Das Vollmachtstimmrecht von Banken und geschäftsmäßigen Vertretern (§ 135 AktG n.F.) im Spannungsfeld von Corporate Governance, Präsenzsicherung und prozeduraler Effizienz

in Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (2010)

Use and Abuse of Investor Suits - An Inquiry into the Dark Side of Shareholder Activism

in European Company and Financial Law Review (2010)

Roth, Private Altersvorsorge

in DAJV - Newsletter (2010)

Kasten, Die Neuregelung der Explorations- und Informationspflichten von Wertpapierdienstleistern im Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, Buchbesprechung

in Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (2010)

Die Drittwirkung des Sicherungsvertrags beim Immobiliarkredithandel

in Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (2009), 209. Band, Heft 3/4

Holzborn, Wertpapierprospektgesetz, Berlin 2008

in Aktiengesellschaft (Die) (2009)

Die Reform des Schuldverschreibungs- und Anlageberatungsrechts – (Mehr) Verbraucherschutz im Finanzmarktrecht?

in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2009)

Die Europäische Regulierung von Hedgefonds und Private Equity – ein Zwischenstand

in NZG. Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (2009)

Challenging Wolf Packs: Thoughts on Efficient Enforcement of Shareholder Transparency Rules

E-print/Working paper (2009)

Abstract: The key issue concerning shareholder transparency rules, and the related rules on acting in concert (Europe), or the voting group concept (U.S.) is enforcement. Rather than thinking about ... [more ▼]

Abstract: The key issue concerning shareholder transparency rules, and the related rules on acting in concert (Europe), or the voting group concept (U.S.) is enforcement. Rather than thinking about appropriate enforcement measures, jurisdictions such as the UK and Switzerland decided in favor of Economic Ownership Disclosure. The current debate in the U.S., on the European and national level of some European jurisdictions is moving in the same direction. This article examines a different option which is the better enforcement of existing transparency rules. In order to counter secret acquisition strategies, similar to antitrust leniency and “protected disclosure” (i.e. whistle blowing) rules, governments are best advised to assign a reward for disclosure. Under the reward model presented here, the initial stock price reaction reflects the value of the information previously hidden from the market. The first participant of a scheme who discloses the holdings of all scheme participants is to be assigned the difference between the price of the target’s voting shares ex ante and ex post disclosure, calculated on the basis of the participants' joint holdings of shares (Announcement Premium). Distinguishing between schemes based on the equity value of the parties involved (Equity Strategy) – commonly referred to as wolf packs - and schemes where an acquirer seeks to create a large stake based on derivatives (Service Strategy), assigning the Announcement Premium to the first entity disclosing the scheme’s holding and intentions is likely to counter Equity Strategies efficiently. The Service Strategy is countered effectively by granting the Announcement Premium to agents that act on behalf of the intermediaries (i.e. to bank employees). [less ▲]

Verdeckter Positionsaufbau im Unternehmenskapitalmarktrecht

in Festschrift für E. Schwark (2009)