References of "Picard, Pierre M 50002853"
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See detailTransfer pricing rules, OECD guidelines, and market distortions
Behrens, Kristian; Peralta, Susana; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2014)

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based profit ... [more ▼]

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based profit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve the foreign market through a fully controlled a¢ liate; or they can become exporters, i.e., they serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. Compared to the benchmark cases, where tax authorities are either unable to audit firms or where they are able to audit them perfectly, the use of the OECD's Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) or Cost-Plus (CP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions. The reason is that the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors, which serve as benchmarks, are not efficient. We show that implementing the CUP or CP rules is detrimental to consumers in the low tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high tax country. [less ▲]

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See detailOn the impact of competition on trade and firm location
Okubo, Toshihiro; Picard, Pierre M UL; Thisse, Jacques-François

in Journal of Regional Science (2014)

We study how the level of trade costs and the intensity of competition interact to explain the nature and intensity of trade within a given industry and the location of firms across countries. As trade ... [more ▼]

We study how the level of trade costs and the intensity of competition interact to explain the nature and intensity of trade within a given industry and the location of firms across countries. As trade costs decrease from very high to very low values, the global economy moves from autarky to two-way trade, through one-way trade from the larger to the smaller region. By exploring the intensive and extensive margins of exports, we investigate how the intensity of trade reacts to the degree of competitiveness. Furthermore, when firms are free to change location, they flow from the small to the large country, and the larger country is always a net exported on the manufactured good. Firms located in the big country have a bigger size than those located in the small one. Under one-way trade, the relocation of firms changes their attitude toward export. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 145 (15 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, November)

Detailed reference viewed: 29 (5 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, November)

Detailed reference viewed: 29 (6 UL)
See detailSustainable Migration Policies
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, October)

Detailed reference viewed: 35 (6 UL)
See detailTrade, economic geography and the choice of product quality
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, October)

Detailed reference viewed: 83 (6 UL)
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See detailProduct Unbundling in the Travel Industry: The Economics of Airline Bag Fees
Brueckner, Jan K.; Lee, Darin N.; Picard, Pierre M UL et al

E-print/Working paper (2013)

This paper provides theory and evidence on airline bag fees, offering insights into a real-world case of product unbundling. The theory predicts that an airline’s fares should fall when it introduces a ... [more ▼]

This paper provides theory and evidence on airline bag fees, offering insights into a real-world case of product unbundling. The theory predicts that an airline’s fares should fall when it introduces a bag fee, but that the full trip price (the bag fee plus the new fare) could either rise or fall. The empirical evidence presented in the paper provides strong confirmation of this prediction. The data also suggest that the average fare falls by less than the bag fee itself, so that the full price of a trip rises for passengers who choose to check bags. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 86 (15 UL)
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See detailPatent Office Governance and Patent System Quality
Picard, Pierre M UL; Van Pottelsberghe, Bruno

in Journal of Public Economics (2013), 104

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 45 (7 UL)
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See detailPatent office governance and patent examination quality
Picard, Pierre M. UL; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno

E-print/Working paper (2013)

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper ... [more ▼]

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 228 (125 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, July)

Detailed reference viewed: 47 (8 UL)
See detailSocial interactions, social capital and urban structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, July)

Detailed reference viewed: 45 (2 UL)
See detailTrade, economic geography and the choice of product quality”
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, June)

Detailed reference viewed: 79 (8 UL)
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See detailAirline Alliances, Carve-Outs and Collusion
Brueckner, Jan; Picard, Pierre M. UL

in Review of Network Economics (2013), 12(2), 211

In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the interhub route, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demand and linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the formation of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 264 (126 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, March)

Detailed reference viewed: 38 (4 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, February 28)

Detailed reference viewed: 27 (1 UL)
See detailCommodity taxation and regulatory competition
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Moriconi, Simone; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Presentation (2013, February 14)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (1 UL)
See detailState owned firms: private debt, cost revelation and welfare
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, February)

Detailed reference viewed: 43 (11 UL)
See detailSustainable Migration Policies
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013, January)

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (0 UL)
See detailSpatial segregation and urban structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013)

Detailed reference viewed: 75 (6 UL)
See detailSocial interactions, social capital and urban structure
Picard, Pierre M. UL

Presentation (2013)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (2 UL)