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See detailAssessing the Impact of Attacks on an Automotive Ethernet Time Synchronization Testbed
Fotouhi, Mahdi UL; Buscemi, Alessio UL; Boualouache, Abdelwahab UL et al

in Fotouhi, Mahdi; Buscemi, Alessio; Boualouache, Abdelwahab (Eds.) et al 2023 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), Istanbul 26-28 April 2023 (2023, July)

Time Sensitive Network (TSN) standards are gaining traction in the scientific community and automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) due their promise of deterministic Ethernet networking. Among ... [more ▼]

Time Sensitive Network (TSN) standards are gaining traction in the scientific community and automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) due their promise of deterministic Ethernet networking. Among these standards, Generalized Precision Time Protocol (gPTP) - IEEE 802.1AS - allows network devices to be synchronized with a precision far higher than other synchronization standards, such as Network Time Protocol (NTP). gPTP is a profile of Precision Time Protocol (PTP) which, due to its robustness to delay variations, has been designated for automotive applications. Nonetheless, gPTP was designed without security controls, which makes it vulnerable to a number of attacks. This work reveals a critical vulnerability caused by a common implementation practice that opens the door to spoofing attacks on gPTP. To assess the impact of this vulnerability, we built two real gPTP-capable testbeds. Our results show high risks of this vulnerability destabilizing the system functionality. [less ▲]

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See detailAn Intrusion Detection System Against Rogue Master Attacks on gPTP
Buscemi, Alessio UL; Ponaka, Manasvi UL; Fotouhi, Mahdi UL et al

in Buscemi, Alessio; Ponaka, Manasvi; Fotouhi, Mahdi (Eds.) et al IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2023-Spring), Florence 20-23 June 2023 (2023, July)

Due to the promise of deterministic Ethernet networking, Time Sensitive Network (TSN) standards are gaining popularity in the vehicle on-board networks sector. Among these, Generalized Precision Time ... [more ▼]

Due to the promise of deterministic Ethernet networking, Time Sensitive Network (TSN) standards are gaining popularity in the vehicle on-board networks sector. Among these, Generalized Precision Time Protocol (gPTP) allows network devices to be synchronized with a greater degree of precision than other synchronization protocols, such as Network Time Protocol (NTP). However, gPTP was developed without security measures, making it susceptible to a variety of attacks. Adding security controls is the initial step in securing the protocol. However, due to current gPTP design limitations, this countermeasure is insufficient to protect against all types of threats. In this paper, we present a novel supervised Machine Learning (ML)-based pipeline for the detection of high-risk rogue master attacks. [less ▲]

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See detailPreventing Frame Fingerprinting in Controller Area Network Through Traffic Mutation
Buscemi, Alessio UL; Turcanu, Ion; Castignani, German UL et al

in IEEE ICC 2022 Workshop - DDINS, Seoul 16-20 May 2022 (2022, May)

The continuous increase of connectivity in commercial vehicles is leading to a higher number of remote access points to the Controller Area Network (CAN) – the most popular in-vehicle network system. This ... [more ▼]

The continuous increase of connectivity in commercial vehicles is leading to a higher number of remote access points to the Controller Area Network (CAN) – the most popular in-vehicle network system. This factor, coupled with the absence of encryption in the communication protocol, poses serious threats to the security of the CAN bus. Recently, it has been demonstrated that CAN data can be reverse engineered via frame fingerprinting, i.e., identification of frames based on statistical traffic analysis. Such a methodology allows fully remote decoding of in-vehicle data and paves the way for remote pre-compiled vehicle-agnostic attacks. In this work, we propose a first solution against CAN frame fingerprinting based on mutating the traffic without applying modifications to the CAN protocol. The results show that the proposed methodology halves the accuracy of CAN frame fingerprinting. [less ▲]

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See detailAutomation of Controller Area Network Reverse Engineering: Approaches, Opportunities and Security Threats
Buscemi, Alessio UL

Doctoral thesis (2022)

Controller Area Network (CAN ) is the de-facto in-vehicle communication system in the automotive industry today. CAN data represents a valuable source of information regarding the vehicle, which can be ... [more ▼]

Controller Area Network (CAN ) is the de-facto in-vehicle communication system in the automotive industry today. CAN data represents a valuable source of information regarding the vehicle, which can be exploited for a multitude of purposes by aftermarket companies, from fleet management to infotainment. With the rise of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) and autonomous driving, we can expect the amount of data transiting on the CAN bus to further augment in the near future. While not encrypted, the communication inside the CAN bus is typically encoded using proprietary formats of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM s) in order to prevent easy access to the information exchanged on the network. However, given the unwillingness of the OEM s to disclose the formats of most of the CAN signals of commercial vehicles (cars in particular) to the general public, the most common way to obtain such information is through reverse engineering. Recently, researchers have started investigating the automation of this process to make it faster, scalable and standardised. Aside from the evident advantages that it would bring to the industry, the automation of CAN bus reverse engineering has also gained interest in the scientific community, where automotive cybersecurity is a prominent topic. While achieving convincing results, the automation of CAN reverse engineering is still invasive, often includes complex hardware configurations or requires the presence of a human operator in the vehicle. This dissertation aims to analyse the main advancements achieved in the field of CAN bus reverse engineering and shed light on open issues. In the first part of this dissertation, we explore opportunities and challenges of the automation of CAN bus reverse engineering and present three approaches that achieve different degrees of automation. The first, FastCAN, is based on the taxonomy of signals. Its goal is to provide a complete, standardised and modular pipeline for semi-automated reverse engineering and reduce the total time for data collection. The second, CSI, is a Machine Learning (ML )-based algorithm for the identification of critical signals working under limited assumptions. We use CSI as a case study to investigate whether CAN reverse engineering can be achieved with no other hardware than a dongle for the collection of raw data. The third, CANMatch, is a complete and fully automated approach based on frame matching. Through CANMatch we seek to demonstrate that the reuse of CAN frame IDs can be exploited to reverse engineer a high number of signals with minimal hardware requirements and human effort. In the second part of this dissertation, we discuss the implications that the full automation of the reverse engineering process has on the security of the bus. In this context, we investigate whether the anonymisation of the CAN frame IDs is sufficient to prevent frame-matching based reverse engineering. The results highlight that ML models can fingerprint CAN frames despite the anonymisation of their IDs. Finally, we propose a defence against frame fingerprinting based on traffic mutations, such as padding on the payload and morphing on the sending frequency. We conclude that traffic mutations are a promising study direction to prevent frame-matching based reverse engineering. [less ▲]

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See detailOn Frame Fingerprinting and Controller Area Networks Security in Connected Vehicles
Buscemi, Alessio UL; Turcanu, Ion; Castignani, German et al

in IEEE Consumer Communications & Networking Conference, Virtual Conference 8-11 January 2022 (2022, January)

Modern connected vehicles are equipped with a large number of sensors, which enable a wide range of services that can improve overall traffic safety and efficiency. However, remote access to connected ... [more ▼]

Modern connected vehicles are equipped with a large number of sensors, which enable a wide range of services that can improve overall traffic safety and efficiency. However, remote access to connected vehicles also introduces new security issues affecting both inter and intra-vehicle communications. In fact, existing intra-vehicle communication systems, such as Controller Area Network (CAN), lack security features, such as encryption and secure authentication for Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Instead, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) seek security through obscurity by keeping secret the proprietary format with which they encode the information. Recently, it has been shown that the reuse of CAN frame IDs can be exploited to perform CAN bus reverse engineering without physical access to the vehicle, thus raising further security concerns in a connected environment. This work investigates whether anonymizing the frames of each newly released vehicle is sufficient to prevent CAN bus reverse engineering based on frame ID matching. The results show that, by adopting Machine Learning techniques, anonymized CAN frames can still be fingerprinted and identified in an unknown vehicle with an accuracy of up to 80 %. [less ▲]

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See detailCANMatch: A Fully Automated Tool for CAN Bus Reverse Engineering based on Frame Matching
Buscemi, Alessio UL; Turcanu, Ion; Castignani, German et al

in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology (2021)

Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most frequently used in-vehicle communication system in the automotive industry today. The communication inside the CAN bus is typically encoded using proprietary ... [more ▼]

Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most frequently used in-vehicle communication system in the automotive industry today. The communication inside the CAN bus is typically encoded using proprietary formats in order to prevent easy access to the information exchanged on the bus. However, it is still possible to decode this information through reverse engineering, performed either manually or via automated tools. Existing automated CAN bus reverse engineering methods are still time-consuming and require some manual effort, i.e., to inject diagnostic messages in order to trigger specific responses. In this paper, we propose CANMatch a fully automated CAN bus reverse engineering framework that does not require any manual effort and significantly decreases the execution time by exploiting the reuse of CAN frames across different vehicle models. We evaluate the proposed solution on a dataset of CAN logs, or traces, related to 479 vehicles from 29 different automotive manufacturers, demonstrating its improved performance with respect to the state of the art. [less ▲]

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See detailPoster: A Methodology for Semi-Automated CAN Bus Reverse Engineering
Buscemi, Alessio UL; Turcanu, Ion; German, Castignani et al

Poster (2021, November)

Semi-automated Controller Area Network (CAN) reverse engineering has been shown to provide decoding accuracy comparable to the manual approach, while reducing the time required to decode signals. However ... [more ▼]

Semi-automated Controller Area Network (CAN) reverse engineering has been shown to provide decoding accuracy comparable to the manual approach, while reducing the time required to decode signals. However, current approaches are invasive, as they make use of diagnostic messages injected through the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) port and often require a high amount of non-CAN external data. In this work, we present a non-invasive universal methodology for semi-automated CAN bus reverse engineering, which is based on the taxonomy of CAN signals. The data collection is simplified and its time reduced from the current standard of up to an hour to few minutes. A mean recall of around 80 % is obtained. [less ▲]

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See detailA Data-Driven Minimal Approach for CAN Bus Reverse Engineering
Buscemi, Alessio UL; Castignani, German; Engel, Thomas UL et al

in 3rd IEEE Connected and Automated Vehicles Symposium, Victoria, Canada, 4-5 October 2020 (2020)

Current in-vehicle communication systems lack security features, such as encryption and secure authentication. The approach most commonly used by car manufacturers is to achieve security through obscurity ... [more ▼]

Current in-vehicle communication systems lack security features, such as encryption and secure authentication. The approach most commonly used by car manufacturers is to achieve security through obscurity – keep the proprietary format used to encode the information secret. However, it is still possible to decode this information via reverse engineering. Existing reverse engineering methods typically require physical access to the vehicle and are time consuming. In this paper, we present a Machine Learning-based method that performs automated Controller Area Network (CAN) bus reverse engineering while requiring minimal time, hardware equipment, and potentially no physical access to the vehicle. Our results demonstrate high accuracy in identifying critical vehicle functions just from analysing raw traces of CAN data. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 261 (22 UL)