References of "Picard, Pierre M 50002853"
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See detailThe spatial selection of heterogeneous firms
Okubo, Toshihiro; Picard, Pierre M. UL; Thisse, Jacques-François

in Journal of International Economics (2010), 82(2), 230-237

Empirical research on strategic alliances has focused on the idea that alliance partners are selected on the basis of social capital considerations. In this paper we emphasize instead the role of ... [more ▼]

Empirical research on strategic alliances has focused on the idea that alliance partners are selected on the basis of social capital considerations. In this paper we emphasize instead the role of complementary knowledge stocks (broadly defined) in partner selection, arguing not only that knowledge complementarity should not be overlooked, but that it may be the true causal force behind alliance formation. To marshal evidence on this point, we design a simple model of partner selection in which firms ally for the purpose of learning and innovating, and in doing so create an industry network. We abstract completely from network-based structural and strategic motives for partner selection and focus instead on the idea that firms’ knowledge bases must “fit” in order for joint leaning and innovation to be possible, and thus for an alliance to be feasible. The striking result is that while containing no social capital considerations, this simple model replicates the firm conduct, network structure, and contingent effects of network position on performance observed and discussed in the empirical literature. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Price Of Silence: Markets For Noise Licenses And Airports
Bréchet, Thierry; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in International Economic Review (2010), 51(4), 1097-1125

This article presents a market design for the management of noise pollution created by aircraft traffic around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise ... [more ▼]

This article presents a market design for the management of noise pollution created by aircraft traffic around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise victims and to meet social acceptability. We show that the market allows the market designer to implement the social planner's optimal allocation of flights as long as the latter does not put too high a weight in his/her objective function on firms' profits compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The fact that local representatives of noise victims may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise licenses are likely to distribute windfall gains to residents, which alters the urban structure in the long run. [less ▲]

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See detailSelf-organized Agglomerations and Transport Costs
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Tabuchi, Takatoshi

in Economic Theory (2010), 42

This paper investigates the number and structure of spatial equilibria in a continuous space for a general class of transport cost functions. The economic space is represented by a circumference on which ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates the number and structure of spatial equilibria in a continuous space for a general class of transport cost functions. The economic space is represented by a circumference on which Þrms and workers-consumers are perfectly mobile. We derive the conditions to be imposed on the transport cost functions under which the distributions of workers and Þrms are stable equilibria. We also derive the conditions under which discrete distributions of workers over equidistant points (cities) are stable equilibria for large and small number of points (cities). [less ▲]

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See detailOn zero and asymmetric trade flows
Okubo, Toshihiro; Picard, Pierre M. UL; Thisse, Jacques-François

E-print/Working paper (2010)

In this paper we study how the trade costs and the intensity of competition can explain the existence of bilateral trade, unilateral trade and no trade within an industry. We show as trade costs decrease ... [more ▼]

In this paper we study how the trade costs and the intensity of competition can explain the existence of bilateral trade, unilateral trade and no trade within an industry. We show as trade costs decrease from very high to very low values, the global economy moves from autarky to a regime of bilateral trade, through a regime of unilateral trade from the larger to the smaller country. Bilateral or unilateral trade is less likely when the global economy gets more competitive. Finally, the market delivers an outcome in which capital is too much concentrated in the larger country. [less ▲]

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See detailCity with forward and backward linkages
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Tabuchi, Takatoshi

E-print/Working paper (2010)

This paper considers the spatial structure of a city subject to final demand and vertical linkages. Individuals consume differentiated goods (or services) and firms purchase differentiated inputs (or ... [more ▼]

This paper considers the spatial structure of a city subject to final demand and vertical linkages. Individuals consume differentiated goods (or services) and firms purchase differentiated inputs (or services) in product (or service) markets where forms compete under monopolistic competition. Workers rent their residential lots in an urban land market and contribute to the production of differentiated goods and inputs. We show that firms and workers co-agglomerate and endogenously form a city. We characterize and discuss the spatial distribution of firms and consumers in such cities on one- and twodimensional spaces (linear city and planar city). We show that final demand and vertical linkages raise the urban density and reduce the city spread. We finally show that a city is too much dispersed compared to the social optimum. [less ▲]

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See detailOn monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity: workers' rents also matter
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Toulemonde, Eric

in Canadian Journal of Economics (2009), 42(4), 1347-1360

In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of rms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show ... [more ▼]

In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of rms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and rms sales and pro ts, which entices too many rms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory framework where wages are not controlled. [less ▲]

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See detailCurrency Unions and International Assistance
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Worrall, Tim

E-print/Working paper (2009)

This paper considers a simple stochastic model of international trade with three countries. Two of the tree countries are in an economic union. Comparisons are made between equilibrium welfare for these ... [more ▼]

This paper considers a simple stochastic model of international trade with three countries. Two of the tree countries are in an economic union. Comparisons are made between equilibrium welfare for these two countries under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Within the model it is shown that flexible exchange rate regimes generate greater welfare. However, we then consider comparisons of welfare when the two countries also engage in some international assistance in order to share risk. Such risksharing is limited by enforcement constraints of cross border assistance. It is shown that, when one takes into account risk-sharing and limited commitment, fixed exchange rate regimes associated with a currency area can dominate flexible exchange rate regimes, which reverses the standard result. [less ▲]

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See detailGovernment Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle UL; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Economic Journal (2009), 119

The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of ... [more ▼]

The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds "à la" Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However the government can contract "ex post" with the private firms. This "ex post" contracting set-up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009. [less ▲]

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See detailWelfare, home market effects, and horizontal foreign direct investment
Behrens, Kristian; Picard, Pierre M UL

in Canadian Journal of Economics (2007), 36(3), 523-545

We investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when firms may choose to operate more than a single production unit. Focusing on a short-run setting with a ... [more ▼]

We investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when firms may choose to operate more than a single production unit. Focusing on a short-run setting with a fixed mass of firms, we first fully characterize the spatial equilibria analytically. Comparing the equilibrium and the first-best, we secondly show that both organizational and spatial inefficiencies may arise. In particular, when fixed costs are low, when transport costs are high, and when products are close substitutes, the market outcome may well have to too many multinationals operating from a social point of view (`over-investment'). As a by-product, under-agglomeration of exporters in the larger market may arise. [less ▲]

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See detailPiracy and Competition
Belleflamme, Paul; Picard, Pierre M UL

in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2007), 16(2), 351-383

The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are ... [more ▼]

The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create in the long run. [less ▲]

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See detailUnions and Firms Agglomeration
Toulemonde, Eric; Picard, Pierre M UL

in European Economic Review (2006), 50(3), 669-694

Economic geography models predict the agglomeration of manufacturing activies only if the workforce is mobile. Still, as the E.U.’s experience shows, core–periphery patterns exist even though the ... [more ▼]

Economic geography models predict the agglomeration of manufacturing activies only if the workforce is mobile. Still, as the E.U.’s experience shows, core–periphery patterns exist even though the workforce is rather immobile. The paper provides a theoretical explanation for such core–periphery patterns through the effect that unions have on firms’ incentive to agglomerate in a region. The paper offers fully analytical results about location equilibria and some interesting welfare properties. [less ▲]

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See detailTax competition, location and horizontal foreign direct investment
Behrens, Kristian; Picard, Pierre M. UL

E-print/Working paper (2005)

We develop a model of capital tax competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the number of plants they operate and their location. When compared to models with single-plant firms, the ... [more ▼]

We develop a model of capital tax competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the number of plants they operate and their location. When compared to models with single-plant firms, the presence of multinationals reverses some standard results. First, instead of being subsidized, capital may actually be taxed in equilibrium, which shows that the presence of taxable ‘multinational rents’ relaxes tax competition. Second, even when firms are subsidized, their subsidyinclusive profits may be decreasing in subsidies, due to fiercer price competition by more multinationals. Third, multinationals may give rise to multiple equilibria in the tax game, one of which can be a ‘subsidy trap’ characterized by many multinationals, high subsidy levels, and low welfare. [less ▲]

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See detailAgricultural Sector and Industrial Agglomeration
Zeng, Dao-Zhi; Picard, Pierre M UL

in Journal of Development Economics (2005), 77(1), 75-106

In many developing countries, agriculture hires at least as many workers as manufacturing industries. We investigate an economic geography model in which agricultural goods are costly to transport and in ... [more ▼]

In many developing countries, agriculture hires at least as many workers as manufacturing industries. We investigate an economic geography model in which agricultural goods are costly to transport and in which manufactures hire labor from the local agricultural sector as unskilled labor. Our conclusions show that the parameters in the agricultural sector are crucial to determine the spatial configuration of economic activity. We provide an analytic treatment to the model. The location equilibria are compared with the first and second best outcomes. [less ▲]

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See detailContracting out and labor demand elasticities
Gorg, Holger; Picard, Pierre M UL; Strobl, Eric A

E-print/Working paper (2005)

We examine the relationship between contracting out and the wage elasticity of labor demand in outsourcing plants. A simple theoretical model suggests that firms engaged in contracting out have lower wage ... [more ▼]

We examine the relationship between contracting out and the wage elasticity of labor demand in outsourcing plants. A simple theoretical model suggests that firms engaged in contracting out have lower wage elasticities. Estimating plant level dynamic labor demand equations for Irish manufacturing we find evidence supportive of this. [less ▲]

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See detailEconomic Geography and the Distribution of Profits
Picard, Pierre M UL; Thisse, Jacques François

in Journal of Urban Economics (2004), 56(1), 144-167

In modern economies, the amount of profits distributed to shareholders is far from being negligible. We show that the way they are distributed among agents matters for the space-economy. For example, the ... [more ▼]

In modern economies, the amount of profits distributed to shareholders is far from being negligible. We show that the way they are distributed among agents matters for the space-economy. For example, the existence of mobile rentiers is sufficient to make the symmetric configuration unstable for all transport cost values and to allow for the partial agglomeration of firms. Obviously, to account for profits and for their distribution, the assumption of free entry must be abandoned. So doing, we ignore fixed costs and show that it is the combination of imperfect competition and firms’ indivisibility that matters for the formation of agglomeration in economic geography. [less ▲]

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See detailEndogenous Qualifications and Firms' Agglomeration
Toulemonde, Eric; Picard, Pierre M UL

in Journal of Urban Economics (2004), 55(3), 458-477

This paper analyzes firms' location when workers endogenously choose to qualify for professional skills but when they remain uncertain about the potential match between their personal abilities and/or ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes firms' location when workers endogenously choose to qualify for professional skills but when they remain uncertain about the potential match between their personal abilities and/or affinities and the firms' specific production tasks. By qualifying in a region where firms agglomerate, workers benefit from higher prospects of good match. At the equilibrium, we show that firms may locate in a single cluster, symmetric clusters or even asymmetric clusters. Comparative statics with respect to product market demand and labor supply parameters are provided. [less ▲]

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See detailCompetition over piratable goods
Belleflamme, Paul; Picard, Pierre M UL

E-print/Working paper (2004)

The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are ... [more ▼]

The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizon tally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the pricing game played by n producers of information goods. We show thereby how the producers' attitudes towards piracy are interdependent and evolve with the relative attractiveness of copies. [less ▲]

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See detailRegional Asymmetries: Economies of Agglomeration Versus Unionized Labor Markets
Picard, Pierre M UL; Toulemonde, Eric

in Regional Science & Urban Economics (2003), 33(2), 223-49

We study the geographical location of a unionized manufacturing industry under technological externalities. When firms benefit from locating in the vicinity of similar firms, we show that they locate in ... [more ▼]

We study the geographical location of a unionized manufacturing industry under technological externalities. When firms benefit from locating in the vicinity of similar firms, we show that they locate in symmetric, partially asymmetric or single clusters.We examine the effects of changes in the productivity parameters, in the product demand parameters and in the union characteristics. Finally, we explore the possibility of hysteresis in firm location and we analyze the welfare implication of a change in union power. [less ▲]

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See detailTaxation and Labor Markets
Picard, Pierre M UL; Toulemonde, Eric

in Journal of Economics (2002), 78(1), 29-56

We exploit the common features of models such as union-firm wage bargaining, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used for analyzing the effects of any budget-neutral tax ... [more ▼]

We exploit the common features of models such as union-firm wage bargaining, search and efficiency wage models to develop a framework that can be used for analyzing the effects of any budget-neutral tax reform on employment in these models. We show that taxes paid by workers are not equivalent to taxes paid by firms when taxes are non linear. Moreover, increasing progressivity is good for employment in these models. [less ▲]

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