References of "Benaloh, Josh"
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Peer Reviewed
See detailEnd-to-end verifiability
Ryan, Peter UL; Benaloh, Josh; Rivest, Ronald et al

in arXiv preprint arXiv:1504.03778 (2015)

This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transparent, evidence - based ... [more ▼]

This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transparent, evidence - based electronic elections. This work is part of the Overseas Vote Foundation’s End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting: Specification and Feasibility Assessment Study (E2E VIV Project), funded by the Democracy Fund. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 131 (6 UL)
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Peer Reviewed
See detailVerifiable postal voting
Ryan, Peter UL; Benaloh, Josh; Teague, Vanessa

in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (2013)

This proposal aims to combine the best properties of paper-based and end-to-end verifiable remote voting systems. Ballots are delivered electronically to voters, who return their votes on paper together ... [more ▼]

This proposal aims to combine the best properties of paper-based and end-to-end verifiable remote voting systems. Ballots are delivered electronically to voters, who return their votes on paper together with some cryptographic information that allows them to verify later that their votes were correctly included and counted. We emphasise the ease of the voter's experience, which is not much harder than basic electronic delivery and postal returns. A typical voter needs only to perform a simple check that the human-readable printout reflects the intended vote. The only extra work is adding some cryptographic information into the same envelope as the human-readable vote. The proposed scheme is not strictly end-to-end verifiable, because it depends on procedural assumptions at the point where the ballots are received. These procedures should be public and could be enforced by a group of observers, but are not publicly verifiable afterwards by observers who were absent at the time. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 170 (2 UL)