking supervision in Europe? One crucial measure of credibility with regard to the SSM and NCA supervision of less significant banks — the large majority of euro area headquartered bank not subject to direct ECB supervision — is the assurance of consistent supervision in the euro area. This involves some degree of convergence of NCA supervision in order to prevent national supervisory forebearance of struggling banks. This contribution thus examines whether or not the design of the SSM provides the foundation to build convergence in euro area supervision of less significant banks, despite very different national supervisory practices and institutional frameworks. The Principal-Agent approach is used to assess the credibility of the SSM design in terms of providing the foundation for consistent supervision. This contribution also examines the credibility of the ECB’s direct supervision of significant banks. The management of the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment of signficant banks can be seen as the first step in demonstrating the capacity of the ECB to make difficult decisions with regard to the stability of the euro area’s banks. [less ▲]

Zasada rządów prawa w polityce zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej (Rule of law in the European Union’s external policy)

in Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (Review of Constitutional Law) (2013), 2013(2), 157-175

Rule of law, whose core is „the access to an independent judiciary and judicial review”, fulfills in EU external policy two functions. Firstly, according to the art. 21 of TEU, all EU external actions ... [more ▼]

Rule of law, whose core is „the access to an independent judiciary and judicial review”, fulfills in EU external policy two functions. Firstly, according to the art. 21 of TEU, all EU external actions have to be subdued to the rule of law. Secondly, promoting and consolidating the rule of law is one the objectives of EU external action. In most constitutional systems, a wide margin of appreciation is left as regards to foreign policy and judicial review is considerably limited. In case of EU, the Court’s jurisdiction over EU external policy is differentiated and reflects the old pillar structure. The question which arises here is whether it can be accommodated with the disposition of the art. 2 of TEU, which states that the European Union which is a single legal entity „is founded on the value of rule of law”, and with the principle of EU external policy coherence. [less ▲]