References of "Boubaker, Sabri"
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See detailBoard gender diversity and corporate social performance: Is there really a link?
Derouiche, Imen UL; Boubaker, Sabri; Dang, Rey et al

Scientific Conference (2017, July 05)

Our study aims to see whether and how board gender diversity (BGD) may influence the corporate social performance (CSP). Theoretically, we rely on the stakeholders’ theory. From an empirical standpoint ... [more ▼]

Our study aims to see whether and how board gender diversity (BGD) may influence the corporate social performance (CSP). Theoretically, we rely on the stakeholders’ theory. From an empirical standpoint, we employ a dynamic panel system GMM (generalized moments method) estimator to estimate a dynamic model of CSP. Our study is carried out on a sample of 101 listed firms on Euronext Paris that made up the SBF Index 250 over the 2006-2010 (be-fore the enactment of the Copé-Zimmermann on gender quota on boards). We find that board gender diversity significantly impacts CSP. Furthermore, a critical mass of female directors is significantly and positively correlated with CSP. The effect is economically significant. Finally, we take into account French specificities by examining the influence of family firms. We found that family firms contribute to the role of female directors regarding CSR activities, especially there is a critical mass of female directors in these firms. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 170 (13 UL)
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See detailCorporate Ownership Structure and the Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash
Derouiche, Imen UL; Saffar, Walid; Boubaker, Sabri

Scientific Conference (2017, April 01)

This article examines the effects of excess control rights of the controlling shareholder and the presence of multiple large shareholders on financial constraints, proxied by cash flow sensitivity of cash ... [more ▼]

This article examines the effects of excess control rights of the controlling shareholder and the presence of multiple large shareholders on financial constraints, proxied by cash flow sensitivity of cash. Using a unique data set of 745 French listed firms during 1998—2013, the results show that firms have high cash flow sensitivity of cash when the controlling shareholder’s control rights exceed its cash-flow ownership. This sensitivity decreases, however, with the contestability of the controlling owner’s power. Taken together, these findings provide empirical support to the argument that firms experiencing excess control rights face considerable financial constraints that are lowered in the presence of high control contestability. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 132 (2 UL)
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See detailGeographic Location, Excess Control Rights, and Cash Holdings
Derouiche, Imen UL; Boubaker, Sabri; Meziane, Lasfer

in International Review of Financial Analysis (2015), 42

We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to shareholder ... [more ▼]

We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to shareholder scrutiny and, thus, will have high agency conflicts as the distance will facilitate the extraction of private benefits. Consistent with our predictions, we find a positive relation between the distance to the main metropolitan area and cash holdings, and this impact is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder has high levels of excess control rights (i.e., separation of cash-flow rights and control rights). Our results hold even after accounting for all control variables, including financial constraints, and suggest that geographic remoteness can be conducive to severe agency problems, particularly when there is a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. [less ▲]

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See detailDoes the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms
Derouiche, Imen UL; Boubaker, Sabri; Nguyen, Duc Khuong

in Journal of Management & Governance (2015), 19(2), 341-370

Prior studies show that agency conflicts are important in explaining corporate financial policies and that the board of directors is central to corporate governance. In this study, we examine the role of ... [more ▼]

Prior studies show that agency conflicts are important in explaining corporate financial policies and that the board of directors is central to corporate governance. In this study, we examine the role of this governing body in the accumulation of cash reserves. Using a sample of 597 French listed firms during 2001–2007, we find that firms with boards deemed to be effective in mitigating agency problems—that is, those appointing independent directors and splitting chief executive officer and chair positions—accumulate less cash reserves than those with less effective boards. Moreover, two-tier boards are more efficient in mitigating the agency costs of free cash flow, leading to less corporate cash hoarding. These findings support the idea that agency conflicts influence cash management policy and that effective boards of directors play an important disciplinary role in a concentrated ownership setting. [less ▲]

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See detailControl-ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash
Derouiche, Imen UL; Belkhir, Mohamed; Boubaker, Sabri

in Economic Modelling (2014), 39

This study investigates the effects of the separation of control and ownership on the value of cash holdings in publicly listed French firms. It also sheds light on the role of board independence in such ... [more ▼]

This study investigates the effects of the separation of control and ownership on the value of cash holdings in publicly listed French firms. It also sheds light on the role of board independence in such a relation. Theory suggests that investors are more likely to discount the value of excess cash held by firms with low corporate governance. Using the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998), empirical results show that the value of excess cash holdings decreases dramatically with the separation of control and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. This value discount is, however, less pronounced in firms with more independent boards (i.e., boards with more independent directors and separate chief executive officer and chair positions). Our empirical findings support the argument that excess cash contributes less to firm value when minority shareholders are more likely to be expropriated by controlling shareholders. Independent boards seem to be effective in mitigating investors’ concerns about the use of excess cash. Overall, the results provide compelling evidence that cash valuation is largely influenced by corporate governance quality in a concentrated ownership setting. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 132 (2 UL)