References of "Picard, Pierre M. 50002853"
     in
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailRegional Asymmetries: Economies of Agglomeration Versus Unionized Labor Markets
Picard, Pierre M UL; Toulemonde, Eric

in Regional Science & Urban Economics (2003), 33(2), 223-49

We study the geographical location of a unionized manufacturing industry under technological externalities. When firms benefit from locating in the vicinity of similar firms, we show that they locate in ... [more ▼]

We study the geographical location of a unionized manufacturing industry under technological externalities. When firms benefit from locating in the vicinity of similar firms, we show that they locate in symmetric, partially asymmetric or single clusters.We examine the effects of changes in the productivity parameters, in the product demand parameters and in the union characteristics. Finally, we explore the possibility of hysteresis in firm location and we analyze the welfare implication of a change in union power. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 73 (1 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailTaxation and Labor Markets
Picard, Pierre M UL; Toulemonde, Eric

in Journal of Economics (2002), 78(1), 29-56

We exploit the common features of models such as union-firm wage bargaining, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used for analyzing the effects of any budget-neutral tax ... [more ▼]

We exploit the common features of models such as union-firm wage bargaining, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used for analyzing the effects of any budget-neutral tax reform on employment in these models. We show that taxes paid by workers are not equivalent to taxes paid by firms when taxes are non linear. Moreover, increasing progressivity is good for employment in these models. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 120 (2 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailOn the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees
Picard, Pierre M UL; Toulemonde, Eric

in Scottish Journal of Political Economy (2001), 48(4), 461-70

In this paper we study the employment effects of a budget neutral restructuring of taxes levied on employers and employees. We derive conditions for taxes levied on workers to have the same employment ... [more ▼]

In this paper we study the employment effects of a budget neutral restructuring of taxes levied on employers and employees. We derive conditions for taxes levied on workers to have the same employment effects as taxes levied on firms under standard processes of wage determination. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 102 (0 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailJob additionality and deadweight spending in perfectly competitive industries
Picard, Pierre M UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2001), 79(3), 521-541

This paper links the old literature on employment subsidies with the current theories of contract and regulation. One important source of inefficiency of employment subsidies is non-additional employment ... [more ▼]

This paper links the old literature on employment subsidies with the current theories of contract and regulation. One important source of inefficiency of employment subsidies is non-additional employment and deadweight spending which occur when private firms receive a subsidy for jobs that would have been created without the subsidy. We identify the asymmetry of information between the government and the private firm as the source of these problems. When the government proposes optimal incentive contracts to promote employment, we show that all employment creations are additional and that the deadweight spending is equal to the information rent, which may be null when firms’ types are discrete. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 74 (2 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailOptimal Employment Subsidies and Market Structures in Industries with Unemployment
Picard, Pierre M UL

in Oxford Economic Papers (2001), 53(2), 352-372

In this paper we analyze the issue of optimal employment subsidies in imperfectly competitive industries in which a distortion in the labour market generates involuntary unemployment. As a benchmark case ... [more ▼]

In this paper we analyze the issue of optimal employment subsidies in imperfectly competitive industries in which a distortion in the labour market generates involuntary unemployment. As a benchmark case, we focus on monopolies and duopolies and on complete information between firms and government. We characterize the levels and creations of employment in the subsidized industry and we check when such employment policies are more favorable to the least productive firms. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 68 (1 UL)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailOptimal Employment Subsidies to Heterogeneous Workers: Unemployment-Trap, Job-Additionality and Tax Rates
Picard, Pierre M UL

in Annales d’Economie et de Statistique = Annals of Economics and Statistics (2001), 62

Unemployment and welfare benefits generate unemployment traps. In this paper, we design the optimal employment subsidies that allow governments to reduce unemployment traps under constant budget deficit ... [more ▼]

Unemployment and welfare benefits generate unemployment traps. In this paper, we design the optimal employment subsidies that allow governments to reduce unemployment traps under constant budget deficit and without diminishing workers' welfare. We explore the effects of work incentives on the shape and on the properties of employment subsidies. We finally address the issues of self-help effect and job-additionality. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 83 (1 UL)