![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() Presentation (2019, June 11) Detailed reference viewed: 96 (3 UL)![]() Nabilou, Hossein ![]() ![]() in Capital Markets Law Journal (2019), 14(3), As part of financial market infrastructures, central counterparties (CCPs) have long been deemed systemically important and are likely to gain in importance due to the regulatory developments mandating ... [more ▼] As part of financial market infrastructures, central counterparties (CCPs) have long been deemed systemically important and are likely to gain in importance due to the regulatory developments mandating central clearing for an increasing number of financial products. This paper focuses on the regulation as well as the recovery and resolution of CCPs in Europe. The existing CCP regulatory framework consists of ex-ante measures, including, among others, capital and liquidity requirements, initial and variation margins, and loss sharing mechanisms. In addition, the European proposal for the recovery and resolution of CCPs (the Proposal) contains several ex-post regulatory measures mainly in the form of rules for recovery and orderly resolution. Having studied the prudential regulatory measures for CCPs contained in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and the ex-post recovery and resolution measures of the Proposal, this paper puts a spotlight on the specific shortcomings of the existing and proposed rules, in particular in terms of misaligned incentives, externalities, collective action problems, and certain practical impediments, and concludes that it would be misguided to inordinately rely on ex-post measures. Highlighting the limitations of the recovery and resolution mechanisms, this paper proposes that given the systemic importance of CCP functions, it is critical to improve the ex-ante measures whose objective is to prevent the failure of a CCP, rather than ex-post measures, which kick in after its failure. Accordingly, recommendations for making such improvements are proposed. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 150 (21 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() Presentation (2019, May 21) Detailed reference viewed: 68 (0 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() Presentation (2019, May 10) Detailed reference viewed: 81 (0 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in BrieFin - EBI Newsletter (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 94 (10 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in DCU Brexit Institute Blog (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 78 (7 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in SSRN (2019) The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has pushed the constitutional boundaries of agencification further. After elaborating on the SRB’s powers and safeguards, one can argue that its ... [more ▼] The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has pushed the constitutional boundaries of agencification further. After elaborating on the SRB’s powers and safeguards, one can argue that its governance structure combined with its policymaking powers distinguish the SRB from all other agencies. While trying to assess its legality of establishment and empowerment, this paper seeks to identify the nature of the empowerment, whether Meroni is still fit for purpose, and whether the limits of institutional balance have been bent or indeed broken. After expressing concerns as to the SRB’s compliance with the current EU institutional framework, the paper offers an alternative for exiting this constitutional deadlock by applying Weiler’s theory of constitutional transformation. Such a solution would legitimize the SRB as well as facilitate the functioning of Banking Union. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 158 (8 UL)![]() ![]() Pantazatou, Aikaterini ![]() ![]() in Hofmann, Herwig; Pantazatou, Aikaterini; Zaccaroni, Giovanni (Eds.) The Metamorphosis of the European Economic Constitution (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 131 (11 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in Hofmann, Herwig; Pantazatou, Aikaterini; Zaccaroni, Giovanni (Eds.) The Metamorphosis of the European Economic Constitution (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 133 (7 UL)![]() ![]() Pantazatou, Aikaterini ![]() ![]() in Fabbrini, Federico; Ventoruzzo, Marco (Eds.) Research Handbook on European Economic Law (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 133 (11 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in EBI Working Paper Series 2019 No. 51 (2019) Detailed reference viewed: 103 (1 UL)![]() ; Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in Journal of Common Market Studies (2019) This paper examines the political economy and law of bank resolution in the case of Italy—specifically its treatment of three failing banks that were resolved in 2016/2017—Monte de Paschi, Veneto and ... [more ▼] This paper examines the political economy and law of bank resolution in the case of Italy—specifically its treatment of three failing banks that were resolved in 2016/2017—Monte de Paschi, Veneto and Vicenza banks. These three cases stand out for the relatively large degree of discretion exercised by national resolution and state aid authorities, ultimately with the permission of their European counterparts. This paper examines the motivations driving Italian authorities to lobby the Commission for leeway in applying the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, and analyses the intricacies of the legal framework to underline the extent of discretion exercised by policy makers. It concludes that the discretion visible in these three cases is not (entirely) contained within EU law, and that bending the law or turning a blind eye to infractions was key to understanding the EU approach to Italy. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 112 (2 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in European Company Law (2018), (5), The establishment of Banking Union and the Single Resolution Mechanism has been arguably a success for the Eurozone. However, the enforcement of the new rules seems to meet significant challenges related ... [more ▼] The establishment of Banking Union and the Single Resolution Mechanism has been arguably a success for the Eurozone. However, the enforcement of the new rules seems to meet significant challenges related to legacy problems that could make bank resolution economically and politically unfavourable for Member States. Italy and the two Veneto banks that were liquidated under national laws in June 2017 constitute such a case. However, this paper argues that this ‘orderly liquidation’ was, in essence, a hidden resolution, which raises logical legality concerns as to the actions ultimately taken by the European and national resolution authorities. The fact that public interest for resolution was not found by the Single Resolution Board, but was instead established by the Commission to provide liquidation aid on the grounds of 107(3)(b) TFEU, combined with the reasoning of the Commission’s decision do not seem to conform with the bank resolution and state aid rules currently in place. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 113 (3 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() Presentation (2018, April 12) Detailed reference viewed: 74 (4 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in Dogaru, Tatiana-Camelia (Ed.) (Re)forming Public Administration Paradigms in Global Governance Context (2018) Detailed reference viewed: 129 (8 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() in Journal of Economic Policy Reform (2018) EU’s response to the recent Euro-crisis has involved a mixture of EU and international law, with the latter being linked to all the arrangements that may have fiscal implications for national Member ... [more ▼] EU’s response to the recent Euro-crisis has involved a mixture of EU and international law, with the latter being linked to all the arrangements that may have fiscal implications for national Member States. The SRF embodies all the controversial characteristics of Banking Union. This article illustrates the legal implications that this political choice creates, and how the interrelation between the SRM, the SRF and the ESM, allows leading economies, including Germany, to control the resolution framework both before and after crisis. This raises questions as to the direction that European Integration is taking and its highly nationalised character. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 149 (6 UL)![]() Asimakopoulos, Ioannis ![]() Presentation (2017, September 22) Detailed reference viewed: 87 (9 UL) |
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