![]() Bourgain, Arnaud ![]() ![]() ![]() Scientific Conference (2013) This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated tax planning. Two ... [more ▼] This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 108 (8 UL)![]() ; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() E-print/Working paper (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 60 (2 UL)![]() ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() E-print/Working paper (2013) Detailed reference viewed: 91 (3 UL)![]() Bourgain, Arnaud ![]() ![]() ![]() E-print/Working paper (2013) This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax ... [more ▼] This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 321 (111 UL)![]() Bourgain, Arnaud ![]() ![]() ![]() in Emerging Markets Review (2012), 13(3), 283-300 In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise ... [more ▼] In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk-taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home country to the more protective system of a developed economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management. Finally, we test the relationship between disclosure, financial openness and bank risk-taking for a panel of 258 banks from the MENA region and Turkey. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 322 (16 UL)![]() Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 42 (2 UL)![]() ; Picard, Pierre M. ![]() ![]() E-print/Working paper (2012) This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods ... [more ▼] This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 97 (18 UL)![]() Pieretti, Patrice ![]() ![]() ![]() E-print/Working paper (2012) In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures ... [more ▼] In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures, whereas the policy choices of the rest of the world are taken as given. Applying the Pontryagin’s maximum principle, we first show that there exists one long run optimal size of the small economy which is saddle-point stable. The transitional path is two-dimensional, if the small economy is patient enough. Then, we show that the share of tax income allocated to the infrastructure expenditures plays an important role in attaining such a steady state. However, a deviation from this policy path can lead to an eventual economic collapse. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 87 (11 UL)![]() Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 107 (0 UL)![]() Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012) Detailed reference viewed: 111 (2 UL)![]() Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012) In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show ... [more ▼] In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic firms are able to predict such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption costs). To the light of the previous result, we find a sufficient condition for the cap on emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 46 (0 UL)![]() Han, Yutao ![]() ![]() ![]() E-print/Working paper (2012) This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a ... [more ▼] This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public goods. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public infrastructure and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 157 (9 UL)![]() ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Environmental and Resource Economics (2011), 48(4), 561-567 Detailed reference viewed: 43 (3 UL)![]() Pieretti, Patrice ![]() ![]() in Journal of International Economics (2011), 84(1), 124-130 Detailed reference viewed: 207 (9 UL)![]() ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in International Journal of Economic Theory (2011), 7(2), 157-230 Detailed reference viewed: 107 (0 UL)![]() Bourgain, Arnaud ![]() ![]() ![]() in Mondes en Développement (2010), 149 The aim of this paper is to analyze the risk taking behaviour of banks in emerging economies in a context of international bank competition for deposits. In this framework, we find no monotone link ... [more ▼] The aim of this paper is to analyze the risk taking behaviour of banks in emerging economies in a context of international bank competition for deposits. In this framework, we find no monotone link between the information disclosure of risk management and excessive risk taking, since this relationship depends on the intensity of international competition. Furthermore, the presence of deposit insurance increases the likelihood of excessive risk taking only if information about risk management is sufficiently disclosed, in a context of high mobility of capital. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 177 (5 UL)![]() Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2010), 10 Detailed reference viewed: 119 (6 UL)![]() ; ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Economics Letters (2010), 106(2), 133-136 Detailed reference viewed: 98 (0 UL)![]() ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Bulletin of Economic Research (2008), 60(1), 13-26 Detailed reference viewed: 95 (3 UL)![]() ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda ![]() in Communications et Stratégies (2007), 68 Detailed reference viewed: 57 (6 UL) |
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