COMMODITY TAXATION AND REGULATORY COMPETITION

Scientific Conference (2016, February 22)

Uncertain demand and supply in energy markets

Scientific Conference (2016)

Green Consumption and relative preferences in an international ologopoly

E-print/Working paper (2016)

(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

in Canadian Journal of Economics (2015)

The Cultural Transmission of Environmental Preferences: Evidence from International Migration

Scientific Conference (2014, July 15)

This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates both theoretically and empirically the hypothesis that individual environmental attitudes can be partly accounted for by a cultural component. To empirically identify this component, we exploit variation associated with international migration flows. We find that the environmental attitudes of migrants, while being resilient to environmental conditions, also embed a cultural component, which persists till the second generation migrants. Our results suggest that, in the presence of multiple environmental problems that require collective action, comprehending the driving forces behind the formation of an environmental culture is critical to design effective policies. [less ▲]

Migration: a burden or a blessing for the natives

E-print/Working paper (2014)

Offshore financial centres and bank secrecy

E-print/Working paper (2014)

Asymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach

in Journal of Public Economics (2014)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

Mergers in Fiscal Federalism

in Journal of Public Economics (2013), 105

Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2013), 15(3), 397-410