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See detailA Private Language Argument to elucidate the relation between mind and language
Fraissler, Hannes UL

in Unisinos Journal of Philosophy (in press), 22(1),

I will defend the claim that we need to differentiate between thinking and reasoning in order to make progress in understanding the intricate relation between language and mind. The distinction between ... [more ▼]

I will defend the claim that we need to differentiate between thinking and reasoning in order to make progress in understanding the intricate relation between language and mind. The distinction between thinking and reasoning will allow us to apply a structural equivalent of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to the domain of mind and language. This argumentative strategy enables us to show that and how a certain subcategory of cognitive processes, namely reasoning, is constitutively dependent on language. The final outcome and claim of this paper can be summarized as follows: We can think without language, but we cannot reason without language. While this still leaves several questions about the relation between mind and language unanswered, I hold that the insights defended in this paper provide the basis and proper framework for further investigation about the relationship between language and the mind. [less ▲]

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See detailSchmidentity and Informativity
Fraissler, Hannes UL

in Synthese (2020)

Although Kripke’s œuvre has had a major impact on analytic philosophy and nearly every aspect of his studies has been thoroughly examined, this does not hold for his schmidentity argument, which, so far ... [more ▼]

Although Kripke’s œuvre has had a major impact on analytic philosophy and nearly every aspect of his studies has been thoroughly examined, this does not hold for his schmidentity argument, which, so far, has been widely neglected. To the extent to which it has been treated at all, it has been for the most part radically misunderstood. I hold that this argument, in its correctly reconstructed form, has general relevance for a treatment of Frege’s Puzzle and points towards a fundamental methodological restriction for philosophy of language and especially for semantics, as far as informativity and the general topic of cognitive significance are concerned. To show this, I will (Sect. 1) briefly set out the context of the schmidentity argument and, in Sects. 2 and 4, sketch a reconstruction thereof, including (Sect. 3) some criticisms of the argument, and (Sect. 6) an excursion about Kit Fine’s semantic relationism, which stands in stark contrast to this paper’s central claim. Moreover, I will (Sect. 5) draw a genuinely new and probably quite unexpected conclusion from all the above (amounting to the position that Frege’s Puzzle cannot be solved in terms of semantics), to finally (Sect. 7) give a glimpse at a bigger picture of where this conclusion should lead our thinking about a theoretical treatment of informativity and a linguistic expression’s cognitive value. [less ▲]

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See detailJohn Locke und wie man sich nicht vorstellt, eine andere Person zu sein
Fraissler, Hannes UL

in Meer, Rudolf; Motta, Giuseppe; Stiening, Gideon (Eds.) Konzepte der Einbildungskraft in der Philosophie, den Wissenschaften und den Künsten des 18. Jahrhunderts (2019)

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