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Showing results 81 to 100 of 102
   Attack-Defense Trees and Two-Player Binary Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games Are EquivalentKordy, Barbara  ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Melissen, Matthijs et alin Proceedings of GameSec 2010 (2010) Attack-defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack-defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show ... [more ▼] Attack-defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack-defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show that attack-defense trees and binary zero-sum two-player extensive form game have equivalent expressive power when considering satisfiability, in the sense that they can be converted into each other while preserving their outcome and their internal structure. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 138 (8 UL)Foundations of Attack-Defense TreesKordy, Barbara ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Radomirovic, Sasa et alin Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (2010) We introduce and give formal definitions of attack–defense trees. We argue that these trees are a simple, yet powerful tool to analyze complex security and privacy problems. Our formalization is generic ... [more ▼] We introduce and give formal definitions of attack–defense trees. We argue that these trees are a simple, yet powerful tool to analyze complex security and privacy problems. Our formalization is generic in the sense that it supports different semantical approaches. We present several semantics for attack–defense trees along with usage scenarios, and we show how to evaluate attributes. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 111 (3 UL) Measuring voter-controlled privacyJonker, Hugo ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Pang, Jun in Proceedings of 4th Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'09) (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 105 (2 UL)A formal framework for quantifying voter-controlled privacyJonker, Hugo ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Pang, Jun in Journal of Algorithms in Cognition, Informatics and Logic (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 105 (4 UL)Discovering the core security requirements of DRM systems by means of objective treesJonker, Hugo ; Mauw, Sjouke in Handbook of Research on Secure Multimedia Distribution (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 77 (0 UL)Towards a decision model based on trust and security risk management. In Ljiljana Brankovic and Willy SusiloAlcalde, Baptiste ; ; Mauw, Sjouke et alin Seventh Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2009) (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 85 (0 UL)Secure ownership and ownership transfer in RFID systemsvan Deursen, Ton ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Radomirovic, Sasa et alin Proc. 14th European Symposium On Research In Computer Security (ESORICS'09) (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 89 (0 UL)Minimal message complexity of asynchronous multi-party contract signingMauw, Sjouke ; Radomirovic, Sasa ; in Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'09) (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 90 (0 UL)An algebra for trust dilution and trust fusionAlcalde, Baptiste ; Mauw, Sjouke in Proc. 7th Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 80 (0 UL)Towards a Decision Model Based on Trust and Security Risk ManagementAlcalde, Baptiste ; ; Mauw, Sjouke et alin Proc. 7th Australasian Information Security Conference - AISC'09 (2009) Detailed reference viewed: 34 (0 UL)Chosen-name attacks: An overlooked class of type-flaw attacksCeelen, Pieter ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Radomirovic, Sasa in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (2008), 197(2), 31-43 In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all ... [more ▼] In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all significant protocol verification frameworks based on formal methods. We identify and classify new type-flaw attacks arising from this capability. Several examples of protocols that are vulnerable to this type of attack are given, including Lowe’s modification of KSL. The consequences for automatic verification tools are discussed. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 108 (0 UL)Public Key Infrastructure; Mauw, Sjouke ; Book published by Springer (2008) Detailed reference viewed: 99 (0 UL)A framework for compositional verification of security protocols; ; et al in Information and Computation (2008), 206(2-4), 425-459 Detailed reference viewed: 90 (1 UL)Untraceability of RFID Protocolsvan Deursen, Ton ; Mauw, Sjouke ; Radomirovic, Sasa in Information Security Theory and Practices. Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks (2008) Detailed reference viewed: 98 (0 UL)Special issue on Security and TrustMauw, Sjouke ; ; in Science of Computer Programming (2008), 74(1-2), 164 Detailed reference viewed: 48 (1 UL)Rights Management for Role-Based Access Control; Mauw, Sjouke ; in Fifth Annual IEEE Consumer Communications & Networking Conference 2008 (CCNC'08) (2008) Detailed reference viewed: 102 (1 UL)A Certified Email Protocol Using Key Chains; ; Mauw, Sjouke in Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops - Volume 01 (AINAW'07) (2007) Detailed reference viewed: 106 (0 UL)Data anonymity in the FOO voting schemeMauw, Sjouke ; ; in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (2007), 168 Detailed reference viewed: 125 (0 UL)Injective Synchronisation: an extension of the authentication hierarchy; Mauw, Sjouke ; in Theoretical Computer Science (2006), 367(1-2), 139-161 Detailed reference viewed: 122 (0 UL)Operational semantics for MSC'96Mauw, Sjouke ; in Computer Networks & ISDN Systems (1999), 31(17), 1785-1799 Detailed reference viewed: 114 (3 UL) |
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