References of "Zanaj, Skerdilajda 50003354"
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See detailAsymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach
Han, Yutao UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL et al

E-print/Working paper (2012)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public goods. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public infrastructure and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

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See detailOn the long run economic performance of small economies
Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2012)

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures, whereas the policy choices of the rest of the world are taken as given. Applying the Pontryagin’s maximum principle, we first show that there exists one long run optimal size of the small economy which is saddle-point stable. The transitional path is two-dimensional, if the small economy is patient enough. Then, we show that the share of tax income allocated to the infrastructure expenditures plays an important role in attaining such a steady state. However, a deviation from this policy path can lead to an eventual economic collapse. [less ▲]

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See detailClean technology adoption under Cournot competition
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Sanin, Maria Eugenia

in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012)

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See detailClean technology adoption under Cournot competition
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012)

In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show ... [more ▼]

In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic firms are able to predict such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption costs). To the light of the previous result, we find a sufficient condition for the cap on emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives. [less ▲]

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See detailClean technology adoption under Cournot competition
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012)

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See detailFree entry in successive oligopolies
Gabszewicz, Jean; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in International Journal of Economic Theory (2011), 7(2), 157-230

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See detailOn tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions' size
Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Journal of International Economics (2011), 84(1), 124-130

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See detailA note on clean technology adoption and its influence on tradeable emission permit prices
Sanin, Maria Eugenia; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Environmental & Resource Economics (2011), 48(4), 561-567

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See detailSuccessive oligopolies and decreasing returns
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2010), 10

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See detailOn uncertainty when it affects successive markets
GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; TAROLA, Ornella; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Economics Letters (2010), 106(2), 133-136

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See detailIntégration financière, attractivité et prise de risque dans les banques de pays émergents
Bourgain, Arnaud UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Mondes en Développement (2010), 149

The aim of this paper is to analyze the risk taking behaviour of banks in emerging economies in a context of international bank competition for deposits. In this framework, we find no monotone link ... [more ▼]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the risk taking behaviour of banks in emerging economies in a context of international bank competition for deposits. In this framework, we find no monotone link between the information disclosure of risk management and excessive risk taking, since this relationship depends on the intensity of international competition. Furthermore, the presence of deposit insurance increases the likelihood of excessive risk taking only if information about risk management is sufficiently disclosed, in a context of high mobility of capital. [less ▲]

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See detailUpstream Market Foreclosure
GABSZEWICZ, Jean; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Bulletin of Economic Research (2008), 60(1), 13-26

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See detailA note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers
GABSZEWICZ, Jean; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Communications & Stratégies (2007), 68

Detailed reference viewed: 47 (5 UL)