Commodity taxation and regulatory competition

Presentation (2013, July)

(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

Presentation (2013, May)

Commodity taxation and regulatory competition

Presentation (2013, February 28)

(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

E-print/Working paper (2013)

Offshore financial centers: Tax havens or safe havens

E-print/Working paper (2013)

From tax evasion to tax planning

E-print/Working paper (2013)

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲]

On the long run economic performance of small economies

E-print/Working paper (2012)

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures, whereas the policy choices of the rest of the world are taken as given. Applying the Pontryagin’s maximum principle, we first show that there exists one long run optimal size of the small economy which is saddle-point stable. The transitional path is two-dimensional, if the small economy is patient enough. Then, we show that the share of tax income allocated to the infrastructure expenditures plays an important role in attaining such a steady state. However, a deviation from this policy path can lead to an eventual economic collapse. [less ▲]

Commodity taxation and regulatory competition

E-print/Working paper (2012)

This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods ... [more ▼]

This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008. [less ▲]

Clean technology adoption

in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012)

Clean technology adoption under Cournot competition

in Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012)

In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show ... [more ▼]

In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by firms that compete ä la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic firms are able to predict such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption costs). To the light of the previous result, we find a sufficient condition for the cap on emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives. [less ▲]