References of "Wan, Xi"
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See detailAirport capacity and inefficiency in slot allocation
Picard, Pierre M UL; wan, xi; Tampieri, Alessandro

in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2019), 62

This paper studies the time slot allocation of flight departures when travelers have a preference for departing on peak times and the number of available peak-time slots is constrained by airport ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the time slot allocation of flight departures when travelers have a preference for departing on peak times and the number of available peak-time slots is constrained by airport capacities. We show that, compared to public airports, private airports may restrain their supply of peak slots strictly below their capacity levels when they serve airlines that compete to the same destinations. Such an inefficiency takes place in airports that have low per-passenger charges and are not too busy. It does not occur in the absence of competition in destination markets. [less ▲]

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See detailAirport Congestion and Inefficiency in Slot Allocation
Picard, Pierre M UL; Tampieri, Alessandro UL; Wan, Xi

E-print/Working paper (2015)

This paper analyzes optimal slot allocation in the presence of airport congestion. We model peak and offpeak slots as vertically differentiated products, and congestion limits the number of peak slots ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes optimal slot allocation in the presence of airport congestion. We model peak and offpeak slots as vertically differentiated products, and congestion limits the number of peak slots that the airport can allocate. Inefficiency emerges when the airport does not exploit all its slots. We show that for a private airport, inefficiency may arise if the airport is not too congested and the per-passenger fee is small enough, while with a public airport it does not emerge. Furthermore the airport, irrespective of its ownership, tends to give different slots to flights with same destination if the underlying market is a duopoly, and a single slot if the underlying market is served by a monopoly. [less ▲]

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