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SELLING MEDIA DEVICES. ADVERTISING AND MARKETING CONSUMER ELECTRONICS IN GERMANY, FRANCE & LUXEMBOURG DURING THE LONG 1960s.

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Abstract

The long 1960s saw a dynamic expansion of mass consumption in Western Europe. Media devices such as transistor radios, record players, television sets, tape and cassette recorders became markedly more common in Germany, France, and Luxembourg, reshaping leisure and media routines. Adopting a transnational, cross-media perspective across these three countries, this thesis examines advertising as both an economic mediator and a cultural phenomenon in that transformation. Focusing on the consumer electronics sector, it analyzes how the production of advertising functioned in multinational firms in the context of marketing and organizational change, and investigates how consumers encountered these communications in media and at the point of sale. Drawing on company archives, press publications, statistical data, and a large corpus of magazine advertisements, it situates the production of advertising within the structures of multinational consumer electronics companies and approximates consumer exposure to advertising and sales measures for media devices.

The thesis shows how the organizational setup of companies visibly influenced public advertising, how campaigns for consumer electronics devices, product groups, and target audiences were precisely attuned to media environments and distribution systems, and how overarching sector characteristics nonetheless shaped consumer electronics advertising in similar ways across brands and borders. It further investigates the impact of the European Common Market on advertising presence and marketing strategy and analyzes advertising in Luxembourg's distinctive multilingual and transnational media environment. Accounting for national specificities and transnational convergences, this research links production contexts and everyday encounters to offer a better understanding of advertising as both a cultural and an economic factor in Western European mass consumer societies during the long 1960s.

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Bayreuth, December 2025

Matthias Höfer

AI Disclaimer:

During the preparation of this thesis, I used Microsoft 365 Copilot (2025, enterprise data protection) for proofreading and to ensure linguistic precision and readability. DeepL Translate (2025) was used occasionally for translation assistance. All text was subsequently reviewed and edited by me, and I take full responsibility for its content and wording.

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1 Introduction

In the spring of 1966, a man parachuted out of an airplane. As he fell toward Earth from a height of 3.800 meters,¹ he screamed into a microphone. This was a literal marketing stunt: the man's goal was to record a tape recounting his experience during the parachute jump for the West German² electronics company *Telefunken*. The tape was meant to demonstrate that the *M 300*, a portable tape recorder marketed by the company and the device used for the recording, was “spin-safe, extremely flat and moreover technologically perfect”.³ Following the successful recording during the parachute jump, *Telefunken* launched an extensive marketing campaign centered around the tape. It placed advertisements in trade magazines aimed at specialist consumer electronics retailers, held a prize contest for retailers and wholesalers, and distributed decorative material revolving around the jump to select retail partners. Most importantly, the company also sent thousands of copies of the tape to retailers. Shortly afterward, *Telefunken* began a large-scale consumer-facing advertising campaign that would reach millions of readers across Germany through a variety of print media channels.⁴ These ads emphasized the sensational nature of the jump and encouraged readers to visit their local consumer electronics retailer to listen to the tape.⁵

This event-focused marketing campaign for *Telefunken*'s *M 300* tape recorder used a spectacular stunt to generate attention for a device and demonstrate its advantages. However, the campaign went a step further than that. By not only widely publicizing the parachute jump but also providing copies of the recording to retailers, the campaign gave consumers an incentive to go to their local store and interact with the *M 300*. This approach would not have been possible for any other type of product; this campaign could only have been about a technical device capable of recording and playing media content. Through recording the jump

¹ All figures in this work are formatted according to European notation, with periods used as thousands separators and commas for decimals.

² Throughout the rest of this work, “Germany” and related terms (e.g. “German”) refer to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), unless explicitly stated otherwise.

³ N.N. (undated). Ein M300 fällt aus allen Wolken. In FM/Wb (undated). *auf gleicher Welle 1*, 3–4, p. 3. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. In the original German: “trudelsicher, extrem flach und auch sonst technisch perfekt”.

⁴ From early March 1966 onward, *Telefunken* would insert parachute jump-focused ads in dailies, Sunday newspapers, and magazines. A few weeks later, the company further added *M 300* brochures to circulating binders of a magazine subscription service, Franzke & Mätze to branch offices (1966, February 9). *Werbeinformationen 05/66*. Subject: “NEUES VOM 'FALLSCHIRMSPRUNG'. Heute: Die Sportmaschine mit dem Springer an Bord ist gestartet.” DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

⁵ See for instance *Telefunken* (1966, March 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Sensationell! Sprung aus 3800m Höhe mit dem magnetophon 300. *Bravo*, 11, 57. This was also underlined in the brochure for the device, *Telefunken* (1966). Brochure *M 300*. Enclosure to Fritsch & Noltemeyer to branch offices (1966, February 25). *Werbeinformationen*, 11/66. Subject: “NEUES VOM 'FALLSCHIRMSPRUNG'. Heute: Der Fallschirm öffnet sich.” DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

on an *M 300* and then having the tape play on the same device throughout Germany, *Telefunken*'s campaign elegantly entangled product marketing with the technological configuration of the consumer electronics⁶ device it aimed to sell.

The *M 300* was also commercialized by *Telefunken*'s French subsidiary. But while consumers on both sides of the Rhine could have purchased the tape recorder in their local retail store, French consumers would most likely not have encountered the parachute jump marketing campaign. It was executed through Germany's consumer electronics retail distribution network and national media landscape, which made sense given that the tape at the campaign's core had been recorded in German. The device's unique selling proposition of being capable of recording under adverse circumstances – for instance, while using an unusual means of transportation – translated well across countries, however: in 1967, *Telefunken France* advertised the *M 300* in the mainstream print media publication *Paris Match* by highlighting that the device would record perfectly even while tobogganing.⁷

To sell their television sets, transistor radios, record players, stereos, tape and cassette recorders, consumer electronics companies advertised and marketed their media devices to millions of Western European consumers in the long 1960s, highlighting the usage possibilities these devices offered.⁸ In the case of the *M 300* tape recorder, consumers in Germany and France

⁶ This work uses the term “consumer electronics” to designate mass-produced, durable, electronic consumer goods used for entertainment purposes by consumers. The definition used in this work encompasses radios, television sets, and phono products (meaning record players, tape recorders, cassette recorders, stereos, etc.) – all devices commonly grouped together under the umbrella term “brown goods” in German and French contemporary discourse. This term was used to distinguish media devices from “white goods” used in the household, such as refrigerators or washing machines. These household appliances are not part of this research. In Germany, the industry called consumer electronics “Braune Ware” or “Unterhaltungselektronik”. For a more detailed discussion of the terminology in the German context, see Gliese, C. (2023). *Innovativität in Krisenzeiten? Der Umgang bundesdeutscher Unterhaltungselektronikhersteller mit dem Strukturwandel der 1970/80er Jahre*. Nomos, pp. 41–42. In France, these goods were subsumed under the terms “produits bruns” or “électronique grand public”, Pluton, C., & Desjardins, J. J. (1978). *Étude sur l'évolution de la concentration électrique grand public et sa distribution en France. Volume 2: Évolution de la concentration, des prix et des marges dans la distribution de produits de la construction électrique grand public* (No. 12; Série Évolution de la Concentration et de la Concurrence). European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <http://aei.pitt.edu/41501/>, p. 12. Video recorders are also not part of this research. While they were already in professional use during the 1960s, it would take until the late 1970s for this product group to be widely adopted by German and French consumers, Gliese, 2023, p. 42, Footnote 34; Gaillard, I. (2012a). *La télévision. Histoire d'un objet de consommation (1945-1985)*. Éditions du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, Institut national de l'audiovisuel, p. 295.

⁷ Telefunken (1967, June 17). Advertisement. Tagline: même sur un toboggan il enregistre. *Paris Match*, 949, 119.

⁸ This term, coined by Arthur Marwick, refers to the period between the last third of the 1950s and first half of the 1970s, which was a time of far-reaching political, societal, and cultural change in Europe, Marwick, A. (1999). *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974*. Oxford University Press. It has since been widely adopted by social and cultural historians. For a discussion of this period and its characteristics in European perspective, see Hüser, D. (2017). Einleitung: Transnationale Populärkultur im Europa der langen 1960er Jahre. Forschungsstand und Forschungspisten. In D. Hüser (Ed.), *Populärkultur transnational: Lesen, Hören, Sehen, Erleben im Europa der langen 1960er Jahre* (pp. 7–23). Transcript Verlag; Schildt, A., & Siegfried, D. (2006b). Youth, Consumption and Politics in the Age of Radical Change. In A. Schildt & D. Siegfried (Eds.), *Between Marx and Coca-Cola. Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980* (pp. 1–38). Berghahn Books, p. 7. For a thorough introduction to the long 1960s in Germany, see Röther, M. (2012). *The*

would have been able to purchase the same device sold under the same brand. They would have seen advertisements for it in leading print media publications which presented similar arguments and used variants of the same corporate identity branding *Telefunken*'s marketing department increasingly enforced in the 1960s.⁹ But the German and French consumer experiences with the marketing and advertising for the device were nonetheless not fully equivalent. Despite its spectacularity, the marketing stunt remained bound to Germany's distribution network and media landscape. This tension between national specificity and transnational convergence is at the heart of this work. Focusing on the consumer electronics sector in Germany, France, and Luxembourg during the long 1960s, it studies how advertising was produced in multinational companies and approximates the consumer experience with advertising in Western European mass consumer societies.

1.1 Context and Rationale

1.1.1 Consumer Electronics in Western European Mass Consumer Societies

Between the 1950s and 1970s, Western European societies underwent a transition “from scarcity to abundance”.¹⁰ Following the reconstruction efforts of the immediate post-war period, Germany, France, and Luxembourg saw the takeoff of mass consumption in the mid to late 1950s,¹¹ and experienced a “boom” of near continuous, pronounced economic growth until the first oil crisis in 1973.¹² This timeframe saw standardized, mass-produced durable consumer

Sound of Distinction. Phonogeräte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1957-1973). Eine Objektgeschichte. Tectum Verlag, pp. 63–100.

⁹ On the transnational dimension of *Telefunken*'s standardized advertising style, see chapter 2.1.1.6. See further the ads themselves, *Telefunken* (1966, March 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Sensationell! Sprung aus 3800m Höhe mit dem magnetophon 300. *Bravo*, 11, 57; (1967, June 17). Advertisement. Tagline: même sur un toboggan il enregistre. *Paris Match*, 949, 119.

¹⁰ Logemann, J. (2021). Dynamiken der Massenkonsumgesellschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, 1918-2008. In C. Kleinschmidt & J. Logemann (Eds.), *Konsum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (pp. 297–333). De Gruyter, p. 305. In the original German: “Wandel vom Mangel zum Überfluss”. This is a recurring assessment in the literature. König, for instance, notes that Germany developed into a “society of abundance” (“Überfluggesellschaft”) between the 1950s and 1970s, König, W. (2013). *Kleine Geschichte der Konsumgesellschaft. Konsum als Lebensform der Moderne* (2. revised edition). Franz Steiner Verlag, p. 38. For France, Daumas similarly claims the country entered the era of abundance (“l'ère de l'abondance”) during this period, Daumas, J.-C. (2018). *La révolution matérielle. Une histoire de la consommation. France, XIXe-XXIe siècle*. Flammarion, p. 345. For a European perspective affirming this claim, see Schramm, M. (2009). Nationale Unterschiede im westeuropäischen Massenkonsum. Großbritannien, Frankreich, Deutschland und Italien 1950-1970. In M. Schramm (Ed.), *Vergleich und Transfer in der Konsumgeschichte* (Vol. 6, pp. 69–85). Leipziger Universitätsverlag, p. 69.

¹¹ For Germany, see Schildt, A. (2007). *Die Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1989/90*. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, p. 82; Logemann, 2021, p. 303. For France, see Chessel, M.-E. (2012). *Histoire de la consommation*. La Découverte, p. 23. For Luxembourg, Wey, C. (1999). Les «Silver Fifties luxembourgeois»: Croissance économique et modernisation? Essai sur la périodisation historique de type «courte durée» en économie de petite dimension. In C. Wey (Ed.), *Le Luxembourg des années 50. Une société de petite dimension entre tradition et modernité / Luxemburg in den 50er Jahre. Eine kleine Gesellschaft im Spannungsfeld von Tradition und Modernität* (pp. 51–78). Musée d'histoire de la ville de Luxembourg, p. 69.

¹² Schramm, M. (2018). *Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas seit 1945*. Böhlau Verlag, p. 39; Kaelble, H. (1992). Boom und gesellschaftlicher Wandel 1948-1973: Frankreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im

goods – the “flagship products of Fordism” –¹³ become attainable for broad levels of Western European populations. Certainly, national differences in adoption speed remained and socio-economic factors manifested themselves through the fine distinctions¹⁴ in consumption. Nonetheless, millions of French, German, or Luxembourgish households acquired their very first washing machine, refrigerator, car, and television set during the long 1960s,¹⁵ while phono products such as record players and transistor radios became defining objects of consumption for Europe’s emerging transnational youth culture.¹⁶ Color television sets, stereos, and recording devices would follow,¹⁷ continuously reconfiguring the media ensemble at the disposal of Western European households.¹⁸ This mass adoption of new technologies

Vergleich. In H. Kaelble (Ed.), *Der Boom 1948–1973. Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa* (pp. 219–247). Westdeutscher Verlag. In France, this post-war period of economic growth is often framed as the “Thirty Glorious Years” (“Trente Glorieuses”) between 1946 and 1975, a term first coined by Fourastié, J. (1979). *Les Trente Glorieuses ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975*. Fayard. On Luxembourg in particular, see Trausch, G. (2017). *Histoire économique du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg: 1815-2015*. STATEC, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.

¹³ Wittke, V. (1996). *Wie entstand industrielle Massenproduktion? Die diskontinuierliche Entwicklung der deutschen Elektroindustrie von den Anfängen der “großen Industrie” bis zur Entfaltung des Fordismus (1880-1975)*. Edition Sigma, p. 68. In the original German: “Leitprodukte des Fordismus”.

¹⁴ As coined by Bourdieu, P. (1979). *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*. Les Éditions de Minuit. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept has been widely adopted by historians of consumption to describe the mechanisms of differentiation in consumer societies. See for instance Welskopp, T. (2021). *Feine Unterschiede oder scharfe Differenzen: Klassen, Milieus und Konsum im Kapitalismus*. In C. Kleinschmidt & J. Logemann (Eds.), *Konsum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (pp. 59–85). De Gruyter, particularly pp. 80–81.

¹⁵ Of course, the precise adoption rate developments varied slightly not only between European societies but also across products. For Germany, see for instance Schildt, A. (2000). *Materieller Wohlstand—Pragmatische Politik—Kulturelle Umbrüche. Die 60er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik*. In A. Schildt, D. Siegfried, & K. C. Lammers (Eds.), *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (pp. 21–53). Christians, pp. 28–31. For France, see Sirinelli, J.-F. (2003). *Les baby-boomers. Une génération 1945-1969*. Fayard, pp. 52–53; Chessel, 2012, p. 32. For Luxembourg, see Wey, C. (1988). *La société luxembourgeoise 1944-1974. Une micro-société pendant les “trente glorieuses.”* *Forum*, 103, 15–18, p. 15; 1999, p. 69.

¹⁶ On consumer electronics devices as cultural objects, their adoption rates, and the role of music for youth culture, Siegfried, D. (2006). *Time is on my side: Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre*. Wallstein Verlag, pp. 73–106; Sohn, A.-M. (2001). *Âge tendre et tête de bois. Histoire des jeunes des années 1960*. Hachette Littératures, pp. 66–86. On Europe’s transnational youth culture (and its national appropriation) more broadly, see Maldener, A. (2024). *Jugend-Medien-Ensemble: Populärkultur in Westdeutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien, 1956-1981*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Mrozek, B. (2019). *Jugend - Pop - Kultur. Eine transnationale Geschichte*. Suhrkamp Verlag; Schildt, A., & Siegfried, D. (Eds.) (2006a). *Between Marx and Coca-Cola. Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980*. Berghahn Books.

¹⁷ Statistical overviews compiled by German and French government institutions not only recorded rising adoption rates but accordingly also expanded what types of consumer electronics devices they even collected data on. For France, see Secrétariat d’État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche (1975). *Annuaire Statistique de la Culture 1960 – 1970. L’Utilisation du Patrimoine et des Flux culturels. Partie 2*. INAthèque, ID 21313; Ministère de la Culture et de l’Environnement, Service des Études et de la Recherche (1977). *Annuaire Statistique de la Culture. Données de 1970 à 1974. Tome 1*. INAthèque, ID 14463. For Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt (1964). *Ausstattung der privaten Haushalte mit ausgewählten langlebigen Gebrauchsgütern 1962/63* (Fachserie M, Preise Löhne Wirtschaftsrechnungen. Reihe 18, Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben). Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/DEHeft_mods_00127990; (1979). *Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 1978. Heft 1. Ausstattung privater Haushalte mit ausgewählten langlebigen Gebrauchsgütern* (Fachserie 15, Wirtschaftsrechnungen). Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/DEHeft_mods_00135992.

¹⁸ In the context of this work, media ensemble is defined as the totality of media technologies accessible to a given household. Amann, C. (undated). *Medienensemble*. In *Lexikon der Filmbegriffe*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://filmlexikon.uni-kiel.de/doku.php/m:medienensemble-8709>. In the original German:

transformed everyday life:¹⁹ electrical household appliances reconfigured domestic work,²⁰ while the widespread adoption of consumer electronics reshaped leisure practices and redefined how and where Europeans engaged with media.²¹ According to Manuel Schramm, “[...] the proliferation of these goods changed people’s lives and everyday routines more than changes in other areas of consumption.”²²

Mass consumption afforded production at an industrial scale. By 1960, there were about two dozen relevant consumer electronics manufacturers in Germany, with three quarters of the market being in the hands of nine companies – among them *Telefunken*, *Blaupunkt*, *Nordmende*, the market’s most important newcomer *Grundig*, and the German subsidiary of the Dutch multinational *Philips*. Other significant industry players and, at the same time, well-known brands were *Saba*, *Graetz*, *Loewe Opta*, *Kuba Imperial*, *Braun*, and *Dual*. The industry’s structure was diverse; family companies with a few hundred employees competed with vertically integrated industrial giants employing tens of thousands of people and manufacturing their own electronic components. Market shares varied between product groups, as not all companies manufactured all types of consumer electronics devices. *Dual*, for instance, successfully specialized in phono products.²³ Although there were some changes in ownership

“Allgemeinbezeichnung für das Gesamt der in einem Haushalt zugänglichen technischen Medien (also nicht des kompletten Arsenal an Medien, die in einer Gesellschaft angeboten werden).”

¹⁹ For Germany, see Schildt, 2007, p. 24. For France, Daumas, 2018, p. 349. On the transformation of everyday life and mass consumer society, see further Chessel, 2012; König, 2013; Andersen, A. (1997). *Der Traum vom guten Leben. Alltags- und Konsumgeschichte vom Wirtschaftswunder bis heute*. Campus Verlag; Maase, K. (1997). *Grenzenloses Vergnügen. Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850-1970*. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.

²⁰ Heßler, M. (2001). »Mrs. Modern Woman«. *Zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte der Haushaltstechnisierung*. Campus Verlag.

²¹ The literature on this connection is vast. Besides the previously cited works on European, French, and German consumption history, it is addressed by media historians and cultural historians of technology. The following list is thus meant only as a point of departure. For object-centered studies, see Fesneau, E. (2011). *Le poste à transistors à la conquête de la France. La radio nomade (1954-1970)*. INA Éditions; Fickers, A. (1998). »Der Transistor« als technisches und kulturelles Phänomen. *Die Transistorisierung der Radio- und Fernsehempfänger in der deutschen Rundfunkindustrie 1955 bis 1965*. Verlag für Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik; Fruth, P. (2018). *Record.Play.Stop. - Die Ära der Kompaktkassette: Eine medienkulturelle Betrachtung*. Transcript Verlag; Gaillard, 2012a; Röther, 2012; Weber, H. (2008). *Das Versprechen mobiler Freiheit: Zur Kultur- und Technikgeschichte von Kofferradio, Walkman und Handy*. Transcript Verlag. For studies that focus more broadly on media and society, see Chupin, I., Hubé, N., & Kaciaf, N. (2012). *Histoire politique et économique des médias en France* (2nd ed.). La Découverte; d’Almeida, F., & Delporte, C. (2010). *Histoire des médias en France de la Grande Guerre à nos jours* (updated and enhanced edition). Flammarion; Delporte, C. (2006a). Au miroir des médias. In J.-P. Rioux & J.-F. Sirinelli (Eds.), *La culture de masse en France. De la belle Époque à aujourd’hui* (pp. 305–351). Fayard; Dussel, K. (2000). Von Radio- zum Fernsehzeitalter. Medienumbrüche in sozialgeschichtlicher Perspektive. In A. Schildt, D. Siegfried, & K. C. Lammers (Eds.), *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (pp. 673–694). Christians; Dussel, K. (2004). *Deutsche Rundfunkgeschichte* (second, reworked edition). UVK Verlag; Faulstich, W. (2012). *Die Mediengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Brill Fink; Schildt, A. (1995). *Moderne Zeiten. Freizeit, Massenmedien und “Zeitgeist” in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre*. Christians; Schildt, 2000.

²² Schramm, 2018, p. 45. In the original German: “Zudem veränderte die Verbreitung dieser Güter die Lebenswirklichkeit und den Alltag der Menschen mehr als Veränderungen in anderen Bereichen des Konsums.”

²³ Gliese, 2023, pp. 121–127. The rise and fall of the German consumer electronics industry in the post-war decades has been studied by Gliese and Staffel, F. (2025). *Zwischen Konkurrenz und Kooperation: Die “Japanische Herausforderung” und die deutsche Unterhaltungselektronikindustrie 1950–1987*. De Gruyter. The industry and

during the 1960s,²⁴ the industry's composition broadly remained stable²⁵ until the structural crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s.²⁶

In contrast, France's domestic consumer electronics industry was in a state of continuous flux. While the characteristics of having differently sized competitors²⁷ and product group-specific

its relation to other actors in the marketplace is covered in Sebastian Teupe's work on the television set markets in Germany and the USA, Teupe, S. (2016a). *Die Schaffung eines Marktes. Preispolitik, Wettbewerb und der Handel mit Fernsehgeräten in der BRD und den USA, 1945-1985*. De Gruyter. For works that more broadly discuss the electrical industry including the consumer electronics sector, see Reindl, J. (2001). *Wachstum und Wettbewerb in den Wirtschaftswunderjahren. Die elektrotechnische Industrie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Großbritannien 1945-1967*. Ferdinand Schöningh; Wittke, 1996. Kilian Steiner and Markus Speidel recount the company history of *Loewe Opta*, also covering developments in the larger consumer electronics industry, Steiner, K. J. L. (2005). *Ortsempfänger, Volksfernseher und Optaphon. Die Entwicklung der deutschen Radio- und Fernsehindustrie und das Unternehmen Loewe, 1923-1962*. Klartext Verlag; Speidel, M. (2012). *Netzwerke, Kooperationen und Management-Buy-Out. Die Geschichte des Unternehmens Loewe zwischen 1962 und 1985*. Klartext Verlag. Although primarily interested in users and objects, the studies by Monika Röther and Heike Weber provide insights concerning the German markets for phono products and transistor radios, Röther, 2012; Weber, 2008. There are further a handful of (auto)biographical works relating to key actors of the industry, see for instance Brunner-Schwer, H., & Zudeick, P. (1990). *Saba – Bilanz einer Aufgabe. Vom Aufstieg und Niedergang eines Familienunternehmens*. Elster Verlag; Brokmann, J. (2005). *Gerhard Kubetschek. Unternehmer aus Leidenschaft*. Streiff & Helmold. For more thorough introductions to the historiography, see Gliese, 2023, pp. 46–50; Staffel, 2025, pp. 21–24. For a brief overview of the industry's development in French, see Klein, F. (2001). La dérouté de l'électronique grand public allemande dans les années soixante-dix. *Entreprises et Histoire*, 27, 89–103.

²⁴ During the 1960s, the German consumer electronics companies *Kuba Imperial*, *Braun*, *Graetz* and *Saba* came under the ownership of large American corporations, which Carina Gliese denotes as a “‘crisis before the crisis’” (“Krise vor der Krise”), Gliese, 2023, pp. 152–153. See also Staffel, 2025, p. 42. Such ownership-changes would of course not have necessarily impacted the outward brand presentation or the consumer perception of a brand.

²⁵ A 1970 market research study for the European Commission explicitly highlighted the relative stability of the German consumer electronics industry compared to its French or Italian equivalents, IFO Institute Munich (1970). *Répercussions du Marché commun dans le secteur des biens de consommation électrotechniques. Principaux résultats d'une étude empirique* (No. 3; Industrie Series). European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <http://aei.pitt.edu/36527/>, p. 28.

²⁶ According to Florian Staffel, the German consumer electronics industry underwent a moment of structural crisis from 1977/78 onward which led to tens of thousands of job cuts and a radical restructuring of the sector. The French *Thomson-Brandt* acquired *Nordmende* (1978), *Saba* (1980), *Dual* (1982), and *Telefunken* (1983/84), while the Dutch *Philips* acquired a majority stake in *Grundig* (1984), Staffel, 2025, p. 48. See further Speidel, 2012, pp. 166–170. The reasons for this crisis, its broader context, and the industry's answers (based on a *Telefunken* case study) are also discussed by Gliese, 2023.

²⁷ Family companies would compete with industrial giants in France as well, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 74. The French consumer electronics industry and market are understudied compared to their German equivalents. Elvina Fesneau and in particular Isabelle Gaillard provide the most detailed accounts of market and industry in their respective works on the television set and on the transistor radio, id.; Fesneau, 2011. The research by Andreas Fickers on the color television standards PAL and SECAM also touches upon the history of the German and French consumer electronics industries, Fickers, A. (2007). “Politique de la grandeur” versus “Made in Germany”. *Politische Kulturgeschichte der Technik am Beispiel der PAL-SECAM-Kontroverse*. R. Oldenbourg. Patrick Fridenson has studied the competition between the German, Japanese, and French color television set industries, Fridenson, P. (1991). Selling the Innovation: French and German Color TV Devices in the 1960s. *Business and Economic History*, 20, 62–68. A number of publications further address individual companies such as *Thomson* or *Teppaz*. See for instance the firm-authored corporate history of *Thomson* and Fridenson's account of its company strategy in the 1970s and 1980s, Fridenson, P. (1992). De la diversification au recentrage: Le groupe Thomson (1976-1989). *Entreprises et histoire*, 1(1), 26–41; Thomson (1995). *L'histoire du groupe Thomson. Une entreprise dans le siècle*. Campus Thomson. For a brief overview of *Teppaz*'s company history, see Robert, H. (2019). L'épopée Teppaz. *L'Araire*, 198, 25–38. For a narrative account that also covers Marcel Teppaz's life, Loude, M. (2006). *Quand Teppaz faisait tourner le monde. Biographie de Marcel Teppaz*. Jacques André. There is, however, no comprehensive overview covering the French consumer electronics industry, market, and trade in their entirety.

market shares applied to the French industry as well,²⁸ its structure was much more complex. After the industry had already undergone considerable concentration processes during the 1950s, there were still 135 French consumer electronics companies in the mid-1960s, with 18 of them accounting for 87,2 % of the industry's total revenue.²⁹ Following a sequence of further mergers and acquisitions, a large majority of the French domestic consumer electronics production ultimately came to be directly or indirectly controlled by three industrial giants by 1972: the Dutch *Philips*, the American *ITT*, and the French champion *Thomson-Brandt*.³⁰

The many changes within the French industry would not have been readily visible for consumers, however, as brand names and associated distribution networks were largely maintained after mergers and acquisitions. By the end of the 1960s, a dozen French manufacturers accordingly commercialized their consumer electronics under around 50 different brands.³¹ Even though ownership structures evolved, consumers would have thus encountered a comparatively stable selection of brand names, with *Philips*, *Radiola*, *Schneider*, *Pathé-Marconi*, *Continental Edison*, *Océanic*, and *Teppaz* being some of the most recognizable.³²

During the 1950s, the German and French consumer electronics markets were dominated by domestic manufacturers,³³ with *Philips* being present through locally producing subsidiaries in both countries.³⁴ This began to shift after the European Common Market's trade rules began to

²⁸ As was the case in Germany, not every consumer electronics company offered a full product portfolio. Only few French consumer electronics companies produced tape recorders, for instance. Similarly, *Teppaz* was one of the most important French manufacturers of record players but did not compete in the television set market, Landau, A. (1973). *Étude sur l'évolution de la concentration dans l'industrie de la construction électrique en France. Construction d'appareils électriques, radios, télévision, électro-acoustique (N.I.C.E. 375). Fabrication d'appareils électrodomestiques (N.I.C.E. 376)*. European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <https://aei.pitt.edu/41727/>, p. 59. On *Teppaz*'s product portfolio, see Robert, 2019.

²⁹ Kuhn de Chizelle, B. (1966). Situation de l'industrie électronique Française. In Avis et Rapports du Conseil Économique et Social. *Journal officiel de la République Française*, 10, 321–375, p. 338. The same figure is given by Gaillard, 2012a, p. 201. On this concentration process and the evolving number of French consumer electronics companies, see further Fickers, 2007, p. 207, Footnote 199.

³⁰ Landau precisely recounts the mergers and acquisitions between 1963 and 1972 which led to this result, Landau, 1973, pp. 59–64. See further Flichy, P., & Narbaitis, M. (1979). L'audiovisuel grand public. In C. Lacroix, M. Petit & F. Rouet (Eds.), *Les Industries Culturelles* (pp. 93–134). La Documentation française, pp. 94–96. Concerning the market shares of these three groups on the French television set market in the mid-1970s, see Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 220–221. On the further development and strategy of *Thomson*, see Fridenson, 1992.

³¹ Gaillard, I. (2013b). Le « désir de télévision »: Le rôle moteur de la demande dans la diffusion de l'objet télévisuel (1950-1984). In P. Fridenson & P. Griset (Eds.), *Entreprises de haute technologie, État et souveraineté depuis 1945: Colloque des 8 et 9 février 2010* (pp. 179–193). Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, p. 189. On this strategy of maintaining brands, see further Gaillard, 2012a, p. 203.

³² That these brands would have had a certain degree of brand recognition is supported by the fact that they were among the handful of brands maintained by *Philips* (*Philips*, *Radiola*, *Schneider*), *Thomson-Brandt* (*Pathé-Marconi*, *Continental Edison*), and *ITT* (*Océanic*) after the wave of mergers – apart from *Teppaz*, which was an independent company, Flichy & Narbaitis, 1979, p. 95.

³³ For Germany, see Staffel, 2025, pp. 41–42. For France, see chapter 2.2.

³⁴ *Philips*'s German and French subsidiaries each had their own production capabilities, Chanier, C. (1990). *La firme Philips face à la construction de l'Europe. Une multinationale sur la voie de l'intégration économique dans les années 50-60* [PhD, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University], p. 43.

take effect in the early 1960s: German consumer electronics firms could increasingly export their products to France, introducing new market dynamics.³⁵ Although German companies had pursued international expansion since the 1950s, the German domestic market remained largely in the control of the local players and *Philips*. As Florian Staffel notes, it would only be from the end of the 1960s onward that Japanese brands began to compete at scale with German brands – both on the German market and across Europe – as the consumer electronics market became increasingly globalized during the 1970s.³⁶ The increasingly transnational dimension and overall momentum of the consumer electronics market in Western Europe during the 1960s were succinctly summed up by a study for the European Commission in 1973:

“On the whole, the production of these goods has grown at a fast pace for the past dozen years, driven mainly by rising living standards, changes in demographic and socio-professional structures, and the pursuit of greater well-being. Furthermore, the pace of this development has been accelerated by the removal of customs barriers. The resulting growth in trade has led to a wide diversification of the types of devices offered to the public, increased competition between manufacturers from different countries has accelerated the decline in prices for these devices, and this, in turn, has led to a rapid increase in the volume of purchases by households. Manufacturers therefore found themselves forced to adapt their production and sales policies to the new conditions created by the expansion of markets. Thus, at the beginning of the 1960s, mass production had to take precedence over artisanal production.”³⁷

1.1.2 Advertising Durable Consumer Goods in the 1960s

Advertising played a crucial mediating role in this dynamic market context. In consumer societies, in which the spheres of production and consumption are separated, it is “[...] the most important means of communication between producers and retailers on the one hand and consumers on the other.”³⁸ Originating in company-specific economic goals – such as creating

³⁵ This development, and what it meant for the market presence of German brands and media devices in France as well as for advertising in particular, is discussed in chapter 2.2. and its subchapters.

³⁶ Throughout much of the 1960s, imported devices only accounted for 0,5–5 % of the overall value of devices offered on the German market. The rapid rise of imports from the second half of the decade onward was also caused by the domestic industry itself, which increasingly imported cheaper goods from their own factories or licensed partners abroad (often in South-East Asia or Japan), Staffel, 2025, pp. 41–44. On the development of import and export in the German consumer electronics market in the 1970s, see further Gliese, 2023, pp. 158–161.

³⁷ Landau, 1973, pp. 3–4. In the original French: “Globalement, la production de ces matériels s’est accrue depuis une douzaine d’années à un rythme élevé, entraînée de façon générale par la hausse des niveaux de vie, le changement des structures démographiques et socio-professionnelles et la recherche de l’amélioration du bien-être. Par ailleurs, le rythme de cette évolution s’est trouvé amplifié par la suppression des barrières douanières. Le développement des échanges qui en est résulté [sic] ayant suscité une grande diversification des modèles d’appareils offerts au public, l’intensification de la concurrence entre les producteurs des différents pays a eu pour effet d’accélérer la baisse des prix des matériels et par là même d’accroître très rapidement le volume des achats des ménages. Les fabricants se sont donc trouvés contraints d’adapter leur politique de production et de commercialisation aux conditions nouvelles créées par l’extension des marchés. Ainsi, au début des années soixante, la production de série devait prendre le pas sur la production artisanale.”

³⁸ Borscheid, P. (2009). Agenten des Konsums: Werbung und Marketing. In H.-G. Haupt & C. Torp (Eds.), *Die Konsumgesellschaft in Deutschland 1890–1990. Ein Handbuch* (pp. 79–96). Campus Verlag, p. 79. In the original German: “[...] dem wichtigsten Kommunikationsmittel zwischen Produzenten und Händlern auf der einen und Konsumenten auf der anderen Seite.” The mediating role of advertising in consumer societies is also underlined by other authors. See for instance Köhler, I. (2021). Marketing als Lockmittel des Konsums: Innovationen in

a market, increasing sales, or promoting a brand – advertising informs consumers about the “spatial, temporal, and qualitative” availability of goods.³⁹ Because of this role, advertising became a pervasive feature of Western European consumer societies. As the seller’s markets of the immediate post-war era progressively turned into buyer’s markets, the competition for consumer attention intensified.⁴⁰ Between 1952 and 1972, gross advertising expenditure in Germany grew from an estimated 894 million Deutsche Mark (DM) to around 9,87 billion DM; a more than tenfold increase.⁴¹ In France, too, advertising expenditure rose incessantly between 1952 and 1973,⁴² with advertising historian Marc Martin assessing that France truly “entered the advertising era” at the beginning of the 1960s.⁴³

Reflecting their societal and economic importance for Western European mass consumer societies in the long 1960s, durable consumer goods were among the most widely advertised products. According to the French research institute *CREDOC*, advertising and sales promotion spending on household equipment – such as television sets, record players, or refrigerators – accounted for 14 % of the total expenditure on the French advertising market in 1973, ranking only behind services and ahead of food or personal care products.⁴⁴ Durable consumer goods companies proactively communicated their product portfolios, and the new lifestyle possibilities they enabled,⁴⁵ to consumers through advertising in conjunction with other marketing measures. They planned and coordinated advertising across media, collaborated with

Marktforschung und Werbung. In C. Kleinschmidt & J. Logemann (Eds.), *Konsum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (pp. 459–481). De Gruyter, p. 459.

³⁹ Köhler, 2021, p. 460. In the original German: “räumliche, zeitliche und qualitative”.

⁴⁰ For the notion that the German market became a buyer’s market from the late 1950s onward and the idea that this entailed a more important socio-economic role for consumers, see for instance Gasteiger, N. (2008). *Vom manipulierbaren zum postmodernen Konsumenten. Das Bild des Verbrauchers in der westdeutschen Werbung und Werbekritik, 1950-1990. Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 90, 129–157, p. 134. See further Köhler, 2021, p. 474. In France, this exact development was notably foreseen by the minister of economic affairs in 1953, as described by Pulju, R. J. (2011). *Women and mass consumer society in postwar France*. Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

⁴¹ Non-inflation adjusted figures including mass media advertising expenditure (print, radio, television, outdoor) as well as estimations for direct marketing, advertising in directories, and cinema advertising, Schmidt, S. J., & Spieß, B. (1996). *Die Kommerzialisierung der Kommunikation. Fernsehwerbung und sozialer Wandel 1956-1989*. Suhrkamp Verlag, p. 201. Borscheid puts mass media advertising expenditure at 565 million DM for 1952 and 4.816 million DM for 1967. Borscheid’s figure for 1962 is in line with the data for mass media given by Schmidt & Spieß, Borscheid, 2009, p. 95. The data for the early 1970s, in turn, is consistent in its order of magnitude with that provided in DIVO INMAR (1974). *Der Westdeutsche Markt in Zahlen. Ein Handbuch für Forschung Werbung und Verkauf. Neubearbeitung 1974*. DIVO INMAR GmbH, p. 386.

⁴² Martin, M. (2012). *Histoire de la publicité en France*. Presses universitaires de Paris Ouest, p. 61.

⁴³ Id., p. 84. In the original French: “l’entrée de la France dans l’ère publicitaire.”

⁴⁴ The study used a rather broad definition of household equipment and would have thus overestimated the importance of the durable consumer goods sector. Nonetheless, it may serve as an indicator concerning the general order of magnitude of the sector’s advertising spending. In a redressed table that excluded services, household equipment even ranked first among consumer goods with 18 % of the total ad expenditure, Taboulet, J. (1975). *Publicité et consommation des ménages français* (No. 587). Centre de recherches et de documentation sur la consommation. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.credoc.fr/publications/publicite-et-consommation-des-menages-francais>, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁵ The idea that ads for durable consumer goods present consumers with gains in options for action (“Zugewinn an Handlungsoptionen”) is taken from Wittke, 1996, p. 82.

retailers on connected sales promotion measures, and tailored their advertising forms and appeals to markets, devices, and target audiences alike.

To reach potential customers, the in-house advertisers and marketers of consumer goods companies would commission full-service advertising agencies and market research institutes to provide additional market data, expertise, and advertising creativity. Building on developments of the interwar period,⁴⁶ these service industries underwent professionalization processes during the post-war decades. New methods and ideas – such as the marketing concept – took hold in both industries, which professionals often adopted and appropriated from America as part of complex processes of trans-Atlantic exchange.⁴⁷ Advertisers and market researchers founded professional organizations, introduced formalized educational paths, launched new trade journals, and systematized their data collection and research processes.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ This continuity is repeatedly emphasized in the literature. Indeed, as previous research on the development of the advertising profession and industry in Germany and France before 1945 has shown, the interwar years already saw American influences, professionalization tendencies, new methods, and the first uses of systematized market research. Developments concerning the industry's professionalization can in many cases be traced back even further, to the beginning of the 20th century, Chessel, M.-E. (1998). *La publicité. Naissance d'une profession, 1900 - 1940*. CNRS Éditions; (2004). *L'enseignement de la publicité en France au XX^e siècle. Le Temps des médias*, 2, 137–149; Reinhardt, D. (1993). *Von der Reklame zum Marketing. Geschichte der Wirtschaftswerbung in Deutschland*. Akademie Verlag; (1996). Zur Historizität der Phänomene „Kommunikationsgesellschaft“ und „Dienstleistungsgesellschaft“: Die Geschichte der Werbeagentur und ihrer Vorläufer in Deutschland. *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte / Journal of Business History*, 41(1), 28–39. See further Borscheid, 2009, pp. 82–92; Martin, M. (1992). *Trois siècles de publicité en France*. Odile Jacob, pp. 247–276. On market research in particular, see Conrad, C. (2004). Observer les consommateurs. Études de marché et histoire de la consommation en Allemagne, des années 1930 aux années 1960. *Le Mouvement Social*, 1(206), 17–39. For a perspective that focuses on the question of continuity in the German advertising industry in the pre- and post-war periods, see Hirt, G. (2011). Verkannte Propheten? Zur Diskrepanz zwischen Status und Einfluss der «Gründergeneration» deutscher Werber in der westdeutschen Werbewirtschaft, 1945 bis 1966/67. *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte / Journal of Business History*, 56(1), 48–74.

⁴⁷ This complexity has for instance been underlined by Köhler, 2021, p. 473; Logemann, J., & Kreis, R. (2022). *Konsumgeschichte*. De Gruyter, p. 25. The extent to which Western European advertisers and market researchers were influenced by their American colleagues, and what role American methods and actors played in the outlined processes has long been subject to discussion. For a critical assessment of the “Americanization paradigm” and a perspective that emphasizes European agency both in advertising and market research, see the work of Stefan Schwarzkopf: Schwarzkopf, S. (2011). The subsiding sizzle of advertising history: Methodological and theoretical challenges in the post advertising age. *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing*, 3(4), 528–548, pp. 533–534; (2012). Managing the Unmanageable: The Professionalization of Market and Consumer Research in Post-War Europe. In L. Langer & R. Jessen (Eds.), *Transformations of Retailing in Europe after 1945* (pp. 163–178). Taylor & Francis; (2013). From Fordist to creative economies: The de-Americanisation of European advertising cultures since the 1960s. *European Review of History*, 20(5), 859–879. For a perspective that more strongly underlines America's exemplary role, see Schröter, H. G. (1998). Advertising in West Germany after World War II. A Case of an Americanization. *Entreprises et histoire*, 19(2), 15–33. For a discussion of the question of Americanization of market research in post-war Germany, see Zimmermann, C. (2004). Marktanalysen und Werbeforschung der frühen Bundesrepublik: Deutsche Traditionen und amerikanische Einflüsse, 1950–1965. In M. Berg & P. Gassert (Eds.), *Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Detlef Junker* (pp. 473–491). Franz Steiner Verlag. On the question of how and when American ad agencies entered a European market, and the challenges this entailed, Hultquist, C. E. (2003). Americans in Paris: The J. Walter Thompson Company in France, 1927–1968. *Enterprise & Society*, 4(3), 471–501.

⁴⁸ On the professionalization in the European market research industry, see Schwarzkopf, 2012. See further Schröter, H. G. (2004). Zur Geschichte der Marktforschung in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert. In R. Walter (Ed.), *Geschichte des Konsums. Erträge der 20. Arbeitstagung der Gesellschaft für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 23.–26. April 2003 in Greifswald (pp. 319–336). Franz Steiner Verlag. On the professionalization of the advertising profession in France in a long-term perspective, see Chessel, 2004; Gaertner, L. (2008). Que produisent les

These industries became influential economic sectors in their own right. Between 1958 and 1968, the collective revenue of France's advertising agencies rose from an estimated 811 million French Franc (FF) to around 2.500 million FF,⁴⁹ while the 22 members of the German association of market research institutes reached a collective revenue of 60 million DM by the late 1960s.⁵⁰

Consumers, in turn, encountered new consumer electronics devices and other durable consumer goods when reading magazines or newspapers. They heard and saw ads on the radio, in the cinema, and on television. They encountered ads when using public transport and walked by outdoor posters and shop window displays. Alongside the new devices, the advertising for durable consumer goods came to permeate everyday life in itself: during the long 1960s, the German and French consumer electronics industries collectively placed thousands of ads for their goods in leading print publications,⁵¹ and larger brands conducted marketing campaigns for new devices that were calculated to reach more than a hundred million advertising contacts.⁵² Advertising thus did not only play an economic role; it also was a mass cultural phenomenon that shaped Western European mass consumer societies of the long 1960s as one of the:

“[...] cultural products, phenomena, and activities that emerged under the conditions of industrial society, were mostly disseminated through mass media channels, and were appropriated by many people as meaningful to their everyday lives.”⁵³

1.1.3 The Question of Advertising across European Markets

During the long 1960s, the everyday processes of market communication in Western European mass consumer cultures took place in market contexts that became progressively more

publicitaires? Retour socio-historique sur la formation d'une expertise. *Revue Management et Avenir*, 15, 140–155. On the professionalization in the French advertising industry between 1945 and 1968, see Hultquist, C. E. (1996). *The price of dreams. A history of advertising in France, 1927-1968* [PhD, Ohio State University], pp. 53–104. For a critical perspective on the professionalization in the German advertising industry which also touches upon questions of formalized education and professional organizations, see Hirt, 2011. On the development of the German advertising industry, see further Hesse, D., & Lurie, K. (2019). The German advertising industry – from 1950 to 2018. *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing*, 12(1), 101–125, pp. 114–115.

⁴⁹ IREP (1968). *La structure des budgets de publicité en 1968*. INAthèque, ID 25573, p. 38.

⁵⁰ These 22 institutes employed more than 1.600 people in total, Andriessens, J. E. (1968). Techniques et mentalités des recherches : Différences entre les pays Européens. In IREP (Ed.), *La recherche publicitaire face à l'ouverture des frontières. Journées d'études 6-8 Mai 1968* (pp. 45–76). INAthèque, ID 25564, p. 53.

⁵¹ Both the German magazine *Stern* and the French magazine *Paris Match* featured thousands of ads by consumer electronics brands between 1959 and 1974, see chapter 3.4.2.1.1.

⁵² For the German *Telefunken* campaign this refers to, see chapter 3.1.2.2.2.

⁵³ Hüser, D., & Pfeil, U. (2015). Einleitung: Populärkulturelle Mittler und deutsch-französisches Verhältnis nach 1945. Spannungsfelder und Forschungsperspektiven transnationaler Populärkultur. In D. Hüser & U. Pfeil (Eds.), *Populärkultur und deutsch-französische Mittler / Culture de masse et médiateurs franco-allemands. Acteurs, Medien, Ausdrucksformen / Acteurs, médias, articulations* (pp. 15–50), p. 20. In the original German: “[...] kulturelle Produkte, Phänomene, Aktivitäten, die unter industriegesellschaftlichen Vorzeichen entstanden sind, die meist über massenmediale Kanäle verbreitet und durch viele Menschen als lebensweltlich bedeutsam angeeignet worden sind.”

interconnected, as has been noted for the consumer electronics industry. Modern historiography has emphasized that the economic integration and growing cultural intertwinement of post-war Europe resulted in a “‘Europeanization’ of consumption” in the sense of an increasingly convergent supply of goods through “increasingly internationally oriented consumer goods manufacturers”, rising transnational trade, and converging consumption patterns.⁵⁴

As consumer goods increasingly crossed European borders, the professionals tasked with communicating brands and products to consumers began to consider advertising in transnational, European perspective. In the advertising and marketing trade, discussions around the potential of arriving at a greater uniformity and degree of standardization in advertising across Western Europe gained momentum in the early to mid-1960s, as the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) deepened intra-European economic ties and opened up new business opportunities. One factor driving this debate was a perceived decline in national differences between European mentalities.⁵⁵ In the opening speech of the 1963 congress on advertising in the European Common Market, the president of the International Advertising Association even went a step further, underlining that: “Of course, your ad text must appear in the local language. Of course, you have to make concessions to local customs. But essentially, people are the same everywhere, [...]”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Logemann & Kreis, 2022, p. 219. In the original German: “‘Europäisierung’ des Konsums”, “zunehmend international orientierte Konsumgüterhersteller”; Kaelble, H. (2021). Grenzenlos. Der transnationale europäische Konsum 1918-2018. In C. Kleinschmidt & J. Logemann (Eds.), *Konsum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (pp. 617–641). De Gruyter. See also Kaelble, H. (2007). *Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. For a perspective that emphasizes the remaining national differences between European mass consumer societies in the Post-War decades, see Schramm, 2009. Previous research in consumption history has further underlined the role of Americanization, highlighting transatlantic exchanges and processes of adaptation and hybridization for Germany and France, see Daumas, 2018, pp. 315–316; König, 2013, p. 36.

⁵⁵ De Iulio, S. (2002). La publicité transnationale entre universalisme marchand et ancrage territorial. *Les Enjeux de l’information et de la communication*, 2002(1), 25–37, pp. 26–27. For the contemporary discussion itself, see for instance Roostal, I. (1963). Standardization of Advertising for Western Europe. *Journal of Marketing*, 27(4), 15–20, p. 16; Devine, C. R. (1964). Rede zur Eröffnung des Kongresses. In Zentrallausschuss der Werbewirtschaft E.V. (Ed.), *Werbung im Europamarkt. Kongress der Werbung 1963. Kongressbericht* (pp. 40–45). Süddeutscher Verlag, p. 43. This European turn in the advertising industry further entailed a European harmonization of standards within the trade, and the formation of the European Association of Advertising Agencies in 1960, which resulted in the establishment of a curriculum for advertising studies that was taught in universities across several European countries in the mid-1960s, Pouillard, V. (2005b). *La publicité en Belgique, 1850-1975. Des courtiers aux agences internationales*. Académie Royale de Belgique, pp. 392–393, 397. A similar development whose transnational dimension has received comparatively little academic attention took place in the market research industry. In the 1950s and 1960s, market researchers increasingly cooperated across European borders in the face of the challenge of supranational markets, with some institutes becoming multinational themselves. They founded a pan-European professional association in the post-war era and held international conferences on the topic of conducting market research at a European scale (for instance in 1960), Conrad, 2004, p. 39. On transnational market research cooperations in 1960s Europe, see further Schröter, 2004, p. 333.

⁵⁶ Devine, 1964, p. 43.

For companies active in several markets, transnationally standardizing advertising could reduce costs and came with the advantage of an internationally coherent product or brand image presentation.⁵⁷ While appealing in theory, its practical implementation was fraught with challenges. Hurdles to transnational standardization in European advertising and marketing as identified in the contemporary literature included the multiplicity of languages, the deviating legal situations, the nationally different advertising media landscapes and distribution systems, more intangible cultural factors,⁵⁸ and a lack of ad agency networks that were truly international in working practice and not in name only.⁵⁹ Besides these structural constraints, the question of standardization versus decentralization seems to have been a recurring source of conflict between the corporate headquarters of multinational companies and their national subsidiaries and representatives.⁶⁰ Simona De Iulio has therefore emphasized that the structure of multinational companies – and the distribution of authority within them – could significantly affect the degree of standardization in advertising across markets.⁶¹

Even though advertisers discussed Europe as “a laboratory of transnational strategies” from the 1960s onward,⁶² if and how these ambitions were translated into practice by multinational companies in the face of these challenges – and what this implied for the experiences of European consumers – remains poorly understood. Advertising has been extensively studied on a national level in a variety of contexts, with German and French researchers investigating

⁵⁷ De Iulio, 2002, p. 28.

⁵⁸ Jonas, K. H. (1965). Bilanz der deutschen Werbewirtschaft. In Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) (Ed.), *Rundfunkanstalten und Tageszeitungen. Eine Materialsammlung. Dokumentation 1. Tatsachen und Meinungen* (pp. 166–173), pp. 171–172. The issue of distribution systems is raised only by Sutton, who situates advertising in a broader marketing context, but underlines that distribution differences could impact advertising planning, Sutton, T. (1964). Gemeinsame und nicht so gemeinsame Faktoren der europäischen Konsumgüterwerbung. In Zentrallausschuss der Werbewirtschaft E.V. (Ed.), *Werbung im Europamarkt. Kongress der Werbung 1963. Kongressbericht* (pp. 93–107). Süddeutscher Verlag. Roostal further raised the issue of “insufficient marketing planning”, Roostal, 1963, p. 20. Particularly the complexity of European media landscapes made advertising planning a challenge, De Iulio, 2002, p. 30.

⁵⁹ At the time, there was a lack of genuinely international advertising agencies which could support a company’s push for standardization in advertising on a transnational level. A company employing different agencies across national markets could often result in nationally distinct advertisements as each national ad agency sought to showcase their creativity, De Iulio, 2002, p. 31. However, this problem also applied to the international agency networks present in multiple countries that did exist, as these often nonetheless operated as separate entities across national markets. Such networks were more of an illusion than reality according to the assertions by marketers and advertisers of large international companies interviewed for a 1968 study on the internationalization of advertising, Touati, E. (1968). Comment les grands annonceurs conçoivent la publicité internationale : Leurs points de vue au travers d’une enquête. In IREP (Ed.), *La recherche publicitaire face à l’ouverture des frontières. Journées d’études 6-8 Mai 1968* (pp. 116–125). INAthèque, ID 25564, pp. 117–118, 124. The national character of international ad agency networks is also highlighted by Roostal, 1963, p. 20.

⁶⁰ Touati, 1968, pp. 117–118, 124. Roostal also highlights this tension between centers and subsidiaries, Roostal, 1963, p. 20.

⁶¹ De Iulio, 2002, p. 31. This is affirmed by the contemporary literature which De Iulio bases herself on. According to Roostal, “The organizational setup and size of the manufacturer and its agency often have had unduly important influences on the question of local versus standardized marketing approaches.”, Roostal, 1963, p. 20.

⁶² De Iulio, 2002, p. 26. In the original French: “un laboratoire des stratégies transnationales”.

advertisers and the advertising industry,⁶³ examining the historical development of advertising as a socio-economic subsystem,⁶⁴ studying the evolution of advertising content and formats in media,⁶⁵ and using advertising as an entry point to investigate culture⁶⁶ or mentalities.⁶⁷ Despite this vast body of research, advertising historians have long been “remarkably reluctant” to go beyond the nation-state in their analysis, as Stefan Schwarzkopf has pointed out.⁶⁸

Previous research suggests that company advertising approaches in the 1960s were situated somewhere on the spectrum between the extremes of fully nationally distinct and uniformly internationally aligned advertising strategies,⁶⁹ with historians of consumption assessing that Western European advertising was overall “still strongly national” in character during the 1960s

⁶³ For France, see Chessel, 1998; 2004; Gaertner, 2008; Hultquist, 1996; 2003. For Germany, see Hesse & Lurie, 2019; Hirt, 2011; Kellner, J. (1995). 1945 bis 1995: 50 Jahre Entwicklung der Werbeagenturen in Deutschland. In J. Kellner, U. Kurth, & W. Lippert (Eds.), *1945 bis 1995. 50 Jahre Werbung in Deutschland* (pp. 11–20). Westermann-Kommunikation; Reinhardt, 1996; Schindelbeck, D. (1995). „Asbach Uralt” und „Soziale Marktwirtschaft”: Zur Kulturgeschichte der Werbeagentur in Deutschland am Beispiel von Hanns W. Brose (1899 — 1971). *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte / Journal of Business History*, 40(4), 235–252. In European perspective, see Schwarzkopf, 2013.

⁶⁴ For France, see Delporte, C. (2006b). *De Bibendum à Culturepub. La publicité à la conquête des masses*. In J.-P. Rioux & J.-F. Sirinelli (Eds.), *La culture de masse en France. De la belle Époque à aujourd’hui* (pp. 410–434). Fayard; Martin, 1992; 2012. For Germany, see Haas, S. (2003). Sinndiskurse in der Konsumkultur. Die Geschichte der Wirtschaftswerbung von der ständischen bis zur postmodernen Gesellschaft. In M. Prinz (Ed.), *Der lange Weg in den Überfluss. Anfänge und Entwicklung der Konsumgesellschaft seit der Vormoderne* (pp. 291–314). Ferdinand Schöningh; Reinhardt, 1993; Reinhardt, D. (1995). Vom Intelligenzblatt zum Satellitenfernsehen: Stufen der Werbung als Stufen der Gesellschaft. In P. Borscheid & C. Wischermann (Eds.), *Bilderwelt des Alltags. Werbung in der Konsumgesellschaft des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Hans Jürgen Teuteberg* (pp. 44–62). Franz Steiner Verlag.

⁶⁵ Particularly the history of television advertising spots has been well studied from a variety of perspectives. For France, see Duchet, C. (2005). La publicité de marques, nouveauté ou continuité ? In F. Jost (Ed.), *Années 70: La télévision en jeu* (pp. 211–230). CNRS Éditions. Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://books.openedition.org/editions-cnrs/31168>; Fleckenstein, H. (2007). *Der französische Werbefilm. Entwicklung ästhetischer und narrativer Verfahren im 20. Jahrhundert*. Günther Narr; Parasie, S. (2010). « *Et maintenant, une page de pub!* ». *Une histoire morale de la publicité à la télévision française (1968–2008)*. INA; Soulages, J.-C. (2022). *50 ans de publicité à la télévision. Le consommateur, ses avatars, ses imaginaires*. Presses universitaires de Rennes. For Germany, see Fischer, H.-D., & Westermann, A. (2001). *Knappe Geschichte der Hörfunk- und Fernsehwerbung in Deutschland. Leitfaden durch medienpolitische Stationen eines Kommunikationsphänomens*. ISL-Verlag; Pulch, H. (1996). Werbefilm im Wandel. Zur Geschichte des deutschen Werbefilms. In S. Bäumler (Ed.), *Die Kunst zu werben. Das Jahrhundert der Reklame* (pp. 371–382). DuMont; Schmidt & Spieß, 1996.

⁶⁶ See for instance Knop, K. (2003). Zwischen Afri-Cola-Rausch und dem Duft der großen weiten Welt: Werbung in den sechziger Jahren. In W. Faulstich (Ed.), *Die Kultur der sechziger Jahre* (pp. 241–272). Wilhelm Fink; (2004). Von Flower Power zur Pril-Blume: Werbung und Werbemedien der 70er Jahre. In W. Faulstich (Ed.), *Die Kultur der siebziger Jahre* (pp. 211–231). Wilhelm Fink; Montiel Alafont, F. J. (2010). *Werbe-geschichte als Kulturgeschichte: Spanien 1940–1989*. Leipziger Universitätsverlag.

⁶⁷ Gries, R., Ilgen, V., & Schindelbeck, D. (1995). Einleitung. Cursorische Überlegungen zu einer Werbe-geschichte als Mentalitätsgeschichte. In *“Ins Gehirn der Masse kriechen!” Werbung und Mentalitätsgeschichte* (pp. 1–28). Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

⁶⁸ Schwarzkopf, 2011, p. 535. Other disciplines mainly interested in advertising as a contemporary phenomenon, such as linguistics or communication science, seem to be more enthusiastic about transnational comparisons, see for instance Held, G., & Bendel, S. (Eds.) (2008). *Werbung—Grenzenlos. Multimodale Werbetexte im interkulturellen Vergleich*. Peter Lang. For an interdisciplinary introduction to the study of advertisement, see De Iulio, S. (2016). *Étudier la Publicité*. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

⁶⁹ As summed up by Chessel, 2012, p. 51. See also De Iulio, 2002, p. 30.

despite first forays into transnational approaches.⁷⁰ Contemporary sources, too, seem to imply that there was a gap between the aspirations of advertisers and the reality in multinational companies: as the president of the cosmetics company *L'Oréal* noted in 1968, truly European brands were still the exception and not the norm.⁷¹ This study argues that the reality was far more complex. By analyzing advertising production and consumer exposure across Germany, France, and Luxembourg, it reveals an intricate interplay of transnational convergences and persistent national differences – for multinational companies and consumers alike.

1.2 Research Questions and Design

The combination of factors outlined above informs the subject, timeframe, geographical focus, and approach of this research. It asks to what extent multinational companies active in one of the key durable consumer goods sectors of the long 1960s – consumer electronics – thought and worked across European borders in planning, executing, and adapting their marketing strategies and advertising approaches for television sets, record players, radios, or tape recorders. Studying cross-border flows as well as frictions and absences of transfer, it inquires how campaigns and individual advertisements were shaped by organizational company structures, overarching brand strategies, national market environments, trade regimes, distribution systems, media landscapes, languages, and by the characteristics of the media devices sold by the consumer electronics industry. Although this research does not systematically compare across industries, it explores the consumer electronics sector in depth, accounting for differences between countries, companies, target groups, and devices.

The production side is not considered in isolation. Because of advertising's mediating role in the marketplace, this work also asks how these company-internal factors and external influences affected the many ways and spaces where Western European consumers could have encountered consumer electronics advertising in their everyday lives. Advertising is therefore analyzed in cross-media perspective and in connection with other marketing measures for consumer electronics brands and devices consumers could have seen and experienced. Emphasis is put on identifying intentional transfers and unintended commonalities to explain national differences and transnational convergences concerning where and how consumers were exposed to advertising and other measures employed to sell media devices.

⁷⁰ Schramm, 2009, p. 79. In the original German: “noch stark national geprägt”.

⁷¹ Dalle, François (1968). La Position de la marque dans le marché commun. In IREP (Ed.), *La recherche publicitaire face à l'ouverture des frontières. Journées d'études 6-8 Mai 1968* (pp. 78–92). INAthèque, ID 25564, pp. 89–90.

To address these questions, this study combines archival research on company structures and marketing strategies with a contextually embedded analysis of advertising measures and mass media advertisements. Given the pervasiveness of advertising in mass consumer societies, tracing its totality is impossible. Therefore, the study adopts a multi-angle approach across three Western European markets to balance representativity and feasibility. It studies the advertising and marketing measures of the international consumer electronics companies *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Braun* in transnational perspective and in relation to their organizational structure. To account for historical asymmetries in transnational trade and brand presence, this research then also investigates the role of advertising during the market entry period of the German *Grundig* and *Telefunken* brands in France following the trade liberalization of the European Common Market in the early 1960s.

To gain a more tangible understanding of the practical implementation of market mediation, this work analyzes several marketing campaigns, advertising approaches, and sales measures for specific devices, product groups, and target audiences in Germany and France. It further examines the role of marketers and advertisers in product development processes and investigates the overarching characteristics of consumer electronics advertising and sales processes. To complement these primarily qualitative approaches, the study also includes a quantitative examination of consumer electronics ads published in *Stern* and *Paris Match*, leading mass media publications in Germany and France respectively, which allows the study of macro-level advertising patterns in media.

Luxembourg is introduced as a separate case. The country is considered in broader perspective, as the unique characteristics of its consumer electronics market and of its multilingual as well as transnational media landscape allow for an in-depth analysis of how language, geography, and media interacted with advertising. In doing so, this work empirically investigates the suggestion of past research on the European history of consumption that the “transnationalization processes” of the post-war decades may have been much more pronounced in small Western European countries.⁷²

In their sum, these approaches provide a comprehensive picture of the production context of advertising in the consumer electronics sector and allow for an approximation of how divergent or convergent consumer experiences with consumer electronics advertising and connected sales measures were across the three EEC founding member countries Germany, France, and Luxembourg. By combining production-side analysis with a systematic inquiry into consumer exposure, this research offers a new methodological approach to advertising history: it analyzes

⁷² Schramm, 2009, p. 71. In the original German: “Transnationalisierungsprozesse”.

advertising as an outcome of contingent processes within companies operating under specific market circumstances to better understand advertising as a cultural phenomenon and economic mediator in mass consumer societies of the past.

This study's interdisciplinary approach and transnational framework position it at the intersection of several historiographical fields. By examining the production structures of advertising within consumer electronics companies in the context of marketing, it contributes to business and marketing history, particularly debates on the intertwinement of corporate strategy, organizational dynamics, and the evolution of promotional practices in multinational firms in a time of European integration. Its analysis of marketing campaigns, advertising, and sales measures further speaks to media historians and cultural historians of technology engaging with the question of how media devices and technologies were positioned and commercialized across different cultural, mediatic, and economic contexts – and how these processes intersected with media infrastructures or transnational flows of devices or content.

While this study contributes to the history of consumption of consumer electronics in Western Europe during the long 1960s – particularly for Luxembourg – its most significant contribution to the field is in providing a better understanding of the extent to which Western European consumers would have shared similar experiences with advertising and sales measures as the connecting forces in the marketplace, adding to debates on the Europeanization of consumption. In studying the processes of advertising and selling media devices, this research moves beyond national case studies, single-media perspectives, and a narrow focus on advertising that disregards its close connection to other promotional practices. The analytical framework that follows elaborates on how these dimensions are operationalized.

1.2.1 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework of this research is inspired by Konrad Dussel's postulate that studying advertising as a phenomenon of mass culture necessitates a framework that considers "production conditions, content, and circumstances of reception" as interrelated dimensions. Although priorities can be set within this triad, "[...] it can only be departed from at the cost of inadmissible simplification."⁷³ Dussel further identifies key methodological challenges: first,

⁷³ Dussel, K. (1997). Wundermittel Werbegeschichte? Werbung als Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft. *Neue Politische Literatur*, 42(1), 416–430, p. 429. In the original German: "Produktionsbedingungen, Inhalten und Rezeptionsgegebenheiten", "[...], doch darf dieser Rahmen nur um den Preis unzulässiger Verkürzung verlassen werden." In her brief discussion on advertising as a mediator in the market, De Iulio similarly underlines the necessity "[...] to situate any analysis of advertising artifacts within the broader context of studying the commercial work of the professionals who invent and produce them." ("Il devient, enfin, incontournable de situer toute analyse des artefacts publicitaires dans la toile de fond de l'étude du travail marchand des professionnels qui les inventent et les réalisent."), De Iulio, 2016, p. 44.

advertising historians should look beyond the nation-state to avoid treating the advertising conditions and practices in a country as inevitable. Second, they must consider how advertising formats and strategies vary between media. Third, they should take into account that different target groups were addressed in different ways. And fourth, they must distinguish between product groups given that:⁷⁴

“[...] so-called ‘low interest products’ of everyday life (such as cigarettes or toothpaste) are advertised differently than expensive ‘high interest products’ (such as stereo systems or cars), [...]”⁷⁵

Research on advertising in the context of mass consumer societies should hence ideally adopt a transnational and cross-media perspective that differentiates between target groups and considers what exactly is advertised – while also accounting for the consumer perspective, the content of advertising, and the contexts of advertising production. This raises the question of operationalization, which Dussel does not conclusively answer.⁷⁶

This research seeks to respond to Dussel’s demands by analyzing advertising in transnational perspective through two interlinked analytical lenses which will both be discussed in depth later on. This work examines both the production of advertising within company structures and the consumer exposure to advertising. These lenses are employed conjointly, albeit they are emphasized to different extents at different points. Advertising content remains pivotal throughout: neither is it possible to understand the production of culture without its product, nor consumer exposure without considering what was encountered. It is the hinge linking both. However, given that advertising efforts are part of “broader commercial interactions” in the marketplace,⁷⁷ this study argues that it is further necessary to set advertising in relation to other fields of marketing – a dimension notably absent in Dussel’s reflections, but vital to fully understand advertising’s cultural and economic role.

Combining the mutually dependent methodological approaches of transfer and comparison,⁷⁸ this research not only investigates “interactions, connections, and entanglements”⁷⁹ in advertising across Germany, France, and Luxembourg, but also traces how specifically national

⁷⁴ Dussel, 1997, pp. 417–418.

⁷⁵ Id., p. 417. In the original German: “[...] sogenannte ‘Low interest-Produkte’ des Alltags (wie Zigaretten oder Zahnpasta) werden anders beworben als kostspielige ‘High interest-Produkte’ (wie Stereoanlagen oder Autos) [...]”

⁷⁶ Id., pp. 417–418. Dussel underlines the theoretical potential of system theory while acknowledging the difficulties of making it viable in empirical practice, id., pp. 428–429.

⁷⁷ In line with the perspective taken in this work, De Iulio notes that studies which are interested in advertising as a mediating factor would need to take this broader commercial context into account, De Iulio, 2016, p. 42. In the original French: “interactions commerciales plus vastes”.

⁷⁸ Hüser, 2017, pp. 8–9.

⁷⁹ Bösch, F., & Büschel, H. (2012). Transnational and Global Perspectives as Travelling Concepts in the Study of Culture. In B. Neumann & A. Nünning (Eds.), *Travelling Concepts for the Study of Culture* (pp. 371–388). De Gruyter, p. 372.

or even local factors produced structural differences as well as similarities concerning both advertising production and consumer exposure.⁸⁰ The tension inherent to transnational historiographical approaches – using nations and national boundaries as the point of analytical departure while seeking to transcend them – is thus central throughout this work.⁸¹

One limitation of this research concerns its sector-specificity. Even though consumer electronics were a widely advertised and mass purchased class of durable consumer goods in Western Europe during the long 1960s, they were still only one class of products among the many services and low or high interest goods companies communicated to consumers about. Consumers would have encountered a barrage of advertising and marketing measures that went well beyond the consumer electronics sector, and this work necessarily only reproduces a slice of this total. Many of its empirical findings are furthermore specific to the consumer electronics sector. Keeping this in mind, the sector may serve as an exemplary case in questioning to what degree Western European durable consumer goods companies worked across borders in their advertising in this period of increasing European integration, and to what extent consumers would have had similar or dissimilar experiences with brand advertising for durable consumer goods across borders.

Nonetheless, it is crucial to not simply equate consumer electronics with other high interest goods. The particularities of the sector must be taken into account. This means touching upon questions of repair and specialized distribution networks. But when focusing on advertising and marketing measures for television sets, radios, and phono products, it is especially necessary to reflect on a characteristic that sets consumer electronics devices apart from other products: they are the user-facing component of media technologies, which exist “as both object *and* medium—a key distinctiveness of media technologies compared to other technologies [...]”⁸² Consumer electronics devices are dependent on media infrastructures and content, which thus have to be considered as well in historical analyses treating consumer electronics.⁸³

⁸⁰ The necessity for transnational studies on phenomena of popular (or mass) culture to compare, consider transfers, and investigate interactions and intertwinements has been emphasized by Hüser & Pfeil, 2015, p. 25. In recent years, this approach has informed a growing body of work on Western European popular culture during the long 1960s. A notable example is the research project *Transnational popular culture – Europe in the long 1960s* (<https://popkult60.eu/>, accessed December 29, 2025).

⁸¹ Gassert, P. (2012). *Transnationale Geschichte* (Version 2.0). *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*. Accessed December 29, 2025. http://docupedia.de/zg/gassert_transnationale_geschichte_v2_de_2012, pp. 2–4. See also Cronqvist, M., & Hilgert, C. (2017). Entangled Media Histories. The value of Transnational and Transmedial Approaches in Media Historiography. *Media History*, 23(1), 130–141, p. 132.

⁸² Fickers, A. (2014). “Neither good, nor bad; nor neutral”: The Historical *Dispositif* of Communication Technologies. In M. Schreiber & C. Zimmermann (Eds.), *Journalism and Technological Change: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Trends* (pp. 30–52). Campus Verlag, p. 42.

⁸³ Staffél, 2025, p. 9. See also Gliese, 2023, p. 113.

To put this in more practical terms: television sets necessitate broadcasting infrastructure and television programs, while record players are useless without a music industry that provides pre-recorded vinyl discs. Without these prerequisites, consumer electronics devices cannot fulfill their intended function. The same of course goes vice versa for the physical infrastructure and institutions linked to a given media technology, which is why Carina Gliese speaks of “symbiosis” in this context.⁸⁴ While such interrelations need to be considered for all media devices, they are especially pronounced for the network media technologies radio and television. Due to their network structure, rather technical decisions – like the commitment of a nation to a television resolution standard – had direct consequences on the “[...] characteristics of the production, transmission and reception technologies of television.”⁸⁵

It is only consequential that this key feature of media technologies impacted the advertising and marketing efforts for the consumer electronics brands and products under investigation here. While not every marketing and advertising effort for media devices was as strikingly linked to the mediality of its subject as in the case of the *M 300* parachute-jump campaign presented in the beginning, this work contends there is an intrinsic connection between the two that goes beyond the general link between mass media and advertising. It is argued that companies selling media devices were not only dependent on their products’ characteristics in their marketing and advertising, but also on the national and transnational factors influencing the corresponding other side of the media technology that the product the company tried to market was part of. This causality, in turn, shaped the consumer experience with consumer electronics advertising and sales measures. Media landscapes and infrastructures are thus discussed within the context of this work insofar as they had a relevant influence on the campaign strategies, marketing measures, advertising approaches, and advertisement content produced by company actors.

1.2.1.1 Studying the Production of Advertising in the Context of Marketing

Understanding advertising as a cultural phenomenon requires situating it within its production context. This work therefore adopts the “production of culture perspective” as its first analytical lens. It is based on the “[...] observation that in modern societies symbolic objects do not mysteriously appear but are fabricated by specialists who work in particular organizational

⁸⁴ As Gliese points out, media technologies usually involve multiple actors. The success of consumer electronics companies therefore also depends heavily on external factors, Gliese, 2023, pp. 181–182. In the original German: “Symbiose”.

⁸⁵ Fickers, A. (2012). The Emergence of Television as a Conservative Media Revolution: Historicising a Process of Remediation in the Post-War Western European Mass Media Ensemble. *Journal of Modern European History*, 10(1), 49–75, p. 67. On the social, political, and economic importance of technological standards illustrated by the example of color television, see Fickers, 2007.

environments.”⁸⁶ As Klaus Nathaus and C. Clayton Childress have underlined, historical media content is shaped by the “actors, structures and processes of content production” – a mechanism that remains understudied by historians.⁸⁷ In line with this approach, this research understands advertising strategies, advertisements, and other marketing materials as the results of a simultaneously cultural and economic historical practice⁸⁸ that involves actors who pursue predefined goals within the organizational structure of a company, who act in specific market environments, and who collaborate with internal and external partners.

Considering the aspects of advertising production in particular, this research builds upon the work of Liz McFall and Christian Kleinschmidt. McFall has emphasized the importance to analyze the conditions in which advertising content is produced “[...] as these have a material import in shaping the final appearance of advertisements.”⁸⁹ Kleinschmidt, on the other hand, has demonstrated that the introduction of new marketing, advertising, and public relations strategies during the 1960s was often intertwined with processes of corporate restructuring and realignment. He therefore argues that such developments must be considered in conjunction.⁹⁰ This research expands on their findings by jointly analyzing company internal sources and published ads. This allows to explicitly link the production context of advertising to its result, demonstrating how consumer-facing advertisements could be visibly influenced by corporate branding guidelines, decision-making processes, collaborations with other marketing functions, and directives on advertising and marketing – which in turn could result from underlying organizational transformations. This approach further allows to investigate potential disparities between intent and execution.

The production perspective of this research is, then, centered on the work of the marketers and advertisers employed by consumer electronics companies. Advertising agencies are considered to the extent to which they were involved in developing brand concepts, marketing strategies, or individual advertisements as external collaborators. Their internal workings are not analyzed in detail, as, in the context of this work, advertising production refers not to the technical steps

⁸⁶ Nathaus, K., & Childress, C. C. (2013). The Production of Culture Perspective in Historical Research: Integrating the Production, Meaning and Reception of Symbolic Objects. *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 10(1), 89–100, p. 90. See also Nathaus, K. (2014). Auf der Suche nach dem Publikum. Popgeschichte aus der »Production of Culture«-Perspektive. In A. Geisthövel & B. Mrozek (Eds.), *Popgeschichte. Band 1: Konzepte und Methoden* (pp. 127–153). Transcript Verlag, p. 129.

⁸⁷ Nathaus & Childress, 2013, p. 98. The production of culture approach notably does not dispute the agency of audiences when it comes to interpretation but rather emphasizes the necessity to begin with the creators when analyzing cultural products, Nathaus, 2014, p. 139.

⁸⁸ Liz McFall describes “Advertising practice [...] as a constituent entity, neither cultural nor economic in essence but, necessarily, both.”, McFall, L. (2004). *Advertising. A Cultural Economy*. SAGE Publications, p. 86.

⁸⁹ According to McFall, “technological, organizational, and institutional circumstances” may all have an impact. It is primarily the organizational layer which is considered in the context of this work, id., p. 193.

⁹⁰ Kleinschmidt, C. (2002). *Der produktive Blick. Wahrnehmung amerikanischer und japanischer Management- und Produktionsmethoden durch deutsche Unternehmer 1950–1985*. Akademie Verlag, p. 260.

of designing an ad or producing a commercial, but to the strategic decisions and organizational processes that shaped advertising content and connected sales measures – the arguably more important steps preceding and informing the precise execution.

The post-war decades are a particularly interesting period to study the interrelations between company organizational structures and promotional practices as both underwent fundamental changes. Between the 1950s and 1970s, many Western European enterprises adopted new organizational structures in response to the growing challenges posed by market dynamics, rapid expansion, and intensified competition. Although the timing, extent, and precise implementation of these restructurings varied, there was a shared tendency to move beyond purely functional structures by decentralizing responsibility and granting greater autonomy to company parts. To give but one example: following a reorganization during the 1960s, the operations of the German chemical and consumer goods company *Henkel* were in the hands of six business units, which each separately handled the development, production, sales, marketing, and commercial management for a group of related products, each also bearing the responsibility for its own profits.⁹¹

In a concomitant development, companies in Western European countries increasingly embraced marketing thought and methods in response to the demands of mass consumer markets.⁹² Jan Logemann even speaks of a “marketing revolution” to describe the widespread adoption of marketing management and the creation of marketing departments in German companies during the 1960s and 1970s as companies sought to more strongly orient their processes on consumers’ wishes and market demands.⁹³ Marketing designated a mode of consumer-oriented thinking and served as an umbrella term for all company operations that connect producers to consumers. This dual meaning was for instance highlighted by the Dutch

⁹¹ Kleinschmidt, 2002, pp. 260–275. On *Henkel* in particular, see id., p. 265. *Henkel*’s new structure was completed by functional departments which managed tasks such as logistics, human resources, or finances across units.

⁹² This link between consumer societies and the “shift from production to marketing orientation” (“Wandel von der Produktions- zur Marketingorientierung”) is for instance highlighted by Rossfeld, R. (2004). *Unternehmensgeschichte als Marketinggeschichte. Zu einer Erweiterung traditioneller Ansätze in der Unternehmensgeschichtsschreibung*. In C. Kleinschmidt & F. Triebel (Eds.), *Marketing. Historische Aspekte der Wettbewerbs- und Absatzpolitik* (pp. 17–39). Klartext Verlag, p. 31. For an overview of the history of marketing in Germany, see Berghoff, H. (2007). *Marketing im 20. Jahrhundert. Absatzinstrument—Managementphilosophie—Universelle Sozialtechnik*. In H. Berghoff (Ed.), *Marketinggeschichte: Die Genese einer modernen Sozialtechnik* (pp. 11–58). Campus Verlag; Köhler, 2021. For France, see Meuleau, M. (1988). *L’introduction du marketing dans l’entreprise en France (1880-1973)*. *Revue Française de Gestion*, 70, 58–71.

⁹³ Logemann, 2021, pp. 320–321. The concept of marketing also came to influence higher education in business and economics during the 1960s in Germany and France alike, Chessel, 2004, p. 141; Dietz, B. (2020). *Revolte in der Warenwelt. Konsumkritik, nonkonformistische Ästhetik und der Paradigmenwechsel in der westdeutschen Werbeindustrie von 1968–86*. In K. Moser, F. X. Eder, & M. Keller (Eds.), *Grenzenlose Werbung: Zwischen Konsum und Audiovision* (pp. 145–171). De Gruyter, p. 147. On the reasons driving the adoption of marketing management around 1960, see Hansen, U., & Bode, M. (1999). *Marketing & Konsum. Theorie und Praxis von der Industrialisierung bis ins 21. Jahrhundert*. Franz Vahlen, p. 103.

multinational *Philips* in the resolutions of its 1959 international advertising convention, which defined marketing as being:

“[...] on the one side, a complete coördination [sic] and integration of all activities aimed at moving the goods from the manufacturer to the consumer, such as research, product design, pricing, direct selling, sales promotion, merchandising, advertising, public relations, etc., and, on the other side, a strong orientation on the wishes and the requirements of the consumer.”⁹⁴

Such reorientations usually entailed changes to a company’s organizational structure because a resolute implementation of the “[...] marketing demand for co-ordination and linkage of all activities of a firm concerning sales [...]” necessitated the redistribution of responsibilities, as Schröter has pointed out.⁹⁵ When companies modified their organizational structure during the long 1960s, advertising could hence become one of several integrated components within the broader framework of marketing – making the boundary between both terms not always clear-cut. Depending on context, advertisers were, for instance, also referred to as marketers.

The combination of these factors makes it necessary to not only consider a company’s advertising function in the narrowest sense when studying the production of advertising in the long 1960s, but to also situate it within company structures and consider it in the broader context of marketing. And given that the examples found in the literature reveal a considerable degree of variety in when and how companies incorporated marketing into their organizational frameworks,⁹⁶ advertising production must be examined at the level of individual companies. This involves asking if and how marketing thought was introduced in a particular company and how this impacted its advertising practice and its published ads. It needs to be studied to what extent company actors conceived advertising strategies and approaches in connection with other forms of marketing and if they acted on the basis of overarching brand strategies.

Rather than treating the developments of the long 1960s as abstract, this work empirically studies how they unfolded in practice on a transnational scale within multinational consumer electronics companies in line with the production of culture perspective. In a broader sense, this work follows the call by Oldenziel, de la Bruhèze, and de Wit to use the question of how multinationals navigated the tensions between cross-border ambitions and national specificities in the European marketplace as an entry point to study “the mediation processes at the junction

⁹⁴ N.N. (1959), *Resolutions of the Philips international advertising convention held in Eindhoven from April 27th until May 2nd, 1959*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, non-paginated.

⁹⁵ Schröter, 1998, p. 26.

⁹⁶ See for instance Köhler’s work on the German car makers *Daimler-Benz* and *Volkswagen*, Köhler, I. (2008). Marketingmanagement als Strukturmodell. Der organisatorische Wandel in der deutschen Automobilindustrie der 1960er bis 80er Jahre. *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte*, 53(2), 216–239. See further the examples of the consumer goods companies *Henkel* and *Dr. Oetker* raised by Kleinschmidt and Berghoff respectively, Kleinschmidt, 2002, p. 237; Berghoff, 2007, p. 17.

between production and consumption” which help understand “the hidden integration of Europe”.⁹⁷

As this research approaches its topic from a practical angle, it does not contribute to the history of marketing theory. Nor is it a history of the consumer electronics industry or of individual companies. Evolving ownership structures, for instance, are only considered insofar as they are relevant to understand the outward brand presentation in line with advertising’s consumer-facing logic. When examining the organizational processes within *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Braun*, or when investigating the market entry period of the *Telefunken* and *Grundig* brands in France, the focus remains on advertising and connected forms of marketing in transnational perspective. This central research interest also informs the second analytical lens employed in this work.

1.2.1.2 Approximating the Consumer Experience with Advertising

Studying the role of advertising in mass consumer societies requires taking both sides of the equation into consideration, meaning communicators and recipients. However, while company sources allow to trace the production perspective, it is impossible to know how consumers would have interpreted an ad – or whether they paid attention to it. Following Schwarzkopf, this research makes no assumptions in this regard: “Semiotic analysis does not allow for the fact that historians cannot replicate the way people in the past read and understood the advertisements they saw.”⁹⁸ This study therefore does not ask about reception in the sense of a consumer response to advertising, nor does it approximate the consumer perspective through semiotic analysis in the Barthesian sense.⁹⁹ Neither does it investigate advertisements as a “distorted mirror” of past societal realities.¹⁰⁰

Instead, this research uses exposure as its second analytical lens. It asks about the many contexts and forms in which consumers encountered advertising and related marketing measures for consumer electronics to approximate the consumer experience with advertising as a cultural and economic reality of everyday life. This lens necessitates adjusting the perspective slightly: while company-internal transnational coordination efforts could result in deliberately similar consumer experiences with advertising and marketing measures across borders, consumers could have also had unintentionally similar encounters and experiences that need to be taken

⁹⁷ Oldenziel, R., de la Bruhèze, A. A., & de Wit, O. (2005). Europe’s Mediation Junction: Technology and Consumer Society in the 20th Century. *History & Technology*, 21(1), 107–139, pp. 123–125.

⁹⁸ Schwarzkopf, 2011, p. 536.

⁹⁹ Barthes, R. (1964). Rhétorique de l’image. *Communications*, 4, 40–51. For an introduction to classical semiotic analysis as a means to study advertising, see De Iulio, 2016, pp. 17–28.

¹⁰⁰ A term and notion coined by Marchand, R. (1985). *Advertising the American dream: Making way for modernity, 1920-1940*. University of California Press.

into account. Consumers would also not have experienced advertising in isolation. This makes it necessary to trace advertising across media, while remaining aware of the specific temporal and spatial contexts in which consumers were targeted. In this regard, this research takes inspiration from an observation by Andreas Fickers:

“If one wants to even approximately assess the significance and impact of media from a social-, political-, and cultural-historical perspective, it is not enough to examine them as isolated entities. Only an analysis of the interplay of all media in the mass media ensemble would make it possible to understand the influence of mediated realities on the lives of certain groups at certain times in certain places.”¹⁰¹

Due to its mediated nature, this remark also applies to advertising. To communicate to consumers about a product or brand, advertisers in 1960s Western Europe could rely on nationwide-read magazines, radio and television stations, regional newspapers, or local outdoor advertising measures. Studying advertising thus necessarily means engaging closely with media landscapes. There is, however, an added layer of complexity to be considered, as mediated encounters between producers and consumers were not the only possibility. Companies would also work with retailers to present products to passersby in their shop windows and provide brochures or merchandise for consumers that entered a shop. Consumers would not have experienced mass media advertising in isolation, which is why this research investigates the interplay between mediated encounters and “the actual confrontations on markets” between suppliers and consumers, thereby adding to previous research by Sebastian Teupe on this neglected topic of consumption history.¹⁰²

Tracing consumer exposure to advertising cross-media as well as in combination with other marketing forms poses a methodological challenge. The everyday contexts in which Western European consumers in the long 1960s were exposed to ads and marketing measures were manifold, involving different brands, products, sectors, and media, with consumers potentially being simultaneously targeted as part of different target audiences depending on their interests and circumstances. Neither mass media advertisements nor company sources alone suffice to approximate this diversity. Both source types have epistemological value the other cannot offer, leading to the necessity to investigate the consumer exposure to advertising through several complementary approaches.

¹⁰¹ Fickers, A. (2009). Eventing Europe. Europäische Fernseh- und Mediengeschichte als Zeitgeschichte. *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 49, 391–416, p. 415. In the original German: “Will man die Bedeutung und Wirkmächtigkeit von Medien aus sozial-, politik- und kulturgeschichtlicher Perspektive auch nur annähernd einschätzen können, reicht es nicht, diese als isolierte Einheiten zu untersuchen. Erst die Analyse des Zusammenspiels aller Medien im massenmedialen Ensemble würde es erlauben, den Einfluss medial vermittelter Wirklichkeiten auf die Lebenswelt bestimmter Gruppen zu bestimmten Zeiten an bestimmten Orten nachvollziehbar zu machen.”

¹⁰² Teupe, 2016a. For the quote and assessment, see id., p. 319. In the original German: “Die tatsächlichen Konfrontationen auf Märkten”. For an introduction to Teupe’s work, see Teupe, S. (2016b). Material Incentives, Market Relations, and Historical Change: Selling Television Sets in West Germany and the United States. *Enterprise & Society*, 17(4), 839–873.

Company sources make it possible to comprehensively trace marketing practices. They reveal where and how often a brand or product was advertised in mass media, and provide information on the sales measures consumers could have encountered in connection, both for individual campaigns and on a structural level. Crucially, they further allow to unearth marketing and advertising measures happening completely outside of the mainstream. These aspects of the consumer experience remain hidden when only drawing on advertisements in one or two media publications as a historical source, making company-level analysis invaluable to understand interactions across media and between marketing forms for certain products, for a company in a given market, and for the investigated sector at large.

What combination of advertising and sales measures a company employed depended on a range of factors, such as its market position in a country at a particular point in time, its internal organization, and the media and retail landscape. For individual marketing campaigns and measures, their configuration then also depended on the goals, target group(s), and the type of product in question. Dussel has therefore cautioned against overgeneralizing the results of the analysis of individual campaigns.¹⁰³ To guard against this risk, this research studies the marketing and advertising of multiple companies across market environments, campaigns, products, target groups, and contexts. Through an array of contextually embedded, empirical case studies and a reconstruction of structural advertising and sales characteristics specific to the investigated sector based on material from several company archives, this research explores transnational, local, and to a certain extent also socio-demographic differences and commonalities in the Western European consumer experience with consumer electronics advertising and marketing measures.

Understanding the consumer exposure to advertising of course requires to also consider advertisements. This research takes up Schwarzkopf's recommendation for historians to use ads as a source about advertising, in the sense that they help "[...] understand how advertisers aimed to present their product, in which market segment they wanted to position it, and which visual and textual means they employed over time."¹⁰⁴ This merit of advertisements as sources has also been explicitly underlined by cultural historians of technology. As Heike Weber notes:

“Since advertising has become the most important medium for communicating technology on the part of manufacturers, advertising messages are ultimately indispensable for a user-oriented history of technology.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Dussel, 1997, pp. 428–429.

¹⁰⁴ Schwarzkopf, 2011, p. 537.

¹⁰⁵ Weber, 2008, p. 78. In the original German: “Da Werbung zum bedeutendsten Medium der produzentenseitigen Technikvermittlung geworden ist, sind Werbekommunikate letztlich für eine am Nutzer orientierte Technikgeschichte unverzichtbar.”

Advertisements for consumer electronics reveal what advertisers believed consumers valued about a media technology and/or device, providing usage suggestions and highlighting connected values.¹⁰⁶ Past research on media devices has mostly focused on tracing the aims of producers through ads, underutilizing company sources on intent and strategy,¹⁰⁷ even though they provide valuable additional insights as to why a brand or product was shown in a certain manner. This research thus links published ads and company material whenever possible to uncover how internal planning processes translated into practice, to investigate the tension between intent and external perception, and to situate ads in the context of larger campaigns. To provide additional perspectives on the advertising exposure of consumers in Western European mass consumer societies beyond individual brands or products, this research further studies advertising on a media and societal level.

Studying advertisements published in a specific medium in sequence introduces a macro-perspective on the consumer experience that company sources alone cannot provide. This approach helps to assess the scope of consumer electronics mass media advertising in Germany and France, and reveals patterns across brands and products. Using a representative dataset of consumer electronics ads published in the German illustrated magazine *Stern* and its French counterpart *Paris Match*, this study examines how insertion patterns varied across seasons, and how ads developed visually over time.¹⁰⁸ The findings are then cross-referenced with qualitative source material. This combined approach enables a more comprehensive understanding of the full range of consumer electronics advertising that readers of either mainstream magazine encountered, thereby complementing the insights derived from the company-, product-, and target group-focused case studies.

From a broader perspective, the development of advertising as a form of communication is closely tied to mass media history and “[...] thus reflects fundamental communicative structures of the respective society.”¹⁰⁹ While this connection can only be touched upon for Germany and France, it is analyzed in depth for Luxembourg on a national level: ads published in Luxembourgish media are linked the transnational and multilingual media consumption patterns of the country's inhabitants, the Grand Duchy's geography and media infrastructure, and the conditions of its small but distinct consumer electronics market. This approach allows

¹⁰⁶ Weber, 2008, p. 78.

¹⁰⁷ As pointed out by Burkhart, B. (2021). Hinter den Kulissen. Historische Produktionskulturforschung zu Musikabspielgeräten. In C. Dörfling, C. Jost, & M. Pfeleiderer (Eds.), *Musikobjektgeschichte. Populäre Musik und materielle Kultur* (pp. 133–160). Waxmann, p. 155.

¹⁰⁸ Both the magazines and the methodology behind the quantitative analysis are discussed in chapter 3.4.2.

¹⁰⁹ Reinhardt, 1993, p. 22. In the original German: “[...] reflektiert somit grundlegende kommunikative Strukturen der jeweiligen Gesellschaft.”

to examine why and how Luxembourgish consumer exposure to consumer electronics advertising – and the Luxembourgish experience with advertising in general – would have diverged from neighboring Germany and France.

1.2.2 Sources and Archives

The outlined approach requires a deliberately broad and heterogeneous source base. As advertising historian Véronique Pouillard has pointed out, it is easy to find any historical advertisements. The difficulty rather lies in constructing a representative corpus, given that not all types of advertising are equally well preserved.¹¹⁰ This research addresses this challenge by tracing several campaigns across media and markets primarily through company sources, and by compiling a complementary corpus of magazine ads which is used to cross-reference company materials with published ads as well as to quantitatively analyze a representative collection of consumer electronics ads published in two magazines in its own right. To study the production of advertising in multinational companies and to approximate the consumer experience in cross-media and transnational perspective, this research thus draws on company archives, magazine advertisement collections, and – particularly in the Luxembourgish case – on reports in the general press.

Following actors, devices, or advertising phenomena across markets or media during the long 1960s, these advertisements, press reports, and archival materials are supplemented by statistical data, market studies, directories, and trade press articles (for instance published in the German *Funkschau* or the French *Le Haut-Parleur*). These source types are used to contextualize and comprehensively trace the cultural and economic aspects of advertising, and to better understand the different Western European consumer electronics markets. They were sourced from a variety of contexts, including the *INAtèque* in Paris, the German, Belgian, and Luxembourgish national libraries, and the digital *Archive of European Integration* hosted by the University of Pittsburgh. It is evident that not all source types and consulted archival fonds are equally pertinent for every aspect of this research. Consequently, the sources – as well as potential limitations – are discussed more extensively at various points throughout this work to highlight the source base of a certain section.

Company archives form the backbone of the first two parts of this research. They provide internal correspondence, budgets, meeting minutes, organigrams, policy papers, style manuals, contracts, circulars, as well as business and market reports that allow to understand the organizational structure of a company's marketing and advertising function, and to situate the

¹¹⁰ Pouillard, 2005b, pp. 21–22.

production contexts of advertising in multinational perspective. Crucially, company archives also offer marketing plans, advertising expenditure forms, insertion schedules, communications to retail partners, and a variety of advertising and sales promotion materials which provide further insight into the strategy, intent, and practice of adjusting advertising to markets, consumer electronics devices, product groups, and target audiences. While this work draws on several company-related archival holdings, the histories of the examined consumer electronics companies, as well as the market contexts in which they operated, are discussed only in the context of advertising production and exposure.

As *Philips* was the largest electrical corporation in mid-1960s Europe,¹¹¹ and a key actor in all examined markets, sources from the *Philips Company Archive* (PCA) in Eindhoven offer an indispensable perspective on the degree of Europeanization in consumer electronics advertising.¹¹² The PCA's holdings allowed to trace the Dutch multinational's advertising production, and to study the execution of concrete marketing campaigns and measures by the company's subsidiaries in Germany and France. For the Luxembourgish case, this research further drew on company sources produced by *Philips's* Belgian and Luxembourgish subsidiaries, which can be found in the *Joseph Cuvelier Repository* of the *State Archives of Belgium* (AGR 2) in Brussels.

The most extensive holdings consulted were those of the German consumer electronics company *Telefunken* at the *Deutsches Technikmuseum Berlin* (DTMB). In the 1950s and 1960s,

¹¹¹ Measured by revenue, Seydel (1966, November 11). *Die 20 grössten Unternehmen der europäischen Elektroindustrie (1965 – nach Umsatzrangfolge)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2031. For an overview of *Philips's* company history between 1891–1991, see Dai, X. (1996). *Corporate strategy, public policy, and new technologies. Philips and the European consumer electronics industry*. Pergamon, pp. 59–100. For a company history that focuses more strongly on the company's overall organizational structure and ends in the late 1960s/early 1970s, see Chanier, 1990, pp. 15–50.

¹¹² Christophe Chanier has examined *Philips's* role in driving European integration, and how the company's overall structure was in turn affected by it for the period 1949–1966. Advertising and sales promotion are addressed only very briefly at a few points throughout, Chanier, 1990. Xiudian Dai has analyzed *Philips's* structure and strategy in relation to European industry policy between the late 1970s and early 1990s, Dai, 1996. Other authors have studied more specialized aspects of the company's internal organization, Europeanization, and internationalization. For a global perspective of *Philips's* European integration processes, see van der Eng, P. (2017). European Integration and Australian Manufacturing Industry: The Case of Philips Electronics, 1960s–1970s. *Australian Economic History Review*, 57(2), 217–238. On *Philips's* internal organization and technology development in the 1950s, see Davids, M., & Verbong, G. (2006). Intraorganizational Alignment and Innovation Processes: Philips and Transistor Technology. *The Business History Review*, 80(4), 657–688. Concerning the internationalization of its production, see van der Putten, F.-P. (2004). Corporate Governance and the Eclectic Paradigm: The Investment Motives of Philips in Taiwan in the 1960s. *Enterprise & Society*, 5(3), 490–526. Despite the company's overall internal organizational structure and its European dimension thus both being rather well understood, *Philips's* advertising and marketing have received comparatively little attention apart from the author's previous work on the organizational impact of marketing thought, Höfer, M. (2024). Reigning in 'little kingdoms'? The implementation of marketing within the advertising function of the Philips Company (1959–1977). *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing*. Advance online publication. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JHRM-03-2024-0015>. This research expands on that paper by investigating the transnational character of *Philips's* advertising production in the 1960s, how national subsidiaries implemented specific campaigns, and what both meant for consumer exposure in Western Europe.

Telefunken experienced what Staffel has called its “Golden Age”, expanding its production capabilities (first in Germany and later abroad), growing its revenue, and increasingly turning toward foreign markets to sell its consumer electronics, electronic components, and professional equipment.¹¹³ As *Telefunken* became one of the most important European consumer electronics brands of the post-war decades,¹¹⁴ and because of an exceptionally broad source basis particularly for the timeframe 1961-1967, *Telefunken* features prominently throughout the work – to study advertising production in transnational perspective, the move of German consumer electronics brands into the French market, and marketing measures and campaigns of various sizes and extents.

The German consumer products company *Braun* was chosen as a complementary case study to the more broadly used archival fonds of *Philips* and *Telefunken*. Renowned for its product design, *Braun* also developed a distinctive corresponding corporate advertising style, which it sought to internationalize as the company grew from a family enterprise into a multinational, foreign-owned corporation.¹¹⁵ To trace this development, this research consulted the *Braun Archiv BraunSammlung* (BS) in Kronberg im Taunus as well as records from the American advertising agency *J. Walter Thompson*,¹¹⁶ whose German subsidiary worked for *Braun* in the early 1970s. This source collection allowed to document agency collaboration and provided an

¹¹³ For *Telefunken*’s company history since its foundation in 1903 as the *Gesellschaft für drahtlose Telegrafie m.b.H.*, see Staffel, 2025, pp. 212–303. He particularly focuses on *Telefunken*’s answer to the structural crisis of the 1970s and to the challenge posed by the Japanese consumer electronics industry, extensively covering the 1970s and early 1980s. More specifically on the 1950s and 1960s, id., pp. 212–224. For the quote, id., p. 212. In the original German: “‘Goldenes Zeitalter’”. For a more concise overview of the company’s history, see Mahr, E. (2003). Im Kraftfeld von Zeitgeschehen—Zeitgeist—Erfindergeist. Das Phänomen der elektromagnetischen Wellen weckt Pioniergeist und Kreativität. In E. Thiele (Ed.), *Telefunken nach 100 Jahren. Das Erbe einer deutschen Weltmarke* (2nd ed., pp. 15–57). Nicolai. In 1967, *Telefunken* was merged with its parent company *AEG*, although the company’s consumer electronics sector continued to trade under the *Telefunken* brand name and retained a large degree of organizational autonomy. A few years later, in 1972, the company’s consumer electronics business became an independent daughter company, the *Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH*. The period between 1972 and 1983 (the year *Telefunken* was bought by the French company *Thomson*) has been extensively covered by Gliese. Similar to Staffel, she also covers the company’s answers to the structural crisis and challenges faced by German consumer electronics companies at the time, Gliese, 2023, pp. 185–336.

¹¹⁴ Staffel notes that in the early 1970s, *AEG-Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business unit – which continued to use the *Telefunken* branding following the merger – “[...] manifested the aspiration to be one of the largest and most significant manufacturers of brown goods in Europe.” (“[...] manifestierte den Anspruch, einer der größten und bedeutendsten Hersteller der braunen Ware in Europa zu sein.”), Staffel, 2025, p. 223.

¹¹⁵ While there are many publications that discuss *Braun* design or designers that worked for the company (such as Otl Aicher and Dieter Rams) in some form, the company’s internationalization and advertising efforts have received much less attention. On *Braun*’s product design, the history of its products, and for short biographies of its leading designers, see Polster, B. (2005). *Braun. 50 Jahre Produktinnovationen*. DuMont. For a collection of primary sources, accounts and interviews involving key figures such as Artur Braun and Fritz Eichler, and another history of *Braun*’s product design, see Jatzke-Wigand, H., & Klatt, J. (Eds.) (2011). *Design+Design Zero. Wie das Braun-Design entstand/The Development of the Braun Design*. More generally on *Braun*’s company history and one of its leading figures, see Wichmann, H. (1998). *Mut zum Aufbruch. Erwin Braun 1921-1992*. Prestel.

¹¹⁶ Due to excellent archival accessibility, *J. Walter Thompson*’s overall history has been comparatively well-studied. On the company’s business in Europe since the interwar period, see Hultquist, 1996, pp. 232–287; 2003; Pouillard, V. (2005a). American Advertising Agencies in Europe: J. Walter Thompson’s Belgian Business in the Inter-War Years. *Business History*, 47(1), 44–58.

external perspective on *Braun*'s advertising practice. It is held at the *John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising & Marketing History*, *David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library* (Hartman Center) at Duke University, Durham.

The last two company-related sets of sources originate from the *Loewe Opta Archiv* (LOA) in Kronach and the *Historical Archives of the European Union* (HAEU) in Florence respectively. While sources on the advertising strategy and budget of the medium-sized German consumer electronics company *Loewe Opta*¹¹⁷ provided additional perspectives, the files from the HAEU pertain to a court case involving the major German consumer electronics company *Grundig*, its French partner *Consten*, and the European Commission.¹¹⁸ Its dossiers are used jointly with sources from the DTMB for a case study on the role of advertising, transnational trade, and distribution in the market introduction phase of German consumer electronics brands in France during the first half of the 1960s.

This focus on the Dutch *Philips* and several German brands aligns with the historically asymmetrical process of integration between Western European consumer electronics markets. As will be discussed later, Luxembourg did not have any domestic consumer electronics production in the long 1960s, and France's manufacturers did not establish a significant advertising presence in Luxembourg or Germany. The company source selection is thus fitting for this research interested in questions of Europeanization in consumer electronics advertising during the long 1960s. It does, however, simultaneously reflect an imbalance in the archival landscape: it was not possible to locate company-internal material relating to the advertising and marketing of a genuinely French consumer electronics brand such as *Teppaz*.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ *Loewe Opta*'s company history and its position within the German consumer electronics industry have been researched extensively, see Steiner, 2005; Speidel, 2012. See further Steiner, K. J. L. (2023). *Loewe. 100 Jahre Designgeschichte / Loewe. 100 years design history*. av edition; (1998). *Die Loewe-Chronik. 75 Jahre Loewe Opta GmbH (1923 - 1998)*. Loewe Opta. The company is referred to as *Loewe* in the remainder of this work.

¹¹⁸ On *Grundig*'s company history, see Staffel, 2025, pp. 95–209. As there is no *Grundig* company archive, Staffel had to draw on several different archival fonds to reconstruct *Grundig*'s history. For a discussion of these sources and the few previous publications on the company, see id., pp. 21, 24–25. Staffel does not extensively examine *Grundig*'s French business, however, nor does he draw on the court case files used in this work. So far, they have only been examined from a legal perspective, Bacharis, G. (2021a). *Consten and Grundig and the Inception of an EU Competition Law. European Papers*, 6(1), 553–566. Bacharis gives an overview of the legal aspects of the *Grundig/Consten*-case, the archival dossiers of the court case, and especially the impact of the case on European law. He deems the case to have been “[...] a highly significant step in the evolution of EU competition law doctrine.”, id., p. 554. For a summary of all documents contained in the case files, see Annex 1 of Bacharis, G. (2021b). *The Court of Justice in the Archives Project. Analysis of the Consten and Grundig case (56/64 and 58/64)*. European University Institute, Academy of European Law. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://hdl.handle.net/1814/71538>.

¹¹⁹ The *Archives nationale du monde du Travail* in Roubaix, for instance, indicated that its collection of sources pertaining to various French consumer electronics companies (Série M, MM. Construction mécanique et électrique, optique, radio) did not extensively cover topics of marketing or advertising, as did the municipal archives in Lyon and the departmental archives Rhône/Lyon for *Teppaz* in particular. Inquiries with companies were equally unsuccessful. There seems to be no readily accessible company archive. Isabelle Gaillard also relied on state archives, market research studies, and reports held in the company archives of banks to investigate French consumer electronics companies, Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 313–318. Similarly, there is no consumer electronics

The second pillar of this research is systematic collections of consumer electronics advertisements for the timeframe 1959-1974 from three print publications. The illustrated magazines *Stern* (Germany), *Paris Match* (France), and *Revue* (Luxembourg) were chosen for their status as leading weeklies with nationwide reach in their respective countries.¹²⁰ Across all three magazines, several years' issues between 1959 and 1974 were consulted (nearly) in full to construct representative datasets that served as a base for cross-referencing and qualitative analysis. In the case of *Stern* and *Paris Match*, metadata collected from a total of 1.622 ads was further used for comparative quantitative analysis.¹²¹ The ads in the *Revue* were treated separately due to the specificity of the Luxembourgish media and advertising landscape. This base corpus was supplemented by ad collections from the widely read German and French youth magazines *Bravo* and *Salut les Copains*.¹²² They were used conjointly with company sources to allow for the analysis of campaigns that did not make use of *Stern* or *Paris Match*. The Luxembourg case required a distinct source strategy for two reasons. First, unlike for Germany or France, very little research has been published on the Grand Duchy's media¹²³ and

company included in Roger Nougaret's overview of company archives in France, Nougaret, R. (2008). Overview of Business Archives in France. *Culture e Impresa*, 6 [PDF]. Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://cultureimpresa.it/06-2008/english/pdf/ica02.pdf>.

¹²⁰ The readership of *Stern* and *Paris Match* – as well as their role as advertising media are discussed more extensively in chapter 3.4.2. For the *Revue*'s reach and role, see chapter 4.1.2. For a general assessment of the importance of print advertising at the time, see chapter 3.4.1.1.

¹²¹ The corpus construction and data collection process are outlined in chapter 3.4.2.

¹²² Both youth magazines were the undisputed market leaders in their segment during the long 1960s, reaching millions of readers. The literature on their socio-cultural impact is vast. For a transnational perspective on these youth magazines' relation to youth culture and consumption, see Maldener, A. (2017). Fabulous consumerism? Mediale Repräsentationen jugendlicher Konsumkultur in westdeutschen, britischen und französischen Jugendzeitschriften der 1960er und 1970er Jahre. In D. Hüser (Ed.), *Populärkultur transnational. Lesen, Hören, Sehen, Erleben im Europa der langen 1960er Jahre*. (pp. 199–224). Transcript Verlag; Mrozek, 2019, pp. 546–573. Specifically on the *Bravo* in the post-war period, see Kuttner, A. (2006). “1968” in der BRAVO? In Archiv der Jugendkulturen e.V. (Ed.), *50 Jahre BRAVO* (second, expanded and updated edition, pp. 73–83). Thomas Tilsner; Maase, K. (2006). Medium jugendlicher Emanzipation: BRAVO in den 50ern. In Archiv der Jugendkulturen e.V. (Ed.), *50 Jahre BRAVO* (second, expanded and updated edition, pp. 25–35). Thomas Tilsner. On *Salut les Copains*, see Quillien, C. (2009). *Nos années Salut les Copains 1959/1976*. Flammarion; Tinker, C. (2007). Shaping Youth in *Salut les copains*. *Modern & Contemporary France*, 15(3), 293–308; (2011). Shaping 1960s youth in Britain and France: *Fabulous* and *Salut les copains*. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 14(6), 641–657; Vergnioux, A., & Lemonnier, J.-M. (2010). Les adolescents des années soixante: *Salut les copains* ! *Le Telemaque*, 38(2), 87–100.

¹²³ On the lacking Luxembourgish media historiography and the challenging situation concerning the availability of pertinent sources, see Lesch, P. (2011). Histoire des médias au Luxembourg: Un grand chantier de recherche encore peu exploré. In M. Colas-Blaise & G. M. Tore (Eds.), *Médias et médiations culturelles au Luxembourg* (pp. 93–105). Éditions Guy Binsfeld. According to Lesch, the country's television history and its Luxembourgish-language radio have been especially understudied, id., p. 94. Notably, a lot of research has been done on the history of the radio station *Radio Luxembourg*. Past works have, however, not focused on the situation of Luxembourg proper but rather on *Radio Luxembourg*'s international dimension and foreign-language broadcasting, Maréchal, D. (2010). *RTL, Histoire d'une radio populaire. De Radio Luxembourg à RTL.fr*. Nouveau Monde; Berg, K. (2021). *Grenzenlose Unterhaltung: Radio Luxemburg in der Bundesrepublik 1957-1980*. Wallstein Verlag; Jehle, A. (2018). *Welle der Konsumgesellschaft: Radio Luxembourg in Frankreich 1945-1975*. Wallstein Verlag; Legay, R. (2023). *The Cultural Histories of Radio Luxembourg and Europe n°1: Broadcasting Across Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan. Nonetheless, there are a handful of publications this research can build upon. For the historical evolution of the country's press landscape and the histories of its individual press publications, see Hilgert, R.

advertising¹²⁴ history in the long 1960s despite the country's unique characteristics. The history of its consumer electronics market has not been studied at all. This research thus takes a broader perspective on Luxembourg to address several gaps in the research before studying consumer electronics advertising in the narrower sense. Second, the consulted company archives contained few materials specific to the Grand Duchy, despite all examined brands having a partner or subsidiary in the country.¹²⁵ Inquiries to the Luxembourgish national archive and to the municipal archives of Esch-sur-Alzette and the City of Luxembourg about the country's consumer electronics wholesalers and retailers did not yield pertinent results either. Even the source base on *Philips Luxembourg* in the *State Archives of Belgium* was only of limited use for the questions central to this study.

For these reasons, this work draws on an extensive press corpus for Luxembourg – including the *Revue*, the leading newspaper *Luxemburger Wort*, and *d'Letzeburger Land* – accessed through *eluxemburgensia.lu*. It was complemented by data from the national institute of statistics and economic studies (*STATEC*), legal texts, market studies and research reports, directories such as the *Indicateur Publicitaire* and the *Annuaire Luxembourgeois*, and a set of television advertising films broadcast on *Télé-Luxembourg* and preserved at the *Centre national de l'audiovisuel (CNA)* in Dudelange. This combination of sources allowed to study the role of (consumer electronics) advertising in a small, multilingual European market, and how it was influenced by cross-border trade and media flows.

(2004). *Zeitungen in Luxemburg 1704–2004*. Service information et presse du gouvernement Luxembourgeois. Briefly on Luxembourgish broadcasting history and politics, see Hirsch, M. (1989). Das Zeitalter der audiovisuellen Medien. In M. Gerges (Ed.), *Memorial 1989. La société luxembourgeoise de 1839 à 1989* (pp. 929–937). Michael Begasse provides a broader overview of media in Luxembourg. Although he focuses on the then-current situation in the early 1990s, his work also covers some historical developments in the overall media landscape, Begasse, M. (1994). *Luxemburg als Medienstandort—Eine Bestandsaufnahme* [Diploma thesis, Katholische Universität Eichstätt]. And in his work on language usage in Luxembourg, Guy Berg examines the country's media and advertising in the late 1980s, sporadically covering earlier periods, Berg, G. (1993). »Mir wëlle bleiwe, wat mir sin«. *Soziolinguistische und sprachtypologische Betrachtungen zur luxemburgischen Mehrsprachigkeit*. Max Niemeyer Verlag, pp. 39–56.

¹²⁴ Luxembourg's advertising history has been largely unstudied. The country's modern advertising landscape has been researched from a communication science perspective by Reddeker, S. (2014). *Werbung und Identität im multikulturellen Raum. Der Werbediskurs in Luxemburg. Ein kommunikationswissenschaftlicher Beitrag*. Transcript Verlag. His work briefly touches upon the historical development of the Luxembourgish advertising industry and market, id., pp. 127–131. Besides Reddeker and Guy Berg's work on language cited in the footnote above, only one further publication could be identified that relates to advertising in Luxembourg in any form: Laura Kozlik has analyzed the historical evolution of the depiction of women in ads published in the Luxembourgish magazine *Revue*, studying ads as a mediatic representation of sexism in society, Kozlik, L. (2018). Mises en scène de la dévalorisation du féminin. Soixante-dix ans de sexisme publicitaire dans le magazine *Revue*. In G. Goetzinger, S. Kmec, D. Roster, & R. Wagener (Eds.), *Mit den Haien streiten. Frauen und Gender in Luxemburg seit 1940. Femmes et genre au Luxembourg depuis 1940* (pp. 203–216). Capybarabooks.

¹²⁵ See chapters 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.

1.2.3 Structure

This work follows a three-part structure. The first part examines the production of advertising within multinational consumer electronics companies under consideration of internal organizational structures and external market realities. Through case studies on *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Braun*, it explores how marketing thought, corporate identity ambitions, and varying degrees of cross-departmental coordination shaped advertising strategies, the circulation of marketing material, and brand coherence on a (trans)national scale. The section then investigates how nation-specific market conditions and challenges influenced advertising approaches by studying the market entry period of the *Telefunken* and *Grundig* brands in France in the early years of the European Common Market. While the emphasis lies on production contexts, their implications for consumer experience are reflected throughout.

The second part turns to marketing and advertising campaigns for devices, product groups, and target audiences. Through empirical case studies from Germany and France, it analyzes how campaigns and individual marketing measures were shaped by national media landscapes, product-group-specific market environments, and socio-demographic factors. By examining product development and campaign planning processes, this section highlights another dimension of production while showcasing the diversity of consumer experiences with advertisements and other promotional measures for television sets, record players, radios, and tape recorders. The part's final chapter acts as a counterweight; to balance out the diversity introduced by the case studies, it identifies structural characteristics across brands, devices, and borders through qualitative analysis and uncovers visual and seasonal patterns via a quantitative study of advertisements published in the German and French illustrated mainstream magazines *Stern* and *Paris Match*.

The third part focuses on Luxembourg as a distinctive case. It examines the country's uniquely multilingual and transnational media consumption patterns, local advertising possibilities, and its small but internationally connected consumer electronics market to show how these factors influenced the advertising for consumer electronics in the country. A case study on the debut and first few years of color television in the Grand Duchy then illustrates how its geography and unique media landscape shaped its television infrastructure and color television set adoption, which would in turn result in advertising uniquely attuned to the local context. This section places particular emphasis on tracing consumer exposure and the contexts in which Luxembourgers would have encountered advertising.

Taken together, the three parts demonstrate how advertising measures were shaped by organizational structures, market environments, media and retail infrastructures, and the

characteristics of the advertised products. They underscore the entanglement of advertising with other marketing practices both from a company and consumer perspective. Using the consumer electronics sector as their entry point, the parts also reveal intentional as well as unintentional transnational convergences and national (or even local) divergences in Western European consumer experiences with advertising as a phenomenon integral to the German, French, and Luxembourgish mass consumer societies of the long 1960s.

2 Organizational Structures, Market Realities, and the Production of Consumer Electronics Advertising

Advertisements are not created in a vacuum. They are the most visible result of advertising as an organizational practice, which involves decisions on advertisement layouts and designs, product positioning, media insertion plans, and advertising budget allocations. In multinational European consumer electronics companies during the long 1960s, these decisions were taken by advertisers and marketers working for different departments, national organizations, or external advertising agencies. The actions and the responsibilities of these actors were shaped and determined by company structures. They collaborated and competed, worked independently or as part of complex transnational networks, and based their decision-making on market realities and brand strategies. Advertising and marketing consumer electronics in the long 1960s were complex, interconnected processes shaped by internal company dynamics and external factors.

This part approaches the production of advertising from two complementary angles. The first chapter investigates who was involved in advertising consumer electronics in three multinational companies – *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Braun* – and how their respective organizational structures influenced advertisements, advertising approaches, and brand strategies on a transnational scale. A focus is put on the question of cross-departmental and international advertising coherence. The second chapter then builds upon this by examining how company advertising approaches were influenced by the external challenges of a specific market environment. To do so, the chapter follows two German consumer electronics companies, *Telefunken* and *Grundig*, as they introduced their brand and products to France in the 1960s. It analyzes advertising not only as part of national and transnational organizational dynamics but also situates it in a larger context of navigating trade barriers, building up a sales organization, and battling unwanted competition. Both chapters thus contribute to understanding the underlying structure of advertising and to a better understanding of the national and transnational processes behind the production of advertising and marketing measures in multinational consumer electronics companies.

The first and most extensively treated topic pertains to the influence of *Telefunken*'s marketing department, as this new department not only changed internal power dynamics but also visibly impacted the domestic and foreign advertising conducted under the *Telefunken* brand. It is explored who was involved in implementing those changes, why these actors were interested in presenting a (trans)nationally coherent brand across its many different parts in the first place, and what measures they took to foster visual cohesion across advertisements inserted by

advertisers working for many different domestic departments and foreign partners or subsidiaries.

This tension between internal diversity and external brand cohesion is then investigated from two complementary angles for *Philips* and *Braun*. *Philips*'s federated structure afforded a significant degree of independence to many of its national subsidiaries concerning advertising strategy and design. Yet, it is occasionally possible to identify transnational overlaps in product positioning in advertising between *Philips*'s national organizations because of the company's structure. This interaction is explored through one specific consumer electronics advertising campaign conducted across multiple European countries. *Braun*'s advertising and company structure is then explored in a long-term perspective. The focus is put on the company's constant struggle to maintain a consistent corporate identity in advertising and other company communication forms across time, departments, and nationally distinct markets.

The second chapter then shifts the perspective to a specific market environment. An increasing share of consumer electronics bought in 1960s France was sold under German brand names. It is thus detailed how and why German consumer electronics brands, namely *Telefunken* and *Grundig*, entered the French market at scale thanks to the new trade regime of the European Economic Community (but not vice versa). The topic of advertising a brand and its devices in a new market is given prominence, although it is set in relation to the question of building up a distribution network in a new market, the challenges of transnational trade and domestic production, and the difficulties of collaborating between advertisers at a transnational scale. It is shown that external market and internal company dynamics both had discernible impacts on a company's advertising approach.

The effect of the external market environment on a company's marketing approach and budget allocation is then explored further in the last subchapter. It discusses parallel imports; a widespread phenomenon in 1960s France, where German consumer electronics were imported and sold to and by French retailers without the involvement of a brand's official French representative. Consumers could have thus encountered consumer electronics initially meant for the German market and imported by third parties in French retail stores. Parallel imports made for unwanted competition for *Grundig*'s French partner and *Telefunken*'s local subsidiary, and thus not only necessitated brand strategy adjustments but also influenced the budget priorities of German consumer electronics companies on the French market.

The part relies primarily on company sources such as business reports, contracts, meeting minutes, budgets, policy papers, organigrams, and internal correspondence. They offer insights into internal decision-making processes and the reasoning shaping advertising measures for

consumer electronics on the national and transnational scale. Particularly in the cases of *Philips* and *Telefunken*, these company sources are linked to print advertisements and other advertising material to trace how organizational practices, transnational collaborations, cross-departmental conflicts, and strategic decisions were reflected in consumer-facing advertising. Statistics and press reports are used to contextualize and supplement the company perspectives.

Two distinctive sets of sources complete the part's corpus. First, materials from *Braun's* advertising agency *J. Walter Thompson*, which allow to contrast the company's internal sources with external assessments of *Braun's* brand identity, organizational structure, and advertising philosophy. Second, dossiers from a court case heard at the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which centered on advertising, imports, and *Grundig's* growing consumer electronics business in early 1960s France. Together with sources on *Telefunken's* French subsidiary market entry period and its transnational collaboration with advertisers from its German mother company, these files underpin the second chapter. Across the part's source corpus, achieving and maintaining a coherent brand image across markets, departments, and advertising formats emerges as a recurring concern for many of the advertisers working for multinational consumer electronics companies during the long 1960s. In fact, some of them seemed to have even felt haunted by their public image.

2.1 The Intertwinement of Advertising and Organizational Structure

In December 1961, Horst Horlitz, the head of *Telefunken's* general advertising division *FM/Wb*, forwarded a caricature to his boss, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach,¹²⁶ the head of *Telefunken's* newly established marketing department *FM*.¹²⁷ It depicted a man lying in bed next to his wife, agitatedly pointing up to the ceiling toward an inane-looking, suit-wearing, grotesque apparition while exclaiming: "There it is again! That damned, goofed-up corporate image of ours".¹²⁸ The man in the caricature was literally being haunted by the flawed public image of the company he worked for – a humorous packaging of a notion Horlitz apparently identified with and believed his superior would appreciate, as the caricature seems to have

¹²⁶ Friedrich-Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was key in shaping *Telefunken's* marketing and advertising between 1961/62 and 1967 as head of the company's new marketing department – and as a member of the executive board. He had previously been part of the board of the cigarette company *Reemtsma* for a prolonged period of time, and then conducted market studies in the USA, N.N. (1962, February). Persönliches. *Funkschau*, 3, 144. After leaving *Telefunken*, he joined the commercial board of the medical and care product manufacturer *Paul Hartmann AG*, which credits him with introducing "modern marketing" to the company, Hartmann (undated). *Ascendancy – from 1945 until the present*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hartmann.info/en-gb/articles/4/e/ascendancy-1945-until-present>. For brevity, he is referred to as Seydlitz for the remainder of this work.

¹²⁷ Heyne, H. (1961, November 1). *Rundschreiben Nr. 10/61 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Organisation der horizontalen Bereiche – Bereich "Marketing" (FM)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

¹²⁸ The caricature had originally been published in *The New Yorker*, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1961, December 4). *Internal letter. Subject: image!* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

encapsulated the challenges Horlitz believed *Telefunken*, too, faced at the time. Over the following years, the marketing department actively sought to overcome this specter of a disjointed brand identity by establishing and implementing a coherent style for *Telefunken*'s outward communications. In doing so, it reshaped not only its internal advertising organization but also its foreign and domestic advertising output.

Uncovering the interrelationship between the organizational structures of multinational consumer electronics companies and their advertising efforts on a transnational scale constitutes the core research interest of this chapter. It examines how and to what extent the consumer electronics companies *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Braun* pursued coherence in their advertising across national borders. It asks what could be meant when companies spoke of a desire to achieve greater transnational uniformity in advertising, what measures were taken to achieve domestic and international coherence, and what factors impeded these efforts. The chapter further delineates which actors were involved in advertising the brand and products of a consumer electronics company, and how organizational restructurings could affect advertising standardization. It is argued that the organizational setups of *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Braun* directly shaped the coherence and coordination of their advertising on a domestic and international scale – or contributed to their absence. Further, it will be demonstrated that transnational standardization of product advertising and of the corporate image elements used in advertising were distinct processes involving different actors in large consumer electronics companies, whose progress must hence be evaluated separately.

Telefunken serves as an anchor case in investigating these topics due to an exceptionally comprehensive source basis. The company's development is analyzed in depth for the period 1962-1967, tracing the interdependence between company organization and published advertisements on a domestic and transnational scale while putting particular emphasis on the role and impact of the marketing department. It is followed by two shorter case studies of *Philips* and *Braun*. Both maintain the overall research focus to enable comparisons while focusing on separate core themes to further broaden the analytical scope.

The Dutch *Philips* corporation makes for a particularly interesting case study to investigate the links between corporate organizational structures and transnationality in advertising due to the company's enormous size and federated character which afforded *Philips*'s parts an outsized degree of autonomy. While this meant that *Philips*'s subsidiaries in Germany or France were largely self-sufficient businesses with their own production plants and thousands of

employees,¹²⁹ the advertising of *Philips*'s national subsidiaries in Europe could nonetheless at least occasionally share certain characteristics. The case study explores this connection and the underlying organizational logic based on a practical example of transnational product advertising in the late 1960s.

An inverse approach is taken for *Braun*. Rather than focusing on a single case in detail, this subchapter analyzes the company's long-term development from a rather small German manufacturer famed for its visual language to a multinational company and the challenges this entailed for the consistent application of the company's corporate advertising style. The different focal points of the three case studies make it possible to investigate advertising and – in particular – the interrelationship between company structures and the transnationalization of advertising from complementary perspectives.

The chapter makes use of a wide array of company sources, such as organizational charts, policy papers, business reports, meeting minutes, correspondence, contracts, guidelines and directives. For both *Telefunken* and *Philips*, the archival sources are set in direct relation with published advertisements to better trace the links between internal organization and external results. This is not the case for the *Braun* case study, which instead utilizes internal and external assessments of its advertising. Press reports are further used throughout the chapter as supplemental sources. Following the production of culture perspective, this chapter examines advertising as a practice contingent upon the company-specific framework within which it was embedded, with questions of organizational configuration taking on added significance when analyzing advertising in a transnational context. This analytical lens serves as the red thread throughout all three case studies, beginning with *Telefunken*.

2.1.1 Pursuing a Coherent Advertising Style. The Structural Impact of *Telefunken*'s Marketing Department

The 1950s and early 1960s were a period of remarkable growth for *Telefunken*. Between 1950 and 1963 – the year *Telefunken* became a joint-stock company –¹³⁰ revenue increased from 90 million to 825 million DM, and the number of employees rose from 9.000 to 33.500. Under director general Hans Heyne (1951-1964), *Telefunken* developed from a research- and development-oriented subsidiary of the *AEG* largely reliant on its parent company's production facilities into “a complete corporation” operating its own factories,¹³¹ producing electronic

¹²⁹ In 1956, *Philips France* employed 11.000 people in its production staff, and the *Deutsche Philips* employed 12.500, Chanier, 1990, pp. 43, 51, 417.

¹³⁰ Heyne, H. (1963, July 29). *Rundschreiben Nr. 16/63 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Umwandlung von TELEFUNKEN in eine Aktiengesellschaft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

¹³¹ N.N. (1963, November 26). *An der Strippe. Der Spiegel*, 48. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/an-der-strippe-a-513648a0-0002-0001-0000-000046172884>. In the original

components, consumer electronics devices, and telecommunications- and data-systems and equipment.¹³² In the post-war period, *Telefunken* thus became an important player on several electronics markets in its own right, which would handle all steps of introducing a product to market – from production to advertising and sales – in-house.

Telefunken had been a decentralized company since the early 1950s.¹³³ Its “cornerstones” were relatively autonomous, vertically organized business units (“Geschäftsbereiche”), which were each responsible for all stages of the value chain for a range of related product groups – or, as Heyne put it, “from raw materials to sales at home and abroad”.¹³⁴ *Telefunken*’s business units grouped development, manufacturing, commercial management, sales and distribution – and in particular specialized divisions (“Fachgebiete”), each responsible for a product group. These divisions all had their own subdivisions for development and sales,¹³⁵ and each division was accountable for its results.¹³⁶ Advertising and market research for products were handled at the business unit level.¹³⁷

Telefunken’s vertical business units were complemented by horizontal departments responsible for policy-crafting, coordination, and consultation.¹³⁸ By 1962, *Telefunken* had horizontal departments responsible for manufacturing, financial administration, research and development, commercial affairs, and marketing.¹³⁹ This fundamental organizational logic of

German: “ein kompletter Konzern”. Like the news report by *Der Spiegel*, an article on the company’s history written on occasion of *Telefunken*’s 100-year anniversary similarly points out that *Telefunken* developed into a “self-contained industrial enterprise with its own factories” during the Heyne-Period, Mahr, 2003, p. 46. In the original German: “ein in sich geschlossenes Industrieunternehmen mit eigenen Fabriken”. On *Telefunken*’s revenue growth and number of employees in the 1950s and 1960s, see further Staffel, 2025, pp. 220–222.

¹³² For an overview of *Telefunken*’s factories and fields of activity in the 1950s, see Mahr, 2003, pp. 47–48, 50. Concerning *Telefunken*’s product portfolio, see Gliese, 2023, p. 187, Footnote 454.

¹³³ Mahr explicitly credits Heyne with the reorganization of *Telefunken*, Mahr, 2003, p. 46. According to Gliese, this organizational restructuring already took place in 1950, Gliese, 2023, p. 188. At the time, Heyne would have been part of the executive board, N.N. (1963, November 26). An der Strippe. *Der Spiegel*, 48. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/an-der-strippe-a-513648a0-0002-0001-0000-000046172884>.

¹³⁴ Heyne, H. (1951, October 12). *Referat des Herrn Dr.-Ing. Heyne anlässlich der Aussprache AEG-Vorstand und Telefunken-Vorstand am 12. Okt. 1951, vorm. 8,30 Uhr. Subject: Wo stehen wir ?* DTMB/AEG, GS 0057, p. 2. In the original German: “Die Grundpfeiler sind die vertikal vom Rohstoff bis zum Verkauf In- und Ausland organisierten Geschäftsbereiche.”

¹³⁵ *Telefunken*’s wide area transmission systems business unit, for instance, housed divisions for carrier systems, telecommunication cables, directional radio, and telephone infrastructure systems in 1958, N.N. (1958, November 1). Hauptgliederung des Geschäftsbereiches Anlagen Weitverkehr. Enclosure of Wuckel & Mössner (1958, December 1). *Og-Anweisung Nr. AW 36. Subject: Gliederungsplan AW*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. See also N.N. (undated). *Organigramm Bereich – Geräte*. DTMB/AEG, GS 4585. Even though the organigram for the “Geräte”-business unit does not explicitly make note of it, its divisions, too, had their own sales subdivisions, G/V-H-Werbung Hannover to mailing list (1956, January 6). *Internal letter. Subject: Rundschreiben Nr. 1081. Deutsche Industriemesse Hannover vom 29.4 – 8.5.1956*. DTMB/AEG, GS 4585.

¹³⁶ Mahr, 2003, p. 46.

¹³⁷ N.N. (undated). *Organigramm Bereich – Geräte*. DTMB/AEG, GS 4585; Heyne to Heymann et al. (1955, March 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Organisation des Bereiches “Geräte”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 4585; N.N. (undated). *Organigramm Geschäftsbereich Geräte*. Enclosure 1 of id.

¹³⁸ Gliese hence speaks of a matrix structure for *Telefunken*, Gliese, 2023, p. 189.

¹³⁹ The company further maintained a general secretariat, N.N. (undated). *Bezeichnungen von Stellen und Arbeitsgebieten in Telefunken GmbH*, p. 8. Enclosure of Mössner & Zickermann (1962, December 17).

combining largely autonomous, product-oriented vertical business units and function-oriented horizontal departments remained in place until – and in modified form even after – the merger with *Telefunken*’s parent company *AEG* in 1967.¹⁴⁰ The precise composition of divisions, departments, and business units within *Telefunken*, however, was subject to various changes over time, which shaped how the company conducted its consumer electronics advertising. This case study explores this interrelationship between organization and advertising by focusing on the impact of the creation, structural entrenchment, and dissolution of *Telefunken*’s marketing department between 1962 and 1967/68 on the company’s advertising on a domestic and international scale.

2.1.1.1 One Brand, Multiple Actors. *Telefunken*’s Advertising Structure before 1962

During the second half of the 1950s, *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business was handled by a business unit called *G* (“Geräte”), led by Kurt Nowack. Its divisions, each responsible for a different product group, were in charge of all steps of introducing a consumer electronics device to market – from manufacturing and development to sales and advertising domestically and abroad.¹⁴¹ In *Telefunken*’s decentralized structure, which afforded extensive autonomy to its vertical units, the company’s consumer electronics advertising was thus organizationally separate from the advertising conducted by its other units. This separation was logical, as electronic components or telecommunications- and data-systems for professional use required other advertising and sales measures than mass-produced durable consumer goods. However, *Telefunken*’s subsequent decision to divide its consumer electronics business – paired with its decentralized approach to product advertising – would ultimately lead to an incoherent presentation of the brand in consumer-facing advertising.

Rundschreiben Nr. 21/62 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Bezeichnung von Stellen und Arbeitsgebieten. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. This source is invaluable for any efforts to trace *Telefunken*’s internal organizational structure in the first half of the 1960s, as it lists all organizational abbreviations (and thus divisions, departments, and units) used within the company.

¹⁴⁰ The *AEG* adopted the same fundamental organizational structure in 1963, and the merged company thus also retained a similar structure, Gliese, 2023, pp. 188–189.

¹⁴¹ *G* had divisions for professional electro-acoustical systems, radios, television sets, record players, tape recorders (studio and consumer), and autoradios, N.N. (undated). *Organigramm Bereich – Geräte.* DTMB/AEG, GS 4585. *G* was established in 1955, Heyne to Heymann et al. (1955, March 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Organisation des Bereiches “Geräte”.* DTMB/AEG, GS 4585. See further N.N. (undated). *Organigramm Geschäftsbereich Geräte.* Enclosure 1 of id. Beforehand, *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business had been the responsibility of its unit for radios and professional electro-acoustical systems, with its other two business units in the early 1950s being responsible for high-frequency systems and vacuum tubes, Heyne, H. (1951, October 12). *Referat des Herrn Dr.-Ing. Heyne anlässlich der Aussprache AEG-Vorstand und Telefunken-Vorstand am 12. Okt. 1951, vorm. 8,30 Uhr. Subject: Wo stehen wir ?* DTMB/AEG, GS 0057, p. 2. It stands to reason that this previous unit was transformed into *G* because *Telefunken* expanded its area of operations in the consumer electronics market during the first half of the 1950s. In 1954, for instance, the company took over a tape recorder plant from the *AEG*, Mahr, 2003, p. 50.

In 1960, *Telefunken* split *G* into two new vertical business units: “Geräte-Rundfunk/Fernsehen” (*GR*) inherited *G*’s divisions for television sets, radios, and professional electro-acoustical systems, while the divisions for tape recorders, record players/changers, and dictation machines were transferred to “Geräte-Mechanik” (*GM*).¹⁴² These new units were each separately responsible for the development, manufacturing, commercial management, sales, and advertising of their assigned products.¹⁴³ *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics export business was handled by a new joint department called *GRM/Ex*. It employed its own personnel for advertising and sales and seems to have reported directly to Kurt Nowack,¹⁴⁴ who now headed the also newly introduced “Gruppe Warengeschäft” (*W*-group), to which *GR* and *GM* were both subordinated.¹⁴⁵ This reorganization effectively created largely autonomously acting, parallel structures each responsible for a part of *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business – and its advertising.

From 1960 onward, *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics advertising was thus not only organizationally distinct from other company parts, but also internally divided into three branches. *GR*, *GM*, and *GRM/Ex* each had their own advertising budgets¹⁴⁶ and acted independently in their respective domains: *GM*, for instance, domestically advertised its phono

¹⁴² How the divisions were split between *GM* and *GR* is evident from the mailing list of Mössner & Zickermann (1960, December 20). *Rundschreiben Nr. 6/60 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Zulässigkeit vertikaler Preisempfehlungen. Handhabung des Preisempfehlungsverbotes*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. The split itself seems to have taken place earlier in the year – presumably around April 1960, when Rudi Mantz became head of *GR*, N.N. (1961, May). *Persönliches. Funkschau*, 10, 551.

¹⁴³ The responsible parties for development, sales, and commercial management at *GR* and *GM* were each listed separately in a 1960 circular for all of *Telefunken*, see mailing list of Mössner & Zickermann (1960, December 20). *Rundschreiben Nr. 6/60 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Zulässigkeit vertikaler Preisempfehlungen. Handhabung des Preisempfehlungsverbotes*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. For the fact that *GR* and *GM* each had their own advertisers, see Seydlitz (1961, November 21). *Gedanken zu einer Besprechung mit Herrn Dr. Heyne*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899, p. 1. *GR* and *GM*’s divisions retained their own development and sales subdivisions, N.N. (1962, December 17). *Liste der bereichsindividuellen und noch anzulegenden Bezeichnungen*, pp. 2, 6. Enclosure of Mössner & Zickermann (1962, December 17). *Rundschreiben Nr. 21/62 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Bezeichnung von Stellen und Arbeitsgebieten*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

¹⁴⁴ See mailing list of Mössner & Zickermann (1960, December 20). *Rundschreiben Nr. 6/60 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Zulässigkeit vertikaler Preisempfehlungen. Handhabung des Preisempfehlungsverbotes*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

¹⁴⁵ The *W*-group also housed *Telefunken*’s tubes business unit, while *Telefunken*’s business units for high-frequency systems and wide area transmission systems were assigned to a second group called “Anlagengeschäft”, N.N. (1960, December). *Die Rundfunk- und Fernsehwerbung des Monats. Funkschau*, 23, 1228. Although the tube business unit was part of *W*, its export remained organizationally separate from consumer electronics, N.N. (undated). *Bezeichnungen von Stellen und Arbeitsgebieten in Telefunken GmbH*, p. 7. Enclosure of Mössner & Zickermann (1962, December 17). *Rundschreiben Nr. 21/62 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Bezeichnung von Stellen und Arbeitsgebieten*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

¹⁴⁶ See for instance Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976; N.N. (undated). *Werbeetat GRM/Ex*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

devices through separate brochures,¹⁴⁷ mass media advertising¹⁴⁸ and stand-up displays.¹⁴⁹ *GR* would have done the same on the German domestic market for radios and television sets. *GRM/Ex*, which was responsible for the international commercialization of *GR*- and *GM*-produced media devices,¹⁵⁰ also supported and realized international advertising. It inserted foreign-language advertisements in international media,¹⁵¹ subsidized ads by local partners,¹⁵² and internationally distributed centrally produced product brochures,¹⁵³ advertising gifts, or decorations.¹⁵⁴ *GRM/Ex* sought to find a balance between achieving advertising coherence with *GR* and *GM* and making nation-specific adjustments.¹⁵⁵ Although *GRM/Ex* directly intervened in foreign advertising,¹⁵⁶ *Telefunken*'s national partners nonetheless retained their autonomy and continued to advertise separately.¹⁵⁷ *GRM/Ex*'s advertising efforts must thus be understood as separate from – yet interlinked with – the advertising of *GR/GM*, and of the foreign partner(s) handling *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics business in a given country.¹⁵⁸

¹⁴⁷ See for instance Nietzel to Seydlitz (undated). *Internal letter. Subject: Drucksachen von GM/V-Werbung.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁴⁸ See for instance Horlitz (1962, October 12). *Notiz. Betr.: Versuch einer Stellungnahme zu den veränderten Werbemaßnahmen von GM.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁴⁹ See for instance Horlitz to Warnke (1962, October 1). *Internal letter. Subject: GM-Werbeaktionen.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁵⁰ *Telefunken* claimed to export to 161 countries in 1964, *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1964). *Unterlagen für die Exportbesprechung 1964. Band 1. B. Kommentar zur Exportsituation von Telefunken und der deutschen Industrie.* DTMB/AEG, GS 2503, p. 24. Given this broad responsibility, *GRM/Ex* contributed a considerable share to the total revenues of *GR* and *GM* (27 % and 33 % respectively in the business year 1961/62, for instance). *GRM/Ex*'s contribution varied heavily between products: it only accounted for 9 % of the revenue of *GR*'s television division, compared to 40 % for the radio division. Not all consumer electronics devices were thus equally exportable, FK/HS-Be (1962, February 5). *Export – Umsatz – Übersicht.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1951. This data further underlines that the German domestic market was still paramount for *Telefunken* at the time.

¹⁵¹ Universal Anzeigen- und Werbedienst G.M.B.H. Zweigniederlassung Hamburg (1963, August 12). *Insertionsplan Telefunken GMBH GRM/Ex.* Enclosure of Franzke to Seydlitz (1963, August 14). *Internal letter. Subject: Export-Insertion.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. See also Horlitz to Richter (1961, November 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Auslandsserie in englischer und spanischer Sprache.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁵² For instance, in Sweden, Switzerland or Mexico, *GRM/Ex* (1963, February 27). *Geplante Werbezuschüsse von GRM/Ex-H für 1963/64.* Enclosure of von Auw to Seydlitz (1963, March 7). *Internal letter. Subject: Ihre Anfrage nach Art und Höhe von Werbezuschüssen der Exportwerbeabteilungen.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁵³ Olufs to Seydlitz (1963, January 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Export-Werbung/Agentur.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁵⁴ *GRM/Ex* also financially supported *Telefunken*'s presence at trade fairs abroad as well as outdoor advertising measures, N.N. (undated). *Werbeetat GRM/Ex.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁵⁵ Zickermann & [Becker] (1962, March 22). *Kurzfassung – Protokoll. Betr.: Besprechung mit GRM/Ex am 16.2.1962 in Hannover.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1983, p. 2.

¹⁵⁶ *GRM/Ex*, for instance, directly inserted advertisements for both *GR* and *GM* products in magazines such as *LIFE en Español*, *The Asia Magazine*, and the Nigeria and Ghana edition of *DRUM*, while also sending out letters to *Telefunken*'s international partners, asking them to build upon this campaign with their local advertising, Universal Anzeigen- und Werbedienst G.M.B.H. Zweigniederlassung Hamburg (1963, August 12). *Insertionsplan Telefunken GMBH GRM/Ex.* Enclosure of Franzke to Seydlitz (1963, August 14). *Internal letter. Subject: Export-Insertion.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973; Martenson to Seydlitz (1963, October 7). *Internal letter. Subject: Brief Life-Folder.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973; Franzke & Pfeiffer (1963, August 19). *Letter. Subject: Anzeigenwerbung.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁵⁷ The rather complicated relationship between *Telefunken* and its foreign partners when it came to advertising is discussed in greater detail for *Telefunken France*, see chapters 2.2.1.5, 2.2.1.6, and 2.2.2.4.

¹⁵⁸ Partnership arrangements varied greatly between countries in the early 1960s, even within Europe. Sometimes different partners handled the business of different *Telefunken* units (four in Italy in 1963), in other cases it was only one partner for all units. This variance also applied to ownership-structure: *Telefunken* had its own

In theory, the advertising efforts of *GR*, *GM*, and *GRM/Ex* were supposed to converge at the horizontal department *FK* and its advertising division *FK/Wb*, which had an overview of and a general responsibility for the units' advertising,¹⁵⁹ and which devised first company-wide guidelines and norms to arrive at a more uniform outward presentation across all company parts.¹⁶⁰ However, the cooperation between *FK* as the central authority for advertising as a company function and the advertisers of the vertical units *GR* and *GM* seems to not have met director general Heyne's expectations, which he candidly expressed in a letter to *FK* in October 1961: "WHAT ACTUALLY IS THE MATTER WITH OUR ADVERTISING ?".¹⁶¹ Another reorganization followed soon after, which would fundamentally alter how *Telefunken's* consumer electronics advertising was conducted.

2.1.1.2 Mandating Change. The Founding of *Telefunken's* Marketing Department *FM*

On the 1st of November 1961, Heyne announced the establishment of a new horizontal marketing department called *FM*. Its head, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, was made a member of the executive board; an indicator of the importance assigned to this department. As to what this organizational change should achieve, the internal circular which announced the department only vaguely posited that *FM* should "[...] organizationally

subsidiaries, used subsidiaries of the *AEG*, or worked with independent companies, *FM/Exk* (1963, April 3). *Telefunken Export und Vertrieb in der EWG und evtl. zukünftigen EWG-Partnerländern*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1951.

¹⁵⁹ It was *FK's* head Zickermann and not the advertisers of *GM* and *GR* who was accountable to director general Heyne concerning *Telefunken's* total advertising measures, Zickermann to Heyne (1961, November 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. This horizontal department had been set up in 1957 to conflate all of *Telefunken's* divisions for general tasks (advertising, legal, etc.), N.N. (1958, June). *Persönliches*. Dr. C. Zickermann. 25 Jahre bei Telefunken. *Funk-Technik*, 11, 374. *Telefunken's* general advertising division had been founded in 1954 and was directly subordinate to director general Heyne before becoming part of *FK*, Zickermann (1954, July 26). *Aktennotiz. Betrifft: Werbung und Presse, Besprechung in Berlin am 9.7.54*. DTMB/AEG, GS 4585.

¹⁶⁰ *FK*, for instance, devised a guideline for a universally applicable color scheme for *Telefunken's* domestic vehicle fleet, as it, too, represented the company in the eyes of the public, Zickermann & Mössner (1961, September 14). *Rundschreiben Nr. 9/61 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Lackierung von TELEFUNKEN-Fahrzeugen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6049. It also worked on a generally applicable norm for *Telefunken's* logo and lettering, Zickermann to Horlitz (1961, October 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Vereinheitlichung des Telefunken-Schriftzuges*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁶¹ Kurt Nowack, the head of the *W*-group, and the managers of *GR* and *GM* were in copy – as was Seydlitz as the future person in charge of *Telefunken's* overall advertising, even though the *FM*-department had not yet been officially announced. Heyne particularly lamented that *Telefunken* remained rather invisible with its domestic advertising compared to the competition in the consumer electronics market, Heyne to *FK* (1961, October 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: "WAS IST EIGENTLICH MIT UNSERER WERBUNG LOS ?". Heyne followed up with another letter to the heads of *FK* and *W* shortly thereafter, again complaining about *Telefunken's* lack of visibility through advertising, Heyne to Nowack & Zickermann (1961, November 1). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In his response, *FK's* head Zickermann claimed an improvement in comparison to earlier years, Zickermann to Heyne (1961, November 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

consolidate, activate and expand the work already carried out at Telefunken within the field of ‘Marketing’” given its continuously growing importance.¹⁶²

The notes of a meeting between Seydlitz and Heyne shortly thereafter reveal a more precise idea of what *FM* was supposed to achieve. A set of two interlinked tasks stands out. First, *FM* should create a “uniform Telefunken style for advertising effectiveness and financial reasons.” Second, the department should help *Telefunken*’s advertisers achieve more impact with the same effort. Therefore, the advertising measures conducted by dozens of actors/positions across the company’s various divisions and units would need to be more closely monitored, coordinated, and centralized through *FM*. It was hence supposed to exert influence over *Telefunken*’s outward advertising communications as well as over the connected internal structure. However, the document further underlined that advertising should not be considered in isolation from other factors. Rather, advertising was to be seen as one part of a larger marketing concept.¹⁶³

The marketing department thus had a broad scope of responsibilities, even though advertising was a key topic based on the goals established for *FM*. Tasks were split between six divisions: product planning, market research, market analysis/sales promotion, commercial policy, export-coordination, and advertising (*FM/Wb*).¹⁶⁴ Besides Seydlitz’s personal involvement, it fell particularly to the horizontal advertising division *FM/Wb* under the leadership of Horst Horlitz to rationalize *Telefunken*’s overall advertising, get involved in the advertising plans and

¹⁶² Heyne (1961, November 1). *Rundschreiben Nr. 10/61 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Organisation der horizontalen Bereiche – Bereich "Marketing" (FM)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. In the original German: “Dieser [Bereich] soll die bisher schon bei Telefunken durchgeführten, in das ‘Marketing’-Gebiet fallenden Arbeiten organisatorisch zusammenfassen, aktivieren und erweitern.” While there is a temporal link between Heyne’s complaints about the advertising performance and the inception of the marketing department, no explicit causal link can be established. According to the circular, it had long been intended to set up such a department.

¹⁶³ The document was partially type- and partially hand-written, with a significant part of Seydlitz’s thoughts being scribbled in the margins and on a page at the back, Seydlitz (1961, November 21). *Gedanken zu einer Besprechung mit Herrn Dr. Heyne*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “Aufgabe: einheitlicher telef. Stil aus werbewirksamen und finanziellen Gründen.”

¹⁶⁴ The department employed 56 people in total – a bit more than half of them carried over from *FK*, the rest being newly established posts –, with only six of them working for *FM/Wb*, N.N. (undated). Organisationsplan *FM*. Enclosure 1 of Seydlitz (1962, January 31). *FM-Rundschreiben Nr. 1/62. Betr.: Organisation des Bereiches Marketing (FM)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. Even in those cases where an *FK*-division was transferred to *FM* and personnel was carried over, the structure, tasks, and personnel allocation of the new division did not necessarily mirror its predecessor. The market research division *FK/Mf*, for instance, was responsible for product research, *FK/Mf* (1961, October 1). *Organigramm FK/Mf. Struktur ab 1.10.61*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1986. This was not the case anymore for *FM/Mf*, Seydlitz (1962, January 31). *FM-Rundschreiben Nr. 1/62. Betr.: Organisation des Bereiches Marketing (FM)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974. *FM*’s structure and the allocation of responsibilities would then of course also slightly change over time. For an overview of the responsibilities of *FM*’s divisions in the mid-1960s, see *FM* (1966, January 1). *Aufgaben und Funktionen des Bereiches Marketing*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2009. One particularly notable change was the reassignment of the export coordinator to the horizontal department *FG*, where a larger export division was set up to handle matters of company policy concerning export while the vertical units continued to handle the day-to-day export business, Herriger & Mössner to Heyne (1964, September 16). *Internal letter. Subject: Exportorganisation*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2503. This was entirely separate from the coordination of foreign advertising which remained (in part) with *FM*.

budgets devised by its colleagues in the vertical units, advise those vertical advertisers on advertising imagery and style, undertake the institutional advertising for the whole brand, coordinate trade fair attendances, and supervise the outdoor advertising at *Telefunken*'s different business premises.¹⁶⁵ Due to this scope of responsibility, *FM/Wb* received its own advertising budget.¹⁶⁶

The executive board's mandate for *FM* and *FM/Wb* encompassed all of *Telefunken*'s advertising efforts; foreign and domestic, across all units and divisions.¹⁶⁷ Now, the marketing department set the advertising framework. As Heyne pointed out in March 1962, the advertisers in the divisions had to adhere to *FM/Wb*'s directives, limiting their autonomy.¹⁶⁸ *FM* and *FM/Wb* in turn were accountable to the executive board regarding the coordination of advertising and the efficient use of advertising funds across all of *Telefunken*'s units.¹⁶⁹ But the marketing department's ambitions to reshape *Telefunken*'s outward communications decidedly went beyond consumer-facing advertising in media publications. It also got in contact with the company's press division to establish common language regulations across advertising and press releases, for instance,¹⁷⁰ and through its own sales promotion subdivision, *FM* planned to work on *Telefunken*'s consumer manuals and inlay slips.¹⁷¹

Despite *FM*'s universal mandate, Seydlitz opted to initially focus on *Telefunken*'s domestic consumer electronics advertising in the first half of 1962, meeting repeatedly with the decision makers of *GR* and *GM*.¹⁷² This focus on *GR* and *GM* made sense, given that it had been their lackluster domestic advertising presence that had drawn Heyne's ire mere months earlier.¹⁷³ In these first cross-functional meetings, the discussion revolved not only around everyday operations, such as a unit's advertising budget and its various advertising efforts during the upcoming business year 1962/63, but also touched upon more fundamental questions concerning the organizational structure of the advertising divisions responsible for consumer

¹⁶⁵ Seydlitz (1962, January 31). *FM-Rundschreiben Nr. 1/62. Betr.: Organisation des Bereiches Marketing (FM)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

¹⁶⁶ Sellin & Erlekamp (1963, August 2). *Prüfbericht über die Revision von FM/Wb*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973, p. 1.

¹⁶⁷ Seydlitz to Olufs (1962, July 9). *Internal letter. Subject: Auslandswerbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁶⁸ Zickermann & [Becker] (1962, March 22). *Kurzfassung – Protokoll. Betr.: Besprechung mit GRM/Ex am 16.2.1962 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983, p. 2.

¹⁶⁹ Seydlitz & Horlitz (1962, October 18). *Internal letter. Draft. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁷⁰ Horlitz to Bender (1962, February 1). *Internal letter. Subject: TPd 2056 und 2056/2 / Sprachregelung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁷¹ Seydlitz to Heyne (1962, January 25). *Internal letter. Subject: Tonkapsel – Ihr Schreiben vom 10.1.1962*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁷² Seydlitz to Olufs (1962, July 9). *Internal letter. Subject: Auslandswerbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁷³ Heyne to FK (1961, October 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: "WAS IST EIGENTLICH MIT UNSERER WERBUNG LOS ?"; Heyne to Nowack & Zickermann (1961, November 1). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

electronics and the functional collaboration between the unit and *FM*.¹⁷⁴ In addition, members of *FM* attended pertinent meetings of those units to potentially inject their opinion into a debate, if necessary.¹⁷⁵ *FM* thus sought to quickly entrench itself as the key authority on advertising and marketing for both of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics units – not only as a passive adviser that product advertisers could call upon but as an active force imposing its views. *FM* expected to be kept in the loop by the advertisers of *GR* and *GM* from this point on, as it wanted to be able to intervene in time to ensure that the outward communications of the two units presented a “coherent concept”.¹⁷⁶ While *GR* apparently adapted rather quickly, it took time for the new organizational procedures and expectations to take hold at *GM*. Although the unit had collaborated largely successfully with *FM* in preparation for and during the launch of a new product as early as spring 1962,¹⁷⁷ *GM* had trouble adjusting to the extent to which *FM* expected to be informed about and be part of day-to-day operations. During this first year, *FM* criticized *GM*'s inadequate informational flows and lacking cooperation,¹⁷⁸ which, according to *GM*'s manager, needed to be attributed to organizational inertia in a period of adjustment:

“[...] I have repeatedly strongly urged and admonished the gentlemen of the sales and advertising divisions to coordinate with *FM* and maintain the ongoing contact on advertising issues not only for reasons of company discipline, but also out of necessity. [...] I know that I don't need to ask you not to assume ill will on the part of my divisions. I would rather ask you to also see this as one of the many unpleasant effects of the unfortunate decentralization. Nevertheless, I share your hope that the *GM* unit will increasingly succeed in achieving useful and continuous cooperation with *FM* in the coming year.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ These discussions involved Seydlitz and Horlitz for *FM*, the advertisers and the chief salesman of *GR*, and notably also the leadership of *GR* and *W*, *GR* (undated). *Programm für Werbebesprechung mit FM am 20.2.1962 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁷⁵ See for instance Knicker (1962, May 14). *Telefunken GM Besprechungs-Niederschrift. Gegenstand: GM-Werbe- und Entwicklungs-Informationsbesprechung am 9.4.62*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976; Schüfer & Rink (1962, October 22). *Telefunken GM Besprechungs-Niederschrift. Gegenstand: Vertriebsbesprechung 7 in Berlin am 15.10.1962*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁷⁶ Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, December 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976, p. 2. In the original German: “ein einheitliches Konzept”.

¹⁷⁷ The preparation and execution of this marketing campaign for the tape recorder *Magnetophon Automatic* is discussed in chapter 3.1.2.

¹⁷⁸ *GM*'s advertisers had, for instance, unilaterally decided to deviate from an insertion plan previously agreed-upon with *FM* and had further put advertising material in circulation without *FM*'s explicit approval, Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, December 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. See also Horlitz to Seydlitz (1962, April 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Gedächtnisnotiz zu der GM-Bereichsbesprechung am 9.4.1962*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976; Horlitz (1962, October 12). *Notiz. Betr.: Versuche einer Stellungnahme zu den veränderten Werbemaßnahmen von GM*. DTMB/AEG GS 5899. In an unsent draft, *FM* even explicitly claimed that *GM* was the exception compared to the other units, who had adjusted more quickly, Seydlitz & Horlitz (1962, October 18). *Internal letter. Draft. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁷⁹ Brückmann to Seydlitz (1962, December 20). *Internal letter. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. In the original German: “[...], dass ich mehrmals die Herren der Vertriebe und der Werbeabteilung dringend angehalten und ermahnt habe, in werblichen Fragen nicht nur aus Gründen der Firmendisziplin, sondern auch aus der Erfordernis heraus, sich mit *FM* abzustimmen und den laufenden Kontakt zu pflegen. [...] Ich weiss, dass ich Sie nicht zu bitten brauche, bei meinen Dienststellen schlechten Willen nicht zu unterstellen. Sie wollen bitte hierin vielmehr auch eine der vielfältigen unangenehmen Auswirkungen der unglücklichen Bereichsdezentralisation sehen. Dennoch aber hoffe ich mit Ihnen, dass es dem Bereich *GM* im

A horizontal department becoming involved in the advertising of vertical units to such a high degree seems to thus have constituted a decisive departure compared to previous cross-functional collaboration. Up until this point, *Telefunken*'s domestic consumer electronics advertising had seemingly been handled rather autonomously by the advertisers of *GR* and *GM* due to the decentralized company structure. During 1962, *FM* then established itself as the central authority for advertising with *GR* and *GM* – some difficulties concerning the practical implementation notwithstanding. This made 1962 a transitional year. Notably, *Telefunken*'s German print advertising in 1962 visibly reflected the company's overall approach to planning and budgeting its consumer electronics advertising, as well as its new internal division of labor and responsibility. The impact of *FM* was immediately discernible in the very ads consumers encountered in print media. This can be demonstrated using *Telefunken*'s advertising in the weekly illustrated magazine *Stern* as an example.¹⁸⁰

2.1.1.3 Advertising as an Organizational Mirror. *Telefunken*'s 1962 *Stern* Campaign

The *Stern* was a key advertising medium for *Telefunken*. Readers encountered the brand on a regular basis, as *Telefunken* published a total of 23 advertisements across all months of the year apart from January and April during the calendar year 1962. This classification by calendar year, however, does not accurately represent *Telefunken*'s internal approach. In the early 1960s, the company planned and budgeted its advertising per business year ending on the 31st of March.¹⁸¹ The first three ads of the calendar year 1962 (published in February and March) were thus effectively part of the previous year's planning.¹⁸² To accurately assess *FM*'s impact on *Telefunken*'s insertion strategy, the company's advertising in the *Stern* during its business year 1962/63 needs to be considered instead. The first ad of the new business year was inserted on the 20th of May 1962. From this point on, the *Telefunken* brand was advertised in at least every

nächsten Jahr in steigendem Masse gelingen wird, zu einer nützlichen und kontinuierlichen Zusammenarbeit mit FM zu kommen."

¹⁸⁰ Two other possibilities would have been the *Quick* magazine or the *Revue*, which were both also used repeatedly by *Telefunken* that year, *Telefunken* (1962). *Brochure "Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899; Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, December 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁸¹ Zickermann accordingly structured his breakdown of *Telefunken*'s insertions per business and not per calendar year, Zickermann to Heyne (1961, November 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. Regarding the fact that this also applied to advertising budgets, see Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. It follows that *Telefunken*'s advertising conceptions were not even necessarily finalized when a calendar year began, Seydlitz to Horlitz (1962, December 20). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899, p. 2.

¹⁸² *Telefunken* (1962, February 11). Advertisement. Tagline: piccolo ist da. *Stern*, 6, 37. Identical advertisements were inserted in the issues 9 (p. 32) and 12 (p. 69). That these ads were part of the planning for the business year 1961/62 is, for instance, evident from the typeface they used for the *Telefunken*-slogan. It was identical to the one used in the ads published during the calendar year 1961, see for instance *Telefunken* (1961, December 10). Advertisement. Tagline: 2/3 des Tages ist es jetzt dunkel. *Stern*, 50, 37. The ads of the business year 1962/63 would then use a new typeface.

second issue of the *Stern* until the 2nd of December through a total of 20 advertisements (see Table 1). No further *Telefunken* ads would then be published in the *Stern* until the 7th of April 1963 – the first issue released in *Telefunken*’s new business year 1963/64.¹⁸³ All of *Telefunken*’s advertising in the *Stern* during the business year 1962/63 hence took place between calendar week 20 and 49.

Table 1: Weekly distribution of *Telefunken* advertisements in the *Stern*, business year 1962/63.

Calendar week:	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
GR	R		R		R		R								
GM		T		T		T		T		T		T			
FM														B	B
Calendar week:	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
GR						TV		TV		TV		S		TV	
GM													RP		
FM		B		B											

R = Radio, T = Tape recorder, B = Brand, TV = Television, S = Stereo, RP = Record Player.

Telefunken ensured a continuous presence in the *Stern* from mid-May to early December 1962, focusing its consumer electronics advertising fully on this period. Despite this sustained rhythm, three distinct phases can be discerned. In May, *GM* launched its new tape recorder *Magnetophon Automatic*. This market introduction was accompanied by intense advertising until early August. Up until the end of June, these insertions were alternated with ads by *GR* for transistor radios, which meant that *Telefunken* was present in every issue between calendar week 20 and 27. The second phase then lasted throughout August and September. During this time, there was a gap in *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics advertising presence in the *Stern*. *FM* and *FM/Wb* stepped in “to bridge the ‘summer slump’ in TELEFUNKEN product insertion”¹⁸⁴ by publishing their own ads that highlighted not specific products but the brand’s overall achievements. The last phase then started in October and lasted until early December. Picking up two weeks after the last *FM* ad, *GR* began to advertise again on the 7th of October

¹⁸³ All issues of the *Stern* magazine published in 1962 and in the first quarter of 1963 were consulted. For the first ad published in May, see Telefunken (1962, May 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Viele Gründe sprechen jetzt für ein Transistorgerät. *Stern*, 20, 39. The other ads were inserted in the issues 21–27, 29, 31, 33–34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46–48. For the first 1963 ad, see Telefunken (1963, April 7). Advertisement. Tagline: bajazzo TS. *Stern*, 14, 67.

¹⁸⁴ Further insertions were made in the *Quick* magazine for the same reasons, and a longer series was inserted in four national newspapers, Dorland Werbeagentur Arbeitsgruppe Planung (1962, June 15). *Protokoll der Werbebesprechung zwischen der TELEFUNKEN GMBH Berlin und der DORLAND Werbeagentur Berlin am 14.6.1962 im Hause TELEFUNKEN*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899, p. 1. In the original German: “Dies geschieht, um das ‘Sommerloch’ der TELEFUNKEN-Produkt-Insertion zu überbrücken.” For the first such ad, see Telefunken (1962, August 19). Advertisement. Tagline: 1924: TELEFUNKEN ist dem Fernsehen auf der Spur. *Stern*, 33, 29.

(in calendar week 40) – now inserting a television set advertisement bi-weekly throughout this period, once making an exception to advertise one of its stereos instead.¹⁸⁵ By contrast, *GM* was conspicuously absent. It inserted only one ad for a record player on the 25th of November.¹⁸⁶ The rest of an initially planned series of record player ads had been cut by *GM* for budget reasons upon consultation with Seydlitz.¹⁸⁷

Telefunken had regularly advertised in the *Stern* in the past; but between May and December 1962, more *Telefunken* ads were published in the magazine (20 in total) than in the previous three business years put together – despite having cut a few of *GM*'s planned ads.¹⁸⁸ Such an increase in frequency allowed to design an insertion pattern that ensured continuous presence. This was a marked departure from earlier years. In 1961, only *GR* products (transistor radios, television sets) had been advertised in the magazine in late spring and early summer, and then again before Christmas. There had been a break between late June and mid-November.¹⁸⁹ For nearly half a year in 1961, readers of the *Stern* would not have encountered any *Telefunken* advertisements. In contrast, at least every second issue during the 1962 core advertising period featured a *Telefunken* ad. This change was a direct result of *FM*'s introduction, which shows the tangible impact organizational changes could have on a company's advertising.

Being steadily present in a medium through such a “continuous advertising chain”¹⁹⁰ was a key component of the advertisement insertion strategy pursued by *FM/Wb* for *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertising. It would remain so in the following years (although not always as strongly pronounced as it was for the *Stern* in 1962). In July 1964, for instance, *FM/Wb* instructed the advertisers of *GR* and *GM* that the budget cuts to domestic consumer electronics advertising they had been asked to implement should under no circumstances compromise the continuity of *Telefunken*'s mass media advertising insertion, as this consistency set it apart from the competition and ensured effectiveness:

¹⁸⁵ See for instance *Telefunken* (1962, October 7). Advertisement. Tagline: 6 Tasten – jede Taste ein Programm. *Stern*, 40, 59.

¹⁸⁶ *Telefunken* (1962, November 25). Advertisement. Tagline: Für schöne Stunden...den TELEFUNKEN Musikus. *Stern*, 47, 145.

¹⁸⁷ Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, November 6). *Internal letter. Subject: GM-Werbekosten; Ihr Schreiben vom 3. 11.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. See also Brückmann to Seydlitz (1962, November 3). *Internal letter. Subject: GM-Werbungskosten.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1976; *GM* (1962, October 30). *Besprechungs-Niederschrift. Subject: Kosten der Werbung 1962/63.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁸⁸ Four ads were inserted in the *Stern* in 1959/60, two in 1960/61, and twelve in 1961/62, Zickermann to Heyne (1961, November 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. Zickermann's table noted only six ads for 1960/61, although he mentioned that three more would follow before Christmas. The document does not include the three ads that were then published for the *Ticcolo* in the *Stern* issues 6, 9, and 12 in early 1962, but which should also be counted.

¹⁸⁹ In 1961, *Telefunken* advertisements were published in the *Stern* issues 16, 18, 21, 23, 26, 46, 48, 50, and 51.

¹⁹⁰ Horlitz & von Auw to GR, GM & GRM/Ex (1964, July 28). *Internal letter. Kosten der Werbung / Schätzung 1964.* DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. In the original German: “kontinuierlichen Anzeigenkette”.

“In terms of advertising technique, it is necessary to maintain the continuity so that when the competitors’ advertising season starts in November and December, the Telefunken insertions have built a sufficiently strong recall value.”¹⁹¹

Telefunken’s 1962 insertion pattern in the *Stern* was the result of a concerted planning effort that was oriented on the company’s business year in its timing and based on *FM*’s convictions regarding the insertion pattern. Advertisements of *GR*, *GM*, and *FM/Wb* were inserted alternately to ensure a continuous *Telefunken* advertising presence, with the latter covering the summer gap between the two seasonal product advertising waves. Consumers would have thus not only seen ads for a broader range of the company’s products in the *Stern* than in the previous year, but they would also have encountered another form of *Telefunken* advertising not present in the magazine the year before that focused on the brand’s past achievements. This was in line with *FM/Wb*’s responsibility to conduct institutional advertising.¹⁹² The impact of *FM* and *FM/Wb* on *Telefunken*’s insertion strategy could also manifest itself in more subtle ways, however: In the calendar year 1961, *Telefunken* had advertised in the *Stern* until the 17th of December.¹⁹³ Under *FM*’s watch, insertions ended a few weeks earlier, as the marketing department seems to have been wary of advertising too close to Christmas.¹⁹⁴

Despite the coordinated planning behind the insertion pattern, the advertisements in the *Stern* simultaneously reflect that the budgets and the responsibilities within *Telefunken* retained a degree of separation: the brand and the products of the two units were each advertised in different issues. No advertisements jointly showcased *Telefunken* radios and record players, for instance. Three different actors with separate advertising budgets and individual goals represented *Telefunken* in consumer-facing print advertising on the domestic market during 1962. This had not always been the case. Before the responsibilities of the joint consumer electronics business unit *G* were divided between *GR* and *GM*, radios, television sets, and tape recorders had also been advertised together in one insertion.¹⁹⁵ This again shows the close interconnection of internal structure and outward advertising presence.

¹⁹¹ Horlitz & von Auw to GR, GM & GRM/Ex (1964, July 28). *Internal letter. Kosten der Werbung / Schätzung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. In the original German: “Werbetechnisch ist es notwendig, die Kontinuität beizubehalten, damit bei Einsetzen der Werbesaison der Konkurrenten im November und Dezember die Telefunken-Insertion einen genügend starken Erinnerungswert erworben hat.”

¹⁹² No such advertising was conducted in the *Stern* in 1961. All issues of the magazine for the calendar year were consulted except issue n° 11. Neither did Zickermann reference institutional advertising in any way in his overview for Heyne, Zickermann to Heyne (1961, November 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. *FK/Wb* did, however, seemingly insert such advertising in other media, although it is unclear on what scale this happened, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1961, December 28). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁹³ Telefunken (1961, December 17). Advertisement. Tagline: Unsere Welt ist kleiner geworden... *Stern*, 51, 9.

¹⁹⁴ Seydlitz & Horlitz (1962, October 18). *Internal letter. Draft. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

¹⁹⁵ Telefunken (1959, October 31). Advertisement. Tagline: Wer Qualität sucht – wählt TELEFUNKEN. *Stern*, 44, 38. This is not to say that there was no cooperation between *GR* and *GM* whatsoever. The units, for instance,

The fact that *Telefunken*'s domestic consumer advertising was internally split between *GR*, *GM*, and *FM* would have also been recognizable from the ads' layout and design. There was an internal consistency and coherence to the ads respectively inserted by each of the three actors; *GR*'s ads had a shared visual identity, as did those of *GM* and *FM*. The ads were clearly part of larger series. This cannot be said for *Telefunken*'s advertising presence in its totality, however. *GR*, *GM*, and *FM* each used a different layout, imagery, and copy text approach. Even the placement of the *Telefunken*-star and of the logotype, as well as the precise arrangement of the company slogan (all key brand identifiers) was not completely consistent across the advertisements inserted in the *Stern* – although the three ads at least shared the same slogan and typeface. There was no completely uniform *Telefunken* advertising style. Instead, consumers were confronted with three different, only internally consistent approaches (see Figures 1-3).



Figure 1: Telefunken (1962, September 18). Advertisement. Tagline: 1958: TELEFUNKEN bringt Stereophonie. *Stern*, 36, 85.



Figure 2: Telefunken (1962, November 9). Advertisement. Tagline: Musik wie im Konzertsaal mit der Stereo-Anlage »Concertino«. *Stern*, 46, 59.



Figure 3: Telefunken (1962, November 25). Advertisement. Tagline: Für schöne Stunden... den TELEFUNKEN Musikus. *Stern*, 47, 145.

The absence of a uniform *Telefunken* style in the first year of *FM*'s existence was understandable given that developing a style and imposing it across units required time and effort. It had seemingly been a priority to coordinate advertising spending across *FM*, *GR*, and *GM*, and to develop a joint insertion plan. On this level, *FM*'s and *FM/Wb*'s influence was already clearly visible: 1962/63 was a marked departure for *Telefunken*'s presence in the *Stern* compared to earlier years regarding advertising frequency, the insertion pattern, and the forms of advertising readers would have encountered. The advertising campaign in the *Stern* was a direct result of *Telefunken*'s degree of organizational integration and its internal state of coordination at this point. Given that the advertising plan for the *Stern* and the budget allocated

jointly published a *Telefunken* consumer electronics product brochure, Telefunken (1962). Brochure "Alles spricht für TELEFUNKEN". Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1962-1/>.

to this medium would not have been discussed in isolation, it follows that the direction prescribed by *FM* and *FM/Wb* presumably reverberated through all of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertising in the business year 1962/63 as budget priorities would have been shifted in accordance with *FM*'s convictions. The marketing department's ambitions extended beyond coordination, however. It also pursued structural reforms.

2.1.1.4 Institutionalizing Coherence: *FM*'s role in Internal Advertising Integration

As *FM*'s function-specific mandate for advertising and marketing encompassed all of *Telefunken*, the department increasingly involved itself in the advertising work done in other units besides *GR* and *GM*.¹⁹⁶ In particular, *FM*'s Seydlitz devoted greater attention to the advertising of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics export department, *GRM/Ex*, in the second half of 1962.¹⁹⁷ After all, *GRM/Ex* was (partially) responsible for "the foreign advertising that helps shape *Telefunken*'s image in the world" according to Seydlitz.¹⁹⁸ *GRM/Ex*, too, then regularly discussed its advertising budget and approach with *FM* from autumn 1962 onward.¹⁹⁹ As was the case for *GR* and *GM*, the marketing department expected *GRM/Ex* to follow its direction from this point on, and was not afraid to exercise its mandate: by early 1963, *FM* had already vetoed a planned project of *GRM/Ex*.²⁰⁰ At the turn of the year 1962/63, *FM* had become involved in the budgeting and media planning of *GR*, *GM*, and *GRM/Ex*, entrenching itself as the final point of acceptance for all their planned advertising measures and material. *FM*'s work in 1963 would then build upon this foundation.

In the first half of 1963, two developments once again transformed *Telefunken*'s organizational structure. First, the company discarded the concept of groups. This entailed a fair amount of

¹⁹⁶ This, for instance, meant working with *A* (Anlagen) on its export advertising, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1962, August 31). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899, p. 3. See also Horlitz (1962, September 5). *Besprechungsbericht Export-Werbung vom 16.8. in Ulm*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. Seydlitz would, of course, also meet with the advertisers of the two *A*-group units and the tube unit to discuss their insertion planning and advertising budget, Seydlitz to Hipauf, Siegel & Zürn (1963, March 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbebesprechungen am 17. Mai 1963*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹⁹⁷ Seydlitz explicitly stated that as much, Seydlitz to Olufs (1962, July 9). *Internal letter. Subject: Auslandswerbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. See also Olufs to Seydlitz (1962, October 22). *Internal letter. Subject: WERBEBESPRECHUNG*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁹⁸ This statement had been prompted by a problem with the internal workflow. In September 1962, Seydlitz had been given too little notice on *GRM/Ex*'s upcoming international media advertising campaign in his opinion, which prompted him to demand that he should from this point on have the opportunity "to intervene in good time" in said foreign advertising, Seydlitz to Horlitz (1962, September 14). *Internal letter. Subject: Auslandswerbung für Warengruppe*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. The full quote in the original German: "Es ist doch sicher nicht zuviel verlangt, wenn ich darauf bestehe, daß ich die Gelegenheit erhalte, mich rechtzeitig bei der Auslandswerbung, die das Image von *Telefunken* in der Welt mitbestimmt, einschalten zu können."

¹⁹⁹ Olufs to Seydlitz (1962, October 22). *Internal letter. Subject: WERBEBESPRECHUNG*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973; Seydlitz to Olufs (1963, February 15). *Internal letter. Subject: Export-Werbebesprechung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

²⁰⁰ Seydlitz to *GRM/Ex-H* (1963, February 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbefilm und Fernsehspots*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. See also Olufs & Richter to Seydlitz (1963, January 30). *Internal letter. Subject: Einsatz eines Werbefilms und von Fernsehspots im neuen Geschäftsjahr*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

relabeling; what had been the *W*-group was now called the *G* business unit (“Geschäftsbereich”), while *GR* and *GM* were now called departments (“Fachbereiche”) instead of business units (“Geschäftsbereiche”). While this change transformed the terminology used in the sources, it had less immediate impact on a structural level for *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business. *GR* and *GM* kept their divisions and were still each separately responsible for the development, manufacturing, commercial management, and sales of their respective product groups. Only the vacuum tubes department, which had been part of the *W*-group – and, due to this connection, had jointly planned domestic advertising with *GR* and *GM* on at least one occasion –, ²⁰¹ was not part of the new *G* business unit anymore. ²⁰² This overall structure would then remain unchanged until the *AEG-Telefunken* merger in 1967. ²⁰³

The second development was much more consequential for *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics advertising: on the 1st of May 1963, *Telefunken* established a new advertising department for the *G*-business unit (*G/Wb*) under the leadership of Hans Franzke. While *GR*, *GM*, and *GRM/Ex* all retained their own advertising budgets and its leadership their influence on the advertising for their products, *G/Wb* was expected from now on to coordinate all foreign and domestic advertising efforts for consumer electronics and bundle administrative functions to cut spending. ²⁰⁴ *FM* had been a driving force in the establishment of this department, ²⁰⁵ as it seems

²⁰¹ Horlitz to Kahle et al. (1961, December 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Argumente für Fernseh-Spots GR, GM, Rö.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. See also N.N. (undated). *Sendezeiten der Telefunken-Fernseh-Spots bis Oktober 1962.* Enclosure of Horlitz to mailing list (1962, August 14). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung im Fernsehen für die Produkte der W-Gruppe.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

²⁰² Three new business units were formed in total: “Anlagen” (*A*) for its telecommunication- and transmission-systems business, “Bauelemente” (*B*) for its components – including tubes, and “Geräte” (*G*) for its consumer electronics, which was still headed by Kurt Nowack, N.N. (1963, July). *Die Industrie berichtet.* Telefunken. *Funkschau*, 14, 967. Hermann Mößner would then succeed Kurt Nowack as head of *G* in 1966, N.N. (1966, June). *funkschau elektronik express.* *Funkschau*, 12, 365.

²⁰³ In 1967, after the merger, a joint sales department with extensive competences (domestic and foreign distribution, marketing, advertising, commercial management) was established for both *GR* and *GM*, who only retained development and manufacturing, N.N. (1967, July). *Aus der Wirtschaft.* Verkauf zusammengefaßt. *Funkschau*, 13, 1042. It is, however, unclear if the setup described by the *Funkschau* endured. According to Gliese, *AEG-Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business unit was split into two departments, with one handling the radio and television product groups while the other was responsible for record players/changers and tape recorders. The labelling, however, was changed again: *G* was renamed to *R*, while *GR* and *GM* became *R1* and *R2*, Gliese, 2023, pp. 189–190. In 1972, the consumer electronics business unit *R* was then again spun out of the company. This development, and the further organizational changes during the 1970s are discussed by Gliese, id., pp. 190–194.

²⁰⁴ Seydlitz & Nowack to mailing list (1963, April 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Koordinierung der Werbung im Warengeschäft.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1983. *G/Wb* was established before the *W*-group was transformed into the *G*-unit, which would follow a few weeks later. Despite heading *G*’s general advertising department, Hans Franzke technically remained part of *GR*.

²⁰⁵ Seydlitz to Horlitz (1962, December 20). *Internal letter without subject.* DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. Heyne had first asked to investigate if it might not make sense to rework the organizational structure of *Telefunken*’s advertising departments in February 1962, Zickermann & [Becker] (1962, March 22). *Kurzfassung – Protokoll. Betr.: Besprechung mit GRM/Ex am 16.2.1962 in Hannover.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1983, p. 2. First discussions in that regard between *FM* and *GR* had then taken place in March, Mantz & Kahle to Seydlitz (1962, March 19). *Internal letter. Subject: Vereinheitlichung der Werbeabteilungen GR/GM/GRM-Ex.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1983. Seydlitz to Geschäftsbereich *GR* (1962, March 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Vereinheitlichung der Werbeabteilungen GR/GM/GRM-Ex.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1983. The decision to establish such a department stood by May 1962. It

to have offered two advantages *FM* could not provide: first, it helped save costs by eliminating duplicate structures, and second, it ensured closer coordination between *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertisers instead of fostering a hub-and-spoke model where all advertisers talked to *FM* and *FM/Wb* but not to each other. It should be noted that this lack of cross-departmental communication between *GR* and *GM* was not exclusive to its advertisers, and *FM* accordingly also sought to coordinate and facilitate contact in other domains within its authority, such as product design.²⁰⁶

Another crucial step toward a better coordination of *Telefunken*'s advertising planning and conceptualization – as well as toward a unified *Telefunken* advertising style – was then to employ the *McCann* advertising agency to handle the advertising of *FM*, *GM*, *GR*, and *GRM/Ex*. This transfer of all of *Telefunken*'s consumer-facing advertising activities to the same agency was not a straightforward process, however. In March 1962, *FM* and *FM/Wb* still had recommended *GM* to keep the existing ties in place for the business year out of expediency and for a lack of ideas concerning possible alternatives: “Furthermore, none of those involved in this issue can yet name an agency that would do a much better job with certainty.” The marketing department then scoured for options²⁰⁷ while all existing, separate contracts and working agreements were kept in place for the time being.²⁰⁸

By early 1963, *McCann* had emerged as Seydlitz's preferred agency partner for *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertising.²⁰⁹ A first contract between *McCann* and *Telefunken* was then

then fell to *FM* to make a suggestion as to what the new structure should look like, Seydlitz to Nowack (1962, December 20). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983.

²⁰⁶ In October 1962, *FM/Wb*'s Horst Horlitz asked a colleague in *FM*'s product planning division to intervene regarding *Telefunken*'s new stereo system, as the company did not offer a matching record changer or tape recorder. Horlitz believed that this would hinder sales as consumers would not want to pair products that did not match in appearance. He notably attributed this oversight to a lack of contact between *GR* and *GM*, Horlitz to Reuting (1962, October 12). *Internal letter. Subject: GR-Concertino-Steuergerät / Vervollständigung des Systems*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

²⁰⁷ Horlitz to Nietzel (1962, March 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Zusammenarbeit mit Agentur Gilde*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. Emphasis in the original. In the original German: “Außerdem kann bislang keiner der an diesem Thema Beteiligten eine Agentur angeben, die mit Sicherheit wesentlich besser arbeiten würde.”

²⁰⁸ *GR* and *GM* each had separate contracts with the *Gilde* advertising agency, Scheer to Franzke (1963, January 30). *Internal letter. Subject: Vertrag mit McCann*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1636. *GRM/Ex* had worked with the agency *Hegemann* in 1962, Olufs to Seydlitz (1963, January 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Export-Werbung/Agentur*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. *FM/Wb* had collaborated with *Dorland*, Dorland Werbeagentur Arbeitsgruppe Planung (1962, June 15). *Protokoll der Werbebesprechung zwischen der TELEFUNKEN GMBH Berlin und der DORLAND Werbeagentur Berlin am 14.6.1962 im Hause TELEFUNKEN*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

²⁰⁹ Seydlitz had first considered working with *McCann* in April 1962, Seydlitz (1962, April 16). *Notiz. Subject: Rücksprache mit Herrn Horlitz*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. The connection then came about through a friend of Seydlitz who was working at *McCann*, von Nell to Seydlitz (1962, June 28). *Letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1099. Official negotiations between *FM* and *McCann* took place in early December, Seydlitz to *GRM/Ex-H* (1963, February 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbefilm und Fernsehspots*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. Having seemingly convinced Seydlitz, *McCann* then met with the heads of the sales divisions of *GR* and *GM* and with the departments' advertisers before Christmas to convince them as well, Seydlitz to von Dumreicher (1962, December 14). *Letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

signed in March 1963 for *GM*,²¹⁰ coming into force on the 1st of April.²¹¹ The contract stipulated that *McCann* would develop a fundamental advertising concept for *GM* based on the information submitted by *GM*, devise its advertising plans, and produce advertising drafts (layout and text) for all mass media formats. The creation of final artworks and the analysis of market research studies were billed separately, with *McCann* being willing to facilitate and supervise such work if handled by external partners.²¹²

Although existing commitments temporarily remained in place, *McCann* gradually took over creative responsibilities for *FM/Wb*, *GR*, *GM*, and *GRM/Ex* during 1963,²¹³ with *G/Wb* coordinating all of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertising with the agency from May 1963 onward.²¹⁴ This partnership of *Telefunken* and *McCann* would then remain in place over the following years.²¹⁵ Notably, this cooperation was not strictly limited to *McCann* working on *Telefunken*'s overall advertising concept(s), insertion planning, and advertisement design and copy drafting. The ad agency also provided *FM* with domestic advertising data that *Telefunken* had previously sourced through a subscription to a market research company,²¹⁶ and

²¹⁰ Telefunken GmbH & H.K. McCann Company MbH (1963, March 15). *Werbeagenturvertrag zwischen TELEFUNKEN GMBH Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik und H.K. McCANN COMPANY MBH*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1636.

²¹¹ Franzke to Müller-Machens (1964, February 12). *Internal letter. Subject: McCann-Vertrag*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1636.

²¹² *McCann* was compensated on a commission basis, which meant that it would receive a share of 15 % of the total advertising expenditure *GM* allocated to a certain media. Notably, the commission was paid out by the media partner and by *Telefunken*. Trade magazines were not included in the contract, Telefunken GmbH & H.K. McCann Company MbH (1963, March 15). *Werbeagenturvertrag zwischen TELEFUNKEN GMBH Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik und H.K. McCANN COMPANY MBH*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1636.

²¹³ Identical but separate contracts with *GR* and *GRM/Ex* would then come into effect on the 1st of January 1964, Franzke to Müller-Machens (1964, February 12). *Internal letter. Subject: McCann-Vertrag*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1636. It had already been planned to sign contracts with *McCann* for *GR*, *GM*, and *GRM/Ex* around a year earlier, Seydlitz to Mantz (1963, January 21). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the case of *GR*, this delay had been due to *Telefunken* missing the deadline to terminate the contract with the *Gilde* in time, Scheer to Franzke (1963, January 30). *Internal letter. Subject: Vertrag mit McCann*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1636, p. 1. The sources are less clear about the case of *GRM/Ex*, as the department definitely already worked with *McCann* during 1963 to devise its export advertising, von Nell, A. to Olufs (1963, March 19). *Letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983. For *FM/Wb*, it is not completely clear when exactly their contract with *McCann* began. In February 1963, Dr Seydlitz suggested to Horlitz that *McCann* should become involved in *FM/Wb*'s institutional advertising for reasons of creative coordination ("besser kreativ koordiniert"), while the insertion process should remain with *Dorland* for the year to honor a previous agreement, Seydlitz to Horlitz (1963, February 1). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. *FM* would then in fact be in contact with members of *McCann* during the year, Seydlitz to von Dumreicher, Franzke & Horlitz (1963, November 6). *Letter. Subject: Senkrechter Schriftzug*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. In later years, *FM/Wb* definitely worked with *McCann*, see for instance Horlitz (1965, February 23). *Notiz. Subject: Information über FM-Anzeigen Neuerscheinungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120.

²¹⁴ This makes it likely that *McCann* was already involved in *GR*'s advertising during 1963 despite a contractual obligation to the *Gilde*. In the letter announcing *G/Wb* on the 1st of May, the *Gilde* was not mentioned at all while the coordination with *McCann* regarding all consumer electronics advertising was emphasized, Seydlitz & Nowack to mailing list (1963, April 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Koordinierung der Werbung im Warengeschäft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983.

²¹⁵ See for instance Horlitz to Buchheister (1967, May 10). *Letter. Subject: PAL-Anzeigen-Serie*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949.

²¹⁶ Horlitz & von Dellingshausen to Seydlitz (1963, June 26). *Internal letter. Subject: Quantitative Werbeforschung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1986.

even designed *GR*'s prospectuses and instruction manuals for a while before this responsibility reverted to *GR*'s advertisers.²¹⁷

Communication among the various actors involved in advertising and promoting *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics devices was of course not always seamless.²¹⁸ Nonetheless, the establishment of *G/Wb* and the contracts with *McCann* were important steps for *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertising. From this point onward, there was but one external partner providing creative input, and one appointee who not only internally coordinated *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertisers but also ensured that *Telefunken*'s product advertisers ideally communicated with the external partner in one voice. The marketing department retained its responsibility for the institutional advertising and the overall direction.

In 1963, *FM*'s second full year of existence, the marketing department had thus played a key role in reshaping the internal organization of its consumer electronics advertising divisions and of their external partnerships, after having inserted itself in the existing advertising processes of the company during the previous year. The marketing department had hence improved the monitoring, coordination, and centralization of *Telefunken*'s consumer-facing advertising as to achieve more advertising impact in 1962 and 1963. In the same vein, a new standardized form was introduced in 1964 to better track advertising expenditure.²¹⁹ The other goal set in 1961²²⁰ would also be achieved soon: the creation and implementation of a uniform style across *Telefunken*'s advertising.

2.1.1.5 Enacting External Coherence: *Telefunken*'s New Domestic Advertising Style

In October 1963, *FM* and *FM/Wb* created a new advertising style for *Telefunken*.²²¹ It was developed with the collaboration of *McCann*,²²² and was based on the design of *FM/Wb*'s institutional advertisements.²²³ The key visual element of this new style was a vertically

²¹⁷ Mantz & Kahle to Seydlitz (1964, June 4). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

²¹⁸ In September 1963, a member of *FM*'s sales promotion subdivision implored Horst Horlitz that they needed to collaborate more closely so that he would be able to stand up for decisions and stances taken by *McCann* or *FM/Wb* when confronted by a product department, see von Dellingshausen to Horlitz (1963, September 13). *Internal letter. Subject: Gegenseitige Information McCann – FM/Wb – FM/Maf*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973, p. 1.

²¹⁹ This form was jointly introduced to *Telefunken* and the *AEG* and was thus also supposed to improve the coordination between both companies, Mössner & Seydlitz to mailing list (1963, August 30). *Rundschreiben Nr. 18/63 für Gesamt-Telefunken. Betr.: Kosten der Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1974.

²²⁰ See chapter 2.1.1.2.

²²¹ Seydlitz to Horlitz (1964, October 6). *Internal letter. Subject: Entwurf für den Prospekt "Linie 1964"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

²²² Seydlitz included only a *McCann* employee next to *G/Wb*'s Franzke and *FM/Wb*'s Horlitz in a letter discussing his findings what other companies (no matter the industry) used vertically oriented text in their advertising, Seydlitz to von Dumreicher, Franzke & Horlitz (1963, November 6). *Internal letter. Subject: Senkrechter Schriftzug*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. And in a booklet presenting the new style, the "fruitful cooperation" ("fruchtbare Zusammenarbeit") with *McCann* was highlighted as well, *Telefunken* (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, p. 78.

²²³ Seydlitz (1963, October 23). *Note. Subject: Mit Herrn Horlitz zu besprechen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

oriented *Telefunken*-logotype in dominant lettering, with the star always being placed right next to it. This strong focus on the vertical typographic element impacted the format of the new ads, which also became decidedly vertical. Usually, the ads had only one image element, which was located at the bottom of the ad. In many product advertisements, only the device was shown; the imagery was stripped of any superfluous elements. But as the internally distributed booklet introducing the style explained, it was not just the layout and graphical design, but also the approach to copy texting that had been reworked and aligned across departments.²²⁴ This alignment applied not only to the consumer-electronics advertisers and *FM/Wb* but notably also to those responsible for components and professional equipment – and even some of *Telefunken*'s international partners,²²⁵ as will be discussed in more detail later on.

In 1964, *Telefunken*'s new look was introduced to the German public through a broad range of domestic print media advertising channels: *FM* inserted institutional advertisements in the *Telefunken* advertising style in German newspapers such as *Die Zeit* and *Die Welt*, while *GR* and *GM* published product advertisements in magazines such as *Der Spiegel*, *Quick*, *Gong*, or *Hör zu*, which were visibly aligned with the *FM*-ads and even more closely with each other.²²⁶ In the *Stern*, the first ad in this style was inserted by *GR* on the 5th of April 1964.²²⁷ It was further used for the *Telefunken* advertisements published in trade magazines by the departments for consumer and professional products alike.²²⁸ Unlike in 1962, with its disparate visual approaches between departments, *Telefunken* now presented a consistent face to the German public (see Figures 4-6).

²²⁴ Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, p. 1.

²²⁵ Id.

²²⁶ The brochure contains dozens of ads by various actors, giving basic indicators where they were published, id.

²²⁷ Telefunken (1964, April 5). Advertisement. Tagline: Teak im Auto. *Stern*, 14, 102.

²²⁸ Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748.



Figures 4-6: Ads published in German print media in 1964 by FM, GR, and GM respectively (left to right). Printed in Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 4–7, 16–17.

In the second half of the year, *Telefunken* also began rolling out a program for its domestic retail partners that sought to extend the reach of its uniform style to the local level. *Telefunken* offered retailers pre-designed print templates that they were supposed to use for their advertising in the local press. These templates effectively were advertisements for *Telefunken* consumer electronics products in the familiar style – but they all crucially left a space in the ad-design where retailers could then add their logo and address; a form of cooperative advertising.²²⁹ To further entice retailers, *Telefunken* offered to pay half of the ads' insertion costs.²³⁰ This program was advantageous for both sides. *Telefunken* ensured consistent brand presentation even among its partners by supplying them with ads that were modeled on *Telefunken*'s mass media advertising in argumentation and imagery,²³¹ and retailers were able to align their local advertising with *Telefunken*'s simultaneous mass media campaigns, making use of the manufacturer's advertising presence while also presenting their own business to their locally relevant clientele.²³²

²²⁹ Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 56–57.

²³⁰ Schnürle to Seydlitz (1964, July 1). *Internal letter. Subject: Telefunken-Image*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2028.

²³¹ Franzke & Rochel (1965, August 12). *Werbeinformationen 23/65. Subject: 'Kleine Anzeigen im großen Stil'*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118, p. 1.

²³² Telefunken (undated). *Kleine Anzeigen im großen Stil 1965/66. 1. Nachtrag*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

In evaluating the style at the year's end, *FM/Wb* deemed it not to be perfectly implemented across the board yet but also assessed that at least a fundamental degree of cohesion had been achieved.²³³ The stringency of the style's implementation varied between actors in the first year. As Seydlitz complained to Horlitz a few months after the style's introduction, some of the departments commercializing professional instead of consumer products had been unable to "creatively adopt the advertising style we created [...] and translate it analogously."²³⁴ Nonetheless, the introduction of the new style must by and large be classified as a success for the marketing department. Already during this first year, it received praise from *Telefunken*'s director general Heyne,²³⁵ from the competition,²³⁶ and from its retail partners alike.²³⁷ *Telefunken* would hence continue in this direction the following year.

For 1965, *Telefunken*'s domestic strategy looked as follows: the established style was retained in near unchanged form in the company's print advertising. It was now also to be applied to printed advertising matter such as product brochures, which would ensure an even greater degree of uniform brand presentation across consumer-facing communication forms. The company's domestic insertion strategy was kept in line with the direction of earlier years as well: the consumer electronics departments inserted product advertisements in widely read magazines to ensure high contact rates, while *FM* inserted institutional ads in national dailies to supplement the product advertising. Continuous presence in print mass media remained an important factor. Trade publication advertising to commercial partners and the continuance of the joint program with retailers for local press insertions completed the approach.²³⁸

This considerable degree of continuity notwithstanding, there was a notable change concerning timing which had been induced by *Telefunken* synchronizing its business year with the calendar year in 1964;²³⁹ from 1965 onward, *Telefunken*'s new advertising campaigns no longer needed

²³³ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 1.

²³⁴ Seydlitz to Horlitz (1964, October 6). *Internal letter. Subject: Entwurf für den Prospekt "Linie 1964"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. In the original German: "[...], daß weder RÖ noch AH imstande sind, die von uns [...] kreierte Werbelinie kreativ aufzunehmen und analog zu übersetzen."

²³⁵ Heyne had repeatedly praised the new style, even calling it "extraordinarily attractive advertising" ("außergewöhnlich attraktive Werbung") in a quote cited in Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 1.

²³⁶ Radius to Horlitz (1964, December 16). *Internal letter. Subject: Telefunken-Werbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

²³⁷ Schnürle to Seydlitz (1964, July 1). *Internal letter. Subject: Telefunken-Image*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2028.

²³⁸ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. Regarding the retailer insertion program, see *Telefunken* (undated). *Kleine Anzeigen im großen Stil 1965/66. 1. Nachtrag*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

²³⁹ This change was also implemented by the *AEG* that same year, Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft & Telefunken Aktiengesellschaft (1965, April 1). *Bericht über das Geschäftsjahr vom 1. Januar bis 31. Dezember 1964. 2. Vorlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 1. There seems to have been a grace period for the business year 1963/64 with regards to the company's advertising. The new style was only introduced in April 1964 (as indicated above), and *GM*, for instance, budgeted its advertising for the business year 1963/64 instead of until the end of the calendar year 1963, Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. This is also visible from the published advertisements: The same ad was inserted in the

to begin only in April but could already start in March²⁴⁰ or February.²⁴¹ A second novelty concerned the ad-placement. For the 1965 campaign, *McCann* and *Telefunken* had tried to secure what they deemed to be the best spots for their ads within the print media publications they used, “following our motto ‘placement precedes timing’”.²⁴² *Telefunken*’s ad series in the *Stern* is proof that these efforts indeed translated in a marked change concerning where the company’s advertising was placed in a magazine: all but one of the 15 ads *Telefunken* inserted in the *Stern* between March and November 1965 were placed on the page 7, 9, 11, or 13 of their respective issues.²⁴³ In 1967, again, around 70 % of *Telefunken*’s ads in the *Stern* were placed on either page 7 or 11.²⁴⁴ This was a marked shift compared to 1962, which had seen *Telefunken* ads being placed indifferently throughout the magazine.²⁴⁵

This new placement strategy offered the advantage that readers would have encountered *Telefunken* ads soon after first opening the magazine, which presumably already ensured a higher degree of attention. Ads in *Telefunken*’s new style with its vertical orientation and half-page format were further particularly well-suited to being placed on the right-hand half of such right-hand magazine pages, as readers would have first noticed the vertically placed, bold-lettered *Telefunken*-logotype when turning the page. Focusing on placement within a magazine was a logical next step in trying to ensure consistent consumer attention for *Telefunken* after having ensured the continuity of insertions across large parts of the year and a coherent style for all communications of the brand.

The *Telefunken* style was further refined in 1966 and 1967. Any modifications were nonetheless incremental in the grand scheme of things. By early 1966, it had become a question of optimization rather than of fundamental change, as Seydlitz inferred from the results of a market research study evaluating *Telefunken*’s image. These optimizing changes entailed enlarging the product images, depicting the products in a more angled perspective, and adjusting the copy

Stern in September 1963 and January 1964, Telefunken (1963, September 29). Advertisement. Tagline: Diese Taste drücken – das möchte jeder: Magnetophon automatic. *Stern*, 39, 102. Telefunken (1964, January 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Nur ein Tastendruck...Magnetophon automatic. *Stern*, 4, 52.

²⁴⁰ For the first ad of the calendar year in 1965, see Telefunken (1965, March 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Helgoland mit dem Festland verbinden? *Stern*, 10, 9. The first ad for a *Telefunken* media device followed two issues later. Unlike before, there was no break between these ads and the ones inserted in April and beyond.

²⁴¹ For the first ad of the calendar year in 1967, see Telefunken (1967, February 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Wir bleiben dabei – auch beim neuen ›FE 217 T‹. *Stern*, 8, 11.

²⁴² Horlitz (1965, February 23). *Notiz. Betr.: Information über FM-Anzeigen Neuerscheinungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120. In the original German: “Nach unserer Devise ‘Platzierung geht vor Zeitpunkt’ [...]”

²⁴³ *Telefunken* inserted ads in the issues 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 25, 31, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, and 46 of the *Stern* in 1965 with each being on the pages 7, 9, 11 or 13. The sole exception was the ad in issue 28, which was placed on page 42.

²⁴⁴ Nine out of 19 *Telefunken* ads in the *Stern* in 1967 were placed on page 11, with a further four being placed on page 7. See the issues 8, 9, 11, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52.

²⁴⁵ See the *Telefunken* ad on page 6 of issue n° 34 of the *Stern*’s 1962 volume, as well as the ads on page 48 of issue n° 33, page 85 of n° 36 and page 149 of n° 38.

text to be more “aggressive, dynamic, and modern”.²⁴⁶ The marketing department simultaneously continued to work on the finer details of brand presentation. This encompassed devising a universally applicable guideline for the ratio between *Telefunken* star and logotype,²⁴⁷ supplying *Telefunken*’s business travelers with company-branded bags,²⁴⁸ or coordinating a task force on packaging that, for instance, tried to introduce a supra-departmental standard for adhesive tape (the *Telefunken*-star was imprinted on it).²⁴⁹ As *FM/Wb* explained, all these little things were of great importance to the company’s self-designated “make-up artists”.²⁵⁰

“[...] we can’t be apathetic to which business cards are handed out, what is imprinted on the sugar cube [packaging] in the casinos and canteens [...]. And we are by all means not indifferent to whether a delivery vehicle drives around with rusty scratches and ‘advertises’ in this way.”²⁵¹

Telefunken hence sought to present its brand in a coherent way across various forms of communication and across departments in the mid-1960s to ensure a consistent brand perception by consumers. Notably, this also held true across nation-state borders.

2.1.1.6 Transnational Coherence? Export Advertising, Foreign Partners, and Organizational Challenges

Since the company’s early days, the *Telefunken* logotype and *Telefunken*-star adorned its advertising communications to represent the brand.²⁵² They ensured a base level of recognizability. In early 1962, *FM/Wb* still recommended using both in combination in its foreign advertising “as general identifying elements. This is the safest way to achieve typographical consistency in national and international *Telefunken* advertising.” Its domestically used slogan, “Alles spricht für...”, had turned out to be impossible to

²⁴⁶ Seydlitz to Franzke (1966, February 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Marplan-Untersuchung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, p. 2. In the original German: “aggressiv, dynamisch, und modern”.

²⁴⁷ Horlitz & Martenson to Reuting & Scholz (1965, September 6). *Internal letter. Subject: Größenzuordnungen Firmenzeichen/Schriftzug*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

²⁴⁸ Horlitz & John to mailing list (1966, June 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Telefunken-Flug- und Fahrscheintaschen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949.

²⁴⁹ N.N. (undated). Alle sollen gut (k)leben! In *FM/Wb* (undated). *auf gleicher Welle 2*, 13–14. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. This task force had been founded in reaction to a complaint by Heyne, which again underscores the important role of individual actors in initiating change in companies, Seydlitz & Horlitz to mailing list (1964, December 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Verpackungen der Telefunken-Produkte*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. See also Heyne (1964, October 26). *Aktennotiz diktiert in Toronto/Canada am 26.10.1964. Betr.: Besprechungen mit Telefunkenvertretung in Toronto*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 3.

²⁵⁰ N.N. (undated). Wissenschaftler ohne Rheuma. Oder: das Bild von uns draußen. In *FM/Wb* (undated). *auf gleicher Welle 2*, 3–6. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, p. 6. In the original German: “Firmengesichts-Kosmetiker”.

²⁵¹ Ibid. In the original German: “[...] kann es uns nicht egal sein, welche Visitenkarten verteilt werden, wie die Zuckerstückchen in den Casinos und Kantinen bedruckt sind [...]. Und es ist uns durchaus nicht gleichgültig, ob ein Auslieferungsfahrzeug mit verrosteten Schrammen in der Gegend herumfährt und derart ‘wirbt’.”

²⁵² These two measures were complemented by the company’s blue-red corporate color, Himmelmann, W., & Schenk, H. (1953). *Unsere Rundfunkwerbung. Telefunken-Zeitung*, 26(100), 245–248, p. 246.

“internationalize” on the other hand.²⁵³ While there were some general guidelines on the presentation of brand identifiers in advertising,²⁵⁴ these were evidently not sufficient to ensure domestic coherence, let alone a consistent presentation of the *Telefunken* brand on an international scale. The *Telefunken* ad series published in 1962 in *Paris Match*, an illustrated French magazine, may serve as an example to illustrate the lack of international coherence (see Figure 7): these ads shared the basic brand identifiers such as the star, logotype, and typeface with the advertisements published in Germany that same year. But this was where the visual similarities ended. The layout was decidedly different overall, and there was no equivalent to the domestic slogan.²⁵⁵ It seems likely that this would have also been the case for other foreign partners and subsidiaries – until the introduction of the new look.



Figure 7: Telefunken (1962, November 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Regardez bien, et vous en conviendrez : avec TELEFUNKEN quelle finesse d'image. *Paris Match*, 709, 43.

²⁵³ Horlitz to Richter (1962, March 5). *Internal letter. Subject: Übersetzung des Firmen-Slogans "Alles spricht für TELEFUNKEN"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “[...] als allgemein kennzeichnende Elemente zu verwenden. Damit wird am sichersten die typographische Übereinstimmung in der nationalen und internationalen Telefunken-Werbung erreicht.”, “internationalisieren”.

²⁵⁴ Horlitz to Hansa (1963, July 31). *Letter. Subject: TELEFUNKEN-einheitliche Behandlung der graphischen Elemente Firmenzeichen, Slogan, Schriftzug*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

²⁵⁵ See for instance Telefunken (1962, October 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Les Transistors TELEFUNKEN...Quelle perfection! *Paris Match*, 706, 47. See also the ads in all subsequent issues of *Paris Match* until issue n° 713. This ad series is again discussed later on from a different perspective, see chapter 2.2.1.5. For the German ads, see chapter 2.1.1.6.

During 1964, *GRM/Ex*'s advertisers ensured the international dissemination of the *Telefunken* style in concertation with the domestic efforts. *GRM/Ex* inserted product ads in a variety of magazines in different languages, such as the Spanish-language *Life en español*, the English-language *Time* magazine, the Finnish magazine *Suomen Kuvalehti*, and the French magazine *Paris Match*. The first foreign partners, too, already began employing it themselves. In Portugal for instance, the *AEG Lusitana de Electricidade* used a more individualized but still recognizable variant of the new *Telefunken* style in its advertisements for *Telefunken* television sets in Portuguese dailies in 1964.²⁵⁶ *G/Wb* had apparently played a decisive role in disseminating the style to a group of foreign *Telefunken* representatives – not just in Portugal, but also in Sweden or Denmark, for instance.²⁵⁷ Even though it had been developed under the stewardship of *FM* and *FM/Wb*, *G/Wb* and *GRM/Ex* hence both played an important role in the internationalization of the advertising style.

Consumers in France or Portugal would have encountered similarly designed *Telefunken* ads as their counterparts in Germany in 1964. There was, however, a fundamental difference between the Portuguese and French ads concerning their provenance: the ads in Portuguese newspapers had been published by the local partner, the *AEG Lusitana de Electricidade*, and therefore showed a certain degree of individualization, while the advertisements in *Paris Match* had been inserted by *GRM/Ex* – and not by *Telefunken*'s local subsidiary, *Telefunken France*, which was generally responsible for the commercialization and advertising of *Telefunken* products in France.²⁵⁸ Given that *Telefunken France* conducted its own advertising in parallel, this meant that in France in 1964, two different actors belonging to the same company advertised *Telefunken* products in two different styles using designs of two different ad agencies – and it depended on the medium consumers read which one of the two they would have encountered. As a result, there are two different answers regarding the degree of transnational coherence between the German and French *Telefunken* product advertisements in 1964.

This is best illustrated by comparing the ads published in Germany and France for the tape recorder *M 300* (see Figures 8-10). *GRM/Ex* inserted an ad for the device in *Paris Match*. It was near identical to its German equivalent published in the *Stern* regarding its imagery and layout and further followed the exact same beats in its copy text argumentation, bar a slightly

²⁵⁶ Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748.

²⁵⁷ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 3.

²⁵⁸ Telefunken G.m.b.H. & Telefunken France S.A. (1961, October 2). Vertriebsvertrag zwischen TELEFUNKEN G.m.b.H. und COMPAGNIE FRANÇAISE TELEFUNKEN am 02.10.1961. Enclosure of Müller-Machens (1966, December 1). *Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit Herrn Fahrner am 29.11.1966. Betr.: Vergütung für die bei CFTH hergestellten Geräte*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2795. The responsibilities of *Telefunken France* are discussed in more detail in chapter 2.2.1.

more thorough technical explanation. The slogan and tagline were adjusted as neither translated literally. Only the bottom-text differed completely; while the French version gave contact information, the German variant printed an obligatory legal note concerning the recording of music.²⁵⁹ This nonetheless considerable degree of overall conformity makes sense given that both the German and French ads would not have just been published within the same framework put in place by *FM* and *FM/Wb* but rather both designed by *McCann* in coordination with *G/Wb*.²⁶⁰ However, *Telefunken France* also advertised the tape recorder *M 300* around the same time in the French youth magazine *Salut les Copains*. Although this ad did already have a similar technical, sober feel as the German ads of *Telefunken*, it nonetheless used an imagery, layout, and copy text structure which deviated from its equivalents in *Bravo* and – more egregiously – *Paris Match*. *Telefunken France* and its advertising agency *Publi-Syntex* had evidently not yet fully implemented the new style.²⁶¹



Figure 8: Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: trudelsicher. *Bravo*, 41, 21.



Figure 9: Telefunken (1964, October 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Même sens dessus dessous, il enregistre fidèlement. *Paris Match*, 809, 160.



Figure 10: Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: N'importe où N'importe quand... *Salut les Copains*, 27, 118.

²⁵⁹ Between the mid-1950s and 1965, German advertisements for tape recorders needed to indicate that privately recording copyrighted music necessitated the consent of the rights holders. This (effectively non-enforceable) rule was the result of a legal conflict between *Grundig* and the collecting society and performance rights organization *GEMA*. From 1965 onward, tape recorder manufacturers were then obligated to directly pay the *GEMA* a share of their sales revenue instead, Dommann, M. (2012). *Tonjagd. Magnetbänder zwischen Recht und Revolution (1949-1969)*. *Archiv für Mediengeschichte*, 12, 137–152.

²⁶⁰ Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: trudelsicher. *Bravo*, 41, 21. Telefunken (1964, October 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Même sens dessus dessous, il enregistre fidèlement. *Paris Match*, 809, 160. The publication *Linie der Werbung 1964* explicitly mentions that *GRM/Ex* inserted such ads in *Paris Match*, Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 54–55.

²⁶¹ Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: N'importe où N'importe quand... *Salut les Copains*, 27, 118.

Depending on the print medium, French consumers would have either encountered *GRM/Ex*-ads designed by *McCann* in Germany or ads conceived by *Publi-Syntex* for *Telefunken France* – for the same device commercialized by *Telefunken France* under the *Telefunken* brand. While readers of *Paris Match* and *Bravo* would have hence seen basically the exact same product advertisement in 1964, this was not the case for readers of *Salut les Copains*. This highlights the fact that transnational standardization of advertising was first and foremost an organizational challenge. Branding coherence did not only necessitate a style concept, but also heavily depended on internal structures for a consistent implementation. The spheres of responsibilities could dictate what advertising looked like down to the smallest details: while the ad by *Telefunken France* only listed itself as a point of contact, the ad by *GRM/Ex* also gave the contact details of *Telefunken*'s Swiss, Belgian, and Luxembourgish partners for the francophone readership of *Paris Match* outside of France. This made sense given *GRM/Ex*'s responsibility for all consumer electronics exports – *Telefunken France*, on the other hand, would have had no incentive to do so in its own advertising.

Telefunken's advertisers sought to advance the style's international dissemination over the next years. By May 1965, *G/Wb* and *McCann* had designed another brochure, which documented *Telefunken*'s advertising activities and discussed the company's advertising conception. It was sent out to international representatives all over the world,²⁶² thus prompting foreign partners in Belgium,²⁶³ the Netherlands,²⁶⁴ or the US²⁶⁵ to affirm to *FM* that they would use the brochure to do their part in keeping with the uniform *Telefunken* advertising style. Other publications would follow, such as another booklet compiling domestic and foreign advertisements from the year 1966 with an accompanying circular by *FM/Wb* giving short but precise instructions on how to proceed regarding copy text, imagery, and the composition of typographic elements – the vertical *Telefunken*-logotype, for instance, should protrude into clear space “like an antenna” while media devices were supposed to be depicted in a state where they were ready for usage (i.e. with a connected microphone in the case of a tape recorder). This booklet was widely distributed domestically and sent to more than a dozen foreign partners, such as the

²⁶² Seydlitz to Holveck (1965, May 17). *Letter. Subject: Telefunken-Werbung 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. See also Seydlitz to Franzke (1965, March 2). *Internal letter. Subject: WERBUNG '65*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

²⁶³ Jespers to Telefunken, AG. Bereich Marketing (1965, June 21). *Letter. Subject: Publicité 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

²⁶⁴ AEG Amsterdam to Seydlitz (1965, July 7). *Letter. Subject: Werbung 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

²⁶⁵ Zwarg to Seydlitz (1965, August 27). *Letter. Subject: Telefunken-Werbung 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

Telefunken Mexicana, *Telefunken France*, or *Telefunken Pakistan*. They were supposed to do their part “to make sure that we are recognized everywhere in the world.”²⁶⁶

It is worth noting that the process described above did not apply to “everywhere in the world” equally. There was a significant gap between the well above a hundred countries with a local *Telefunken* representative selling the brand’s consumer electronics,²⁶⁷ and the comparatively small number of countries with a subsidiary or important partner that received advertising style documentation according to mailing lists.²⁶⁸ This discrepancy becomes even more glaring when considering that *FM/Wb* only monitored a handful of subsidiaries directly in the mid-1960s concerning the application of the style, their budget structure, and advertising insertion plans.²⁶⁹ Given that *Telefunken*’s advertisers did not always manage to assert their position with rather closely controlled partners such as *Telefunken France* in the mid-1960s, with whom they would even meet personally,²⁷⁰ it is reasonable to assume that the representatives in Venezuela²⁷¹ or Hong Kong²⁷² retained an even larger degree of autonomy.

It is unclear to what extent the style would have been imposed on or applied by the partners in the scores of countries making up the gap – and it seems unlikely that there was a uniform answer anyway. Nonetheless, consumers in at least some of these countries would have had the chance to encounter ads in the new *Telefunken* style anyway, as it was predominantly the countries without a *Telefunken* subsidiary or assembly partner that *GRM/Ex*’s international advertising campaigns were supposed to reach:²⁷³ if a Venezuelan regularly browsed the

²⁶⁶ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1967, June 23). *Letter. Subject: Linie der Werbung 1966*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. In the original German: “Wie eine Antenne”, “Wir alle müssen dafür sorgen, daß wir überall in der Welt wiedererkannt werden.”

²⁶⁷ Telefunken Bereich Marketing (1964). *Unterlagen für die Exportbesprechung 1964. Band 1. B. Kommentar zur Exportsituation von Telefunken und der deutschen Industrie*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2503, p. 24.

²⁶⁸ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1967, June 23). *Letter. Subject: Linie der Werbung 1966*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949.

²⁶⁹ N.N. (undated). Überleitungsplan FM/WB nach Arbeitsgebieten und lfd. Aufgaben. Enclosure 6 of Telefunken Bereich Marketing (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502.

²⁷⁰ See chapters 2.2.1.5 and 2.2.1.6.

²⁷¹ FM/Exk (1963, April 24). Mutmassliches Verbreitungsgebiet von “Life en Espanol” und Telefunken-Exporte nach spanisch-sprechenden Ländern. Enclosure of Ackermann to Seydlitz (1963, April 24). *Internal letter. Subject: Insertion in “Life en Espanol”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

²⁷² Jackson in Hong Kong did, however, receive a small subsidy from *GRM/Ex* in 1963 for its advertising, *GRM/Ex* (1963, February 27). Geplante Werbezuschüsse von *GRM/Ex-H* für 1963/64. Enclosure of von Auw to Seydlitz (1963, March 7). *Internal letter. Subject: Ihre Anfrage nach Art und Höhe von Werbezuschüssen der Exportwerbeabteilungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

²⁷³ Ackermann to Seydlitz (1963, April 24). *Internal letter. Subject: Insertion in “Life en Espanol”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. Subsidiaries and assembly partners were supposed to pay for their own advertising in the *FM*-era. In practice, they often nonetheless received subsidies from the German departments, Seydlitz to Eckart (1965, September 20). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung bei Beteiligungsgesellschaften*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. This is discussed in greater detail for *Telefunken France*, see chapters 2.2.1.5 and 2.2.1.6.

internationally read magazine *Life en español*,²⁷⁴ they would have seen *Telefunken* consumer electronics ads designed by *McCann* for *GRM/Ex* in 1964²⁷⁵ independently of any advertising efforts by the local representative.

In any case, it is clear that by the mid-1960s, a group of important international partners had the necessary direction and documentation to help bring about a greater international cohesiveness in *Telefunken* advertising. This seems to have produced results: *Telefunken France* and its ad agency *Publi-Syntex*, for instance, adopted their own version of the unified approach (similar to the *AEG Lusitana de Electricidade* a few years earlier). Even though the French subsidiary's advertisements in 1967 clearly deviated from their German counterparts in their details,²⁷⁶ they followed the same general direction regarding the fundamental elements of brand presentation (see Figures 11 & 12). This was exactly what *FM* and *FM/Wb* had strived to achieve: the style ensured universal recognition for *Telefunken* while allowing the company's decentralized advertisers – domestic and abroad – to retain a sufficient degree of flexibility within this framework:

“We [FM/Wb] are deliberately refraining from a strict standardization of the advertisements because we now know from experience that it is sufficient to keep the graphic and typographic elements in harmony in the arrangement of lettering, text and product.”²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ FM/Exk (1963, April 24). Mutmassliches Verbreitungsgebiet von “Life en Espanol” und Telefunken-Exporte nach spanisch-sprechenden Ländern. Enclosure of Ackermann to Seydlitz (1963, April 24). *Internal letter. Subject: Insertion in “Life en Espanol”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

²⁷⁵ Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 18–19.

²⁷⁶ See for instance Telefunken (1967, June 17). Advertisement. Tagline: même sur un toboggan il enregistre. *Paris Match*, 949, 119. The absence of references to any other actors besides *Telefunken France* and the signature of *Telefunken France*'s advertising agency make it near-certain that this ad was published by *Telefunken France* and not by *GRM/Ex*. For a comparison with Germany, see for instance Telefunken (1967, April 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Stereo-Effekte... *Stern*, 18, 11.

²⁷⁷ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 2. In the original German: “Bewußt sehen wir von einer strengen Normung der Anzeigen ab, weil wir nun aus Erfahrung wissen, daß es genügt, die graphischen und typographischen Elemente in der Anordnung von Schriftzug, Text und Produkt in Harmonie zu halten.”



Figure 11: Telefunken (1967, June 17). Advertisement. Tagline: même sur un toboggan il enregistre. *Paris Match*, 949, 119.



Figure 12: Telefunken (1967, April 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Stereo-Effekte... *Stern*, 18, 11.

In the mid-1960s, *Telefunken*'s advertising hence not only came to share a recognizable visual style across its domestic print media advertising (no matter the department); to a certain extent, the *Telefunken* style was also employed on a local and international level thanks to its retail partners, international representatives, and *GRM/Ex*. According to Seydlitz, its implementation had not just been a matter of distinguishing the company's image from the competition. It was also about a more efficient use of the available means:

"One of the goals of the FM department's coordinating work in the area of advertising was to develop a uniform advertising style for the entire company, a style that differentiates us from our competitors and is 'Telefunken-typical' (style saves money)."²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ Seydlitz to mailing list (1964, December 17). *Internal letter. Subject: Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. In the original German: "Das Ziel der koordinierenden Arbeit des Bereiches FM auf dem Gebiet der Werbung war es unter anderem, einen einheitlichen Werbestil für die gesamte Firma zu entwickeln, einen Stil, der uns von anderen Wettbewerbern differenziert und 'Telefunken-typisch' ist (Stil spart Geld)." This idea of economizing *Telefunken*'s advertising through the unified style was raised repeatedly, such as in the brochure introducing the style and in an internal circular on the state of advertising within the company, *Telefunken* (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, p. 78; Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 1.

A key rationale behind this unification effort – as well as behind the earlier efforts to better coordinate budgets and insertion plans – was the notion that it would save the company money in the long run, as advertisements in the same style would achieve a cumulative effect. Achieving a uniform style was therefore not simply a question of aesthetics but rather a strategic goal meant to reinforce brand identity vis-à-vis the competition while also increasing efficiency.

2.1.1.7 The Fragility of Coherence. *FM's* Legacy and Dissolution

The marketing department's work transformed *Telefunken's* advertising within just a few years. It did so first regarding the domestic strategy and insertion patterns, and then also regarding style, imagery, and copywriting on a local to international scale. These efforts discernibly impacted the company's image. According to a comparison of two externally commissioned market research studies,²⁷⁹ conducted in 1962 and 1965 respectively, which each had asked German consumers to imagine a personification of the company, *Telefunken's* advertisers, salesmen, market researchers, and other relevant personnel had collaboratively managed to rewire public perception, as *FM/Wb* proudly highlighted in an internal publication summing up the studies' findings:

“In the public imagination in 1962, the man [Mr. Telefunken] looked like this: Quite frail, usually reclining on a lounge, he talks a lot about his past, about his achievements as a young man. He enjoys the present by reminiscing. He also has rheumatism.”²⁸⁰

The 1965 study offered a much more flattering description in comparison:

“‘Mr. TELEFUNKEN’ is a stately, enterprising scientist. A distinguished, reserved, serious engineer. A man who works reliably, who is considered meticulous and who is expected to be active and forward-thinking. [...]. He hates cheap tricks.”²⁸¹

This positive turn was mainly attributed to the new advertising direction with its combination of “memorable style-elements”, an optimized usage of advertising media, and a common visual identity across the advertising of domestic departments and foreign partners alike. *Telefunken's* advertising approach distinguished it from the competition,²⁸² and assured harmony between

²⁷⁹ For the full report including a short discussion of the underlying studies, see *FM/MF* (1967, January 24). *Die Entwicklung des TELEFUNKEN-Image 6/66*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5932, p. 3.

²⁸⁰ N.N. (undated). Wissenschaftler ohne Rheuma. Oder: das Bild von uns draußen. In *FM/Wb* (undated). *auf gleicher Welle* 2, 3–6. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, p. 3. In the original German: “In der Vorstellung der Öffentlichkeit von 1962 sah der Mann so aus: Recht gebrechlich, meist auf einer Liegestatt, spricht er viel von seiner Vergangenheit, von seinen Leistungen als junger Mann. Er genießt die Gegenwart in Erinnerungen. Rheuma hat er auch.”

²⁸¹ Ibid. In the original German: “‘Herr TELEFUNKEN’ ist ein stattlicher, rühriger Wissenschaftler. Ein vornehmer, zurückhaltender, seriöser Ingenieur. Ein Mann, der zuverlässig arbeitet, der als sorgfältig gilt und dem man Aktivität und fortschrittliches Denken zutraut. [...]. Er haßt billige Tricks.”

²⁸² Id., pp. 4–5. In the original German: “einprägsame Stilelemente”. This connection is made even more explicit in the full report, *FM/MF* (1967, January 24). *Die Entwicklung des TELEFUNKEN-Image 6/66*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5932, p. 37.

company image and visual style, as both were equally “technical and factual”.²⁸³ Although this comparison between image-studies provided the marketing department with a resounding validation of its work,²⁸⁴ *FM* would nonetheless be closed down in 1967/68 – and the *Telefunken* style it had worked on for years would vanish with it.

On the 1st of January 1967, *Telefunken* merged with the *AEG*. From this point on, there was no independent company called *Telefunken* anymore, only *Telefunken*-branded products.²⁸⁵ Consumer-facing advertisements should nonetheless continue to use the *Telefunken* brand identifier. Only in special cases were the *AEG* and *Telefunken* logotypes supposed to appear together.²⁸⁶ During 1967, consumers would not have been immediately able to tell that anything had changed compared to years past when encountering a *Telefunken* ad: the style continued to be used in Germany²⁸⁷ and abroad.²⁸⁸ This made sense, as *FM/Wb* was still responsible for advertising policy, the supervision of advertising budgets, the approval of printed advertising matter, the coordination of product advertising media choices and insertion patterns, and the conception and implementation of the unified advertising style. This arrangement was short-lived, however. 1967 was again a transitional year that would see the gradual dissolution of *Telefunken*’s marketing department *FM*.²⁸⁹

A first step in that direction was taken at the turn of the year 1966/67, when the head of *FM*’s sales promotion division was transferred to a newly established department of the consumer electronics business unit *G* called *G/AWA* (“absatzwirtschaftliche Abteilung”),²⁹⁰ which was responsible for the marketing, product management, and domestic and foreign advertising of

²⁸³ This was also the aspiration for *Telefunken*’s international advertising, Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1967, June 23). *Letter. Subject: Linie der Werbung 1966*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. In the original German: “technisch-sachlich”.

²⁸⁴ *FM* publicized the results accordingly within the company. The results were discussed extensively in a widely distributed internal publication on marketing, N.N. (undated). *Wissenschaftler ohne Rheuma. Oder: das Bild von uns draußen*. In *FM/Wb* (undated). *auf gleicher Welle* 2, 3–6. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. Seydlitz further brought the results directly to the attention of the company’s leadership, Seydlitz & Serke to mailing list (1967, March 20). *Internal letter. Subject: Die Entwicklung des TELEFUNKEN-Image*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7972.

²⁸⁵ Horlitz & Martenson (1966, November 18). *Werbeleiter-Tagung vom 7. und 8.11.1966. Ergebnisse und Vereinbarungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949.

²⁸⁶ AEG/HM Zentrale Werbeabteilung (undated). *Hinweise für die Werbung ab 1.1.1967*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6049.

²⁸⁷ See for instance *Telefunken* (1967, December 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Das ist ein Hobby, das Sie begeistern wird. *Stern*, 49, 11.

²⁸⁸ See for instance *Telefunken* (1967, November 18). Advertisement. Tagline: “REGARDEZ DE TOUT VOS YEUX”... *Paris Match*, 971, 40.

²⁸⁹ *FM/Wb* of course also retained its responsibilities for institutional advertising, advertising subsidies, the coordination of domestic and foreign trade fair attendances, as well as its partial responsibility for naming and packaging during 1967. Only the responsibility for outdoor advertising was already transferred to the *AEG*’s central advertising department during the year, N.N. (undated). *Überleitungsplan FM/WB nach Arbeitsgebieten und lfd. Aufgaben*. Enclosure 6 of *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502.

²⁹⁰ N.N. (undated). *Überleitungsplan FM/MAF nach Arbeitsgebieten und lfd. Aufgaben*. Enclosure 4 of *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502, p. 1.

all *Telefunken*-branded consumer electronics devices.²⁹¹ Between July 1967 and the end of the year, the tasks and responsibilities of *FM* were then taken over either by horizontal departments of the *AEG* or – if related to consumer electronics – by *G/AWA*.²⁹² *FM*'s personnel was either transferred or laid off.²⁹³ This included its head, Seydlitz, who left the company on the 31st of December 1967.²⁹⁴

While most responsibilities of *FM/Wb*, too, had been transferred to divisions of the *AEG*'s horizontal marketing department *HM* on the 31st of December 1967, *FM/Wb* would continue to perform its possibly most important task – ensuring the uniformity of *Telefunken*'s advertising – until the 31st of March 1968.²⁹⁵ As a consequence, there were still ads for *Telefunken* consumer electronics products published in the *Stern* and the *Bravo* during the first half of 1968 that at least retained elements of this style. These would be the last remnants of *FM*'s work over the previous years. During the same period, the first *Telefunken* ads that clearly broke with the style appeared in *Stern* and *Bravo*.²⁹⁶ Such a coexistence of diverging ad designs was systematically prevented during earlier years when *FM* was the sole authority.

From April 1968 onward, responsibility for *Telefunken*'s advertising style and advertising planning shifted to the *AEG*'s central advertising division, *HM/ZWA*. Meanwhile, *G/AWA* was now tasked with ensuring international alignment across the company's most important foreign representatives such as *Telefunken France* or *Telefunken Mexicana*.²⁹⁷ Fully under new control

²⁹¹ N.N. (1967, July). Aus der Wirtschaft. Verkauf zusammengefaßt. *Funkschau*, 13, 1042. Regarding the structure of the consumer electronics departments after the *Telefunken-AEG* merger, see further Gliese, 2023, pp. 189–194.

²⁹² Certain tasks were also no longer performed from this point on, see Enclosures 1–6 of *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502.

²⁹³ N.N. (undated). Zeitplan für die Überleitung der FM-Funktionen. Enclosure 1 of *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502, p. 1. While *Telefunken*'s business units were integrated into the *AEG*'s structure as new vertical units, fewer of the members of *Telefunken*'s horizontal staff departments were taken on by the *AEG*, Mahr, 2003, p. 51. This may be explained by certain redundancies between the horizontal departments of *AEG* and *Telefunken*, which – at least in part – performed identical tasks before the merger, resulting in layoffs, FM to mailing list (1967, August 21). *Internal letter. Subject: Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502.

²⁹⁴ N.N. (1968, January). *Funkschau elektronik express. Aktuelle Nachrichten. Funkschau*, 2, 36–37, 62, p. 37.

²⁹⁵ N.N. (undated). Überleitungsplan FM/WB nach Arbeitsgebieten und lfd. Aufgaben. Enclosure 6 of *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502.

²⁹⁶ See for instance *Telefunken* (1968, May 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Dies ist der große Europäer Ludwig van B. Das ist der kleine Europäer »bajazzo TS«. *Stern*, 20, 7. See also *Telefunken* (1968, May 6). Advertisement. Tagline: Worauf warten 14 müde Partygäste? *Bravo*, 19, 13. For ads that departed from the style, see for instance *Telefunken* (1968, February 25). Advertisement. Tagline: Selbst wenn wir das europäische Farbfernseh-System PAL nicht erfunden hätten, würden wir Ihnen raten, farbig fernzusehen. *Stern*, 8, 69. See also *Telefunken* (1968, May 20). Advertisement. Tagline: In jeder Lage für jeden Jux zu haben – »magnetophon 300 TS«. *Bravo*, 21, 11.

²⁹⁷ For a few select subsidiaries, *G/AWA* already took over on the 31st of December 1967 instead, N.N. (undated). Überleitungsplan FM/WB nach Arbeitsgebieten und lfd. Aufgaben. Enclosure 6 of *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502, pp. 2, 5.

following this process of consolidation initiated by a large-scale organizational change, *Telefunken*'s advertising direction was changed entirely: all ads in the second product advertising wave of the year 1968 broke with the *FM* style in format, imagery, layout, and copy text approach. While there was no return to separate advertising approaches for *GR* and *GM* products (*G*'s advertising was still handled jointly after all), the style that had been fostered throughout the previous years had already been completely tossed aside. Only a base level of consistency in the form of the brand identifiers was retained.²⁹⁸

The stylistic coherence of the mid-1960s would not return in the following years. Even for iterations of advertisements for the same device aimed at the same target group, the domestic approach was always changed regarding layout, imagery, and copy text (see Figures 13-16). The same applied to brand identifiers. Although the vertical logotype and the star were kept, their arrangement was repeatedly changed, as was the typeface. *Telefunken* used three different slogans in the *Bravo* in a period of about twelve months.²⁹⁹ It follows that the coherence between the domestic and international advertising, too, would have become less pronounced after *FM*'s demise: by 1971, the advertising for *Telefunken* record players in France had nothing in common with its German equivalent anymore concerning layout or typography. Not even the *Telefunken* logotype as a basic brand identity marker was presented in the same manner.³⁰⁰



Figure 13: Telefunken (1968, September 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein heißer Tip. *Bravo*, 38, 17; (1969, September 22). Advertisement. Tagline: BRAVO! *Bravo*, 39, 21; (1970, March 30). Advertisement. Tagline: „mister hit“. *Bravo*, 41, 17; (1970, October 5). Advertisement. Tagline: Gestatten – „mister hit“. *Bravo*, 41, 37; (1971, April 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Telefunken „mister hit 71“. *Bravo*, 17, 27.

²⁹⁸ There was a break in *Telefunken* consumer electronics advertising between issue 20 and 34, with the latter introducing the new look, *Telefunken* (1968, August 25). Advertisement. Tagline: In 9 von 10 Rundfunkstudios arbeiten TELEFUNKEN Tonbandgeräte. *Stern*, 34, 9. See for instance also *Telefunken* (1968, October 4). Advertisement. Tagline: Wir kämpfen nicht um Medaillen. *Stern*, 40, 63. The same process happened in the *Bravo*.
²⁹⁹ The ads for the record player *mister hit* illustrate this well. The cited ads are all stand-ins for larger series, *Telefunken* (1968, September 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein heißer Tip. *Bravo*, 38, 17; (1969, September 22). Advertisement. Tagline: BRAVO! *Bravo*, 39, 21; (1970, March 30). Advertisement. Tagline: „mister hit“. *Bravo*, 41, 17; (1970, October 5). Advertisement. Tagline: Gestatten – „mister hit“. *Bravo*, 41, 37; (1971, April 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Telefunken „mister hit 71“. *Bravo*, 17, 27.

³⁰⁰ *Telefunken* (1971, March). Advertisement. Tagline: à prix égal offrez-vous la qualité Telefunken. *Salut les Copains*, 103, 110; (1971, April 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Telefunken „mister hit 71“. *Bravo*, 17, 27.

From the late 1960s onward, *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics advertising hence diverged significantly from the comparatively coherent approach established under the marketing department in the mid-1960s. By the end of the 1970s, this had caused problems with the brand's public perception. According to an external review conducted for *Telefunken* in 1979, the company's outward communications were not sufficiently verbally and visually consistent, while its advertisements in particular were deemed to be lacking a distinct style that set them apart from the competition.³⁰¹ Progress was therefore not linear, and regression remained a real possibility. In the case of *Telefunken*, the advertising reforms of the mid-1960s did not outlast the actors that implemented them.

Despite *FM* seeing success while it exercised its mandate, its thinking and approach seem to not have sustainably permeated *Telefunken*'s vertical departments. This demonstrates that centrally imposing change was effective but not necessarily sustainable if the mindset of the decentralized actors remained unaltered. In fact, Seydlitz even stated that not much had changed in that regard during his last year at the company:

“[...] in Germany and at TELEFUNKEN nobody yet truly knows what marketing actually is, what brand, advertising, design and market research are for, what they mean in the overall framework of the company and how we or other companies use these factors, [...]”³⁰²

This failure to instill a lasting mindset shift may have been related to the way marketing had been introduced to *Telefunken*'s organizational structure: through *FM*, it had only been implemented as a centralized function. However, the company had not also installed marketers in the vertical units, which meant that *Telefunken* did not have “professionals at all levels of the company” according to Seydlitz.³⁰³

The case of *Telefunken* illustrates how closely interwoven the domestic and international coherence across advertising communications – or lack thereof – could be with a company's organizational structure: Endowed with a far-reaching mandate concerning the coordination, unification, and centralization of advertising, *FM* reconfigured *Telefunken*'s advertising approach and style particularly at the domestic level – but also on a transnational scale – within a few years after its inception. Individual decision-makers, such as Seydlitz, played a decisive role in this process, shaping and enforcing *Telefunken*'s overarching advertising strategy and style. *FM* managed to impose its direction on many of the company's product advertisers in Germany and abroad despite obstacles, such as organizational inertia, fragmented

³⁰¹ Gliese, 2023, p. 310.

³⁰² Seydlitz to Fuchs (1967, January 27). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. In the original German: “[...] in Deutschland und bei TELEFUNKEN noch niemand wirklich weiß, was Marketing eigentlich ist, wozu Marke, Werbung, Formgestaltung und Marktforschung da sind, was sie im Gesamtspiel des Unternehmens bedeuten und wie wir oder andere Firmen diese Faktoren einsetzen, [...]”

³⁰³ Ibid. In the original German: “Professionelle in allen Stufen des Unternehmens”.

responsibilities, and the limits of centralized authority – although some degree of local flexibility remained both necessary and desirable. However, the transnational and cross-yearly advertising coherence maintained through *FM*'s control unraveled quickly after the department was dissolved. After a first organizational change had brought forth the *Telefunken* style of the mid-1960s, it was soon undone by another. The following subchapter explores how two other consumer electronics companies navigated similar tensions.

2.1.2 Comparative Perspectives on Advertising and Organizational Structure: *Philips* and *Braun*

Given that the organizational restructurings and the increased international outlook in advertising at *Telefunken* were reflective of the larger trends at the time as outlined in the introduction, it follows that some of *Telefunken*'s competitors in the consumer electronics market underwent similar developments. Among *Braun*, *Telefunken*, *Philips*, and *Loewe*, only the latter seems to have retained a purely functional structure in which sales and advertising remained organizationally separate from development and production into the 1970s.³⁰⁴ The Dutch multinational *Philips* already had a company structure that combined functional departments and largely autonomous national organizations and product units by the 1950s,³⁰⁵ while *Braun* followed suit in 1963 – explicitly citing market conditions and competitiveness as actuating factors for its restructuring.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, both *Braun*³⁰⁷ and *Philips* also came to embrace marketing as an organizational principle, which at least in the case of *Philips* was explicitly meant to serve as a means of integration for its advertising function.³⁰⁸ And just like *Telefunken*, both companies concerned themselves with the question of harmonizing consumer-facing advertising on a transnational scale – a challenging task, uniquely interwoven with the organizational structures of both companies.

The following sections examine how *Philips* and *Braun* navigated the interdependence between organizational structure and transnational advertising coherence through distinct strategies. Both case studies focus on different sub-aspects, however, and are hence more complementary than directly comparable in all aspects as they examine advertising and marketing from

³⁰⁴ See the organigrams in *LOA Griesmeier Bestand 13.00/2 Organisation 1971-72*. Speidel has accordingly noted that *Loewe*'s product development and sales/marketing functions did not sufficiently cooperate during the 1970s, which could result in products that were not sufficiently in line with market demands, Speidel, 2012, p. 165.

³⁰⁵ Dai, 1996, pp. 87–92.

³⁰⁶ Gros (1963, January 9). *Organisations- und Personalverfügung des Vorstandes 1/63: Einrichtung von Artikel- und Geschäftsbereichen*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

³⁰⁷ N.N. (undated). *Organisationsschema BRAUN*. BS, magazine file Organigramme; N.N. (1971). *Organisation des Artikelbereiches Elektronik*. BS, magazine file Organigramme; Braun (1971). *Geschäftsbericht 1970/71*. BS.

³⁰⁸ Höfer, 2024. The following section draws on the same primary sources as this article and partially builds on the analysis first published there. However, the material is approached from a distinct analytical perspective, focusing on transnationality in advertising instead of on the organizational changes induced by marketing thought.

different angles. A longitudinal analytical approach is used in the case of *Braun*, as it is traced how the company's development and growth over time created challenges for its efforts to apply a transnationally coherent advertising style. Individual advertisements play no role in this zoomed-out perspective. Inversely, changes over time are not explored in depth in the *Philips* case study, as its attention is instead focused on the question how the company's organizational structure in the late 1960s shaped the partially national, partially transnational introductory advertising campaign of a particular consumer electronics device.

2.1.2.1 Transnational Approaches in a Federated Structure: *Philips's* Advertising Organization

Philips was a major multinational industrial corporation. Already by the late 1950s/early 1960s, the Dutch company had factories and sales organizations all over the world,³⁰⁹ more than 200.000 employees,³¹⁰ and was active in diverse fields such as lighting, telecommunications, industrial components, medical devices, and consumer electronics.³¹¹ During the long 1960s, it was structured into central functional departments, so-called major industrial groups (MIGs), and national organizations (NOs) of varying sizes.³¹² As Europe's largest electrical corporation in the mid-1960s (by revenue),³¹³ *Philips* understood itself as a "federation"³¹⁴ in which the MIGs were responsible for development, production, and the coordination of the commercialization of their respective product groups. Each MIG housed several subdivisions. Radios, record players, and television sets, for instance, fell under the responsibility of separate subdivisions within the same MIG.

The range of tasks executed by an NO – and its degree of autonomy – depended on its size. Smaller NOs were akin to sales organizations, whereas the largest – such as the ones in Germany or France – had their own significant research and production capabilities. While commercial activities were generally a domain of the NOs, the corporate headquarters in Eindhoven could be more involved in legal or financial matters.³¹⁵ The extent of the autonomy

³⁰⁹ Chanier, 1990, p. 34. Even as early as 1950, the company had 152 factories and around ten times as many international sales representatives, see Dai, 1996, p. 79.

³¹⁰ In 1960, *Philips* had a workforce of 211.000. By 1975, its total number of employees neared 400.000 globally, Hoebe, A.H. (1978, May 26). *Philips van 1938 – 1977*. Enclosure of Hoebe, A.H. (1978, May 26). *Korte Schets van de Geschiedenis van General Advertising Department*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D.

³¹¹ For a full list, see Dai, 1996, p. 86. See also Chanier, 1990, p. 42.

³¹² Chanier, 1990, p. 40. The major industrial groups were called "Hoofd Industrie Groepen" in Dutch, which is why they were often also shortened to HIGs.

³¹³ Seydel (1966, November 11). *Die 20 grössten Unternehmen der europäischen Elektroindustrie (1965 – nach Umsatzrangfolge)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2031.

³¹⁴ van der Eng, 2017, p. 220. See also Dai, 1996, p. 92.

³¹⁵ The MIGs were also responsible for the Dutch market, Chanier, 1990, pp. 42–44, 51. However, due to *Philips's* size, the Dutch domestic market was of comparatively small importance to the company, Porter, M. E. (1983). *Cases in Competitive Strategy*. Free Press, p. 521.

of *Philips's* company parts during the 1960s was considerable. In 1967, the head of its *General Advertising Department (G.A.D.)* described *Philips's* “many different departments, being product departments, functional departments or national organisations” as having become “little kingdoms in their own rights”.³¹⁶

2.1.2.1.1 The Autonomy of *Philips's* Advertisers and the Decentralization of Style

Philips's federated company structure translated to the setup of its advertising function. *Philips's* advertisers worked in the *G.A.D.*, within the MIGs, or in one of the national organizations. By 1968, the allocation of responsibilities in the corporate headquarters was as follows: The *G.A.D.* set guidelines and developed general advertising policy for the whole concern, fabricated advertising material not related to any particular products and advised and supported the advertisers working in the NOs and MIGs. It also expected to be involved in the selection processes of new advertising managers and agencies for the NOs and seemed to have at least for a while also conducted institutional advertising in international media. The advertisers in the MIGs' product subdivisions in turn centrally produced product-related advertising material to be distributed to the NOs and compiled material and information related to a new product's planned positioning in the market, which was meant to serve as the point of departure for the NOs. The MIGs' advertisers were further involved in questions of product packaging and naming and were supposed to facilitate interchange between NOs or coordinate advertising approaches between countries if it made sense for a device.³¹⁷

Notably, these MIG product advertisers were part of larger product marketing teams in which they worked with sales promoters, market researchers, and other specialists under the leadership of a marketing manager.³¹⁸ This structure was ideally mirrored on the national level: “The

³¹⁶ van Geel, C. J. (1967). The advertising function and the advertising policy within the Philips concern. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1967). *Report of the 7th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council. Held in Eindhoven on October 9/10 1967*, Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 2.

³¹⁷ G.A.D. (1968). The advertising function and the advertising policy within the Philips concern. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1968). *Report of the 8th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council. Held in Eindhoven on Tuesday January 16, 1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, pp. 6–10; (1968). Implementation of the advertising policy as laid down in the paper: ‘The Advertising Function and the Advertising Policy within the Philips Concern’. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1968). *Summary of procedures of the 9th meeting of the P.I.A.C. on Wednesday Nov. 6 and Thursday Nov. 7 1968 in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, pp. 4–5, 8–14. Regarding the institutional advertising conducted by the *G.A.D.*, see further N.N. (1959), *Resolutions of the Philips international advertising convention held in Eindhoven from April 27th until May 2nd, 1959*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, non-paginated.

³¹⁸ G.A.D. (1968). The advertising function and the advertising policy within the Philips concern. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1968). *Report of the 8th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council. Held in Eindhoven on Tuesday January 16, 1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 3.

results and decisions of the marketing teams on a concern level are funneled toward the marketing teams in the national organisations.”³¹⁹ Planning and executing *Philips*’s product advertising campaigns then fell to the product advertisers in the NOs, who were responsible for “art, copy, media-choice, advertising approach, advertising allowances and budgets” – in short, for all advertising components of their respective national product marketing plans. Accordingly, the day-to-day collaboration with ad agencies and freelancers then also took place on the national level,³²⁰ with the advertisers working in *Philips*’s NOs chiefly being interested in the creativity of ad agencies.³²¹ This meant a division of labor in which “the advertising strategy should be planned by the advertising department, while the advertising tactics are to be realized by the advertising agency” as had already been set down in the resolutions of *Philips*’s 1959 international advertising convention.³²²

The level of support from the headquarters would have differed between countries. Larger NOs had dedicated product group advertisers that could rely on general experts for window dressing or exhibitions employed by the advertising department³²³ as well as on a proper ad agency for support and could hence easily plan and produce their own advertising. This would not have necessarily been the case in smaller *Philips* subsidiaries, which only employed generalist advertisers or even had “no advertising people and often poor agency support”.³²⁴ According

³¹⁹ van Geel, C. J. (1967). The advertising function and the advertising policy within the Philips concern. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1967). *Report of the 7th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council. Held in Eindhoven on October 9/10 1967*, Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 12. The follow-up advertising policy document of 1975 still emphasized this two-step process, G.A.D. (1975). *The Advertising Function in Philips*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., pp. 4–5.

³²⁰ G.A.D. (1968). The advertising function and the advertising policy within the Philips concern. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1968). *Report of the 8th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council. Held in Eindhoven on Tuesday January 16, 1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 10. It should be noted, however, that *Philips*’s subsidiaries worked with the local branches of the *Intermarco* agency in many European countries by this point with one reason being that this was supposed to help “maintain greater continuity in agency service”, Philips International Advertising Council (1966). *Report of the sixth meeting of the Philips International Advertising council held in Eindhoven on June 22nd/23rd, 1966*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 3.

³²¹ van Geel, C. J. (1963, July 10). *Organisation of advertising departments and advertising agencies in the European Philips companies*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., p. 12.

³²² N.N. (1959), *Resolutions of the Philips international advertising convention held in Eindhoven from April 27th until May 2nd, 1959*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, non-paginated.

³²³ This combination of product advertisers and generalists was outlined for the German *Philips* subsidiary, Philips International Advertising Council (1973). *14th Philips International Advertising Council (15th and 16th November, 1973) Summary of the Discussions*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, pp. 4–5.

³²⁴ Philips International Advertising Council (1969). *Summary of procedures of the 11th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council on: Monday November 3rd and Tuesday November 4th 1969, in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 7. For a detailed account of the vast differences regarding staffing and performed tasks between the advertising departments of *Philips*’s European subsidiaries, as well as on the differences between their ad agencies regarding commission and services,

to a proposition meant to standardize the informational flow from the MIGs' product advertisers to the NOs, the MIGs were supposed to provide "campaign suggestions" for smaller NOs in addition to product photographs and "data and policy lines" meant for everyone.³²⁵ It thus seems likely that NOs with limited means stayed closer to suggestions and material provided by the MIGs than large NOs, such as the ones in Germany or France, who had the resources to devise their own campaigns and create distinct ads together with their advertising agencies.

The division of responsibilities sketched out above effectively delineated the practical execution of product advertising campaigns as well as the conceptualization of advertisements as a domain of the (larger) NOs. Nonetheless, numerous efforts were undertaken throughout the 1960s and early 1970s to foster the collaboration and exchange of material and information between *Philips's* advertisers on all levels. The sharing of knowledge and ideas was institutionalized through internal publications, training courses, and regular meetings while there was a continued expectation that the advertisers working in Eindhoven would facilitate the interchange of material whenever it made sense. The NOs on the other hand were being increasingly expected to systematically report back. *Philips's* advertisers would not only come together at the company's international advertising conventions in the 1960s, but also in more specific contexts. The leading European advertising executives in the NOs and of the *G.A.D.* would meet periodically, as would the advertisers working in the consumer product groups in Eindhoven under the stewardship of the *G.A.D.* These product-group advertisers would in turn hold meetings with regionally grouped NO advertising departments, such as those of the German-speaking countries, for instance.³²⁶

Transnational influences in advertising within the *Philips* group during the long 1960s were hence not limited to centrally producing certain general and product-related advertising material; the advertisers in the NOs would have also had the chance to encounter and adopt

see van Geel, C. J. (1963, July 10). *Organisation of advertising departments and advertising agencies in the European Philips companies*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D.

³²⁵ Philips International Advertising Council (1969). *Summary of procedures of the 11th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council on: Monday November 3rd and Tuesday November 4th 1969, in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 7.

³²⁶ These efforts to bring all parts of *Philips's* advertising function closer together and to also better integrate advertising with other company parts through marketing were then further intensified under new leadership of the *G.A.D.* and the *Philips International Advertising Council* from 1967/1968 onward, Höfer, 2024. Advertising-adjacent functions seemed to have also increasingly fostered the exchange of ideas and collaboration on a transnational scale in the 1960s. The *General Sales Promotion Division*, for example, similarly issued a publication that featured sales promotion measures from different NOs while a new study group brought together market researchers from five European countries from 1963 onward, General Sales Promotion Division (1965, April). *sales promotion monitor 11*(1). Unpublished manuscript. PCA, 823 marketing. Philips International Advertising Council (1963). *Report of the fourth meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council held in Eindhoven on the 26th and 27th of June 1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 3.

ideas and material from their colleagues abroad. In addition, these regular meetings produced tangible results of transnational standardization and coordination. As early as 1960, the work of *Philips's Euro-Advertising Steering Committee* led to the adoption of uniformly designed lighted signs for *Philips* retailers in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, for instance,³²⁷ while the lower-level meetings involving the regional groups of NO advertising departments and consumer product group advertisers from Eindhoven seem to have resulted in at least some transnationally coordinated advertising campaigns to introduce important new products to the Scandinavian, Germanic, or Romance-language markets during the 1960s.³²⁸ The *G.A.D.* believed it a worthwhile endeavor to try and increasingly coordinate advertising transnationally between NOs insofar possible as it could potentially save costs, contribute to *Philips's* international image, pool creativity and expertise, and make use of “International media overflow”.³²⁹ Not every such effort was a success, however: attempts to systematically share television advertisements between NOs failed repeatedly.³³⁰

Like *Telefunken*, *Philips* was hence concerned with internally coordinating its advertising function across company parts on a transnational scale during the 1960s, and, at the same time, with increasingly aligning its outward advertising communications across national markets, even citing similar motivations as its German competitor such as cost-efficiency or brand image for doing so. However, *Philips* followed a different philosophy regarding the consumer-facing implementation. While *Telefunken's* marketing department insisted on a uniform style across all company parts in the mid-1960s, *Philips's* approach was more nuanced, seeking to balance national considerations with the potential benefits of international harmonization and economies of scale. This was not to the liking of everyone in Eindhoven: according to an assessment by the central division responsible for electro-acoustical products in 1967, *Philips's* advertising was too disparate between national markets in comparison to the more centralized approaches of their German and Japanese competitors.³³¹ Nevertheless, at a meeting of the

³²⁷ Euro-Advertising Steering Committee (1960). *Report of the second meeting of the Philips Euro-Advertising Steering Committee held in Eindhoven on the 9th of November 1960*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 3.

³²⁸ Hoeben, A.H. (1978, May 26). *Korte Schets van de Geschiedenis van General Advertising Department*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., pp. 3–4. These regional committees were discontinued in 1971, however, Philips International Advertising Council (1972). *Summary of procedures of the 13th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council on Thursday May 4, and Friday May 5, 1972 in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 11. It would be an interesting avenue of further research to trace the extent of these collaborations.

³²⁹ G.A.D. (1968). Implementation of the advertising policy as laid down in the paper: ‘The Advertising Function and the Advertising Policy within the Philips Concern’. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1968). *Summary of procedures of the 9th meeting of the P.I.A.C. on Wednesday Nov. 6 and Thursday Nov. 7 1968 in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 6.

³³⁰ Höfer, 2024.

³³¹ Chanier, 1990, p. 499.

Philips International Advertising Council in 1968, which brought together the advertising managers of several NOs as well as the leadership in Eindhoven to develop policy and further international coordination and unification,³³² it was concluded that:

“It is felt that an overall advertising policy standardisation or harmonisation is necessary. On top of that a part of the advertising materials production like pictures, coloured brochures etc. might be the concrete outcome of international integration. Next to this centrally produced material each country should be in a position to have an individual creative approach for those parts of the marketing plan which are depending on local competition, consumer behaviour, and other marketing conditions. The aim however, is never to try to achieve a complete unity or uniformity in creative outlook, visualization, copy, lay-out etc. [...]”³³³

Philips’s organizational structure and orientation in the late 1960s allowed the advertisers in the NOs to act with relative autonomy in campaign conceptualization and advertising design. This meant that there was usually no visual overlap between the advertisements inserted by *Philips France* and the German *Deutsche Philips* in print mass media publications at the time.³³⁴ These advertisements would have further been part of separately developed marketing campaigns, which took the nationally different market contexts, consumer requirements, and media landscapes into consideration.³³⁵ Nonetheless, there are instances where the fundamental product-related guidance and material provided by the product advertisers in Eindhoven resulted in consumer-facing advertisements in Germany and France sharing certain transnational commonalities despite *Philips*’s federated structure. This is illustrated in the following section based on a practical example.

2.1.2.1.2 Shared Positioning, Divergent Designs. *Philips*’s *Cassettophone* Campaign

In 1968, *Philips* launched the *Cassettophone*, a rather inexpensive device that could play cassettes, but which had no recording function. It was introduced to the German and French publics during the summer of 1968 through advertising in the general and youth mass media print publications of each country, with the *Deutsche Philips* placing ads in magazines such as *Stern* and *Bravo* and *Philips France* in *Paris Match* and *Salut les Copains* in France. As would be expected, separately designed advertisements were used to familiarize consumers with the

³³² The council had been founded in 1959 to explicitly pursue those goals, N.N. (1959). Regulations of the Philips International Advertising Council. Enclosure of van Geel, C. J. to Vente, G. J. (1959, May 15). *Internal letter. Subject: Philips International Advertising Council*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 75 : 823 Philips International Advertising Council.

³³³ Philips International Advertising Council (1969). *Summary of procedures of the 10th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council on: wednesday 23rd of April and thursday 24th of April 1969 in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 6.

³³⁴ A systematic consultation of *Philips* advertisements in the *Stern* and *Paris Match* was undertaken for multiple years in the timeframe 1959-1974 with spot checks for *Bravo* and *Salut les Copains*. A comparison of Swiss, Austrian, and German magazines or of French and Italian ones might yield different results due to the regional coordination taking place for important product market introductions in the 1960s as outlined above.

³³⁵ Höfer, 2024. See further the section on *Philips* marketing campaigns, chapter 3.2.

product, and there was no transnational congruence regarding the advertising frequency.³³⁶ Nonetheless, these first ads for the *Cassettophone* shared a range of attributes in design and copywriting direction alike. The advertisements in both countries drew upon the ‘hippie aesthetic’ in their imagery, depicting young people wearing the colorful apparel fashionable at the time, and matching this in the layout with the inclusion of a single flowing typographic element each (see Figures 17 & 18). In both ads, someone was shown casually carrying the *Cassettophone* in one hand, and the copy texts, too, shared multiple arguments (albeit not all): both highlighted that the device was easy to operate, could be used in every circumstance, had good musical reproduction quality, and that the available offer of pre-recorded cassettes catered to all tastes.



Figure 17: Philips (1968, June 16). Advertisement. Tagline: cassettophon. *Stern*, 24, 143.



Figure 18: Philips (1968, July 6). Advertisement. Tagline: en 1968 la musique c'est... *Paris Match*, 1000, 143.

³³⁶ One *cassettophon* ad was inserted in the *Bravo* and three in the *Stern*, see Philips (1968, June 16). Advertisement. Tagline: cassettophon. *Stern*, 24, 143; (1968, September 16). Advertisement. Tagline: cassettophon. *Bravo*, 38, 83. See further the ads in the *Stern* issues 27 and 36. *Philips France* advertised the device nine times in *Paris Match* and five times in *Salut les Copains*, albeit using deviating designs later on, see for instance Philips (1968, July 6). Advertisement. Tagline: en 1968 la musique c'est... *Paris Match*, 1000, 143; (1968, June). Advertisement. Tagline: en 1968 la musique c'est... *Salut les Copains*, 71, 130–131. See further the ads in the *Paris Match* issues 996, 1002, 1003, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1016, 1024 and in the *Salut les Copains* issues 72, 73, 74, and 76. *Philips France* also commercialized and advertised the *Cassettophone* under its secondary *Radiola* brand around the same time, using not only the same magazines to advertise but even the exact same copy text. It was only the imagery and headline which were slightly adjusted, while keeping with the same overall theme, see for instance *Radiola* (1968, May). Advertisement. Tagline: en 1968, la musique c'est le cassettophone *Radiola*. *Salut les Copains*, 70, 34–35. See also issues 72 and 75, as well as issue 1021 of *Paris Match*.

Based on what has been outlined about *Philips*'s shared responsibility in product marketing and advertising processes, it stands to reason that these ads were the result of nationally distinct creative interpretations of the fundamental positioning for the product as determined by the center. The national advertisers would have begun their work after the *Cassettophone*'s name, packaging, and market positioning were predefined in Eindhoven with the cooperation of the responsible product advertiser. The device's packaging, its package inserts, and the instruction manual support this (see Figures 19 & 20). In fact, the instruction manual and packaging had clearly been produced centrally, as the manual enclosed with the device in a sale to a Belgian consumer explained the device in French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, and Dutch while keeping in line with the design of the packaging and – crucially – also with the general direction of the German and French advertisements in appealing to young audiences through colorful design and flowing typography.³³⁷

The product would have hence been introduced to the market with the same literal and figurative packaging throughout Europe. The other package inserts, a warranty certificate and a brochure offering pre-recorded cassettes in the Belgian case, seemed to have been of national origin, however.³³⁸ This made sense, given that cassettes in Belgium would not have cost the same as in France or Germany owing to the currency differences alone (not to speak of potential variations in availability or consumer taste) while repairs undertaken in the context of a warranty would have usually necessitated the assistance of a retailer at a time when consumer electronics distribution networks were nationally distinct.³³⁹ Sales promotion and service were matters of national concern. The German and French ads accordingly opted for different approaches in this regard: the *Deutsche Philips* had collaborated with the German band *The Rattles* for the product launch, which included not only their presence in the ad-campaign but also encompassed an accompanying sales promotion measure highlighted in the ad, while the French campaign on the other hand emphasized a price-linked promotional offer.³⁴⁰

³³⁷ Philips (1968). Packaging and Belgian box content for the Philips Cassettophone. In Garitz, A. (Photographer), *Vom Wesen der Dinge. Philips Cassettophon 2200*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.verschwundene-dinge.de/zu-den-themen/musikwiedergabe/kassettenrekorder-philips-cassettophon.html>.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ When entering a new market, consumer electronics companies needed to forge new retailer connections. On building up distribution networks, see 2.2.1.3.

³⁴⁰ Philips (1968, June 16). Advertisement. Tagline: cassettophon. *Stern*, 24, 143; (1968, July 6). Advertisement. Tagline: en 1968 la musique c'est... *Paris Match*, 1000, 143.



Figures 19 & 20: Philips (1968). *Packaging and Belgian box content for the Philips Cassettophone*. Images © Andreas Garitz. Used with permission. Initially published in the online exhibition “Vom Wesen der Dinge”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.verschwundene-dinge.de/zu-den-themen/musikwiedergabe/kassettenrekorder-philips-cassettophon.html>.

In the case of *Philips's Cassettophone*, French and German consumers would not have seen the exact same mass media advertisements as advertising design and copy texting were national domains. Insertion timing and media channel choice, too, were decided at the national level, as were the accompanying sales promotion measures. The mass media advertising they would have encountered, however, did nonetheless have a similar feel and shared argumentative approach since the product advertisers in the corporate headquarters had worked out a transnationally identical market positioning for the device and developed a corresponding packaging, name, and multilingual manual, which was then provided to several of its European NOs. This was a direct reflection of *Philips's* organizational structure and approach to transnationalization in advertising and marketing in the late 1960s, with its balancing act between national autonomy and individualized approaches to advertising creativity and strategy on the one side and a trend toward transnationally sharing approaches or ideas and centrally producing material for reasons of cost and image insofar as possible. The *Cassettophone* was not an isolated example; as *Philips's* organizational structure facilitated exactly such a division of labor, there are at least a few other instances where the chosen advertising approaches make it seem probable that the advertisers in Germany and France began from the same common starting point courtesy of the center.³⁴¹

³⁴¹ To give but two examples: In late 1962, the portable *Philips* record players with an attached loudspeaker were newly fitted with diamond-tipped styluses instead of using sapphires as had been done previously in Germany and France alike. Accordingly, the ads in both countries focused on the diamond as the key visual element of their advertisements (despite the deviating designs), with the copy texts equally highlighting that diamond tips were gentler on records and ten times more durable. While no definite link can be established, a common basis seems likely, Philips (1962, November 24). Advertisement. Tagline: musique pure comme le diamant. *Paris Match*, 711, 135; (1962, December). Advertisement. Tagline: So macht Plattenspielen wirklich Freude... *Bravo*, 48, 25. A similar conclusion may be drawn for the *GF 423*, a portable record player advertised in German and French youth

The *Cassettophone* was a new product that could be used in the exact same manner in Germany, France, or Belgium, and *Philips*'s product advertisers in the responsible MIG apparently believed that it would appeal to a similar target audience in different European countries. This would not have applied to all of *Philips*'s consumer electronics devices, however. It is worth emphasizing that the *Deutsche Philips* and *Philips France* were large, quite independent NOs in the 1960s with their own production capabilities and, importantly, consumer electronics product portfolios that were not fully identical. For television sets, for instance, such an approach would have been impossible. Due to different television broadcasting standards in Germany and France, the *Deutsche Philips* and *Philips France* commercialized completely different television sets, which would not have just made joint packaging and naming a nonsensical endeavor, but could further result in marketing campaigns that were nation-specific regarding their fundamental market positioning and the argumentative approach used in their advertising (in addition to nationally distinct ad-designs and chosen media channels as would be expected).³⁴²

There are other limitations to what has been outlined about *Philips*'s organizational structure and the transnationality of its advertising. First, this was a time-specific phenomenon linked to the degree of autonomy conceded to the NOs in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the immediate post-war period, the *G.A.D.* had still exerted a determining influence on some of the advertising campaigns conducted abroad,³⁴³ while then later on, during the 1980s, the NOs' autonomy was curtailed in favor of the product divisions, which became "responsible for not only production but also marketing all over the world."³⁴⁴ Second, this mainly applied to the European context. As van der Eng has pointed out with reference to manufacturing, *Philips* – such as other multinational European enterprises – chiefly focused on the consolidation of their European activities during the 1960s and 1970s. *Philips*'s Australian subsidiary, on the other hand, with its local for local production, was relatively unaffected by any such efforts.³⁴⁵ The same seems to have applied to *Philips*'s advertising function.³⁴⁶ The *Philips International Advertising*

media in the mid-1970s. Albeit the ad-designs were fundamentally different, both showed the device open and closed and in its multiple colors, while both copy texts emphasized the *GF 423*'s design and its capability to play everywhere. The device was positioned similarly with comparable arguments, *Philips* (1975, June). Advertisement. Tagline: One, Two...Three...Rock! *Salut les Copains*, 154, 9; (1975, November 13). Advertisement. Tagline: The Stylistics. *Bravo*, 47, 69.

³⁴² One such example is detailed in chapter 3.2.2.

³⁴³ Hoebe, A.H. (1978, May 26). *Korte Schets van de Geschiedenis van General Advertising Department*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., p. 2. This direct intervention by the *G.A.D.* could even result in Europe-wide marketing campaigns. One such campaign for *Philips* television sets in 1953/54 is described in Fickers, 2009, pp. 391–392.

³⁴⁴ Dai, 1996, p. 313.

³⁴⁵ van der Eng, 2017, p. 218.

³⁴⁶ Two notable exceptions were the *Philips Latin American Advertising and Sales Promotion Committee*, the only and ultimately unsuccessful attempt during the 1960s to improve the collaboration between NOs outside of Europe,

Council was dominated by Europeans,³⁴⁷ the 1968 *Philips International Advertising Convention*, for instance, was exclusively attended by members of European NOs,³⁴⁸ the meetings between regional groups of NO advertising departments and consumer product group advertisers from Eindhoven only applied to European regions,³⁴⁹ and from the languages present on the centrally produced material for the *Cassettophone* it is evident that this material was destined for European markets.³⁵⁰

Philips was not the only multinational company to use the approach outlined for the *Cassettophone*. According to De Iulio, this procedure (called “pattern-standardization”) of centrally predetermining a marketing theme/approach for a product and having the national subsidiaries then adapt it to their own needs and purposes would become increasingly common during the 1970s.³⁵¹ It is important to emphasize that this was a completely different mode of transnational standardization in comparison to efforts related to corporate identity and style. What has been outlined for the *Cassettophone* was a matter of transnational product positioning and not of brand positioning. These elements must be seen as separate since different advertisers and marketers were responsible for either at *Philips* and *Telefunken* alike.

International image-considerations were an occasionally recurring topic within *Philips*’s advertising function also, but there was no comparable push for a uniform *Philips* style as happened at *Telefunken* in the mid-1960s. Although *Philips*’s advertisers had put it on record in the resolutions of their 1959 *Philips International Advertising Convention* that all their advertising should ideally also contribute to shaping a “sound ‘corporate image’”,³⁵² it apparently took until 1973 before the company had an internationally valid corporate identity

and the contributions of Latin American or African NOs to the internal documentation of the year’s best advertising campaigns. On the committee, see Hoeben, A.H. (1978, May 26). *Korte Schets van de Geschiedenis van General Advertising Department*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., p. 4. For the campaigns, see for instance G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA.

³⁴⁷ It had one non-European member in the early 1960s, the advertising manager of *Philips Brazil*, see for instance Philips International Advertising Council (1961). *Report of the third meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council held in Eindhoven on the 22nd and 23rd of November 1961*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 6.

³⁴⁸ N.N. (1968). *Summary of the 7th Philips Advertising Convention, April 22 – 25, 1968, at Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, p. 8.

³⁴⁹ Hoeben, A.H. (1978, May 26). *Korte Schets van de Geschiedenis van General Advertising Department*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., pp. 3–4.

³⁵⁰ Philips (1968). Packaging and Belgian box content for the Philips Cassettophone. In Garitz, A. (Photographer), *Vom Wesen der Dinge. Philips Cassettophon 2200*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.verschwindene-dinge.de/zu-den-themen/musikwiedergabe/kassettenrekorder-philips-cassettophon.html>.

³⁵¹ De Iulio, 2002, p. 32.

³⁵² N.N. (1959), *Resolutions of the Philips international advertising convention held in Eindhoven from April 27th until May 2nd, 1959*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, non-paginated.

manual.³⁵³ The prevailing sentiment during the 1960s seems to have been more in line with the view expressed by the Swedish member of the *Philips International Advertising Council* in 1961, who claimed

“[...] that the fact that each Philips company is able to develop the advertising most suitable to its particular market is one of the great advantages made possible by our international federation. The very important common denominator in these advertising efforts that vary in each market is already there, viz. the Philips logotype and emblem.”³⁵⁴

Philips seems to have thus allowed for greater national variation regarding stylistic choices in advertising than *Telefunken* during the *FM* era – a characteristic of its federated structure. This is not to say that consumers might not have possibly encountered a more coherent *Philips* company image across advertising forms on a national level due to the efforts of an NO. Similar to *Telefunken*’s approach on the German domestic market in the mid-1960s, *Philips France*, for instance, not only centrally produced marketing material for its retailers in 1971 but also sought to ensure “a stronger brand image” by attuning the designs of its nationwide advertising and of the cooperative advertising *Philips France* conducted together with its local partners.³⁵⁵ Internationally, however, *Philips* seems to have had some trouble in that regard: the corporate identity manual was still not always respected by the NOs in the mid-1970s,³⁵⁶ and the head of *Braun*’s communication department explicitly listed their competitor *Philips* as his “No-no example” concerning consumer-facing communication in 1979 because “it most certainly has no Corporate Identity.”³⁵⁷

Philips’s decentralized, federated structure during the 1960s was reflected in its advertising: national autonomy took precedence over transnational coherence when it came to visual design or media strategy. Unlike *Telefunken*, *Philips* did not impose a common visual style through its center. Nonetheless, some of *Philips*’s advertising campaigns – such as those for the *Cassettophone* – shared the same product positioning and centrally produced advertising material across several European markets. This form of transnational standardization, however, was distinct from efforts to pursue a uniform advertising style, as it involved different actors and motivations. This is also evident in the following case study of *Braun*, which explores the

³⁵³ Philips International Advertising Council (1972). *Summary of procedures of the 13th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council on Thursday May 4, and Friday May 5, 1972 in Eindhoven*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 7.

³⁵⁴ Philips International Advertising Council (1961). *Report of the third meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council held in Eindhoven on the 22nd and 23rd of November 1961*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 12.

³⁵⁵ N.N. (1971). *Summary of the 8th Philips International Advertising Convention held in Eindhoven, April 19 – 23, 1971*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, p. 7.

³⁵⁶ Philips International Advertising Council (1975). *16th Philips International Advertising Council Eindhoven, 6 & 8 november 1975*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 25.

³⁵⁷ Schmittel, W. (1979, August 9). *Thoughts for Lorne Waxlax from Wolfgang Schmittel about Braun communication philosophy*. BS, magazine file Werbung bei Braun allgemein. Highlighting in the original.

company's struggles to maintain a coherent advertising style during a period of growth and decentralization.

2.1.2.2 Maintaining a Corporate Identity in the Face of Growth: the Case of *Braun*

2.1.2.2.1 The Origins of *Braun*'s "Unmistakable Face" in Advertising

Braun was widely recognized for its coherent design at the time. As a German magazine for advertising design wrote in 1975:

"When Braun is cited as an example, it is primarily because of the striking homogeneity that characterizes the company's entire image. Braun has a distinctive 'corporate style,' an unmistakable face."³⁵⁸

As the article explained, this applied across all of *Braun*'s advertising and other outward communications – not only in Germany, but rather on a transnational scale. Everyone who designed advertising material for *Braun* adhered to a shared stylistic concept shaped by *Braun*'s central communications department.³⁵⁹ This aligned with the company's self-representation. As Wolfgang Schmittle, the head of the communications department and a key figure in shaping the *Braun* style, wrote that same year in a book on corporate design:

"It seems to me that the most important aspect of Braun's design is that it is based on a pronounced and comprehensive concept of the company. It is a concept which has determined the designing of the products, communication and the whole appearance of Braun, externally and internally, for almost two decades."³⁶⁰

Schmittle referred to a holistic overhaul of *Braun*'s company direction and corporate image in the mid-1950s. In collaboration with designers from the Ulm School of Design, the company radically reimagined its product aesthetics – starting with its radio sets – and aligned the designs of its outward communications accordingly. New fonts and frameworks were introduced to ensure that packaging, printed material, stand-up displays, advertisements, etc. all presented the company coherently and in line with the new product design.³⁶¹ All new advertising means were supposed to comply with a common grid-based design template, which served as a framework that confined the creativity of advertisers and graphic designers to ensure a cumulative and uniform effect across *Braun*'s advertising measures,³⁶² while *Braun*'s remodeled product design aesthetic served as the conceptual anchor for its advertising.

³⁵⁸ N.N. (1975). Einheitlichkeit macht stark. Das Kommunikationskonzept der Braun AG. *Graphik. Das Magazin für Werbegestaltung*, 8, 2–15, p. 2. In the original German: "Wenn Braun als Beispiel zitiert wird, dann in erster Linie wegen der auffallenden Homogenität, die das gesamte Erscheinungsbild des Unternehmens zeigt. Braun hat einen ausgeprägten ›Firmenstil‹, ein unverwechselbares Gesicht."

³⁵⁹ Id., pp. 2, 9.

³⁶⁰ Schmittle, W. (1975). Braun. In Schmittle, W. (Ed.), *Design concept realisation* (pp. 19–56). ABC, p. 19.

³⁶¹ Braun, A. (2011). Wie das Braun-Design entstand/The Development of the Braun Design. In Jatzke-Wigand, H. & Klatt, J. (Eds.), *Design+Design Zero. Wie das Braun-Design entstand/The Development of the Braun Design*, 4–47, pp. 19, 32. On this pivotal moment of *Braun*'s history, see also Polster, 2005, pp. 34–40.

³⁶² Eichler, F. (1966, July 11). Braun – das Gesicht einer Firma. Vortrag zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung in der Neuen Sammlung München am 11.7.66. BS, pp. 1–2. See also Schnelle-Schneyder, M. (2011). Bürger Eichler,

The radios in *Braun*'s new style – lighter colors, clean and simple forms, functional – were intended to better blend into the modern living environments becoming increasingly common at the time.³⁶³ This design philosophy was to be translated to *Braun*'s advertising approach. As outlined in an internal document on its “fundamentals of business policy” from June 1955: “The starting point of our advertising is therefore the idea of a modern lifestyle, [...]” To ensure coherence across all forms of advertising communication, both visual and textual elements were to align with this guiding concept. Concerning the practical implementation, it was established that *Braun* advertisements should use photographs instead of drawings, employ modern and clearly readable typefaces, and feature an overall text layout that was “light and airy (like a modern room)”. Copy texts were intended to be informative, succinct, and precise about the product and its use, while striking a casual and understated tone – with room for humor where appropriate.³⁶⁴ The fundamental ideas established in the mid-1950s would then (theoretically) inform the approach for *Braun*'s domestic and foreign advertising over the decades that followed, as Wolfgang Schmittel had noted in 1975.³⁶⁵

Braun grew immensely in those two decades. In 1955, *Braun* had a revenue of about 50 million DM, with close to half coming from sales abroad. By 1959, the company had doubled its revenue to 102 million DM³⁶⁶ as its redesigned products quickly found commercial success and critical acclaim.³⁶⁷ In 1959, the domestic market accounted for around two-thirds of the total as sales abroad had plateaued in the latter part of the decade.³⁶⁸ From this point on, however, the trend would slowly inverse while the company continued to rapidly expand its international operations. By the mid-1960s, around half of *Braun* group's overall revenue of 245 million DM was generated abroad,³⁶⁹ and by 1977/78, foreign revenues made up close to two-thirds of the *Braun* group's revenue of 776 million DM.³⁷⁰ Although *Braun* remained a small company in comparison to the industrial giants *Philips* and *Telefunken* throughout the long 1960s – *Braun*

Dr. Fritz. In Jatzke-Wigand, H. & Klatt, J. (Eds.), *Design+Design Zero, Wie das Braun-Design entstand/The Development of the Braun Design*, 64–75, p. 69.

³⁶³ Market research seems to have played a considerable role in this change in direction, N.N. (1955, August). Rundfunkgerät wird zum Möbel. *Braun Betriebsspiegel. Sonderausgabe August 1955*, 2–12. BS. Although *Braun* started with its radio sets, the new ideas were quickly applied to its other products as well, Eichler, F. (1966, July 11). *Braun – das Gesicht einer Firma*. Vortrag zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung in der Neuen Sammlung München am 11.7.66. BS, pp. 1–2.

³⁶⁴ N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*. BS, pp. 16–21. Highlighting in the original. In the original German: “Ausgangspunkt unserer Werbung ist daher die Idee vom modernen Lebensstil, [...]” “Der Schriftsatz soll locker und luftig sein (wie ein moderner Raum), [...]”

³⁶⁵ Schmittel, 1975, p. 19.

³⁶⁶ *Braun* (1960). *Geschäftsbericht 1959*. BS, p. 2.

³⁶⁷ N.N. (1964, November 3). Magisches Rechteck. *Der Spiegel*, 45. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/magisches-rechteck-a-788d6463-0002-0001-0000-000046175954>.

³⁶⁸ *Braun* (1960). *Geschäftsbericht 1959*. BS, p. 2.

³⁶⁹ *Braun* (1966). *Geschäftsbericht 1965/66*. BS, p. 8.

³⁷⁰ *Braun* (1978). *Geschäftsbericht 1977/78*. BS, p. 4.

employed only slightly more than 4.000 people in the business year 1960/61,³⁷¹ and around 8.400 by 1974/75 —³⁷² it nonetheless developed into a multinational company of respectable size. It follows that *Braun*’s organizational structure accordingly needed to account for this considerable increase in scale and scope.

After the death of company founder Max Braun in 1951,³⁷³ *Braun* had initially been managed by his sons Erwin (sales) and Artur (technology) together with director Wilhelm Wiegand. As a response to the company’s growth, they undertook a first restructuring during 1959/60 to more effectively allocate responsibilities between functions such as development, sales, or administration.³⁷⁴ In 1960, *Braun* further established a holding company for its growing number of foreign subsidiaries,³⁷⁵ and in 1961, *Braun* became a joint-stock company.³⁷⁶ Two years later, in 1963, the enterprise fundamentally overhauled its organizational setup to better support its planned future expansion. From now on, four vertical business units (shavers, household appliances, photo, electronics) would each handle all steps from development and production to sales and advertising for their respective product groups while three horizontal departments (finance, administration, sales) and a number of staff departments (such as the legal and personnel departments) remained responsible for overarching tasks.³⁷⁷ Due to the large degree of autonomy transferred to these units, which would also develop the foreign markets for their respective product groups independently of each other, a chief executive at *Braun* later referred to them as “companies within the company”.³⁷⁸

In 1967, the Braun brothers sold the company to *Gillette*.³⁷⁹ Around the same time, *Braun* seemingly introduced the first marketing-related organizational changes to its vertical business units.³⁸⁰ From 1969/70 onward, a new vertical business unit assumed the responsibility for sales and marketing on *Braun*’s international markets due to their ever-increasing importance for the

³⁷¹ Braun (1965). *Geschäftsbericht 1964/65*. BS, p. 9.

³⁷² Braun (1975). *Geschäftsbericht 1974/75*. BS, p. 10.

³⁷³ Polster, 2005, p. 30.

³⁷⁴ N.N. (1960, June). Werner Dube Vorsitzender der Geschäftsleitung. *Braun Werksnachrichten Juni 1960*. BS; N.N. (1960, March). Unternehmensleitung neu gegliedert. *Braun Werksnachrichten Sonderausgabe März 1960*. BS; N.N. (1959, June). Neuorganisation der Unternehmensführung. *Braun Werksnachrichten Juni 1959*. BS.

³⁷⁵ Braun (1961). *Geschäftsbericht 1960*. BS, p. 2.

³⁷⁶ Braun (1962). *Geschäftsbericht 1961/62*. BS.

³⁷⁷ Gros (1963, January 9). *Organisations- und Personalverfügung des Vorstandes 1/63: Einrichtung von Artikel- und Geschäftsbereichen*. BS, magazine file Organigramme; Braun (1962). *Geschäftsbericht 1961/62*. BS, non-paginated; N.N. (1963). Neuorganisation der Braun AG. *Braun Betriebsspiegel 1/63*. BS.

³⁷⁸ Herrmann, H-W. (1975). Durch Kraftzentren flexibler. Reorganisation Braun AG. *Manager Magazin 1*, 52–56. BS, magazine file Organigramme, p. 52. In the original German: “Firmen in der Firma”.

³⁷⁹ Braun (1967). *Geschäftsbericht 1966/67*. BS, p. 7. See also Braun, 2011, p. 41.

³⁸⁰ N.N. (undated). *Organisationsschema BRAUN*. BS, magazine file Organigramme. In 1971, *Braun* expanded the role of marketing within the company, Braun (1971). *Geschäftsbericht 1970/71*. BS, p. 22. See also Braun (undated). *Company History*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center. For an organigram depicting its organizational role within a unit, see N.N. (1971). *Organisation des Artikelbereiches Elektronik*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

company's overall revenue and because of difficulties to coordinate the development of foreign markets between the product divisions. Unlike the product-centric business units, this new unit was partitioned into regional areas and bundled all of *Braun*'s foreign business interests.³⁸¹ In an associated development, the *Braun AG* again assumed direct responsibility for most of its foreign business, transferring it back from the holding company it had formed around a decade earlier.³⁸² After the product unit partition had been rather stable since 1963, *Braun* would then reorganize its vertical product units by merging its units for appliances and shavers in 1971.³⁸³ Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, *Braun* underwent several restructurings (see Figure 21), becoming a large, complex corporation with an increasingly international orientation. Throughout this period, advertising would have been handled by a variety of actors working within different organizational structures, for different product groups, and distinct markets – many of them acting with relative autonomy due to the way the company was set up.




Figure 21: N.N. (undated). *Organisationsschema BRAUN*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

³⁸¹ Herrmann, H-W. (1975). Durch Kraftzentren flexibler. Reorganisation Braun AG. *Manager Magazin I*, 52–56. BS, magazine file Organigramme, p. 54; Braun (1969). *Geschäftsbericht 1968/69*. BS, p. 9; (1970). *Geschäftsbericht 1969/70*. BS, p. 7; N.N. (undated). *Organisationsschema BRAUN*. BS, magazine file Organigramme. It should be noted that *Braun* had previously established a horizontal department responsible for the coordination of foreign markets in October 1965. However, it seems to not have produced the expected results, as it was already abolished again during the business year 1966/67, Braun (1965). *Geschäftsbericht 1964/65*. BS, p. 10; (1967). *Geschäftsbericht 1966/67*. BS, p. 13.

³⁸² Braun (1970). *Geschäftsbericht 1969/70*. BS, p. 6.

³⁸³ *Braun* further transferred its flash attachments product line from its electronics to its photo unit, Braun (1970). *Geschäftsbericht 1969/70*. BS, p. 8.

2.1.2.2.2 “The ‘Voice’ of Braun”: Frameworks to Institutionalize Identity

Throughout all these organizational changes, the leading personnel responsible for *Braun*’s advertising design direction had remained constant: Fritz Eichler had been heavily involved in charting the new company direction in the mid-1950s. He would remain *Braun*’s “aesthetic conscience”³⁸⁴ concerning product and advertising design throughout the following decades. He shaped the core ideas on what design signified for *Braun* as a company and as a brand. It was only from 1973 onward, after his tenure as executive board member (since 1967) and head of the design department (“Gestaltung”) had ended, that he ceded this responsibility and assumed a more restrained role on the supervisory board.³⁸⁵ Wolfgang Schmittel, the head of *Braun*’s advertising design department – later called the communications department –,³⁸⁶ had worked under Eichler’s direction since the 1950s. He played a key role in refining the “verbal and visual design of Braun’s appearance”³⁸⁷ and would continue to uphold the *Braun* style until his departure from the company in 1980.³⁸⁸

These actors were responsible for developing the conceptual and practical frameworks so that *Braun*’s advertisers (and product designers) working across the company’s various parts would “arrive at similar solutions because they start from the same fundamental considerations and apply the same qualitative standards”³⁸⁹ – irrespective of media format choices or product-specific argumentative approaches. From the continuity in personnel followed a consistency in conceptual direction. In 1972, the general manager of *Braun*’s Spanish subsidiary encapsulated the essence of *Braun*’s advertising approach as he had come to understand it from past

³⁸⁴ N.N. (1964, November 3). Magisches Rechteck. *Der Spiegel*, 45. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/magisches-rechteck-a-788d6463-0002-0001-0000-000046175954>. In the original German: “das ›ästhetische Gewissen‹”.

³⁸⁵ Eichler’s crucial role is evoked throughout Artur Braun’s account of the development of the Braun design. He remained part of *Braun*’s supervisory board until his death in 1991, Braun, 2011. Eichler had already been part of the supervisory board beforehand, see for instance Braun (1965). *Geschäftsbericht 1964/65*. BS, p. 5. He had been explicitly tasked with the responsibility for the “uniform modern advertising style” (“einheitlichen modernen Werbestil”) at *Braun* as early as 1955, N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*. BS, p. 14a. According to Polster, it was also a key role of his to facilitate communication between the product and advertising design departments, Polster, 2005, p. 500.

³⁸⁶ Schmittel’s department was successively named advertising design (“Werbegestaltung”), communicative design (“Kommunikative Gestaltung”), and “Communications”, see Gros (1963, January 9). *Organisations- und Personalverfügung des Vorstandes 1/63: Einrichtung von Artikel- und Geschäftsbereichen*. BS, magazine file Organigramme, p. 3; N.N. (1971). Aufbau des Geschäftsbereichs Gestaltung (4/1971) - Organisationsschema Braun AG. *Braun Betriebsspiegel* 4/71. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.designundtext.com/de/3.11_braun-organisationsschema-gestaltung-vorstand-eichler-pb.php; N.N. (1978, December). *Commercial – Structure and Staff*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

³⁸⁷ Braun, 2011, pp. 32, 40.

³⁸⁸ Polster, 2005, p. 502.

³⁸⁹ Braun (1973). *Geschäftsbericht 1972/73*. BS, p. 5. According to Artur Braun, the reflections on design included in this business report had been written by Eichler, Braun, 2011, pp. 44–45.

conversations with Eichler, Schmittel, and lead product designer Dieter Rams³⁹⁰ as “matter-of-factness with that smile”, i.e., conveying informative, factual arguments in a likeable manner;³⁹¹ a description in line with the copywriting approach in the “fundamentals of business policy” from 1955.³⁹²

Braun’s advertising design authorities also continued to develop precise specifications regarding the practical aspects of brand presentation across advertising means. Like the grid-based design template, which had been one of the outcomes of the new company direction taken in the mid-1950s, *Braun*’s manual on the “visual design of information and advertising” devised in the late 1960s was supposed to be understood as a framework for *Braun*’s advertisers to bring to life while ensuring a baseline of coherence and mutually reinforcing impact between advertising forms.³⁹³ It provided universally applicable principles not only on corporate fonts, the general layout of advertisements, the *Braun* logotype, text formatting (ragged-right layout), the format and perspective of product photographs, or *Braun*’s modular system for window displays, but, for instance, also included measurements for *Braun*’s business cards and a norm for quotation marks (French guillemets «» instead of the German variant »«).³⁹⁴

Another set of corresponding internal publications, which were composed by Schmittel and his team with feedback from *J. Walter Thompson (JWT)*, *Braun*’s main advertising agency at the time,³⁹⁵ would follow in the mid-1970s. By 1976, there was a *Braun* manual on packaging design,³⁹⁶ about *Braun*’s “Views on Design”³⁹⁷, on the “Realization of a Corporate Concept”³⁹⁸,

³⁹⁰ Dieter Rams joined *Braun* in 1955 and would remain with the company until 1997 as lead product designer, Polster, 2005, p. 502. According to *Der Spiegel*, he is “considered the most influential product designer of the German Federal Republic” (“Dieter Rams gilt als der einflussreichste Produktdesigner der Bundesrepublik.”), Lübbert, R. (2025, June 13). Die Einfachheit der Dinge. *Der Spiegel*, 25. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/produktdesigner-dieter-rams-1975-die-einfachheit-der-dinge-a-ef17a05e-5194-4330-9931-a6230e05208c>.

³⁹¹ Semmel, H. (1972). Nicht mehr bei Braun – und doch lächeln. *Braun Betriebsspiegel* 7-8/72. Reprinted in Max Braun Stiftung (Ed.) (2000). *Mehr als Erinnerungen. Eine Dokumentation der Max Braun Stiftung*, 147. BS. In the original German: “Sachlichkeit mit eben diesem Lächeln”.

³⁹² N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*. BS, pp. 16–21.

³⁹³ These notions regarding goals and the concept of bringing the framework to life were later evoked by Eichler and echoed nigh-verbatim in the introduction of the manual, Eichler, F. (1966, July 11). *Braun – das Gesicht einer Firma. Vortrag zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung in der Neuen Sammlung München am 11.7.66*. BS, p. 4; Braun [1968]. *Richtlinien für die visuelle Gestaltung von Information und Werbung*. BS, p. 3.

³⁹⁴ Braun [1968]. *Richtlinien für die visuelle Gestaltung von Information und Werbung*. BS.

³⁹⁵ Blank, G. (1975, June 4). *Aktennotiz. Braun – Packungsgestaltung*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1974-1977, Braun Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center; Schmittel, W. to Black, G. (1974, March 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Leitlinien der Kommunikation*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1974-1977, Braun Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center.

³⁹⁶ Braun (undated). *Leitlinien für die Gestaltung von Braun Verpackungen*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center.

³⁹⁷ Braun (undated). *Views on Design*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center.

³⁹⁸ Braun (undated). *Braun Design. The Realization of a Corporate Concept*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center.

as well as updated “communication guidelines” which gave instructions on typography, product visualization, or the company logo –³⁹⁹ “[...] so that we may build upon the past and do not have to start from zero.”⁴⁰⁰ Unlike the previous manual, which had still been written in German, this English-language manual explicitly emphasized that these guidelines were to be applied on an international scale to guarantee continuity, to set the *Braun* image apart from the competition, to leverage “‹spill-over› communications between countries”, and to ensure that all communication was shaped by the same distinctive qualities as *Braun* products.⁴⁰¹ On a practical level, this, for instance, entailed a requirement for *Braun* advertisers to use typefaces without serifs because they were “the least ‹national› in character” (see Figure 22).⁴⁰²

Type and typographical production are vital means of communication. Together with product visualization, they determine the overall impression.

The following criteria apply to countries in which the Latin alphabet is used. In all other countries, these criteria should be applied in such a way that other type and other typographical means can achieve the same impression.

Selection of type
Since 1955, we have been using normal sans serif type devoid of extreme or modish characteristics. The text of this brochure is set in Helvetica. We also use Futura, Akzidenz-Grotesk, Folio, Univers.

By contrast, here is an example of roman type, which – even though it has its own merits – we do not use.

For typographers and typesetters, the following is considered normal: The space within the individual letters is optically equal to the space between the letters. The proportions should be such that, for instance, a capital H appears to be an optical square. The strength of the letters must achieve a balanced relationship to the background. The space between the lines is optically larger than the space between the individual words.

Don't make experiments.

(Let us do it for you)

It's the best because it's Scherzer's Synchro is the best shaving geometry we've ever developed. It's smooth and flexible and thorough. In every way. For every beard.

It's the best because it has a platinum shield on the Scherkerpl - and platinum is more sympathetic to a shaver's skin than other metals.

in terms of it's
Mazda's new. We
don't want you to drop it,
but if you do, chances are it
won't break.
It's the best of a long,
long line of very
good Start drivers
- drivers that have
been carefully and
scientifically improved
over a period of 25 years.
Start 6000 is the best driver
Bosch has ever made. But that
doesn't mean it will always be.

Don't experiment: Only sans serif type may be used in Braun communication. It is an important element in the distinctive character of our presentation.

ブラウンの见えない差
透れにくく、肌にやさしいブラチオの感触——

[illegible]

A Japanese advertisement. Despite the difference caused by the Japanese type it still has a Braun-like character.

Figure 22: Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 32.

⁴⁰⁰ Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 10.

⁴⁰² Id., p. 33.

The manual also included product-independent specifications regarding media placement and strategy: similar to *Telefunken*'s requirements around a decade earlier, it was advised to insert *Braun* advertisements near the beginning of a magazine (within the first twenty percent) and on a right-hand page. Concerning strategy, Schmittel and his team underlined that “media that allow maximum demonstration and visualization of our products, and sufficient argumentation” were highly preferable for all of *Braun*'s consumer goods. *Braun*'s advertisers were accordingly supposed to opt for window displays or audiovisual and print mass media channels instead of advertising in stadiums, for instance.⁴⁰³ Such directives should be understood as entirely distinct from context-specific advertising factors, such as product argumentation, insertion planning, or potential cultural differences. As fundamental guidance regarding *Braun*'s corporate identity (and to a lesser extent regarding the types of products it commercialized), they were transnationally valid and applicable irrespective of otherwise relevant market-, media-, or device-related differences in advertising.

In a 1973 presentation, Schmittel illustrated this principle by reworking the layout, logo placement, and typography of a group of *Braun* advertisements published by different *Braun* advertisers in one issue of the German magazine *Der Spiegel* to bring them in closer alignment with *Braun*'s design framework – evidence that *Braun*'s style was not as consistently applied in practice by the early 1970s as the consistent direction might suggest. Schmittel presented this rework as a way to overcome the advertisers' divergent “personal handwriting” while preserving the individual product messaging. In his view, brand identifying elements should not be subject to the creative process of designing a product advertisement.⁴⁰⁴

“In communication the typography is the ‘voice’ of Braun. Not the one of the product. Therefore, typography is not related to whether something technical or modern or nice is to be said. Nobody changes his voice, according to whom he speaks or what he says.”⁴⁰⁵

While a consistent application of such comprehensive frameworks could ensure a coherent corporate image presentation across advertising and other communication forms, it was not necessarily to the liking of the creatives and strategists developing the advertising measures for a specific *Braun* product in a particular market environment due to the limitations it imposed. Both Eichler and Wolfgang Schmittel were aware of this tension. Eichler nonetheless maintained that adherence to *Braun*'s advertising design framework did not inhibit capable

⁴⁰³ Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 53.

⁴⁰⁴ Schmittel, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

⁴⁰⁵ Id. Highlighting in the original.

creatives from making a “lively and impactful statement”,⁴⁰⁶ while Schmittel later argued that their guidelines left “enough freedom for all strategic and marketing requirements which each idea requires.”⁴⁰⁷ The consistent implementation of these corporate identity directives across markets depended on the collaboration of local decision-makers, however. Given *Braun*’s increasingly multinational, decentralized structure, consistent implementation hence proved to be a challenge despite the coherent philosophy and practical guidelines.

2.1.2.2.3 Organizational Barriers to Advertising Coherence: *Braun* as a Multinational Company

From the outset, *Braun* intended to establish its new advertising style internationally in a long-term perspective. While the German domestic market was *Braun*’s primary focus in the mid-1950s, and although it was acknowledged that “individual advertising design still seems indispensable in each country for the time being”, *Braun* nonetheless planned to share (parts of) its new guiding principles for *Braun*-advertising with the company’s foreign representatives and have them adopt the shared approach as soon as possible. The compensation practices for the advertising conducted by foreign partners were supposed to be adjusted accordingly to improve *Braun*’s control over activities and style, and the interchange of advertising materials between the representatives and the headquarters was to be improved.⁴⁰⁸

The extent to which this was put into practice on a transnational scale remains unclear. At the first conference bringing together domestic *Braun* managers with representatives from foreign subsidiaries and partners in 1966, Eichler emphasized that *Braun* would from now on aim for greater international uniformity in its outward communications than it had in the past. This was particularly supposed to apply to advertising,⁴⁰⁹ which implies that the consistent implementation of *Braun*’s corporate style had not always kept pace with the company’s international expansion. In any case, a considerable discrepancy between aspirations and reality had become apparent by the early 1970s despite the consistent advertising design direction. In an external evaluation by psychologist and market researcher Bernt Spiegel, he explicitly assessed that *Braun*’s decentralized company structure had been the central obstructing factor due to the short-term performance expectations it imposed on local decision-makers and because it hindered communication:

⁴⁰⁶ Eichler, F. (1966, July 11). *Braun – das Gesicht einer Firma. Vortrag zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung in der Neuen Sammlung München am 11.7.66*. BS, p. 4. In the original German: “eine lebendige und wirkungsvolle Aussage”.

⁴⁰⁷ Schmittel, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

⁴⁰⁸ N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*. BS, pp. 5, 24–25. In the original German: “Wenn vorläufig auch noch individuelle Gestaltung der Werbung in einzelnen Ländern unerlässlich scheint, [...]”

⁴⁰⁹ N.N. (1966). In- und Ausland rücken zusammen. *Braun Betriebsspiegel 1/66*. BS.

“Braun never gave up this mental attitude [...], but during the recent years of hectic growth and turbulent events in its development Braun was not always able to adhere to it as a program. In order to maintain a certain mental attitude within a large enterprise [...], a certain number of centers of support for it are required in the organization. When these centers are reduced to too few islands, when in addition the form of the organization destroys communication, or when even changes in the form of the organization impede communication, when in the rush of business operations and in the face of pressure from outside the urgent supersedes the important, then the program can still exist, but the order of battle disintegrates. [...]. This is not to say that the former spirit and program were given up by many of the firm’s leading managers. The process is usually simply that although the basic program is still ‘known’ – and can still even be regarded as desirable – it loses its conscious influence on the decision maker to whom rationalizations are always available to explain why he had to deviate from the program.”⁴¹⁰

Braun accordingly took steps to improve the communication, coordination, and collaboration between its domestic and international company parts during the first half of the 1970s. After seemingly having conducted its domestic advertising without any advertising agency during the 1960s,⁴¹¹ *Braun* first employed *JWT* as one of multiple domestic advertising agencies,⁴¹² and then increasingly also for its international vertical department⁴¹³ and its foreign subsidiaries.⁴¹⁴ The company also introduced recurring international meetings/conferences on topics such as advertising, marketing, sales promotion or agency relations,⁴¹⁵ and launched an internal magazine with the aim of explaining policy and better sharing marketing methods between countries.⁴¹⁶ Schmittel’s set of manuals published in the mid-1970s may be understood as part of this effort as well.

⁴¹⁰ Spiegel, B. (1971, January 2). *BRAUN AG – as it is – as it would like to be – as it wants to be known*. BS, pp. 12–13. Highlighting in the original. For the German counterpart, see Spiegel, B. (1971, January 2). *DIE BRAUN AG wie sie ist wie sie sein möchte wie sie will, daß man sie sieht*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (2 of 2). Hartman Center. Spiegel seems to have been regularly consulted by *Braun*, Schatz, H.-J. (2000). Braun als „Kaderschmiede“. In Max Braun Stiftung (Ed.), *Mehr als Erinnerungen. Eine Dokumentation der Max Braun Stiftung*, 141–142. BS. Concerning Spiegel’s methodological contributions to consumer research, see Köhler, 2021, p. 477.

⁴¹¹ Hirsch, E. (1969, April). Design und Marketing. Interview mit Dr. Eichler und L. Schmude. *Absatzwirtschaft*, 4. Reprinted in Eichler, F. (1973) “Gesagt” von Dr. Fritz Eichler 1963...1972, pp. 27–31. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.designundtext.com/de/3.5_eichler-design-marketing-p.php. See also Spiegel, B. (1971, January 2). *BRAUN AG – as it is – as it would like to be – as it wants to be known*. BS, p. 3.

⁴¹² The accounts of *Braun*’s vertical units for consumer electronics and photography were in the hands of other agencies, Späth, F. A. to Blank & Keites (1973, April 25). *Internal letter. Subject: Status – Report Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 3. Clients Braun, 1973 (4 of 4). Hartman Center, pp. 4–5.

⁴¹³ Späth, F. A. to Johnston, D. (1974, March 29). *Internal letter. Subject: RE: BRAUN*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, Braun, 1974 (4 of 5). Hartman Center, p. 2.

⁴¹⁴ Späth, F. A. (1973, July 26). *Status Report Braun International*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The Harry Clark Papers, 1945-1992 and undated. Box 11. Clients: Braun, Correspondence with other JWT-Offices, 1973. Hartman Center, p. 1.

⁴¹⁵ N.N. (1971, March). Consumer Response to Braun Marketing Programs. *spotlight*, 1, 1–2. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international; N.N. (1971, May/June). Annual Marketing Plan Meeting. *spotlight*, 3, 1. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international; Mills, R.S. (1973, January). EEC/EFTA Agent Conference. *spotlight*, 1, 2. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international; N.N. (1973, July). Annecy Sales Managers’ Meeting June 18 - 20, 1973. *spotlight*, 3, 9. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international.

⁴¹⁶ Zeien, A. M. (1971, March). *spotlight. a Tool for Effective Communication*. *spotlight*, 1, 1. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international.

By 1973, the executives at *Braun* and its parent company *Gillette* had come to the conclusion that they wanted “to reach a point which would allow the classification ‘one sight/ one sound’ for all BRAUN communication activities all over the world.”⁴¹⁷ According to Tom Singer, the executive vice president at *Gillette* responsible for overseeing *Braun*,⁴¹⁸ it would thus be necessary to exert more direct control from the corporate headquarters over its national subsidiaries during these “early days of expansion and increased marketing and advertising activities in other markets” as there were “not innumerable good ways of advertising the Braun mystic”.⁴¹⁹ While there was an understanding that *Braun* had a clear corporate identity which would benefit from being consistently applied on a transnational scale – taking precedence over national factors – the practical implementation was complicated by the fact that *Braun*’s communications department seems to not have been endowed with the necessary authority. Unlike *Telefunken*’s *FM*, Schmittel apparently could not simply impose his direction. Regarding this goal of “one sight/ one sound”,⁴²⁰ *JWT* claimed that there was

“[...] hardly any possibility for direct interference by the headquarter; the way to reach that point is purely information and persuasion because headquarters still wants to leave full responsibility to the local managers [...]”⁴²¹

Braun’s communications department lacked the authority to mandate the enforcement of their stylistic directives. Outcomes hence varied significantly depending on the convictions of the local managers regarding the necessity of complying with the direction set by Schmittel and Eichler. At least some of them, such as Horst Semmel, the general manager of *Braun*’s Spanish subsidiary, embraced the *Braun* style and acted as advocates to ensure local compliance despite opposing tendencies:

“In my discussions with advertising agencies and my own employees, I have often heard the criticism that Braun’s strict stance on graphic design restricts the creative freedom of agencies and advertising professionals to such an extent that it is impossible to create fruitful advertising within these rules. I believe this statement is merely an admission of failure, because those who master the rules can create freely within their boundaries [...]”⁴²²

⁴¹⁷ Späth, F. A. (1973, July 26). *Status Report Braun International*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The Harry Clark Papers, 1945-1992 and undated. Box 11. Clients: Braun, Correspondence with other JWT-Offices, 1973. Hartman Center, p. 1.

⁴¹⁸ Gillette Corporate Employee Relations Department (1972, September). *Organigram The Gillette Company*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

⁴¹⁹ Johnston, D. (1973, July 3). *Aide Memoire. Re: Braun – Visit with Tom Singer – July 3, 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Donald Johnston Papers, 1964-1996, and undated. Box 20. File Braun (2/2). Hartman Center, p. 1.

⁴²⁰ Späth, F. A. (1973, July 26). *Status Report Braun International*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The Harry Clark Papers, 1945-1992 and undated. Box 11. Clients: Braun, Correspondence with other JWT-Offices, 1973. Hartman Center, p. 1.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Semmel, H. (1972). Nicht mehr bei Braun – und doch lächeln. *Braun Betriebsspiegel* 7-8/72. Reprinted in Max Braun Stiftung (Ed.) (2000). *Mehr als Erinnerungen. Eine Dokumentation der Max Braun Stiftung*, 147. BS. In the original German: “In meinen Diskussionen mit den Werbeagenturen und mit meinen eigenen Mitarbeitern habe ich oft die Kritik gehört, daß die strenge Aussage von Braun über die graphische Gestaltung die schöpferische Freiheit der Agenturen und Werbeleute so stark einschränkt, daß man innerhalb dieser Gesetze keine fruchtbare

However, this was not the case for everyone, as is evident from a report by *JWT* on a meeting between representatives from the company headquarters in Kronberg and *Braun*'s Austrian subsidiary:

“Kronberg demanded – vehemently – the uniform Braun style. A style characterized by refinement, elegance, wit, charm, and honesty. An appearance that imprints the unmistakable Braun stamp on every single means of advertising. Its purpose is to achieve a cumulative effect of all Braun's communication efforts for Braun.

Without going into the problems of diverging marketing strategies, different target plans, and rather poor cooperation between Vienna and Kronberg, Braun Austria was rather reluctant to embrace this directive.”⁴²³

The reports and assessments by *JWT* in the early 1970s further make it clear that the way *Braun* was organizationally set up at the time impeded a coherent approach to advertising in addition to the views of individual managers. First, *Braun*'s employment of different agencies for its domestic vertical units without concurrent cross-departmental coordination led to recurring issues where different *Braun* products were advertised in the same issues of a magazine in deviating layouts – as they had been developed and placed by different units and agencies.⁴²⁴ Second, the relationship between the vertical international unit and *Braun*'s domestic advertisers seems to have been far from collaborative. *JWT*, for instance, received two different briefings and strategy instructions for the same product, which resulted in two different advertising campaigns – with *JWT* deeming them to be of vastly different quality, one being “not good in our opinion.”⁴²⁵ Third, even though Schmittel, who was responsible for agency relations,⁴²⁶ was keen on expanding the partnership with *JWT* internationally, local managers did not necessarily share this view. On the contrary, *Braun*'s organizational setup and “line of

Werbung schaffen könne. Ich glaube, diese Aussage ist nur ein Armutszeugnis, denn wer die Gesetze beherrscht, kann innerhalb ihrer Grenzen frei schaffen [...]”

⁴²³ Kohlbecker, K. (1972, November 20). *JWT – Memorandum. Betrifft: Werbe-Review BRAUN ELECTRIC AUSTRIA am 06.11.1972*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The Harry Clark Papers, 1945-1992 and undated. Box 11. Clients: Braun Correspondence with other JWT-Offices, A-Z, 1972. Hartman Center, p. 3. In the original German: “Kronberg verlangte – massiv – den einheitlichen Braun Stil. Ein Stil, der sich durch Vornehmheit, Eleganz, Witz, Charme und Ehrlichkeit auszeichnet. Ein Auftreten, was jedem einzelnen Werbemittel den unverwechselbaren Braun-Stempel aufdrückt. Zweck ist ein kummulativer [sic] Effekt aller kommunikativen Bemühungen Brauns für Braun zu erzielen. Ohne auf die Probleme divergierender Marketing Strategien, unterschiedlicher Zielpläne und einer eher mangelhaften Zusammenarbeit Wien-Kronberg einzugehen, war Braun Österreich eher zurückhaltend in der Aufnahme dieser Anweisung.”

⁴²⁴ *JWT* (1973, August 27). *Media – Koordination. Stellungnahme zu den Problemen der Mehrfachbelegung von Zeitschriften im Rahmen der BRAUN-Produktwerbung*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 3. Clients Braun, 1973 (4 of 4). Hartman Center, p. 1. See also Schmittel, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

⁴²⁵ Späth, F. A. to Johnston, D. (1974, March 29). Internal letter. Subject: RE: BRAUN. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, Braun, 1974 (4 of 5). Hartman Center, p. 2. On the tensions between domestic and international, see further Späth, F. A. to Gilow, P. (1973, August 6). *Memorandum. Subject: Re: BRAUN*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Donald Johnston Papers, 1964-1996, and undated. Box 20. File Braun (2/2). Hartman Center.

⁴²⁶ Späth, F. A. to Sharman, J. (1973, September 29). Internal letter. Subject: Re: BRAUN. J. Walter Thompson Company. Donald Johnston Papers, 1964-1996, and undated. Box 20. File Braun (2/2). Hartman Center.

responsibility” even promoted the managers of national subsidiaries “to prove [their] local independence in such actions”.⁴²⁷

2.1.2.2.4 The Persistent Gap between Aspiration and Reality. The *Braun* Style in the late 1970s

In the mid-1970s, *Braun* again underwent a fundamental restructuring to better account for the ever-increasing importance of the international markets. The vertical units for international business and for appliances and shavers were both dissolved. Instead, *Braun* grouped its international business – including the German domestic market, which had previously been treated separately – into three regional groups: the German-speaking countries, the EEC plus Scandinavia, and the rest of the world. These regional groups were granted autonomy in managing their respective markets. This spatial partition was complemented by a new functional unit for technology, responsible for research, development, and manufacturing of appliances and shavers. Another newly created unit called “Commercial” was to link the technology unit and the regional groups by overseeing *Braun*’s product lines.⁴²⁸ This unit employed product and marketing managers for different product groups, and housed support functions such as logistics, market research, and (advertising) communications.⁴²⁹ However, the vertical structure was retained for the photo and electronics units for a few more years,⁴³⁰ with the electronics unit even temporarily regaining the responsibility for its international business.⁴³¹

⁴²⁷ Späth, F. A. to Johnston, D. (1973, October 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Re: BRAUN Italy*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Donald Johnston Papers, 1964-1996, and undated. Box 20. File Braun (2/2). Hartman Center, p. 2. There seems to have been a certain degree of ignorance concerning the necessity of international integration. After a presentation for *Braun*’s Italian subsidiary, the local manager asked Schmittel “‘why a hell [sic] should we use an agency because of the international network? What does this network mean to us?’”, Späth, F. A. to Johnston, D. (1974, March 29). *Internal letter. Subject: RE: BRAUN*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, Braun, 1974 (4 of 5). Hartman Center, p. 1.

⁴²⁸ Braun (1976). *Geschäftsbericht 1975/76*. BS, p. 6. The company of course retained executive departments for legal, personnel, and administrative matters, Zeien, A.M. (1977, March). *Organigram Braun A.G.* BS, magazine file Organigramme. This reorganization seems to have built upon earlier ideas sketched out in Herrmann, H-W. (1975). *Durch Kraftzentren flexibler. Reorganisation Braun AG. Manager Magazin 1*, 52–56. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

⁴²⁹ N.N. (1978, December). *Organigram Commercial*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

⁴³⁰ N.N. (undated). *Organisationsschema BRAUN*. Zeien, A.M. & Mahlich, G. Ch. (1976, December). *Organigram Elektronik*. Zeien, A.M. (1977, March). *Organigram Braun A.G.* BS, magazine file Organigramme. By this point, the days of *Braun*’s consumer electronics business were numbered. In 1959, radios, television sets, and record players had been the product group generating the second-most revenue, and, for a while, consumer electronics would retain a certain importance for the company: by 1968/69, *Braun* was still expanding its foreign consumer electronics sales and distribution networks. By the late 1970s, however, *Braun*’s consumer electronics business amounted to little more than selling stereos on the German domestic market – where it was under pressure from Asian competitors. Other product lines had become the leading drivers of revenue instead. Accordingly, *Braun*’s consumer electronics business was spun out of the company in 1981, only two years after it had been aligned with the new company structure, Braun (1960). *Geschäftsbericht 1959*, p. 2; (1969). *Geschäftsbericht 1968/69*, p. 11; (1978). *Geschäftsbericht 1977/78*, p. 5; (1980). *Geschäftsbericht 1979/80*, p. 4; (1981). *Geschäftsbericht 1980/81*, p. 4. BS; Stern, P.G. (1979, July). *Organigram Braun AG*. BS, magazine file Organigramme.

⁴³¹ N.N. (1975, March/April/May). *Electronic Division will handle International Hi-Fi Business. spotlight*, 2, 1. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international.

In this new setup, the ideal advertising procedure was as follows (at least for those product groups it applied to): the corporate headquarters would develop “lead ads” and assemble information which was then sent to all national markets “to secure effective advertising which is in line with the product and its positioning” everywhere. The national advertisers would then build upon this, devising a media insertion plan, different design interpretations of the central concept and perhaps combining it with a local sales promotion offer —⁴³² an approach reminiscent of *Philips* in the late 1960s. At *Braun*, these transnational product advertising efforts were of course all supposed to be in line with the *Braun* style based on the framework for logo, typography, etc. to ensure a coherent corporate identity.

In that regard, the direction remained steady as evidenced by a document outlining Schmittel’s vision in 1979: *Braun*’s communications needed to constitute “one sight and one sound”. In Schmittel’s view, this was to be achieved by applying the company’s “Braun-style” across advertising, packaging, PR, and sales promotion forms for all product groups, between countries, and regardless of the views of the responsible ad agency and product manager. The corporate concept with its guidelines on appropriate visual and textual approaches for the durable consumer goods *Braun* commercialized needed to take precedence over any device- or market-specific creative advertising ideas to ensure long-term coherence across all brand communications. Schmittel wanted one consistent, distinct “handwriting” to shape *Braun*’s identity with consumers.⁴³³ The practical implementation, however, remained inconsistent even in the new corporate structure. Despite the efforts to achieve coherence, internal assessments revealed persistent fragmentation.

According to the analyses presented at an event assessing last year’s advertising in 1979, *Braun*’s advertising communications in 1978 clearly reflected the company’s internal disarray: its domestic advertising in the illustrated *Stern* magazine was deemed to be conveying no “common corporate image” across product groups,⁴³⁴ while its international advertising in Denmark, Sweden, France, and Italy was judged to be lacking consistency between countries as well as within the respective countries themselves.⁴³⁵ Only the two most basic rules were respected across all outside communications according to another speaker: the invariable

⁴³² This was, for instance, successfully implemented for the shaver *Braun Micron*, Bihler, J. & Müller-Zinn, H. (1979). *Braun communication internationally. Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 61–67, p. 63.

⁴³³ Schmittel, W. (1979, August 9). *Thoughts for Lorne Waxlax from Wolfgang Schmittel about Braun communication philosophy*. BS, magazine file Werbung bei Braun allgemein.

⁴³⁴ Eichner, G. & Krämer, J. (1979). How did Braun present itself in “Stern” magazine. *Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 31–38, p. 38.

⁴³⁵ Bihler, J. & Müller-Zinn, H. (1979). *Braun communication internationally. Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 61–67, pp. 66–67.

presence of *Braun*'s logo, and the usage of sans-serif-type fonts. *Braun*'s additional comprehensive communication guidelines were seemingly not followed consistently.⁴³⁶ It was thus demanded that "[...] we must arrive at a coherence in our communication. Braun had it once in the past, and it was a very valuable asset."⁴³⁷ This was an assessment reminiscent of that by Spiegel in 1971, who already had characterized the *Braun* advertising style as "long established but later somewhat blunted".⁴³⁸

At *Braun*, the company's growth and decentralized organizational setup had led to a situation where the continuity in advertising design direction was not always matched by the continuity of its implementation, at least during the 1970s. According to the 1979 "advertising review", the company's internal workings contradicted the brand's external perception: the company logo was displayed on all of its outward communications. This meant that, when observed only from the outside, *Braun* would thus appear to consumers to be one joint entity, for which they would reasonably assume that it "[...] probably plans for what, in which way, when, where and mainly how it advertises." Seen from the inside, however, this was "not at all the case."⁴³⁹ Although everything *Braun* – the company – produced was commercialized under the *Braun* brand,⁴⁴⁰ advertising for *Braun* was conducted by a multitude of actors working in different national organizations and for various products. The totality of *Braun*'s domestic and international advertising in 1978 had not been the result of a coordinated, planned process, but rather the haphazard outcome of all the company's advertisers each seeking the best approach for their product, market environment, and/or target group.⁴⁴¹ To address this gap between aspiration and reality, it was proposed in jest to put a warning label on all future *Braun* advertisements:

“Caution! We decline any liability regarding the impression which other ads with the same company symbol made or will make on you. Other Braun ads come either from our predecessors, whose views we no longer share. Or from other product lines with which we do not associate.”⁴⁴²

⁴³⁶ Krämer, J. (1979). Coordinating and unifying the graphics. *Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 85–89, p. 87.

⁴³⁷ Kissel, D. (1979). Advertising and corporate image. *Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 8–11, p. 11. In 1980, *Braun* accordingly demanded the ad agency *GGK* to help facilitate the return to a more coherent presentation across all product advertising campaigns, *GGK Düsseldorf* (1980, March 4). *Der Braun-Stil. Der einheitliche Auftritt aller Braun-Produkt-Kampagnen*. BS, magazine file Werbung bei Braun allgemein.

⁴³⁸ Spiegel, B. (1971, January 2). *BRAUN AG – as it is – as it would like to be – as it wants to be known*. BS, p. 2.

⁴³⁹ N.N. (1979). [Untitled introduction]. *Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 3–5, p. 4.

⁴⁴⁰ Kissel, D. (1979). Advertising and corporate image. *Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 8–11, p. 9.

⁴⁴¹ N.N. (1979). [Untitled introduction]. *Advertising Review 1979*. BS, magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation, 3–5, pp. 3–4.

⁴⁴² Id., p. 4.

Of course, the only truly viable option was to effectively conceal internal fragmentation and decentralization on an organizational level by consistently adhering to *Braun*'s corporate image policy in advertising and other outward communications. This, however, proved easier to claim than to implement consistently in a complex multinational corporation commercializing various product groups on many different markets, as the scores of *Braun* advertisers and managers involved could all believe it necessary to – just this once – deviate from the *Braun* style for their particular case.

Unlike *Telefunken* or *Philips*, *Braun* pursued a consistent advertising style direction throughout the long 1960s and beyond, albeit it proved difficult to consistently enforce the *Braun* style during the 1970s as local autonomy often took precedence over the central directives on advertising in *Braun*'s decentralized structure. This assertion must be nuanced, however: *Braun* nonetheless saw greater success regarding the transnational coherence of its outward communications than many of its competitors due to its continuity in personnel and design philosophy. This is evident from *Braun* explicitly being recognized for its coherent design – for instance by the initially quoted magazine.⁴⁴³ The *Braun* case again underscores that transnational advertising coherence was not merely a matter of vision and design, but also a very practical question of organizational configuration. At the same time, advertising was also shaped by the distinct constraints, opportunities, and forms of transnational collaboration in individual national markets. The following chapter explores these topics through the cases of *Grundig* and *Telefunken* in France, situating their advertising strategies and budget allocation in this new market within the broader context of transnational trade, distribution networks, and evolving market conditions.

2.2 Business Abroad. Selling and Advertising German Consumer Electronics in 1960s France

“[...] the concrete realization of the Common Market, which is a total upheaval of the conditions of the French market, which until now had been living under a regime of protectionism.”⁴⁴⁴

As *Consten*, the French partner of the German consumer electronics company *Grundig*, pointed out in 1964, the European Common Market fundamentally transformed its business. During the after-war period, the sizable French consumer electronics market had been firmly in the hands of domestic producers. By 1959, only a minuscule share of the 932 million FF worth of devices

⁴⁴³ N.N. (1975). Einheitlichkeit macht stark. Das Kommunikationskonzept der Braun AG. *Graphik. Das Magazin für Werbegestaltung*, 8, 2–15.

⁴⁴⁴ Consten (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l'exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 3. In the original French: “[...] la réalisation concrète du Marché Commun qui est un bouleversement total des conditions du marché français vivant jusqu’alors sous un régime de protectionnisme.”

bought by French consumers (measured by apparent consumption) had been manufactured abroad: France imported less than 20 million FF worth of consumer electronics, which translated to an import penetration rate of 2,14 %.⁴⁴⁵ Protectionist industrial policy had shielded the French consumer electronics market from foreign competition throughout the 1950s.

From the turn of the decade onward, the new trade regulations of the European Common Market, which lowered import barriers for other members of the European Economic Community (EEC), then induced “total upheaval”: by 1964, France imported consumer electronics worth 242 million FF – a twelvefold increase in five years. The growth in imports eclipsed the already robust overall growth of the French consumer electronics market, which had slightly more than doubled in size between 1959 and 1964. Accordingly, foreign goods accounted for more than 11 % of French apparent consumption in 1964 (by value).⁴⁴⁶

Unlike the Dutch multinational *Philips*, which had supplied the French market through *Philips France*’s domestic production facilities during the protectionist era,⁴⁴⁷ and for which the Common Market was more of an opportunity to increase intra-organizational trade and better integrate its scattered European production,⁴⁴⁸ German consumer electronics companies profited from the EEC’s new trade regime by being able to break into the previously closed-off French market for the first time: between 1962 and 1964, Germany nearly doubled the value of

⁴⁴⁵ Apparent consumption is a proxy measure for market size. It is calculated using the formula: domestic production – exports + imports. The import penetration rate in turn is calculated by dividing imports by apparent consumption. Figures calculated by the author. For the data, see Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, pp. 325–326.

⁴⁴⁶ In 1964, the apparent consumption was 2.143 million FF when calculated based on the data given by Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, pp. 325–326. The *Annuaire Statistique de la France* on the other hand sets apparent consumption of consumer electronics at 2.352 million FF for 1964. This difference seems to stem from the *Annuaire* using the market price for imports as the calculatory basis instead of their value at the border. While this figure is thus a more accurate representation of the actual size of the French market, it proved impossible to calculate import penetration quotas on this basis as the *Annuaire* did not indicate the value of imports at market price separately. Although the *Annuaire* provides data on industry production, export, and import, they do not add up to figures given in the source’s table on apparent consumption, INSEE (1968). *Annuaire statistique de la France 1968* (No. 74, nouvelle série 16), p. 297. The gap would have been less pronounced for 1959 due to the considerably lower share of imports. More importantly, the general tendency of imports occupying a much larger market share in 1964 than in 1959 holds true regardless.

⁴⁴⁷ *Philips France* had, for instance, set up a local production line for tape recorders to supply the French market, UNEF to the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, March 9). Letter. Subject: Affaire n° 0004 Gründig [sic] – Consten. Enclosure X of Collin (1965, August 25). *Memoire contenant les observations écrites de la Société U.N.E.F. intervenante à l’appui des conclusions de la défenderesse dans les affaires jointes 56/64 et 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 27. *Philips* had already founded sales and distribution subsidiaries in a plethora of (mainly European) countries in the 1920s – including France (1920) and Germany (1926). *Philips*’s first local production facilities were already built up at the time as well, Dai, 1996, p. 66.

⁴⁴⁸ From the late 1950s onward, some *Philips* production plants became specialized in certain product groups, Dai, 1996, pp. 95–96. Trade between different European NOs subsequently increased in the first half of the 1960s. The main route of re-distributing products within the *Philips* group, however, went through Eindhoven, Chanier, 1990, pp. 490–491. This interlinkage of EEC-production (and of other operations) was an expressed goal of *Philips*, for which several euromarket integration committees were established within the company, N.N. (1960, January 20–21). *Report of the first Euromarket Advertising Meeting held in Eindhoven on the 20th and 21st of January 1960*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 75 : 823 Philips International Advertising Council. As van der Eng points out for Australia, *Philips*’ production outside of Europe mainly remained what he calls “local-for-local” well into the 1970s, as the company’s focus was primarily on European integration, van der Eng, 2017, p. 218.

its radio-, television set-, and phono product-exports to France, rising from 73 to 143 million FF.⁴⁴⁹ Although these figures cannot be directly compared to import data, their magnitude does suggest that a significant share of all French consumer electronics imports came from its neighbor across the Rhine during the first half of the 1960s. Indeed, France became the second-most important export market for the German consumer electronics industry during the 1960s, following closely behind only the Netherlands.⁴⁵⁰ While the vast majority of consumer electronics products sold in France would have continued to come from domestic production plants, French consumers thus increasingly also bought devices “made in Germany”. This was not the case the other way around: French-made consumer electronics did not manage to decisively break into the German market.

The French industry was not as internationally competitive as its more export-oriented German counterpart,⁴⁵¹ which benefited from economies of scale since the 1950s. As Reindl has observed: “High levels of exports enabled an expansion in production volume, which in turn led to a reduction in costs per unit. The reduction in sales prices in turn facilitated further increases in sales volume.”⁴⁵² While the EEC’s trade liberalization allowed German consumer electronics companies to expand their French business, French firms could not similarly capitalize on the new trade regime in the other direction. In 1964, Germany imported consumer electronics goods worth only 11,5 million FF from France. This was not even a tenth of what it exported vice versa, and a negligible quantity given the size of the German consumer electronics market: French imports accounted for less than 0,5 % of apparent consumption. This asymmetry in transnational trade would persist throughout the 1960s.⁴⁵³

⁴⁴⁹ Currency conversion by the author. Germany exported 59.400.000 DM and 116.200.000 DM worth of consumer electronics goods to France in 1962 and 1964 respectively, Schedl, H. (1972). *Untersuchung zur Konzentrationsentwicklung in verschiedenen Untersektoren der elektrotechnischen Industrie in Deutschland. Rundfunk-, Fernseh- und Phonogeräte (N.I.C.E. 375). Elektrohaushaltsgeräte (N.I.C.E. 376)*. European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <http://aei.pitt.edu/40993/>, p. 12. All currency conversions in this work are based on the historical exchange rates provided in the database of Werner Antweiler from the University of British Columbia, which compiles data from the *International Monetary Fund*’s statistical yearbooks, Antweiler, W. (2024). *Foreign Currency Units per 1 U.S. Dollar, 1950-2023* [PDF]. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf>.

⁴⁵⁰ After the exports to France had still been less than half (by value) of those to the Netherlands in 1962, the gap between both was rather narrow between 1963 and 1969. In 1964, for instance, France accounted for 12,3 % of all German consumer electronics exports by value, Schedl, 1972, pp. 12, 14. See also Reindl, 2001, p. 259.

⁴⁵¹ French producers exported only 8 % of their output (by value) in 1963 and 17 % in 1971, compared to 26 % and 39 % for German consumer electronics companies, Calculation by the author based on the data given by Landau, 1973, pp. 46, 58; Schedl, 1972, pp. 13–16. France had a negative consumer electronics trade balance since 1962, Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, p. 326. For comparison, the German foreign trade balance in consumer electronics (by value) only turned negative from the end of the 1970s onward, Gliese, 2023, p. 161.

⁴⁵² Reindl, 2001, p. 256. In the original German: “Die hohen Lieferungen ins Ausland erlaubten eine Ausweitung des Fertigungsvolumens, wodurch die Stückkosten gesenkt werden konnten. Die Reduzierung der Verkaufspreise erleichterte wiederum weitere Absatzsteigerungen.”

⁴⁵³ Currency conversion by the author. For the data, see Schedl, 1972, pp. 4, 15. It was only during the first half of the 1970s that the relative trade gap would shrink – although the absolute trade gap remained immense. By 1973, Germany exported radios, television sets, and phono products worth 312 million DM to France compared to

For French consumer electronics companies, the EEC's trade liberalization hence signified fiercer competition from abroad. For German consumer electronics companies on the other hand, it could mean a promising business venture. To make the most of this opportunity, they worked with subsidiaries and local partners to develop their commercial presence in France, forge local manufacturing partnerships – as not all consumer electronics were equally exportable –, build distribution networks from the ground up, and introduce their brand and products to consumers through advertising on a national scale.

As German media devices became a more common sight, German brands similarly attained a noticeable presence across French retail shop windows and mass media publications. In 1962, nearly 10 % of all brand ads for consumer electronics devices published in the French illustrated magazine *Paris Match* featured German brands such as *Telefunken* and *Grundig* – up from less than 2 % three years earlier. In line with the asymmetrical trade pattern, French brands did not establish a similar presence in Germany: Not a single ad for a French consumer electronics brand or product was inserted across 311 consulted issues of the German illustrated magazine *Stern* during the long 1960s.⁴⁵⁴ While French consumers would have increasingly encountered German consumer electronics brands and products when reading an illustrated magazine or window-browsing at their local retailer, this was not the case the other way around.

This made it impossible to pursue a comparative analytical approach on a transnational level: French brands simply did not attain similar visibility in Germany, nor did they benefit from the Common Market in the same way. Given this structural asymmetry in trade and advertising brand presence, this chapter focuses exclusively on the increasing role German consumer electronics products, brands, and ads played in 1960s France. It is decidedly not a study of the French consumer electronics market in its totality. Rather, it questions what challenges consumer electronics companies faced when entering new markets in the 1960s and investigates the market-specific and transnational dynamics that shaped their advertising.

The first subchapter traces how two of the largest German companies in the consumer electronics industry, *Telefunken* and *Grundig*, and their French subsidiary/import partner expanded their sales and brand presence in France between ca. 1959/60 and 1967/68. Emphasis

imports worth 96 million DM, Schedl, H. (1975). *Untersuchung zur Konzentrationsentwicklung in verschiedenen Untersektoren der elektrotechnischen Industrie in Deutschland. I. Rundfunk-, Fernseh- und Phonogeräte (N.I.C.E. 375). II. Elektrohaushaltsgeräte (N.I.C.E. 376)*. European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <http://aei.pitt.edu/41421/>, pp. 12, 15.

⁴⁵⁴ This calculation notably excludes ads inserted by retailers or mail order companies. Consumer electronics ads by German brands would remain a common sight in *Paris Match* – besides domestic brands, the Dutch *Philips*, and then later on Japanese competitors – until the end of the investigation period in the mid-1970s. The advertisement dataset, collection process, and methodology underpinning these findings on brand presence in the leading illustrated magazines *Stern* and *Paris Match* are discussed in chapter 3.4.2.

is put on the challenges of importing, selling, and advertising in a new market with differing requirements, no adequate distribution network, or brand recognition. For *Telefunken*, transnational collaboration and decision-making processes between the advertisers working for the German brand and its French subsidiary are investigated as well. It will be demonstrated that the advertising budget and approach for German consumer electronics brands and products in France were shaped by the market environment, internal company dynamics, and external competition. This is expanded on in the second subchapter, which investigates the phenomenon of parallel imports.

Around the same time German brands expanded their presence in France, French companies also began to directly import consumer electronics from Germany – without any involvement of German manufacturers or of their French partners and subsidiaries. These parallel imported devices were then offered to French retailers for price points undercutting the offer of the partners and subsidiaries of German brands. The second subchapter analyzes why this phenomenon occurred, which product groups were affected, who benefited from it, what measures were taken to prevent it and how relevant it was for the German brands and the overall market. As in the first half of this chapter, the main emphasis is put on the relationship between parallel imports and advertising, and on the transnational character of the phenomenon. The subchapter demonstrates that parallel imports as an external factor could play a crucial role in setting the advertising strategy and budget of German brands in France during the 1960s.

To investigate these threads, the chapter primarily draws on two distinct but complementary sets of sources. For *Telefunken* and its subsidiary *Telefunken France*, the analysis relies on a host of internal letters, reports, budgets, and meeting protocols. For *Grundig* and its independent French import partner *Consten*, the foundation is an extensive body of documentation from a high-profile court case on parallel imports heard at the Court of Justice of the European Communities. While the court case material – discussed more extensively in the second subchapter – is rich in detail, it does not allow for an analysis of internal disagreements between import partner and parent company, as *Grundig* and *Consten* evidently sought to present a united front against the opposing parties. Such dynamics can only be analyzed for *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France*. Taken together, the two sets of sources allow to precisely reconstruct how German brands and their partners/subsidiaries navigated the French market in those early years of expansion, and how they grappled with the challenge of parallel imports. Advertising emerges as a central theme in both sets of sources, appearing as a key strategic concern for market entry and a principal point of contention in internal and external disputes around parallel imports.

2.2.1 How to Enter a New Market: *Grundig* and *Telefunken* in France

2.2.1.1 Gaining Access. Transnational Trade and Local Presence in the Common Market

German consumer electronics companies had been interested in doing business in France well before the establishment of the European Common Market. The emerging industrial giant *Grundig*⁴⁵⁵ had entered an agreement with *Consten* as early as 1952 to import and sell *Grundig* products in France, for instance. At the time, such business was still heavily constrained by French import quotas, however.⁴⁵⁶ These quotas, which hindered trade across borders more heavily than tariffs, had been abolished in other sectors from 1949 onward for Germany and France alike.⁴⁵⁷ But consumer electronics products had been among the product groups – alongside clocks, trucks, or nickel alloys – for which the French state had kept these quotas in place the longest,⁴⁵⁸ presumably to shield the domestic consumer electronics industry from competition.⁴⁵⁹

German companies would try and find creative solutions to circumvent this trade barrier: in 1955, for instance, *Telefunken* supplied a French consumer electronics manufacturer, *Grammont*, with electrical components for radio sets, which were then used to assemble radios ordered by its partner *Telefunken France*. In this setup, *Telefunken* had no “normal commercial relationship” with *Grammont*; its primary interest rather lay in the “exploitation of their import licenses”. Such a workaround was of course no permanent solution. *Telefunken France* hence built up domestic production capabilities during the second half of the 1950s,⁴⁶⁰ before the

⁴⁵⁵ Between 1948/49 and the late 1970s, *Grundig*’s nominal revenue grew from 29 million DM to around 3 billion DM. Similarly, its number of employees rose from about 1.000 in 1950 to close to 40.000 by the end of the 1970s. On *Grundig*’s development in the post-war decades, see Staffel, 2025, pp. 95–108. For the figures, see id., p. 98.

⁴⁵⁶ Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l’intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l’affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888, p. 12.

⁴⁵⁷ Buchheim, C. (2005). Ökonomischer Strukturwandel in Frankreich und Deutschland im europäischen und transatlantischen Zusammenhang. In H. Miard-Delacroix & R. Hudemann (Eds.), *Wandel und Integration. Deutsch-französische Annäherungen der fünfziger Jahre. Mutations et intégration. Les rapprochements franco-allemands dans les années cinquante* (pp. 159–178). R. Oldenbourg, p. 175.

⁴⁵⁸ N.N. (1960, December 29). Le taux de libération de nos échanges porté à 93,75 %. *Le Monde*. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1960/12/29/le-taux-de-liberation-de-nos-echanges-porte-a-93-75_2105051_1819218.html. On the French import quota system, see further N.N. (1959, December 7). Vers la fin du contingentement. *Le Monde*. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1959/12/07/vers-la-fin-du-contingentement_2164845_1819218.html.

⁴⁵⁹ It seems plausible that protectionist motives governed the decision to keep intra-European consumer electronics import quotas in place comparatively long, given that France also maintained separate import quotas for the highly competitive Japanese consumer electronics industry throughout the 1960s, IFO Institute Munich, 1970, p. 11. This is substantiated by *Grundig*’s import partner *Consten*, which spoke of a “régime de protectionnisme” on the French consumer electronics market, Consten (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l’exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 3.

⁴⁶⁰ G/V-H Export to Zickermann (1956, March 3). *Internal letter. Subject: Schreiben der Television Grammont vom 28.2.1956 an Herrn Dr. Ing. Heyne*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794. In the original German: “normale Handelsbeziehung”, “Ausnutzung derer Importlizenzen”.

changing trade conditions of the EEC then greatly reduced the need to manufacture locally, leading *Telefunken* to abandon its ambitions to that effect.⁴⁶¹

In fact, *Telefunken* took the trade liberalization as an opportunity to start anew in France. It cut all ties with its previous partner – an independent company which had held the rights to replicate (“Nachbau”) and sell consumer electronics under the *Telefunken* brand in France –⁴⁶² and established a subsidiary instead, which it controlled directly. This subsidiary, the *Compagnie Française Telefunken S.A.*, was officially founded on the 28th of March 1961.⁴⁶³ *Telefunken*’s previous partnership then ended on the 31st of March 1961,⁴⁶⁴ and from the 1st of April 1961 onward, exports by EEC member states of television sets, tape recorders, and most radios were no longer subject to import quotas in France.⁴⁶⁵ The European Common Market thus not only facilitated transnational trade but also caused German companies to reconsider their strategic and organizational approach to foreign markets. *Braun*’s chief executive in the early 1970s, for

⁴⁶¹ *Telefunken* had planned to buy the production plant and distribution organization of its French partner *Electro-Union* before delays in the transaction and the changed market situation had prompted the company to abandon these plans, Kunkel (1962, November 22). *Notiz über die CFT – Vorbesprechung am 15. November 1962, 15.00 Uhr in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, p. 1.

⁴⁶² Eckart (1960, April 12). *Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung in Berlin am 8.4.1960. Betr.: Electro-Union*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397; N.N. (undated). *Übersetzung eines Schreibens des französischen Finanz- und Handelsministeriums vom 10.1.1961 an Herrn Dr. Tomasi, Paris. Betr.: Deutsche Investition in Frankreich – COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE TELEFUNKEN*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397.

⁴⁶³ N.N. (1969, January 15). *Übersichtsblatt AEG-Telefunken France*. DTMB/AEG, JB 0815. Initially, a group of French stakeholders had owned 33 % of this new company, Eckart (1960, April 12). *Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung in Berlin am 8.4.1960. Betr.: Electro-Union*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397. These stakeholders had been involved in running the new company in 1961. Cooperation proved to be difficult, however, prompting *Telefunken* to buy them out in 1962. From this point onward, the German company had complete and exclusive control of its French subsidiary, Kunkel (1962, November 22). *Notiz über die CFT – Vorbesprechung am 15. November 1962, 15.00 Uhr in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397.

⁴⁶⁴ *Telefunken* had, however, already let this relationship peter out beforehand, Eckart (1960, April 12). *Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung in Berlin am 8.4.1960. Betr.: Electro-Union*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397.

⁴⁶⁵ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 4, Footnote 1. The Commission gives the 29th of September 1960 as the date on which the import quotas for tape recorders were lifted, with the quotas for television sets and most types of radios being abrogated after the 31.03.1961. However, according to the lawyers of *Grundig*, the French import quotas for tape recorders had actually also been in place until the 31.03.1961, Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 51. According to the Commission, a separate quota on battery-powered radios would remain in place until the 01.01.1962. However, this date seems to have been off as well. In an internal letter by a *Telefunken* market researcher from February 1962, it is mentioned that the last remaining French quota – on transistorized battery-powered radios – was still in place, but would be lifted within the year, Schimrock to Barth (1962, February 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Exportbesprechung am 16.2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1951, p. 2. This would fit with the timeline provided by the *IFO Institute*, which mentioned that the last remaining French quota concerning radios was lifted on the 01.10.1962, IFO Institute Munich, 1970, p. 10. According to this study, France was the only country within the EEC to still impose quotas on other members as a form of import restriction in the EEC’s early years. The study gives precise values for the French import quotas 1959-1961 of radios and television sets (and also for refrigerators, for example), showing that importation became easier from 1959 onward as the quotas already became more relaxed before they were completely abolished. None of the sources mention record players. It seems possible that similar quotas were in place for this product group and that they were lifted around the same time, but it cannot be said with certainty. In any case, all French import quotas on consumer electronics were lifted by the 01.10.1962 at the latest, with most being lifted on the 1st of April 1961.

instance, also claimed that: “It was only the Common Market that created new opportunities and prompted us to rethink our export organization.”⁴⁶⁶ It hence seems possible that the decision by *Grundig*’s French partner *Consten* to change its corporate form from a sole proprietorship (“entreprise personnelle”) to a limited liability company (“société à responsabilité limitée”) in July 1961,⁴⁶⁷ too, was related to these new market conditions given the close temporal proximity.

The EEC’s new trade regime notably also concerned tariffs, the other large hindrance to cross-national trade between member states: in a multi-step process between 1959 and 1968, all tariffs between member countries were abolished.⁴⁶⁸ Between 1959 and the beginning of 1962, tariffs between EEC members were already lowered by a cumulative 40 %.⁴⁶⁹ This considerably lower tariff-level, paired with the abolition of import quotas, meant that German consumer electronics companies wanting to do business in France found themselves in a significantly more favorable market environment in the early 1960s compared to a few years earlier. This directly translated to dynamic company growth for the *Compagnie Française Telefunken* – which would again be called *Telefunken France* from 1963 onward –⁴⁷⁰ and *Consten* alike.

While German brands had technically already been present on the French market during the 1950s, the business with German consumer electronics devices could only truly take off under the new trade regulations: After a largely stagnant period from 1952 to 1959, *Consten* raised its annual revenue from ca. 5 million FF to around 70 million FF (56,7 million DM) between 1959

⁴⁶⁶ Herrmann, H-W. (1975). Durch Kraftzentren flexibler. Reorganisation Braun AG. *Manager Magazin* 1, 52–56. BS, magazine file Organigramme, p. 53. In the original German: “Erst der Gemeinsame Markt eröffnete neue Möglichkeiten und regte uns an, die Exportorganisation zu überdenken.”

⁴⁶⁷ Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1962, December 28). *Note concernant le contrat d'exclusivité Grundig – Consten – Affaire N° 00004*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 12.

⁴⁶⁸ Buchheim, 2005, p. 176.

⁴⁶⁹ Schimrock to Barth (1962, February 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Exportbesprechung am 16.2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1951. While tariffs had been lowered, they were still quite a way off from being completely harmonized between countries in 1962. On the 01.01.1962, there were the following tariffs for consumer electronics (to which a form of VAT would still be added): Germany: 9 % on radios and television sets, 7 % on phono products. France: 14,4 % on radios and television sets, 12–15,6 % on phono products. Luxembourg: 12 % on radios and television sets, 7,2–10,8 % on phono products, Weblus (1962, February 9). *Zölle und Einfuhrabgaben für einige elektrotechnische Erzeugnisse in den Ländern der EWG (in % vom Zollwert)*. Enclosure of Weblus to Olufs (1962, February 9). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1951.

⁴⁷⁰ 1961 had been a transitory period in that regard. It had been necessary to use another name for the new company due to ongoing contracts, but also out of concerns that the brand name *Telefunken France* was still too strongly linked to *Telefunken*’s previous French partner *Electro-Union*. It had been planned to rename *Compagnie Française Telefunken* to *Telefunken France* from 1962 onward, Henning (1961, April 4). *Protokoll über die Sitzung am 23. März 1961 in Hannover. Betr.: Situation C.F. TELEFUNKEN, Paris, und Electro-Union, Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, p. 3. However, in December 1962, the company was still called *Compagnie Française Telefunken*, *Telefunken* (1962, December 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Pour tous vos travaux d'enregistrement, un magnétophone TELEFUNKEN, à votre mesure. *Paris Match*, 713, 116. The name change must thus have taken place in 1963, as the preamble of the company’s 1964 plan referred to the company as *Telefunken France*, Fahrner (1963, December 31). *Präambel zum Hauptplan 1964 der Telefunken France SA, Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

and 1964.⁴⁷¹ Accordingly, its cross-border trade with *Grundig* grew even more impressively, from 500.000 DM to 22.700.000 DM worth of goods between 1957 and 1963 (an increase of roughly 4.500 %).⁴⁷² *Telefunken France* experienced similar dynamic growth in the early 1960s: in its business year 1962/1963, *Telefunken France*'s revenue was ca. 17.270.000 DM (21,3 million FF), which marked an increase of 183 % compared to the year before.⁴⁷³ The company's revenue would then continue to climb further, reaching 41 million FF in the calendar year 1964.⁴⁷⁴

While both representatives of German brands managed to quickly increase their revenue during the first half of the 1960s, it is important to not overstate their significance for the French consumer electronics market. They were effectively newcomers, and this was reflected in their market share at the time. Even with the rapid growth of the previous years, *Telefunken France* still only sold around 21.000 radios, 13.000 television sets, and 5.000 tape recorders in 1964 (plus an indeterminate amount of record players). Tens of thousands of French consumers hence purchased a *Telefunken*-branded device that year. However, these figures were still insignificant relative to the overall size of the French consumer electronics market: In 1964, 2,39 million radios, 1,35 million television sets, and around 150.000 tape recorders were sold in France. *Telefunken France* thus had a market share of around 0,9 % for both radio and television sets and accounted for 3,3 % of all tape recorders sold in France that year.⁴⁷⁵ Given *Consten*'s

⁴⁷¹ Currency conversion to DM by the author, N.N. (undated). Chiffre d'affaires annuel de la société Consten. Enclosure 6 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888. Another source puts *Consten*'s revenue at just below 58 million FF for the business year 1963/64, Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 42. While it cannot be said with certainty where this difference comes from, it seems possible that one source may have used the calendar year as the calculatory basis while the other used the business year.

⁴⁷² Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1964, December 10). *Klageschrift der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH., in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 46. The European Commission directly ascribed this increase to the abrogation of quotas, Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 45.

⁴⁷³ Currency conversion by the author, Kunkel (1964, May 6). *Übersichtsblatt Telefunken France S.A.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁴⁷⁴ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁴⁷⁵ For all radio-related figures (including market shares), see FM/MF (1965, September 8). Anteil von Telefunken am Inlandsabsatz von Rundfunkgeräten 1955 – 1965 Frankreich in 1000 Stück. Enclosure 10 of FM/MF to Seydlitz (1965, September 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Rundfunk- und Fernsehgeräte-Markt Frankreichs*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. According to this source, the radios sold by *Telefunken France* were partially imported from *Telefunken* and partially sourced domestically. The television sets commercialized by *Telefunken France*, however, had all been produced in France. For this information and all figures pertaining to television sets, see FM/MF (1965, September 8). Deckung des Inlandsabsatzes aus inländischen [sic] Produktion und Importen (in 1000 Stück). Enclosure 6 of FM/MF to Seydlitz (1965, September 10). *Internal letter. Subject: Rundfunk- und Fernsehgeräte-Markt Frankreichs*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. The overall sales figures for radio and television sets given by Kuhn de Chizelle deviate only very slightly from the figures given by *Telefunken*, Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, pp. 335–338. Tape recorder market share calculated by the author. For the number of tape recorders sold by *Telefunken France*,

revenue, the market share of *Grundig*-branded products would have been higher during the first half of the 1960s, albeit not significantly so.

Consten and *Telefunken France* also remained comparatively small companies with regards to their workforce, even though both expanded their operative capacity in line with their growing sales revenue. Between 1961 and 1963, *Consten*'s workforce increased fourfold, from 41 employees in the first half of 1961 to 160 at the end of 1963.⁴⁷⁶ Similarly, *Telefunken France*'s workforce reached 80 people on the 31st of March 1963 – 48 % more than a year earlier. And by the end of 1963, the company had further increased its staff to 103.⁴⁷⁷ Both *Telefunken France* and *Consten* thus generated millions in annual revenue with a very small number of employees: *Telefunken* and *Grundig* employed 33.500 (1963)⁴⁷⁸ and 30.000 (1962)⁴⁷⁹ people respectively in total, while even mid-sized French consumer electronics companies such as *Ribet-Desjardins* or *Teppaz* employed 1.200 (1957)⁴⁸⁰ and 800 people (1964) respectively.⁴⁸¹ Such a high revenue per employee was possible due to *Consten*'s and *Telefunken France*'s area of responsibility, which did not encompass development or production. Rather, according to *Grundig*, *Consten* was “like a sales department outsourced from the producing company”.⁴⁸² The same applied to *Telefunken France*.

From 1961 onward, *Telefunken*-branded radios, television sets, record players, and tape recorders were exclusively sold and distributed in France through its newly formed subsidiary. *Telefunken* would not supply these consumer electronics to anyone else in France, and *Telefunken France* was granted the right to use the *Telefunken* name and brand identifiers on the French market. In turn, *Telefunken France* was contractually obliged to set up an adequate

see N.N. (1965, June 29). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. For the total number of tape recorders sold in France, see N.N. (1964, October 13). *Starke Nachfrage nach Tonbandgeräten in Frankreich. Nachrichten für Außenhandel*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In August 1964, *Telefunken France*'s inventory of goods was worth eight million FF in total. Television sets accounted for more than half of this total (4,3 million FF). *Telefunken France* also held radios worth nearly around 1 million FF, tape recorders worth around 600.000 FF and only 328.000 FF worth of record players. Tubes, accessories, and electronic components accounted for the rest, N.N. (1964, September 10). *Telefunken France S.A. Situation au 31 Août 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397. Given the rather low value of its record player stock, it seems likely that *Telefunken France* would have only sold a few thousand record players that year.

⁴⁷⁶ N.N. (undated). Ce que notre contrat nous a permis de réaliser et ce que sa suppression ne nous permettra pas de développer. Enclosure 2 of *Consten* (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l'exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁷ Kunkel (1964, May 6). *Übersichtsblatt Telefunken France S.A.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁴⁷⁸ N.N. (1963, November 26). *An der Strippe. Der Spiegel*, 48. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/an-der-strippe-a-513648a0-0002-0001-0000-000046172884>.

⁴⁷⁹ *Grundig* (1962, April 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Ce qu'il y a derrière GRUNDIG. *Paris Match*, 681, 110.

⁴⁸⁰ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 74.

⁴⁸¹ Robert, 2019, p. 35.

⁴⁸² Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1964, December 10). *Klageschrift der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH., in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886. In the original German: “[...] wie eine aus dem Produktionsunternehmen ausgegliederte Vertriebsabteilung.”

distribution structure, to service and repair *Telefunken* products, to assist *Telefunken* with market research on the French market, and to conduct “effective and beneficial advertising”, for which *Telefunken* would provide support through advertising-related documentation free of charge.⁴⁸³ *Telefunken*’s dictaphones had been explicitly excluded from the contract, as they were exclusively imported and distributed in France by another company, *Etex S.A.*, which was allowed to use the *Telefunken* branding for these products. Consumer electronics companies thus did not necessarily have solely one partner per foreign market. It was also possible for a brand to split its product groups between multiple actors.⁴⁸⁴

There does not seem to have been a uniform approach between companies in that regard: *Grundig* apparently only worked with *Consten*. The French company and *Grundig* had entered an agreement which was very similar to the one of *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France* as early as April 1957, in which *Consten* – an independent company, not a subsidiary – was appointed the sole distributor of *Grundig* radios, television sets, dictaphones, and tape recorders in France. Just like *Telefunken France*, *Consten* was granted the exclusive right to use the *Grundig* brand in France and *Grundig* committed itself not to supply anyone else in France. Conversely, *Consten* was contractually expected to provide service and repair, and to conduct “adequate and sufficient advertising”.⁴⁸⁵ *Consten* also undertook market research for *Grundig*.⁴⁸⁶

Although *Grundig* and *Telefunken* had opted for differing organizational setups to commercialize their consumer electronics on the French market, their contracts with their French partner/subsidiary defined the respective areas of responsibility between the French sales and distribution representative and the German producer in a remarkably identical manner.

⁴⁸³ Telefunken G.m.b.H. & Telefunken France S.A. (1961, October 2). Vertriebsvertrag zwischen TELEFUNKEN G.m.b.H. und COMPAGNIE FRANÇAISE TELEFUNKEN am 02.10.1961. Enclosure of Müller-Machens (1966, December 1). *Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit Herrn Fahrner am 29.11.1966. Betr.: Vergütung für die bei CFTH hergestellten Geräte*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2795. In the original German: “eine wirkungsvolle und nutzbringende Werbung”.

⁴⁸⁴ *Telefunken*-branded dictaphones were not produced by *Telefunken* itself in the early 1960s but rather by an associated company, the *Protona GmbH*, *Etex S.A.* (undated). *Product catalog Telefunken minifon*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. Using two separate partners abroad for different product groups was not a solution unique to *Telefunken*. *Braun* for example was present in France with *Braun France*, but also through a separate, external distribution partner for their HiFi products called *Major Electronic*, N.N. (1974, April/May). HiFi, the French way. *spotlight*, 3, 5. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international.

⁴⁸⁵ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 2. In the original German: “angemessene und ausreichende Werbung”. While the Commission directly cites from the contract of 1957, it is unfortunately not clear from this source what the agreement between *Consten* and *Grundig* looked like between 1952 and 1957. But there seemed to have been an earlier agreement in place, as *Consten* referred to itself as *Grundig*’s “exclusive sales agent in France since 1952”, Collin (1965, August 25). *Memoire contenant les observations écrites de la Société U.N.E.F. intervenante à l'appui des conclusions de la défenderesse dans les affaires jointes 56/64 et 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 18. In the original French: “[...] que nous sommes depuis 1952 agent exclusive de vente, pour la France [...]”.

⁴⁸⁶ Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1964, December 10). *Klageschrift der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH., in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 60–61.

In both cases, exclusive rights to selling and advertising *Telefunken* or *Grundig* products under the respective brands were granted in exchange for a responsibility to distribute and sell, but to also properly advertise, take care of repair and service, and collaborate on market research. Based on these tasks and responsibilities, the following three sections inquire if the same products were commercialized under the *Telefunken* and *Grundig* brand name in Germany and France, how *Telefunken France* and *Consten* built up their distribution networks to increase the brand's reach, and what it meant to advertise a brand in a new market as a representative.

2.2.1.2 Rebranding and Adaptation: the Challenges of Commercializing Consumer Electronics Abroad

Consten and *Telefunken France* effectively functioned as outsourced sales departments, primarily responsible for commercializing German consumer electronics imports. However, they did not always offer the exact same products as *Grundig* and *Telefunken* in Germany. For one, German manufacturers tailored parts of their portfolio to the aesthetic preferences of French consumers: *Grundig* furnished its radiograms for the French market with a different chassis,⁴⁸⁷ and *Telefunken* collaborated with a German furniture company in 1964 to design a radiogram exclusively for the French market.⁴⁸⁸ But more importantly, consumer electronics needed to be technically adjusted to the French market to varying degrees.

While tape recorders and record players/changers could be sold virtually unchanged (at least on a technical level),⁴⁸⁹ radios ideally accounted for differing listening habits: *Grundig*, for instance, fitted the radio receivers it exported to France with improved ferrite antennas. This made them better suited to receive long wave broadcasts, which was a far more prevalent way

⁴⁸⁷ Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 61, Footnote 83.

⁴⁸⁸ *Telefunken France*'s head had final approval on the design, Witthöft (1964, August 25). *Aktennotiz über eine Besprechung betr. Terzola VII für Telefunken France in Mannheim am 24.8.1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2795.

⁴⁸⁹ *Grundig*'s tape recorders were not adjusted to the French market concerning their technical specifications, Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 61. This is not to say that companies would not make other adjustments: *Telefunken*, for instance, fitted the export variant of its tape recorder *Magnetophon Automatic* with a differently colored casing – but it seems to not have also adjusted the device on a technical level, Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, March 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. See also chapter 3.1.2.1. Similarly, in its marketing plan for the (never released) record changer *TW 517*, *Telefunken* considered export markets when it came to naming the device and concerning the labeling of its buttons (symbols instead of German text), but technical adjustments were not discussed at all, Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler "TW 517"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 4–7. See also chapter 3.1.1.2. Record playing devices would not have needed to account for differing media standards. According to Laing, the vinyl disc had become the international standard by the late 1950s, Laing, D. (2013). *The recording industry in the twentieth century*. In L. Marshall (Ed.), *The international recording industries* (pp. 31–52). Routledge, p. 40.

of radio-listening in France than in Germany.⁴⁹⁰ And German television sets were even impossible to commercialize in France at scale due to incompatible broadcasting norms, necessitating a solution tailored to the French market.

Technological constraints thus directly affected how and to what extent consumer electronics goods were traded across borders. While the French radio- and phono-product-markets came under increasing pressure from German imports since the beginning of the decade, the French television set market was far less affected by the new trade regulations. France's television norm choice in effect served as an additional barrier to transnational trade in both directions: In 1963, 16,4 % of all radios bought by French consumers were imported, compared to only 3,9 % of television sets (by quantity). Out of well over a million TVs sold in France that year, only 46.000 were imports.⁴⁹¹ This made *Grundig* a rather exceptional case. The company not only manufactured the radios and tape recorders sold and distributed by *Consten* in the mid-1960s, but it had also set up a costly separate production line for French-norm television sets.⁴⁹² *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France* opted to work with a domestic manufacturer instead: On the 10th of April 1961, *Telefunken France* entered an accord with the *Compagnie Française Thomson Houston* (the later *Thomson*) to produce an 819-line-norm television set for them, for which *Telefunken* would supply the tubes (similar to its radio deal with *Grammont* in 1955).⁴⁹³ Not all media devices available on the French market under a German brand name during the 1960s were thus imports.

While there was a considerable overlap between German-produced consumer electronics and consumer electronics sold under German brand names in France, they were not congruent categories. What products were imported, purchased from other manufacturers, or produced locally varied between companies – and could further be subject to considerable changes across

⁴⁹⁰ Its radiograms for the French were also fitted with a different power cord, Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 60–61 & p. 61, Footnote 83. *Telefunken's* portable radios also underwent technical adjustments to align with the demands of the French market, Kunkel (1962, November 23). *Notiz über die CFT – Besprechung am 14. November 1962 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, p. 3.

⁴⁹¹ Percentages calculated by the author based on apparent consumption. For the assessment and the underlying data, see Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, pp. 335–338.

⁴⁹² Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 60. According to *Telefunken*, *Grundig* had initially opted for a replica-production of television sets in France and had only begun producing them in Germany rather recently by 1965, Weblus (1965, September 15). *Die momentane wirtschaftliche Lage in Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 3. However, this seems unlikely, as the sources from the *Grundig* court case make no mention of this, and *Consten* explicitly underlined that it imported “100 %” of its products from Germany in its 1962 advertising (in an ad that, in addition, even depicted a television set), *Grundig* (1962, April 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Ce qu'il y a derrière GRUNDIG. *Paris Match*, 681, 110.

⁴⁹³ Thomson & C.F.T. (1961, April 10). *Protocole d'Accord entre Thomson et Compagnie Française Telefunken*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794.

time not only due to new trade regimes, but also following company-specific strategic decisions: In 1971, *Grundig* opened a television set production plant in France,⁴⁹⁴ while *Telefunken* seems to have set up a French-standard color TV production line in Germany in the mid-1970s.⁴⁹⁵ All such arrangements were particular to French market conditions and would have differed for import partners and subsidiaries in other countries. In 1965, *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics business in the EEC member states was accordingly a blend of exportation, reliance on national production, and production sourced from third parties.⁴⁹⁶

Even though not all products sold by *Telefunken France* in the early/mid-1960s were manufactured by *Telefunken*, customers would have had no way to know the difference. Companies deliberately obscured such connections. The television set *Thomson* produced for *Telefunken France* would use the same chassis as three of *Thomson*'s own brands, but *Telefunken France* was free – and even expected – to give it a differing external design. The *Thomson* name would not appear anywhere on the products, and, conversely, *Telefunken France* would not name *Thomson* in any way in promotional or technical material. Both parties would further ensure that their distribution partners would also not refer to the other in their sales argumentation. *Thomson* and *Telefunken France* thus made sure that their agreement would not become evident to consumers, keeping their brand positioning separate and aiming to maintain an illusion of choice.⁴⁹⁷

It was only through mishaps that consumers could become aware of such dealings – like in 1965, when *Consten* and *Telefunken France* apparently issued basically identical warranty cards to French customers for a tape recorder produced by *Grundig* but also sold in a deviating design with *Telefunken* branding. These connections were usually known to French retailers, but it was not intended for consumers to find out about them, which is why *Telefunken*'s

⁴⁹⁴ *Grundig*'s plant was in Creutzwald, France, Wiesinger, J. (1994). *Die Geschichte der Unterhaltungselektronik. Daten, Bilder, Trends*. Institut für Medienentwicklung und Kommunikation GmbH in der Verlagsgruppe Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH, p. 127.

⁴⁹⁵ It is not clear if *Telefunken* also exported B/W television sets to France by this point, Schmidt & Seebach (undated). *Präambel, Schätzung 4/76*. DTMB/AEG, JB XA 898. *Telefunken* had made plans to self-produce television sets for the French market as early as 1962, Kunkel (1962, November 23). *Notiz über die CFT – Besprechung am 14. November 1962 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, p. 3. These seem to have gone nowhere in the short-term, as *Telefunken France* extended the 1961 contract with *Thomson* in 1964 for another three years (at least), Fahrner (1964, July 16). *Notiz über die Besprechung bei CFTH, Paris, am 9.7.1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794.

⁴⁹⁶ Fachgebiet GR (1965, November 5). *Fachgebietsbesprechung Fachbereich GR am 13. Oktober 1965 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 4.

⁴⁹⁷ Thomson & C.F.T. (1961, April 10). *Protocole d'Accord entre Thomson et Compagnie Française Telefunken*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794. In the second agreement, it was stipulated that *Telefunken France* would be able to request “small technical gimmicks” (“kleine technische Gags”) they would like to have included in their variant, Fahrner (1964, July 16). *Notiz über die Besprechung bei CFTH, Paris, am 9.7.1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794. It was a rather common practice on the French consumer electronics market to commercialize the same device under multiple brand names. By 1971, *Thomson* and the *Compagnie Générale d'Electricité*, for instance, each marketed their devices under four and five different brands respectively, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 203.

marketing department intervened after a commercial customer of *Telefunken France* had complained about the warranty cards making it visibly obvious.⁴⁹⁸

Being able to offer a market-adjusted product portfolio under the *Grundig* and *Telefunken* brands – ensured chiefly but not exclusively through imports – was a key prerequisite for *Consten* and *Telefunken France* to successfully break into the French consumer electronics market. This was only the first step, however. The brand representatives also needed to build up a distribution network to ensure that their market-appropriate media devices would find their way to French consumers. This was a gradual process that involved finding new distribution channels, creating connections to retailers and wholesalers, maintaining existing links, and establishing support structures.

2.2.1.3 Building Reach. The Importance of Distribution Networks

With a vastly greater amount of goods flowing into the French market in the early 1960s from *Grundig* and *Telefunken* alike due to the changed market environment, it became a pressing issue for *Consten* and *Telefunken France* to increase their number of retail partners through which these German consumer electronics devices could reach consumers. Both companies would have needed to start the expansion of their distribution network during the first half of the 1960s basically from scratch: *Telefunken France* had only been founded in 1961, and *Consten*'s lawyer explicitly identified the abrogation of import quotas as the departure point only after which the company had been able to properly begin to build up its distribution structure.⁴⁹⁹

The French consumer electronics market posed a particular challenge in that regard. As a 1979 report on market and industry pointed out in reference to Japanese consumer electronics companies increasingly making inroads on the French television set market during the 1970s, the French consumer electronics distribution system posed an additional barrier for market entry for newcomers due to its high degree of fragmentation and the prevalence of small retail businesses:

“[...], the particular structure of French distribution, which is not very concentrated (25.000 points of sale), has also hampered Japanese exports: more than three-quarters of distribution is carried out by small retailers; as there are very few wholesalers, it is very difficult for a foreign manufacturer

⁴⁹⁸ *Telefunken* identified two possible answers as to how this might have happened: Either *Grundig* had copied their warranty cards or *Telefunken France* had issued their own warranty cards unbeknownst to the responsible German department, Seydlitz to Mößner (1965, October 6). *Internal letter. Subject: M 401. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964; Mößner to Seydlitz (1965, October 12). Internal letter. Subject: M 401. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.*

⁴⁹⁹ Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64. HAEU/CJUE-0888, p. 12.*

(particularly Japanese manufacturers) to establish itself on the French market, as it requires setting up a larger sales network than in Germany [...].”⁵⁰⁰

The partners and subsidiaries of German companies seeking to break into the French market during the previous decade would have faced the same difficulties, as these fundamental characteristics of distribution would not have meaningfully changed during the long 1960s: according to an estimate of the French industry association *Fédération nationale des industries électroniques* cited by Isabelle Gaillard, there were around 18.000 to 20.000 industry-relevant points of sale throughout France in the late 1950s. At the time, the grand majority of devices were directly supplied to retail stores (which usually carried several competing brands) by the manufacturers without intermediary wholesalers, for which the manufacturers put regional agent networks in place.⁵⁰¹ *Consten* and *Telefunken France* needed to adapt to these conditions to successfully get their products into a relevant share of the thousands of French stores carrying consumer electronics.

While no detailed figures are available for *Consten*, it is possible to precisely trace the evolution of *Telefunken France*’s distribution network, showing a considerable expansion between 1962 and 1965. In November 1962, a bit more than one and a half years after its foundation, *Telefunken France* supplied only around 530 retailers throughout France. Out of those 530, around 100 had entered contracts guaranteeing fixed purchases. This was preferable for *Telefunken France* as it allowed the company to better plan in advance⁵⁰² compared to the less predictable orders of contractually unbound “occasional customers”.⁵⁰³ At the time, *Telefunken France* employed twelve traveling sales representatives to work directly with distributors and close deals with them. Additionally, the company collaborated with wholesalers, who acted as so-called “Stützpunkthändler”. They worked with retailers on *Telefunken France*’s behalf in their respective regions. To expand and improve its network, *Telefunken France* planned to add six more sales agents in the short run and set up their own regional sales offices in the long run

⁵⁰⁰ Flichy & Narbais, 1979, p. 120. In the original French: “[...], les structures particulières de la distribution française, très peu concentrée (25 000 points de vente) ont aussi freiné les exportations japonaises : la distribution pour plus des trois quarts par de petits détaillants ; dans la mesure où il existe très peu de grossistes, il est très difficile pour un fabricant étranger (et notamment pour les Japonais) de s’implanter sur le marché français puisqu’il faut y monter un réseau commercial plus important qu’en RFA [...]” A study published in 1980 put the number of specialist retail stores for electrical household goods and consumer electronics at 20.000 to 25.000, de Santis, J. (1980). Les Circuits de Distribution des Produits d’Équipement Électroménager. 2. In Avis et Rapports du Conseil Économique et Social. *Journal officiel de la République Française*, 16, 633–645, p. 639. Another study for the European Commission even estimated the total number of stores selling consumer electronics and electrical household goods in France (not just specialist retailers) to be as high as 35.000 to 45.000 in the early 1970s, Pluton & Desjardins, 1978, p. 12.

⁵⁰¹ Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 80–81.

⁵⁰² Kunkel (1962, November 23). *Notiz über die CFT – Besprechung am 14. November 1962 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397.

⁵⁰³ Terhorst to mailing list (1965, September 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Halbjahresbericht der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2. In the original German: “Gelegenheitskunden”.

as to reduce the reliance on wholesalers external to the company. But perhaps most importantly, the company aimed to raise the number of retailers it supplied to around a thousand.⁵⁰⁴

These earliest figures do not quite align with the ones provided for the 1st of January 1963 in a report by *Telefunken France*'s managing director, which claimed that *Telefunken France* had nine sales representatives at the beginning of 1963, worked with seven wholesalers (which had regional exclusivity), and supplied a total of 451 retailers across France. Out of those 451, 231 had a yearly contract with *Telefunken France*. Another ca. 100 retailers bought from *Telefunken France* without contractual agreement. And the last 120 were not direct customers of *Telefunken France* but rather supplied through the wholesalers.⁵⁰⁵ Such indirectly supplied retailers were usually "small merchants in the countryside".⁵⁰⁶ Though it cannot be conclusively established how many retailers *Telefunken France* supplied exactly or how many sales representatives it employed, both sets of figures are of the same order of magnitude. By means of a network of wholesale partners and traveling salesmen which sought to directly convince retailers of *Telefunken France*'s portfolio, *Telefunken*-branded consumer electronics would thus have been available for purchase in around half a thousand retail stores throughout France – including in rural areas. *Telefunken France* would then rapidly expand its distribution network over the next two years.

By the 1st of January 1964, there were a total of at least 722 retail stores in which French customers could buy *Telefunken*-branded products (the exact figure depended on the number of retail stores belonging to each of the five buying syndicates the company had started to supply in the meantime). By the 1st of October 1965, this figure had nearly doubled, with *Telefunken France* supplying 1.376 retail stores overall. During the first half of the 1960s, the consolidation of its distribution network was thus very much an ongoing process: at the beginning of 1965, the company had supplied some 300 fewer stores than in October.⁵⁰⁷ *Telefunken*-branded devices thus became available at an increasing number of French retail stores during the first half of the 1960s – a key component of the brand's market presence.

⁵⁰⁴ Kunkel (1962, November 23). *Notiz über die CFT – Besprechung am 14. November 1962 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397.

⁵⁰⁵ Fahrner (1965, January 1). *Abschrift. Entwicklung der Vertriebsorganisation der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE SA zwischen dem 1.1.1963 und 1.1.1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁰⁶ Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, March 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Aktennotiz über Besprechungen bei Telefunken France am 29. 1. 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: "kleine Händler auf dem Lande".

⁵⁰⁷ In 1964, *Telefunken France* supplied 285 retailers on yearly contracts, 150 contract-free retailers, and 280 retailers buying through one of 13 wholesale-partners. It also provided its products to two department stores and five buying syndicates, *Telefunken France S.A.* (1965, October 1). *Entwicklung der Vertriebsorganisation (GR/GM) der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S. A. zwischen dem 1.1.1964 und dem 1.10.1965*. Enclosure of Fahrner to Nowack (1965, October 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

Despite its growth-trajectory, *Telefunken France*'s retail network lagged other industry players: *Schneider Radio-Télévision*, for instance, already worked with around 3.000 French distributors in 1962.⁵⁰⁸ While it is not surprising that a French company entrenched on the market had a more developed distribution network than a newcomer, *Telefunken France* was also behind its German competitor *Blaupunkt*, which claimed to have around 1.200 French retail partners in May 1963 –⁵⁰⁹ a figure *Telefunken France* would only reach in 1965. *Telefunken France*'s distribution network by the mid-1960s thus seems to have been respectable but not extraordinary, even for a company that had been present on the market in its current form for only a few years. It follows that not everyone at *Telefunken* was satisfied with how the distribution network of *Telefunken France* had developed up until this point. In September 1965, an employee of *Telefunken*'s department overseeing the company's investments criticized the distribution network of *Telefunken France* as being "too weak".⁵¹⁰

Indeed, based on the number of industry-relevant retail stores in France (likely somewhere between 18.000-25.000 during the 1960s) and the number of stores supplied by *Telefunken France* in October 1965 (1.376), it may be estimated that Telefunken-branded devices were only available in 5,5-7,6 % of stores carrying consumer electronics. While this needs to be understood as nothing more than an approximate figure,⁵¹¹ it shows that potential customers would have encountered the *Telefunken* brand in a sizable percentage of stores across France by the mid-1960s, as *Telefunken France* had made considerable efforts during the first half of the decade to forge direct and indirect connections to retailers. However, it also signified that *Telefunken* was still far from a commonplace brand in France by the mid-1960s, with its devices far from being available for purchase everywhere.

⁵⁰⁸ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 81.

⁵⁰⁹ Blaupunkt (1963, May 25). Advertisement. Tagline: Blaupunkt d'origine en France ! Blaupunkt la marque au point. *Paris Match*, 737, 124–125.

⁵¹⁰ Terhorst to mailing list (1965, September 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Halbjahresbericht der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2. In the original German: "zu schwach".

⁵¹¹ It should be noted that there are also strongly deviating assessments of *Telefunken France*'s distribution structure by contemporary actors: While the aforementioned employee of *Telefunken*'s department overseeing the company's investments claimed that *Telefunken France* supplied 602 out of what he reckoned to be a total of around 12.000 potential French retailers and wholesalers (disregarding the indirect connections *Telefunken France* had forged through wholesalers), the managing director of *Telefunken France* on the other hand asserted that the company supplied 1.100 stores in early 1965 out of around 4.000 to 5.000 retail stores specialized in radio and television in France (seemingly omitting all other possible distribution channels). Based on these figures available at *Telefunken*, the penetration degree of *Telefunken France*'s distribution structure in the mid-1960s would have been somewhere in the range of 5 % to a (certainly overexaggerated) 27,5 % – depending on who was asked, and which figures the calculation was based on. However, neither assessment seems in line with other available data (albeit for different reasons). See Terhorst to mailing list (1965, September 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Halbjahresbericht der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2; Seydlitz (1965, March 18). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Besprechung bei der Telefunken France am 29. Januar 1965 in Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

To maintain good relations with its growing network of retailer partners, it was necessary for *Telefunken France* to simultaneously set up regional support structures: between January 1964 and October 1965, *Telefunken France* raised its number of regional supply centers carrying stock from four to seven.⁵¹² This trend continued at least until 1967, when the company added another new supply center and expanded an existing one, both of which were not only responsible for distributing goods in its region but also for providing after-sales service (i.e. repairs).⁵¹³ In addition to regional supply centers, the company also expanded its network of representatives. By the end of 1963, *Telefunken France* had found representatives for the consumer electronics side of its business for all districts of metropolitan France.⁵¹⁴ However, even by January 1965, not all of these district representatives were actual sales branch offices of *Telefunken France*. Several districts were still under the responsibility of associated merchants acting on the company's behalf,⁵¹⁵ highlighting that the development of *Telefunken France's* distribution network was still an ongoing process by the mid-1960s.

The expansion of *Consten's* network followed a similar pattern, albeit there were differences concerning the execution. In 1962, *Consten* usually supplied its products directly to retailers, as was common in France. But the company also had a network of regional agents, which were responsible for acquiring new partners in retail, overseeing after-sales service, and holding a stock of products. For these services, these regional agents received a commission of 6 % from the sales in the region for which they were responsible.⁵¹⁶ To solidify its own regional presence, *Consten* opened six new branch offices ("succursales") between 1963 and 1966, each responsible for a region of France. Together with another office in Paris, one remaining independent regional agent in Nantes, and a sales representative in Clermont-Ferrand, *Consten's* nine regional offices covered all of metropolitan France by 1966.⁵¹⁷

While the source does not explicitly state it, it can be assumed that these new branch offices took over service, acquisition, and supply from the independent regional agents in their

⁵¹² Telefunken France S.A. (1965, October 1). Entwicklung der Vertriebsorganisation (GR/GM) der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S. A. zwischen dem 1.1.1964 und dem 1.10.1965. Enclosure of Fahrner to Nowack (1965, October 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵¹³ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, November 17). *Stellungnahme zur Schätzung 1967, zum Hauptplan 1968 und zum Mehrjahresplan bis 1970*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7954.

⁵¹⁴ Fahrner (1963, December 31). *Präambel zum Hauptplan 1964 der Telefunken France SA, Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵¹⁵ Seydlitz (1965, March 18). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Besprechung bei der Telefunken France am 29. Januar 1965 in Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2.

⁵¹⁶ Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1962, December 28). *Note concernant le contrat d'exclusivité Grundig – Consten – Affaire N° 00004*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 11.

⁵¹⁷ N.N. (undated). Implantation des succursales de la société Consten avec leur date d'ouverture. Enclosure 5 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888.

respective regions, especially given that remnants of the previous system remained in place for the time being in Nantes and Clermont-Ferrand. *Consten*, like *Telefunken France*, thus needed not only to find partners in retail, but also to develop a supporting regional network alongside it. Initially, both companies had relied on independent regional merchants/partners acting on their behalf – but only until they were able to establish their own regional presence. Between the early and mid-1960s, *Consten* and *Telefunken France* had made great strides in that regard, but neither had been able to completely detach themselves from needing to work with independent partners by this point.

Although *Consten* and *Telefunken France* would have been chiefly interested in retailers as a means to sell their devices, they were also the first point of contact for repairs and service: according to the warranty cards customers received with a purchase, after-sales service technically fell into the responsibility of the retailer that had sold the device. In practice, however, customer service was largely performed by the producing/importing company in France and Germany alike.⁵¹⁸ It was thus an integral part of *Consten*'s and *Telefunken France*'s responsibilities. Indeed, as *Grundig* argued in a letter to the European Commission, adequate customer service was a “*conditio sine qua non*” for a sales organization in this sector.⁵¹⁹ This notion of service being vital for consumer electronics companies looking to make headway in a new market is supported by the fact that, for its 1961 relaunch, *Telefunken France* was not only to hire salesmen, but also staff that would allow the company to perform repairs.⁵²⁰

It follows that a significant portion of all *Consten* employees were technicians. In 1962, 20 out of a total of 68 employees were technicians based in the company's headquarters, with another five being technical inspectors. These constantly travelled around the country,⁵²¹ regularly visiting retailers to conduct repair work there and instruct them about the technical aspects of new products. By April 1964, the company also employed technicians in its branch offices across France and had raised the number of its traveling technical inspectors to 18.⁵²² *Consten*

⁵¹⁸ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 10.

⁵¹⁹ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 22. On repairing consumer electronics and other consumer durables, see further Weber, H. (2021). Mending or Ending? Consumer Durables, Obsolescence and Practices of Reuse, Repair and Disposal in West Germany (1960s-1980s). In S. Krebs & H. Weber (Eds.), *The Persistence of Technology. Histories of Repair, Reuse and Disposal* (pp. 233–261). Transcript Verlag.

⁵²⁰ Henning (1961, April 4). *Protokoll über die Sitzung am 23. März 1961 in Hannover. Betr.: Situation C.F. TELEFUNKEN, Paris, und Electro-Union, Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, pp. 2–3.

⁵²¹ Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1962, December 28). *Note concernant le contrat d'exclusivité Grundig – Consten – Affaire N° 00004*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 12.

⁵²² Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 11.

thus made great efforts to offer support on a regional and local level in order to strengthen and consolidate its bonds with retailers.

Consten and *Telefunken France* not only had a market-appropriate product portfolio during the first half of the 1960s, but also an increasingly sophisticated distribution structure that ensured product availability in retail stores and post-purchase customer support. However, *Telefunken France* and *Consten* also needed to make their respective brand and its products broadly known to the French public. This was crucial. Distribution networks were not sufficient by themselves to capture market share. Indeed, according to *Grundig*, “[...] the French consumer also only buys a [...] brand once he has been made aware of it through corresponding advertising.”⁵²³ Advertising was thus another component – besides customer service – which *Grundig* deemed essential for a sales organization’s success.⁵²⁴

2.2.1.4 Advertising in a New Market: *Grundig* and *Consten*

In the eyes of *Grundig*, nationwide advertising was particularly necessary – “indispensable”⁵²⁵ even – to introduce a brand to consumers in a new market and subsequently help it retain any “good will”⁵²⁶ it earned. A 1962 advertisement by *Consten* in the popular illustrated weekly magazine *Paris Match* (circulation in 1960: ca. 1,5 million)⁵²⁷ highlights this belief in the necessity of making the *Grundig* brand name more familiar to French consumers in those early years of *Consten*’s expansion (see Figure 23). The ad’s tagline offered to show readers “what is behind Grundig” (“Ce qu’il y a derrière GRUNDIG”) with the text emphasizing the company’s immense size and its experience: it cited the company’s number of employees, its years in business, its position as a global market leader, and its know-how acquired on the German market. This positioning clearly aimed to alleviate any reservations by potential customers concerning a brand they had likely not encountered before. The ad even stated as such, offering “Grundig’s industrial strength as your best guarantee”. The focus was near-exclusively put on the *Grundig* brand, with the ad even highlighting that the range of products offered under the brand in France was “100 % importé”, and that customers would recognize a

⁵²³ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 15. In the original German: “[...] weil auch der französische Verbraucher eine [...] Marke erst kauft, wenn er durch entsprechende Werbung aufmerksam gemacht ist.”

⁵²⁴ *Id.*, p. 22.

⁵²⁵ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 5. In the original German: “Gerade die überregionale Werbung ist es aber, die für die Einführung einer Marke und für die Absatzförderung unerlässlich ist.”

⁵²⁶ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 14.

⁵²⁷ During the year 1960, *Paris Match* had an average circulation of 1.487.942 per weekly issue, Proscop (1962). *Guide Proscop France. Le marché français 1962*, p. V 105.

retailer carrying *Grundig* products by the shamrock featured in the *Grundig* logo. By contrast, *Consten* was only briefly named at the bottom of the ad.⁵²⁸

7. 942

Ce qu'il y a derrière GRUNDIG

Premier producteur allemand de télévision
Premier producteur mondial
de magnetophones et meubles musicaux

**La puissance industrielle
de GRUNDIG
voilà votre meilleure garantie !**

Depuis des années
la 2^e chaîne fonctionne en Allemagne :
GRUNDIG a acquis dans cette technique
une expérience inégalable
dont bénéficie naturellement
le nouveau 59T100 F (modèle ci-dessus)
dès à présent livrable sur le marché français.

Et grâce au Marché Commun
la prestigieuse gamme GRUNDIG
vous est offerte en France
à des prix "normaux".

A l'origine de cette vous reconnaître le dévoué GRUNDIG

GRUNDIG
100 % IMPORTÉ

10 usines
30.000 employés
15 ans de
succès magique

Représentation générale en FRANCE, Société **CONSTEN**, 89, avenue Marceau - COURBEVOIE (Seine) DEF. 16-17 et DEF. 62-62

110

Figure 23: Grundig (1962, April 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Ce qu'il y a derrière GRUNDIG. *Paris Match*, 681, 110.

It is not a coincidence that *Consten* used an introductory advertising strategy in 1962 even though the company had already been around for years at this point. Here, again, the trade liberalization needs to be understood as the seminal moment that fundamentally changed how present the *Grundig* brand was in France as the impartial advocate general established in his closing argument in the court case of *Grundig/Consten* against the European Commission: "It should not be forgotten that *Consten*'s expansion of revenue only occurred after the

⁵²⁸ Grundig (1962, April 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Ce qu'il y a derrière GRUNDIG. *Paris Match*, 681, 110. In the original French: "La puissance industrielle de GRUNDIG voilà votre meilleure garantie !".

liberalization of imports in 1961/62 and that, according to the information in the proceedings, intensive and costly advertising only began after this point in time.”⁵²⁹ The new trade regime thus also shaped *Consten*’s advertising strategy as well as its advertising spending. While the sources do not give a unanimous answer what percentage share of its revenue *Consten* exactly allocated to advertising,⁵³⁰ it is clear that its absolute advertising expenditure rose considerably alongside its revenue: between 1961 and the second half of 1963, *Consten*’s average monthly advertising spending increased threefold from 31.937 to 106.875 FF.⁵³¹ This would of course have translated into a growing *Grundig* brand presence.

As more *Grundig* devices flowed into the French market, and more retailers began carrying them, consumers would have thus also increasingly encountered *Grundig* advertising in the press, in cinemas, and on billboards, although it is unclear how exactly *Consten* allocated its advertising funds between different media.⁵³² But according to *Telefunken*, *Grundig/Consten* placed ads in at least six popular magazines in 1964 (among them *Paris Match* and *Vogue*), as well as in car magazines and trade journals – spending 340.000 FF on insertions in the first half of the year alone.⁵³³ This would have been more than half of *Consten*’s total advertising spending the year before. Even when accounting for a probable increase in expenditure, it is

⁵²⁹ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 52. In the original German: „Es darf nicht vergessen werden, dass sich eine Umsatzausweitung für Consten erst nach der Liberalisierung der Einfuhr in den Jahren 1961/62 ergab und dass nach den Angaben im Verfahren erst nach diesem Zeitpunkt eine intensive und kostspielige Werbung eingesetzt hat.“

⁵³⁰ The European Commission estimated *Consten*’s advertising expenditure as a percentage of total revenue to be only 1,9 % for the calendar year 1963, Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 17. *Grundig*’s lawyers on the other hand claimed it was as high as 6,6 % for the business year 1962/63. However, this was calculated using a very low figure for *Consten*’s revenue, it is not corroborated by any other source, and its provenance is not explained, thus putting its validity into question, Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 57. For a detailed discussion of this point of contention, see Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 51.

⁵³¹ In the 16 months between the 1st of January 1961 and the 30th of April 1962, the company spent 326.500 FF on general advertising and a further 184.500 FF on advertising at trade fairs. In the twelve months after, between the 1st of May 1962 and the 30th of April 1963, *Consten*’s total spending on general advertising more than doubled to 760.000 FF, and trade fair advertising spending rose to 250.000 FF. Then, in the eight months between the 1st of May 1963 and the end of the calendar year 1963, 698.000 FF were spent on general advertising, with another 157.000 FF invested in advertising on trade fairs, N.N. (undated). Ce que notre contrat nous a permis de réaliser et ce que sa suppression ne nous permettra pas de développer. Enclosure 2 of *Consten* (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l’exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 1. This data allowed to calculate the averages given above.

⁵³² *Consten* only stated that it advertised through these mass media channels, N.N. (undated). Ce que notre contrat nous a permis de réaliser et ce que sa suppression ne nous permettra pas de développer. Enclosure 2 of *Consten* (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l’exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 5.

⁵³³ Martenson (1965, January 18). *Insertionsaktivitäten deutscher Firmen in Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

reasonable to assume that magazine advertising was a key component of *Consten*'s overall advertising approach. This focus on magazine advertising made sense given *Grundig*'s conviction that nationwide advertising was essential to familiarize consumers with a brand.⁵³⁴

However, establishing familiarity through mass media advertising was not sufficient by itself to make a sale. Rather, it needed to be flanked by other advertising and sales measures.

Consten thus also promoted the *Grundig* brand and its products through other means. By early 1964, the company produced and distributed around 200.000 *Grundig* product brochures each month, installed *Grundig* neon signs at associated retailers – with “over 300” being already in place at the time –, and carried out a sales promotion measure in collaboration with retailers called the “Grundig Weeks” (“Semaines GRUNDIG”). This measure, which *Consten* claimed to be unique on the French market for electronic consumer goods, followed a distinct pattern: The shop window(s) and the decoration of the store of the retail partner were redone in preparation for the event with a focus on *Grundig* products, while the local public was informed of the upcoming “Grundig Weeks” through a combination of local advertising and personal invitations sent out to potentially interested customers. During the event itself, *Consten* personnel demonstrated *Grundig* devices and prize raffles were held at the store. Some time afterward, promotional material was sent out to visitors, which – as *Consten* euphemistically put it – should help them “concrétiser leur visite”, meaning that it should entice them to make a purchase.⁵³⁵

The “Grundig Weeks” show that *Consten* was acutely aware of the brand's position on the French market and oriented its advertising and sales promotion measures accordingly. Given that *Consten* had only begun to expand its distribution network from 1961 onward,⁵³⁶ it is likely that many of its retailer connections were not fully consolidated by this point. Widespread mass media advertising had also only started around 1961/62,⁵³⁷ which meant that many French consumers would not have been well-acquainted with the *Grundig* brand and its products. According to *Consten*, the measure's goal was thus to “intimately familiarize the public with products of GRUNDIG”.⁵³⁸ The “Grundig Weeks” provided effective advertising for the

⁵³⁴ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 5.

⁵³⁵ N.N. (undated). Ce que notre contrat nous a permis de réaliser et ce que sa suppression ne nous permettra pas de développer. Enclosure 2 of *Consten* (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l'exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 5.

⁵³⁶ Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888, p. 12.

⁵³⁷ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 52.

⁵³⁸ N.N. (undated). Ce que notre contrat nous a permis de réaliser et ce que sa suppression ne nous permettra pas de développer. Enclosure 2 of *Consten* (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l'exposé*

Grundig brand and its product portfolio at the point of sale while also helping to build and maintain cordial relations with retailers. The fact that *Consten* employed thirty “promovents” at the time may be understood in the same vein: These sales promoters travelled around France to stay with different retailers for a few days each in order to support them in their advertising efforts – which could mean orchestrating an event at the shop to promote sales, rework window decorations, or help with advertising in local media.⁵³⁹

Consten’s advertising approach in media and at the point of sale during the first half of the 1960s was shaped by the challenges associated with introducing a brand to retailers and consumers in a new market. The company’s advertising focused not on *Consten* itself but rather centered on adequately promoting the *Grundig* brand and its products in France – as was its contractual responsibility as *Grundig*’s import partner. It is unclear if and to what extent *Grundig* involved itself in the advertising of its independent French partner, and there is no evidence that *Grundig* gave any advertising subsidies to *Consten*. Rather, it seems as if it was *Consten*’s obligation alone to finance advertising for the *Grundig* brand.⁵⁴⁰ This is notable because it was decidedly not the case for *Telefunken France*. The French subsidiary not only received subsidies for its advertising from its German parent company but also saw various actors within *Telefunken* actively interfere with its advertising in France.

2.2.1.5 Advertising in a New Market: *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France*

Already before the establishment of *Telefunken*’s subsidiary *Telefunken France* in 1961, French consumers would have encountered advertising for consumer electronics under the *Telefunken* brand – for instance in January 1959, when a full-page advertisement for a *Telefunken* television set was inserted in *Paris Match*.⁵⁴¹ This ad had most probably been inserted by the independent company conducting advertising under the *Telefunken* brand⁵⁴² and commercializing *Telefunken*-branded devices in France at the time. Strikingly, the 1959 ad made prominent use of the *Telefunken* logo and referred to past achievements of *Telefunken* in the field of television

des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 5. In the original French: “Les « Semaines GRUNDIG » sont destinées à familiariser intimement le public avec les produits GRUNDIG.”

⁵³⁹ It seems likely that the “promovents” were responsible for the “Grundig Weeks”, but the sources draw no direct connection between the two, Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 11.

⁵⁴⁰ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 52.

⁵⁴¹ *Telefunken* (1959, January 24). Advertisement. Tagline: une technique de haute précision. *Paris Match*, 511, 7.

⁵⁴² Gross to Olufs (1959, January 12). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1635.

to promote a *Telefunken*-branded television set, which could not have been produced by *Telefunken*.⁵⁴³

Three years later, in 1962, *Telefunken France* would then also use *Paris Match* to advertise *Telefunken*-branded television sets as part of a larger ad series in the magazine.⁵⁴⁴ Consumers would have been unlikely to notice a difference given that *Telefunken* brand identifiers were present in 1959 and 1962 – seemingly demarcating both ads as belonging to the same entity – but the 1962 ad had been produced in completely different circumstances than its predecessor. Now, *Telefunken* products were advertised and commercialized by a direct subsidiary of *Telefunken* instead. Even the advertised *Telefunken*-branded television sets were sourced from another French company following the 1961 *Thomson* contract. The *Telefunken* brand had thus been present in France during the 1950s – but the early 1960s effectively saw a relaunch under new market conditions involving a completely different set of actors.

Similar to *Consten*, *Telefunken France* was expected to advertise the *Telefunken* brand name nationwide in France,⁵⁴⁵ and for *Telefunken France*, too, magazine advertisements were a crucial component of this strategy. But while *Consten* had introduced readers to the *Grundig* brand by giving them extensive information they should associate with *Grundig*, *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France* opted for a slightly different approach in 1962 to (re-)introduce the *Telefunken* brand and its product portfolio. In the weeks before Christmas, a series of full-page B/W *Telefunken* ads was placed across eight subsequent issues of *Paris Match*. These ads aimed to familiarize readers with *Telefunken*'s product line-up by highlighting a different product group each week while simultaneously underlining *Telefunken*'s characteristic as an international company offering the full range of consumer electronics: "Telefunken radios, transistors, record players, radiograms, televisions and tape recorders are sold all around the world."⁵⁴⁶ Emphasis was placed on presenting specific product groups and media devices, while

⁵⁴³ *Telefunken*'s French partner *Electro-Union* had produced *Telefunken*-branded television sets in the late 1950s, N.N. (undated). *Übersetzung eines Schreibens des französischen Finanz- und Handelsministeriums vom 10.1.1961 an Herrn Dr. Tomasi, Paris. Betr.: Deutsche Investition in Frankreich – COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE TELEFUNKEN*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397. Previously, in the mid-1950s, *Telefunken*-branded TV sets for the French market had been sourced from *Grammont*, G/V-H Export to Zickermann (1956, March 3). *Internal letter. Subject: Schreiben der Television Grammont vom 28.2.1956 an Herrn Dr. Ing. Heyne*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794.

⁵⁴⁴ *Telefunken* (1962, November 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Regardez bien, et vous en conviendrez : avec TELEFUNKEN quelle finesse d'image. *Paris Match*, 709, 43.

⁵⁴⁵ Fahrner to Olufs (1965, March 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Aufstockung unseres Werbeetats 1965*. Enclosure of Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, March 18). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁶ *Telefunken* (1962, October 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Les Transistors TELEFUNKEN...Quelle perfection! *Paris Match*, 706, 47. In the original French: "Radios, transistors, électrophones, meubles radio-phono, téléviseurs et magnétophones TELEFUNKEN se vendent dans le monde entier." This line was used across all eight ads, from the first one in issue 706 to the last one in issue 713, *Telefunken* (1962, December 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Pour tous vos travaux d'enregistrement, un magnétophone TELEFUNKEN, à votre mesure. *Paris Match*, 713, 116. It is unclear if *Telefunken*'s export department GRM/Ex had a part in designing or financing these advertisements. It certainly seems possible given their involvement in France in 1964 and the fact that they were

information on the brand was communicated on the side. Such a campaign in a widely read magazine such as *Paris Match* was not cheap: at the time, a single one-page B/W insertion in *Paris Match* cost 25.000 Francs,⁵⁴⁷ which put the insertion cost alone at about 200.000 FF (excluding potential discounts). Although this was a considerable expense, it was evidently deemed a worthwhile investment in the brand's future in France after its business had effectively been restarted the previous year.

Just like *Consten*, *Telefunken France* evidently did not confine itself to magazine advertising, although both companies allocated a significant share of their total advertising funds to print media: in 1964, 48 % of *Telefunken France*'s overall advertising expenditure was spent on advertising in print publications – 785.000 FF out of a total of 1.643.000 FF. Other advertising forms the company used included outdoor advertising (16 %), printed advertising matter (i.e. product brochures) (11 %), trade fairs and exhibitions (10 %), gifts or merchandise (4 %), and radio, film, and television advertising (4 %).⁵⁴⁸

In practice, this meant that the *Telefunken* brand was present in France through an illuminated advertising sign at the Place de l'Opéra in Paris,⁵⁴⁹ magazine advertising in *Paris Match*⁵⁵⁰ and *Salut les Copains*,⁵⁵¹ stands at the regional fairs of Nancy, Lyon, Bordeaux, or Strasbourg, advertising spots placed on the radio waves of the broadcaster *Europe n°1*, insertions in regional newspapers like *Le Progrès* (based in Lyon), or even in a theater's program.⁵⁵² *Telefunken France*'s advertising efforts of course also encompassed retailer collaboration, for instance in the case of a limited-time campaign in December 1964 for radiograms.⁵⁵³ To support their retail partners, *Telefunken France* printed product brochures,⁵⁵⁴ provided financial subsidies to

explicitly mentioned in the 1962 ad-campaign next to *Telefunken France* (which was still called *Compagnie Française Telefunken* at the time). For the 1964 involvement, see chapter 2.1.1.5.

⁵⁴⁷ Hultquist cites figures from the magazine *Vente et Publicité* for 1961 and 1964. In both years, *Paris Match* asked 25.000 FF for a full-page B/W ad, making it highly likely that it would have been the same price for 1962 and 1963 as well, Hultquist, 1996, p. 79, Footnote 59.

⁵⁴⁸ FM/Wb (1965, March 22). Kosten der Werbung. Hauptplan/Schätzung/Ist 1964/65 Fach-Bereich TELEFUNKEN FRANCE. Enclosure of Martenson & von Auw to Fahrner (1965, March 22). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁴⁹ Horlitz to Seydlitz (1963, May 13). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Kurzbericht über Aktivitäten*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

⁵⁵⁰ Telefunken (1964, October 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Même sens dessus dessous, il enregistre fidèlement. *Paris Match*, 809, 160.

⁵⁵¹ Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: N'importe où N'importe quand... *Salut les Copains*, 27, 118.

⁵⁵² Dubus (1964, December 17). Note à la DIRECTION GENERALE. Enclosure of Fahrner & Dubus to Seydlitz (1965, January 19). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Stellungnahme und Bemerkungen der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE zur beiliegenden Studie der Werbeagentur PUBLI-SYNTAX, Paris, unsere Werbeaktionen 1964 und Vorschau 1965 betreffend*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁵³ Fahrner & Dubus to Seydlitz (1964, November 27). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁵⁴ Telefunken France (1964, September). *Brochure "Telefunken"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2020.

retailer advertising on the local level,⁵⁵⁵ supplied them with illuminated signs,⁵⁵⁶ and produced an advertising film (in early 1965), which they planned to give to associated retailers so they could show it in their local cinemas.⁵⁵⁷ It further seems likely that *Telefunken France*'s advertising gifts and merchandise found their way to the points of sale.

In 1964/65, French consumers had the chance to encounter the *Telefunken* brand in a variety of public spaces, across the spectrum of the media ensemble, and at their local retailer. Print advertising – though important and a cornerstone of *Telefunken France*'s advertising budget – was but one element of a larger effort, as the company promoted *Telefunken* devices through national and locally effective measures alike. However, *Telefunken*'s brand presence on the French market was not *Telefunken France*'s achievement alone. Its parent company was heavily involved on several levels – even the ad published in *Paris Match* in 1964 had not been inserted and financed by *Telefunken France* but rather by the consumer electronics export department *GRM/Ex*.⁵⁵⁸ Actors from *Telefunken* not only directly interfered in the brand's French presence, but, in addition, also involved themselves in *Telefunken France*'s advertising. This applied particularly to *FM*.

Telefunken's marketing department *FM* had been founded in late 1961 – a few months after *Telefunken France*. After initially being preoccupied with advertising on the German domestic market, *FM* then increasingly also turned its attention to *Telefunken*'s foreign brand presence. This encompassed the advertising of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics export department *GRM/Ex* and the internationalization of the new *Telefunken* advertising style –⁵⁵⁹ and from 1963/64 onward, also *Telefunken France*'s advertising approach and budget: as early as spring 1963, the head of *FM/Wb*, the advertising division of *Telefunken*'s marketing department, had met with his colleague responsible for the advertising of *Telefunken France* for “thorough conceptional discussions on advertising”.⁵⁶⁰ At later meetings, *Telefunken France* and *FM*

⁵⁵⁵ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2. *Telefunken France* supported retailers with advertising funding up to a level of two percent of their revenue, Dubus (undated). *Aufteilung des Gesamtbudgets 1965 in Höhe von F 1.015.000*. Enclosure 1 of *Telefunken France* (1965, March 26). *Notiz an die Generaldirektion. Aufteilung des Werbeetat 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁵⁶ Dubus (1964, December 17). *État du MATERIEL LUMINEUX distribué depuis le 1er JANVIER 1964*. Enclosure of Fahrner & Dubus to Seydlitz (1965, January 19). *Internal letter. Subject: Stellungnahme und Bemerkungen der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE zur beiliegenden Studie der Werbeagentur PUBLI-SYNTEX, Paris, unsere Werbeaktionen 1964 und Vorschau 1965 betreffend*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁵⁷ Fahrner & Dubus to Seydlitz (1965, January 20). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁵⁸ *GRM/Ex* had inserted this ad as part of a larger effort to internationally introduce the new company advertising style developed by *Telefunken*'s marketing department *FM*, see chapter 2.1.1.6.

⁵⁵⁹ See chapters 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5, and 2.1.1.6.

⁵⁶⁰ Horlitz to Seydlitz (1963, May 13). *Internal letter. Subject: Kurzbericht über Aktivitäten*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973. In the original German: “eingehende konzeptionelle Werbebesprechungen”.

would also, for instance, discuss the uniform *Telefunken* style conceptualized by *FM*,⁵⁶¹ which *Telefunken France* would subsequently adopt.⁵⁶²

Telefunken France became subject to more scrutiny and direct involvement than most other subsidiaries and import partners of *Telefunken* during the mid-1960s. Only *Telefunken Ibérica* seems to have been monitored similarly close. The French and Spanish markets were apparently deemed to be of exalted importance among the foreign markets on which *Telefunken* was present – at least in the eyes of the marketing department. Multiple measures aimed to increase and systematize the transnational flow of information between *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France* give testimony of this.

In April 1964, *FM* aimed to better inform *Telefunken France* and *Telefunken Ibérica* on *Telefunken*'s stances on advertising by including them in a mailing list for communications on advertising.⁵⁶³ And in April 1965, only those two, together with *Telefunken do Brasil*, were asked to provide *FM* with prospectuses of them and their competitors –⁵⁶⁴ even though by 1964, the company had representatives in well above a hundred countries.⁵⁶⁵ *Telefunken Ibérica* and *Telefunken France* seem to have also been singled out when it came to getting a better grasp of abroad advertising expenditure. In January 1963, *FM* had noted that “FM/Wb should in fact know via the export departments which of our representatives have advertised how, where and to what extent, or what they have spent these advertising subsidies on.”⁵⁶⁶ Accordingly, *FM/Wb* became involved in controlling the advertising spending of *Telefunken Ibérica* and *Telefunken France* from 1964 and 1963 onward respectively,⁵⁶⁷ and beginning in 1965, both were expected to report their advertising expenditure using the same standardized form as *Telefunken*'s domestic product departments.⁵⁶⁸

The transnational flow of information between *FM* and *Telefunken France* notably also came to encompass market research. In the early days of the French market expansion, a contracted

⁵⁶¹ Fahrner (1965, January 27). *Besuchsprogramm und Besprechungspunkte für die Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁶² See chapter 2.1.1.6.

⁵⁶³ Seydlitz to Horlitz (1964, April 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

⁵⁶⁴ Horlitz & John to Telefunken do Brasil, Telefunken Ibérica & Telefunken France (1965, April 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

⁵⁶⁵ Zickermann & Schaefer (1964, September 28). *Protokoll über die Exportbesprechung am 23. September 1964 um 12.30 Uhr in Frankfurt/M.* DTMB/AEG, GS 2031, p. 2.

⁵⁶⁶ Seydlitz to Horlitz (1963, January 7). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “FM/Wb müßte eigentlich über die Exportabteilungen wissen, welche unserer Vertretungen wie, wo und in welchem Ausmaß inseriert bzw. wofür sie diese Werbezuschüsse ausgegeben haben.” For this data, see von Auw to Seydlitz (1963, March 7). *Internal letter. Subject: Ihre Anfrage nach Art und Höhe von Werbezuschüssen der Exportwerbeabteilungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

⁵⁶⁷ Martenson to Seydlitz (1965, January 20). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbekosten in Prozent vom Umsatz*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁶⁸ Seydlitz (1965, February 12). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Kennzahlen Werbeausgaben Tfk France und Ibérica*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

freelancer had informed *Telefunken* about the French market. From the 1st of April 1960 onward, he had provided the company with quarterly reports on the sales of consumer electronics products by the French industry, on import and export of those products, on the development of their prices, and on market shares, earning 250 DM per report.⁵⁶⁹ However, in December 1963, it was decided to terminate this contract at the end of the next quarter, as such data could now be obtained from *Telefunken France*.⁵⁷⁰ In the following years, the collaboration between *FM* and *Telefunken France* regarding market research was expanded. This, for instance, entailed *FM* giving advice on how to best construct comparative statistics while *Telefunken France* provided the figures,⁵⁷¹ or *Telefunken France* providing input on market research studies on the French market produced by *FM*.⁵⁷²

Telefunken France was hence not fully independent in how it approached advertising (and market research) on the French market in the mid-1960s. *Telefunken France* was not only expected to exchange pertinent information with *Telefunken*, but *FM* also became involved in controlling the subsidiary's advertising spending. This direct involvement becomes more understandable when considering that *Telefunken France*'s advertising budget was partially provided by departments of its German parent company.

Telefunken France's comparatively high advertising budget of 1.643.000 FF in 1964 put the company in the same order of magnitude as *Consten* regarding advertising spending, which meant that *Telefunken France* spent more on advertising than *Consten* when expressed as a percentage of its revenue – 4 % that year, given its revenue of around 41 million FF. However, *Telefunken* had provided close to 15 % (244.000 FF) of *Telefunken France*'s overall advertising budget. Three different departments, namely the export department of *Telefunken*'s business unit for electronic components (*B/Ex*), the consumer electronics export department *GRM/Ex*, and the marketing department *FM* had respectively given 30.000 FF, 153.000 FF, and 61.000 FF in advertising subsidies. This was a considerable increase compared to 1963, when *Telefunken* had provided *Telefunken France* with 165.000 FF in advertising subsidies.⁵⁷³ These

⁵⁶⁹ Joachim Schaufuss & Telefunken (undated). Vertrag zwischen TELEFUNKEN G.m.b.H. und Assessor Joachim Schaufuss. Enclosure of Cofalka to von Lenthe (1963, December 20). *Internal letter. Subject: Vertrag mit Herrn J. Schaufuss*, DTMB/AEG, GS 2794.

⁵⁷⁰ Cofalka to von Lenthe (1963, December 20). *Internal letter. Subject: Vertrag mit Herrn J. Schaufuss*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2794.

⁵⁷¹ Weblus to Fahrner (1965, December 8). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. See also Weblus to Seydlitz (1965, July 16). *Internal letter. Subject: SCART – Statistik*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁷² Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, March 31). *Internal letter. Subject: Marktstudie vom 15.12.1964 über die voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Fernsehgeräteabsatzes in Frankreich bis zum Jahre 1970*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁷³ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In a later table on the same topic, the figure of total advertising spending of *Telefunken France* in 1964 was very slightly adjusted down to 1.621.000 FF, which equaled 1.313.000 DM, FM/Wb (1965, March 22). *Kosten der Werbung. Hauptplan/Schätzung/Ist 1964/65 Fach-Bereich TELEFUNKEN FRANCE*. Enclosure of Martenson & von Auw

figures underline the relative importance of the French subsidiary; France was *Telefunken*'s second most important export market for consumer electronics (by revenue) in 1963.⁵⁷⁴ *GRM/Ex*'s plan for the business year 1963/64 foresaw significantly less subsidies for the company's other partners abroad.⁵⁷⁵

The money *Telefunken France* received from *Telefunken* was not necessarily at its free disposal. Rather, it seems to have been earmarked for specific advertising measures or reserved for certain devices only in line with department goals and responsibilities. *GRM/Ex*, for example, stipulated in 1965 that funding they provided for product-related advertising measures could not be used by *Telefunken France* to advertise the television sets supplied by Thomson "[...], as the advertising budget available to us is intended exclusively for sales of the devices supplied by us."⁵⁷⁶

Advertising support for *Telefunken France* would come in non-monetary forms as well: *Telefunken* also seconded personnel for French trade fairs, for instance.⁵⁷⁷ *Telefunken France*'s advertising material, too, was partially imported from Germany and partially produced in France – a split befitting the partially imported and partially French-produced consumer electronics sold by *Telefunken France*. German product departments would, for instance, supply *Telefunken France* with templates to use in its advertising.⁵⁷⁸ Advertising gifts adorned with the *Telefunken* logotype were also produced centrally and then sold to the partners abroad – this would have presumably also applied to the French subsidiary.⁵⁷⁹ *Telefunken France*

to Fahrner (1965, March 22). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. Several other estimates of *Telefunken France*'s 1964 advertising expenditure can be found in DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. These sometimes differ by a significant amount. Credibility was given to the figures cited here as they were the latest ones available.

⁵⁷⁴ Telefunken Bereich Marketing (1964). *Unterlagen für die Exportbesprechung 1964. Band 1. B. Kommentar zur Exportsituation von Telefunken und der deutschen Industrie*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2503, p. 18.

⁵⁷⁵ Out of the ten partners listed in the source, Sweden received the highest amount of support worth 65.000 DM. Others, like Greece (15.000 DM) or Hong Kong (22.000 DM), received significantly less. Even accounting for the lower evaluation of the French Franc relative to the Deutsche Mark, there was thus a gulf between those partners and *Telefunken France* when it came to subsidies, GRM/Ex (1963, February 27). *Geplante Werbezuschüsse von GRM/Ex-H für 1963/64*. Enclosure of von Auw to Seydlitz (1963, March 7). *Internal letter. Subject: Ihre Anfrage nach Art und Höhe von Werbezuschüssen der Exportwerbeabteilungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

⁵⁷⁶ Olufs & Brockmann to Fahrner (1965, March 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Aufstockung Ihres Werbeetats 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: "[...], da das uns zur Verfügung stehende Werbebudget ausschliesslich für den Absatz der von uns gelieferten Geräte bestimmt ist." This is corroborated by *Telefunken France*'s advertising budget for 1967. It foresaw 460.000 FF worth of subsidies from *GRM/Ex*, *FM/Wb*, and the *BRH/Ex*, which were all earmarked for specific measures. *BRH/Ex*, for instance, only financed 17.000 FF worth of insertions in trade magazines, which made sense given that the department would have supplied *Telefunken France* with electronic components that were only of interest to professional customers, Terhorst & Naundorf (1966, December 12). *Protokoll über die Planbesprechung TELEFUNKEN FRANCE am 28.11.1966 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2699, p. 5.

⁵⁷⁷ Olufs & Brockmann to Fahrner (1965, March 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Aufstockung Ihres Werbeetats 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁷⁸ Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 4.

⁵⁷⁹ von Dellingshausen & Mätze to Seydlitz (1967, May 30). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbegeschenke, Eil-Anfrage*, DTMB/AEG, GS 1949.

would on the other hand, for instance, collaborate with its advertising agency *Publi-Syntex* and a filmmaker to autonomously produce an advertising film.⁵⁸⁰ This split regarding the production of material used in advertising could even concern the same type of advertising: in 1964, parts of the printed advertising matter – i.e. catalogs – used in France were printed by *Telefunken* in Germany and bought by *Telefunken France*,⁵⁸¹ while other catalogs were printed in France instead.⁵⁸² And unlike catalogs, other printed advertising material could seemingly be supplied to *Telefunken France* free of charge.⁵⁸³

Although *Grundig* seems to not have financially supported *Consten*'s advertising, *Telefunken* was notably not the only German consumer electronics company to give advertising subsidies and provide material to its French subsidiary or partner: *Loewe*'s sales abroad division, for instance, similarly planned to spend close to 50.000 DM on trade fairs and insertions in France in 1967 – and at least a part of the advertising gifts and prospectuses it financed for its partners abroad would certainly have been destined for France as well.⁵⁸⁴ There was thus no uniform approach among German consumer electronics companies concerning the financial and material support for advertising on the French market. But at least in the case of *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France*, the advertising material, budget, and advertising approach used for the

⁵⁸⁰ Fahrner & Dubus to Seydlitz (1965, January 20). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁸¹ N.N. (undated). Kataloge. Enclosure 5 of *Telefunken France* (1965, March 26). *Notiz an die Generaldirektion. Aufteilung des Werbeetat 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁸² *Telefunken France* (1964, September). *Brochure "Telefunken"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2020.

⁵⁸³ Fahrner (1965, January 31). *Niederschrift der anlässlich des Besuchs der Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke am 28. und 29. 1. 1965 in Paris mit Telefunken France besprochenen Punkte (Werbeaktion der Telefunken France im Jahre 1965 – Kostenaufwand)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2. To combat this lack of clarity as outlined for *Telefunken France* and to improve coordination, FM developed a consistent scheme outlining who would pay for what advertising service/material between FM/Wb, GRM/Ex, and the respective foreign partner, N.N. (1966, August 29). *Entwurf. Betr.: Kosten der Werbung. Werbezuschüsse und -Mittel an Europäische TELEFUNKEN-Gesellschaften (Beteiligungen) und Vertriebsgesellschaften (z.T. fremd) bzw. Vertretungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, p. 2. This proposal was based on the model of the AEG, Prinzing & Zickler to mailing list (1966, July 25). *HM/HK-Rundschreiben XVI/5/66. Zuordnung der durch die Bereitstellung von Werbemitteln an die AEG-Vertretungen (einschl. der Beteiligungsgesellschaften) im europäischen Ausland entstehenden Kosten*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. Although it is unclear if *Telefunken*'s draft was implemented, it seems likely that the AEG's enforced scheme would have been adopted after the merger.

⁵⁸⁴ The sales abroad division planned to finance more than half a million consumer electronics prospectuses in total, as well as many different *Loewe*-branded advertising gifts: it was not only planned to distribute posters and stand-up displays, but also 10.000 *Loewe*-branded hand fans, 3.000 ballpoint pens, and 200 kaleidoscopes, *Loewe Opta GmbH Verkauf Ausland* (1967, January 30). *Entwurf eines Werbebudgets 1967 der Abteilung Verkauf Ausland*. Enclosure of Fabry to Griesmeier, von Brockdorff (1967, January 30). *Internal letter without subject*. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972. It is not quite clear how active *Loewe* was in France during the 1960s. In 1967, *Loewe* had a French distribution partner – which had been around for several years – called *Loewe Radio France*. However, this company was seemingly not very active, which is why *Loewe*'s sales and distribution manager planned to supplant it with a newly formed sales and distribution subsidiary to rejuvenate the company's business in France, von Brockdorff, (1968, June 18). *Vertriebsbericht der Loewe Opta GmbH per 31.5.1968*. LOA 21.27 Brockdorff, p. 3. Initially, von Brockdorff had wanted to reactivate the *Loewe Radio France*, von Brockdorff (1967, June 27). *Vertriebsbericht Januar bis Mai 1967*. LOA 21.27 Brockdorff, p. 2. This plan was seemingly abandoned in favor of forming a new company.

Telefunken brand and *Telefunken* devices in France during the early to mid-1960s were clearly the result of a joint transnational effort between subsidiary and parent company.

2.2.1.6 Misaligned Goals. The Advertising of *Telefunken France* in 1965

Telefunken and *Telefunken France* cooperated on multiple levels in the first half of the 1960s to introduce the *Telefunken* brand to the French market. But the assessments, convictions, and objectives of *Telefunken* and its French subsidiary, as well as of *Telefunken*'s different departments working with *Telefunken France* were not always congruent with each other. Such misalignment could lead to tensions and disagreements between the actors involved. The conflict that arose around *Telefunken France*'s 1965 advertising budget is especially interesting in that regard, as the sources allow for a detailed reconstruction of events, revealing the difficulty of working on a transnational scale with the involvement of multiple stakeholders with overlapping authorities.

The origin of the dispute lay in the heavily cut advertising budget *Telefunken France* initially proposed for 1965: the budget *Telefunken France* submitted to *FM* foresaw curtailing spending on print insertions by 85 % compared to the preliminary 1964 advertising expenditure – even though its revenue was projected to grow. Although advertising spending was to sink overall, the proposed cuts affected different media unequally: outdoor advertising spending for example was even planned to rise slightly.⁵⁸⁵ As Horst Horlitz, the head of *FM/Wb*, pointed out in his commentary of the proposal in early January 1965, this budget would only allow for very few ads in magazines with a national reach.⁵⁸⁶ *Telefunken France*'s proposal thus did not find the approval of *FM*'s head Seydlitz. He favored “active advertisement” – meaning insertions – over more “passive” advertising forms like illuminated outdoor signs, which he saw as auxiliary forms of advertising incapable of developing a market on their own.⁵⁸⁷

This disagreement over *Telefunken France*'s advertising budget allocation – and thus in effect its advertising direction – prompted Seydlitz, Horlitz, and the head of the consumer electronics advertising division *G/Wb*, Hans Franzke, to make it the focus of their meeting with *Telefunken France*'s leadership in Paris at the end of January 1965.⁵⁸⁸ The meeting aimed to revise the plan

⁵⁸⁵ Martenson & von Auw (1965, January 4). *Kosten der Werbung Hauptplan 1964 u. 1965 Fach-Bereich TELEFUNKEN FRANCE*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. This plan would receive updates for 1964 and 1965 alike and should not be taken at face value. This version is only referenced to establish what information the people responsible at *Telefunken* based their assessments and actions on at this particular moment.

⁵⁸⁶ *Telefunken France* only budgeted 71.000 DM for insertions – although one half-page advertisement in *Paris Match* already cost as much as 12.150 DM, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, January 7). *Internal letter. Subject: “Kosten der Werbung” Hauptplan 1965 Telefunken France*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁸⁷ *FM* had already urged *Telefunken France* to more strongly focus on active advertising in late 1964, Seydlitz (1965, January 19). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Telefunken France – Leuchtwerbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁸⁸ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

to address *FM*'s concern over *Telefunken France*'s insufficient print advertising spending given that its revenue was projected to rise.⁵⁸⁹ However, it did not produce a consensus due to diametrically opposed positions.

As the majority of *Telefunken France*'s 1965 advertising budget had already been allocated to financial support for local retailers, catalogs, trade press advertising, outdoor advertising, and trade fairs,⁵⁹⁰ only 250.000 FF could still be spent freely. All meeting participants deemed this sum basically insufficient for effective regional or national insertion. The German delegation maintained that at least a modest nationwide magazine advertising campaign should be conducted nonetheless, which would need to be planned well in advance to make the most of the little funding available. *Telefunken France* on the other hand preferred to reserve the funds to fund "killer prices" ("Kampfpreise") if necessary, using them for advertising only if market conditions allowed. In addition, *Telefunken France* wanted this decision to be taken spontaneously in autumn,⁵⁹¹ when its new TV sets would launch on the French market.⁵⁹²

During the meeting in January 1965, it had also been considered to simply raise the spending on print advertising to allow for a decently sized advertising campaign in *Paris Match*, *Jours de France* and *Télé-7-jours*. However, it remained unclear where the necessary additional funds would come from, as neither *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics department nor *FM* were willing to provide additional subsidies at this point. The decision how to proceed was then passed along to *Telefunken*'s board,⁵⁹³ which ultimately decided that *Telefunken France* needed

⁵⁸⁹ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, January 19). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹⁰ New figures on *Telefunken France*'s advertising spending were established during the meeting: *Telefunken France* would allocate 200.000 FF in 1965 to support the advertising of local retailers, and another 700.000 FF on all other forms of advertising, Fahrner (1965, January 31). *Niederschrift der anlässlich des Besuchs der Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke am 28. und 29. 1. 1965 in Paris mit Telefunken France besprochenen Punkte (Werbeaktion der Telefunken France im Jahre 1965 – Kostenaufwand)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 1. 450.000 FF out of the remaining 700.000 FF would then be spent on catalogs, trade press advertising, outdoor advertising, and trade fairs, Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 3. This, for instance, encompassed spending on a new general product catalog available in autumn 1965 (120.000 copies costing 90.000 FF) or on advertising in the Paris metro in December 1965 worth 32.000 FF, Dubus (1964, December 18). *Projet de repartition budget publicité 1965*. Enclosure of Fahrner & Dubus to Seydlitz (1965, January 19). *Internal letter. Subject: Stellungnahme und Bemerkungen der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE zur beiliegenden Studie der Werbeagentur PUBLI-SYNTEX, Paris, unsere Werbeaktionen 1964 und Vorschau 1965 betreffend*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹¹ Fahrner (1965, January 31). *Niederschrift der anlässlich des Besuchs der Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke am 28. und 29. 1. 1965 in Paris mit Telefunken France besprochenen Punkte (Werbeaktion der Telefunken France im Jahre 1965 – Kostenaufwand)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. See also the six-page letter by Seydlitz in which he rectified several points he deemed to be incorrect in the original meeting minutes, Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹² Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, April 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹³ The board had initially been asked to determine if *Telefunken France* would be allowed to reduce its planned return for 1965 to increase ad-expenditure, Fahrner (1965, January 31). *Niederschrift der anlässlich des Besuchs der Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke am 28. und 29. 1. 1965 in Paris mit Telefunken France besprochenen Punkte (Werbeaktion der Telefunken France im Jahre 1965 – Kostenaufwand)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964; Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

to curtail its spending in other areas to free up additional funds for nationwide advertising. This elicited an outspoken response by *Telefunken France* in a letter to Seydlitz:

“However, it is completely out of the question and unreasonable for us to bear the full costs of effective and sufficient brand advertising alone. We are no better off financially than the German branch offices. No one in Germany will ask a branch office to bear advertising costs at a national or even regional level. Nevertheless, this year we are again planning to have an advertising budget (including subsidies for retailers) of over 1 million francs. This is, as recognized, by far not enough to be able to effectively advertise Telefunken on a national level, but even 200,000 or 300,000 F more would not make this possible. [...]. The decision of the board turned out as we had expected. It confirms the company's tendency not to support foreign subsidiaries in carrying out large-scale name advertising. I have no comment to make on this.”⁵⁹⁴

Telefunken France repeated this argumentation of being unfairly burdened with costs and expectations in a separate letter sent in mid-March 1965 to the head of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics export division *GRM/Ex*, William Olufs, whom *Telefunken France* petitioned for assistance.⁵⁹⁵ In response, *GRM/Ex* provided an additional 100.000 DM in advertising funding, under the condition that *Telefunken France* matched this sum and used this additional budget to advertise and promote only those devices *Telefunken France* purchased from *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics department.⁵⁹⁶ This additional funding not only saved *Telefunken France* from having to cut its costs anywhere near as drastically as the board had demanded but also seemingly helped to finally bring a breakthrough between *FM* and *Telefunken France* on the 8-9th of April – a quarter into the year.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁴ Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, March 18). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “Dass wir jedoch allein die vollen Kosten einer wirkungsvollen und ausreichenden Markenwerbung tragen können, ist vollkommen ausgeschlossen und nicht zumutbar. Wir liegen kalkulatorisch nicht besser als die deutschen Geschäftsstellen. Niemand wird in Deutschland von einer GS verlangen, sie solle Werbekosten auf nationaler oder selbst nur regionaler Ebene tragen. Trotzdem sehen wir dieses Jahr wieder einen Werbeetat (Händlerzuschüsse inbegriffen) von über einer Million F vor. Dies ist, wie anerkannt, bei weitem ungenügend, um eine Telefunken-Werbung auf nationaler Ebene wirkungsvoll machen zu können, aber auch 200.000 oder 300.000 F mehr würden eine solche nicht ermöglichen. [...]. Die Entscheidung des Verwaltungsrats fiel, wie wir sie erwartet hatten, aus. Sie bestätigt die Firmentendenz, ausländische Filialen nicht bei der Durchführung von Namenswerbung grösseren Stils zu unterstützen. Ich habe hierzu keine Stellung zu nehmen.” Fahrner's claim that *Telefunken France* would spend more than a million FF included the 900.000 FF detailed in a previous footnote as well as another 115.000 FF worth of advertising material which had been purchased in 1964 and was to be used in 1965. This technically brought the total spending for 1965 to 1.015.000 FF, Fahrner (1965, January 31). *Niederschrift der anlässlich des Besuchs der Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke am 28. und 29. 1. 1965 in Paris mit Telefunken France besprochenen Punkte (Werbeaktion der Telefunken France im Jahre 1965 – Kostenaufwand)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the later calculation of advertising costs by *FM*, these 115.000 FF were again attributed to 1964, Martenson & von Auw to Fahrner (1965, March 22). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹⁵ *Telefunken France* had not directly asked Olufs for funds but rather inquired if he could lower the company's purchasing prices to help it cut costs in order to reach the 200.000 FF necessitated by the board, Fahrner to Olufs (1965, March 18). *Internal letter*. Subject: Aufstockung unseres Werbeetats 1965. Enclosure of Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, March 18). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹⁶ Olufs & Brockmann to Fahrner (1965, March 29). *Internal letter*. Subject: Aufstockung Ihres Werbeetats 1965. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹⁷ The meeting involved Seydlitz, *FM/Wb*'s Horst Horlitz, and Fritz Fahrner, the managing director of *Telefunken France*, Horlitz (1965, April 20). *Ergebnisbericht über die Besprechung bei Telefunken France (8. und 9.4.1965)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

At this meeting in April, it was decided that *Telefunken France* would conduct a nationwide advertising campaign in *Paris Match*, *Jours de France*, and *Télé-7-jours* – like *FM* had suggested back in January. The needs of *Telefunken France* and *GRM/Ex* were taken into account insofar possible: the campaign would run from mid-September to the second week of December, thus from autumn onward. And it would focus on television sets, with eight out of 13 advertisements per magazine being dedicated to this product group. This was in line with *Telefunken France*’s previously stated intents. Due to *GRM/Ex*’s provision that their funding could only go toward their products, the campaign could not focus entirely on television sets, however: the rest of the ads would need to center on radios or tape recorders to match the share of funding received from *GRM/Ex* in line with the number of ads allocated to their products. Following this meeting, *Telefunken France*’s ad agency immediately began designing advertisements in accordance with *FM*’s *Telefunken* style.⁵⁹⁸

FM and *FM/Wb*, who had a mandate by the board for all of *Telefunken*’s advertising efforts,⁵⁹⁹ had gotten their will: *Telefunken France* would conduct a national advertising campaign in print magazines. The marketing department had also asserted its role as *Telefunken*’s highest advertising authority in another way during this meeting. Based on *FM*’s conviction that *Telefunken France*’s advertising-related overhead – meaning fixed spending on outdoor advertising or trade fairs – was too high, it required *Telefunken France* to terminate ongoing contracts for outdoor advertising to have a greater sum available for “active” forms of advertising in 1966. This would allow the company to increasingly focus on product-related insertions in widely circulating magazines to create a continuous, nationwide presence. In addition, the subsidiary would from now be obliged to consult *FM/Wb* before closing any contracts running longer than a year.⁶⁰⁰

After the meeting in April 1965 and subsequent approval of the campaign’s timeframe by the head of *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics business unit *G*, *FM/Wb*’s Horst Horlitz met again with representatives of *Telefunken France* and their agency *Publi-Syntex* in June. This meeting focused on finalizing the media selection as well as on refining the advertising layout, design

⁵⁹⁸ *Telefunken France* was foreseen to spend 200.000 FF of its still freely available advertising funds on this campaign, as well as 28.000 FF it had saved on other advertising measures and *GRM/Ex*’s 100.000 DM. It was planned to insert 39 half-paged ads in total across the three magazines, Horlitz (1965, April 20). *Ergebnisbericht über die Besprechung bei Telefunken France* (8. und 9.4.1965). DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. Unlike in the initial statement of intent by Olufs and this report by Horlitz, the 100.000 DM in funds provided by *GRM/Ex* were later on given as 100.000 FF instead, which would have made a certain difference due to the lower valuation of the French Franc compared to the Deutsche Mark. The sources provide no explanation for this. For one such later valuation in francs, see for example Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, June 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbebesprechung bei Telefunken France am 4. Juni 1965 Ergebnisnotiz*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁵⁹⁹ Seydlitz to Olufs (1962, July 9). *Internal letter. Subject: Auslandswerbung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

⁶⁰⁰ Horlitz (1965, April 20). *Ergebnisbericht über die Besprechung bei Telefunken France* (8. und 9.4.1965). DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

and argumentation. Some last adjustments were made during this meeting, and *FM* even provided another 35.000 DM for brand advertising in the same magazines “[t]o accelerate the introduction to the French market in the interests of *Telefunken* as a whole, [...]” *Publi-Syntex* was then supposed to slightly rework the designs based on the feedback, send them again to Horlitz for a last approval, and subsequently book the insertions by the end of June. According to Horlitz, this campaign would ensure a nationwide presence for *Telefunken* devices and the brand during the industry’s most important sales period.⁶⁰¹

All these meetings, agreements, efforts, and adjustments outlined above came to naught, however. The campaign did not take place. Not a single *Telefunken* ad was published in *Paris Match* in the given timeframe,⁶⁰² and it stands to reason that this was also the case for the other magazines. This was due to an intervention by William Olufs, the head of *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics export division *GRM/Ex*, who had provided the additional funds that had enabled the campaign in the first place. Shortly before Horlitz’s trip to Paris, Olufs and *Telefunken France*’s managing director Fahrner had unilaterally decided to allocate the additional funding provided by *GRM/Ex* to a “summer campaign” because they both believed that the planned nationwide campaign was too limited in scope and thus “could not have any impact”. Fahrner seems to have disclosed this to Horlitz only in the concluding discussion of his visit, presenting him with a *fait accompli*: *GRM/Ex*’s funds had already been allocated, which effectively rendered the long-planned nationwide advertising campaign impossible. Fahrner then proposed to Horlitz that they might conduct a regional advertising campaign with the remaining funds –⁶⁰³ a proposal *Telefunken France* had already submitted to *FM* in preparation for the meeting in April.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰¹ It was planned to add the news magazine *L’Express* as a fourth advertising medium, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, June 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbebesprechung bei Telefunken France am 4. Juni 1965 Ergebnisnotiz.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “Um die Markteinführung im Sinne von Gesamt-Telefunken in Frankreich zu beschleunigen, [...]”

⁶⁰² All issues of *Paris Match* published in 1965 were consulted.

⁶⁰³ This regional campaign would have cost around 200.000 FF, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, June 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbebesprechung bei Telefunken France am 4. Juni 1965 Ergebnisnotiz.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “keine Wirkung haben könne”.

⁶⁰⁴ The meeting in April had been preceded by *Telefunken France* submitting another budget proposal as well as plans for two shorter ad-campaigns to *FM*. *Telefunken France*’s advertising agency *Publi-Syntex* had developed these plans on *Telefunken France*’s request (as the board had obliged *Telefunken France* to spend another 200.000 FF on advertising), Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, April 6). *Internal letter without subject.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. The campaign proposals by *Publi-Syntex*, one for a campaign in regional dailies and one for a radio campaign, were enclosed to Fahrner’s letter. *Publi-Syntex*’s proposals were continuations of concepts used in 1964, when *Telefunken France* had conducted an ad-campaign on a peripheral radio station and a five-week campaign in several provincial dailies across France. However, the latter 1964 campaign had not found Horlitz’s approval, Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, June 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbebesprechung bei Telefunken France am 4. Juni 1965 Ergebnisnotiz.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2. See also Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, January 7). *Internal letter. Subject: “Kosten der Werbung” Hauptplan 1965 Telefunken France.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 1.

Telefunken France had never really been convinced by the nationwide advertising campaign proposed by *FM*. During the meeting in April, *Telefunken France* was effectively overruled despite raising concerns about the money being better spent elsewhere.⁶⁰⁵ However, by aligning with *GRM/Ex* which had the final say about their part of the budget, *Telefunken France* nonetheless prevailed in the end. Their new “summer campaign” involved premiums for retailers and traveling sales representatives, as well as paying for a trip to Hannover and Berlin for merited retailers working with *Telefunken France*. It also encompassed product advertising through local insertions and posters,⁶⁰⁶ which were mainly put up in the shop windows of retail partners.⁶⁰⁷

This campaign ran for a total of two months and focused on products *Telefunken France* imported from Germany and thus through *GRM/Ex*.⁶⁰⁸ Seydlitz pointed out to *Telefunken France* that this campaign was no substitute for the insertion campaign *FM* had pushed for. He even assessed that “money is only being spent without achieving a lasting impact.”⁶⁰⁹ But to no avail. In his response to Seydlitz, *Telefunken France*’s managing director Fahrner contended that such special advertising campaigns “were fully justified from a commercial point of view” if one had to force sales, and that it simply had not been the campaign’s goal to advertise the *Telefunken* brand.⁶¹⁰ *Telefunken France*’s leadership evidently preferred to strengthen its retailer relations and pursue its short-term commercial interests by inducing product sales through local advertising and sales measures over *FM*’s proposal to support not only product sales but also raise brand awareness in the French market in the long term through nationwide advertising.

As a result, the *Telefunken* brand was temporarily absent from nationally read French magazines despite all previous transnational planning. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the sources what ultimately became of *Telefunken France*’s remaining advertising funds for 1965.⁶¹¹ Neither is it possible to conclusively establish the conflict’s impact on transnational

⁶⁰⁵ Horlitz (1965, April 20). *Ergebnisbericht über die Besprechung bei Telefunken France (8. und 9.4.1965)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁰⁶ Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, June 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbebesprechung bei Telefunken France am 4. Juni 1965 Ergebnisnotiz*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁰⁷ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, July 22). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁰⁸ This small campaign centered on the transistor radio *Bajazzo TS* and the portable tape recorder *M 300*, Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, July 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Sonderaktion “Campagne d’été”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁰⁹ Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, July 22). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “Es wird nur Geld ausgegeben, ohne eine langfristige Wirkung zu erzielen.”

⁶¹⁰ Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, July 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Sonderaktion “Campagne d’été”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “[...] Sonderaktionen, die kaufmännisch gesehen ihre volle Berechtigung haben, [...]”

⁶¹¹ Several options seem conceivable. The company might have conducted Fahrner’s proposed campaign in regional media, spent it on aggressive pricing measures, as had been suggested earlier in the year. It also seems possible that the funds simply remained unspent, or were used to promote the new television set *Telefunken France*

collaboration. Seydlitz planned to request an audit of *Telefunken France*'s 1965 ad expenditure to better understand who at *Telefunken* was subsidizing *Telefunken France*'s advertising directly or indirectly, and especially to see if no advertising funds had been misappropriated for other measures,⁶¹² which seems to have been a result of this conflict. It is unclear whether anything came of this as the audit could not be located.

Since *Telefunken France* continued to receive advertising subsidies from *FM/Wb* until *FM* was dissolved after the merger of *Telefunken* with its parent company *AEG*,⁶¹³ and given that Fahrner stayed at the helm even as *Telefunken France* was then also merged with *AEG France*,⁶¹⁴ there seem to have been little to no consequences for Fahrner in the long term. In fact, there is evidence that it was but a temporary dispute: in 1967, *Telefunken France* inserted a series of ads in *Paris Match* in the company advertising style which showcased the *Telefunken* product range to a nationwide audience, precisely as *FM* had suggested for 1965.⁶¹⁵

Even though the outlined sequence of events may thus not have had significant long-term consequences, it reveals just how closely *Telefunken France*'s advertising approach, budget-size, and -allocation were interrelated with the goals, responsibilities, and personal convictions of the actors in France and Germany involved in *Telefunken France*'s advertising. At least in the case of one of *Telefunken*'s most important foreign subsidiaries in the mid-1960s, advertising was a topic of trans-border collaboration involving the local advertising agency, the advertisers and leadership of the subsidiary, *Telefunken*'s marketing department, the advertisers of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics business unit (*G/Wb* and *GRM/Ex*), and even the company higher-ups if necessary. This again shows that advertising was not treated as an afterthought but rather seen as a crucial element when seeking to establish a brand in a new market. In line with this perception of significance, German departments not only provided advertising material and funds (with conditions) but also influenced or even controlled *Telefunken France*'s advertising spending allocation and ad-designs.

had introduced to market in July 1965 with a sales promotion measure or advertising campaign with a more limited reach as the product had an immense importance for the company: it was the first new model *Telefunken France* offered in two years, at a time when around half of the company's total revenue at the time was generated through television set sales. On the television set-related revenue share, see Holveck & Fahrner (1965, March 16). *Geschäftsbericht der TELEFUNKEN France S.A. per 31.12.1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2699.

⁶¹² Seydlitz (1965, September 15). *Aktennotiz. Without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶¹³ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, December 1). *TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S.A. Notiz über die Planbesprechung 1968 am 27. November 1967 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, p. 7.

⁶¹⁴ The *AEG-Telefunken France S.A.* began operating on the 1st of January 1969, *AEG-Telefunken Direktion* (1969, February 12). *Rundschreiben Nr. 3/69, Betreff: Auslandsorganisation*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2795. See also N.N. (1969, January 15). *Übersichtsblatt AEG-Telefunken France*. DTMB/AEG, JB 0815.

⁶¹⁵ *Telefunken* (1967, June 17). Advertisement. Tagline: même sur un toboggan il enregistre. *Paris Match*, 949, 119. See also for example *Telefunken* (1967, May 27). Advertisement. Tagline: la perfection dans les moindres détails. *Paris Match*, 946, 121.

The 1965 conflict further makes it evident that the views and aims of all these different stakeholders did not always align: while *FM* pushed for nationwide advertising following the same approach it applied in Germany at the time (using widely-read magazines to publish half-page product advertisements in the *Telefunken* style) in order to strengthen the *Telefunken* brand in France – in line with its purpose –, *GRM/Ex* seems to have prioritized advertising and sales promotion measures that would increase the sales of the products it supplied to *Telefunken France* – in line with its own, distinct purpose. Although *FM* had the authority to impose its views, the misalignment of interests between *Telefunken* actors involved in *Telefunken France*'s advertising for different purposes nonetheless enabled *Telefunken France* to defy *FM*: *GRM/Ex* and the subsidiary instead chose to allocate *GRM/Ex*'s funds in a way that more closely aligned with their goals and views.

This outcome had been facilitated by a lack of clarity on *Telefunken*'s side concerning the responsibility for the advertising of its foreign partners and subsidiaries during the first half of the year 1965. After *FM* had increasingly occupied itself also with international advertising matters, *FM/Wb* widely circulated a memo in December 1964, which had aimed to more clearly delineate responsibilities between them, the advertising division of the consumer electronics department (*G/Wb*), and the export division *GRM/Ex*.⁶¹⁶ However, this note instead led to confusion, as Kurt Nowack, the head of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics business unit *G*, pointed out to Seydlitz:

“Due to this memo, it has unfortunately become largely unclear here [in this department] as to who is definitively responsible for the advertising of the foreign subsidiaries. Mr. Franzke [of *G/Wb*] is personally of the opinion, also based on discussions with Mr. Horlitz, that he will for example no longer be involved with the advertising of *Telefunken France* in the future.”⁶¹⁷

Nowack followed this up with a counterproposal of his own,⁶¹⁸ which was not implemented either. Rather, responsibility for the advertising of the French subsidiary continued to be shared

⁶¹⁶ In the note, *FM/Wb* posited that advice for *Telefunken Ibérica* and *Telefunken France* concerning “[...] the use and distribution of advertising resources, the selection of advertising media, the creation of priorities, consideration of mentalities, etc.” (“Einsatz und Verteilung der Werbemittel, Auswahl der Werbeträger, Schwerpunktbildung, Rücksicht auf Mentalitäten usw.”) would chiefly fall within their domain, while *G/Wb* and *GRM/Ex* would continue to play an important role in establishing the unified *Telefunken* style in several European subsidiaries, like in Denmark or Portugal, and in distributing advertising and marketing material across Europe, Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1964, December 7). *Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116, p. 3.

⁶¹⁷ Nowack to Seydlitz (1964, December 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbemitteilung Nr. 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116. In the original German: “Aufgrund dieses Rundschreibens herrscht hier leider weitgehend Unklarheit, wer für die Werbung der Auslandsbeteiligung eindeutig zuständig und verantwortlich ist. Herr Franzke ist persönlich der Auffassung und stützt sich dabei auch auf Gespräche mit Herrn Horlitz, dass er z.B. mit der Werbung der *Telefunken France* in Zukunft nicht mehr befasst ist.”

⁶¹⁸ According to Nowack, *G/W* should be responsible for all countries that *G* exported to, no matter if it was a direct subsidiary or a local partner – while *FM/Wb* should oversee all countries that had their own production plants, like Brazil or Spain, *ibid.*

for the time being between members of *G* and *FM*.⁶¹⁹ In mid-May 1965, Seydlitz instructed Horlitz to finally develop a definitive solution to clearly delineate the responsibility specifically for *Telefunken France*. The solution Seydlitz envisioned would amount to *FM/Wb* having the “overall control” (“Gesamtsteuerung”), while the advertisers of *GRM/Ex* should have the immediate supervision.⁶²⁰

Before Horlitz could work out the finer details, however, he was confronted with the fact that *Telefunken France* had used advertising funds to finance measures that ran contrary to previous agreements and without getting *FM*’s approval. He effectively blamed *GRM/Ex* for interfering, claiming that it was impossible for *FM/Wb* to assume responsibility for *Telefunken France*’s advertising under these circumstances.⁶²¹ Ultimately, however, the responsibility for the “conception, coordination and control of a uniform advertising style” of *Telefunken*’s foreign daughter companies – such as *Telefunken France* –, as well as a mandate to be directly involved in the ad-budgeting and the development of advertising plans of eight branches across the world (*Telefunken France* and *Telefunken Ibérica* were among them) indeed came to lie with *FM/Wb* until the department was disbanded in 1967/68.⁶²² Afterwards, the transnational collaboration between *Telefunken* and *Telefunken France* concerning advertising would have inevitably taken on a new quality and intensity (for better or worse) as it would have involved new actors with other ideas, responsibilities, and priorities.

The responsibility within *Telefunken* for the advertising of *Telefunken France* and other foreign subsidiaries was thus not always clearly delineated and subject to considerable changes over time. And it was precisely during the first half of 1965 that there was uncertainty in that regard within *Telefunken*: at the time, *FM* and *G* shared the responsibility for *Telefunken France*’s advertising approach. In effect, *Telefunken France* took advantage of the maneuvering room it enjoyed (at least in part) due to these overlapping responsibilities at *Telefunken*, which subsequently led to accusations of interference within *Telefunken*. This highlights the impact

⁶¹⁹ Nowack’s solution would have put *Telefunken France* fully under the aegis of *G/Wb*. It is evident from the sequence of events that unfolded in the first half of 1965 that this did not happen. *G/Wb*’s Hans Franzke went to visit *Telefunken France* together with Seydlitz and Horlitz in January 1965, and all three also later on received the campaign suggestions devised by *Telefunken France*’s advertising agency in preparation for the meeting in April, Seydlitz to Fahrner (1965, February 15). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964; Fahrner to Seydlitz (1965, April 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶²⁰ Seydlitz to Horlitz (1965, May 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbemitteilung Nr. 2 – hier: Verantwortlichkeit für TFK-France*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

⁶²¹ Horlitz to Seydlitz (1965, June 21). *Internal letter. Subject: Vorgang Werbung Telefunken France*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶²² These responsibilities were then transferred to *G/AWA*, N.N. (undated). Überleitungsplan FM/WB nach Arbeitsgebieten und lfd. Aufgaben. Enclosure 6 to *Telefunken Bereich Marketing* (1967, August 20). *Zusammenlegung der horizontalen Marketing-Bereiche HM und FM bzw. Auflösung des Bereiches FM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2502. In the original German: “Konzipierung, Koordinierung und Kontrolle eines einheitlichen Werbestils”.

organizational structures could potentially have on advertising, as well as the interconnectedness of domestic and foreign developments. Taken together, both these factors underline just how contingent the 1965 advertising of *Telefunken France* was on company-internal processes.

Yet, *Telefunken France* was at the same time also subject to external market forces which co-shaped its 1965 advertising approach. To fully understand why *Telefunken France* had felt the need to heavily curtail their 1965 advertising spending in the first place – which had prompted all subsequent discussions –, why the company was so strongly opposed to nationwide advertising in the mid-1960s, and why Fahrner felt not sufficiently supported by *Telefunken* despite the advertising-related resources provided to *Telefunken France*, a phenomenon that inadvertently arose out of the integrative efforts of the EEC to establish the Common Market needs to be considered; so-called parallel imports. As it turned out, *Telefunken France* and *Consten* were not the only companies seeking to take advantage of the new trade environment to commercialize *Telefunken* and *Grundig* products in France – and, curiously, this phenomenon particularly impacted the advertising of *Consten* and *Telefunken France*.

2.2.2 Unexpected Competition: the Phenomenon of Parallel Imports

2.2.2.1 Understanding Parallel Imports. The *Grundig/Consten* Court Case

The Common Market was paramount to the expansion of the French business of *Telefunken* and *Grundig* alike. But its newly liberalized market environment also provided opportunities to other actors, such as retailers and intermediaries. Generally, French retailers were expected to only buy *Grundig* products through *Consten* in the early 1960s. Both parties had taken steps to ensure the exclusivity of their distribution chain. *Grundig* would not sell to anyone besides *Consten* in France, and *Consten* was designated *Grundig*'s sole representative in France, which entailed exclusive rights to use *Grundig*'s trademarks in France for the duration of their partnership. *Grundig*'s German partners in wholesaling and retail had also been contractually obligated to not export their products abroad. Taken together, these measures should ensure territorial protection not just for *Consten*, but also for other partners of *Grundig* abroad, where similar agreements had been implemented. However, as early as April 1961, immediately after the first import quotas were abolished, French companies such as *UNEF* started buying *Grundig* products directly from West German wholesalers willing to disregard their contractual

obligations with *UNEF* then offering *Grundig* products to French retailers for lower prices than what was asked by *Consten*.⁶²³

These parallel imports led to several complaints from *Consten*'s retail partners,⁶²⁴ and prompted *Consten* to take legal action in the French courts against *UNEF* and *Willy Leissner*, an Alsatian company who had sold *Grundig* consumer electronics purchased in Germany. In response, *UNEF* appealed to the European Commission in March 1962, which resulted in both French court cases being suspended to await the Commission's decision.⁶²⁵ In its appeal, *UNEF* claimed that the exclusive distribution agreement signed between *Consten* and *Grundig* was invalid based on the stipulations of the Treaty establishing the EEC. After a period of legal uncertainty, the European Commission issued a decision on the 23rd of September 1964, which declared the exclusive distribution agreement to be unlawful, and explicitly forbade *Grundig* and *Consten* from obstructing parallel imports. A key reason for their decision was that such agreements and practices stifled competition within the Common Market.⁶²⁶ This decision prompted a significant increase in activity by parallel importers from late 1964 onward.⁶²⁷

Grundig and *Consten* both appealed against this decision to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in separate cases, which were joined into one on the 29th of June 1965. Several parties intervened in the ensuing high-profile court case, with *UNEF* and *Willy Leissner* arguing for the European Commission, while the German and Italian governments intervened on behalf

⁶²³ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 2–4.

⁶²⁴ *Id.*, p. 4.

⁶²⁵ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 2. In 1962, *Consten* also went after German companies, contacting partners of *Grundig* they had identified as suppliers for the French parallel importers, such as the company's independent representative ("Werksvertreter") in Freiburg, *Consten* to Karl Manger (1962, January 4). Letter without subject. Enclosure 2 of Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886. At the time, *Grundig* also sent letters to its German retail partners asking them to cease and desist their exports to France, *Grundig Radio-Werke G.m.b.H.* to Firma Hanswerner Decker (1962, January 22). Letter. Subject: Export von Grundig-Geräten. Enclosure 4 of Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886. *Grundig* was not alone in trying to prevent parallel imports through lawsuits. *Telefunken France* for example also went to court in France against the parallel importing company *Aubin* from Marseille before the decision of the European Commission in September 1964 explicitly allowed the practice, *Fahrner* to *Olufs* (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶²⁶ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 1–6, 20.

⁶²⁷ *Fahrner* to *Olufs* (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. This trend tendency is corroborated by *UNEF*'s lawyer, *Collin* (1965, August 25). *Memoire contenant les observations écrites de la Société U.N.E.F. intervenante à l'appui des conclusions de la défenderesse dans les affaires jointes 56/64 et 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 19.

of *Grundig/Consten*.⁶²⁸ In its decision on the 13th of July 1966, the Court sided with the European Commission, declaring that agreements such as the one between *Grundig* and *Consten* could possibly run contrary to the “fundamental goals of the Community” as they re-erected trade barriers between nations.⁶²⁹ For the court case, the parties submitted hundreds of pages of documentary evidence, raising dozens of arguments.⁶³⁰ But in the end, as Grigorios Bacharis has pointed out in his appraisal of the case and the corresponding archival material from a legal point of view, the Court “[...] focused on principle rather than the facts of the specific case. It clarified that market integration was paramount, [...]”.⁶³¹

From September 1964 onward, parallel imports were explicitly allowed, with the outcome of the court case then only reinforcing the Commission’s stance. The liberalized trade conditions between the EEC members France and Germany hence not only benefited German consumer electronics manufacturers and their French partners/subsidiaries. They also presented an opportunity to intermediaries, who took advantage of a still existing price-disparity between the German and the French market for German-produced consumer electronics by selling to retailers at prices below the ones offered by *Consten* – or other German consumer electronics brands for that matter, as *Grundig* was far from the only one affected. *UNEF*, for example, had a range of West German brands on offer in 1964/1965.⁶³²

This raises the question why these parallel importers were able to undercut the prices offered to French retailers by the official distribution channels of German consumer electronics brands. To find an answer, it is necessary to consider the price margins of the French subsidiaries or partners of German consumer electronics brands in comparison to the margins of German wholesalers. The comparison carried out in the following paragraphs chiefly relies on the

⁶²⁸ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 3. Italy and Germany joined the court case as they were “hostile to potential institutional consequences of the overreach of the Commission” and of the opinion that exclusivity agreements could be beneficial when trying to gain access to a new market, Bacharis, 2021a, p. 555, Footnote 8.

⁶²⁹ Court of Justice of the European Communities (1966, July 13). *Urteil des Gerichtshofes. Verbundene Rechtssachen 56 und 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0890. For the reasoning given for the decision, see pp. 89–112. For the quote, see id., p. 93. In the original German: “den grundlegenden Zielen der Gemeinschaft zuwiderlaufen.”

⁶³⁰ Bacharis, 2021a, p. 558.

⁶³¹ Id., p. 560. Bacharis’s assessment that the Court decided on principle is corroborated by the fact that the impartial advocate general pleaded for the Court to decide in favor of *Grundig/Consten* based on the arguments presented by all parties, Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 63.

⁶³² Its offer also encompassed devices from *UHER*, *Akkord*, *Dual*, *Schaub-Lorenz*, and *Telefunken*, *UNEF* (1964, March 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Les plus fortes remises. *Le Haut-Parleur*, 1073, 54. See also *UNEF* (1965, May 10). Price list. Enclosure 1 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l’intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l’affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888.

factual evidence produced during the *Grundig/Consten* court case, but the described logic also applied to other brands like *Dual* or *Telefunken*.

2.2.2.2 The Interrelationship of Advertising and Parallel Imports

Generally, *Grundig* sold its products for roughly the same price to *Consten* as it did to its German wholesale partners. Then, customs duties and taxes were added to the price at the border in the case of *Consten*; at this point, such hindrances to cross-national trade between EEC member states had been reduced but not yet completely abolished. However, as the European Commission already pointed out in its initial 1964 decision, the markup at the border was by itself insufficient to explain the price-disparity of *Grundig* products between the two countries. This meant that *Consten* had a higher margin per product than a German retailer.⁶³³ No actor in the *Grundig/Consten* court case contested this in principle. Using one specific *Grundig* tape recorder as a recurring example, both sides agreed that its price in France was higher than in Germany even after taking the markups at the border into account. It was rather the precise extent of this margin that was disputed in court.⁶³⁴

In any case, the difference in margin was clearly sufficiently large for parallel importers to take advantage of it by buying consumer electronics from German wholesalers and then selling these

⁶³³ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 4–5. According to *Telefunken France*, they even had to pay 30 DM more per unit for *Telefunken's* *Bajazzo* radio compared to the German wholesale partners of *Telefunken*, which would have further exacerbated the problem of parallel imports, Seydlitz (1965, March 18). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Besprechung bei der Telefunken France am 29. Januar 1965 in Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶³⁴ In a calculation by *Grundig* showing how the border impacted the price of the tape recorder *TK 14*, it was determined that it was around 42 % more expensive for *Consten* than it was for a German wholesaler solely due to charges added at the border. But it was sold in France by *Consten* for a listing price of 792 FF compared to 479,33 FF in Germany, which was a markup decidedly above 42 %, N.N. (1962). *Preisbildung für Grundig-Tonbandgeräte in Frankreich verglichen mit den deutschen Preisen (Stand Ende 1962)*. Enclosure 1 of Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886. For a further discussion of the transnational pricing differences in the specific case of the *TK 14* tape recorder from the perspective of the European Commission, see Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 29–34. On the *TK 14's* pricing, see further Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, pp. 16–17. These questions of where the transnational difference in pricing came from, how to adequately calculate it, on what basis the calculations should be made, and what parts of the price difference could be justified by higher costs were points of contention throughout the *Grundig/Consten* court case. An overview of the positions taken and arguments brought forth concerning margins and costs is given by the reporting judge in his summary report, Trabucchi (1966, March 8) *Bericht in den verbundenen Rechtssachen 56 und 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, pp. 49–56. Due to their contested nature, the calculations and figures in the dossiers should be taken with a grain of salt – as was also pointed out by the advocate general, Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, pp. 40–46.

products on to retailers with discounts around 2-4 % higher⁶³⁵ than what was offered by the respective brand's official distribution channel. In doing so, parallel importers were aided by the fact that lower customs duty rates applied to this type of transnational transaction compared to the rates that applied between a consumer electronics manufacturer and its French partner or subsidiary.⁶³⁶

While the non-preferential customs treatment did not help, a much larger issue was that the value for money provided by *Grundig* to *Consten* and to German retailers was not equivalent, even though *Grundig* sold to both at similar prices: in Germany, *Grundig* financed customer service/repair and advertising themselves – effectively including it in the services provided for the sales price –, while in France, advertising and customer service/repair fell into the responsibility of *Consten*.⁶³⁷ The European Commission alleged that this amounted to an unfair treatment of French consumers:

“It is rather the case that the plaintiff [*Grundig*], on the basis of its distribution system, passes on the advertising costs in France to *Consten* (and thus ultimately to French consumers) without granting *Consten* a reduced purchase price compared with the German domestic price. However, since this price already takes into account the advertising costs incurred in the Federal Republic of Germany, the products sold in France are burdened twice with advertising costs by means of absolute territorial protection.”⁶³⁸

⁶³⁵ *Grundig* estimated that parallel importers gave around 2–3 % more discount than they did, Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 19. According to an estimate by *Telefunken France*, UNEF gave up to 4 % more discount than they did, Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 4). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen nach Frankreich – neue Tonbandgeräte Typen 105 und 106*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶³⁶ The financial advantages of exporting as a wholesaler seemed to have been considerable. *Telefunken* even momentarily considered opening a sham wholesaling company (“Scheingrosshandlung”) to have the lower customs duty rates apply to their own exports to France, Nowack to Seydlitz (1964, December 16). *Internal letter. Subject: Telefunken France / Ihr Schreiben vom 26. November 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. Similarly, *Consten*'s lawyer pointed out that parallel importers paid significantly lower customs duties and that there was a difference in treatment regarding the calculation of VAT which was preferential for parallel importers, Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888, pp. 10–11. German wholesalers selling to French parallel importers also received an export trade remuneration (“Ausfuhrhändler-Vergütung”) of 3,68 % which consumer electronics companies apparently did not receive, Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 6.

⁶³⁷ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 4–5. Besides advertising and service/repair, *Consten* also had to order in advance, and conduct market research for *Grundig*, which both would have added to their costs, and set them apart from a mere wholesaler, Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 11. See also Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, pp. 5–6.

⁶³⁸ Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 48–49. In the original German: “Es ist vielmehr so, daß die Klägerin [*Grundig*], gestützt auf ihr Vertriebssystem, die Werbekosten in Frankreich auf *Consten* (und damit letztlich auf die französischen Verbraucher) abwälzt, ohne *Consten* einen gegenüber dem deutschen Inlandspreis ermäßigten Einkaufspreis einzuräumen. Da in diesem Preis aber die in der BR Deutschland anfallenden

Hence, according to the European Commission, French consumers were paying too much for *Grundig* products. First, by indirectly bearing part of the costs of *Grundig*'s German advertising efforts, and second, by necessitating *Consten* to require higher margins for its advertising in France. Based on this, the Commission's lawyer argued that *Consten* should not have absolute territorial protection preventing parallel imports, as it was this protection that enabled *Grundig* and *Consten* to proceed in this manner in the first place.⁶³⁹ *Grundig* on the other hand argued that, due to the fierce competition on the German market, it was not feasible for them to take on the costs for sales and advertising in other countries.⁶⁴⁰ Additionally, *Grundig* did not charge *Consten* for any technical adjustments to products specifically made for the French market, which was seen as a kind of counterbalance helping to set off the lack of support concerning the advertising costs.⁶⁴¹

Parallel importers did not have to concern themselves with advertising expenses in the same way. They focused on products of brands that were already known to French consumers,⁶⁴² and were generally unburdened by the responsibility of needing to advertise a brand on a national level, as *Grundig* pointed out in a letter to the Commission:

“Routinely, the ‘parallel importers’ only carry out individual advertising for their batch sales, whereby (apart from exceptional cases that are not numerically relevant) they do not focus their advertising on the individual brand, but on their company. They do not engage in national advertising, as UNEF also cannot deny. However, it is precisely national advertising that is essential for the introduction of a brand and for promoting sales.”⁶⁴³

Werbekosten bereits berücksichtigt sind, werden die in Frankreich vertriebenen Waren mit Hilfe des absoluten Gebietsschutzes zweimal mit Werbekosten belastet.”

⁶³⁹ Thiesing (1965, February 12). *Klagebeantwortung in der Rechtssache Nr. 58/64 der Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Fürth/Bayern, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 60.

⁶⁴⁰ Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 59. A possible solution to this problem would have been for the German consumer electronics industry to collectively agree on setting two different prices for abroad and the domestic market. However, this was deemed to be unrealistic due to the discordance within the industry, Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁴¹ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten GmbH und Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, p. 39.

⁶⁴² Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, February 20). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 7.

⁶⁴³ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 5. Emphasis in the original. In the original German: “Regelmässig machen die ‘Parallel-Importeure’ nur eine Einzelwerbung für ihre Postenverkäufe, wobei sie (von zahlenmässig nicht in Betracht kommenden Ausnahmefällen abgesehen) ihre Werbung nicht auf die einzelne Marke, sondern auf ihre Firma abstellen. Eine überregionale Werbung betreiben sie, wie auch die Firma UNEF nicht bestreiten kann, nicht. Gerade die überregionale Werbung ist es aber, die für die Einführung einer Marke und für die Absatzförderung unerlässlich ist.” This line of argumentation was reiterated in *Grundig*'s statement of claim in its case against the Commission, Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1964, December 10). *Klageschrift der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH., in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 62–63.

National brand advertising was necessary for a brand wanting to establish itself in a new market and subsequently keep its market share. As established, it was a contractual obligation for *Consten* to conduct such advertising,⁶⁴⁴ with the same being true for *Telefunken France* for example.⁶⁴⁵ And under the agreements with *Grundig* and *Telefunken*, *Consten* and *Telefunken France* necessitated higher margins than a German wholesaler to finance such expensive advertising measures. As long as *Consten* and *Telefunken France* were nonetheless able to make an attractive product value proposition to French retailers for *Grundig* and *Telefunken* products when only compared to products of other consumer electronics brands, this was not an issue. But with parallel importers, it was a different case. They offered the same products for cheaper prices to French retailers, directly profiting in two ways from the fact that *Consten* and *Telefunken France* needed to spend on nationwide advertising. First, as they offered products by the same brand, all nationwide brand advertising measures also worked in their favor. Second, nationwide advertising was an expense they did not have, which helped them undercut the prices companies like *Consten* and *Telefunken France* could offer to retailers. Companies involved in the parallel importing business thus explicitly targeted French retailers with advertising and sales measures. Not only did *UNEF*, for instance, advertise its product portfolio and brand range with reference to its discount prices in French trade publications such as *Le Haut-Parleur* or *Revue du Son*,⁶⁴⁶ its representatives also regularly visited retailers across France.⁶⁴⁷ In this regard, too, parallel importers could profit off the work of the German producer and its French partner or subsidiary; like in the case of the *Grundig stenorette* where *UNEF* appropriated the advertising approach of the original French product brochure for the sales letters it wrote to retailers, even replicating some sentences verbatim.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁴ Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, September 23). *Entscheidung der Kommission vom 23. September 1964 über ein Verfahren nach Artikel 85 des Vertrages (IV/A-00004-03344 "Grundig-Consten")*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 2.

⁶⁴⁵ Telefunken G.m.b.H. & Telefunken France S.A. (1961, October 2). Vertriebsvertrag zwischen TELEFUNKEN G.m.b.H. und COMPAGNIE FRANÇAISE TELEFUNKEN am 02.10.1961. Enclosure of Müller-Machens (1966, December 1). *Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit Herrn Fahrner am 29.11.1966. Betr.: Vergütung für die bei CFTH hergestellten Geräte*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2795.

⁶⁴⁶ UNEF (1964, March 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Les plus fortes remises. *Le Haut-Parleur*, 1073, 54; (1965, February). Advertisement. Tagline: Les plus fortes remises. *Revue du Son*, 142, 18.

⁶⁴⁷ Drexler & Synowski to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1964, April 23). *Letter. Subject: Sache IV-A/00004-03344*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 5.

⁶⁴⁸ This assessment is based on a comparison of the Enclosures 3 and 4 of Lassier's intervention. See Grundig/Consten (1961). Brochure Grundig Stenorette. Enclosure 3 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888; UNEF (November 1961). Sales letters. Enclosure 4 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888. This course of action by UNEF led to accusations of "commercial parasitism" ("parasitismo [sic] commercial") by *Consten* during the court case, Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888, p. 11.

Although at least some parallel importers also advertised and sold parallel imported consumer electronics directly to consumers, the real danger for French partners/subsidiaries of German brands seems to have been the effect this phenomenon had on their retail partners.⁶⁴⁹ Setting up and maintaining a well-functioning distribution network was a key component for the expansion of their operations in France to succeed – and parallel imports imperiled their relations with retailers. In late 1964, several retailers that had bought from *Telefunken France* in the past had stopped displaying *Telefunken* products in their shops. As to their reasoning for doing so, they told *Telefunken France* that they did not want to buy from parallel importers, but that they were neither keen on buying the same products from *Telefunken France* for a higher price.⁶⁵⁰ It follows that other retailers would have had no such inhibitions and were content to buy from parallel importers for lower prices instead. In addition, parallel imports also prompted regional wholesaling partners to reconsider their business relations. *Telefunken France*'s partner in Nice, for instance, was underpriced in its offer of *Telefunken* products to retailers by a company from nearby Monaco, impeding its business. This led said partner to point out to *Telefunken France* that they, too, would potentially need to start buying directly in Germany instead of working with *Telefunken France* if this situation was to continue.⁶⁵¹

For German wholesalers on the other hand, parallel imports were a positive phenomenon. In fact, parallel importers even made efforts to reach not only French retailers but also German wholesalers through their advertising and sales measures, as their business was dependent on both. Their importance becomes evident when looking at two measures taken by parallel importers in late 1964: a German wholesaler decided to set up a booth at the Marseille fair together with their local partner *Aubin* to promote German consumer electronics to French retailers and directly take purchase orders on site while *UNEF* planned to advertise in a German magazine specifically aimed at wholesalers of consumer electronics to find new partners and expand their business.⁶⁵²

Becoming involved in parallel importing could thus be financially interesting for German wholesalers, French retailers not already contracted to an affected German brand, and for intermediaries facilitating cross-border trade. It was detrimental for the business of the partners

⁶⁴⁹ Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Parallelimporte nach Frankreich.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. See also Teleparis (1964, November 26). Advertisement. *Le Figaro*. Enclosure of Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Parallelimporte nach Frankreich.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁵⁰ Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵² *UNEF* planned to advertise in the magazine *Rundfunk-Fernseh-Grosshandel*. The German wholesaler having a booth in Marseille was *Lehner & Küchenmeister* from Stuttgart, Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. See also Boulanger to Fahrner (1964, October 28). Letter without subject. Enclosure 1 of Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

or subsidiaries of German consumer electronics companies in France, for the retailers working with them, and for the French wholesalers acting as contracted intermediaries for German brands, as they could not match the offers made to retailers by parallel importers. It is, however, difficult to ascertain to what extent consumers profited from parallel imports.

2.2.2.3 Lower Prices, Lesser Service? Parallel Imports and the Consumer Experience

While one might assume that the discounts offered by parallel importing companies to retailers directly led to lower consumer prices, this was decidedly not the case according to the facts established during the *Grundig/Consten* court case: retailers offered *Grundig* products at the same price to consumers, regardless of whether they had bought them from *Consten* or a parallel importer. It only meant higher margins for retailers. For consumers, the phenomenon of parallel imports thus seemed to have had little positive impact as the impartial advocate general in the *Grundig/Consten* court case pointed out in his final assessment, despite the argumentation of the European Commission to the contrary.⁶⁵³ However, the universal validity of this statement needs to be questioned. There are also indicators that parallel imports possibly led to lower consumer prices at least in some contexts.

In Paris, for instance, a range of consumer electronics “Discounter[s]” competed fiercely on price in the mid-1960s. According to *Telefunken France*, this intense competition contributed to the demand for parallel imports –⁶⁵⁴ presumably as these enabled to further lower prices, which would have of course benefited consumers. This would not necessarily have been the case in other parts of France, as parallel imports were a regionally differentiated phenomenon which disproportionally affected Paris and the Eastern French provinces in the early to mid-1960s.⁶⁵⁵ Then, by 1967, the parallel importing *Singer Corporation* managed to increasingly penetrate the French provinces with a new distribution approach: *Singer* commercialized their parallel imported *Grundig* and *Telefunken* products through a network of thousands of sales representatives and additional part-time agents going door-to-door throughout France with a catalog in hand, working on commission. This made *Singer* particularly concerning to *Telefunken France*, which now needed to compete with *Singer* on price in regions previously

⁶⁵³ Roemer (1966, April 27). *Schlussantrag in den Rechtssachen 56 und 58 / 64 : Consten Gmbh und Grundig-Verkaufs-Gmbh gegen Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, vorgetragen in der Sitzung des Gerichtshofes vom 27. April 1966*. HAEU/CJUE-0890, pp. 42–43.

⁶⁵⁴ Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Parallelimporte nach Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁵⁵ For the eastern provinces, see Mößner (1967, July 18). *Notiz. Betr.: Gespräche mit Telefunken France am 13./14.7.1967 und zweitweilig mit zwei Herren von G/RV*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7954, p. 3. For Paris, see Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1964, December 10). *Klageschrift der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH., in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 57.

less affected by parallel imports.⁶⁵⁶ And while the source does not explicitly state it, lowering prices to combat competition by door-to-door salesmen only made sense if *Telefunken France* assumed that its retail partners would pass them on to their consumers.

Regardless of the potential impact on prices, parallel imports were a phenomenon opaque to consumers. They would have seen an ad by a French company offering *Grundig*, *Dual*, or *Telefunken* products for a competitive price,⁶⁵⁷ without necessarily knowing that they were being sold parallel imported products. This lack of transparency could lead to dissatisfactory customer experiences and negative sentiments toward a brand. This is evidenced by a case from 1965, when an upset French customer wrote directly to *Grundig* in Germany. He had bought a *Grundig* tape recorder from *UNEF* which had ceased to function soon after the purchase, making him turn to *UNEF* for repairs. According to his account, *UNEF* had taken several months for the repair and had returned the product in a barely functional state, necessitating further repairs after an hour of use. He had then asked *UNEF* to exchange his tape recorder for a functioning one but had not received another answer in return. As *UNEF*'s customer service was seemingly not up to par, he turned directly to *Grundig* to demand whether he “could or could not count on a GRUNDIG device.”⁶⁵⁸ In other cases, *Consten* took over the repair of parallel imported *Grundig* products – although it was technically not their responsibility and incurred additional costs – to prevent such occurrences from damaging the reputation of the *Grundig* brand in France.⁶⁵⁹

Despite this general opacity, it would have been noticeable for certain parallel imported devices that they had initially been destined for the German domestic market. In the case detailed above, the *UNEF*-bought *Grundig* tape recorder had a German interface, with the recording button being labeled “Aufnahme”. It follows that this must have been the case for other parallel imported products as well.⁶⁶⁰ Parallel imported radios were also not always an ideal fit for the

⁶⁵⁶ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, December 1). *TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S.A. Notiz über die Planbesprechung 1968 am 27. November 1967 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, pp. 5–7.

⁶⁵⁷ Teleparis (1964, November 26). Advertisement. *Le Figaro*. Enclosure of Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Parallelimporte nach Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁵⁸ Leriche to Grundig (1965, October 5). Letter without subject. Enclosure 2 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888. In the original French: “[...] si je puis compter ou non sur un appareil GRUNDIG.” The letter clearly identified *UNEF* as the company from which he had bought the device. This is a bit curious, however, as *UNEF* claimed in its advertising that it only sold to retailers (“revendeurs”), *UNEF* (1964, March 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Les plus fortes remises. *Le Haut-Parleur*, 1073, 54; (1965, February). Advertisement. Tagline: Les plus fortes remises. *Revue du Son*, 142, 18. As the letterhead identifies Leriche as a business owner, it seems possible that he purchased the device for private use but as a “revendeur” on paper.

⁶⁵⁹ Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1964, December 10). *Klageschrift der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH., in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 61.

⁶⁶⁰ Leriche to Grundig (1965, October 5). Letter without subject. Enclosure 2 of Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l'intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l'affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888.

French market on a technical level, which too had the potential to lead to a subpar experience for consumers according to *Grundig* and *Consten*.⁶⁶¹ This was less of an issue for other consumer electronics. Television sets were not parallel imported at all due to the differing norms between Germany and France, while tape recorders needed no technical adjustments.⁶⁶² Not all consumer electronics were thus equally affected by parallel imports. The phenomenon particularly pertained to radio products and tape recorders.⁶⁶³ But how many consumers would have bought a parallel imported tape recorder? What was the scale of the phenomenon?

German consumer electronics brands occupied a noticeable, though not a large part of the French market during the first half of the 1960s.⁶⁶⁴ Parallel importing companies in turn were of a considerably smaller size than the partners and subsidiaries of German consumer electronics companies. As *UNEF* put it, their revenue was “small albeit far from being insignificant” compared to *Consten*.⁶⁶⁵ Since the appearance of parallel imports was a direct consequence of the Common Market, it follows that parallel importing companies would also experience rapid growth from 1961 onward, following a trend similar to the official French subsidiaries and partners of German consumer electronics companies: *UNEF*’s revenue grew by 234 % between 1961 and 1963 (and it would have certainly increased further following the Commission’s decision). In 1963, *UNEF* sold *Grundig* tape recorders worth 2.150.000 FF – 13,9 % as much as *Consten*, whose tape recorder sales reached 16.000.000 FF in 1963.⁶⁶⁶ However, this figure somewhat undersold the actual market reality in multiple ways. *UNEF* of course also commercialized tape recorders of other German brands and sold other consumer electronics as well. *Grundig* products, on the other hand, were also parallel imported by companies besides *UNEF*, which meant that the total market share of *Grundig* tape recorders attained by parallel importers in 1963 was certainly above 13,9 %.

⁶⁶¹ Radios sold by *Grundig* in Germany were often not capable of receiving the long wave range, which was a wave range much more commonly used in France. *UNEF* apparently had *Grundig* radios in its portfolio that did not allow for long wave listening, Lassier (1965, October 28). *Observations sur le fond de l’intervention No. 3 de la société U.N.E.F. dans l’affaire 56/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0888, p. 7.

⁶⁶² Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, pp. 60–61.

⁶⁶³ Fahrner & Holveck (1964, December 8). *Präambel zum Hauptplan 1965 der Telefunken France SA., Paris*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2699, pp. 1–2. Although *UNEF* also carried dictation machines and record players, for instance, *UNEF* (1964, March 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Les plus fortes remises. *Le Haut-Parleur*, 1073, 54.

⁶⁶⁴ See chapter 2.2.

⁶⁶⁵ *UNEF* to the European Commission (1964, March 9). Letter. Subject: Affaire n° 0004 Gründig – Consten, p. 4. Enclosure 10 of Collin (1965, August 25). *Memoire contenant les observations écrites de la Société U.N.E.F. intervenante à l’appui des conclusions de la défenderesse dans les affaires jointes 56/64 et 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0887. In the original French: “[...], notre chiffre d’affaires est petit quoique loin d’être insignifiant.”

⁶⁶⁶ *Id.*, pp. 3–4.

Parallel imports thus happened at a scale highly relevant to German brands, although parallel imported products were far from making up the majority of all sales of German consumer electronics products in France. Seen through the lens of the overall market for consumer electronics in France, parallel imports become a smaller phenomenon. Nonetheless, due to the sheer size of the French consumer electronics market, tens of thousands of consumers would have purchased a parallel imported product: *UNEF* by itself would have sold thousands of parallel imported tape recorders in 1963 alone.⁶⁶⁷

This is not to say that the French industry players did not take note of the phenomenon at all. At least in the immediate aftermath of the 1964 decision of the European Commission, the French consumer electronics industry also became concerned about parallel imports because they further destabilized the already precarious pricing and discount system of the French consumer electronics market.⁶⁶⁸ Generally, however, the offer of French consumer electronics companies would not have been immediately affected by parallel imports. They did not receive intra-brand competition in the same way their German competitors did. Neither did the phenomenon encompass television sets, which accounted for around two thirds of the overall revenue of the French industry in 1964.⁶⁶⁹ This exempted large parts of the domestic industry's business from being affected by parallel imports in any capacity. For German companies on the other hand, parallel imports considerably influenced even their advertising – such as in the case of the 1965 dispute around the advertising budget and approach of *Telefunken France* between the French subsidiary and the marketing department *FM*.

⁶⁶⁷ This assertion is based on the following approximate calculation: the tape recorder *Grundig TK 14* was used as a “representative” device throughout the court case, see for example Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886, p. 48. At the end of 1962, this “representative” device, the *TK 14*, was sold for an effective price (i.e. including the usually granted discount on the list price) of 633 FF to French consumers, N.N. (1962). *Preisbildung für Grundig-Tonbandgeräte in Frankreich verglichen mit den deutschen Preisen (Stand Ende 1962)*. Enclosure 1 of Hellmann & Pfeiffer (1965, May 8). *Erwiderung in der Rechtssache 58/64 der Firma Grundig-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, in Fürth / Bayern, Kurgartenstrasse 37, gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. HAEU/CJUE-0886. If it is assumed that *UNEF* only sold *TK 14*s for 633 FF each in 1963, the company would have sold around 3.400 devices based on the earlier given revenue of 2.150.000 FF that *UNEF* made with *Grundig* tape recorders that year. This was certainly not the case, with the actual market reality being much more complex. However, this approximated value may serve as a pointer to ascertain the size of the phenomenon, which involved multiple companies similar to *UNEF*, spanned multiple years, involved other German brands, and encompassed not only tape recorders.

⁶⁶⁸ Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. Parallel imports were one contributing factor for the introduction of new pricing regulations for the French consumer electronics market, Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Parallelimporte nach Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. For an overview of the French legislation on distribution and pricing in the sector, see Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 175–178.

⁶⁶⁹ According to data provided by the F.N.I.E., the total revenue of the French industry with radio sets, electro-acoustical goods and television sets amounted to 2.046 million FF in 1964, with television sets contributing 1.374 million FF to this total, INSEE, 1968, p. 295.

2.2.2.4 The Consequences of Parallel Imports for Advertising and Transnational Relations

During the first half of the 1960s, *Telefunken France* not only faced the challenge of having to establish a brand, but it also had to simultaneously contend with the pressure from parallel imports. The company had already offered combative prices and discounts to retailers in 1964 to match up with the prices of parallel importers in order to be able to reach the planned sales for the year.⁶⁷⁰ After the decision of the Commission definitively allowed the practice in late 1964, the ensuing increase in parallel importing activity instigated *Telefunken France*'s proposal to reallocate a large part of its advertising budget for 1965 to combative pricing instead.⁶⁷¹ *Telefunken France*'s aversion to invest in national advertising was directly linked to the threat of parallel imported devices, as such advertising measures significantly benefited German wholesalers according to the managing director of *Telefunken France*:

“It is planned to drastically curtail our advertising budget as far as Telefunken advertising at the national level and prestige advertising is concerned, because this advertising largely benefits German wholesalers. However, Telefunken France has its own budget and its own profit return which it is responsible for. It is therefore out of the question that we continue to pay advertising costs for domestic German operations and in return are undercut by dubious French companies on the local market!”⁶⁷²

This internally presented argument followed a remarkably similar logic to the one made by the European Commission. According to the Commission, the difference in value for money *Grundig* offered to German wholesalers compared to *Consten* meant that French consumers were burdened with disproportionate advertising costs – while *Telefunken France* maintained that they were unfairly expected to pay for advertising benefiting German wholesalers. In effect, this too was an accusation of an unjust distribution of costs adversely affecting French actors compared to their German counterparts.

The conclusions drawn from this, however, were decidedly different: The Commission saw parallel imports as a remedy fit to alleviate the cost distribution discrepancy between German and French consumers, and thus sought to legalize them, while *Consten* and *Telefunken France* of course wanted to prevent them. They were negatively affected in their operations by the phenomenon as parallel imports made it harder to pursue adequate returns while simultaneously

⁶⁷⁰ Holveck & Fahrner (1965, March 16). *Geschäftsbericht der TELEFUNKEN France S.A. per 31.12.1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2699, p. 1.

⁶⁷¹ Fahrner to FM/Wb (1964, November 13). *Internal letter. Subject: Kosten der Werbung – Etataufstellung 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. Regarding the increase of activity after the decision of the Commission, see further Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁷² Fahrner to Seydlitz (1964, November 4). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “Beabsichtigt ist, unseren Werbeetat, soweit es Telefunken-Werbung auf nationaler Ebene und Prestigewerbung betrifft, drastisch zu kürzen, weil diese Werbung zum grossen Teil den deutschen Grossisten zugute kommt. Telefunken France hat jedoch ihren eigenen Etat und ihre eigene Rendite und ist dafür verantwortlich. Es ist somit ausgeschlossen, dass wir weiterhin für den innerdeutschen Betrieb Werbekosten zahlen und dafür nur auf dem hiesigen Markt durch zweifelhafte französische Firmen unterboten werden!”

being mandated to conduct sufficient advertising and provide adequate customer service. *Telefunken France* consequently had a certain aversion to nationwide advertising efforts, as the company felt that such measures benefited the competition while simultaneously making it harder to compete on price. As all available sources on *Consten* and *Grundig* stem from a court case where both companies sought to present a united front, no assertion can be made whether *Consten* internally accused *Grundig* of failing to prevent parallel imports or even facilitating the phenomenon. The internal sources from *Telefunken* on the other hand make it very clear that *Telefunken France* blamed their parent company for the occurrence of parallel imports and the difficult position they found themselves in due to the phenomenon.

Already in 1964, *Telefunken France* and its retail partners accused *Telefunken* of at least tolerating the phenomenon, if not even being secretly content with it: “In general, the retailers here are of the opinion that these parallel imports are tacitly approved and partially even facilitated by Telefunken Germany.”⁶⁷³ In the preamble for their 1968 business plan, *Telefunken France* then went a step further: it disingenuously stated that the plan had been devised with the reservation in mind that *Telefunken* would not only try everything in their power to prevent parallel imports but also refrain from creating and supporting “parallel sales organizations” in France besides *Telefunken France* – another thinly veiled accusation that *Telefunken* played an active role in facilitating parallel imports in France. In 1967/68, this accusation chiefly related to the *Singer Corporation*⁶⁷⁴ with its network of door-to-door salesmen.⁶⁷⁵

Telefunken France’s position and Fahrner’s repeated complaints about *Telefunken*’s lacking support become more understandable when considering that – unlike for *Consten* or *Telefunken France* – parallel imports were not necessarily an exclusively negative phenomenon for the product departments of German consumer electronics companies. For them, selling to a wholesaler involved in the parallel import business also increased their own sales. In early 1965, *Telefunken France* estimated that *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics department *G* accounted for approximately 20 to 25 % of the overall revenue of *Telefunken* products in France through parallel imports while pointing out that the department was not willing to aid with the

⁶⁷³ Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 4). *Internal letter. Subject: Paralleleinführen nach Frankreich – neue Tonbandgeräte Typen 105 und 106*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. In the original German: “Allgemein sind die Händler hier der Ansicht, dass diese Paralleleinführen stillschweigend von Telefunken Deutschland gebilligt und teilweise sogar gefördert werden.” In another letter a few weeks later, Fahrner reiterated that *Telefunken* “was indirectly facilitating” (“indirekt gefördert werden”) parallel imports, this time making the position his own instead of mentioning that it was a conviction held by retailers, Fahrner to Olufs (1964, November 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Parallelimporte nach Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964.

⁶⁷⁴ Fahrner & Kunkel (1967, November 2). *Präambel zum Hauptplan 1968 für Telefunken France S.A.* DTMB/AEG, GS 7954, p. 1. In the original German: “Parallelvertriebsorganisationen”.

⁶⁷⁵ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, December 1). *TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S.A. Notiz über die Planbesprechung 1968 am 27. November 1967 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, pp. 5–7.

advertising costs in France despite profiting from parallel imports.⁶⁷⁶ Even if this estimate was on the high end, it shows that parallel imports would have noticeably contributed to the sales of domestic departments of German consumer electronics companies.

This effect does not automatically make tacit approval or even active support the most probable explanations, however. Rather, it seems as if it was simply impossible for large manufacturers to fully prevent parallel imports. *Telefunken* even stated as much in its response to *Telefunken France*'s accusations concerning *Singer*. Indeed, the parallel importer had first obtained *Telefunken* products through a German company called *Schwab*, which had initially been supplied by one of *Telefunken*'s branch offices. However, after *Telefunken* had banned *Schwab* from receiving *Telefunken* products, *Schwab* had started buying from other companies acting as intermediaries between them and *Telefunken* in response, making it impossible for *Telefunken* to track and prevent all sales to *Schwab*, which then in turn sold to *Singer* in France.⁶⁷⁷ Parallel imported products could thus reach French consumers through a variety of small- to medium-sized companies, sometimes even going through the hands of multiple intermediaries. This made it difficult for manufacturers to trace and prevent parallel imports. But even if *Telefunken* did not actively facilitate *Singer*'s parallel imports, it was *Telefunken France* that had to again bear the consequences.

In 1968, *Telefunken France* was in the situation of having to compete with *Singer* on price in the provinces, although the parallel importer apparently offered *Telefunken* products with discounts that *Telefunken* deemed to be "almost erroneously high".⁶⁷⁸ Given that – just like in 1965 – *Telefunken* was not willing to temporarily forgo its return on investment from *Telefunken France*,⁶⁷⁹ or offer any concessions to *Telefunken France* concerning pricing,

⁶⁷⁶ Fahrner (1965, January 31). *Niederschrift der anlässlich des Besuchs der Herren Dr. von Seydlitz, Horlitz und Franzke am 28. und 29. 1. 1965 in Paris mit Telefunken France besprochenen Punkte (Werbeaktion der Telefunken France im Jahre 1965 – Kostenaufwand)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 2.

⁶⁷⁷ Accordingly, *Telefunken* vehemently denied having directly negotiated with *Singer* without involving *Telefunken France* and thus also rejected the claim that *Telefunken* had actively sought to establish a second distribution and sales organization in France through *Singer*. Notably, *Singer* had no interest in being supplied by *Telefunken France*, Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, December 1). *TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S.A. Notiz über die Planbesprechung 1968 am 27. November 1967 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, pp. 5–6. *Telefunken*'s assertion that it was impossible to fully prevent parallel imports is given credence by the fact that German consumer electronics companies also struggled to retain full control over the distribution of their devices on the domestic market due to the ingenuity of merchants further down in the distribution chain. To give but one example: as *Saba*'s manager recounts in his company biography, several German department store chains – whom *Saba* did not want to supply – had managed to get a hold of the company's television sets despite *Saba*'s best efforts to the contrary. As it turned out, these department stores had sent their employees en masse to specialist retailers, where they had bought one *Saba* TV set each while posing as private citizens, Brunner-Schwer & Zudeick, 1990, p. 269.

⁶⁷⁸ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, December 1). *TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S.A. Notiz über die Planbesprechung 1968 am 27. November 1967 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, pp. 5–7. In the original German: "fast irrtümlich hoch".

⁶⁷⁹ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, November 17). *Stellungnahme zur Schätzung 1967, zum Hauptplan 1968 und zum Mehrjahresplan bis 1970*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7954, p. 9.

Telefunken France was thus faced with the prospect of losing around 30 FF on average in profit per product sale for each of a total of around 10.000 media devices in 1968 due to the necessity of having to lower prices. And just like in 1965, the solution to combat falling proceeds – at least partially induced by downward pressure on prices caused by parallel importing companies – was to significantly cut back advertising spending, which fell from 1.704.000 FF in 1967 to 750.000 FF in 1968.⁶⁸⁰

The pressure from parallel imports exerted on *Telefunken France* thus resulted at least twice in a significant cut to the company's advertising expenditure, demonstrably impacted the company's advertising strategy at least in 1965, and prompted accusations toward its parent company. But even beyond advertising, parallel imports were a phenomenon of significant commercial importance for German consumer electronics brands, as evidenced by them not only repeatedly addressing the topic internally but by also battling parallel imports in court. Although parallel imports certainly added to the challenge of introducing a consumer electronics brand to a new country, they did not pose an insurmountable obstacle for the subsidiaries and partners of German manufacturers. *Grundig* took direct control of *Consten* in 1967, changing the name to *Grundig-France* (and presumably enacting organizational changes that would have affected the brand's advertising in France),⁶⁸¹ while *Telefunken France* was merged with *AEG France* in late 1968 –⁶⁸² but neither company went out of business due to parallel imports. *Telefunken's* French subsidiary was in fact highly profitable despite them during the first half of the 1960s: *Telefunken France* provided returns on the invested capital at an average annual rate of above 20 % between 1961 and 1966.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ Terhorst & Naundorf (1967, December 1). *TELEFUNKEN FRANCE S.A. Notiz über die Planbesprechung 1968 am 27. November 1967 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397, pp. 5–7. The advertising budget of *Telefunken France* in 1967 included 344.000 FF in subsidies from German departments, while the one in 1968 only included 150.000 FF of subsidiaries. This was a result of the fusion of *Telefunken* and *AEG* that had entailed the closing of *FM/Wb*, who had in the past subsidized the advertising of *Telefunken France* with around 150.000 FF, again underlining the importance of company internal processes for advertising funding and approach.

⁶⁸¹ N.N. (1967, March 17). *Grundig prend le contrôle de Consten*. *Le Monde*, 21. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1967/03/17/grundig-prend-le-contrôle-de-consten_2614628_1819218.html.

⁶⁸² N.N. (1969, January 15). *Übersichtsblatt AEG-Telefunken France*. DTMB/AEG, JB 0815. Due to the composition of the consulted source corpuses, it was not possible to trace the phenomenon of parallel imports beyond 1967/68.

⁶⁸³ FV/BTG (1967, May 9). *Internal note. Subject: Rentabilität der TELEFUNKEN FRANCE seit ihrer Gründung*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1397. That *Telefunken France* was nonetheless highly profitable gives credence to the claim by *UNEF's* lawyer that *Consten* had remained in a strong commercial position even after parallel imports had increased sharply following the decision of the Commission in late 1964, Collin (1965, August 25). *Memoire contenant les observations écrites de la Société U.N.E.F. intervenante à l'appui des conclusions de la défenderesse dans les affaires jointes 56/64 et 58/64*. HAEU/CJUE-0887, p. 19.

2.3 Part Conclusion: Advertising Consumer Electronics between Transnational Coherence and Market Specificity

The production of advertising was a decentralized, multi-layered process in all examined multinational consumer electronics companies. It involved a complex sequence of interlinked practical steps based on the division of labor and was therefore highly contingent on directives, decision-making processes, and the precise configuration of company organizational structures. The production process could be closely intertwined with other parts of marketing and involved collaboration across departments and borders. Central authorities issued directives and guidelines, (co-)selected agencies, crafted policy, conducted institutional advertising, and centrally produced advertising material. Product advertisers – in the national subsidiaries and/or in the headquarters – separately devised campaign ideas, product-specific material, and argumentation approaches for the devices of their respective product groups. National subsidiaries and partners with differing degrees of self-sufficiency and autonomy completed the picture. Advertising agencies were employed as external partners only for specific departments or national subsidiaries in some cases, and on an international scale in others. They usually handled the creative aspects of advertising as a service contractor but could also become involved to a greater extent.

The exact division of responsibilities varied significantly between companies and markets, as well as across time. This makes it impossible to give blanket assessments of what aspects of the overall advertising process fell into the responsibility of local advertisers or central actors working on a transnational scale. Competences could also overlap, as domains were not always distinctly delineated. This facilitated tensions and conflicts between company parts which could pursue different ideas concerning advertising budget allocations or marketing strategies due to deviating priorities or misaligned departmental goals and personal convictions. Due to this complexity, the transnational cohesion of advertising was a very practical issue of internal communication and coordination.

During the long 1960s, Western European multinational consumer electronics companies became increasingly international in outlook and size, prompting them to embrace marketing and undergo significant organizational changes. Restructurings could directly result in improvements – as well as degradation – regarding advertising direction and coordination. These changes, in turn, had a visible impact on the layout, insertion patterns, or corporate identity markers of published advertisements. While it might not have been immediately apparent to consumers, a company's advertising thus reflected the internal cohesion and setup of its advertising function. But in practice, the eclectic organizational setups would rather have

been in conflict with the outside perception: consumers would have classified all advertising communications they encountered in association with a brand as originating from the same monolithic entity. In reality, this entity was a decentralized conglomeration of actors that did not always share a vision or pursue the same goals – not only on an international level, but also domestically between product groups. Standardizing corporate image markers across all company communications was seen as an ideal means to mediate this tension. A consistent implementation of a uniform company style could ensure a base level of coherence from a local to international scale and between product groups, setting the brand apart from the competition, taking advantage of cumulative effects, and obscuring the internal multiplicity.

Merely conceptualizing a style and operationalizing it through guidelines on typography, layout, imagery, and copy texting tonality was not sufficient. Rather, to what extent companies managed to create a cohesive impression on a national or even transnational scale was also dependent on the degree of coordination between company parts as facilitated by meetings, conventions, reporting structures, or internal publications, and a shared understanding of the necessity to pursue a cohesive corporate image – or a sufficiently strong mandate by a central actor capable of imposing its authority regardless of conviction. In short, it depended on the delineation of the spheres of responsibility and the facilitation of coordination. In the rapidly growing consumer electronics companies of 1960s Western Europe, these processes proved to be difficult to execute consistently across time and markets, however.

It became an increasingly complex organizational challenge to implement and maintain a singular voice across all communications to consumers as consumer electronics companies diversified their operations and ventured into European and global markets – they faced organizational inertia, a lack of communication or capabilities, ignorance, or active resistance. Even though it was argued that corporate image frameworks retained a sufficient degree of creative freedom for advertisers and agencies to express themselves and account for product or market-specific conditions, this perspective was not always shared by local actors.

The precise manner and extent to which this idea of transnational advertising standardization was pursued differed between companies. While *Philips's* federated structure conceded significant autonomy to national organizations, key individuals at *Telefunken* and *Braun* were committed to shaping and implementing cohesive styles in the 1960s and 1970s respectively: Consumers could have encountered ads that presented the *Telefunken* or *Braun* brand in a similar manner irrespective of the advertised product and advertising medium across national borders. However, this only applied with temporal and spatial constraints. Neither company achieved a sustainable, consistent implementation across all its communications. Consistency

in standardized advertising presentation afforded continuous, ongoing efforts with regression being a real possibility.

The notion of advertising standardization was polysemic: it could refer to media strategy, tonality, visual style, or product positioning. A fundamental distinction must be made between the outlined endeavors to create a transnationally valid corporate image style and product-related efforts of transnational standardization. These were separate threads pursued through different organizational channels for other reasons. Although they could coexist, transnational coherence concerning corporate image markers did not guarantee transnational coherence concerning elements of product advertising and vice versa. At least in certain cases, centrally developed product-related advertising conceptualizations, positionings, and argumentative approaches were paired with centrally produced, transnationally viable marketing material such as manuals or packaging for reasons of cost efficiency due to economies of scale. National advertisers and agencies built upon this with distinct but kindred advertisement designs and argumentative approaches, pairing those with market-appropriate sales promotion measures and media strategies.

This points to the boundaries of transnational standardization. French and German consumers could have read the same manual and even taken a product out of the same box, but fully identical advertisements seem to have been the exception. Given the national differences between media landscapes, distribution networks, languages, and mentalities, it was apparently deemed necessary to leave a considerable degree of national flexibility concerning questions of media insertion strategy, sales promotion measures, copy texting, or advertising imagery. This also meant some measures of coordination and standardization only made sense on a national scale, such as the coordination of insertion patterns between product advertisers or the provision of templates to local retail partners. Pursuing transnational coherence in advertising was hence not an all-encompassing endeavor, as certain aspects necessitated locally adapted approaches. Standardization in advertising was hence not a binary goal but a spectrum varying in scope, format, and intensity.

Concerning the analytical limits of the case studies presented in the first chapter of this part, it must be noted that far from all consumer electronics companies were as transnationally active as *Philips*, *Telefunken*, or *Braun* during the long 1960s. While other consumer electronics companies such as *Loewe* were also interested in “more European and internationally oriented advertising materials”, and in improving the cooperation between their domestic advertising

agency and the company's foreign partners and their agencies in the early 1970s,⁶⁸⁴ the questions of transnational standardization treated here would not have been as exigent for consumer electronics companies that solely or chiefly competed in one market, which saw export as more of an outlet for excess production capability, or whose transnational integration was simply not yet as advanced. Transnational standardization evidently presupposed international presence. However, forging partnerships or building up subsidiaries to establish a noticeable brand presence in a foreign market through advertising and distribution networks was a complex and costly endeavor contingent on market-specific circumstances. During the long 1960s, this resulted in an asymmetrical process of market entry and subsequent alignment in the European consumption of consumer electronics which of course also affected the corresponding advertising.

The European Common Market had an enormous impact on the presence of German consumer electronics in France, but not the other way around. For the French subsidiaries and partners of German brands, the new trade rules of the EEC brought about their "true commercial departure".⁶⁸⁵ They experienced rapid growth in the first half of the 1960s, establishing themselves on the market by increasing imports, expanding their distribution networks, building up support structures, and intensifying their advertising and sales measures. Both *Grundig* and *Telefunken* identified nationwide advertising as a particularly crucial element to ensure their brand's enduring success in the new market. As a result of *Consten's* and *Telefunken France's* efforts, German consumer electronics products would have seen a sharp increase in availability in retail stores throughout France, while the brands became much more present in the lives of French consumers through advertising in media and at the point of sale. These advertising and sales measures were tailored to the brand's position on the new market, leading to a one-sided convergence in consumption concerning brand and product availability between the German and French consumer electronics markets, but an enduring divergence in the exact configuration of advertising.

Crucially, the European Common Market also led to unintended transnational convergences: like the subsidiaries and partners of German brands, parallel importing companies got their start with the abrogation of French import quotas, following a similar upward trajectory concerning revenue and transnational trade during the early 1960s. As German consumer electronics companies did not provide the same value for money to their domestic wholesalers and their

⁶⁸⁴ Beyer to mailing list (1972, February 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Einladung unserer Werbeagentur nach Gut Schlickerried/Oberbayern*, 3. – 5. März 1972. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972, p. 2. In the original German: "mehr europäisch und international aufgemachte Werbemittel".

⁶⁸⁵ Consten (1964, February 21). *Mémoire de la société Consten concernant l'exposé des griefs retenus par la Commission de la C.E.E.* HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 3. In the original French: "le vrai départ commercial".

French subsidiaries or partners, parallel importers could offer products of the same make to retailers for lower prices while profiting from the nationwide advertising *Consten* and *Telefunken France* were required to conduct for *Grundig* and *Telefunken* respectively. Parallel imports led to new connections between French retailers and German wholesalers and prompted new sales and advertising efforts by intermediaries and French retailers commercializing parallel imported products. These were fundamentally different from the approaches taken by the subsidiaries and partners of German brands, which in turn needed to adjust their marketing strategies or budgets in response to the new market environment.

This sequence of events demonstrates that transnational transfers could be unpredictable and highly dependent on external factors: the continued existence of parallel imports hinged on decisions by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Communities. It also highlights that there was a disconnect between the product portfolio and the advertising and sales measures of *Telefunken France* or *Consten* and the product offer and the advertising and sales measures for *Telefunken* and *Grundig* products in 1960s France: French consumers might have seen *Grundig* brand advertising financed by *Consten*, to then go out and buy a *Grundig* tape recorder their local retailer had bought through *UNEF*. The Europeanization of consumption was not expedited by politics and multinational companies alone; it is crucial to also consider the agency of the other actors shaping the European marketplace.

Although domestic production continued to dominate the market, French consumers would have increasingly encountered German consumer electronics in their local retailer's shop windows during the first half of the 1960s, as well as in ads in the magazines they were reading. Some of these products sold under German branding were produced in Germany, others in France – oftentimes, consumers would have had no way to know, as companies actively tried to hide a product's provenance. Similarly, consumers often would not have known if they were offered a parallel imported product, or one sold by the partner or subsidiary of the German brand. In many cases, it also would not have made a difference. But in others, for instance in the context of customer service, or if it was a radio unadjusted to the French market, it might have. There also seem to have been regional differences concerning the prevalence of parallel imported products; the advertising and sales measures consumers were exposed to would have varied accordingly. Consumers in France and Germany would have thus encountered the same German consumer electronics brands, but the French consumer experience with a German brand's products, after-sales service, and advertising was nonetheless co-determined by the local market environment.

The findings of the second chapter nuance the conclusion drawn from the first: advertising was shaped by organizational structures on a transnational scale in multinational companies; but it also remained contingent on national market environments. While there was a clear trend toward transnational convergence during the long 1960s concerning the standardization of advertising and marketing across the many parts of multinational consumer electronics companies, it would be exaggerated to speak of a convergent consumer experience; advertising exposure also remained closely tied to national (or local) market conditions in Western Europe. Together, the chapters demonstrate that consumer electronics advertising in the long 1960s was interlinked with market environments, strategic considerations, and company-internal dynamics, which, in turn, were shaped by a complex interplay of national and transnational developments and processes. This notably also applied to advertising and marketing strategies for individual devices, product groups, and target audiences.

3 From Concept to Consumer. Marketing and Advertising Strategies for Consumer Electronics in Germany and France

Throughout the long 1960s, consumer electronics companies continuously strove to interest potential customers in Germany and France in their product portfolios and entice them to purchase devices. As ownership rates of consumer electronics proliferated in these Western European societies of mass consumption during this timeframe, the channels, means, and methods companies used to reach consumers diversified. Consumer electronics companies devised comprehensive mass marketing strategies to make new products widely known, developed iterations of reoccurring product group advertising campaigns, and conceived targeted advertising, sales promotion, and distribution approaches for consumer subgroups. The following part aims to not only map this diversity but to also identify overarching patterns shaping German and French consumer experiences with consumer electronics advertising.

The part comprises an array of empirical case studies that trace the marketing efforts of consumer electronics companies in the mid-1960s for devices, product groups, or target groups. This tripartite structure is derived from the sources: companies devised marketing campaigns, advertising approaches, and sales measures by taking individual media devices, product groups, or target groups as the respective starting points for their considerations. These case studies provide a cross-sectional view of what consumer electronics marketing, advertising, and promotional efforts looked like in practice. Following the case studies, the focus shifts to identifying quantitative patterns and qualitatively exploring structural logics shaping consumer electronics advertising strategies and product positionings across individual cases and for the long 1960s as a whole. To explore this key tension between diverse approaches and common characteristics, the part is structured into four chapters – which each examine different aspects, albeit through a shared transnational perspective.

The first chapter contrasts the development processes and marketing approaches of two consumer electronics devices manufactured by the German consumer electronics company *Telefunken*: an automatic record changer, whose launch was ultimately called off after years of development, and an automatic tape recorder, which was introduced to the market with an elaborate, large-scale marketing campaign. This chapter delineates the role of advertising and marketing in product failure and success. It further shows that advertising approaches could be closely connected to the device that was to be advertised and highlights just how intertwined advertising was with other marketing elements – such as public relations or sales measures.

The second chapter then moves to the level of product group advertising campaigns. Based on *Philips France's* B/W television set campaigns in the early 1960s, it is demonstrated that advertising campaigns for a certain product group could draw on common argumentative base-themes across years given a relatively stable market environment while also showing that technological advantages could prompt temporary deviations from an overall theme. In addition to this focus on the argumentative approach, the chapter also investigates how campaign-compositions changed over time as the media ensemble evolved.

The third chapter investigates how companies tailored their advertising to consumer segments not only in tone and argumentation but also by adjusting communication channels and devising custom advertising material. The chapter takes a multi-faceted approach to the topic by investigating targeted measures for migrant workers, motorists, language-learning institutions, and spatially segmented audiences in German urban areas and the French countryside. In doing so, the chapter provides a perspective on consumer electronics advertising and sales measures that happened partially or completely outside of mass media advertising channels, examines the role of alternative distribution networks, and explores the crucial interrelation of product features and target groups. It is demonstrated that not everything was advertised to everyone, and that advertisers highlighted different facets depending on the audience.

Building upon the diversity of arguments and approaches established in the German and French case studies in the first three chapters, the last chapter then shifts perspective: its central aim is to identify overarching patterns across the diversity of advertising approaches, campaign configurations, and product positionings outlined in the previous three chapters. This is done in two steps. First, the chapter investigates structural characteristics shaping consumer electronics advertising. It is argued that consumer electronics products as a particular class of durable, mass-produced consumer goods usually shared certain features that translated into fundamentally similar advertising and sales solutions across brands or devices. In a second step, the chapter approaches the topic of structural similarities through a quantitative analysis of German and French illustrated magazine advertisements published between 1959 and 1974 in the magazines *Stern* and *Paris Match*. This comparative, longitudinal perspective on consumer electronics advertising allows to unearth macro-level trends concerning advertising rhythms and the evolution of visual design across a large set of mainstream consumer electronics advertisements not readily visible in qualitative source material.

Given the part's relatively broad scope and ambition to simultaneously address diversity and recurrent patterns, it necessarily draws on a wide array of sources, such as company-internal documents (mainly pertaining to the consumer electronics manufacturers *Telefunken* and

Philips), trade publications, statistics, individual advertisements, brochures, and a dataset of 1.622 consumer electronics advertisements from the illustrated magazines *Stern* and *Paris Match*. Company-internal sources, which allow to trace product development processes, advertising budgets, targeted advertising measures using non-mainstream channels, and full marketing campaigns, are crucial throughout the part – except for the last subchapter, which primarily bases its argumentation on the quantitative dataset. A transnational perspective is maintained throughout the part, insofar as the source material permits. Yet, as the first chapter will already demonstrate, consumer electronics advertisers in the long 1960s often adopted a predominantly national perspective.

3.1 Marketing Individual Devices: the Failure of *Telefunken*'s Record Changer *TW 517* and the Success of its Tape Recorder *Magnetophon Automatic*

In the early 1960s, *Telefunken* developed an automatic record changer and an automatic tape recorder. Both products were based on novel technical solutions – but while the tape recorder would go on to be quite successful, the record changer never even made it into the hands of consumers. This chapter uses these two devices and their contrasting product life cycles as case studies to describe and analyze market introduction processes of consumer electronics devices in the 1960s. Special emphasis is placed on the role of *Telefunken*'s marketing department. The central aim of these two empirical, source-driven case studies is to demonstrate the interconnectedness of marketing deliberations and measures with the design and technical conception of the devices in question. In other words, it will be shown that an automatic tape recorder would be marketed quite differently than a bar of soap, for instance – but, more importantly, also than a comparable non-automated tape recorder. Internal company documents and published forms of product communication, such as magazine advertisements or brochures, are the main types of sources used in this chapter. Inspiration for this approach comes from Benjamin Burkhart's observation that

“[...] the relevant research on music media devices in particular is usually based on the analysis of the producer's intentions as conveyed by the media – i.e. advertising – while the actual intentions of those responsible for the product are part of heuristic analytical models but are not examined on the basis of ethnographic surveys or historical sources. This is a desideratum of object research in cultural studies.”⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸⁶ Burkhart, 2021, p. 155. In the original German: “Nichtsdestotrotz stützen sich gerade die einschlägigen Forschungsarbeiten zu apparativen Musikmedien für gewöhnlich auf die Analyse der medial vermittelten Herstellerintentionen - sprich Werbung -, während die tatsächlichen Absichten der Produktverantwortlichen zwar Teil heuristischer Analysemodelle sind, aber nicht auf Basis ethnografischer Erhebungen oder historischer Quellen untersucht werden. Hier ist ein Desiderat der kulturwissenschaftlichen Objektforschung zu attestieren.”

The first device-centered case study analyzes the reasons why the market introduction of *Telefunken*'s automatic record changer was called off despite years of development in the first half of the 1960s. In doing so, the only comparable device on the market and its market positioning is discussed, as well as the involvements of *Telefunken*'s marketers in the internal development of the record changer, such as recursive market research tests for example. Particular attention is given to the 1962 marketing plan for the device, as it showcases how deeply marketing strategies could be intertwined with the materiality and usage possibilities of the physical object that was to be marketed. Overall, this first subchapter demonstrates that the device's unique design and technical conception, the marketing department's strategy proposal, and the larger market environment respectively all played pivotal and interconnected roles in shaping the device's demise. While commercial failures are worthy subjects of study in their own right,⁶⁸⁷ the history of this consumer electronics device is especially interesting as it did not even get the chance to fail (or succeed) on the market.

The second and more in-depth case study on the automatic tape recorder revolves around the market launch that followed its successful development. A focus is thus put on events that took place in the year 1962 when the product was introduced to market. It is detailed how the rollout was prepared, what measures were taken after the product was made available for sale, and to what extent the launch marketing strategy devised by *Telefunken*'s marketers was linked to the device's design and technical conception. These topics are addressed each for public relations, advertising and marketing measures aimed at retailers, mass media advertising, and advertising and sales measures for consumers at the point of sale, which are shown to have been the main points of concern for a consumer electronics product launch at the time.

Then, the advertising costs and priorities of the tape recorder's market introduction are examined, including of the perspective of *Telefunken*'s German regional branch offices, and the device's success is ascertained. Subsequently, indications are given regarding the potential impact of the marketing measures on individual consumers. Thereafter, a comparison is drawn to the tape recorder marketing by the German branch of *Philips* to show that certain aspects of *Telefunken*'s marketing campaign were rather unique, while others were shaped by the general features of tape recorders as an overall class of devices. Lastly, the analytical scope is broadened to a transnational level. By analyzing how the device was advertised on the French market, similarities and discrepancies between the German and French approaches are unearthed and explained.

⁶⁸⁷ Weber, 2008, p. 81.

3.1.1 Understanding Product Failure. Market Environment, Product Design, and Marketing Planning for the *TW 517*

3.1.1.1 *Philips's Success with the Automatic Record Player Mignon*

To understand the failed product development of *Telefunken's* automatic record changer, it is necessary to consider the only comparable product line available on the German market at the time: *Philips's Mignon* record player series, whose first iteration was launched in 1956. The *Mignon* was remarkable because it functioned fully automated: the user only had to insert a 17-cm (7-inch) vinyl disc into the slot of the box-like *Mignon*, and the device did the rest on its own, automatically ejecting the disc once it had played it. The mechanism was inside the device's chassis. Users thus did not manually position the needle of the record player on the disc. It only had one button. When pressed, the device would eject the disc. The automation meant that the *Mignon* itself was exceptionally simple to use, making it "the ideal record player for technically inept Phono-friends, for children, and for those whose hands already shake a bit [...]" according to the trade magazine *Funkschau*. Its automation made the device a novelty on the German market. However, this first iteration of the concept of an automatic record player still needed to be connected to the electric grid by cable, and to a radio which would serve as the external loudspeaker.⁶⁸⁸ The *Mignon* thus necessitated a rather elaborate setup.

In an ad aimed at retailers published in the *Funkschau* in 1957, *Philips* hence made no mention of mobility (see Figure 24). Instead, the company underlined the device's comfortableness, its reliability, its gentle handling of discs, and its "future-proofness" as the key arguments that retailers should use in sales conversations, asking them to showcase the *Mignon* in their shop windows and within the store. This was underlined by a graphical illustration of a sales situation depicted in the ad's corner in which the device was demonstrated to a female customer. *Philips's* argumentation effectively tried to address possible qualms consumers and retailers might have had with the *Mignon* head-on: in underscoring the device's reliability, *Philips* argued that it was a good thing that the mechanical workings of the device were inaccessible, as it meant that they were safeguarded from external influences.⁶⁸⁹ Similarly, the ad asserted that no human hand could be more careful than the *Mignon* in handling "sensitive" vinyl discs and that the device was future proof because the 17-cm vinyl disc would be "the disc of

⁶⁸⁸ N.N. (1956, November 3). Der Schallplattenautomat „Mignon“. *Funkschau*, 21, 883–884. In the original German: "der ideale Plattenspieler für technisch unbegabte Phonofreunde, für Kinder und für jene, deren Hände schon etwas zittern [...]" The *Mignon* may have been named in reference to the self-playing *Welte-Mignon* pianos popular half a century earlier. For the *Welte-Mignon* piano, see N.N. (1956, November 3). Und das elektrische Klavier, das klimpert leise... *Funkschau*, 21, 883.

⁶⁸⁹ Philips (1957, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Viele Gründe sprechen für Mignon. *Funkschau*, 9, 243. In the original German: „Zukunftssicherheit“.

tomorrow”.⁶⁹⁰ These framings sought to turn the device’s weaknesses – being a black box that could only play one type of disc, and which necessitated users to relinquish their agency and trust that the device did not damage their records – into strengths.

Viele Gründe sprechen für

Mignon





Warum ist Philips Mignon, der neue M 45-Phono Automat, in kurzer Zeit zu einem Verkaufsschlager geworden? Warum entscheiden sich immer mehr Schallplatten-Freunde für dieses moderne Abspielgerät? Es gibt viele Gründe, die für Mignon sprechen, Gründe, die auch Ihr Verkaufsgespräch zu einem überzeugenden, sachlich fundierten Gespräch werden lassen. Zeigen Sie Ihren Kunden Philips Mignon! Schaufenster und Verkaufstisch bieten genügend Platz für eine Sonderdekoration mit Mignon – dem Phono-Automaten der Zukunft!

Philips Mignon ist in zwei Modellen lieferbar. Grundausrüstung **DM 74,-** mit Spannungswähler und 2-adrigem NF-Kabel. **DM 79,-**

Bedienungskomfort
Jeder kann mit Philips Mignon Schallplatten abspielen, ohne ein Schema für die Bedienung erlernen zu müssen. Weil Mignon sich selbst bedient, kann man nichts verkehrt machen.

Zuverlässigkeit
Die stabile Mechanik ist von außen her unbeeinflussbar. Präzise Steuerungselemente sorgen für die genaue Reihenfolge der Funktionen.

Plattenschonung
Besser als Mignon kann keines Menschen Hand mit den empfindlichen Mikrorillenplatten umgehen. Nur das etikettierte Mittelteil und der Außenrand kommen mit dem Gerät in Berührung.

Zukunftssicherheit
Es steht fest, daß die M 45-Platte hinsichtlich Marktanteil und Programmumfang die Schallplatte von morgen sein wird. Ihre Vielseitigkeit wird ihr – und damit auch Mignon – unter allen Musikfreunden steigende Beliebtheit einbringen.

PHILIPS

FUNKSCHAU 1957 / Heft 9
202

243

Figure 24: Philips (1957, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Viele Gründe sprechen für Mignon. *Funkschau*, 9, 243.

According to the 1957 retailer advert, the *Mignon* was a commercial success.⁶⁹¹ Consequently, *Philips* elaborated on the fundamental design with new variants – like a version specifically designed for car usage.⁶⁹² By 1960, *Philips* offered the *Mignon MK 10* at a price point of 199

⁶⁹⁰ Philips (1957, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Viele Gründe sprechen für Mignon. *Funkschau*, 9, 243. In the original German: „empfindlichen Mikrorillenplatten“, „die Schallplatte von morgen“.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² Philips (1961, May). Advertisement. Tagline: NEU von Philips. *Funkschau*, 9, 441.

DM. The *Mignon MK 10* was battery-powered and had an internal loudspeaker, making it self-sufficient. This resolved a core design flaw of the original *Mignon* and enabled *Philips* to use mobility as an argument in its advertising. In the youth magazine *Bravo*, for instance, the *Mignon MK 10* was positioned as a dual-purpose device that could be used by the child of a household during the week to listen to their own music and provide the whole family with music during trips on the weekend or on vacation.⁶⁹³ In 1961, *Philips* released the *Mignon MK 35*,⁶⁹⁴ which was still featured in *Philips*'s product brochure for the general public come 1963.⁶⁹⁵ The fundamental concept of the *Mignon* was thus evidently successful enough to merit multiple iterations and to be actively marketed by *Philips* for years.

3.1.1.2 The Marketing Plan for *Telefunken*'s Automatic Record Changer *TW 517*

In the early 1960s, *Telefunken* planned to introduce a product to market which was conceptually similar to the portable variants of the *Mignon*: a record changer that could automatically play multiple 17-cm discs in succession; project name *TW 517*. Although it had a compartment to store several discs, the *TW 517* was designed as a portable product with an internal loudspeaker and the possibility to be powered not only through the grid but also on battery power.⁶⁹⁶ One of the first steps in bringing this product to market was the creation of a design prototype, which had been developed by a designer external to *Telefunken*. However, his design for the *TW 517* tested incredibly poorly in a market research study in February 1961 on “record players for young people” which *Telefunken* had commissioned from a psychologist. While the target group reacted favorably to the technical aspects of the device, its design was the subject of heavy ridicule. The participants of the study likened it to a “medicine cabinet”, a “piece of equipment of the German armed forces”, and to “army bread”. Other participants even called it “Lolita” or “Babydoll”, giving the product's design a problematic sexual connotation. These reactions led *Telefunken* to get someone else to rework the design. The resulting new variant was then again tested by the psychologist with the very same target group in March 1962, this time getting positive feedback on technical conception and design alike.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹³ Philips (1960, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Im Hause für den Junior. Draußen für die ganze Familie. *Bravo*, 20, 9.

⁶⁹⁴ Philips (1961, May). Advertisement. Tagline: NEU von Philips. *Funkschau*, 9, 441. This device was functionally close to the *Mignon MK 10*, which meant that *Philips* again emphasized the product's mobility in its advertising, Philips (1961, October). Advertisement. Tagline: Musik schenkt so viel Freude. *Bravo*, 42, 23.

⁶⁹⁵ Philips (1963). Brochure “*Freund der Familie*”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Philips/Philips-1963-Programm/>.

⁶⁹⁶ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁶⁹⁷ Kraume to Reuting (1963, May 20). Internal letter. Subject: *TW 517 – Entwurf von Professor Kersting*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. In the original German: “Abspielgeräte für junge Menschen”, “Arzneischränk”, “Kommißbrot”, “Bundeswehr-Ausrüstungsgegenstand”. *Telefunken* had already worked with the same

Telefunken's product development phase was thus of an iterative, recursive character. Prototypes were subjected to market research, the results of which then informed the following development, with new design prototypes subsequently being tested again. This was not unique to *Telefunken*: According to Hansen and Bode, such an involvement of market researchers during product development processes with the goal to take the opinions of potential consumers into account from the outset became a more widespread practice in German post-war consumer society.⁶⁹⁸ In the case of the *TW 517*, the second, more positive target group test meant that the process of introducing device to market could advance further.

The initial work in the market research and product development process for the *TW 517* had been conducted before the establishment of *Telefunken*'s marketing department *FM*.⁶⁹⁹ But the newly-founded department then became involved in the product launch process for the *TW 517* by November 1962 at the latest, when Rudolf Oerding, the head of the marketing department's division for market research, co-wrote a marketing plan for the *TW 517* with *FM*'s overall head Seydlitz. This plan detailed the potentials and pitfalls of the product and recommended further courses of action. It was sent to Kurt Nowack, the head of the consumer electronics business unit *G*, and to several members of *FM* and *GM*, the latter being *Telefunken*'s department for tape recorders and record players.⁷⁰⁰

This marketing plan for the *TW 517* first outlined the market environment and the product's competition. In doing so, the focus was put on the sole device on the market somewhat similar to the *TW 517*:

“It is well known that there is a wealth of cased record changers and players on the market whose function is commonly known in terms of their use and technology. They are no longer of interest to the user as devices, but only for their ability to produce music with the help of vinyl records. One exception is the Mignon from Philips, [...]”⁷⁰¹

psychologist, Günther E. Knuth, in 1961 to assess how *Telefunken* tape recorders were experienced by consumers, Knuth to *Telefunken GmbH*, Abteilung Marktforschung (1961, December 19). *Letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. See also Knuth (undated). Aktennotiz. Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse der psychologischen Studie über Tonbandgeräte. Enclosure of Knuth to *Telefunken GmbH*, Abteilung Marktforschung (1961, December 19). *Letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. The *TW 517* was not the only case where *Telefunken* involved an external partner in its product development – and such partnerships were not necessarily limited to design only. In 1963, *Telefunken* commissioned the “independent inventor” (“freier Erfinder”) Erich Rabe to develop a cassette recorder and a tape recorder. This was not a practice unique to *Telefunken*, as Rabe was also doing business with *Grundig*, Brückmann to Nestel (1963, September 13). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Hereinnahme von Fremdentwicklungen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

⁶⁹⁸ Hansen & Bode, 1999, p. 84. This recursive relationship between market research and development processes could also apply at a larger scale, i.e. between product generation cycles. As Heike Weber points out, consumer electronics companies applied learnings from market research on how consumers used a consumer electronics device during the development of future products, Weber, 2008, p. 57. See also Burkhardt, 2021, p. 135.

⁶⁹⁹ On *FM*'s founding, see chapter 2.1.1.2.

⁷⁰⁰ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁰¹ Id., p. 1. In the original German: “Bekanntlich gibt es auf dem Markt eine Fülle von Wechsler- und Spieler-Koffern, deren Funktion vom Nutzen und von der Technik her allgemein bekannt sind. Sie sind für den Benutzer

Apparently, the *Mignon* had not become quite as resoundingly successful as *Philips* had expected, which *FM* ascribed to an inadequacy in delivering on its key proposition: the *Mignon* promised to be the convenient choice – a proposal for which *FM* perceived a demand in the market – but in practice, users of the *Mignon* still needed to manually switch discs every few minutes. The *TW 517* was an improvement in that regard. It could change discs automatically, which made for a more convenient user experience. *Telefunken*’s marketing plan identified the *Mignon*’s technical conception as another reason why the product had fallen short of its great expectations, as it was fraught with two “psychological problems”: its black box design (*Telefunken* called it a “magic-box”), and the inherent fear of users that the device may damage their discs. According to *FM*, the *Mignon* had initially been plagued by defects which had exacerbated these psychological issues, and *Philips* had failed to adequately respond to these issues in its product conceptualization and advertising approach.⁷⁰² As has been shown above, *Philips*’s advertising to retailers in 1957 did in fact address precisely these topics head-on. It is however true that the consumer-facing advertising between 1959-1961 did not mention those two issues, choosing to focus on mobility and convenience instead.⁷⁰³ *FM*’s report did not fail to point out that these problems also applied to the *TW 517*.

The technical concept of the *TW 517* was not a groundbreaking innovation offering significant advantages over the competition. The automation made the product a bit more convenient compared to a normal record changer, but the product mainly offered novelty for novelty’s sake. This had significant implications for the marketing approach:

“The product’s concept solves a known problem in a completely new technical manner but does not offer any significant increase in benefit for the user compared to the previous solution (using a conventional record changer). It is therefore only the technical innovation as such that can trigger the impulse to buy, and it must therefore be the focus of the marketing concept.”⁷⁰⁴

According to the report, such an approach which focused on the technical novelty risked that the product would only be relevant on the market for a few years. To nonetheless make the

nicht mehr vom Gerät her interessant, sondern lediglich von ihrer Fähigkeit, mit Hilfe von Schallplatten Musik zu erzeugen. Eine Ausnahme bildet der *Mignon* von Philips, [...]”

⁷⁰² Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 1. In the original German: “psychologische Probleme”.

⁷⁰³ Philips (1959, November 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Musik zu hören – und zu träumen... *Stern*, 48, 91; (1960, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Im Hause für den Junior. Draußen für die ganze Familie. *Bravo*, 20, 9; (1960, December). Advertisement. Tagline: ...oder automatisch? *Bravo*, 50, 15; (1961, October). Advertisement. Tagline: Musik schenkt so viel Freude. *Bravo*, 42, 23.

⁷⁰⁴ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 2. Underlining in the original. In the original German: “Das Produktkonzept löst eine bekannte Aufgabenstellung auf technisch völlig neuartige Weise, die jedoch gegenüber der bisherigen Lösung (durch konventionellen Wechsler) keine erhebliche Nutzensteigerung bietet. Es ist also lediglich die technische Neuheit als solche, die den Kaufimpuls auslösen kann, und die daher im Mittelpunkt des Marketingkonzepts stehen muß.”

product a financial success, the market introduction would thus be of central importance. It would need to be well prepared – and require considerable financial investments. The report highlighted that this posed a risk, especially since *Telefunken* did not have a lot of experience with such an approach of introducing a product to market.⁷⁰⁵

The proposed marketing concept was supposed to “compensate” the product’s flaws. These were the limitation to 17-cm discs (as was the case for all iterations of the *Mignon*), the competition on price by regular devices, and a risk perceived by Oerding that the new technical concept of the device made it more susceptible to breakdowns. Based on these observations, the plan derived recommendations and statements about the device’s conceptualization, with the first being that the *TW 517* could not afford a reputation of being failure prone. It needed to be reliable, even in suboptimal conditions. In that regard, it was paramount that the device would not damage the user’s discs, as *FM* believed that these were usually more precious to the average user than the device used to play them.⁷⁰⁶ The report thus suggested that the device would need to have a manual that explained the technical processes very clearly, and that the chassis should be easily openable even while the device was running, allowing users to see its workings. This would not only help to combat the fear that the device might possibly damage discs but also enable owners of the *TW 517* to feel like a “magician”, as they would come to understand the device, while it remained a black box to others.⁷⁰⁷ Reflections about potential consumer usage patterns were thus a core element of the marketing concept.

Concerning the *TW 517*’s weakness of being limited to 17-cm discs only, the report proposed that the marketing concept should frame this drawback as an advantage by underlining that this enabled the device to have a smaller size, making the *TW 517* more handy than a common cased record player/changer. Such elements that set it apart from conventional devices were supposed to be a key part of the marketing efforts for the *TW 517*: owning this product – by virtue of offering a novel technical solution – should enable customers to “demonstrate” that they were “progressive and open-minded ‘people of today’”.⁷⁰⁸ This meant that the marketing for the device could not target the general public.

Rather, the product and any marketing efforts would need to be tuned specifically to the youth and the avant-garde. For them, the device should be a marker of “‘in-group’-identification” setting them apart from others. Color and form of the *TW 517* were to account for this.

⁷⁰⁵ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 2.

⁷⁰⁶ Id., pp. 1, 3. In the original German: “kompensieren”.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid. In the original German: “Zauberer”.

⁷⁰⁸ Id., pp. 3–4. Underlining in the original. In the original German: “[...], sich als fortschrittliche und aufgeschlossene ‘Leute von heute’ zu demonstrieren.”

Accordingly, *FM* required the device's design to convey the idea of transportability (as it could be powered by battery and cable), while simultaneously matching the aesthetic of a teenager's room.⁷⁰⁹ The market positioning of consumer electronics devices was thus also dependent on societal preconditions: this idea of designing the device to fit a teenager's taste concerning the décor of their personal space would have made considerably less sense a decade earlier, as it was dependent on young people actually having their own rooms – which only became a widespread phenomenon during the 1950s and 1960s.⁷¹⁰

Telefunken's reflection on the *TW 517* notably did not encompass the device's potential gender dimension. This is somewhat surprising given that Detlef Siegfried has argued that the *Mignon's* automation made for an ease of use that would have “significantly reduced the barrier to purchase particularly for girls” as female teenagers in 1960s Germany had been brought up to be less technophilic than their male counterparts,⁷¹¹ and becomes even more remarkable when considering that *Telefunken's* advertisers and marketers would then indeed go on and draw an explicit connection between automation and gender for its tape recorder *Magnetophon Automatic*.⁷¹² In the case of the *TW 517*, however, it rather seems as if the youth was considered one largely cohesive target group.

While gender thus played no explicit role in the marketing suggestions for the *TW 517*, *Telefunken's* marketers also concerned themselves with technical details: *FM* recommended paying particular attention to the device's capability to play distortion-free at higher volumes during the next development stage, as the marketing department expected that parties would be a relevant usage situation for the *TW 517*. This was a logical assumption given the product's characteristics as an automated, portable record changer targeting the youth.⁷¹³ This shows that manufacturers indeed strived to “anticipate specific usage choreographies” as Burkhart has hypothesized.⁷¹⁴ *FM* also demanded that it should be possible to connect the *TW 517* to a radio or a tape recorder and that the device should offer optional stereo reproduction of sound if another loudspeaker was connected. This was primarily meant as a marketing gag according to

⁷⁰⁹ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 3–4. In the original German: “‘in-group’-Identifizierung”.

⁷¹⁰ By 1955, less than half of all German teenagers had their own sleeping room, but this situation would slowly improve during the 1950s, Schildt, 1995, p. 159. This development of children and teenagers increasingly having their own room for the first time would continue during the 1960s, Schildt, 2007, p. 40.

⁷¹¹ Siegfried, 2006, p. 102. In the original German: “reduzierte die Anschaffungsschwelle vor allem für Mädchen erheblich”.

⁷¹² This is discussed in chapter 3.1.2.1.

⁷¹³ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 5.

⁷¹⁴ Burkhart, 2021, p. 133. In the original German: “[...], spezifische Nutzungschoreografien antizipiert [...]”.

the report. *FM* did not really believe that the device would be used for stereo listening, but *Telefunken*'s marketers wanted to be able to use that possibility in their advertising efforts.⁷¹⁵

Besides several small recommendations seeking to improve the user experience, the report further suggested marking the device's buttons with symbols to indicate their functions (instead of text) to make the device more easily exportable, and asserted that the device needed to be sold for under 300 DM, recommending a price point of around 275 DM. *FM* further proposed finding a new name for the *TW 517* that should have a tinge of progress while also being easily pronounceable in other languages. This was deemed to be of exalted importance. *FM* believed names to be a key element in shaping the image of a device.⁷¹⁶

The *TW 517* was based on a novel technical concept. The device thus required significantly more explanatory efforts than a regular record changer. To ensure the success of the market introduction of the *TW 517*, *FM* believed it would be necessary to conduct large-scale consumer-facing advertising and to collaborate with retailers in marketing the device (instead of trying to merely sell the device to retailers). This meant keeping the retailers informed about the advertising plans relating to the *TW 517* and supporting their sales efforts through eye-catching stand-up displays or decorations. In total, *FM* expected an advertising budget of at least 300.000 DM to successfully introduce the product to market while proposing that 30.000 units should be produced for its first year on the market.⁷¹⁷

During the product development phase, *Telefunken*'s marketing department *FM* thus developed a holistic marketing strategy for the *TW 517*. It encompassed advertising as one point among others – such as design, for instance –, while leaving concrete advertising tactics such as ad design or media choice aside for the time being. Remarkably, *FM* did not mention any specific marketing materials, media channels, or advertising slogans and designs in its marketing plan. Rather, *FM* proposed how to position the product on the market and put forth an argumentative approach and a launch strategy. These were all devised long before any advertising agency would have become involved, and it is reasonable to assume that these ideas would have served as the foundation for an advertising briefing if the launch of the product had actually come to pass.

⁷¹⁵ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler "TW 517"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 4–7. The assertion that stereo listening would not be important for the *TW 517* would have been related to the format. According to Röther, 17-cm stereo discs were relatively uncommon compared to stereo LPs and would only become available in the mid-1960s, Röther, 2012, pp. 311–312.

⁷¹⁶ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler "TW 517"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 4–7.

⁷¹⁷ Id., p. 8. Assuming that all these units would have been sold for 275 DM, this meant that the product was projected to generate a revenue of 8.250.000 DM through end consumer sales in its first year, with the proposed advertising spending amounting to around 3,6 % of that revenue.

What of the transnationality of the proposed marketing concept? There is no indication that foreign partners or subsidiaries were explicitly asked for their input in the product development phase. The market research centered on the German context, placing emphasis on the domestic market. However, the plan considered the possibility of exporting the product at two points: First, it recommended to give the device a name which should be easily pronounceable in other languages. Second, it suggested to use symbols for the device's user interface instead of (German) text, which would have facilitated sales abroad.⁷¹⁸ No considerations were made beyond that. However, there was little in the plan which was highly specific to the German context. In theory, the suggestions concerning the positioning of the device and the communication were easily transferable to other countries; the *TW 517*'s proposal of a more convenient user experience through automation could have had a similar appeal for French consumers, for instance.

3.1.1.3 The *TW 517*'s Further Development and Eventual Market Misalignment

Two days after the marketing plan had been put into circulation in November 1962, the product department *GM* held a meeting during which it was confirmed that the department would now take the next steps to get the device into a production-ready state. In doing so, *GM* would take *FM*'s suggestions and remarks into account. *GM* also accepted the proposal to produce 30.000 units in the first year of the product's lifecycle.⁷¹⁹ As an intermediary step in this process, *FM* expected *GM* to produce a limited trial run series, providing *FM* with 30 units for market tests. Based on those, *FM* would recommend a few last adjustments.⁷²⁰ Overall, it seemed that there was now a clear path for the market introduction of the *TW 517*, although there still was a degree of uncertainty regarding the product's design: In spring 1963, the head of the consumer electronics business unit *G* apparently even entertained the idea of returning to the initial design proposed by the external designer, asking Seydlitz to reevaluate it. The latter again dismissed it, pointing out that it had tested badly among the target group two years earlier.⁷²¹

Such issues notwithstanding, *GM* felt confident enough in the *TW 517* during the conception of its multi-year plan in October 1963 to set a market launch date; the 1st of October 1964. This date was chosen to enable *GM* to make the most out of the Christmas business. Despite having earlier on accepted *FM*'s proposed production figure of 30.000 units in the first year, *GM* now

⁷¹⁸ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler "TW 517"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 5, 7.

⁷¹⁹ Brückmann & Stauber (1963, January 15). *Protokoll der Fachgebietsbesprechung GM vom 29.11.62 in Hannover-Ricklingen, Göttinger Chaussee 76*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, pp. 7–8.

⁷²⁰ Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler "TW 517"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 4–7.

⁷²¹ Seydlitz to Nowack (1963, May 24). *Internal letter. Subject: Entwurf für TW 517*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

planned with less: 5.000 units in the last quarter of 1964, 15.000 units in 1965, and 8.000 units per year from 1966 to 1969. This was a considerable reduction. The foreseen advertising budget now apparently also fell short of the 300.000 DM demanded by the marketing plan, prompting *FM* to act. Within a few days, a member of *FM*'s market analysis and sales planning department *FM/MAF* who had been present at the meeting of *GM* proposed that he, Seydlitz, and the head of the product planning and design division *FM/PP* should jointly review whether *FM* was still willing to support the product's market introduction despite *GM*'s deviation from their proposals or if they should veto it.⁷²² *FM* swiftly came to a decision: during a subsequent meeting on the 10th of October between Seydlitz and the head of *GM*, the 1964 market launch of the *TW 517* was called off.⁷²³ In but a week's time, the market launch decision for the *TW 517* taken by the responsible product department had been completely reversed by the marketing department, as the former had not respected the requirements laid out by the latter.

Despite the postponement, *GM* finalized the development of the *TW 517* by January 1964. This, too, had taken longer than anticipated because *Telefunken* had encountered challenges in making the device fit for both battery- and grid-powered usage – which had been another stipulation of the marketing plan. By this point, *GM* had pivoted to spring 1965 as the new launch date for the *TW 517*. The device had now also been renamed to *Musikus 517* – following the same naming convention *Telefunken* used for most of its record playing devices.⁷²⁴ In that respect, *GM* did not follow Oerding's proposal to give the device a name which would be alluring to its target group. In other regards, however, *GM* now followed *FM*'s ideas meticulously: *GM* planned to start production a few months before spring 1965 to ensure that enough units would be available for purchase as soon as the planned advertising campaign started. *GM* also set a price point of 298 DM,⁷²⁵ just below the 300 DM set as the upper limit by the 1962 marketing plan. Thus, in January 1964, *GM* again accounted for *FM*'s wishes concerning the production figure and the proposed marketing approach, which meant a heavy focus on the moment of the product launch.

A planned release in spring 1965 meant that the device was years behind its initially targeted release schedule: Back in October 1961, eight months after the first market research test of the

⁷²² von Dellingshausen to Reuting (1963, October 7). *Internal letter. Subject: TW 517*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷²³ Hochhut to von Dellingshausen & Reuting (1963, October 11). *Internal letter. Subject: TW 517*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷²⁴ Goetz & Knicker (1964, April 7). *Protokoll über die Fachgebietsbesprechung des Fachbereiches GM am 16.1.64 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 7. In *Telefunken's 1966/67 line-up of record playing devices featuring in its brochure*, eight out of ten followed the *Musikus* naming convention, *Telefunken* (1966). *Brochure "report '66/67"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1966/>, pp. 24–27.

⁷²⁵ Goetz & Knicker (1964, April 7). *Protokoll über die Fachgebietsbesprechung des Fachbereiches GM am 16.1.64 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 7.

initial design of the device, *GM* had foreseen a release in spring 1963.⁷²⁶ Despite the considerable time and effort invested between 1961 and 1964, the *TW 517* was not released in spring 1965 either by all appearances. In fact, the device's launch seems to have been scrapped completely. There is no trace of it in any of the issues of the youth magazine *Bravo* released between 1965 and 1968, or in the 1965 issues of *Stern* magazine.⁷²⁷ Neither does it feature in *Telefunken*'s general product brochures for 1966/67, 1967, or 1967/68.⁷²⁸ It seems impossible that the *TW 517* released without using these channels, especially given that the youth target group had been identified as a cornerstone in the 1962 market concept.

The archival sources offer no explanation as to why *Telefunken* ultimately decided against the release of the *TW 517*. The market environment may have played a key role. Due to all the postponement and delays, the *TW 517* had to contend with a vastly different market in 1965 than during its conception stage: In 1961, Kurt Nowack, head of *Telefunken*'s consumer electronics business unit *G*, had been quite optimistic about the product's potential success, citing the high 17-cm disc sales numbers of the German disc industry as a reason.⁷²⁹ Nowack's assessment had merit for the situation in 1961: Vinyl singles had been the predominant sound storage medium of the 1950s,⁷³⁰ and the industry still sold considerably more singles than LPs in the early 1960s. But there was a discernible trend in the opposite direction. The number of sold singles declined each year between 1960-1964 while the number of sold LPs went up. By 1968, more LPs than singles were sold on the German market.⁷³¹ Notably, this trend also applied to the music consumption patterns of the youth, as pop and rock musicians increasingly focused on albums in LP format during the 1960s.⁷³² Further factors that may have contributed to *Telefunken*'s decision to not introduce the *TW 517* to market might have been the increasing

⁷²⁶ Nahs (1961, December 27). *Fachgebietsbesprechung des Geschäftsbereiches GM mit dem Vorstand am 24./25.10.1961 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 7.

⁷²⁷ All issues of both magazines for the given year(s) were consulted apart from *Stern*'s first issue of the year 1965.

⁷²⁸ Telefunken (1966). *Brochure "report '66/67"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1966/>; (1967). *Brochure "report '67"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1967-1/>; (1967). *Brochure "Report '67/68"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1967/>.

⁷²⁹ Nahs (1961, December 27). *Fachgebietsbesprechung des Geschäftsbereiches GM mit dem Vorstand am 24./25.10.1961 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 7. According to Nowack, the German disc industry sold around 50 million 17-cm discs per year. This seems to have been a rather high estimate. According to the figures published in the trade magazine *Musikmarkt* cited by Röther, the German disc industry sold 32 million singles and 4,5 million LPs in 1961 (it is unclear if the figure given by Röther also included exports), Röther, 2012, p. 311. For an overview of the German market for vinyl discs and cassettes, and for an introduction to the recording industry, see Müller, C. A. (2020). *Werk oder Ware?: Wirtschaftlicher Strukturwandel in der Tonträgerindustrie der Bundesrepublik zwischen 1951 und 1983*. Campus Verlag.

⁷³⁰ Faulstich, 2012, p. 229.

⁷³¹ Siegfried, 2006, p. 632.

⁷³² Röther, 2012, p. 314.

popularity of record players with record changer sales on the decline,⁷³³ or the introduction of the cassette recorder in 1963 as a new type of device, which would have at least partially competed in the same market.⁷³⁴

In 1957, *Philips* had claimed that the 17-cm vinyl disc was “the disc of tomorrow”. The company had done so to assure potential customers of the *Mignon* that the device’s limitation to that format would not pose a problem.⁷³⁵ By the mid-1960s, this was not the case anymore. The demands of the market had shifted. While the 17-cm single had not quite become the disc of yesterday at this point, the LP grew in importance each year. This would have made it considerably harder to convince consumers that the fundamental weakness of the *TW 517* was in fact an advantage because it made for a smaller size, as had been proposed by the 1962 marketing plan. Even young people, who had been identified as a core target group for the *TW 517*, increasingly would have opted to not buy record playing devices that could only play singles by the mid-1960s, as their consumption patterns evolved as well. It seems plausible that by the time the *TW 517* was finally ready for launch, it was no longer considered to be in alignment with the market’s requirements. The 1962 marketing plan had already deemed the device a risky business which would require considerable advertising investment upfront. By 1964/65, *Telefunken* apparently deemed these risks too high given the market environment. That *Philips* removed the portable *Mignon MK 35 T* from its program in 1967/68 is further evidence that the market had moved away from such media devices after about a decade.⁷³⁶ They had no place in the media ensemble anymore.

Despite the *TW 517* never actually making it into the hands of consumers, the case reveals a lot about the processes behind introducing a consumer electronics device to market: *Telefunken* commissioned an external designer for the *TW 517*, whose design was then included in an

⁷³³ In 1962, 735.000 record changers and 375.000 record players were sold in Germany. By 1964, record changer sales were down to 652.300 units while record player sales were up to 487.300 units, with *Telefunken* projecting that these trends would continue in the following years, *Telefunken Fachgebiet Phonogeräte* (undated). Chart “Spieler Inlands Umsatz in 1000 Stück”; (undated). Chart “Wechsler Inlands Umsatz in 1000 Stück”. Enclosures of Knörr (1965, June 29). *Protokoll Fachgebietsbesprechung Fachbereich GM am 19. 5. 65 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052.

⁷³⁴ Cassette recorders offered a competing profile: they were sold for a price point similar to the one planned for the *TW 517*, they were small, easy to use, and enabled portable music listening – while not requiring users to buy expensive discs, which was particularly interesting for the youth, Fruth, 2018, pp. 16, 125–126.

⁷³⁵ Philips (1957, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Viele Gründe sprechen für Mignon. *Funkschau*, 9, 243. In the original German: „die Schallplatte von morgen“.

⁷³⁶ The *Mignon MK 35 T* still featured in the 1966/67 overview catalog for German wholesalers, Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V. (Ed.) (1966). *Handbuch des Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Großhandels 1966/67*. Verlag für Radio-Foto-Kinotechnik GmbH, p. B 96. In the 1967/68 catalog, it was not mentioned anymore (an *Auto-Mignon* still featured), Redaktion der Funk-Technik (1967). *Katalog für den Rundfunk-Fernseh-Phonohandel 1967/68*. Verlag für Radio-Foto-Kinotechnik GmbH, pp. H 37–H41. The concept did not disappear completely with the *Mignon*, however. In France, *Lesa* advertised an automatic battery-powered record player (called *mady*) only fit for single vinyl discs as late as 1968, *Lesa* (1968, April 6). Advertisement. Tagline: Electrophone automatique sur piles avec introduction frontale du disque. *Paris Match*, 991, 125.

externally commissioned market research study pre-testing products among young people, conducted for *Telefunken* by a psychologist, which was followed by design adjustments and another target group test in a recursive process. The opinion of consumers could thus exert immense influence on product development. Consumer electronics companies actively sought out consumers' opinions and adjusted their products accordingly. In the case of the *TW 517*, it was especially the opinion of young people that mattered to *Telefunken*. This orientation toward the youth as a key target group was set in relation to the unique profile of the *TW 517* in the device's marketing plan written by leading figures of *Telefunken*'s marketing department – in a way, the device's target group was preordained by its materiality. The marketing plan subsequently influenced the further development of the technical concept and the design of the product by *GM*. With regards to those processes, the plan must be understood as a guideline that was not inviolable in every regard. But for the product launch itself, its assertions served as a baseline, with *FM* effectively vetoing a planned launch because it believed that *GM* had deviated too heavily from the marketing plan regarding the advertising budget and production volume figures it had set for the device.

The marketing plan itself is also worth discussing. It shows the wide range of topics marketers considered important for a successful product introduction, and how the topic of advertising was approached within marketing plans for product introductions. The marketing plan analyzed the market situation, specifically focusing on the only type of device on the market that shared similarities with the *TW 517* concerning the technical conception and highlighting its shortcomings from a user perspective. Based on learnings from *Philips*'s *Mignon* devices, and on *FM*'s assessment that the *TW 517* offered technical novelty without improving the user experience, *FM* devised a marketing concept for the automatic record changer. It centered around said novelty and around mitigating the flaws inherent to the product's technical concept. From these two core tenets, *FM* derived suggestions about the product's target group, life cycle, design, user interface, features, pricing, naming, production volume, and the related communication, advertising and sales efforts. These suggestions were developed in interrelation with one another.

This marketing plan was specifically tailored to the *TW 517* only. It took into account the market conditions and distribution structures of the consumer electronics industry, as well as the unique challenges associated with this specific product, which differed considerably from other record playing devices and necessitated more explanatory efforts. The deliberations of marketers would then in turn influence the precise configuration of the device, thus exerting influence not only on the communicational approach or market-oriented subjects like production volume but

also on design or technical conception. Such topics were understood to be intrinsically linked to how the device could be marketed. Overall, *FM* envisioned a market launch-centric strategy for the *TW 517*. Concerning advertising, it is remarkable that the product communication as proposed by the marketing plan was not only supposed to inform consumers and position the product in a certain way. Rather, the plan is testimony to a certain belief that clever messaging and framing were capable of shaping the public perception, as it suggested that *Telefunken*'s communicative efforts should try to frame a core flaw of the *TW 517* as an advantage of the device. *Telefunken* effectively wanted to use its advertising to confer qualities unto the *TW 517*, which were not inherent to the device's technical conception. In the end, this plan never came to fruition. But *Telefunken* brought another device to market in the first half of the 1960s whose defining characteristic also was automation: the *Magnetophon Automatic*.

3.1.2 Orchestrating a Product Launch: Marketing the *Magnetophon Automatic*

3.1.2.1 Market Environment, Materiality, and Marketing Planning

Around the same time *Telefunken* was reworking the design of the *TW 517*, in December 1961, the company was well into the process of developing a new tape recorder, the *Magnetophon Automatic*. Due to its technological conception, the *Automatic* was easier to use than the devices available on the market at the time. This made it a very promising product.⁷³⁷ The German industry had mass-produced tape recorders from the mid-1950s onward. Although this had led to lower prices for consumers in the second half of the decade, tape recorders had not penetrated the mass market to the same degree as radios or record playing devices: In 1957, only 166.000 tape recorders were sold on the German market. By 1959, this figure had risen to 297.000 devices – but this was still considerably behind the 1.142.000 record playing devices sold, for instance.⁷³⁸

Accordingly, only a very small percentage of households possessed a tape recorder in the late 1950s.⁷³⁹ Even with their prices trending downwards, the tape recorders of the 1950s were still considerably more expensive than a record player. In addition, they were usually rather unwieldy and complicated to use.⁷⁴⁰ Especially this last point hampered the popularization of

⁷³⁷ Oerding (1961, December 27). *Testbericht über das Magnetophon 62 "AUTOMATIC"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷³⁸ Röther, M. (2008). Pop Songs for the Tape Recorder, LPs for the Record Player? The Market Launch of Tape Recorders in West Germany and the Copyright Debate on Young Consumers' Practice of Tape-recording in the 1950s and 1960s. *Historical Social Research*, 33(3), 301–318, pp. 304–305.

⁷³⁹ Id., p. 305.

⁷⁴⁰ Fruth, 2018, p. 69. Another reason that impeded the proliferation of tape recorders in the 1950s and early 1960s was an unresolved copyright issue concerning the practice of privately using a tape recorder to record music off a radio broadcast or a disc. For a thorough account of this debate and the German legal situation, see Röther, 2008. This was of course a known problem among companies producing tape recorders, see Conrad, J. (1962, June). Zur Marktlage der Tonbandgeräte. *Funkschau*, 12, 314.

the tape recorder: A large potential customer base was deterred from buying a tape recorder because such devices were complicated to operate, as *Telefunken* pointed out in its magazine for retailers in 1961.⁷⁴¹ It follows that consumer electronics companies sought to improve the user experience by simplifying their media devices to improve their chances on the market. The *Magnetophon Automatic* seemed especially promising in that regard. Generally, the device fell into a category of tape recorders which the head of the department for tape recorders and record playing devices at the *Deutsche Philips* had dubbed “driver’s license free devices” (“führerscheinfreie Geräte”) in 1962. These were tape recorders that were comparatively simple to use, which had only one tape speed and came with an internal loudspeaker.⁷⁴² But these were not characteristics exclusive to the *Automatic*. To understand what really set the *Automatic* apart, it is necessary to consider what was innovative about the *Automatic*’s interface and its user experience.

The *Magnetophon Automatic* had three buttons (record, stop, play), a slider for the rewind/forward function, two different input sockets for radio and microphone, and a knob to adjust the volume of its internal loudspeaker when playing a tape (see Figure 25). Alternatively, a radio could be connected as an external loudspeaker. Its most groundbreaking innovation in streamlining the user experience was its ability to automatically regulate the audio level during recording. This set the *Automatic* apart from other tape recorders which required users to always keep an eye on the recording level indicator and manually adjust the level control if necessary. Automating this process eradicated the need for a control on the device’s interface. The *Automatic*’s users could be sure to succeed in producing a high-quality recording without having to fiddle with settings during the recording process. Notably, the *Magnetophon Automatic* nonetheless featured a recording level indicator. However, it fulfilled no functional purpose without the corresponding control. It had been retained “solely to fully convince skeptics” by allowing them to verify that the device was indeed recording correctly.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴¹ Röther, 2012, p. 355.

⁷⁴² Conrad, J. (1962, June). Zur Marktlage der Tonbandgeräte. *Funkschau*, 12, 314.

⁷⁴³ N.N. (1962). Magnetophon automatic – das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 6–8. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bocket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962. In the original German: “[...] nur noch zur vollständigen Überzeugung von Skeptikern vorhandene [...]”; N.N. (undated). *Script for retailer visits “das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975; Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V. (Ed.) (1962). *Handbuch des Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Großhandels 1962/63*. Verlag für Radio-Foto-Kinotechnik GmbH, p. B 125. For the physical object, see AEG (1962). *Tonbandgerät AEG Magnetophon Automatic*. DTMB, 1/1997/0753 0. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://berlin.museum-digital.de/object/46215>. The physical object held at the DTMB is the AEG branded version of the *Magnetophon Automatic*, which seems to have been identical to the device marketed under the same name by *Telefunken*, Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V., 1962, pp. B 98, B 125.

Although the automated audio level regulation was particularly convenient, the *Automatic* also introduced additional, smaller innovations that, too, helped to reduce friction: As soon as a user pressed the record button, the device would automatically detect whether a microphone or radio was connected and adjust where to capture the sound from accordingly. This meant there was no need for a manual switch between the two audio input channels, which constituted a small but helpful quality-of-life improvement. In addition, the *Automatic* was always ready to immediately play or record as long as it was connected to a power socket (it could not be powered with batteries) due to a kind of standby feature. This was not the case for other tape recorders, which had a designated on/off switch, and would need 20-30 seconds after being turned on before being ready to play because their vacuum tubes first needed to heat up. *Telefunken* had thus managed to get rid of multiple interface elements through automating several steps in the *Magnetophon Automatic*'s usage procedure. Taken together, these improvements created a much simpler user experience: When the device was powered, had a tape inserted, and received audio input, a press on the record button was sufficient to produce a decent sounding recording.⁷⁴⁴



Figure 25: AEG (1962). *Tonbandgerät AEG Magnetophon Automatic*. DTMB, 1/1997/0753 0. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://berlin.museum-digital.de/object/46215.3_07135500696.jpg; © Deutsches Technikmuseum; License: CC BY.

⁷⁴⁴ N.N. (1962). Magnetophon automatic – das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 6–8. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bucket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962; N.N. (undated). *Script for retailer visits “das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975; Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V., 1962, p. B 125.

Reducing a device's complexity for the end-user by decreasing the number of interface elements and automating processes could considerably improve its chance for widespread adoption. As Andreas Fickers has pointed out in reference to the technological advancement of 1920s radio sets, "[t]he gradual development of automatic tuning devices, then, was an indispensable condition for the radio set to transform from a tinkerer's or amateur's medium to a mass medium."⁷⁴⁵ As will be shown below, the *Magnetophon Automatic*'s key marketing proposition accordingly emphasized its user-friendly handling, with *Telefunken* seeking to target new groups of consumers previously put off tape recorders due to their complexity.

Following the same approach as for the *TW 517*, *Telefunken* conducted market pre-tests for the *Automatic*. The device was included in a psychological market research study, and *Telefunken*'s market researcher Rudolf Oerding also tested the device with people he privately knew and collected their opinions. Based on the feedback gathered from this qualitative market research, Oerding gave recommendations regarding the device's user interface and usability, its design, price, name, target group, and the content of the user manual. Many of his proposals aimed to improve the experience of casual users with the device, although he also touched upon the topic of marketing and advertising: he believed that *Telefunken* should seek to appeal to non-technophilic consumers with the *Magnetophon Automatic*. To achieve this, *Telefunken* should take inspiration from the advertising campaigns for automatic cameras.⁷⁴⁶

Tape recorders had been repeatedly equated to cameras in discourse during the 1950s: books that instructed enthusiasts how to best make use of a tape recorder drew parallels between the two, and ads positioned tape recorders as devices with which consumers could record "an acoustic family album".⁷⁴⁷ But Oerding more specifically referred to the technological development the compact camera had gone through in the 1950s. During this decade, compact cameras had become in large demand among German consumers. However, if users wanted to produce a well-made color photograph, they needed to manually adjust the settings of their camera, making the devices not completely intuitive to use. This pushed companies like *Agfa* to focus their research and development efforts on automation in order to further broaden the potential user base for its cameras – and in 1959, *Agfa* released the first fully automated compact camera, the *Agfa Optima*, which became a success for the company, as it unburdened its users

⁷⁴⁵ Fickers, 2014, p. 41.

⁷⁴⁶ Oerding (1961, December 27). *Testbericht über das Magnetophon 62 "AUTOMATIC"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁴⁷ Bijsterveld, K., & Jacobs, A. (2009). Storing Sound Souvenirs: The Multi-Sited Domestication of the Tape Recorder. In K. Bijsterveld & J. van Dijck (Eds.), *Sound Souvenirs. Audio Technologies, Memory and Cultural Practices* (pp. 25–42). Amsterdam University Press, pp. 25–26, 29.

from having to engage with topics like shutter speed or aperture.⁷⁴⁸ As will be shown, *Telefunken* would heavily draw on this motif of equating the *Automatic* to an automatic camera in its outward communication about the device. Corresponding to his conviction that the *Automatic* was a development step for the tape recorder market equivalent to the automatic camera, Oerding believed that this should also be reflected in its design:

“Our marketing idea of releasing a completely new device for a completely new group of buyers will be significantly diluted if we don't also find a completely new ‘face’. For both retailers and consumers, the revolutionary innovation on the inside can only be made credible by novelty on the outside.”⁷⁴⁹

This sentiment that it would have been preferable to give the *Magnetophon Automatic* a new design to also set it apart visually was shared by *FM*'s head Seydlitz. However, this had apparently not been possible due to time constraints in the product's development. Instead, the design of the previous 76er-series was reused for the *Automatic*.⁷⁵⁰ Despite this, *Telefunken* apparently believed that the device had broad commercial appeal. This belief extended to the device's gender dimension. According to Seydlitz, the *Magnetophon Automatic* should appeal to men and women alike.⁷⁵¹ This was rather unusual for a tape recorder at the time. Conventional tape recorders were gendered devices: As per market research presented at the 1962 Hannover fair by the head of the department for tape recorders and record playing devices of the *Deutsche Philips*, tape recorders were exclusively used by one male member of a given household in over 70 % of cases.⁷⁵²

In accordance with such expectations, *Telefunken* dedicated significant production capacities to the *Automatic*. In a letter from the 6th of March 1962, Seydlitz pointed out that every fourth device produced by one specific production plant of *Telefunken* in the following year would be an *Automatic*. This meant that the device “must become a hit.”⁷⁵³ To put this into precise figures, *Telefunken* projected to sell 8.000 units abroad and 25.000 units on the German

⁷⁴⁸ Fengler, S. (2006). „Den Markt klar im Sucher !?“ Krise und Niedergang des Amateurkamerageschäfts der Agfa-Gevaert AG in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren. *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook*, 47(2), 95–114, pp. 98–100.

⁷⁴⁹ Oerding (1961, December 27). *Testbericht über das Magnetophon 62 “AUTOMATIC”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 2. In the original German: “Unsere Marketing-Idee, ein ganz neues Gerät für einen ganz neuen Käuferkreis herauszubringen, wird erheblich verwässert, wenn wir nicht auch ein ganz neues ‘Gesicht’ finden. Sowohl für den Handel als auch für den Verbraucher kann die revolutionierende Neuerung im Innern nur durch die Neuheit im Äußeren glaubhaft gemacht werden.”

⁷⁵⁰ Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, March 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. *Telefunken* would then update the design for the *Magnetophon Automatic II*, which was released in 1964, *Telefunken* (1964). *Brochure “report ‘64/65”*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1964/>, p. 18.

⁷⁵¹ Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, March 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁵² Conrad, J. (1962, June). Zur Marktlage der Tonbandgeräte. *Funkschau*, 12, 314.

⁷⁵³ Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, March 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. Underlining in the original. In the original German: “Das Gerät muss ein Treffer werden.”

domestic market.⁷⁵⁴ In 1962, approximately 443.900 tape recorders were sold in Germany (including imports), with *Telefunken* (including sales made under the *AEG* brand) accounting for 81.400 of them – a market share of 18,3 %. Assuming *Telefunken* sold all 25.000 units of the *Automatic*, this would have translated into a share of around 5,6 % of the total domestic tape recorder market for the product. In addition to their domestic sales, the German consumer electronics industry exported 265.000 tape recorders that same year. 36.000 of those were *Telefunken* devices.⁷⁵⁵ While the company even produced a special variant of the device for the export market fitted in a differently colored casing,⁷⁵⁶ the commercial focus was clearly on the domestic market.⁷⁵⁷ For one, the planned domestic sales of the *Automatic* were more than three times higher than its foreseen sales abroad. And in addition, the device was planned to attain a higher market share of *Telefunken*'s total domestic tape recorder sales in 1962 (above 30 %) compared to its share of the company's exports (ca. 22,22 %) – of course assuming that the device's projected sales numbers were reached.

By the 6th of March 1962, *GM* and *FM* did not have everything figured out concerning the advertising concept for the *Magnetophon Automatic*,⁷⁵⁸ even though the device's release was drawing quite close by this point: its mass production started in early April,⁷⁵⁹ and it would be delivered to retailers from the 15th of May 1962 onward.⁷⁶⁰ In fact, the last minutiae on how to approach the market launch of the *Automatic* were discussed between *FM* and *GM* on the 9th of

⁷⁵⁴ Seydlitz (1962, March 8). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: GM. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975*. Seydlitz gave an estimation of around 600.000 tape recorders sold domestically by the German industry. This seems to have been too high based on the figures for 1962 given by *Telefunken*'s tape recorder department in 1965 (see footnote just below).

⁷⁵⁵ *Telefunken Fachgebiet Tonbandgeräte* (undated). Chart "Tonbandgeräte Inland-Umsatz"; (undated). Chart "Ausfuhr von Tonbandgeräten". Enclosures of Knörr (1965, June 29). *Protokoll Fachgebietsbesprechung Fachbereich GM am 19. 5. 65 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052.

⁷⁵⁶ The export variant was in a blue casing, Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, March 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. The casing of the German domestic market variant on the other hand was grey, Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V., 1962, p. B 125.

⁷⁵⁷ This strong emphasis on the domestic market was characteristic of the German consumer electronics industry in the early 1960s: In 1962, the industry produced consumer electronics devices worth 2,8 billion DM, with foreign markets receiving goods worth only around a quarter of that total (ca. 728 million DM), Schedl, 1972, p. 4. In later years, this ratio would become less lopsided, as consumer electronics companies deliberately chose to increasingly look toward export markets for their continued growth. Within the industry, there was talk of a "flight into the export markets" ("Flucht in den Export") in the mid-1960s, Seydlitz to mailing list (1966, September 26). *Internal report*. Subject: Marketing-Unterlagen und -Empfehlungen für die TELEFUNKEN Haupt- und Mehrjahresplanung 1967 – 1972. DTMB/AEG, GS 3055, p. 10. By 1973, the industry exported a bit more than a third of all goods it produced (in value), Schedl, 1975, p. 4. *Telefunken* itself would generate nearly half of its overall revenue through its exports and its foreign production by 1977, Grosse (1978, January 17). *Referat AEG-Telefunken Konzern: Expansives Auslandsgeschäft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5922. Accordingly, the projected sales ratio between the domestic and foreign markets might have looked quite different for a product introduction in the mid-1970s. It is conceivable that this shift influenced how German consumer electronics companies approached marketing planning and market research over time.

⁷⁵⁸ Seydlitz to Brückmann (1962, March 6). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁵⁹ N.N. (undated). *Script for retailer visits "das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁶⁰ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

April. It was only on this date that *FM* approved *GM*'s consumer advertising insertion plan for the *Automatic*, that smaller details concerning text or layout of its consumer-facing advertisements were adjusted, and that it was agreed upon how to precisely go about the initial announcement of the device.⁷⁶¹ Despite the importance of this market introduction, its planning was thus in a continuous state of flux right until a few weeks before the launch date.

The market rollout of the *Automatic* followed a 33-step plan which detailed what would need to happen in which order and on what precise dates between the 15th of April and the 30th of September 1962 (see Figure 26). In conjunction with other sources, this marketing plan makes it possible to reconstruct the course of events, the actors involved, and the role assigned to advertising in this complex, cross-functional process.⁷⁶² It should be pointed out that not every measure implemented by *GM* during the launch found *FM*'s approval,⁷⁶³ even though the overall process of introducing the *Magnetophon Automatic* to market seemed to have been closely coordinated between both departments.




Figure 26: Section of N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁶¹ Knicker (1962, May 14). *Telefunken GM Besprechungs-Niederschrift*. Gegenstand: *GM-Werbe- und Entwicklungs-Informationsbesprechung am 9.4.62*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976, pp. 1–2.

⁷⁶² N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁶³ For instance, *GM* sent out a brochure to retailers about consumer advertising measures for the *Automatic* without consulting *FM* beforehand. This led to an internal admonishment by *FM*: the brochure did not adhere to *FM*'s brand-presentation guideline to always present the *Telefunken*-lettering in blue in such publications, and, in addition, *FM* and *FM/Wb* critiqued that the quality of its design and presentation was not adequate. Accordingly, they demanded that *GM* – and more specifically its advertising division *GM/Wb* – improve their efforts to keep them in the loop ahead of time, especially given that *FM* was expected to take responsibility for any such outward communications, Seydlitz & Horlitz to GM Bereichsleitung (1962, May 25). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Händlerinformation Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. This circumstance may serve as a reminder that the market introduction of the *Automatic* happened at a point in time when *FM* had not yet been around for long, and that it had thus not become a completely entrenched habit by this point for other parts of the company involved in advertising to always consult *FM* instead of acting autonomously, see chapter 2.1.1.2.

3.1.2.2 The Market Rollout of the *Magnetophon Automatic*

3.1.2.2.1 Introducing the *Automatic* to Market: the Role of PR

Public relations was a key aspect in the market rollout of the *Magnetophon Automatic*. On the 25th of April – less than three weeks before the device would be delivered to retailers – *Telefunken*'s general press service sent out a first press release to announce the device. The day after, on the 26th of April, news agencies would first report on the device in text and image. Another day later, *Telefunken*'s technical press service would begin sending out technical information on the device to the trade press. Between the 5th and 10th of May, these trade publications as well as popular magazines with a technological orientation would also receive test devices. In a last step, on the 10th of May, regional press publications would be sent what seems to have been a prewritten article, for which they also would receive a matrix photo of the device two days later.⁷⁶⁴ Both of *Telefunken*'s press services thus made efforts in the weeks leading up to the device's release to place it in the news-cycle, providing specifically tailored material to the different types of press which sought to facilitate reporting.

Around the same time as the first public relations measures took place, *Telefunken* introduced the device to the world at the Audio Fair in London (26-29th of April). Immediately thereafter, between the 29th of April and the 8th of May, *Telefunken* was also present at the industrial fair in Hannover, for which the company had produced special brochures about the device.⁷⁶⁵ The Hannover fair did not only matter for professional contacts (i.e. with retailers or wholesalers), but it would have also been the stage for the first encounters of consumers with the device, as the Hannover fair was open to consumers who experienced its consumer electronics area as being "almost like a carnival".⁷⁶⁶ In addition, such fairs mattered for the reporting of the press: On the 27th of April, the Luxembourgish newspaper *Luxemburger Wort* published a short report on the presentation of the *Magnetophon Automatic* at the Audio Fair, for instance. This report, which the *Wort* had adopted from the news agency *United Press International*, highlighted the device as being the world's first automatic tape recorder and pointed out that tape recording technology was now following in the footsteps of the camera industry, which had released the first fully automated cameras in 1959.⁷⁶⁷ In its reporting on the presentation of the *Automatic*

⁷⁶⁴ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁶ Melik & Brandt to Loewe Opta (1960, May 2). *Letter without subject*. LOA Marketingunterlagen Dr. Meissner 1950-1973. In the original German: "[...], in der es fast wie auf dem Rummel zuing."

⁷⁶⁷ N.N. (1962, April 27). Erstes automatisches Tonbandgerät. *Luxemburger Wort*, 2.

at the Hannover fair, the trade publication *Funkschau* drew similar parallels to automated cameras.⁷⁶⁸

The public relations measures of *Telefunken* in the run-up to the release of the *Magnetophon Automatic* were thus successful in securing the device a place in the news cycle. Journalists seemed to have perceived it as a genuine novelty, meriting reporting even in the daily press, which *Telefunken* would not have necessarily been able to secure for a more conventional consumer electronics device. Even though *Telefunken* had made efforts to get all public relations material for its product to the press well before release, press publications followed their own schedules when it came to discussing the device: The *Neckar-Bote*, the local newspaper of the small German town Seckenheim, for instance, reported on “the world’s first automatic tape-recording device” with a delay of more than six months, on the 9th of November 1962. Its article used an image provided by *Telefunken*, and also highlighted that tape recording technology now went through a development akin to that of the camera industry three years earlier.⁷⁶⁹ As this parallel was repeatedly drawn by journalists of the public and trade press in Germany and abroad, it seems likely that they adopted this narrative from *Telefunken*’s public relations material after it had first been proposed in *FM*’s marketing concept.

3.1.2.2.2 The Vital Part of Retailers in the *Automatic*’s Rollout

The second group *Telefunken* needed to inform about the *Magnetophon Automatic* were retailers. They were the first outside of the company to whom the device was announced via a circular letter on the 16th of April 1962. Around ten days later, the retailers received the new issue of *Telefunken*’s retailer magazine *Telefunken Sprecher*.⁷⁷⁰ It featured a detailed article about the *Automatic*. In this communication to retailers, *Telefunken* drew on the motif of the automatic camera as well, explicitly drawing parallels between the tape recording and the photography markets in the narrative *Telefunken* proposed to its retailers. According to *Telefunken*, the tape recorder market was now in a similar spot as the photography market a few years back – and the *Magnetophon Automatic* was the equivalent to the automatic camera,

⁷⁶⁸ Kühne, F. (1962, June). Neue Ela-Technik. Spezialisieren – Transistorisieren – Miniaturisieren – Automatisieren. *Funkschau*, 12, 317–320. Other trade publications certainly also reported on the *Magnetophon Automatic*. The trade publication *Funk-Technik* published a short report on the device in its second issue for June where it presented the novelties of the Hannover Fair, Diefenbach, W. W. (1962, June) Magnetontechnik auf der Hannover-Messe 1962. *Funk-Technik*, 12, 421–425, p. 424. The *Funk-Technik* also printed a technical report on the *Automatic* written by a *Telefunken* employee. The *Automatic* even featured on the cover page of this issue, Knicker, W. (1962, July). »Magnetophon automatic«. *Funk-Technik*, 14, 471–473.

⁷⁶⁹ N.N. (1962, November 9). Das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt. *Neckar-Bote*, 2. Blatt, 1. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/newspaper/item/IPDBZ3EL3QS7TPZHLQ6PF7GPB237TWKL?issuepage=2>.

⁷⁷⁰ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

here to reinvigorate it.⁷⁷¹ The article sought to convince retailers of the narrative it proposed by explaining the significantly improved usability of the *Automatic*, and by claiming that a majority of those private citizens who had tested prototypes had not wanted to return their test-*Automatics*, even though they all had previously been opposed to purchasing a tape recorder for themselves.⁷⁷² This substantiated the narrative of the *Automatic* as being able to tap into new markets that tape recorders had previously been barred from. Similarly, *Telefunken* sought to convince retailers that the *Automatic* also appealed to female consumers (as had been the case for the automatic camera). Accordingly, the article underlined that the device's test-consumers "[...] repeatedly emphasized that especially the wives, who are otherwise so averse to technology, were able to operate the device with ease after the first brief skimming of the short operating instructions, which is almost exclusively comprised of pictures."⁷⁷³

In this issue of the *Telefunken Sprecher*, the company also announced its advertising and sales promotion plans for the *Magnetophon Automatic* to its retailers: *Telefunken* would provide them with stand-up displays for their shop windows, as well as a special print, which would explain the device to interested customers, and a new brochure for *Telefunken*'s tape recorders that specifically highlighted the *Automatic*. In addition, *Telefunken* would of course conduct consumer-facing advertising. The advertising approach the company had chosen reflected its belief in the broad appeal of the device: it had booked television advertising spots and placed advertisements in six widely read illustrated magazines. *Telefunken* communicated this to, in effect, use its consumer advertising to advertise to its retailers. The company sought to convince the retailers that they would adequately support them in their sales efforts, and that their local customers, too, would be reached by *Telefunken*'s advertising campaign. This is why *Telefunken* emphasized the campaign's size, estimating that it would reach well above 130 million advertising contacts (as some would encounter it multiple times) throughout Germany.⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁷¹ N.N. (1962). Magnetophon automatic – das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 6–8. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bucket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962.

⁷⁷² Ibid. Oerding's internal test report, however, makes no mention of such enthusiasm, Oerding (1961, December 27). *Testbericht über das Magnetophon 62 "AUTOMATIC"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁷³ N.N. (1962). Magnetophon automatic – das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 6–8. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bucket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962, p. 7. In the original German: "Wiederholt vorgehoben wurde die Tatsache, daß vor allem die sonst der Technik so abholden Ehefrauen das Gerät nach dem ersten kurzen Überfliegen der kurzen und fast nur aus Bildern bestehenden Bedienungsanleitung sofort spielend bedienen konnten."

⁷⁷⁴ N.N. (1962). Wir werben für Magnetophon automatic. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 21. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bucket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962.

Telefunken's regional branch offices would not only act as intermediaries between the departments of *Telefunken* and the retailers by passing on the brochure, special print, and shop window display to the retailers in their region after having received them in preparation for the product launch. Their salesmen would also play a key role in convincing the retailers of the *Magnetophon Automatic* ahead of the device's release. Between the 28th and 30th of April 1962, shortly after the retailers had been sent the *Telefunken Sprecher*, the branch offices would receive a script their salesmen were to follow in their interactions with the retailers in their region.⁷⁷⁵ This script was a five-page document detailing precisely how a *Telefunken* salesman should act and gesture during his presentation of the device, dictating word-for-word what he should say to the employee of a given retailer responsible for its tape recorder business (see Figure 27).⁷⁷⁶ This script was to be used during a salesman's visit to a retailer, with the goal to secure a purchasing order for the *Automatic*. In its argumentation, the script built upon the same ideas as the article in the *Telefunken Sprecher*. The salesman should bring up the parallel to automatic cameras and then focus heavily on what made the *Automatic* easier to use in practice than previous tape recorders. However, the script differed from the print publication in its mode of conveying this same information, as it was meant to be the basis for a live demonstration of the *Automatic*.⁷⁷⁷ This demonstration showcased the *Magnetophon Automatic* to retailers in a manner that was tailored to the features of the device, substantiating that companies considered the specific mediality and the user experience of a consumer electronics device when developing the advertising and sales measures for it.

⁷⁷⁵ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁷⁶ N.N. (undated). *Script for retailer visits "das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt

H a n d l u n g

T e x t

Der Telefunken-Reisende hat das Fachgeschäft betreten. Er führt ein Magnetophon Automatic mit aufgelegten 15 cm Spulen sowie ein Mikrofon mit sich. Das Tonband ist absichtlich um etwa 100 Zählwerkseinheiten vorge-spult. In dieser Lage des Tonbandes ist das Zählwerk auf 000 gestellt worden.

Der Telefunken-Reisende befindet sich in einem getrennten Raum oder in einer ruhigen Ecke des Ladens mit dem für das Tonbandgerätege-schäft verantwortlichen Mitarbeiter des Kunden. Er stellt das Gerät auf einen Tisch in der Nähe einer Steck-dose. Er nimmt den Deckel des Mag-netophon Automatic ab. Er führt den Netzstecker in die Steckdose ein. Er führt den Mikrofonstecker in die entsprechende Buchse des Magnetophon Automatic ein. Er überzeugt sich noch einmal, dass das Zählwerk auf 000 steht.

"Vom ersten automatischen Tonbandgerät der Welt, dem Magnetophon Automatic, haben Sie zweifellos aus unserem Tele-funken-Sprecher oder während der Han-nover-Messe schon gehört. Nachdem die Grossserienfertigung dieses Gerätes be-reits Anfang April begonnen hat und alle Erprobungen jetzt erfolgreich ab-geschlossen sind, kann ich Ihnen diese Neuheit heute vorführen.

Sie wissen, dass die automatischen Kameras den vor einigen Jahren bedenk-lich zurückgegangenen Kameraumsatz auf eine nie zuvor erreichte Höhe ge-bracht haben, weil viele Interessenten bei den herkömmlichen Kameras Scheu vor "zu-viel-Technik" hatten. Die Telefunken Marktforschung hat schon vor einiger Zeit ermittelt, dass für Tonbandgeräte genau das gleiche zu-trifft.

Figure 27: N.N. (undated). *Script for retailer visits "das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

This live demonstration for the employee would go as follows: The salesmen would set up the device in a secluded corner of the retailer's shop. Then, he would begin by reminding the employee about the tediousness of using a conventional tape recorder by detailing all steps

necessary to prepare such a device for recording and then contrasting it with the process of recording on the *Automatic*, which could be started at the press of one button. To underline this point, the script even included stage directions such as: “During this sentence, he taps his fingertips impatiently on the tabletop to dramatize the wait.” Subsequently, the salesmen would demonstrate the *Magnetophon Automatic*’s capability to automatically control the audio level by recording live on the device. Here, again, the script gave precise instructions not only for the text the salesman was supposed to record – which would show off this capability of the device – but also for the demonstration: during the course of this recording, the salesmen would need to raise his voice to levels of “enthusiastic screaming”, then lower the volume of his voice to whispering, before then starting to scream again. The live demonstration would then be followed up with an immediate replay of what had been recorded. This served as proof to the employee that the device was indeed capable of what the salesman had just highlighted.⁷⁷⁸

Long before any consumer advertising started, *Telefunken* thus made efforts to try and get the press to report on the *Automatic* as a technical novelty and informed retailers about the *Magnetophon Automatic*. However, merely informing retailers was not sufficient. To ensure commercial success, the company needed to convince the retailers of two things: first of the device’s merits, and second, that they would be adequately supported in their sales efforts for the device through consumer-facing advertising and the provisioning of advertising and sales material. Such measures aimed at retailers would continue alongside and after the device’s release. From the 15th of May 1962 onward, the *Magnetophon Automatic* was delivered to retailers. A day later, members of *GM/V*, the sales division of *Telefunken*’s tape recorder and record player department, went on a three-week lecture tour stopping at different retailers. And on the 15th itself, the retailers received a brochure about the consumer-facing advertising measures for the device in print and on television (see Figure 28),⁷⁷⁹ which detailed the insertion dates for both media to inform retailers “[...] when you can expect prospective customers for the Magnetophon automatic.”⁷⁸⁰

⁷⁷⁸ N.N. (undated). *Script for retailer visits “das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. In the original German: “Er klopft während dieses Satzes ungeduldig mit den Fingerspitzen auf die Tischplatte, um das Warten zu dramatisieren.”, “einem begeisterten Schreien”.

⁷⁷⁹ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁸⁰ Telefunken (1962). *Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “[...], wann Sie mit Interessenten für das Magnetophon automatic rechnen können.”



Figure 28: Telefunken (1962). Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic“. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

3.1.2.2.3 Advertising the *Automatic* to Consumers through Mass Media Channels

After the *Automatic* was already available in stores for a non-binding list price of 449 DM –⁷⁸¹ which was considerably more expensive than an average record player but rather moderate for a tape recorder – *Telefunken* also began to target consumers through an advertising campaign whose goal was to “make the Magnetophon automatic known on a national level”.⁷⁸² To do so, *Telefunken* had booked advertising spots on television and placed print ads in illustrated magazines. For its print campaign, *Telefunken* had chosen the magazines *Stern*, *Quick*, *Revue* (not to be confused with the Luxembourgish magazine of the same name), *Bunte Illustrierte*, and *Der Spiegel*, placing 5 ads in each (6 in *Stern*) over a total timeframe of 11 weeks between the 20th of May and the 4th of August 1962. The placements varied slightly across publications; sometimes ads were placed in consecutive issues, sometimes there was a gap of two issues in between. In devising this print media plan for the *Magnetophon Automatic*, ads had clearly not been scheduled individually for each publication. Rather, their scheduling and placement had

⁷⁸¹ Telefunken (1962, May 27). Advertisement “Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?“. *Stern*, 21, 117. This list price seems to have been raised later on. In the wholesaler catalogs of 1962/63 and 63/64, which also featured non-binding list prices for devices, the *Automatic* had been given a list price of 464 DM, Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V., 1962, p. B 125; (1963). *Handbuch des Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Großhandels* 1963/64. Verlag für Radio-Foto-Kinotechnik GmbH, p. B 132.

⁷⁸² Telefunken (1962). Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic“. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “Um [...] das Magnetophon automatic auf Bundesebene bekanntzumachen, [...]”

been developed in concertation and arranged across media platforms – presumably in an effort to maximize the number of contacts in the greater public across the 2 ½ months of this product introduction campaign.⁷⁸³ Overall, *Telefunken* estimated that around 45 % of the German adult population would encounter print advertisements for the *Automatic*.⁷⁸⁴

The print campaign exclusively featured the same ad in three versions, which had an identical text and differed from each other only through their slightly varied imagery. Each depicted the same young man in a suit: once sitting cross-legged,⁷⁸⁵ once standing,⁷⁸⁶ and once leaning back in a chair while smoking a pipe.⁷⁸⁷ Especially this version of the man reclining in the chair conveyed a (literal) laid-back attitude in handling the device (see Figure 29). In all three of those stances, he operated the *Magnetophon Automatic* by only using one finger to press on the recording button of the device. The text highlighted this very idea. It explained that the device would take care of the rest after pressing the button, leading to “100 percent correct recordings”. The advertisement explicitly positioned the device as the tape recorder for people that “dreaded ‘too-much-technology’”,⁷⁸⁸ i.e. that were not overly tech-savvy, and invited readers to call *Telefunken* to receive more information. *Telefunken* clearly put its advertising focus on conveying why the user experience of the *Automatic* differed from other tape recorders. There was, however, no reference to automatic cameras, which had been a mainstay in all of *Telefunken*’s previous communications about the *Automatic*. This again underlines that consumer electronics companies varied the messaging of their marketing idea in accordance with the chosen form of communication.

⁷⁸³ Only the *Stern* magazine featured ads in a regular, bi-weekly rhythm. All other print publications saw variations. When considered together, however, a pattern emerges: at least two out of five publications featured an ad each week. In four weeks, three of five did. An emphasis was put on the first few weeks after the introduction of the *Automatic*, as three of the four weeks which featured advertisements in three publications were planned for late May and early June, *Telefunken* (1962). *Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. The overall, cross-departmental pattern of *Telefunken*’s 1962 advertising in the *Stern* is discussed in chapter 2.1.1.3.

⁷⁸⁴ N.N. (1962). Wir werben für Magnetophon automatic. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 21. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bocket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962.

⁷⁸⁵ *Telefunken* (1962, June 24). Advertisement “Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?”. *Stern*, 25, 54.

⁷⁸⁶ *Telefunken* (1962, June 10). Advertisement “Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?”. *Stern*, 23, 110.

⁷⁸⁷ *Telefunken* (1962, May 27). Advertisement “Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?”. *Stern*, 21, 117.

⁷⁸⁸ *Telefunken* (1962, May 27). Advertisement “Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?”. *Stern*, 21, 117. In the original German: “Scheu vor ‘Zu-viel-Technik’”.

Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?



DM 449,-
unverbindl. Richtpreis

Magnetophon
automatic

Verbraucher-Umfragen haben bestätigt: Noch mehr Menschen würden sich ein Tonbandgerät kaufen, wenn sie nicht Scheu vor »Zu-viel-Technik« hätten. – Jetzt ist Schluß damit!

TELEFUNKEN präsentiert das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt: »Magnetophon automatic«! Ein Fingerdruck genügt alles andere nimmt Ihnen das »Magnetophon

automatic« ab – viel genauer als Sie es je von Hand her tun könnten! Sie erzielen 100prozentig richtige Aufnahmen. Dieses Tonbandgerät suchten Sie schon lange. Hier ist es.

Alles spricht für **TELEFUNKEN**

 Wollen Sie mehr über das »Magnetophon automatic« wissen? Rufen Sie Hannover 0511/74074! Der TELEFUNKEN Anrufbeantworter nimmt Tag und Nacht Ihre Wünsche entgegen. ● Die Aufnahme urheberrechtlich geschützter Werke der Musik und Literatur ist nur mit Einwilligung der Urheber bzw. deren Interessenvertretungen und sonstigen Berechtigten, z. B. GEMA, Bühnenverlage, Verleger, Hersteller von Schallplatten usw. gestattet.

stern 117

Figure 29: Telefunken (1962, May 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät? *Stern*, 21, 117.

In addition to the print advertisements, the *Magnetophon Automatic* was also advertised through a 30-second television spot *Telefunken* had developed together with the advertising agency *Gilde*.⁷⁸⁹ Although the content of the spot is unknown, its broadcasting patterns are not: the television ad for the *Automatic* was broadcasted a total of 31 times across Germany's regional television programs between the 17th of May and the 4th of July 1962. The number of placed advertisements varied between regional broadcasters (between 4 and 7). So did the placement dates. And not every broadcaster was included. Notably, no advertisements were placed in the program of the Bavarian regional broadcaster *Bayerischer Rundfunk*.⁷⁹⁰ This meant that

⁷⁸⁹ Horlitz to mailing list (1961, December 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Argumente für Fernseh-Spots GR, GM, Rö. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899*. See also Warnke to mailing list (1962, May 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbefernseh-Spot für Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. It is unfortunately unclear to what extent the *Gilde* was involved in developing the other advertising communications for the *Automatic*. An involvement in the design and layout of the print advertisements seems possible.

⁷⁹⁰ The placement dates in fact varied quite heavily. Even though the spot ran on the first regional network on the 17th, it would take until the 29th of May for the ad to be broadcast on the network of Berlin's regional broadcaster. Similarly, the last ad in the program of the *Hessischer Rundfunk* was placed more than a month before the very last televised advertisement overall ran on the network of the *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* on the 4th of July,

television set owners across Germany would have come in contact with televised advertisements for the *Automatic* not only in varying intensity, but also at different times – and in parts of Germany, they would not have encountered any. There seem to have been no radio or outdoor advertising components.⁷⁹¹

While the print advertising for the *Magnetophon Automatic* had been conceived as a concerted effort, its television advertising was rather fragmented. This was due to the non-centralized structure of German television, which also extended to its advertising buying. To buy spots, advertisers had to go through different companies for each regional broadcaster.⁷⁹² This exclusively regional character of German television advertising lasted until the year following the introduction of the *Automatic*, when the second German public-service television channel, the *ZDF*, started broadcasting nationwide from April 1963 onward.⁷⁹³ As there was an excess demand for television advertising space due to a limit on airtime,⁷⁹⁴ advertisers had less sway over the allocation of their spots compared to private print publications. This may help to explain the seeming randomness in when and where *Telefunken* advertised the *Automatic* on television. The structuring of advertising campaigns thus also depended on the media landscape – but more importantly, who would be reached by such campaigns did, too. Nonetheless, *Telefunken* estimated that their television campaign would reach an overall audience of more than 40 million people if 50 % of all possible viewers tuned in.⁷⁹⁵ This was a plausible, if maybe slightly overstated assumption. According to a nationwide survey from 1962, 21 % of German viewers tuned in often for television advertisements, and another 33 % did so seldom.⁷⁹⁶

3.1.2.2.4 Advertising the *Automatic* at the Point of Sale

Telefunken made considerable efforts to reach a broad public by trying to place the *Magnetophon Automatic* in the domestic and foreign news cycle and by subsequently

Telefunken (1962). *Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

⁷⁹¹ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975; Telefunken (1962). *Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

⁷⁹² Hans-Bredow-Institut (1964). *Internationales Handbuch für Rundfunk und Fernsehen 1964* (Vol. 8). Hans-Bredow-Institut, pp. D1–D12.

⁷⁹³ Dussel, 2004, pp. 238–239.

⁷⁹⁴ Fischer & Westermann, 2001, p. 64. This was not only a problem in the early to mid-1960s. In 1959/60, demand for advertising spaces on German television was around 30 % larger than the offer, Schmidt & Spieß, 1996, p. 131. According to a newspaper report from March 1962, German television broadcasters even denied around 70 % of all demands by advertisers at the time, N.N. (1962, March 10). *Deutsches Werbefernsehen beunruhigt die holländische Wirtschaft. Luxemburger Wort*, 16. By 1974, German advertisers still could not spend as much as they would have liked to on television advertisements, N.N. (1974, October). *Europe-tops in solving ad problems. Media Decisions*, 150–154. J. Walter Thompson Company. Advertising Vertical File, 1950–1994. Box 51. ADV – International Europe. Hartman Center, p. 150.

⁷⁹⁵ N.N. (1962). *Wir werben für Magnetophon automatic. Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 21. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bocket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962.

⁷⁹⁶ Schildt, 1995, pp. 297–298.

advertising the device in German magazines and through German regional television broadcasters, with the goal to inform the public about the device and to convince potential customers of its advantages. In the best case, this mass media advertising would have translated into interested consumers coming into retailers' stores to specifically ask about the *Automatic*. In fact, *Telefunken* explicitly set it as the goal of its tape recorder advertising in late 1962 to induce such behavior.⁷⁹⁷ But to truly make the *Automatic* a success, *Telefunken* needed to make sure that retailers showcased and demonstrated the *Magnetophon Automatic* adequately, which is why the company sought to facilitate both of these steps as well.

To that end, *Telefunken* had provided retailers with advertising and sales material (brochures and shop window displays) before the device's release.⁷⁹⁸ Consumers would thus have seen displays for the device in retailer shop windows across Germany and had the chance to receive further information through brochures once inside a store. In *Telefunken*'s brochure for its tape recorder portfolio, the *Automatic* was again introduced with the analogy to automatic cameras – an argumentation absent in its print advertising. In addition, this brochure provided consumers with a range of ideas for how they might use their tape recorders, like recording music off the radio or creating acoustical family memories (see Figure 30). The brochure even suggested to utilize a tape recorder to subconsciously learn for a test or a recital by listening to the text that was to be memorized in one's sleep.⁷⁹⁹ However, in many cases, all these advertising measures would not have been sufficient to make a successful tape recorder sale, as these were consumer electronics devices which were in much greater need of explanation and demonstration than radios or television sets.⁸⁰⁰ At the time, around two thirds of tape recorders were sold through specialist retailers. The industry attributed this partly to consumers' expectations that qualified personnel would demonstrate and explain the devices to them.⁸⁰¹

⁷⁹⁷ Warnke to mailing list (1962, December 11). *Internal letter. Subject: Reise-/Informations-Bericht: GS-Reise für Tonbandgeräte-Geschäft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 4.

⁷⁹⁸ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁷⁹⁹ Telefunken (1962). *Brochure "Tonbandgeräte Magnetophon 1962/63"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1962>, pp. 3, 10–13. It was rather common in the 1950s and early 1960s to advertise tape recorders by proposing a bunch of (creative) usage forms, Bijsterveld, K. (2004). "What do I do with my tape recorder ...?": Sound hunting and the sounds of everyday Dutch life in the 1950s and 1960s. *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 24(4), 613–634. See also Röther, 2012, p. 340.

⁸⁰⁰ Warnke to mailing list (1962, December 11). *Internal letter. Subject: Reise-/Informations-Bericht: GS-Reise für Tonbandgeräte-Geschäft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 2.

⁸⁰¹ Conrad, J. (1962, June). Zur Marktlage der Tonbandgeräte. *Funkschau*, 12, 314.




Figure 30: Telefunken (1962). Brochure “Tonbandgeräte Magnetophon 1962/63”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1962/telefunken62-10.jpg>, p. 10.

Demonstrations were thus an important element to successfully sell a tape recorder in the early 1960s. Accordingly, *Telefunken* provided its retailers with a “script for end consumer demonstration” shortly after they had started to sell the *Automatic*.⁸⁰² The contents of this script are unknown. However, it may be assumed that it followed a similar logic as the script used by *Telefunken*’s branch office salesmen for their in-person demonstrations with retailers, which would have needed little adjustments to fit a retailer-consumer interaction. It is unclear to what extent retailers actually did make use of this script. As tape recorders only accounted for around 6 % of the value-based share of sales of specialist retailers in 1962, retailers were usually not overly inclined to go the extra mile to make a tape recorder sale.⁸⁰³ This led a member of the sales division of *Telefunken*’s tape recorder and record player department to make the observation that “[s]ince the tape recorder requires a very long demonstration time in relation to its sales value, the specialist retailer will – all other conditions being equal – give preference

⁸⁰² N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. In the original German: “Drehbuch für Endverbrauchervorführung.”

⁸⁰³ Warnke to mailing list (1962, December 11). *Internal letter. Subject: Reise-/Informations-Bericht: GS-Reise für Tonbandgeräte-Geschäft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 2.

to the device that can be demonstrated and sold most quickly.”⁸⁰⁴ The *Automatic* may have had a certain advantage in that regard, because it was a comparatively quickly and easily demonstratable device – as long as retailers prepared for this eventuality. Accordingly, in January 1963, *Telefunken*’s marketers stressed that their salesmen would need to “[...] make it clear to the retailer time and again that an Automatic is only demonstrated sensibly if it is plugged [into the grid] and standing on the counter all day.”⁸⁰⁵

In an effort to keep its branch office sales personnel and its retailers motivated to make efforts for the *Magnetophon Automatic* in the months following the product launch, *Telefunken* staged a sales competition between mid-May and mid-August, which pitted its branch office salesmen against each other, and held a telephone quiz for its retailers from the 20th of August to the 21st of September 1962. This was planned to coincide or follow up on the consumer advertising in print and on television, which started in mid-May, and would end on the 4th of August for print and on the 4th of July for television respectively.⁸⁰⁶ Afterwards, consumer advertising in print seemed to have stopped for the year. The internal company sources do not indicate any additional campaigns, and there were no further ads published for the *Automatic* in the *Stern* or the *Bravo* during the remainder of the year 1962. *Telefunken* did, however, continue to advertise the product on television through nine additional television advertising spots in September and October 1962, which were part of a larger campaign that also encompassed other *Telefunken* products. Given that three of the nine ads were broadcast by the *Norddeutscher Rundfunk* and another four by the *Hessischer Rundfunk*, this campaign would have only had a regional impact, however.⁸⁰⁷

3.1.2.2.5 Introducing the *Automatic* to Market: Costs, Priorities, and the Question of Success

Telefunken invested heavily into advertising measures for the *Automatic*’s launch marketing campaign. It is not possible to determine the exact sum the company spent on advertising the *Magnetophon Automatic*, though *Telefunken*’s total spending on domestic advertising measures for its tape recorders in the business year 1962/63 may serve as a point of reference concerning the dimension (see Figure 31): *Telefunken*’s tape recorder advertising costs reached

⁸⁰⁴ Warnke to mailing list (1962, December 11). *Internal letter. Subject: Reise-/Informations-Bericht: GS-Reise für Tonbandgeräte-Geschäft*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, p. 2. In the original German: “Da das Tonbandgerät in Relation zum Umsatzwert eine sehr lange Vorführzeit benötigt, wird der Fachhandel – bei sonst gleichen Voraussetzungen – das am schnellsten vorzuführende und zu verkaufende Gerät auf Sicht bevorzugen.”

⁸⁰⁵ von Dellingshausen to Reuting (1963, January 15). *Internal letter. Subject: Vertrieb von Tonbandgeräten*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975. In the original German: “[...] dem Händler immer wieder klar machen, daß ein Automatic nur dann sinnvoll demonstriert ist, wenn es den ganzen Tag angeschlossen auf dem Tresen steht.”

⁸⁰⁶ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁸⁰⁷ N.N. (undated). *Sendezeiten der Telefunken-Fernseh-Spots bis Oktober 1962*. Enclosure of Horlitz to mailing list (1962, August 14). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung im Fernsehen für die Produkte der W-Gruppe*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

1.143.000 DM overall that year, or 3,5 % of its domestic tape recorder sales revenue of 32.222.000 DM excluding *AEG* sales.⁸⁰⁸ These advertising costs of 1.143.000 DM were largely comprised of three budgetary items (besides 115.000 DM “processing costs”): 306.000 DM for magazine advertising, 219.000 DM for television, radio, cinema and miscellaneous advertising, and 244.000 DM for product brochures meant for consumers. Other items were considerably less expensive: *Telefunken*’s tape recorder division had also spent 29.000 DM on advertising material meant to support retailers, 32.000 DM on sponsoring prize competitions, and 33.000 DM on the Hannover fair. No money was allocated to outdoor advertising, and only 2.000 DM had been invested to advertise tape recorders in daily newspapers.⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁸ As part of its advertising planning for 1963/64, *GM* provided Seydlitz with a preliminary estimate of its advertising costs for 1962/63, compiled on the 9th of January 1963. These figures may thus have been subject to further changes, although a large part of the total sum would have already been definitively spent by this point, making large deviations rather unlikely. The source also gives figures for *Telefunken*’s advertising costs for record players and changers in the business year 1962/63. These only reached 206.000 DM, with a mere 66.000 DM of this total being allocated to mass media advertising. These were rather small sums, given that *Telefunken* generated approximately 15 million DM in domestic revenue from record playing devices, which meant that the company had only disbursed around 1,3 % of this revenue for advertising measures, Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. However, with regards to the advertising spending on record playing devices, it must be noted that *Telefunken* still made a lot of its revenue in this business domain through equipping radiograms – also of other brands like *Grundig* – during the early 1960s. Between 1962 and 1965, the company changed strategy in that regard, shifting its focus to record players and changers sold directly to end consumers. But in 1962, this direction was still prevalent. This should be taken into account when assessing the advertising costs of this department, as it would have certainly reduced the necessity for consumer-facing advertising measures, Brückmann & Stauber (1963, January 15). *Protokoll der Fachgebietsbesprechung GM vom 29.11.62 in Hannover-Ricklingen, Göttinger Chaussee 76*, DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, pp. 1, 7–8. See also Knörr (1965, June 29). *Protokoll Fachgebietsbesprechung Fachbereich GM am 19.5.65 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 7.

⁸⁰⁹ Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

Telefunken GM: Tape Recorder Advertising Budget 1962/63

All numbers given in DM




Figure 31: Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. Estimate for the business year 1962/63 as given on the 9th of January 1963. Visualization by the author.

Telefunken's overall tape recorder advertising budget for 1962/63 is thus an indicator that the company had a very clear strategic focus on measures that reached a plethora of consumers during that business year. This fits with the company's goals for the *Automatic*. And it may even be assumed that the grand majority of this advertising budget did indeed go toward the *Magnetophon Automatic*, as *Telefunken*'s tape recorder division had decided in April 1962 that the device would be the focus of "nearly all the advertising" during the current year.⁸¹⁰ This is substantiated by the fact that *Telefunken* advertised no other tape recorders in the *Stern* magazine in 1962 and the first quarter of 1963, and it may also be corroborated by taking into account the pricing of mass media advertising.

Consider the insertion prices of television advertising spots: it cost 2.400 DM to place one 30-second advertising spot on the television broadcast of the *Hessischer Rundfunk* between 7 and 8 pm in October 1963, 5.625 DM with the *Norddeutscher Rundfunk*, and even 12.600 DM with the *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* (excluding discounts in all cases).⁸¹¹ Given that *Telefunken*

⁸¹⁰ Knicker (1962, May 14). *Telefunken GM Besprechungs-Niederschrift. Gegenstand: GM-Werbe- und Entwicklungs-Informationsbesprechung am 9.4.62*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976, p. 2. In the original German: "Fast die ganze Werbung".

⁸¹¹ Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1964, pp. D1–D12.

advertised the *Automatic* in a total of 40 television spots (31 initially, and nine at a later date), a sum of 219.000 DM for television, radio, cinema and miscellaneous advertising could have feasibly been reached through the television advertisements for this device alone. *Telefunken* thus dedicated considerable financial means to make the domestic launch of the first automatic tape recorder a success. The company spent significantly more on advertising it than on the other tape recorders in its portfolio that year. It also seems rather likely that the total advertising costs for the *Automatic* were higher than the 300.000 DM *Telefunken* had proposed as the market introduction budget for the *TW 517*.

The advertising measures for the *Magnetophon Automatic* at launch were effective on a national (print), regional (television), or local (individual retailer) level. These measures were supposed to function conjointly. But limited means meant that trade-offs needed to be made. This inevitably led to a certain disproportionality concerning the attention paid to each of these overlapping spheres of influence. To make the *Automatic* as widely known as possible, *Telefunken* had put emphasis on such measures that would reach the greater public, with the company's television and print advertising amounting to millions of advertising contacts. Not necessarily everyone within the company saw it as the best course of action as is evident from the feedback collected at an unspecified point during the late summer or early fall 1962 from the regional branch offices of *Telefunken* on how they had perceived the advertising measures for the *Magnetophon Automatic* up until this point.

The regional branch offices had smaller points of concern regarding the advertising for the *Magnetophon Automatic*, for instance, regarding the size of the window display provided to retailers or the quantities they received of a certain advertising and sales promotion material. They also gave their opinion about the general advertising approach chosen for the product. While some, like the Frankfurt and Hamburg offices, were generally satisfied with the overall strategy, others were considerably more critical, with the most outspoken being *Telefunken*'s branch office in Hannover: "It is recommended that the television advertising be discontinued and that the advertising in magazines be substantially curtailed."⁸¹²

Instead, the Hannover office proposed to focus more on the local level, for example by advertising the device through leaflets, and through cooperative advertising in local newspapers together with retailers. Other offices shared this sentiment. The Berlin office suggested to advertise in regional newspapers in lieu of magazines, while the branches in Munich and Nuremberg were in favor of merely supplementing the magazine insertions with additional

⁸¹² N.N. (undated). *Stellungnahme der Geschäftsstellen zur Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. Underlining in the original. In the original German: "Empfohlen wird die Einstellung der Fernsehwerbung und eine wesentliche Einschränkung der Illustrierten-Insertion."

regional forms of print advertising. It follows that opinions were also split about the regionally effective television advertisement. While the two Bavarian offices remarked their regret about the absence of ads on Bavarian television, the Frankfurt office recommended continuing to advertise on television in the following months.⁸¹³ But it also had no reason not to do so, as the Frankfurt office was responsible for the sales in the German state of Hesse, whose regional television broadcaster had shown quite a few spots for the *Automatic*.

From the perspective of the branch offices, it made sense to wish for as many locally or regionally effective advertising measures as possible. After all, they each had received an individual sales target for the *Magnetophon Automatic*,⁸¹⁴ and it mainly fell upon them to work with the retailers in their respective region. As the head of the advertising division of *Telefunken*'s marketing department, Horst Horlitz, pointed out in a rebuttal of an unrelated critique by some of the company's branch offices in January 1963, widely differing assertions between *Telefunken*'s advertisers and the company's branch offices concerning the efficacy of nationwide advertising were somewhat inevitable:

“The ‘sales front’ must and will always think regionally. As a result, it will never rate a supra-regional product advertisement as highly as a locally concentrated one. And here lie further sources of error with this assessment: advertisements in magazines are commonly regarded as expensive, and they do indeed tie up considerable resources [...]. However, due to their large circulation and fairly even geographical distribution, they are a very economical means of advertising, as the insertion price per thousand copies is extremely low – much lower than that of regional daily newspapers. The critics also always forget to take into account that magazines are regularly read quite extensively in their regional districts as well.”⁸¹⁵

Discordance could thus not only arise between the marketing department and the product department, but also between the headquarters and the regional branch offices, who felt that advertising money was best spent in their domain. This was a logical consequence of their organizational role. Inversely, the marketing department's objectives for the *Automatic* made them inclined to opt for nationally effective measures, which were expensive when considering the absolute sums, but less so when taking the contact price as a calculatory basis.

The approach *Telefunken*'s marketers had chosen for the *Magnetophon Automatic* was eventually validated by the device's commercial success. According to meeting minutes from

⁸¹³ N.N. (undated). *Stellungnahme der Geschäftsstellen zur Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

⁸¹⁴ N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

⁸¹⁵ Horlitz to Schnürle (1963, January 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Kritik an Werbemaßnahmen aus den Räumen Hamburg und Nürnberg*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “Die ‘Verkaufsfront’ muß und wird immer regional denken. Sie wird infolgedessen eine überregional angelegte Produkten-Werbung [sic] niemals so hoch einschätzen wie eine örtlich konzentrierte. Und hier liegen weitere Fehlerquellen der Beurteilung: Anzeigen in Illustrierten gelten landläufig als teuer, und sie binden tatsächlich auch erhebliche Mittel, [...]. Aufgrund ihrer großen Auflage und der geographisch recht gleichmäßigen Streuung aber sind sie ein sehr wirtschaftliches Mittel der Anzeigen-Werbung, denn der Insertionspreis pro tausend Exemplare liegt außerordentlich niedrig – viel niedriger als bei regionalen Zeitungen der Tagespresse. Die Kritiker vergessen auch immer zu berücksichtigen, daß Illustrierte regelmäßig ziemlich dicht auch in ihren regionalen Bezirken gelesen werden.”

the 29th of November 1962, the *Automatic* accounted for 34 % of all domestic sales of *Telefunken*'s tape recorder division, making it the division's major sales item in the ongoing business year 1962/63.⁸¹⁶ It is important to underline that not every consumer electronics device received the same amount of attention and funding as the *Automatic* did – not even in the context of a product launch. Unlike in the case of the *TW 517* for instance, *Telefunken* believed that the *Automatic* offered a genuine advantage to its users and would thus appeal to consumers that had previously refrained from purchasing a tape recorder. Due to this conviction, *Telefunken* had allocated considerable production capabilities to the device, and therefore also needed it to be successful. Accordingly, the company invested heavily in its nationwide advertising. It is in this context of a consumer electronics company trying to use all possible marketing means to successfully introduce an innovative device to market that the launch plan and the funding allocated to the *Magnetophon Automatic*'s market introduction campaign need to be understood.

Telefunken would of course continue to market the *Automatic* in the following year. The company again inserted advertisements in magazines like *Stern* from autumn 1963 onward,⁸¹⁷ and supplemented this mass media advertising through locally effective measures (such as stand-up displays) at the point of sale.⁸¹⁸ By this point, however, the device was no longer singular on the market. In fact, *Telefunken*'s competition had reacted very quickly. *Grundig* followed suit with their own automatic tape recorder within a matter of months, leading *Telefunken* to question whether their own launch might have been ill-timed: “The Automatic device, shown in Hanover this year, timely drew our competitors' attention to this innovation. Our business competition now used the off-season to launch a similar device by fall of this year.”⁸¹⁹ This meant that the *Automatic* would have been without direct competition for less than half a year during the summer of 1962. But during this brief period, no other product on

⁸¹⁶ Brückmann & Stauber (1963, January 15). *Protokoll der Fachgebietsbesprechung GM vom 29.11.62 in Hannover-Ricklingen, Göttinger Chaussee 76*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052.

⁸¹⁷ Telefunken (1963, September 29). Advertisement. Tagline: Diese Taste drücken – das möchte jeder: Magnetophon automatic. *Stern*, 39, 102. See also Telefunken (1963, October 13). Advertisement. Tagline: Diese Taste drücken – das möchte jeder: Magnetophon automatic. *Stern*, 42, 6.

⁸¹⁸ Warnke (1963, August 19). *Besprechungs-Niederschrift. Verkaufsleitertagung am 19. August 1963 in Hannover Fachbereich GM*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976, p. 1.

⁸¹⁹ N.N. (1962, July 5). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: GM-Besprechung mit Herrn Brückmann, im Beisein von Herrn Eilenstein, am 3.7.1962 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976, p. 3. In the original German: “Das Automatic-Gerät, in Hannover dieses Jahr gezeigt, hat unsere Konkurrenz rechtzeitig auf diese Neuheit aufmerksam gemacht. Unsere Wettbewerber benutzten nun die saisonlose Zeit, bis Herbst dieses Jahres ein ähnliches Gerät herauszubringen.” *Telefunken* noted that *Grundig* would come out with an automatic device for 398 DM, which means that the comment would have referred to *Grundig*'s *TK 19 Automatic*, Verband Deutscher Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Fachgroßhändler e.V., 1963, p. B 115.

the market could offer the same – and this was reflected in the budget, argumentation, and direction of its market introduction campaign.

3.1.2.2.6 *Telefunken's Agency in the Automatic's Product Launch Marketing Campaign*

Telefunken constructed the domestic product launch marketing campaign for the *Automatic* in a way that layered nationally, regionally and locally effective public relations, advertising, and sales measures to create overlapping spheres of influence. *Telefunken* developed a marketing idea for the *Magnetophon Automatic* which was intrinsically connected to the device's technical conception and design – as had been the case for the automatic record changer *TW 517*. Although the *Automatic* and the *TW 517* shared the key characteristic of automating parts of the usage process, there was a fundamental difference between both with regards to the actual implications of automation: while the *TW 517* mainly provided novelty for novelty's sake, the *Automatic* actually considerably simplified the user experience of the average consumer only wanting to record music off a disc or the radio.

Consumer-facing mass media advertising measures gave *Telefunken* a direct channel to communicate the *Automatic's* unique advantage to consumers. *Telefunken* could announce the product and position it for potentially interested buyers in a way it could directly shape. The company could also exert control over the number of consumer contacts through the number of insertions and mass media channels chosen, as well as the envisioned target group by choosing largely mainstream publications instead of more niche publications. *Telefunken's* success in informing the public about the *Automatic* – or in enticing a purchase – then largely depended on individual media consumption patterns and personal interests. *Telefunken* was dependent on other actors for all further measures promoting the *Automatic*, limiting the company's agency. Who would be reached by what measure and in what form was in large parts out of *Telefunken's* hands.

For its public relations efforts to succeed in inducing press reporting, *Telefunken* effectively needed to convince journalists that the device was newsworthy. While the company had a good argument in that regard with the *Automatic* being “the first automatic tape recorder”, this did not guarantee any reporting. If a report was indeed published, its form, content, and timing were not up to *Telefunken* – although the company saw success in having the press adopt its narrative. Press reporting would have enhanced the *Automatic's* chances to become a success at launch. But *Telefunken* was considerably more dependent on retailers in that regard. Convincing retail partners of the device and of the measures *Telefunken* would take to support retailers in selling the *Automatic* was paramount. Again, *Telefunken* could only inform, demonstrate, and provide retailers with argumentation patterns and physical sales aids – with the retailer then deciding

whether he was willing to put up a sales window display and/or to give thorough demonstrations.

Accordingly, whether and how a given consumer would have learned about the *Automatic* varied strongly depending on the interplay of all these factors: What kind of magazines did consumers read and how intensely? Did they have a television set, and did they tune in and pay attention when advertisements for the *Automatic* ran on the regional broadcasting network? Did they even live in a region where they received such televised ads? Did their local press report on it? Where in this paper was the report published and when? Was there a retailer nearby who not only sold the device but also dedicated shop window space to it? Did this retailer know the *Automatic* well enough to argue on its behalf in a sales conversation? Did he go the extra mile to give a thorough demonstration of the device and its advantages to convince a customer on the edge about their purchasing decision? How interested was a consumer even in potentially buying a tape-recording device in general? And did the *Automatic*'s usage proposition as put forth by *Telefunken* through the device's design and technical conception and the ensuing communicational efforts appeal to them based on how they imagined that they would use a tape recorder?

At the time it was launched, the *Automatic* filled a previously unoccupied market niche, offering a unique sales proposition based on innovative technology, which enabled *Telefunken* to tap into new target groups – but it may be assumed that any novelty or uniqueness consumers might have perceived regarding the *Magnetophon Automatic* would have somewhat waned as its technology became more widely used. Within a few years, the usage proposition offered by the *Automatic* (and similar devices) would even have become completely obsolete, as the German market became increasingly split between two extremes in the second half of the 1960s: consumer electronics companies offered an array of manually controlled high-end devices aimed at enthusiasts seeking to express themselves creatively, as well as cassette recorders, which also enabled casual users to record and listen to music while being even easier to use than automatic tape recorders. This differentiation left little space for devices such as the *Automatic*, which consequently “lost their right to exist” within the decade according to Monika Röther.⁸²⁰ *Telefunken*'s automatic tape recorder was thus but an intermediary evolutionary step in the ever-evolving media ensemble of Western European consumer societies during the long 1960s.

⁸²⁰ Röther, 2012, pp. 362, 365, 403, 405. The citation can be found on p. 403. In the original German: “verloren ihre Existenzberechtigung”.

3.1.2.3 Evaluating the Exemplarity of the *Automatic*'s Marketing Campaign

3.1.2.3.1 Insights from the 1962 Tape Recorder Advertising Campaign of the *Deutsche Philips*

To ascertain just how unique the market introduction campaign for the *Magnetophon Automatic* actually was at the time, it is best to draw comparisons to the tape recorder campaign of another consumer electronics company on the German market that year – such as the one by the German branch of *Philips*, for instance. The advertisers of the *Deutsche Philips* had entered their 1962 tape recorder marketing campaign in the running for the *Philips international advertising award*, a company-internal accolade.⁸²¹ In this entry, the company explained that it had expected that the German tape recorder market would not grow and only keep level with 1961. *Philips*'s German marketers stated three core reasons for this assertion, which in turn had informed their overall marketing approach for the company's range of tape recorders in the year 1962.

The first reason was related to the interactions taking place at the point of sale. The *Deutsche Philips* believed that retailers were usually not adequately capable of demonstrating tape recorders and giving advice on their usage, as they themselves lacked expertise in operating such devices. Thus, in addition to advertising to retailers through trade publications, keeping them informed about upcoming products or seasonal advertising campaigns, and providing them with sales promotion material such as brochures or decorative elements, the company also produced “a complete handbook on the right operation and demonstration of Philips tape recorders, distributed among the retailers sales staff” to address this sales-inhibiting factor.⁸²² Just like *Telefunken*, the *Deutsche Philips* thus also believed in the importance of retailer demonstrations to make a tape recorder sale in the early 1960s, which in turn meant that it was paramount that retailers were well-informed and qualified. After all, it would not exactly inspire confidence in a potentially interested customer if a retailer was not able to operate a tape recorder with ease or clearly explain the finer technical details setting two given tape-recording devices apart. Through its trade advertising and the handbook, the *Deutsche Philips* sought to ensure that this would not be the case.

The basic idea behind *Telefunken*'s script for consumer demonstrations was therefore not completely unique, but rather a logical step in the face of a perceived imbalance between the importance of a good sales conversation and demonstration at the point of sale due to the characteristics inherent to tape recording devices on the one hand and the actual skills and

⁸²¹ For more details on this award and a discussion of the source value of submitted campaigns, see chapter 3.2.

⁸²² G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, pp. 82–87. For the quote, see id., p. 82.

knowledge of retailers on the other. However, the precise elaboration of this idea had of course been specifically tailored to the *Automatic*, as it was presented to retailers in a way that clearly distinguished it from other tape recorders based on its technical conception – while the *Deutsche Philips* instead merely provided a handbook on its whole product range.

This is not to say that the *Deutsche Philips* did not also try to win over its retailers for certain tape recorders in particular. For instance, it sought to persuade its retailers of the idea that its tape recorder *RK 5* was ideal to facilitate father-son bonding moments by suggesting that “[t]he tape recorder connects the generations – just like the electric toy train, for example. [...]. Let us sell the RK 5 like an electric toy train – with camaraderie.”⁸²³ The *RK 5* was positioned as an intergenerational object. On a structural level, this approach is somewhat reminiscent of *Telefunken*’s communication to its retail partners, equating the *Automatic* to an automatic camera in the sense that such argumentation patterns used in communication with retailers seemed to have fulfilled a double purpose: beyond seeking to convince retailers, they effectively provided them with ideas and themes they would have been able to reuse in sales conversations with consumers.

As its second reason for the lacking growth in the tape recorder market, the *Deutsche Philips* posited that tape recorders demanded active engagement from their users, which did not appeal to as many people as “the passivity necessary for the enjoyment of television, radio, records.” Based on this idea, the company identified several subsegments of the market it could try to specifically target, such as “[y]oung men with higher than average intellect” or the amateurs in the film or recording milieus. Accordingly, the *Deutsche Philips* inserted advertisements for its tape recorders in a broad variety of rather specific publications, such as medical journals, journals for amateur photographers, or the youth magazine *Twen*. The advertising message was of course tweaked accordingly. The *Deutsche Philips* would highlight technical elements in hobbyist publications, music in *Twen*, and in medical journals, it proposed that the reader would be able to record talks at medical congresses.⁸²⁴

The 1962 tape recorder campaign by the *Deutsche Philips* differed fundamentally from *Telefunken*’s campaign for the *Magnetophon Automatic* in its approach. Certainly, the *Deutsche Philips* had not completely neglected to also insert more general advertisements for its tape

⁸²³ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 83. In the original German: “Das Tonbandgerät verbindet die Generationen – genau so, wie z.B. die elektrische Spielzeugeisenbahn. [...]. Lassen Sie uns das RK 5 wie eine elektrische Spielzeugeisenbahn verkaufen – mit Kameradschaft.”

⁸²⁴ Id., pp. 82–87.

recorders in daily newspapers or illustrated magazines, such as the *Stern*.⁸²⁵ But the constitutive ideas behind both campaigns were diametrically opposed to one another: *Philips* had first and foremost chosen to be targeted in its advertising as tape recorders “in their present form, call for mental activity”, which was not to everyone’s liking—⁸²⁶ while *Telefunken* on the other hand specifically made use of the most widely watched and read mass media channels possible for the *Automatic*, as it constituted a departure from this present form (at least to a certain extent). The third reason provided by the *Deutsche Philips* for plateauing sales was that a lot of consumers had stopped using the tape recorders they had bought “– for lack of initiative and/or new ideas for using them. These passive recorders are bad advertising.” Thus, the company’s 1962 advertising measures were not only about attracting new buyers, but rather also about “stimulating owners” of a tape recorder. To that end, the company published a book for consumers detailing the many things they might use a tape recorder for. Other measures must be understood in the same vein, such as the annual competition for amateur tape-recording enthusiasts (which by this point was already in its fourth year) organized by the *Deutsche Philips*, or its advertising in illustrated magazines suggesting ideas what one might use a tape recorder for.⁸²⁷ These two measures were of course about keeping hobbyists attached to the brand and about attracting new consumers respectively – but they were also meant to entice those consumers that had previously abandoned their already purchased tape recorder to again interact with their device. This was not a topic *Telefunken* had to be overly concerned with in its market introduction campaign for the *Automatic*, as the device could be positioned as being unlike earlier tape recorders that were more complicated and onerous to use.

The 1962 tape recorder campaigns of the *Deutsche Philips* and of *Telefunken* were in part based on the same assumptions and did involve similar measures. This made sense given both campaigns took place in the same market environment and concerned the same overall product group, which had certain peculiarities that needed to be considered when devising any advertising and sales measures. However, with regards to target groups and media channels, both campaigns went into two completely different directions, as *Telefunken* believed that the *Magnetophon Automatic* would appeal to previously uninterested consumers. Here, the

⁸²⁵ See for example Philips (1962, October 21). Advertisement. Tagline: Was ist das Wichtigste am Tonbandgerät? *Stern*, 42, pp. 100–101.

⁸²⁶ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 82.

⁸²⁷ Id., pp. 82–87. The *Deutsche Philips* had not been the first to come up with the idea of a prize competition for tape recording enthusiasts. Since the early 1950s, there was an “annual international competition of sound hunters” organized by the “Fédération Internationale des Chasseurs de Sons”, Bijsterveld, 2004, p. 614. On sound hunting as a hobby, see further Masson, J.-B. (2022). *Sound Hunting: The Tape Recorder and the Sonic Practices of Sound Recording Hobbyists in France and Britain, 1948-1978* [PhD, University of York]. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/32509/>.

device's specificities opened up new possibilities concerning advertising argumentation and positioning in certain media channels – while simultaneously closing others: it would not have made sense to advertise the *Automatic* in specialist magazines for recording hobbyists, as the product would not have appealed to this target group. Indeed, the term “automatic” would even come to be associated with cheap tape-recording devices in the following years, as *Telefunken*'s marketing director Seydlitz pointed out in 1965.⁸²⁸

3.1.2.3.2 Transnational Overlaps. Advertising the *Magnetophon Automatic* in France

The marketing plan developed for the market introduction of the *Magnetophon Automatic* exclusively concerned the German domestic market (as had been the case for the 1962 campaign of the *Deutsche Philips*). This is where the company put its focus: Not only did *Telefunken* invest considerable funds to advertise the product to German retailers and consumers, but when looking at the allocation of units, the domestic market would have been around three times more important to *Telefunken* than all foreign markets combined (25.000 to 8.000). Nonetheless, this also means that a significant part of the total production was sold abroad. This raises the question what transnational elements may be discerned when looking into how one of *Telefunken*'s foreign subsidiaries went about marketing the device.

The French case provides a fitting example. At the time of the market introduction of the *Magnetophon Automatic*, the French tape recorder market was still rather underdeveloped. In 1963, very few French households owned a tape recorder. The research service of the French ministry of cultural affairs put the equipment rate for 1963 at around 2 % of households,⁸²⁹ while a press report estimated that 3,1 % of French households owned one. But sales numbers were growing quickly: from 35.000 units in total in 1959 to 110.000 in 1962 and 150.000 in 1963. And German consumer electronics companies disproportionally profited from this growth as German tape recorders accounted for around 50 % of the total value of French tape recorder imports between 1961-1963.⁸³⁰

⁸²⁸ Accordingly, *Telefunken* actively chose not to automate its higher-end tape recorders in the mid-1960s, as hobbyists wanted to be able to manually adjust all settings, Knörr (1965, June 29). *Protokoll Fachgebietsbesprechung Fachbereich GM am 19.5.65 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 4.

⁸²⁹ Service des études et recherches du ministère des affaires culturelles (1971). *L'Équipement audio-visuel des ménages* (No. 10; Développement Culturel, p. 1).

⁸³⁰ N.N. (1964, October 13). Starke Nachfrage nach Tonbandgeräten in Frankreich. *Nachrichten für Außenhandel*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. This is corroborated by figures given by the permanent French representation at the EEC for 1961: Tape recorders worth 16.398.720 FF were sold in France that year, with tape recorders from Germany making up 8.054.000 FF of this value. *Grundig* had already become an important player in the French tape recorder market, with the company selling tape recorders worth 2.583.000 FF through *Consten* and another 300.000 FF through *UNEF*, Représentation permanente de la France auprès des Communautés européennes to the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1962, December 28). *Note concernant le contrat d'exclusivité Grundig – Consten – Affaire N° 00004*. HAEU/CJUE-0889, p. 11.

A highly significant share of all tape recorders on offer in French retail stores at the time would thus have been German devices (or their export variants). Accordingly, *Telefunken* saw France as an opportunity. In February 1962, *Telefunken* planned to “force” its tape recorders more strongly onto the French market.⁸³¹ However, by 1963, *Telefunken France* still only accounted for a rather small percentage of the market, as the company sold 3.700 tape recorders that year, and 5.000 in 1964 – a market share of around 3,3 % in both years.⁸³² These sales figures included the *Magnetophon Automatic*, which would have been in French stores by the beginning of November 1962 at the very latest, when the product was first advertised in *Paris Match*.⁸³³ *Telefunken France* would have thus sold – at most – a few thousand *Automatics* to consumers across France between 1962 and 1964.

Telefunken’s French subsidiary was still in the process of establishing itself more broadly on the French market by 1962, after it had essentially been subject to a refoundation only a year earlier. Also, by this point, the parent company’s marketing department *FM* was not yet heavily involved in *Telefunken France*’s advertising.⁸³⁴ It cannot, however, be ruled out that at least the advertisers in *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics department would have been in (regular) contact with *Telefunken France* concerning the *Automatic*. The sources do not allow for any assessment in that regard. Similarly, it is also not possible to make statements about measures which would potentially have taken place at the point of sale for instance, or about marketing campaigns which made use of media channels beyond *Paris Match* and *Salut les Copains*. Nonetheless, certain conclusions may be drawn based on the argumentative approach and insertion strategy chosen for the advertisements published for the device in *Paris Match*.

In late 1962, a *Telefunken* advertising campaign took place in *Paris Match* which consisted of eight ads in total. It covered the whole product range sold by *Telefunken*’s French subsidiary while also promoting the brand as a whole. The company’s record playing devices, transistor radios, radiograms, and tape recorders each received one ad which highlighted the respective product group, while three ads were allocated to *Telefunken France*’s television sets. In each of these cases, the company advertised the product group without referring to any device in particular, as the focus was clearly on making consumers aware of the brand and its product

⁸³¹ N.N. (undated). Anlage 1 zum Protokoll über GRM/Ex-Besprechung am 16.2.1962. Enclosure of Zickermann & Becker (1962, March 22). *Kurzfassung – Protokoll. Betr.: Besprechung mit GRM/Ex am 16.2.1962 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983. In the original German: “forciert werden”.

⁸³² N.N. (1965, June 29). *Aktennotiz. Betr.: Frankreich*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. The market share was calculated based on the 110.000 units for 1962 and 150.000 for 1963 given earlier in the paragraph.

⁸³³ Telefunken (1962, November 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Appuyez sur une touche ... C’est tout ! *Paris Match*, 708, 36.

⁸³⁴ On *FM*’s increasing involvement in *Telefunken France*’s advertising, see chapter 2.2.1.5.

range.⁸³⁵ Notably, the sole exception was the *Magnetophon Automatic*. It was the only device that had a whole 1-page B/W ad dedicated solely to itself, which remained consistent with the rest of the campaign in its formatting.⁸³⁶ Similarly, the *Automatic* was also one of only two *Telefunken* devices advertised in the French youth magazine *Salut les Copains* the following year.⁸³⁷

The *Automatic* was thus given a bigger platform than other devices commercialized by *Telefunken France*, at least in these two publications. This is a hint that the *Automatic* was seen as having a large potential on the French market as well. Yet, this assessment needs to be understood in a relative sense: the French tape recorder market was around a quarter of the size of its German equivalent in 1962 measured in units sold.⁸³⁸ This alone meant that *Telefunken* would have sold considerably more tape recorders on the German market. In addition, *Telefunken* was also a much bigger player on the tape recorder market in Germany than *Telefunken France* was in France when considering market shares. The criteria for commercial success of the *Automatic* would have thus been very different between the two countries. The product could not be advertised on the same scale in France as it was in Germany. A large-scale campaign just for the *Automatic* would not have been feasible for *Telefunken France* due to the market environment and position the company found itself in. Moreover, the approach taken by *Telefunken* on the domestic market was not transferable to the French media landscape: television advertising – a key component of the German campaign – was not allowed in France at the time.⁸³⁹

Although the *Automatic* could not be advertised as widely in France as it was in Germany, the argumentative approach used in the German print advertisements largely carried over in 1962. The ad in *Paris Match* also focused on the fact that users only needed to press one button, and the device would then take care of everything else (see Figure 32). As in Germany, “the world’s

⁸³⁵ The first ad was published in issue 706 of *Paris Match*, Telefunken (1962, October 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Les Transistors TELEFUNKEN...Quelle perfection! *Paris Match*, 706, 47. Seven further ads followed in each subsequent issue until issue 713, Telefunken (1962, December 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Pour tous vos travaux d'enregistrement, un magnétophone TELEFUNKEN, à votre mesure. *Paris Match*, 713, 116. This campaign is also discussed from a different perspective in chapter 2.2.1.5.

⁸³⁶ Telefunken (1962, November 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Appuyez sur une touche ... C'est tout ! *Paris Match*, 708, 36.

⁸³⁷ The *Automatic* was advertised in October, and the *Electrophone 1052* in November, Telefunken (1962, October). Advertisement. Tagline: haute félicité Telefunken. *Salut les Copains*, 15, 2; (1962, November). Advertisement. Tagline: haute félicité Telefunken. *Salut les Copains*, 16, 104.

⁸³⁸ In 1962, ca. 443.900 tape recorders were sold in Germany (compared to the 110.000 sales in France cited above). For the figure for Germany, see Telefunken Fachgebiet Tonbandgeräte (undated). Chart “Tonbandgeräte Inland-Umsatz”. Enclosure of Knörr (1965, June 29). Protokoll Fachgebietsbesprechung Fachbereich GM am 19. 5. 65 in Berlin. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052.

⁸³⁹ Brand product advertising would only be allowed on French television from the 1st of October 1968 onward. So-called “compensated advertising” (“publicité compensée”) had been allowed since 1959, but this only applied to advertising for collective bodies and was limited to only a few minutes per day, Parasie, 2010, pp. 7, 17.

first truly automatic tape recorder” was positioned as the device for consumers who were interested in tape recorders but “feared” the complexity of other tape-recording devices.⁸⁴⁰ This correspondence between the German and French print advertisements even extended to parts of the phrasing.⁸⁴¹ Further, in keeping with *FM*’s camera analogy, the French ad’s tagline – “Press a button ... That’s all !”⁸⁴² – could be read as a subtle homage to *Kodak*’s famous 1888 amateur camera advertising slogan “You press the button ... and we do the rest.”⁸⁴³ Although no direct connection can be established in that regard, the French ad clearly drew inspiration from its German counterpart released a few months earlier concerning its argumentative strategy. This, however, did not extend to the imagery which was instead kept in line with the larger *Telefunken* advertising campaign in *Paris Match*: The ad for the *Automatic* depicts the same young man, who also appeared in all seven other ads in this magazine. In this advert, he stands with his arms crossed, looking directly at the reader. This was a departure from the German ad imagery, which had made a point of always having the depicted man use one finger to press the recording button of the *Automatic* no matter his stance.


⁸⁴⁰ Telefunken (1962, November 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Appuyez sur une touche ... C’est tout ! *Paris Match*, 708, 36. In the original French: “le 1^{er} magnétophone au monde vraiment automatique”, “vous font peur”.

⁸⁴¹ The tagline of the German ad was a rhetorical question: “Do you also dream of the ideal tape recorder?” (“Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät?”). The French ad started its copy text with an eerily similar rhetorical question: “Do you dream of a tape recorder?” (“Vous rêvez d’un magnétophone ?”).

⁸⁴² Telefunken (1962, November 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Appuyez sur une touche ... C’est tout ! *Paris Match*, 708, 36. In the original French: “Appuyez sur une touche ... C’est tout !”

⁸⁴³ On the slogan and its context, see Buse, P. (2016). *The Camera Does the Rest. How Polaroid Changed Photography*. The University of Chicago Press, p. 8.

Appuyez sur une touche ... C'est tout!




TELEFUNKEN Magnetophon automatic

Vous rêvez d'un magnétophone? Mais les appareils compliqués vous font peur? Alors voici ce qu'il vous faut: le 1er magnétophone au monde vraiment automatique, le Magnetophon automatic de TELEFUNKEN. Appuyez sur une touche ... Automatiquement la bande enregistre ... Une autre touche ... Ecoutez ... C'est impeccable. D'une pression sur la touche, vous commandez l'enregistrement et l'écoute. C'est tout! - Radios, transistors, électrophones, meubles radio-phono, téléviseurs et magnétophones TELEFUNKEN se vendent dans le monde entier. Pour tous renseignements: France Métropolitaine: Compagnie Française TELEFUNKEN S. A., Boîte Postale 1-20, Paris. Autres pays: TELEFUNKEN, Exportabteilung, Hannover, Allemagne de l'Ouest.



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Figure 32: Telefunken (1962, November 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Appuyez sur une touche ... C'est tout ! *Paris Match*, 708, 36.

There was thus a certain degree of transnational intertwinement between *Telefunken's* German and French advertising for the *Magnetophon Automatic* in 1962. This especially concerned the product-related argumentative approach, which makes sense given that the unique sales proposition derived from the technical conception of the *Automatic* was not specific to a certain

country or culturally bound. To an extent, this also had implications for the media channel chosen in France to advertise the device. The *Automatic* was supposed to have a broad appeal, and *Paris Match* – in its capacity as a widely read illustrated magazine – provided the possibility to reach a large audience (like the *Stern* for instance).

However, concerning the imagery and advertising intensity, differences remained between both countries. These elements were not only bound to the marketing concept of the device that was to be advertised but were rather also contingent on other factors, such as advertising budget, media landscape, or market environment. The *Paris Match* advertisement for the *Automatic* was part of a larger brand- and product range-focused advertising campaign and consequently adopted the layout and imagery of this campaign. This was not the case for the German market introduction. In this larger market, where *Telefunken* would sell considerably more units and where the brand was much more established, it was possible to instead dedicate a whole separate campaign to the device. It also needs to be underlined that transnationally similar argumentative approaches were not inevitably used. Unlike the 1962 French and German print advertisements for the *Automatic*, the 1963 advertising for the *Automatic* would again differ in both countries regarding layout and imagery – and would, in addition, not share a common argumentative approach.⁸⁴⁴

3.2 Advertising Product Groups. *Philips France's* 1962 and 1964 Television Set Campaigns

Consumer electronics companies did of course not only market and advertise individual devices during the long 1960s or exclusively deal with market launch campaigns. Campaigns for complete product groups played a large role as well. This chapter discusses two such campaigns – more specifically the two entries of 1962 and 1964 submitted by *Philips France* for the *Philips international advertising award*, an internal competition between the different national organizations of the *Philips* concern. For this award, the advertisers of the national organizations submitted detailed campaign presentations which discussed elements such as the market environment, the general idea(s) behind a campaign, its timeframe, budget allocation, and advertising media planning. These sources thus allow to trace the execution of complete advertising campaigns and to get insights into the thought processes of a campaign's architects. The campaigns submitted for this award were collected and published in yearbooks in the hope that *Philips* advertisers might be inspired by the work of their peers. According to the

⁸⁴⁴ Telefunken (1962, October). Advertisement. Tagline: haute félicité Telefunken. *Salut les Copains*, 15, 2; (1963, September 29). Advertisement. Tagline: Diese Taste drücken – das möchte jeder: Magnetophon automatic. *Stern*, 39, 102.

introductory statement of the issue for 1962-63, these campaign compilations were supposed to give advertisers the “[...] chance to compare your advertising with a neighboring country or to study the philosophy of a series of campaigns for one or more Philips products.”⁸⁴⁵

Due to the context in which these campaign presentations were written and published, they may be considered reliable sources. *Philips*’s advertisers would have sought to provide their colleagues with a picture that was as complete as possible. However, a certain degree of caution needs to be exercised nonetheless, as the context of an award submission meant that there would have certainly been an incentive to paint one’s campaign – and one’s own work – in the best light possible. This goes for the campaign presentations themselves, as negative elements might have been omitted, but more importantly it also applies in a larger context: the campaigns were considered to be exemplary by the advertisers that submitted them. This has a positive and a negative side. On the one hand, these campaigns would have potentially been above average in terms of resources invested or its creative platform. There is thus a certain selection bias at play. Not all campaigns would have been as thought out or well-funded as the ones described here. On the other hand, exemplary campaigns may be considered to have been just that: model campaigns that showed what the advertisers of the *Philips* subsidiary in a given country considered what an advertising campaign could be in the best possible case.

By focusing on *Philips France*’s black and white television set advertising campaigns of 1962 and 1964, it is outlined what an exemplary product group advertising campaign looked like according to the advertisers working at *Philips France* during the first half of the 1960s. These two campaigns constituted merely one part of the total advertising for consumer electronics devices by *Philips France*. They would have been the main advertising campaigns for *Philips*-branded television sets in those years – but advertising campaigns for *Philips* radios, record players, or tape recorders would have taken place concurrently, as would separate advertising campaigns for television sets and other consumer electronics devices under the *Radiola* brand which also belonged to the *Philips* concern.⁸⁴⁶

The socio-economic and mediatic conditions of television in early 1960s France are detailed first, as this market environment shaped the conception of the two campaigns. Subsequently, the campaigns will be discussed in depth. As both featured the same product group, it is possible to identify continuities and divergences with regards to campaign ideas, argumentative approach, and utilized advertising channels. This sets them apart from introductory campaigns such as the one for *Telefunken*’s *Magnetophon Automatic*, which were singular occurrences

⁸⁴⁵ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 3.

⁸⁴⁶ Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, p. 361.

that showcased the features of a particular consumer electronics device. The chapter then concludes with an inquiry into the temporal and transnational feasibility of the two *Philips France* television set campaigns concerning their argumentative approaches and the marketing channels they used.

3.2.1 The Market Environment for Television in Early 1960s France

In July 1962, 3,15 million television sets were in use among the 13,5 million French households according to *Philips France*. This translated into an adoption rate of around 23,3 %.⁸⁴⁷ At the time, the French television set market was in full expansion: Of these 3,15 million television sets, over 1,3 million had been sold to consumers in the years 1960-1961.⁸⁴⁸ 1962 falls thus squarely into what Gaillard has identified as the “boom”-phase of 1958-1964, during which French consumer demand for TVs grew around 25 % on average per year.⁸⁴⁹ By April 1965, 40,8 % of French households would own a set.⁸⁵⁰ This boom had been preceded by a long run-up period during the 1950s, which had seen impressive growth as well, albeit from a much lower base starting point: in 1952, there had only been 24.000 television sets in French households. By 1959, this figure had risen to 1,3 million.⁸⁵¹ Domestic industrial production had scaled accordingly,⁸⁵² television set manufacturers tried to keep up with consumer demand.⁸⁵³ From an industry point of view, a key characteristic of the French television set market in the 1950s and during the first half of the 1960s was its seasonality. Sales always rose during the last months of the year.⁸⁵⁴ A second key characteristic was its relative insularity. Even as the transnational trade for other consumer electronics devices surged,⁸⁵⁵ a negligible number of all television sets sold in France were imported (around 26.400 in 1962 for instance). The French

⁸⁴⁷ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77. This fits well with the 23,1 % of households owning a television set in April 1962 according to *INSEE* data, Secrétariat d'État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1975, p. 46.

⁸⁴⁸ C.V. & P. (1967). *Television Market July 1967. Country: France*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 811.31: 822 televisietoestellen (marketing).

⁸⁴⁹ After 1964, sales would plateau for a few years and then, after the introduction of color television, the sales of B/W television sets would begin to decline, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 123.

⁸⁵⁰ Secrétariat d'État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1975, p. 46.

⁸⁵¹ Daumas, 2018, p. 336.

⁸⁵² According to Gaillard, industrial television set production in France increased roughly twentyfold between 1952 and 1959, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 64. This trend is corroborated by sales figures given by *Telefunken*. According to the company's data, the French industry would have sold 27.100 television sets in 1952, and 511.000 in 1959. These two figures included exports, although their percentual share was minuscule (out of all 511.000 sets sold in 1959, 22.300 were sold into export), HM/PRI (undated). *Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Zahlen bis 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1142. Sheet 24. Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Geräte-Verkauf 1948 – 1967. Frankreich.

⁸⁵³ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 179.

⁸⁵⁴ Id., p. 89.

⁸⁵⁵ See chapter 2.2.

industry in turn exported even less, selling only around 11.100 television sets abroad in 1962.⁸⁵⁶ The television sets French consumers bought in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s were thus almost all produced domestically. This was largely due to France's decision to adopt the 819-line resolution norm, which isolated the country as most other European countries opted for 625-lines instead.⁸⁵⁷ The 819-line norm would prove to be a technological barrier that shielded French domestic television set producers from external competition, though it hindered their export possibilities at the same time.⁸⁵⁸ The *Philips* group was the dominant power in the late 1950s among the manufacturers present on the French television set market: in 1958 *Philips*'s television set revenue in France was nearly five times bigger than that of its closest competitors.⁸⁵⁹ Although not French in origin, the group had significant production capabilities in the country,⁸⁶⁰ selling its devices under the *Philips* and *Radiola* brands.⁸⁶¹ In 1961, the *Philips* group had a television set market share of 23,1 % in France. By 1964, its market share was still at 22 %, with nearly 300.000 TVs sold.⁸⁶²

The rise of the medium of television in France had been facilitated by an expansion of the television transmitter network,⁸⁶³ and by a continuous increase in the hours of programming broadcast.⁸⁶⁴ Both were indispensable prerequisites for a widespread adoption of the technology among consumers. If someone was not able to watch television programs – be it because one's household was not in range of a transmitter or because nothing was broadcast most of the time –, buying a television set was pointless. But even if these prerequisites were given, devices also needed to be affordable for the general population. This had initially not been the case: In 1949, an average worker would have needed to spend roughly seven months of wages to purchase a television set. By 1960, this figure had dropped to two months –⁸⁶⁵ and to only a few weeks for

⁸⁵⁶ The majority of these French television set exports went to the franc zone, Landau, 1973, pp. 53, 55. The same figures are given by *Philips, C.V. & P. (1967). Television Market July 1967. Country: France.* Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 811.31: 822 televisietoestellen (marketing).

⁸⁵⁷ Fickers, 2007, p. 91.

⁸⁵⁸ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 71.

⁸⁵⁹ Id., p. 38, Footnote 74.

⁸⁶⁰ See chapter 2.2.

⁸⁶¹ Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, p. 361.

⁸⁶² Market share calculated based on the sales of the industry to trade, C.V. & P. (1967). *Television Market July 1967. Country: France.* Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 811.31: 822 televisietoestellen (marketing).

⁸⁶³ The television broadcasts of the French state broadcaster reached 70 % of the French population by 1959, up from 20 % in 1950, Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 42–43. By the end of 1964, 97 % of the population was within reach of a transmitter broadcasting the first French television program, Cofalka (1964, December 15). *Voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Fernsehgeräte-Absatzes in Frankreich bis zum Jahr 1970. 11/64.* DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 3.

⁸⁶⁴ In 1947, twelve hours of television programming were broadcast per week. In 1953, this figure had risen to 34 hours, d'Almeida & Delporte, 2010, p. 164. This development would continue in the following years. By 1958, 2.451 program hours were broadcast per year (or 47 hours per week), and by 1968, this figure was up to 5.232 hours, Fickers, 2007, p. 234.

⁸⁶⁵ Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 95–96.

higher-earning societal groups.⁸⁶⁶ This had been possible because the freely disposable share of French household income had tripled between 1953 and 1963, while the prices for television sets had remained relatively stable even as their technology and screen size continued to improve.⁸⁶⁷

It should be noted that French television sets nonetheless remained comparatively expensive: according to a 1964 market research study by *Telefunken*, French television set prices were as much as 60-70 % higher than in Germany when adjusting for purchasing power.⁸⁶⁸ Several factors contributed to this considerable price difference, such as the complexity of the French 819-line broadcasting norm, the French decision to tax the television set as a luxury good during the 1960s,⁸⁶⁹ and the relatively low degree of concentration in the French industry.⁸⁷⁰ But despite such hurdles, television sets were becoming more attainable for average French households. At the same time, they nonetheless remained large, extraordinary purchases. A television set was thus usually bought for the whole family and would be allocated a space in the middle of the living room, placing it at the center of domestic life.⁸⁷¹

⁸⁶⁶ Gaillard estimates that a *Philips* television set with a 43 cm screen, which was sold for 1.157 nouvelles FF in 1960 would have cost a “cadre supérieur” (senior executive) only two weeks’ worth of wages, Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 129–130.

⁸⁶⁷ Cofalka (1964, December 15). *Voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Fernsehgeräte-Absatzes in Frankreich bis zum Jahr 1970. 11/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, pp. 8, 13.

⁸⁶⁸ *Telefunken* also calculated that French television set benchmark prices were 15-25 % higher on average than in Germany between 1955 and 1964. However, when adjusted for the purchasing power of an industrial worker, French prices were effectively 60-70 % higher: according to *Telefunken*’s data, a French industrial worker would have needed to work 538 hours for a television set in 1963 (972 hours in 1955), while a German worker only would have needed to work 316 hours (546 hours in 1955), Cofalka (1964, December 15). *Voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Fernsehgeräte-Absatzes in Frankreich bis zum Jahr 1970. 11/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, pp. 4, 15. Gaillard similarly notes that in the late 1950s, the cheapest television set would have been available for purchase for around 93.000 ancien FF (before the currency reform) in France versus 65.000 ancien FF in Germany, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 77. Consequently, German households were equipped with television sets to a much higher degree than French households at the beginning of the 1960s, Schildt, 1995, p. 274.

⁸⁶⁹ Gaillard, 2013b, pp. 180–181. A contemporary report published in the Official Journal of the French Republic put less weight on the price impact of the 819-line norm, instead emphasizing the unfavorable tax regime. The report also notes, however, that the introduction of a second norm (625-lines) for the second channel raised TV set prices by around 10 %, Kuhn de Chizelle, 1966, pp. 336–337.

⁸⁷⁰ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 77.

⁸⁷¹ *Id.*, pp. 138, 141. The rise of consumer credit also contributed to making television sets more widely affordable. In 1958, around one in two television sets were sold on credit in France, and around one in four in the late 1960s. German consumers, too, made frequent use of consumer credits to purchase television sets at the time, Gaillard, I. (2010). *Télévisions et Crédit à la Consommation: Une Approche Comparative France-RFA 1950-1970. Entreprises et histoire*, 59(2), 102–111. On the increasingly important role of consumer credit in Germany and France in the post-war period, see further Effosse, S. (2019). Consumer Credit as a Marketing Tool: The French Experience in European and Transatlantic Comparison, 1950s–1960s. In J. Logemann, G. Cross, & I. Köhler (Eds.), *Consumer Engineering, 1920s–1970s: Marketing between Expert Planning and Consumer Responsiveness* (pp. 149–170). Palgrave Macmillan; Gaillard, I. (2012b). Selling Televisions on Credit: The Rise of Consumer Loans in Postwar France. In J. Logemann (Ed.), *The Development of Consumer Credit in Global Perspective: Business, Regulation, and Culture* (pp. 23–40). Palgrave Macmillan; Logemann, J. (2011). Americanization through Credit? Consumer Credit in Germany, 1860s–1960s. *Business History Review*, 85(3), 529–550. On consumer credit in Luxembourg, see Jaans, J. (1978). «Braucht Dir Geld?». *Revue*, 37, 34–35, 37–38.

Once bought, a television set would remain in the household for years. In 1963, French manufacturers calculated with an average product lifespan of eight years.⁸⁷² In the early 1960s, the French television set market was in a state where a lot of households bought a television set for the very first time. Second sets played no discernible role on the market⁸⁷³ and replacement sales, too, were still a fringe phenomenon.⁸⁷⁴ But even though TVs were becoming an ever more common sight in French households, television set equipment rates did not rise completely even across all parts of society. There was, for instance, still a noticeable urban-rural divide in 1962, with 13,1 % of households in rural communities owning a television set compared to 34,7 % of Parisian households.⁸⁷⁵

Nonetheless, when looking at the overall picture, it may be asserted that television sets had well and truly become a mass consumer good in France by 1962: that year, French consumers bought a million TVs.⁸⁷⁶ In the early days, television set manufacturers had still needed to educate consumers about television as an overall medium, instead of being able to solely focus on promoting one's own brand.⁸⁷⁷ In the early to mid-1960s, this was evidently not the case anymore. Even though there was only one channel available to most French consumers⁸⁷⁸ until the 18th of April 1964, when broadcasting started on the second French television channel,⁸⁷⁹ television quickly became part of the daily routine for those that had purchased a device. At the beginning of the 1960s, around three quarters of French television set owners already spent

⁸⁷² According to *Telefunken*, this average product lifespan would continue to trend upwards to nine or ten years, Cofalka (1964, December 15). *Voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Fernsehgeräte-Absatzes in Frankreich bis zum Jahr 1970. 11/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 16. This is corroborated by Gaillard, who gives a median lifespan of ten and a half years for television sets in 1960s France, Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 184–185. In the 1950s, a television had lasted around seven years on average, id., p. 34.

⁸⁷³ Cofalka (1964, December 15). *Voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Fernsehgeräte-Absatzes in Frankreich bis zum Jahr 1970. 11/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964, p. 16.

⁸⁷⁴ According to *Philips*, replacement sales accounted for around 55.000 out of the million devices sold in 1962, C.V. & P. (1967). *Television Market July 1967. Country: France*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 811.31: 822 televisietoestellen (marketing).

⁸⁷⁵ Secrétariat d'État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1975, p. 49. According to Gaillard, this divide was at least in part caused by a lack of home-electricity infrastructure: households in parts of western France were only electrified in the late 1950s, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 93.

⁸⁷⁶ C.V. & P. (1967). *Television Market July 1967. Country: France*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 811.31: 822 televisietoestellen (marketing).

⁸⁷⁷ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 56.

⁸⁷⁸ There was only one French program until 1964. Only a minor part of the population in some of the Eastern and Southeastern French departments was reached by broadcasts from abroad, originating from Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, or Luxembourg. However, being in the range of a foreign transmitter did not mean that consumers necessarily had the equipment to watch these broadcasts. Multi-norm sets, which were, for instance, necessary to receive German programming, accounted for less than 3 % of all television sets sold in France in the early 1960s, G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

⁸⁷⁹ Brochand, C. (1994). *Histoire générale de la radio et de la télévision en France. Tome II. 1944–1974*. La Documentation française, p. 525.

more than 2 hours per day watching TV.⁸⁸⁰ Between 1964 and 1973, this figure would plateau at around 2 hours and 15 minutes per day, which meant that watching television accounted for 70 % of the overall available leisure time of television set owners according to Gaillard.⁸⁸¹

3.2.2 “Years of Satisfaction”. *Philips France*’s 1962 Television Set Advertising Campaign

Given the market situation outlined so far, it made sense that manufacturers would have been chiefly concerned with trying to convince first-time television set buyers that they best opt for their brand in the early to mid-1960s. It was precisely this train of thought which constituted the foundation for *Philips France*’s television set advertising at the time according to their own account in 1965:

“The purchase of a television set is a relatively heavy expense for the household. It is therefore indispensable to give the potential buyer solid reasons for choosing a PHILIPS television set and in particular to convince him that this set is properly designed and built and made to last for a long time.

For several years our campaigns have tended to persuade the public of the certainty that our television sets have all these advantages, hence our slogans ‘years of satisfaction’ and ‘it’s more reliable’.”⁸⁸²

In 1962/63, for instance, *Philips France* had chosen said “years of satisfaction” as the “main theme” for its large-scale TV set advertising campaign, which was conducted from the 15th of September 1962 onward across the French media ensemble at a scale befitting a company selling hundreds of thousands such devices per year: Advertisements appeared across 72 dailies, 15 widely circulating magazines, 3.282 billboards and posters in 250 cities (covering an overall surface area of 45.000 m²), and on several more posters plastered on the outside of railway wagons connecting Paris and its suburbs. Corresponding advertising messages were broadcasted on four different radio stations 15 times per week (*Radio Luxembourg*, *Europe n°1*, *Radio Monte-Carlo* and *Radio Andorre*).⁸⁸³

For this campaign, *Philips France* made use of all mass media channels open to them. At the time, brand advertising was not yet allowed on French television,⁸⁸⁴ and cinemas refused to show advertisements for television sets. While *Philips France* gives no indication why this was the case,⁸⁸⁵ this refusal may have been a (futile) attempt to not actively aid the further

⁸⁸⁰ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 303. According to another estimate by INSEE for 1961 cited by Gaillard, television set owners spent an average of twelve hours per week in front of it, id., p. 121.

⁸⁸¹ Id., pp. 121–122.

⁸⁸² G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

⁸⁸³ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, pp. 77–81.

⁸⁸⁴ For a thorough discussion of the introduction of brand advertising to television, see Parasie, 2010.

⁸⁸⁵ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

advancement of a medium cinemas perceived as a direct competitor: owing to the rise of television, annual cinema ticket sales declined from 411 million in 1957 to 257 million by 1966.⁸⁸⁶ Public service radio stations, too, did not allow brand advertising.⁸⁸⁷ But unlike for television, where advertisers would have only been able to reach small audiences in geographically rather limited parts of France through *Télé-Luxembourg* or *Télé-Monte-Carlo* up until 1968,⁸⁸⁸ the aforementioned four “stations périphériques” (and, among them, especially *Radio Luxembourg* and *Europe n°1*) provided advertisers with a radio advertising outlet capable of reaching huge parts of the French population all across the country.⁸⁸⁹ All this mass media advertising was of course flanked by measures at the point of sale. *Philips France* provided its retail partners with “shop window posters, handbills, catalogues, banderoles, cardboard displays and posters” befitting the imagery and argumentation of the campaign.⁸⁹⁰ *Philips France* made use of these channels to introduce its new 1962/63 television set product range,⁸⁹¹ evidently trying to reach as many French citizens as possible with its campaign.

What made *Philips France*’s 1962 campaign remarkable was its “secondary theme”,⁸⁹² which was inextricably linked to a market environment unique to early 1960s France. As has been established, France’s second television channel started to broadcast in spring 1964.⁸⁹³ It had, however, already been announced by the French press around five years earlier, in July 1959. This had angered the manufacturers,⁸⁹⁴ as it had led consumers in the early 1960s to expect that their newly bought television sets be able to receive both programs,⁸⁹⁵ even though the norm used to broadcast the second program had not even yet been set. This only happened on the 3rd of June 1961, when it was decided to use a variant of the 625-line norm used in most of Europe.⁸⁹⁶ And it would then take until the second half of the year 1962 for the first television

⁸⁸⁶ Hultquist, 1996, p. 72.

⁸⁸⁷ Martin, 2012, p. 91.

⁸⁸⁸ Martin, 1992, p. 333.

⁸⁸⁹ Id., p. 411; 2012, p. 91. In 1961, *Radio Luxembourg* reached 12,6 million French adult citizens every day across all parts of the French hexagon according to a brochure compiled by the radio’s advertising space brokering agent *Informations et Publicité*, which was based on data collected for a market research study this agent had commissioned with the *ETMAR*-institute, *Informations et Publicité* (1962). *Ce qu’il faut savoir sur l’auditoire de Radio-Luxembourg en France*. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Les médias audiovisuels, ID 12841-0021, Dossier RTL 1961-1979.

⁸⁹⁰ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

⁸⁹¹ Philips (1962, October 13). Advertisement. Tagline: des années de satisfaction. *Paris Match*, 705, 16.

⁸⁹² G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77. The cited source gives no reasoning why this had been the case. It stands to reason that this may have been an attempt to at least not actively aid the further advancement of a medium perceived as a direct competitor. It would have ultimately proven futile. Between 1957 and 1966, the number of annually sold cinema tickets declined from 411 million to 257 million, which was chiefly due to the spread of television, Hultquist, 1996, p. 72.

⁸⁹³ Brochand, 1994, p. 525.

⁸⁹⁴ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 97–98, 124.

⁸⁹⁵ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

⁸⁹⁶ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 169.

sets to be available on the market that were ready to receive both the 819-line and the 625-line norms out of the box.⁸⁹⁷ Between 1959 and 1961, television set manufacturers were thus in an awkward position, as they were expected to deliver something they could not. However, this would not have been immediately apparent when looking at some of their advertising.

As early as May 1959 – even before the widely publicized press reporting – manufacturer *Schneider* advertised its television sets as being “ready to be fitted with the adapter needed for the 2nd canal.”⁸⁹⁸ In this case, *Schneider* explicitly noted that further adjustments to the device would be necessary in the future. Later ads would deliberately obfuscate this fact. In October 1960 for instance, *Ducretet Thomson* touted in its consumer-facing advertising that its new TV was ready for the second channel: “For the 2nd program (currently being studied by the R.T.F.): a simple touch! If the 2nd program starts tomorrow, the T 5124 is ready for it today!”⁸⁹⁹ *Philips* and *Clarville* followed suit, similarly advertising their TV sets in 1961 as being “ready” (“prévu”, “prêt”) for the second channel.⁹⁰⁰ Any such advertising statements were half-truths at best. The television sets in question were still not actually immediately ready to receive the second television channel, even though the advertisements were phrased in a way that sought to evoke this notion among consumers. Rather, these TVs would have still necessitated further intervention, as *Philips France* pointed out:

“French manufacturers have not been able to launch on the market TV sets actually contrived for both programs. They only managed to modify their models gradually so that customers were offered with a TV sets “ready”, “provided for”, “adapted”, “prepared” etc., which, in reality, entailed further expenses at the moment when the second program would be in use.”⁹⁰¹

Philips France would then be the first company that managed to bring such television sets to market that were not just “ready”, but rather “really equipped for the reception of the second program”.⁹⁰² As soon as this applied to all newly produced *Philips* TV sets (in November 1962), *Philips France* pivoted its television set advertising approach to completely revolve around this technical lead (see Figure 33). Accordingly, the company’s ads featured a new tagline reading “neither ready, nor provided for, nor adaptable, but wholly equipped for the second channel

⁸⁹⁷ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

⁸⁹⁸ *Schneider* (1959, May 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Double avantage. *Paris Match*, 529, 78. In the original French: “Tous nos téléviseurs sont prévus pour recevoir l’adaptateur nécessaire à la 2^e chaîne.”

⁸⁹⁹ *Ducretet Thomson* (1960, October 8). Advertisement. Tagline: SUPER PLAT UNIVERSEL. *Paris Match*, 600, 44–45. Underlining in the original. In the original French: “Pour le 2^e programme (en cours d’étude par la R.T.F.) : une simple touche ! Si demain, le 2^e programme démarre, dès aujourd’hui, le T 5124 est prévu pour le recevoir !”

⁹⁰⁰ *Philips* (1961, March 25). Advertisement. Tagline: LE NOUVEAU PHILIPS écran rectangulaire. *Paris Match*, 624, 146; *Clarville* (1961, September 16). Advertisement. Tagline: déjà prêts pour la 2^{ème} chaîne ! *Paris Match*, 649, 72.

⁹⁰¹ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

⁹⁰² *Ibid.* It seems possible that *Philips France* would have benefited from *Philips*’s vast experience with the 625-line standard in other European countries such as the Netherlands or Germany. The source only notes that *Philips* had managed to first introduce this technological innovation “[t]hanks to its great industrial power”, *ibid.*

without any later modification.” In the accompanying text, it was argued that buying such a set would not only be cheaper than retrofitting a device later on, but that it would also save consumers from any potential waiting times as technicians would probably be overwhelmed with retrofitting-requests as soon as the second channel would start broadcasting.⁹⁰³ This variation of the campaign would then run until the end of January 1963. During March 1963, *Philips France* conducted a short follow-up measure, which revolved around retailers offering to examine the television sets of consumers to see if it would be possible to modify them in order to make them capable of receiving the second channel, with the underlying goal to prompt a “[r]ecall of the new PHILIPS TV sets superiority”.⁹⁰⁴

⁹⁰³ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77. *Philips France* had pointed out this feature of its new devices from the outset in its 1962/63 campaign, Philips (1962, October 13). Advertisement. Tagline: des années de satisfaction. *Paris Match*, 705, 16. However, with its second phase, which would have started in November (the first such ad appeared in *Paris Match* on the 17th) this argumentation took on a completely different salience in *Philips France*’s advertising, Philips (1962, November 17). Advertisement. Tagline: Ni “prêt”, ni “prévu”, ni “adaptable”, mais entièrement équipé pour la 2^{ème} chaîne sans aucune modification ultérieure. *Paris Match*, 710, 17. Three issues earlier, the same imagery had been used, albeit still with the previous tagline instead, Philips (1962, October 27). Advertisement. Tagline: des années de satisfaction. *Paris Match*, 707, 30. In contrast, later ads would continue this new argumentation while using different imagery, Philips (1962, December 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Ni “prêt”, ni “prévu”, ni “adaptable”, mais entièrement équipé pour la 2^e chaîne sans aucune modification ultérieure. Des années de satisfaction. *Paris Match*, 714, 144. The other brand of the *Philips* concern on the French market, *Radiola*, also made use of this argumentation in its advertising in late 1962, equally using *Paris Match*, for instance, to point out that their television sets were ready for the 2nd channel without the need for any further modifications, Radiola (1962, October 13). Advertisement. Tagline: les Téléviseurs Radiola vous assurent. *Paris Match*, 705, 21. The “years of satisfaction”-idea on the other hand played no role in the *Radiola* advertising, which visibly also followed a different brand image presentation strategy and more strongly emphasized price. See for instance Radiola (1962, October 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Radiouse...avec Radiola. *Paris Match*, 706, 123.

⁹⁰⁴ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77. See also id., pp. 80–81.

Ni "prêt", ni "prévu", ni "adaptable", mais
entièrement équipé pour la 2^{ème} chaîne
 sans aucune modification ultérieure

Oui, sans aucune modification ultérieure, votre téléviseur PHILIPS recevra la 2^{ème} chaîne dès sa mise en service, parce qu'il est équipé de l'ensemble indispensable à cette réception : le sélecteur U. H. F. PHILIPS possède des moyens techniques et industriels assez puissants pour vous offrir dès maintenant toute une gamme de téléviseurs entièrement équipés pour la 2^{ème} chaîne à partir de 1.295 NF - T.L. seulement.

Très important : Certains téléviseurs sont présentés comme "prêts", "prévus", ou "adaptables à la 2^{ème} chaîne". Il leur manque en effet des éléments qui devront être ajoutés le moment venu, entre autres le sélecteur U. H. F. En choisissant dès maintenant un appareil "entièrement équipé", vous économiserez ultérieurement les frais d'une transformation plus onéreuse qu'un montage en usine. Vous éviterez aussi une longue attente, car la mise en service de la 2^{ème} chaîne amènera chez les radio électriciens un afflux subit et massif de téléviseurs à modifier.

Téléviseur 59^{cm}
 asymétrique **1.695** NF
 + T. L.

Faire confiance à
PHILIPS
 c'est s'assurer des années de satisfaction.

Figure 33: Philips (1962, November 17). Advertisement. Tagline: Ni "prêt", ni "prévu", ni "adaptable", mais entièrement équipé pour la 2^{ème} chaîne sans aucune modification ultérieure". *Paris Match*, 710, 17.

For the new television set advertising following in autumn/winter 1963, *Philips France* drew on the "main theme" of the previously outlined campaign. But now, the company warned consumers to "Avoid a risky choice!" and advised them to choose a *Philips* TV, as – according to the ad's reasoning – only a renowned brand such as *Philips* was able to offer up-to-date,

durable television sets of the highest quality. This messaging of associating a television set purchase with risk was accentuated by the imagery. The ad depicted a dice shaker and dice, evoking an association with gambling.⁹⁰⁵ *Philips France* evidently believed that consumers were anxious about making the wrong choice in their large, one-time purchasing decision. The company sought to capitalize on this feeling by assuring consumers that opting for the *Philips* brand would not be a gamble – in contrast to the competition, it was implied. While the 1963 campaign thus shows continuity with the “main theme” of the previous year’s campaign (despite slightly varying the argumentation), the window for the “secondary theme” on the other hand had closed as other companies followed suit: by April 1964, when the 2nd canal started broadcasting, all new TVs available on the market were ready to receive it without the need for further interventions.⁹⁰⁶

3.2.3 Continuity and Change. *Philips France*’s 1964 Television Set Advertising Campaign

For its 1964 television set advertising campaign, *Philips France* then “[...] thought that the best campaign would be that which gave irrefutable proof of what we have been proposing for a long time.”⁹⁰⁷ In order to demonstrate its longstanding claim that *Philips* television sets were sturdy devices that would provide “years of satisfaction”, *Philips France* drew on the tests it conducted with its TV set prototypes to construct an advertising campaign with the slogan “Épreuve...et preuve” (“Test...and proof”).⁹⁰⁸ Out of the reportedly 103 tests the company subjected its TVs to in testing,⁹⁰⁹ *Philips France* had chosen three which it deemed to be “particularly striking in the public mind and which lend themselves to an interesting presentation in the written press, and for radio and television broadcasts”:⁹¹⁰ letting the TV fall from a certain height (see Figure 34),⁹¹¹ subjecting it to a temperature of 80° Celsius,⁹¹² and

⁹⁰⁵ Philips (1963, October 5). Advertisement. Tagline: Évitez un choix hasardeux ! *Paris Match*, 756, 28. See for instance also Philips (1963, November 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Évitez un choix hasardeux ! *Paris Match*, 764, 144. In the original French: “Évitez un choix hasardeux !”, “années de satisfaction”.

⁹⁰⁶ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 124. By this point, however, the transmitter network for the 2nd channel was far from being completely built. A significant part of the French populace would thus not have been able to watch it regardless of whether their TV could receive it or not, id., pp. 124, 152.

⁹⁰⁷ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁹ See for instance Philips (1964, November 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! L’étuve à 80°. *Paris Match*, 813, 12.

⁹¹⁰ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

⁹¹¹ Philips (1964, September 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! La chute libre. *Paris Match*, 807, 31.

⁹¹² Philips (1964, October 17). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! La table vibrante. *Paris Match*, 811, 41.

putting it on a heavily vibrating table.⁹¹³ Subjecting consumer electronics devices to stress tests during product development was certainly not unique to *Philips France*. But this did not really matter for this campaign messaging to work, since the company was the first to publicize this fact: “Undoubtedly, many of our competitors test their prototypes in exactly the same manner as we do. We have however been the first to use these tests as a basis for an entire publicity campaign.”⁹¹⁴ As *Philips France* itself pointed out, this campaign nicely lent itself to print, film, and radio alike – and it had even been conceptualized with such multi-mediatic dissemination in mind. It follows that the company again made use of the entire media ensemble.⁹¹⁵

Épreuve... et... preuve!

La chute libre

Avant de mettre en fabrication un nouveau modèle, Philips fait subir à des prototypes, 103 épreuves électroniques et mécaniques.

La "CHUTE LIBRE" est l'une de ces épreuves.

Elle permet de contrôler la résistance du téléviseur à des chocs qu'il ne connaîtra jamais en réalité, même durant son transport.

C'est une des preuves que les téléviseurs PHILIPS sont "À TOUTE ÉPREUVE" et c'est une des 103 raisons pour lesquelles un téléviseur PHILIPS vous donnera des années de satisfaction.

TÉLÉVISEURS PHILIPS
c'est plus sûr!

PHILIPS

Demandez à votre Distributeur Officiel Philips de vous présenter la gamme des téléviseurs (à partir de 1295 F + T. L.). Il vous renseignera également sur le "crédit longue durée" que Philips vous propose pour tout achat d'appareil.

BON EXEMPLAIRE GRATUIT du magazine illustré en couleurs BONJOUR PHILIPPINE! à prendre chez un Distributeur Officiel PHILIPS

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Figure 34: Philips (1964, September 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! La chute libre. *Paris Match*, 807, 31.

⁹¹³ Philips (1964, November 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! L'étuve à 80°. *Paris Match*, 813, 12.

⁹¹⁴ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

⁹¹⁵ Id., pp. 63–64, 67.

The 1964 campaign had a significant print component. Between September and November, *Philips France* inserted four campaign-specific advertisements in 55 dailies in Paris and the provinces, and another four in the magazines *Paris Match* and *Jours de France*, which showed one test each, followed up by a recapitulatory ad showing all three tests together. In addition, the company bought 14 ads in total across five magazines that had their principal readership in rural areas – such as *L'Agriculteur du Sud-Est* – for the timeframe October to early December to increase their campaign's efficacy specifically in those parts of the country “where the proportion of penetration of television is less accentuated”.⁹¹⁶ The print component of *Philips France*'s 1964 television set advertising campaign was clearly aimed at the general mass market in its media booking and messaging, and would have reached well above a million readers with each ad in *Paris Match* alone.⁹¹⁷ In that regard, the campaign was similar to the one from 1962. But unlike two years earlier, *Philips France* now also made dedicated efforts to more precisely target consumers in rural areas, where television set adoption rates were still lagging behind urban areas in the first half of the 1960s.⁹¹⁸ The company evidently saw untapped potential in this segment of the market and allocated additional advertising resources to it, thus slightly adjusting its general strategy to better account for the conditions of the market.

As had already been the case for the 1962 campaign, radio advertising was another big component of the 1964 television set advertising strategy of *Philips France*: the company had booked 156 radio ads with each of the four peripheral radio stations. The campaign message was slightly adjusted to better fit the medium: the broadcast text mentioned all three tests in quick succession, before then underlining twice that *Philips* TV set prototypes were subjected to 103 tests overall. In deviation from the print variants, which focused solely on the prototype testing in imagery and text, the radio ad also made sure to make listeners aware of the fact that consumer devices were tested as well, before then ending on the established messages of TV set satisfaction and brand reliability.⁹¹⁹

In 1962, film had been an inaccessible medium for companies wanting to advertise television sets throughout all of France (advertising on the regional network of *Télé-Luxembourg*, for instance, would have been possible). While brand advertising was still prohibited on French television by 1964, cinema chains had seemingly abandoned their previous stance of refusing

⁹¹⁶ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, pp. 63–64, 67. For the quote, see id., p. 63. For the film's storyboard, see id., p. 67.

⁹¹⁷ *Paris Match* had a circulation of 1,45 million per issue in 1960 and 1,2 million in 1966, Hultquist, 1996, p. 78. See also Proscop, 1962, p. V 105.

⁹¹⁸ Secrétariat d'État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1975, p. 49.

⁹¹⁹ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, pp. 63–65. For the full English translation of the radio commercial text, see id., p. 65.

to screen any ads for television sets in the meantime. This meant that *Philips France* could make use of this component of the French media ensemble for its 1964 advertising campaign, booking a week of showings for its commercial shot on color film in 327 cinemas located either in Paris, its outskirts, or one of 33 other cities. The campaign's messaging translated well to the audiovisual. According to *Philips France*, film was "the ideal medium for the demonstrations which we had decided to make our campaign theme." Unsurprisingly, the film showed a sequence of prototype tests, adding a few more to the three depicted throughout the print campaign while keeping the overall tone.⁹²⁰

Philips France certainly also again made use of outdoor advertising. Between the 16th and 31st of October 1964, the company advertised its television sets on posters and billboards in 3.381 locations across 294 French towns (including Paris with its 151 locations), covering a surface area of nearly 50.000 m². However, the contents communicated through outdoor advertising were usually only absorbed in passing, which made this medium less well-suited than film, radio, or print for this specific campaign, as it necessitated a certain degree of engagement from the onlooker/listener in order to understand the point it was trying to get across. *Philips France* thus believed it necessary to make significant, media-specific adjustments for the outdoor advertising component of the campaign: "[...], due to the nature of the medium, and for reasons of taste, [it is] required that the passer-by be attracted, at first glance, by the appearance of a television set looking its best."⁹²¹ This component thus did not reference testing. Instead, the company went with an ad-design that ensured that its television sets would be aesthetically set in scene while keeping with the basic idea that *Philips'* television sets were reliable products. *Philips France* also changed the slogan for this advertising format to better reflect the adjusted approach: "Technical perfection, beauty of line".⁹²²

As had been the case in 1962, retailers had an important role to play in *Philips France's* 1964 television set advertising campaign. In fact, traditional consumer electronics retail shops were relevant actors on the black and white television set market in 1960s France in particular. Because television sets were expensive purchases, consumers valued the consultation retailers offered as well as their after-sales service. At the beginning of the 1970s, such retailers thus still accounted for over three quarters of all B/W television set sales in France.⁹²³ The significance *Philips France* attributed to retailers can already be seen when considering the company's print advertisements in *Paris Match*, for instance: these came with a cut-out coupon

⁹²⁰ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

⁹²¹ Id., p. 64.

⁹²² Id., pp. 64, 66.

⁹²³ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 185.

that consumers could redeem at their local retailer to receive a free copy of *Philips France*'s house magazine for consumers, *Bonjour Philippine!*, which was seemingly meant to incentivize a shop visit. Furthermore, these print ads also included a notice that the company's retail partners would not just be able to present *Philips*'s television set product range to interested parties, but also inform them about the consumer credit option offered by *Philips France* for television set purchases,⁹²⁴ which was intended to facilitate the affordability of television sets.⁹²⁵ These two measures, however, did not pertain to any specific retailers in particular. But apart from making extensive use of mass media channels to reach consumers nationwide, *Philips France* also worked with its retail partners to cast a supplemental net of locally effective advertising forms for the 1964 campaign.

An unspecified number of individual retailers and collectives adapted *Philips France*'s print advertising for insertion in their respective local newspapers across the country, and 430 retail partners bought copies of the cinema commercial from *Philips France*, which came with an addendum at the end that included their name and address to show it in their local movie theater.⁹²⁶ In addition, *Philips France* also collaborated with several retailers in the suburbs of Paris to rent space in stations of local public transport for a hundred posters of 4x3 meters in size for the whole of January 1965. Given this reception context, these posters, too, depicted the more instantaneously appealing “Technical perfection, beauty of line”-design, to which the respective local retailer's address had been added. It follows that this ad-design was also the one used for the 45.000 smaller posters *Philips France* distributed to its retailers across the country for them to use as they saw fit. For those same reasons, the campaign-specific shop window display the company had on offer had been based on this design as well, which passersby could have seen in 600 retailer shop windows across the country.⁹²⁷ Through those channels, retailers were able to precisely target their locally relevant audience. Due to the structure of the French media landscape, no similar possibilities existed for the radio. At the time, French state radio programs did not allow brand advertising.⁹²⁸ And the peripheral radio stations, which accepted ads, used far-reaching long wave transmitters⁹²⁹ to indiscriminately

⁹²⁴ See for instance Philips (1964, November 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! L'épreuve à 80°. *Paris Match*, 813, 12.

⁹²⁵ Making use of consumer credit for TV purchases became increasingly common and accepted in French society during the 1960s, Effosse, 2019.

⁹²⁶ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, pp. 63–64.

⁹²⁷ Id., p. 64.

⁹²⁸ Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1964, pp. F 24–25.

⁹²⁹ Fesneau, 2011, p. 130.

reach listeners throughout France.⁹³⁰ Their audience composition was thus ill-suited for retailer advertising, which only needed to be locally effective.

3.2.4 The Temporal and Transnational Feasibility of *Philips France*'s Television Set Campaigns

Both outlined advertising campaigns of *Philips France* happened during the “boom”-phase⁹³¹ of the French television set market. At the time, demand was growing quickly, and many French households bought their first ever television set. Unlike in the early days of television, consumers did not need to first be convinced of the medium's merits anymore. Instead, it was now “indispensable to give the potential buyer solid reasons”⁹³² to choose a specific brand. Although TVs were coveted and increasingly affordable goods of mass consumption, they remained expensive. *Philips France* thus sought to convince consumers that all *Philips* TVs would last for years as they were reliable and competently built. This was the common foundation for *Philips France*'s television set advertising campaign concepts in those years, giving them argumentative continuity in a relatively stable market environment.

Despite the continuity in messaging, both the imagery and the precise argumentative approach evolved over the years. Similarly, *Philips France* would also adjust or even completely change the precise argumentative approach and the imagery if the company believed that the reception context of a certain channel it used to communicate with consumers necessitated it. It needs to be noted, however, that neither source extensively discussed imagery, ad-design or layout (although images of the company's advertising and sales material were included in the campaign presentations). The advertisers working at *Philips France* placed much greater emphasis on strategy, mainly covering topics like market environment, advertising media planning, or messaging in their campaign presentations. This gives the impression that ad-design, layout, and imagery were but the new wrapping a message received depending on the medium and/or the year.

Philips France's 1962 and 1964 campaigns had been conceptualized against the backdrop of the overall market environment of this class of consumer electronics devices, and the campaign approaches were based on what the company perceived to be the most important consumer expectation for this product group at the time. It follows that the advertising campaigns

⁹³⁰ See for instance the regional distribution of listeners of *Radio Luxembourg* in 1961 and 1968. While the station's listeners were not spread equally across France's regions, it nonetheless reached millions of citizens across the French hexagon, Informations et Publicité, 1962; (1969). *RTL Luxembourg en un an l'écoute augmente de 30 %*. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Les médias audiovisuels, ID 12841-0021, Dossier RTL 1961-1979.

⁹³¹ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 123.

⁹³² G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

discussed here were not about one specific television set. Certainly, the ads usually depicted a particular model, and maybe even gave a name and price. But the campaigns did not insist on the specific features of any given television set (like screen size). Instead, *Philips France*'s messaging was explicitly meant to apply to all *Philips* television sets.

In its argumentation for this class of consumer electronics products, the company was contingent on the fact that the advertised devices were part of a larger media technology existing “as both object *and* medium”.⁹³³ This is best illustrated by *Philips France*'s 1962 television set advertising campaign. At a very specific point in time in late 1962, the campaign's focus was switched to underscore that the company had been the first to produce television sets capable of receiving France's second television channel without needing any further adjustments. This approach depended on the technological process *Philips France* had made compared to the company's competitors and on earlier advertisements of the industry. Most notably, it was intrinsically linked to the unique mediatic environment of early 1960s France. *Philips France*'s advertising argumentation in late 1962 would not have been feasible for any other company, in any other country, for another consumer electronics device, or at any other point in time.

On the other hand, *Philips France*'s main advertising strategy for its television sets in 1962-1964 would have technically been transnationally feasible, as its fundamental message – *Philips* TVs were long-lasting, technically well-built, and reliable devices – fit well with the requirements of the French market environment without being exclusive to France or the *Philips* brand per se. German manufacturer *Kuba Imperial*, for instance, used an advertising tagline for its television set lineup in 1962 that seemingly relied on a quite similar rationale: “2 years warranty, the best proof for quality”, pointing out the “technical perfection” in the accompanying text.⁹³⁴ But the mere fact that it was theoretically feasible to use an argumentation transnationally did not necessarily mean that companies actually did. When looking at the television set advertising of the *Deutsche Philips* in the *Stern* magazine in 1962 and 1964 for instance,⁹³⁵ there is no indication that the television set advertising campaigns of both subsidiaries of the *Philips* group were conceived, planned, or designed in transnational collaboration. Neither do *Philips France*'s campaign presentations hint toward transnational collaborative efforts in any capacity. It thus seems likely that the responsible product

⁹³³ Fickers, 2014, p. 42.

⁹³⁴ Kuba Imperial (1962, September 16). Advertisement. Tagline: 2 Jahre Garantie der beste Qualitätsbeweis. *Stern*, 37, 2. In the original German: “2 Jahre Garantie der beste Qualitätsbeweis”, “technische Vollendung”.

⁹³⁵ Philips (1962, November 25). Advertisement. Tagline: 3x ja zu PHILIPS Fernsehen. *Stern*, 47, 53; (1964, September 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Gratis zwei Fernseh-Faltmodelle für die Stellprobe zu Haus. *Stern*, 39, 117.

department of the French national *Philips* organization devised these campaigns in relative autonomy, as would have been common practice within the company at the time.⁹³⁶

For both television set advertising campaigns, *Philips France* made use of the whole media ensemble – insofar the company had access to it. In the latter parts of the years 1962 and 1964, consumers could have encountered advertising for *Philips* TVs when listening to the peripheral radio stations, when reading a magazine or their local newspaper, when riding the train to Paris for work, and when passing billboards or retailer shop windows throughout France. In 1964, *Philips France*'s TV set advertising would then also find its way into cinemas throughout the country. Ironically, only the medium of television remained free of advertising for *Philips* television sets in the first half of the 1960s due to the brand advertising ban in place until 1968. In this regard, the advertising campaigns were contingent on the possibilities offered by the French advertising landscape at a given point in time. But this was an aspect in which *Philips France*'s television set campaigns would not necessarily have differed from advertising campaigns by market leaders in durable mass consumer goods markets abroad. However, advertising campaigns could also become intertwined with the media technology that was to be advertised in particular. This can be seen by the refusal of French cinemas in 1962 to show ads for television sets; it would not have been *Philips France*'s new TV product lineup for 1962/63 that prompted this rejection – rather, it was the media technology of television as a whole.

Due to the mass-appeal of television and *Philips France*'s strong position on the French television set market at the time, the company was able to spend considerable funds on advertising campaigns that were meant to have a broad impact. The sources give no indication about the budget sizes of those 1962 and 1964 television set campaigns, though it may be estimated that the total cost of the 1964 campaign, for instance, would have likely been north of a million FF.⁹³⁷ Remarkably, *Philips France*'s two campaigns were distinctly French in how they allocated the overall advertising budget. According to Martin, two key characteristics of the French advertising market at the time were the prominence of radio advertising owing to the peripheral radio stations, and a comparatively great importance attributed to outdoor and

⁹³⁶ On the interrelation of advertising and *Philips*'s organizational structure, see chapters 2.1.2.1.1 and 2.1.2.1.2.

⁹³⁷ The four insertions each in the two periodicals *Paris Match* and *Jours de France* accounted for 12,53 % of the overall mass media budget of the 1964 campaign, which together with the expenses for daily press, the rural press, the cinema, and the radio amounted to 100 %, G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 64. In 1964, four full-page B/W ads in *Paris Match* would have cost 100.000 FF, Hultquist, 1996, p. 79, Footnote 59. And in *Jours de France*, four full page B/W ads cost 55.200 FF by 1971, J. Walter Thompson Company (1971). *Media Information France. 1971*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Advertising Vertical File, 1950-1994. Box 51. ADV – International Europe – France. Hartman Center, p. 6. Insertions in *Jours de France* would have certainly cost less in 1964. Supposing that four insertions would have cost around 50 % in 1964 of what they did in 1971, advertising spending on those two periodicals alone would have nonetheless still amounted to a bit more than 125.000 FF – or 12,5 % of one million FF. The expenses for outdoor advertising, for instance, were not even yet included in this total.

poster advertising.⁹³⁸ This is especially apparent when comparing the 1962 advertising expenditure across mass media in France and Germany (see Table 2), based on data from the *Institut de Recherches et d'Études Publicitaires (IREP)*.⁹³⁹

Table 2: Percentual allocation of total mass media advertising spending in France and Germany, 1962.

All figures given in %	France	Germany
Press advertising	69,9	82,6
Outdoor/poster advertising	12,0	3,5
Radio advertising	11,6	1,9
Cinema advertising	5,1	2,7
Television advertising	1,4	9,3

This distribution would not change fundamentally for either country by 1964.⁹⁴⁰ Unfortunately, the data provided by *Philips France* for its 1962 or 1964 campaigns does not match the format of the *IREP*-data exactly. For 1962, the company breaks down its advertising expenditure into 55,8 % for press insertions, 13 % for poster and outdoor advertising, 23,8 % for radio commercials, and 7,4 % for printed matter used at the point of sale. Cinema and television advertising would have been at 0 %.⁹⁴¹ For 1964 on the other hand, *Philips France* gives the following allocation: 69,48 % press, 11,63 % cinema, 18,89 % radio.⁹⁴² Notably, the 1964 campaign's large poster and outdoor advertising component was not included in this breakdown. And for 1962, printed matter as a non-mass media advertising form was included, also distorting the calculation. Direct comparisons between the data are thus impossible. Looking at common tendencies does nonetheless reveal that *Philips France*'s 1962 and 1964 advertising campaigns both kept with the general French trend of allocating significant parts of the total to radio advertising. And based on *Philips France*'s data for 1962, this was also true for poster and outdoor advertising. How those two television set advertising campaigns were structured thus also reflected nation-specific particularities in advertising expenditure allocation between media.

⁹³⁸ Martin, 2012, pp. 91–93.

⁹³⁹ There was not just a difference concerning the percentual allocation of funds between the two countries. Absolute mass media advertising spending in Germany was more than twice as high in 1962 as it was in France. Mass media advertising spending per capita was around double as well, IREP (1970). Les investissements publicitaires en Europe, in *Bulletin d'Information et de Documentation de l'IREP*, 10, 20–30. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Dossiers personnels sur l'IREP, ID 12834-0001, Dossier N°1 IREP 1960-1975, pp. 21, 23, 27.

⁹⁴⁰ The precise percentage-allocations certainly varied, but the overall trends were consistent between 1962 and 1964, Id., pp. 21, 23.

⁹⁴¹ G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77.

⁹⁴² G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 64.

For both advertising campaigns discussed here, *Philips France* sought to closely involve its retail partners, just like *Telefunken* had done for the *Magnetophon Automatic*. This meant providing them with advertising material for the point of sale that fit with the overall imagery and argumentation of the respective mass media campaign, as well as collaborating with them on locally effective media advertising measures meant to supplement *Philips France*'s mass media advertising efforts. But it could also mean trying to incite consumers to visit retailers through the mass media advertising itself, or implementing campaign measures chiefly built around retailer-consumer interactions – such as *Philips France*'s follow-up campaign in March 1963, during which its retailers offered consumers television set examinations to assess if their devices were modifiable for the second channel. This retailer measure, which had been conceptualized following *Philips France*'s orientational shift in late 1962 concerning its television set advertising campaign, was then also uniquely tailored to the situation of the media technology of television in France at the time.

This degree of specificity certainly did not apply to all manufacturer-retailer collaborations. Take for instance the 1964 sales promotion measure of the *Deutsche Philips* for its television sets: consumers could lend out size-accurate mockups of *Philips* televisions sets from their local retailers at no cost to take them home in order to see which model would fit where (see Figure 35). This campaign was publicized through mass media channels like the *Stern* magazine and accompanied by shop window posters indicating that the retailer participated in the campaign.⁹⁴³ As such, this measure was built upon the fact that television sets were also pieces of furniture.⁹⁴⁴ Given that this applied to French TVs as well, this campaign would have been usable by *Philips France*. Yet, theoretical transnational feasibility did not automatically transfer into application, which was contingent on intra-organizational transfer processes and the overall organizational structure of a given consumer electronics company.⁹⁴⁵

⁹⁴³ Philips (1964, September 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Gratis zwei Fernseh-Faltmodelle für die Stellprobe zu Haus. *Stern*, 39, 117.

⁹⁴⁴ This link is explored in depth by Miggelbrink, M. (2018). *Fernsehen und Wohnkultur. Zur Vermöbelung von Fernsehgeräten in der BRD der 1950er- und 1960er-Jahre*. Transcript Verlag.

⁹⁴⁵ This is discussed repeatedly throughout part 2. On *Philips* in particular, see chapters 2.1.2.1.1 and 2.1.2.1.2.

SENSATION BEI PHILIPS FERNSEHEN:

GRATIS zwei Fernseh-Faltmodelle für die Stellprobe zu Haus

Bei Ihrem Fachhändler erhalten Sie leihweise die Faltmodelle in der Tragetasche.



So wird probiert, wo welches Modell am besten steht.

Mit wenigen Handgriffen entfalten Sie die Modelle, original in Aussehen und Größe. Bequem und schnell finden Sie den Platz, wo das neue Philips Fernsehgerät stehen soll. Das scharfe Bild, der gute Ton, die perfekte Technik sind bei Philips Fernsehgeräten selbstverständlich. Das weiß jeder! Jetzt aber wissen Sie auch, welches Fernsehgerät am besten zur Einrichtung paßt.



Die Philips-Stellprobe erhalten Sie leihweise beim Fachhandel, kostenlos und unverbindlich. Achten Sie auf dieses Schaufensterplakat.

Wenn Fernsehen — dann jetzt einen Philips.
Die Olympischen Spiele auf dem Philips Bildschirm
das Erlebnis des Jahres!

...nimm doch
PHILIPS
Fernsehen

Figure 35: Philips (1964, September 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Gratis zwei Fernseh-Faltmodelle für die Stellprobe zu Haus. *Stern*, 39, 117.

Philips France's two exemplary product group advertising campaigns of the early 1960s may be characterized by a certain ambivalence concerning temporality and transnationality. Both campaigns were contingent on the socio-economic and mediatic conditions particular to France and had clearly been designed with the French market environment in mind. Nonetheless, they featured elements that advertisers in other countries would have been able to adapt for their

television set campaigns after reading about the French ones in the yearbooks of the *Philips international advertising award*. Overall, such product group advertising campaigns targeted mass audiences with argumentative approaches that could remain stable throughout several years as they were usually not specific to any device(s) but deliberately generic instead. No matter if a French consumer would have seen advertising for a *Philips* television during a cinema visit in 1964, or while reading *Paris Match* in 1962; the long-term reliability of *Philips*'s television sets was underscored in both cases. Notably, such broad advertising approaches coexisted with much more tailored strategies for specific audience segments.

3.3 Addressing Audiences. Target Group-Specific Advertising, Sales, and Distribution Strategies

“An extraordinary device, carefully selected target groups, an interesting advertising mailing – the combination promises success.”⁹⁴⁶

Consumer electronics were mass-produced goods that would prominently feature in mass media advertising and in thousands of stores throughout France and Germany alike during the long 1960s. However, not every consumer electronics device was equally well suited for mass market advertising and sales measures, and not all target groups were best reached through mass media advertising. In such cases, approaches were more precisely tailored, as the above-cited excerpt from a letter sent to *Telefunken*'s branch offices by the advertisers of the company's *GM* department highlights. Delineating these interdependencies between device(s) to be advertised, target group(s), and advertising, sales, and distribution approach(es) is the key goal of the following chapter.

First, it is discussed how and why consumer electronics companies began to address migrant workers in Germany as a separate socio-demographic group in the mid-1960s. At the time, it became increasingly clear that the growing number of migrant workers in the country constituted a promising target group due to their purchasing power and interest in certain consumer electronics product groups. Effectively targeting migrant workers was challenging, however, as they could not be reached through mass media advertising due to their distinct media consumption patterns while interactions with retailers were impeded by language barriers. This first subchapter details how the industry – and *Telefunken* in particular – overcame these sales-inhibiting factors by developing advertising and sales approaches uniquely attuned to migrant workers as a socio-demographic target group.

⁹⁴⁶ Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66. Subject: Direktwerbeaktion für den Teletop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019. In the original German: “Ein außergewöhnliches Gerät, sorgfältig ausgewählte Zielgruppen, eine interessante Werbesendung – das zusammen verspricht einen Erfolg.”

In a next step, the target group of motorists is raised as a contrasting example to show how the same consumer electronics device(s) would be positioned differently depending on the addressed target group. Remarkably, this applied not only to advertising channels, imagery, or argumentation, but potentially also to the distribution channels used to present and sell the device(s) to the public. The analytical perspective then is inverted. Instead of focusing on a particular target group, an “extraordinary device”⁹⁴⁷ becomes the focal point. It is detailed how the technical conception of *Telefunken*’s record player *Telestop R/AS* made the device particularly well-suited for niche use cases, which in turn allowed the company to target businesses such as language schools with its advertising and sales efforts for the device.

Lastly, the interconnections between consumer electronics devices, target groups, and advertising, sales, and distribution measures are investigated at the spatial level. It is contended that consumers had vastly different experiences concerning what consumer electronics products they came across, and the advertising, sales, and distribution forms for the media devices they encountered, depending on where they lived. To make this argument that consumers were also subject to localized advertising and sales measures – i.e. that they belonged to spatially constituted target groups – the local advertising and sales efforts of two consumer electronics retailers active in German urban areas are outlined, as well as a sales promotion solution developed for the French countryside.

Besides an introductory part on migrant workers in Germany, which is based on secondary literature, the case studies of this chapter chiefly draw on company sources from *Philips*, *Braun*, and particularly *Telefunken*, as well as on press publications, brochures, and advertisements. The cases introduced in the following chapter are testament to the adaptive capacity of consumer electronics companies. These companies reached certain target groups – whether constituted based on socio-demographic factors, interests, or spatiality – through alternative means of advertising, sales, or distribution. Similarly, they advertised and sold some consumer electronics devices through uncommon channels and ensured that they presented products differently to distinct target groups. In a broader sense, then, these case studies attest to a necessity to also look beyond mass media publications to be able to represent the full complexity of consumer electronics advertising, sales, and distribution in the long 1960s.

⁹⁴⁷ Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen* 41/66. Subject: *Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019. In the original German: “Ein außergewöhnliches Gerät, [...]”

3.3.1 Migrant Workers in Germany as a Target Group of Consumer Electronics Companies

3.3.1.1 The Consumption and Media Usage of Migrant Workers in 1960s Germany

In the 1950s, the unemployment rate in Germany fell from an annual average of 11,0 % in 1950 to 1,3 % in 1960, even going below 1 % in the following years. This led Germany to work with foreign governments from around 1960 onward, sourcing labor from abroad to sustain its economic growth. During the 1950s, the number of immigrant workers had remained relatively low: in 1954, Germany had 73.000 so-called “Gastarbeiter” (“guest-workers”), and in 1957, the percentage of foreigners in the total workforce was only 0,4 %. By 1960, foreign workers already made up 1,1 % of the workforce.⁹⁴⁸ But it was the 1960s that would then see an immense influx of migrant workers in Germany. In 1961, there were already ca. 550.000 migrants in the labor force. Until 1973, when the German government fundamentally changed their recruitment policy (“Anwerbestopp”), this figure would rise to around 2,6 million. Between the 1950s and 1973, the increase in migrant workers coming to Germany was facilitated by recruitment agreements initially with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960) and Turkey (1961). These were followed by agreements with Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968).⁹⁴⁹

Most – albeit far from all –⁹⁵⁰ of those coming to Germany during the first half of the 1960s were young men arriving without their family and seeking to earn good wages. They had been recruited under the mutual assumption that they would eventually return home. This meant that they kept close links with their respective home country and that they sent home remittances and/or saved up significant portions of their wages for after their return.⁹⁵¹ According to a figure from the German postal service cited by the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, the “Gastarbeiter” had sent remittances to their families worth around one billion DM in 1963. However, as *Der Spiegel* pointed out in the same report, they also had spent roughly the same amount on consumption that year, buying home appliances, photo cameras, and consumer electronics also

⁹⁴⁸ Schildt, 1995, pp. 55–56. Regarding the causal relationship between reaching full employment and a growing interest of the German industry in recruiting agreements, see also Knortz, H. (2008). *Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte. "Gastarbeiter" in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953-1973*. Böhlau Verlag, pp. 152–153.

⁹⁴⁹ Oltmer, J. (2012). Einführung: Migrationsverhältnisse und Migrationsregime nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. In J. Oltmer, A. Kreienbrink, C. Sanz Díaz (Eds.), *Das “Gastarbeiter“-System. Arbeitsmigration und ihre Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa* (pp. 9–21). Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 10–11.

⁹⁵⁰ Id., p. 15.

⁹⁵¹ Herbert, U. (2001). *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge*. C.H. Beck, p. 212. Between the late 1950s and 1973, around 14 million migrant workers came to West Germany. Many of them would return to their country of origin: Around 11 million left Germany after some time, while the others stayed and brought their family to Germany instead, Oltmer, 2012, p. 11.

worth one billion DM.⁹⁵² At least a part of such purchases was also intended to be taken back home. As Karin Hunn points out, Turkish migrants often brought gifts with them on visits to Turkey in an effort to balance out the “the high social costs” of migration.⁹⁵³ Radios and tape recorders were especially popular to bring as presents.⁹⁵⁴ In many cases, however, consumer electronics were also purchased for personal use – Turkish migrants would “constantly” listen to the radio as one newspaper complained in 1962.⁹⁵⁵

Listening to the radio was indeed a common pastime of migrant workers in Germany. However, the geographical distance made it challenging for Italians and nigh impossible for Greeks or Spaniards to receive their domestic radio stations in Germany in the early 1960s. In addition, there was little German radio content available in their respective languages. Migrant workers thus turned toward programs emanating from the Eastern Bloc, as the radio stations there offered more content in their languages.⁹⁵⁶ This put political pressure on the German regional broadcasters to enlarge their offer, which they did from the 1st of November 1964 onward: every day, 45 minutes in Spanish, in Italian, in Greek, and in Turkish were aired by every German federal broadcaster on a new, third channel. Starting in 1966, television programming for “Gastarbeiter” was offered from time to time as well, and in 1970, a radio program for Yugoslavian migrants was added.⁹⁵⁷

By the mid-1960s, migrant workers could thus listen to radio programs specifically meant for them on ultra-short wave by German regional broadcasters and receive further programs in their respective languages through Eastern European stations on medium wavelength. Many migrant workers listened to all content available to them in their respective language, with 21 % of Turks, 17 % of Greeks, 24 % of Spaniards and 12 % of Italians regularly tuning in to an Eastern European station according to a newspaper report from January 1966. For some migrant workers, these stations were the only option: 10 % of the radios owned by “Gastarbeiter” living

⁹⁵² N.N. (1964, October 10). Per Moneta. *Der Spiegel*, 41. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/per-moneta-a-41e741dc-0002-0001-0000-000046175674>.

⁹⁵³ Hunn, K. (2005). »Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück...« *Die Geschichte der türkischen »Gastarbeiter« in der Bundesrepublik*. Wallstein Verlag, pp. 177–178. In the original German: “die hohen sozialen Kosten”.

⁹⁵⁴ Other popular gifts included other consumer electronics, home appliances, nylon socks, and shirts, Hunn, 2005, p. 178, Footnote 275.

⁹⁵⁵ Hunn, 2005, p. 142. Hunn references a report of the *Oberfränkische Volkszeitung*. In the original German: “ständig”.

⁹⁵⁶ The first broadcasts by German radio broadcasters aimed at Italian immigrants started in December 1961. Although they were broadcast daily, they were only a quarter of an hour long and not aired by all regional broadcasters. Other groups of migrant workers were offered even less, with “Gastarbeiter” from Spain for example getting a quarter hour of airtime in Spanish on German radio every week from February 1962 onward Sala, R. (2005). „Gastarbeitersendungen“ und „Gastarbeiterzeitschriften“ in der Bundesrepublik (1960–1975) – ein Spiegel internationaler Spannungen. *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 2(3), 366–387, pp. 368–371.

⁹⁵⁷ Id., pp. 372–375. These radio broadcasts were produced by the *WDR* (Italian, Turkish) and the *BR* (Italian, Spanish, Greek) and then shared with the other broadcasters.

in the transmission range of the public radio broadcaster of the federal state of Hesse were not capable of receiving ultra-short wave.⁹⁵⁸ The German government also financially supported press publications aimed at the “Gastarbeiter” in the 1960s, among them the Italian *Corriere d'Italia*, the Turkish *Anadolu*, the Greek *I Elliniki* and the Spanish *7 Fechas*. Their reach, however, remained limited among the target group who preferred audiovisual media.⁹⁵⁹

3.3.1.2 Targeting Migrant Workers through Multilingual Product Brochures

Although the consumption level and standard of living of migrant workers often remained below what would have been commensurate with their wages,⁹⁶⁰ migrant workers became an increasingly relevant target group during the first half of the 1960s. This was especially true for consumer electronics companies, whose goods were in demand among migrant workers as gifts and for personal use. In 1964 – the year in which the millionth “Gastarbeiter” was welcomed to Germany in a highly publicized event –⁹⁶¹ a member of *Telefunken*’s board inquired with *FM*’s Seydlitz if the company made any efforts to specifically target migrant workers with advertising measures. This involvement of the company’s leadership highlights the (newfound) importance placed on being present among this growing subgroup of consumers. Consequently, in April 1965, *Telefunken* released the first product brochure of a German consumer electronics company that was exclusively aimed at migrant workers.⁹⁶² It proved to be quite a success, with its initial run of 50.000 copies being out of stock by late June, leading to a reprint of another 60.000 copies.⁹⁶³

By September 1965, quite a few other industry players were preparing to also soon publish their own multilingual brochures specifically aimed at the “Gastarbeiter”, namely *Grundig*, *Saba*, *Blaupunkt*, and *Philips* (see Figure 36). Like the *Telefunken* brochure and a similar one by *Graetz* released in the meantime, these brochures all featured product texts in Greek, Italian,

⁹⁵⁸ N.G. (1966, January 7). Abends das Lied aus der Heimat. Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik lauschen Radio Prag. *Die Zeit*, 2. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.zeit.de/1966/02/abends-das-lied-aus-der-heimat>. The sense of connection the radio could provide should not be underestimated. The article quotes from a letter sent by a listener to a German broadcaster, which claimed that their radio program “refreshed the memory of our distant homeland” (“die Erinnerung an unsere ferne Heimat auffrischt”).

⁹⁵⁹ Sala, 2005, pp. 377–380.

⁹⁶⁰ This was connected to the habit of migrant workers to send remittances and save money, Herbert, 2001, p. 212.

⁹⁶¹ N.N. (1964, October 10). Per Moneta. *Der Spiegel*, 41. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/per-moneta-a-41e741dc-0002-0001-0000-000046175674>.

⁹⁶² Seydlitz to Herriger (1965, October 22). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbliche Bemühungen um die Gastarbeiter*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁶³ Martenson to Seydlitz (1965, June 23). *Internal letter. Subject: Gastarbeiter-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. Initially, it was planned to print another 50.000 copies, which is the figure given by Martenson. However, a later report mentions a total of 110.000 copies for both editions, making it more probable that the reprint had a size of 60.000 copies, Franzke (1965, August 31). *Besprechungsnotiz “Sonderaktion magnetophon 300”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120, p. 4. A third edition was then published as early as November 1965, Franzke to Seydlitz (1965, November 30). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

Spanish and Turkish. These language choices were deliberate: 31 % of the 1,2 million migrant workers living in Germany by this point were Italian, with Spanish (15,5 %), Greek (15,5 %) and Turkish (10,5 %) nationals following behind. A large majority of migrant workers thus spoke one of those four languages, making them the logical choice for multilingual brochures. By the second half of the year 1965, several large players in the German consumer electronics market – but far from all – had thus recognized that there was significant untapped potential in the “Gastarbeiter” market. They constituted an interesting “reservoir of consumers” for the industry, as one trade publication put it.⁹⁶⁴ This raises the question how exactly the industry sought to capitalize on that potential.



Figure 36: Philips (1965). Brochure “Tape Recorders Record Players Radio Receivers”. Enclosure of von Dellingshausen to Seydlitz (1965, December 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

These multilingual brochures usually did not feature the complete range of products companies had to offer. *Graetz*, for instance, focused on stationary and portable radio sets in its catalog, while *Blaupunkt* only showcased its portable radios.⁹⁶⁵ *Philips* and *Telefunken* also advertised their tape recorders and record players, with *Telefunken* even featuring one portable B/W

⁹⁶⁴ Mr (1965, September). Konsumentengruppe Gastarbeiter. *FT-Informationen. Mitteilungen der Funk-Technik für die Rundfunk- und Fernsehwirtschaft*, 18, 207–208. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original German: “Konsumentenreservoir Gastarbeiter”. See also the *Blaupunkt* brochure, *Blaupunkt* (1965). Brochure “Blaupunkt Kofferradio”. Enclosure of Franzke to Seydlitz (1965, November 30). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁶⁵ Mr (1965, September). Konsumentengruppe Gastarbeiter. *FT-Informationen. Mitteilungen der Funk-Technik für die Rundfunk- und Fernsehwirtschaft*, 18, 207–208. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. See also the *Blaupunkt* brochure, *Blaupunkt* (1965). Brochure “Blaupunkt Kofferradio”. Enclosure of Franzke to Seydlitz (1965, November 30). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

television set. In fact, even though both brands did not only advertise portable radio sets, portability was nonetheless a highly important aspect of most (*Philips*) or all (*Telefunken*) products featured in these two brochures.⁹⁶⁶ This means that the majority of products advertised in such brochures were portable music playing devices, with high-end television sets or radiograms not being featured at all. This focus was certainly related to questions of purchasing power and living standards, though, according to an article by *Telefunken* in which the company aimed to explain its thought process behind their targeting of migrant workers to its associated retailers, it was also a question of age: “The average age of the migrant workers is between 25 and 35. This is an age at which, according to experience, there is a great deal of interest in musical entertainment.”⁹⁶⁷

What about the reasoning behind the emphasis on portability? Per *Telefunken*’s head of marketing, Seydlitz, the portability of the featured devices would make it easier for the “Gastarbeiter” to take them along when leaving Germany.⁹⁶⁸ This did not necessarily only apply to migrant workers permanently returning home. While the possibility of returning home with consumer electronics as gifts, which Karin Hunn has highlighted as a common practice among Turkish migrant workers for instance,⁹⁶⁹ was not explicitly mentioned by *Telefunken*, the company also believed that migrant workers would in certain cases contribute to the transnational flow of their goods: in the article by *Telefunken* aimed at its retailers, the company put forth the possibility that migrant workers might sell on their German-bought tape recorder or radio in their respective country of origin during periods of home leave, before then buying a new one as soon as they returned to Germany.⁹⁷⁰

A product’s portability and the possibility to use it not only in Germany but also in one’s country of origin were both highly relevant factors in sales conversations with migrant workers according to an article published in a trade magazine in September 1965.⁹⁷¹ Potentially different television standards between nations hindering the transnational usage of television sets are the

⁹⁶⁶ Telefunken (1965). Brochure “*Sizi tenvir ediyorum!*”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118; Philips (1965). Brochure “Tape Recorders Record Players Radio Receivers”. Enclosure of von Dellingshausen to Seydlitz (1965, December 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁶⁷ N.N. (1965). Warum wir in Deutschland nicht nur in deutscher Sprache werben? *Telefunken Sprecher*, 32, 28–29. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original German: “Das Durchschnittsalter der Gastarbeiter liegt zwischen 25 und 35 Jahren. Ein Alter, in dem erfahrungsgemäß das Interesse für musikalische Unterhaltung einen sehr großen Raum einnimmt.”

⁹⁶⁸ Seydlitz to Herriger (1965, July 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Gastarbeiter-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁶⁹ Hunn, 2005, p. 178, Footnote 275.

⁹⁷⁰ N.N. (1965). Warum wir in Deutschland nicht nur in deutscher Sprache werben? *Telefunken Sprecher*, 32, 28–29. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. See also Martenson to Seydlitz (1965, June 23). *Internal letter. Subject: Gastarbeiter-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁷¹ Mr (1965, September). Konsumentengruppe Gastarbeiter. *FT-Informationen. Mitteilungen der Funk-Technik für die Rundfunk- und Fernsehwirtschaft*, 18, 207–208. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

most obvious example in that regard. But such problems could also stem from far more trivial sources. In an internal market research study on tape recorders based on a survey *Telefunken* conducted in spring 1965 among retailers, it was established that “foreign customers” – meaning tourists, military personnel and migrant workers – bought battery-powered tape recorders in 55 % of all cases, while “Germans” bought tape recorders with a power cord 75 % of the time. This is a testament to the importance placed on (transnational) portability by such customers. However, as the study also pointed out, the surveyed retailers attributed the remaining percentage of devices with power cords sold to “foreign customers” at least in part to the concern of “Gastarbeiter” that they would not be able to procure fitting batteries in their home countries.⁹⁷² Such concerns specific to a certain target group should thus not be underestimated as a potentially deciding factor in a sales situation – not only for a general purchasing decision, but also with regards to a decision made between several options within a product group.

In the case analyzed here, the advertising for consumer electronics to migrant workers as a particular target group would combine product specific arguments, which could be used irrespective of the audience, with arguments that were specifically relevant to them: In *Telefunken*’s “Gastarbeiter”-brochure, the sales arguments used to advertise these products were in parts identical to the argumentation patterns used in ads aimed at the general public, for example in the *Stern* magazine. In the case of the portable tape recorder *M 300* for instance, both the ad in *Stern* and the text in the “Gastarbeiter”-brochure pointed out that recordings made with the product had been used in radio broadcasts, that the *M 300* was “flat like a book”, and that it was usable with one hand, meaning that the other hand was free for the “reporter-microphone TD 300”.⁹⁷³ Other arguments were more specially tailored to the target group. For the portable radio *bajazzo sport*, it was highlighted that it would enable its users to capture short wave signals from their respective home countries. The language-specific tagline thus asked Spaniards if they would like to listen to Madrid (“¿Quiere Vd. oír Madrid?”), while the tagline in Italian referred to Rome instead. And the portable television set *FE 105P* was positioned as a compact device that would enable its user to watch television programs “even in the smallest

⁹⁷² FM/MF (1965). Einzelhandels-Befragung Tonbandgeräte. Enclosure of Schleip to Seydlitz (1965, August 3). Internal letter. Subject: Einzelhandels-Befragung “Tonbandgeräte”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2019, p. 4. In the original German: “ausländische Kunden”, “Deutsche”. It needs to be pointed out that the percentage of purchases of battery-powered tape recorders was probably a bit higher in reality due to the construction of the survey.

⁹⁷³ Telefunken (1965). Brochure “*Sizi tenvir ediyorum!*”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original Italian: “è piatto come un libro” and “microfono da reporter TD 300”. For the German ad, see Telefunken (1965, November 14). Advertisement. Tagline: Sogar im ratternden Zug, im fahrenden Auto, im schaukelnden Boot...keine Tonschwankungen! *Stern*, 46, 11. In the original German: “flach wie ein Buch” and “Reporter-Mikrofon TD 300”.

room” (see Figure 37),⁹⁷⁴ which was presumably meant as a reference to the precarious and/or cramped living situations migrant workers often found themselves in at the time.⁹⁷⁵




Figure 37: Telefunken (1965). Brochure “Sizi tenvir ediyorum!”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118, non-paginated.

In comparison, the brochures of *Blaupunkt* and *Philips* took a more prosaic approach. *Blaupunkt* only gave very technical product descriptions, listing the type of antenna used or the number of transistors per product. *Philips* opted for a descriptive style, giving basic technical information alongside general product characterizations. Neither brochure seems to have had language-specific variation.⁹⁷⁶ This is not to say that *Telefunken* did not also provide technical details in its brochure. But unlike in the case of *Blaupunkt* for example, they were decidedly not the focus for *Telefunken*, as is evident from the fact that they were given a smaller font size compared to

⁹⁷⁴ Telefunken (1965). Brochure “Sizi tenvir ediyorum!”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original Spanish: “Hasta en la habitación más pequeña puede ver televisión.” It is remarkable that *Telefunken* opted to include a television set in the brochure, as there were no programs on German television in any of the migrant workers’ native languages when it was published, Sala, 2005, p. 375.

⁹⁷⁵ N.N. (1964, October 10). Per Moneta. *Der Spiegel*, 41. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/per-moneta-a-41e741dc-0002-0001-0000-000046175674>.

⁹⁷⁶ Blaupunkt (1965). Brochure “Blaupunkt Kofferradio”. Enclosure of Franzke to Seydlitz (1965, November 30). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118; Philips (1965). Brochure “Tape Recorders Record Players Radio Receivers”. Enclosure of von Dellingshausen to Seydlitz (1965, December 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

the sales argumentation described above.⁹⁷⁷ Even though the precise approaches varied, they all included technical product information due to the context in which these brochures would have been used.

3.3.1.3 Overcoming Language Barriers through Advertising and Sales Material

The “Gastarbeiter”-brochures were meant to be auxiliary advertising and sales devices for retailers, as the advertisers of *Telefunken*’s consumer electronics department explained in a letter to the company’s branch offices, who would then go on to distribute the brochures to their regional retailer networks:

“It [the brochure] overcomes language difficulties and also appeals to foreigners who do not speak German and would therefore understandably be reluctant to have a radio or tape recorder explained to them.

This advertising measure allows you to conveniently win over a group of people with quite considerable purchasing power as customers. Do not let this opportunity for additional revenue pass you by!”⁹⁷⁸

The brochures had thus been created to overcome language barriers during a sales conversation. Consumer electronics were not everyday purchases, which meant that people might have wanted a demonstration of a product or be informed about the technical intricacies that set two given products apart. Especially the latter would have been a problem for retailers to effectively communicate, as this could involve speaking about differing tape speeds and frequency ranges, or the “automatic recording level indicator”⁹⁷⁹ of a tape recorder, which was technical vocabulary one did not necessarily have at the ready in a foreign language. The brochures alleviated this problem. To further reduce any inhibitions migrant workers might have had when coming into a retail store, *Telefunken* also offered brochure display stands to retailers, which were supposed to encourage potential customers to freely take one of the brochures without hesitation.⁹⁸⁰

In the same vein of wanting to reduce language barriers, *Telefunken* also offered pre-recorded tapes in Italian, Spanish, Turkish and Greek for the *M 300*, which retailers were supposed to

⁹⁷⁷ Telefunken (1965). Brochure “*Sizi tenvir ediyorum!*”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁷⁸ Franzke & Röhrbein to branch offices (1965, November 22). *Werbeinformationen* 33/65. Subject: *Neuaufgabe des Gastarbeiter-Prospektes*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original German: “Er [der Prospekt] überbrückt Sprachschwierigkeiten und spricht auch Ausländer an, die der deutschen Sprache nicht mächtig sind und daher verständlicherweise Hemmungen hätten, sich ein Rundfunk- oder Tonbandgerät erläutern zu lassen. Diese Werbeaktion macht es Ihnen möglich, auf bequeme Weise einen durchaus kaufkräftigen Personenkreis als Kunden zu gewinnen. Lassen Sie diese zusätzliche Umsatzchance nicht ungenutzt!”

⁹⁷⁹ Philips (1965). Brochure “Tape Recorders Record Players Radio Receivers”. Enclosure of von Dellingshausen to Seydlitz (1965, December 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118, p. 3.

⁹⁸⁰ N.N. (1965). Warum wir in Deutschland nicht nur in deutscher Sprache werben? *Telefunken Sprecher*, 32, 28–29. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. See also Martenson to Seydlitz (1965, June 23). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Gastarbeiter-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

play for interested customers, as the product would then “explain itself”. For the four voiceovers, *Telefunken* had chosen to work with speakerines involved in the radio broadcasts for migrant workers, which gave a familiar voice to the product.⁹⁸¹ The positive connotations migrant workers had toward content they listened to on the radio were thus channeled by *Telefunken*’s advertisers to sell another part of the media ensemble, which displays a remarkable awareness for the potential inherent to intermedial interactions. More importantly, however, these tapes are noteworthy for capitalizing on the duality of media technology as medium and object⁹⁸² for advertising and sales purposes.

It would not have been possible to advertise any other product group besides media artifacts in this way. This highlights just how unique advertising measures could potentially be, as these tapes were not only specific to the advertised product group: they were also adjusted to an unusual sales context, in which the product was advertised to someone that had not mastered the language of the person selling it. Additionally, in their design, the consumption of other media content by the target group had been taken into account. This advertising and sales measure was thus firmly anchored in the specific mediatic, economic and societal contexts of 1960s Germany, in the sense that it was adjusted to the object it pertained to, for the distribution system it was sold through, and for the needs and interests of the target group it addressed.

The brochures and tapes were advertising and sales aids intricately connected to the point of sale. They presupposed, however, that the potential customer had already entered the store. Therefore, *Telefunken* also supplied its retailers with shop window posters that informed migrant workers passing by that this shop would provide them with information on consumer electronics products in their respective native language. Like the brochure (see Figure 38), these posters depicted the “blonde, young lady” holding each a small Italian, Greek, Spanish and Turkish flag in her hand, as well as a short text in the four languages indicating that this retailer would advise and recommend potential customers concerning radios, record players and tape recorders.⁹⁸³

⁹⁸¹ Seydlitz to Herriger (1965, July 2). *Internal letter. Subject: Gastarbeiter-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original German: “das M 300 erklärt sich selbst”.

⁹⁸² Fickers, 2014, p. 42.

⁹⁸³ N.N. (1965). Warum wir in Deutschland nicht nur in deutscher Sprache werben? *Telefunken Sprecher*, 32, 28–29. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original German: “blonde, junge Dame”.



Figure 38: Telefunken (1965). Brochure “Sizi tenvir ediyorum!”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. Cover page.

After having already distributed an overall of 110.000 copies of its “Gastarbeiter”-brochure across two runs, *Telefunken* decided to print another 100.000 for the seasonal business in autumn and winter, which is further evidence of the measure’s success. The departments *GR* and *GM* jointly financed this third edition, splitting the costs proportionally according to the number of pages respectively dedicated to their products: *GR* paid 60 % of the brochure’s production cost for a total of 6 pages advertising *GR*’s tape recorders and two of its record players, while *GM* paid the other 40 % for 4 pages advertising three of *GM*’s radios and one of its television sets. This new edition was adjusted with regards to the products it showcased, especially highlighting the portable tape recorder *M 300*. Additionally, *Telefunken* would now also conduct media advertising that specifically targeted migrant workers: they planned to release 6 half-paged advertisements each in the press publications *Anadolu*, *Corriere d’Italia*, *I Elliniki* and *7 Fechas*.⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁸⁴ *GR* and *GM* respectively paid 17.500 DM and 12.500 DM of the total cost of ca. 30.000 DM for the brochure, Franzke (1965, August 31). *Besprechungsnotiz “Sonderaktion magnetophon 300”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120, pp. 3–5. By inserting ads in *Anadolu*, *Corriere d’Italia*, *I Elliniki*, and *7 Fechas*, *Telefunken* notably opted to advertise in the government-subsidized publications of each language group.

It was scheduled to publish these print advertisements in the latter part of the year 1965, with *GM* bearing the overall costs of 18.000 DM. This makes it highly likely that these ads only depicted record players and/or tape recorders, as the costs would have otherwise been split between departments, as was the case for the brochure. And as *Telefunken* decided to conduct this advertising campaign during a meeting specifically focused on expanding the advertising for the *M 300* tape recorder in the last months of 1965, it seems probable that most – if not all – of the 24 ads in those press publications showcased this product. These advertisements should depict the same woman as the brochure and the posters and be “tailored to the mentality of the migrant workers” in their textual approach.⁹⁸⁵ The press publications for migrant workers were the most effective (mass) media channel available to *Telefunken* to reach this specific target group. Advertising through radio messages would have been another logical choice to reach migrant workers; probably even more so than the print publications, which – unlike the “Gastarbeiter”-broadcasts – did not reach a very wide audience.⁹⁸⁶ This, however, was not an option for *Telefunken*, as the third channels, on which these transmissions were aired, did not allow advertising at the time.⁹⁸⁷

Telefunken combined media advertising with measures at the point of sale, promising consultation in a migrant worker’s respective native language, which it then sought to deliver upon through the tapes and the brochure. These measures aimed to reduce the language barrier for migrant workers, making them more likely to enter a shop, consult a salesperson, and subsequently buy a *Telefunken* device. As *Telefunken* pointed out to retailers, they also potentially profited from these advertising and sales aids which facilitated sales conversations for them and brought people into their stores:

“How often were you unable to give the Italian, the Greek, the Spaniard or the Turk an exhaustive answer due to a lack of vocabulary? And do you know how many migrant workers didn’t visit your store because they had inhibitions about the communication? It could have been many, many.”⁹⁸⁸

For consumer electronics companies, migrant workers were an interesting target group. But they were not easily reachable through classical mass media channels. Although suitable print

⁹⁸⁵ Franzke (1965, August 31). *Besprechungsnotiz “Sonderaktion magnetophon 300”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120. In the original German: “Die Textansprache soll auf die Mentalität der Gastarbeiter abgestimmt sein.”

⁹⁸⁶ Sala, 2005, pp. 377–380.

⁹⁸⁷ Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (1966). *Statistisches Taschenbuch Baden-Württemberg 1966*. Statistisches Landesamt. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/BWHeft_mods_00046124, p. 56. See also Hans-Bredow-Institut (1969). *Internationales Handbuch für Rundfunk und Fernsehen 1969/70* (Vol. 11). Hans-Bredow-Institut, p. C 118.

⁹⁸⁸ N.N. (1965). Warum wir in Deutschland nicht nur in deutscher Sprache werben? *Telefunken Sprecher*, 32, 28–29. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118, p. 28. In the original German: “Wie oft konnten Sie dem Italiener, dem Griechen, dem Spanier oder dem Türken keine erschöpfende Auskunft geben, weil der Sprachschatz nicht ausreichte. Und wissen Sie, wieviele [sic] Gastarbeiter Ihr Geschäft nicht aufsuchten, weil sie Hemmungen vor der Verständigung hatten? Es können viele, sehr viele gewesen sein.”

publications existed, their reach in the mid-1960s was rather limited – and the radio programs produced in Germany that migrant workers chiefly listened to were free of advertising. This meant that the point of sale grew in importance as the venue for advertising and sales measures. There, however, companies had rather indirect influence. They could only try to facilitate the exchange between the retailers and the potential customers by providing retailers with multilingual brochures or prerecorded tapes to lower language barriers and thus increase the chances of successful communication between both parties.

Consumer electronics companies adjusted to this demographical shift in Germany from the mid-1960s onward, displaying adaptability in their advertising and sales approaches. It needs to be underlined, however, that these companies did not really distinguish between migrant workers in their efforts to reach them with targeted advertising and sales measures. For their intents and purposes, consumer electronics companies apparently believed it sufficient to treat the migrant workers as a homogenous group with a common mentality, forgoing any notion of internal differentiation. At most, the advertising material substituted Madrid in the Spanish text for Rome in the Italian equivalent.

This approach of targeting migrant workers as one specific group of consumers through special advertising and sales measures had staying power in the German consumer electronics industry: *Telefunken* still released special “Gastarbeiter”-brochures twice per year in 1974.⁹⁸⁹ Of course, certain adjustments became necessary. In 1965, brands like *Philips* or *Blaupunkt* had not included any television sets in their migrant worker brochures, with only *Telefunken* doing so – by the mid-1970s, however, “Gastarbeiter” had become such an important target group for tabletop B/W television sets, that *Braun* and *Telefunken* both identified a decline in sales to migrant workers as a leading cause for the overall downturn in sales in that product group.⁹⁹⁰ It stands to reason that brochures and other sales and advertising measures aimed at migrant workers would have accounted for this development. Similarly, the industry’s understanding who constituted the target group of migrant workers would also come to encompass more nationalities. In the mid-1970s, *Braun* proposed its retailers a shop-window decoration for a sales promotion targeting migrant workers which also included the Portuguese and Yugoslavian flags alongside the Italian, Spanish, Greek and Turkish ones.⁹⁹¹ The challenge of needing to

⁹⁸⁹ Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (undated). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 32.

⁹⁹⁰ Schmidt & Seebach (1976, April). *Präambel*. DTMB/AEG, JB XA 898, p. 4. Braun (1975, June). *Factbook AB – E. 2. Ausgabe (Juni 1975)*. BS, p. 3.

⁹⁹¹ Braun (undated). *Erfolgreiche Verkaufsförderungs-Aktionen im Fachgeschäft*. BS, magazine file Fachhandel II, pp. 9–13. This publication was part of a series that was not primarily aimed at consumer electronics retailers. Other sales promotion ideas in this issue exclusively applied to razors or lighters for example. *Braun*’s propositions in this publication for measures that targeted migrant workers are thus not discussed in detail, as they do not specifically pertain to consumer electronics and were rather meant for household appliances, for instance. To give

communicate in spite of language barriers to make a successful sale, however, remained the same. This remained a worthwhile endeavor for consumer electronics companies and their retail partners as long as the following statement by *Braun* remained true:

“It is to be expected that a considerable proportion of sales of electric shavers and household appliances, hood dryers and hair care appliances, radio and television sets, record players and tape recorders will again be made with migrant workers this year [1973].”⁹⁹²

3.3.2 The Variety of Target Group-Specific Advertising, Sales, and Distribution Measures

3.3.2.1 Reaching Motorists through Target Group-Appropriate Distribution Networks

The advertising, sales, and distribution measures of consumer electronics companies in the long 1960s could become highly specific to a target group, as shown with the industry’s efforts to target migrant workers. This specificity becomes even more obvious when considering the difference in approaches for the same product between target groups. The case of the *M 300* is particularly illuminating in that regard, as *Telefunken* saw particular potential for the product among migrant workers. This is evident from the foreign language tape recordings for the product, the fact that the *M 300* was highlighted in the new version of the brochure, and that it was likely the focus of the accompanying migrant worker press advertising. The *M 300* was advertised to migrant workers using partially the same arguments as in the advertisements for the general public. But not every aspect of the *M 300* was present in the migrant worker brochure: its car-related accessories did not feature in it at all.

This is notable, as the idea of using the *M 300* in the car had been present in its marketing material from the outset. In *Telefunken*’s 1964/65 product portfolio brochure for the general public, driving gloves, a road map, and car keys were depicted next to the *M 300* (see Figure 39). The company also offered a universal car mount for the product, as well as a cable which made it possible to power the *M 300* using the car battery. *Telefunken* was able to propose this usage form to potential customers because the *M 300* had an internal loudspeaker, was of a relatively small size and weight (thus fitting under the dashboard), and could reliably play as

but one example: *Braun* provided retailers with prewritten generic letters retailers that they were supposed to send to employee representatives of local companies employing migrant workers, asking them to put up posters in any company-owned accommodations housing migrant workers. With regards to the expansion of nationalities targeted, however, there is no reason to believe that advertising and sales promotion efforts for consumer electronics aimed at migrant workers in the mid-1970s would have taken a fundamentally different approach to the one of *Braun*. While the publication “Erfolgreiche Verkaufsförderungs-Aktionen im Fachgeschäft” itself is not dated, it must have been released before May 1975, see N.N. (1975, May). Der aktive Fachhandel arbeitet mit dem Braun Ideen-Service. *kontakte*, 14, 3–4. BS, Lever arch file BRAUN “Kontakte” Händlerinformation.

⁹⁹² N.N. (1973, July). Gastarbeiter sind wichtige Kunden. *kontakte*, 8, 3. BS, Lever arch file BRAUN “Kontakte” Händlerinformation. In the original German: “Es ist damit zu rechnen, daß auch in diesem Jahr ein erheblicher Anteil des Umsatzes an Elektrorasierern und Elektro-Haushaltsgeräten, Trockenhauben und Haarpflegegeräten, an Rundfunk- und Fernsehgeräten, Plattenspiellern und Tonbandgeräten mit Gastarbeitern getätigt wird.”

well as record in motion.⁹⁹³ Accordingly, in its 1966/67 general brochure, *Telefunken* proposed the idea to potential customers that the *M 300* would allow them to listen to precisely the music they wished to listen to during car rides.⁹⁹⁴



Figure 39: Telefunken (1964). Brochure “report ‘64/65”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1964/20.jpg>, p. 20.

Unlike in its migrant worker brochure, *Telefunken* thus positioned the *M 300* also for in-car usage in its brochures for the general public in 1964/65 and 1966/67. The company believed that the product’s technical features allowed for such a usage, and it therefore also provided product accessories which sought to improve the user experience in this context. It follows that motorists were a highly interesting target group for the *M 300*, which *Telefunken* targeted with specific sales and advertising measures – just like it had for migrant workers. The advertising and sales measures for the *M 300* aimed at migrant workers stayed within the confines of *Telefunken*’s usual distribution network. To target motorists, the company went beyond its regular network: in early April 1965 (the same month in which the first migrant worker brochure was published), *Telefunken* released a brochure for *Telefunken*’s *bajazzo* radios and

⁹⁹³ Telefunken (1964). Brochure “report ‘64/65”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1964/>, pp. 20–21.

⁹⁹⁴ Telefunken (1966). Brochure “report ‘66/67”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1966/>, p. 32.

for the *M 300* which was “very specifically tailored in its address to car owners.”⁹⁹⁵ This was a large and quickly growing group of potential customers: By 1965, there were over 9,2 million passenger cars in Germany, up from just below 4,5 million five years earlier.⁹⁹⁶ In order to best reach this target group, *Telefunken* chose to not only distribute the brochure through their own network, but also cooperated with the advertising department of German car manufacturer *Volkswagen*, who distributed 100.000 copies of the brochure to their contracted retailers. *Telefunken* hoped that this would enable them to reach drivers as a specific target group of consumers directly and efficiently. In the same vein, the company’s advertisers also asked the branch offices to try and place this brochure in car accessory shops.⁹⁹⁷

This approach of *Telefunken* and *Volkswagen* selling a portable consumer electronics device through the distribution network of a car manufacturer had already been utilized in France. In 1959, French car manufacturer *Citroën* marketed a universal transistor radio, the *Radioën*, – which had been designed specifically for use in the *Citroën 2CV* – exclusively through its own distribution network of agents, branch offices, and concessionaires, after it had been showcased at *Citroën*’s booth at the French automobile trade fair. The *Radioën* had been commissioned by *Citroën* with the French consumer electronics brand *Continental Edison*. Although the product was not sold through *Continental Edison*’s distribution network, the company still advertised the product and the collaboration, for example in the French magazine *Paris Match* (see Figure 40). *Continental Edison* presumably did so because the company believed that the collaboration would positively impact their brand. At least the tagline of the advertisement implies as much, as it proudly announced that “*Citroën* has chosen *Continental Edison*.”⁹⁹⁸

⁹⁹⁵ Mätze & Noltemeyer to branch offices (1965, April 5). *Werbeinformationen 11/65*. Subject: Prospekt “*bajazzo/M 300*” (Nr. G 100-65). DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. In the original German: “in seiner Ansprache ganz speziell auf den Autobesitzer ausgerichtet.”

⁹⁹⁶ Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (2024). *Bestand an Kraftfahrzeugen und Kraftfahrzeuganhängern in den Jahren 1960 bis 2024 nach Fahrzeugklassen*. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.kba.de/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/FahrzeugklassenAufbauarten/2024/b_fzkl_zeitreihen.html.

⁹⁹⁷ Mätze & Noltemeyer to branch offices (1965, April 5). *Werbeinformationen 11/65*. Subject: Prospekt “*bajazzo/M 300*” (Nr. G 100-65). DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

⁹⁹⁸ Continental Edison (1959, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: CITROËN a choisi CONTINENTAL EDISON. *Paris Match*, 547, 90. In the original French: “*Citroën* a choisi *Continental Edison*”.

CITROËN *a choisi*
CONTINENTAL EDISON




Photo Baier

Quand Citroën a décidé de doter sa 2 CV d'un poste transistor amovible, c'est à "Continental Edison" qu'il a fait appel. "Continental Edison" a donc conçu et réalisé le **RADIOËN** spécialement prévu pour assurer en croisière, à l'étape ou chez vous, une audition absolument parfaite. "Continental Edison", créateur des téléviseurs et postes radio "Chef-d'Œuvre", prouve une fois de plus sa maîtrise dans le domaine de l'électronique.



Continental Edison
 RADIO
 'TELEVISION

LE RADIOËN EST VENDU EXCLUSIVEMENT PAR LES SUCCURSALES, LES CONCESSIONNAIRES ET AGENTS CITROËN ; IL EST PRÉSENT ACTUELLEMENT AU SALON DE L'AUTO AU STAND CITROËN.

Figure 40: Continental Edison (1959, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: *CITROËN a choisi CONTINENTAL EDISON*. Paris Match, 547, 90.

Certainly, selling car radios through car-focused distribution networks would not have been confined to such special cooperations. But the *Volkswagen-Telefunken* and *Citroën-Continental Edison* collaborations were of a different quality, as they involved products that were not permanently installed car radios but rather products that could also be used in other ways. They showcase that not only the advertising and sales material but also the distribution networks would be adjusted to better reach a target group if it made sense for a product. Both cases share

a similarity in that regard: companies from two different industries cooperated to market products of the consumer electronics industry through distribution networks pertaining to the car manufacturing industry. There is, however, a difference concerning the agency of the actors involved. While *Citroën* had commissioned the *Radioën* specifically to be used in one of its models, and thus exclusively marketed it through its own distribution channels, *Telefunken* marketed the *M 300* not only through *Volkswagen*'s distribution channels. *Telefunken* chose to do so because the company believed that the product features and accessories made it a good fit for car usage. In addition, *Telefunken* also marketed the *M 300* through its own distribution network, adjusting the advertising and sales efforts in accordance with the channels it used to best fit the respective target groups.

3.3.2.2 “Listening and Learning with Telestop R/AS”. Advertising and Selling a Record Player as a Language-Learning Device

The cases detailed so far show the extent to which consumer electronics companies were willing to adjust the distribution channels they used as well as their advertising and sales efforts concerning argumentation and approach to better reach a given target group. However, despite all the adjustments companies made, they ultimately still used consumer-oriented retailer distribution networks and employed consumer-targeted advertising and sales measures to reach specific consumer subgroups. This was not the case for *Telefunken*'s record player *Telestop R/AS*. The quick stop and rewind feature of this record player set it apart from other devices in its product group, as this feature enabled unique usage forms, which in turn translated into advertising and sales forms unusual for a consumer electronics device.

Telefunken introduced the *Telestop R/AS* to the German market in mid 1966 with a special product brochure titled “Listening and Learning with Telestop R/AS” (see Figure 41).⁹⁹⁹ A key point in this brochure was language teaching, which – per the brochure – increasingly made use of vinyl discs. However, as the brochure pointed out, although it was often necessary to repeat words or sentences in language teaching, it was tedious and potentially time-consuming to replay individual sections of a vinyl disc with normal record players, because the teacher had to manually place the pickup arm of the record player in just the right spot. It was precisely such problems that the *Telestop R/AS* proposed to alleviate by providing its users with the

⁹⁹⁹ Fritsch & Rochel (1966, June 9). *Werbeinformationen 36/66. Subject: Telestop R/AS-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019. The *Telestop R/AS* was not the first device of its kind. A “Telestop-variant [...] for language training and music lessons” was already part of *Telefunken*'s product portfolio in 1961 (“eine Telestop-Variante [...] für Sprachschulung und Musikunterricht”), Nahs (1961, December 27). *Fachgebietsbesprechung des Geschäftsbereiches GM mit dem Vorstand am 24./25.10.1961 in Hannover*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1052, p. 6.

possibility to quick stop a disc and rewind it.¹⁰⁰⁰ In fact, the product had been mainly developed for teaching contexts that made use of vinyl discs.¹⁰⁰¹



Figure 41: Telefunken (1966). Brochure “Hören und Lernen mit Telestop R/AS”. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

In the mid-1960s, it was in fact not completely uncommon to learn or teach languages with the assistance of vinyl discs. According to an analysis of reply cards returned to *Telefunken* by consumers who had bought one of their record players in 1964, 4 % of customers indicated that they would primarily use their newly bought record player for language instruction.¹⁰⁰² This meant that the *Telestop R/AS* was somewhat of a niche product. It was better suited for the interests of a small percentage of potential customers than other record players, but for most consumers, its key feature posed no real advantage. Consequently, *Telefunken*’s advertisers

¹⁰⁰⁰ Telefunken (1966). Brochure “Hören und Lernen mit Telestop R/AS”. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019. In the original German: “Hören und Lernen mit Telestop R/AS”.

¹⁰⁰¹ Fritsch & Rochel (1966, June 9). *Werbeinformationen* 36/66. Subject: *Telestop R/AS-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

¹⁰⁰² Telefunken Bereich Marketing (1965, September 10). Fragekartenaktion Abspielgeräte. Table 6. Enclosure of Cofalka to mailing list (1965, September 24). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Analyse der privaten Benutzer von Telefunken-Phonogeräten (Ergebnisse einer Fragekartenaktion)*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2019. It was certainly also possible to use tape recorders and cassette recorders to learn languages. It follows that companies used this line of argument in their advertising for these product groups. Philips (1971, November 20). Advertisement. Tagline: *des langues en boîte ?* *Paris Match*, 1176, 24; Uher (1968, October 6). Advertisement. Tagline: *Besser lernen – mit dem Tonband*. *Stern*, 40, 97.

distributed the brochure only in relatively small numbers. The sources do not state how many copies *Telefunken* printed in total, but they do mention that one of the nine German regional branch offices received 300 copies,¹⁰⁰³ which may serve as a hint that the overall number of copies must have been relatively small even when only compared to the migrant worker brochure or the brochure for motorists. Additionally, *Telefunken* featured the *Telestop R/AS* in its brochure for the general public 1966/67, asking potentially interested customers to get in touch to receive the product brochure.¹⁰⁰⁴ The *Telestop R/AS* was thus marketed directly to consumers through *Telefunken*'s regular distribution network.

This was not the only channel *Telefunken* used to market the *Telestop R/AS* in Germany. The advertisers of *Telefunken*'s department for record players and tape recorders *GM* also targeted ca. 450 language schools, correspondence schools, and educational publishing houses through direct advertising measures. Each of these institutions received the brochure, reply cards, and one of three letters. These letters were adjusted in their approach to the respective interests of language schools, correspondence schools, and educational publishing houses (see Figure 42).¹⁰⁰⁵ In its letter to language schools, *Telefunken* focused on the improvement the replay feature of the *Telestop R/AS* would bring to the practice of non-native speakers teaching the pronunciation of a foreign language through vinyl disc by eliminating the need to painstakingly search by hand for the passage on the disc that was to be repeated. The accompanying remote control would even enable to do so without needing to be in the immediate proximity of the device, which had an internal loudspeaker. *Telefunken* thus targeted language schools as potential customers, positioning the *Telestop R/AS* as a product that would improve the quality of the school's teaching.¹⁰⁰⁶

Correspondence schools got a different pitch: *Telefunken* claimed that their product would improve the success of their language classes, as students that had a *Telestop R/AS* would be able to make better use of the vinyl discs for language learning the correspondence schools provided to them. This line of argumentation effectively positioned the *Telestop R/AS* as a

¹⁰⁰³ Fritsch & Rochel (1966, June 9). *Werbeinformationen 36/66. Subject: Telestop R/AS-Prospekt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Telefunken (1966). *Brochure "report '66/67"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1966/>, p. 25. It also featured in the following brochure, Telefunken (1967). *Brochure "report '67"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1967-1/>, p. 46.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66. Subject: Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Sarach & Grünthal (1966). Letter. Subject: Wie erteilen Sie Fremdsprachenunterricht ohne "native speaker"? Enclosure S to Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66. Subject: Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019. The teacher would not have been able to stray too far from the device, however, as it was remote-controlled via cable, Telefunken (1967). *Brochure "report '67"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1967-1/>, p. 46.

learner's device rather than a teacher's device. Accordingly, *Telefunken* proposed the product as an "interesting object for resale" to correspondence schools, promising "favorable conditions".¹⁰⁰⁷ The proposal to educational publishing houses was similar. *Telefunken* pointed out the product's unique advantages for language teaching, before then suggesting that the *Telestop R/AS* would make a fine addition to the portfolio of teaching materials the respective publishing house offered to schools and language teaching institutions. In this letter, *Telefunken* also pointed out the financial aspect.¹⁰⁰⁸ All three letters closed with a reference to the possibility of being visited by a sales consultant.




Figure 42: Section of Sarach & Grünthal (1966). Letter. Subject: Sie schicken Ihren Schülern den Sprachlehrer in die Wohnung ... Enclosure F to Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66*. Subject: *Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Sarach & Grünthal (1966). Letter. Subject: Sie schicken Ihren Schülern den Sprachlehrer in die Wohnung ... Enclosure F to Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66*. Subject: *Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019. In the original German: "interessantes Wiederverkaufsobjekt" and "zu günstigen Konditionen".

¹⁰⁰⁸ Sarach & Grünthal (1966). Letter. Subject: Kennen Sie schon unseren Plattenspieler mit Rückwärtsgang? Enclosure L to Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66*. Subject: *Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

The technical conception of the *Telestop R/AS* made it unusually well suited for one highly specific context in which record players were occasionally used at the time. A single product feature not only allowed for new venues of argumentation in the advertising and sales material, but also led *Telefunken* to identify new target groups and enabled the company to take an unusual approach in its advertising and distribution. Notably, the campaign described above seems to have been limited to the German market only, even though an approach centered on the unique feature and sales proposition of the *Telestop R/AS* would have been just as applicable in France, for instance.

Although the advertising and sales measures for the *Telestop R/AS* were rather particular for a record player, direct approaches made sense for other products. Besides targeting insurance brokers or lawyers through advertisements in their trade publications,¹⁰⁰⁹ *Telefunken* advertised its dictation machines directly to journalists, doctors, or lawyers through individualized letters, sending out just below 2.000 such letters for a cost of 2.500 DM during one campaign in 1963.¹⁰¹⁰ This was sensible for dictation machines primarily aimed at certain groups of professionals. However, it would have been absurd to try and market a television set aimed at the general public this way since consumer electronics were goods of mass consumption which necessitated mass marketing. This is precisely what makes the advertising efforts for the *Telestop R/AS* so noteworthy. Due to its technical conception, the product featured in *Telefunken*'s brochure for the general public as well as in direct advertising letters sent to a very limited audience. Rather unusually for a consumer electronics device, parts of *Telefunken*'s advertising efforts for the *Telestop R/AS* were thus not directly aimed at consumers. Instead, the company tried to market the product to correspondence schools for example. This would have been an appropriate course of action for hardly any other record player.

3.3.3 Spatially Segmented Target Groups in the Consumer Electronics Market

3.3.3.1 The Advertising and Sales Efforts of Retailers in German Urban Areas

To fully understand how consumer electronics devices were marketed to consumers in the long 1960s, spatiality needs to be considered as an influential factor as well: where people lived impacted the circumstances under which they encountered consumer electronics devices and any advertising and sales promotion measures for those products. It is therefore argued that target groups would also be constituted among spatial separation lines. Or, to put it in more succinct terms: a consumer in Paris would have not experienced advertising for consumer

¹⁰⁰⁹ Seydlitz to Nowack (1963, July 8). *Internal letter. Subject: Insertion für Diktatgeräte 1963*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

¹⁰¹⁰ Warnke to FM (1963, July 4). *Internal letter. Subject: Direkte Werbeaktionen*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1973.

electronics in the same way as a consumer in a more rural part of France. The local consumer electronics retailing landscape is especially important in this regard, as it was their advertising and sales promotion measures that were most strongly linked to a given locality. This is the case because the market presences of retailers and manufacturers differ fundamentally. The commercial presence of manufacturers among consumers was – and still is – chiefly built around their products. Retailers, on the other hand, are primarily present on the market through their enterprise and its physical location. Their sales personnel directly interacts with customers, who come from a geographically limited catchment area.¹⁰¹¹ What impact did this have on advertising and sales promotion measures for consumer electronics?

To illustrate, consider the example of *Radio-Kallert*, a retailer in West Berlin selling consumer electronics and other electrical appliances such as clocks or electric shavers during the long 1960s. This enterprise was situated in a residential area full of older buildings, with a newly developing area in the vicinity. According to a short report about his business, its location, customer base, and product range written by the owner of *Radio-Kallert* for a publication of the German manufacturing company *Braun*, the business's customer base consisted of elderly people living in the old residential area itself, and of diverse customers coming to *Radio-Kallert* from the newer areas after having been referred there by positive word-of-mouth owing to good experiences with consultations. Casual, walk-in customers played less of a role for *Radio-Kallert*. Personal contact between customers and the three full-time employees of the business was paramount: “[...] people trust familiar faces.” Having low prices hence mattered less than offering good service to its customer base.¹⁰¹²

Radio-Kallert carried only a handful of brands for its regular product range, in addition to which it reserved space for trendy devices “that are effectively pre-sold through special manufacturer advertising.” Consumers visiting the shop to buy a television set, for instance, would have been able to choose between sets from three or four brands only. They might have been able to get a television set cheaper elsewhere – there even was a department store and a discounter just a few streets over, both offering consumer electronics as well. But when shopping at *Radio-Kallert*, customers could be sure that its employees would help them make an informed decision, and

¹⁰¹¹ Hansen & Bode, 1999, p. 164. To a certain extent, a manufacturer's geographical location could matter too, at least in the German consumer electronics market of the 1960s. In the area around the German cities of Nuremberg, Erlangen, and Munich, for instance, with its cluster of consumer electronics factories, around a quarter of all sales to consumers in the year 1960 were direct factory-to-consumer sales that circumvented retailers, whereas this sales form only accounted for around 10 % of sales in other parts of the country. These figures originate from a study of the German market research institute GfK cited by Teupe, 2016a, p. 374.

¹⁰¹² Braun (undated). *Das Sortiment des Fachhandels: Struktur, Umfang, Angebot. Braun Ideen-Service für Fachpartner*. BS, magazine file Fachhandel II, pp. 16–17. In the original German: “[...] man hat Vertrauen zu bekannten Gesichtern.”

that the business would offer a competent repair and after-sales service. The retailer thus catered to a loyal, localized community within the city of West Berlin. This shaped its advertising strategy: *Radio-Kallert* inserted ads in the publications of local associations and the parish magazine of its local church.¹⁰¹³

Consumer electronics retailers in other spatial conditions adjusted their approach accordingly. Take *Elektro-Rohrbach* as an example, which featured in the same publication of *Braun* as *Radio-Kallert* with a similar report written by an employee. This enterprise, too, was specialized in consumer electronics and other electrical appliances. And, similarly to *Radio-Kallert*, it believed that diligently consulting its customers was of great importance. This was seen as a measure that built consumer trust and served as a form of free advertising. Where *Elektro-Rohrbach* significantly differed from *Radio-Kallert*, however, was its location: its place of business was situated in adjacency to the inner-city pedestrian zone of the mid-sized German town of Gießen. This translated into a differently composed customer base: *Elektro-Rohrbach* claimed that its catchment area stretched up to 60 kilometers, encompassing all strata of society. It had its share of recurring customers, who accounted for around three quarters of its overall business, with the rest coming from walk-in customers. *Elektro-Rohrbach*'s approach to promoting itself was intricately linked to its location. The company would certainly advertise in Gießen's local newspapers in case it had any special offers to promote, for instance. But more importantly, the store's location meant major foot-traffic. And, consequently, the company placed great importance on frequently redecorating its street-facing 45-meter-long shop window display area.¹⁰¹⁴

How specialist retailers went about promoting the consumer electronics products they sold – and particularly their own place of business – was thus related to their physical location and the consumer base composition of the associated catchment area. For a business in a major city chiefly deriving its revenue from the community of its district, it made sense to advertise hyper-locally, for instance, through its parish magazine. Retailers situated in medium-sized cities potentially had geographically larger catchment areas encompassing the city's surroundings and might thus have preferred to advertise through the local newspaper read in that city and the adjacent villages. The precise location of a retailer within a city could matter as well. For

¹⁰¹³ Braun (undated). *Das Sortiment des Fachhandels: Struktur, Umfang, Angebot. Braun Ideen-Service für Fachpartner*. BS, magazine file Fachhandel II, pp. 16–17. In the original German: “[...] die quasi vorverkauft sind durch besondere Firmenwerbung.”

¹⁰¹⁴ *Elektro-Rohrbach* in fact even had two different sales areas in separate buildings: one directly at the street, where it sold household appliances, lamps, transistor radios, and smaller electrical devices, and a second one situated in another building behind the one on the street, where it displayed its larger devices, such as stereos and television sets, id., pp. 18–19.

example, it influenced the relative importance of having an attractive shop window display to draw in spontaneous walk-in customers. In that sense, consumers were targeted by spatially limited advertising and sales measures of local actors in the consumer electronics market. The extent to which spatiality could influence the consumer experience on the consumer electronics market becomes even more evident when looking beyond urban areas.

3.3.3.2 “On Tyres to Buyers”. Targeting Consumers in Rural France

During the long 1960s, German and French societies both underwent urbanization processes. In France, however, this shift in population distribution was more disruptive, as the country had still been more rural in the mid-1950s than Germany.¹⁰¹⁵ In 1955, around 70 % of German citizens lived in urban areas compared to only 58,5 % of French citizens doing so in 1954. Over the next two decades, French society would become more urban. By 1962, the share of French citizens living in urban areas would increase to 63,5 % –¹⁰¹⁶ and by 1975, it would reach 67,5 %.¹⁰¹⁷ Despite this general trend, millions of French citizens continued to live in small rural communities throughout the timeframe in question: according to *Philips France*, approximately 18 million French citizens were still residing in communities of less than 2.000 individuals by the mid-1960s. Their sheer number alone made them an important target group.¹⁰¹⁸ Reaching them was a challenge for consumer electronics manufacturers. In cities, consumers were confronted with consumer electronics advertising through billboards or advertising posters put up in bus or metro stations. They would walk by shop window displays and posters of a specialized consumer electronics retailer. And of course, they were targeted through mass media brand advertising in all its forms by various consumer electronics companies from France or abroad. Not so in the countryside.

After the Second World War, *Philips France* had carried out a market research study which had found that their brand was not known nor were its products present in rural France. Insufficient penetration by advertising measures was identified as being one key reason for this state of affairs: “Rural districts are not covered by propaganda as press, radio, neon, direct-mail and poster advertising are directed at thickly populated areas.” The second reason was a relative disinterest of regionally responsible *Philips* partners, who were typically based in urban areas

¹⁰¹⁵ Kaelble, 1992, pp. 234–236.

¹⁰¹⁶ N.N. (1963). *Étude relative à l’urbanisation française et à ses facteurs* (No. 322). Centre de recherches et de documentation sur la consommation. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.credoc.fr/publications/etude-relative-a-lurbanisation-francaise-et-a-ses-facteurs>, p. 7.

¹⁰¹⁷ Out of 52 million French citizens, 35,5 million lived in cities by the 1st of January 1975, Passeron, H. (1978). *L’économie régionale en 1980 : population, emploi et comptes* (Série R, n° 31 ; Les Collections de l’I.N.S.E.E). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, p. 8.

¹⁰¹⁸ General Sales Promotion Division (1966, June). On tyres to buyers. *Sales Promotion Monitor*, 12(2), 2–6. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 823 Marketing, p. 2.

and usually overlooked the small rural communities that were also situated within their respective territories. Yet, in those select cases where retailers actively made efforts to sell *Philips* devices in rural communities, they found success. Taken together, these observations led *Philips France* to conclude that the sales of *Philips* devices in rural areas were not poor due to insufficient purchasing power among rural consumers or because of an unsuitability of *Philips*'s products for this target group. Rather, the company believed that their inadequate sales in rural areas needed to be attributed to an absence of "purchasing desire" among the rural population caused by unawareness of what *Philips* had on offer.¹⁰¹⁹

Deficiencies in distribution and advertising had contributed to this situation where *Philips* was not well known, and neither its products nor its communications were really present in French rural communities. Small retail shops physically located within those rural communities could potentially help address those shortcomings by presenting *Philips* goods in their shops. However, their means were rather limited, as *Philips France* pointed out in 1966:

"You should see it like this: a trader in a little village or hamlet is not a rich fellow, otherwise he would not be there. Generally he has nothing more than a display behind the window-sill where the missus used to put her plants, and the room has been emptied and serves also for doing odd jobs (service workshop would be quite an exaggeration). Because he has no money, he cannot put much more into his window than a few products such as torches, one or two fans, a toaster, a few little radios, perhaps a gramophone and, at a pinch, if he has a little more working capital, a TV receiver, a refrigerator, and a washing machine. Generally he also sells tools and cleaning materials, sometimes also cartridges and guns, in short the type of General Store. But even then his range is not impressive."¹⁰²⁰

Philips France thus developed a measure to ensure that rural consumers would nonetheless come in contact with *Philips*'s product range: from the mid-1950s onward, *Philips France* had a growing fleet of "mobile shops" (see Figure 43). These effectively were *Philips*-branded vans full of *Philips* devices which drove around the French countryside to regularly visit the communities of very small rural retailers, setting up shop there for half a day or a full day in arrangement with those retailers. This would of course have significantly expanded the range of products a retailer could demonstrate and offer potentially interested customers:¹⁰²¹

"Now there comes a shop on wheels which for one day per month puts at his disposal the most complete range of electrotechnical counter products (and even more). Now he has something to show his customers. His customers are offered a choice and even more important, certainly in rural areas, they are now able not only to see the product but also touch it, smell it, turn it over and over and,

¹⁰¹⁹ General Sales Promotion Division (1966, June). On tyres to buyers. *Sales Promotion Monitor*, 12(2), 2–6. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 823 Marketing, pp. 2, 4.

¹⁰²⁰ *Id.*, p. 5.

¹⁰²¹ *Ibid.* For the depiction of such a sales situation, see Philips (1966). *Sales promotion vehicle, France, 1966* (*Sales Promotion Monitor*, Sept 1966, p. 17). PCA, Z9508-2.

as far as he is concerned, to lick it, literally and figuratively. If only you knew how important this is for these people, who sit so tightly on their money.”¹⁰²²

The concept proved to be successful. In *Philips France*’s account, rural retailers would tell their customers to wait for those mobile shop visits, and, inversely, consumers in such areas would also actively begin to wait for such days. Hence, after having initially started out with just three such vans, *Philips France* operated 21 of them by 1966, each visiting retailers in the French districts assigned to it once per month. In some cases, local retailers would rent out the vans for slightly longer stays or even enter exclusivity contracts with *Philips France* to ensure that visits would continue. In addition, 43 retail partners adapted the concept for themselves, making tours in rural areas with their own mobile shops in coordination with *Philips France*.¹⁰²³



Figure 43: Philips (1966). *Sales promotion vehicle, France, 1966* (*Sales Promotion Monitor*, Sept 1966, p. 17). Image © Royal Philips. Used with permission. PCA, Z9508-2.

Philips France had conceived this measure as a retailer-manufacturer partnership; the mobile shops had been set up in a way that was easily compatible with pre-existing distribution structures. The company was of the opinion that having a retail partner was necessary to prepare for such visits and to follow up on them with regards to servicing or queries.¹⁰²⁴ More importantly, *Philips France* also believed that in such communities, purchasing decisions for durable consumer goods were still based on interpersonal trust rather than because of

¹⁰²² General Sales Promotion Division (1966, June). On tyres to buyers. *Sales Promotion Monitor*, 12(2), 2–6. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 823 Marketing, p. 5.

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁴ Id., pp. 5–6.

impersonal brand communication forms such as magazine advertising: “The local dealer has a strong influence on the buyer. A farmer does not buy a radio set or a washing machine because of the fact that it is of a certain make, but because it is sold to him by someone whom he has known for a long time and in **whom he has confidence**.”¹⁰²⁵ Having the local retailers on board was thus key to ensure that any newly gained interest in *Philips* devices would translate into sales.

This venture helped solve the issues *Philips France* had had with the availability and visibility of its products (and its brand) in rural areas. *Philips* advertising measures that specifically targeted consumers in such communities would then follow suit.¹⁰²⁶ Unfortunately, the source does not specify further what these advertising campaigns looked like. However, it seems likely that such advertising took one of two forms: *Philips France* could have made use of print media publications that were mainly read by members of such communities – as it did in 1964 for instance, when it advertised its television sets in publications such as the *Journal de la France Agricole* and *L’Agriculteur du Sud-Est*.¹⁰²⁷ The other option would have been to cooperate with local retailers to jointly advertise in publications with a geographical reach limited to that community only, such as the magazine of a club or association.

Philips France conceived of rural consumers as a specific target group for which its usual approach to advertising, distributing, and selling was not the most auspicious. What differentiated this target group from urban consumers was its spatial environment, which was characterized by rather little advertising penetration and a very limited choice of consumer electronics devices in the locally available distribution structure. The mobile shops provided a solution that was adjusted to this environment, showing that advertising, distributing, and promoting the sale of consumer electronics devices were interlinked processes. Even if consumers living in rural areas were reached by the mass media advertising of a manufacturer – which was not necessarily the case – this was not sufficient by itself. To make a sale, manufacturers then also needed to utilize the interpersonal connections of the locally trusted retailers and ensure that the product was available for demonstrations in the first place. Investigating localized advertising and sales practices is essential to fully understand how consumer electronics were promoted in the long 1960s. Yet, it is equally necessary to examine the structural patterns that shaped consumer electronics advertising.

¹⁰²⁵ General Sales Promotion Division (1966, June). On tyres to buyers. *Sales Promotion Monitor*, 12(2), 2–6. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 823 Marketing, p. 4. Highlighting in the original.

¹⁰²⁶ *Id.*, p. 6.

¹⁰²⁷ G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 63.

3.4 Common Denominators. Advertising Patterns in a Diverse Market

In the long 1960s, consumer electronics came in diverse designs, with differing feature sets that allowed for deviating user-experiences, and at vastly different price-points. As Weber has observed, this was a deliberate effort. Companies offered a broad range of devices to satisfy every want:

“In the mass consumer society of the post-war period, the central marketing strategy is virtually to introduce as many forms and interpretations of a technology as possible to the market in order to serve different user groups ‘in line with the market’.”¹⁰²⁸

This product diversity was of course reflected in advertising: in 1965, *Philips France* advertised the cheapest radio in its portfolio, the pocket-sized transistor radio *Ministor I*, in the French illustrated magazine *Paris Match*. Just an issue later, the company promoted its high-end transistor radio *Transworld* in the same magazine; a device aimed at journalists or diplomats, and around ten times more expensive than the *Ministor I*.¹⁰²⁹ Despite both being transistor radios, these media devices not only had different technological capabilities and were clearly meant to be used in different ways, but they were also aimed at distinct target groups reading the same magazine. Even the same device could be advertised to vastly different audiences, from readers of homely interior decorating magazines to those of the German edition of the erotic magazine *Playboy*.¹⁰³⁰

As the previous chapters demonstrated, the means and channels used to advertise and market consumer electronics devices and product groups were heavily case adjusted during the long 1960s. The *Telestop R/AS*, for instance, was a niche device, and *Telefunken*’s advertising and sales efforts for this language-learning record player accordingly accounted for the device’s unique profile and usage possibilities. Moreover, *Telefunken* even approached each potentially relevant target group with a line of argument and an offer that was specifically tailored to them, based on *Telefunken*’s assumptions how these actors might make use of their product.

Mass media advertising for one consumer electronics product group or device coexisted with very targeted measures for another. As the following chapter argues, this observation also holds

¹⁰²⁸ Weber, 2008, p. 66. In the original German: “In der Massenkonsumentengesellschaft der Nachkriegszeit besteht geradezu die zentrale Vermarktungsstrategie darin, möglichst viele Ausformungen und Interpretationen einer Technik auf den Markt zu bringen, um ‘marktgerecht’ unterschiedliche Nutzergruppen zu bedienen.”

¹⁰²⁹ The *Ministor I* cost 129 FF. Both prices excluding sales tax. The ad for the *Ministor* radios included a reference to the *Transworld* at the other end of *Philips*’s product portfolio, Philips (1965, November 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Avez-vous un ‘Ministor’ dans votre poche ? *Paris Match*, 867, 32–33. The *Transworld* was priced at 1.350 FF. The *Transworld*’s positioning (and presumably also its name) was derived from its capability to receive radio broadcasts from 85 countries, Philips (1965, November 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Transworld champion du monde des transistors. *Paris Match*, 868, 34. See further the ads for the *Ministor*-radios in issue n° 870 and for the *Transworld* in issue n° 866 and n° 864.

¹⁰³⁰ In this case, *Telefunken* advertised its stereo devices in *Schöner Wohnen*, *Zu Hause*, *Playboy*, and five other magazines, Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (undated). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 10.

true in a broader sense: despite the diversity of advertising measures, plans, and approaches, most consumer electronics advertising efforts nonetheless took place within predetermined boundaries shaped by the structural properties of consumer electronics as a particular class of branded mass-manufactured goods sold through intermediaries. The chapter explores this notion by identifying convergences and common patterns pertaining to the shared particularities of the advertised groups of media devices through two perspectives.

In a first step, the subpart investigates the structural characteristics of consumer electronics advertising chiefly through company-internal sources that reveal the perspectives and convictions of contemporary consumer electronics advertisers, thus offering a cross-company, cross-product synthesis. It addresses the mediating role of mass media in allowing consumer electronics brands to communicate with consumers. It then explores the crucial importance of not only conducting advertising at the point of sale but of also winning over retailers through separate advertising and sales measures. It further investigates the cumulative effects of brand advertising, and the so-called “prospective user de-signs”,¹⁰³¹ which shaped the advertising imagery, argumentation and product positioning of consumer electronics products and other technological devices – not only between brands but also across borders and time.

In a second step, the chapter then examines how the properties of consumer electronics as mass-produced consumer goods could manifest themselves in mainstream advertising. This is achieved through a longitudinal comparative quantitative analysis. It is based on metadata related to advertising rhythms and visuals from a large set of consumer electronics advertisements published in the German illustrated magazine *Stern* and the French illustrated magazine *Paris Match* between 1959 and 1974. These results are contextualized through qualitative source material and secondary literature. This media-centric approach not only reveals shared characteristics on a macro-level (irrespective of devices or brands) but also allows to trace how mainstream consumer electronics advertising evolved over time, how it was influenced by the medium of publication, and how transnational differences and product-group specificities nonetheless remained important factors.

3.4.1 The Structural Characteristics of Consumer Electronics Advertising

“For those companies whose products are part of the daily purchasing decision-making process, advertising in the boxing ring should be more fortunate than for us. [...]. However, our advertising concept differs significantly from this and we cannot and will not give up our tendency to run informative consumer advertising in mass media.”¹⁰³²

¹⁰³¹ This framework developed by Heike Weber is discussed in chapter 3.4.1.4.

¹⁰³² Horlitz & John to von Entress-Fürsteneck (1966, August 9). *Letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. In the original German: “Für diejenigen Firmen, deren Produkte im täglichen Kaufentscheid liegen, dürfte die Werbung im Boxring glücklicher sein als für uns. [...]. Unser Werbekonzept unterscheidet sich hiervon aber

As *Telefunken*'s advertisers pointed out in response to a proposal to advertise at a high-profile boxing fight in the mid-1960s, not every opportunity was suitable for them. The company sold consumer electronics such as radios, record players, tape recorders, television sets or stereos – all durable, expensive consumer goods, which would ideally last years and were thus purchased infrequently. Few consumers in the 1960s would have bought a record player, let alone an even more costly television set, on a whim. Unlike choosing a toothpaste or beverage, purchasing a new consumer electronics device was a high involvement decision where consumers would inform themselves more thoroughly prior to a purchase. *Telefunken*'s advertising strategy hence needed to reflect this basic quality of all consumer goods it commercialized. This structural constraint was by no means exclusive to *Telefunken* in the mid-1960s and should rather be understood as a basic tendency of the Western European consumer electronics industry as a whole throughout the long 1960s. *Braun*'s communication guidelines in the mid-1970s, for instance, similarly established that:

“We prefer media that allow maximum demonstration and visualization of our products, and sufficient argumentation. For example: magazines, leaflets, television, window displays. But not: stadium advertising, which at best permits product visualization, but no argumentation.”¹⁰³³

Not all advertising forms and approaches were thus equally well-suited for the industry; the high cost and technical complexity of consumer electronics generally necessitated informative advertising campaigns and media formats that could build trust and convey product knowledge. Due to certain shared fundamental product characteristics and common perspectives of the people responsible for advertising them, consumer electronics were frequently advertised with similar means through similar channels regardless of the manufacturer – although campaign composition details or specifically designed advertising materials, of course, nonetheless varied considerably to account for market conditions and device specifications, as has been shown previously.

3.4.1.1 The Mediating Role of Mass Media

Unlike in business-to-business transactions, the final customer of a consumer electronics device and its manufacturer usually did not interact directly. The industry's advertisers were well aware that branding and advertising mediated this impersonal, indirect relationship, with brands

wesentlich und wir können und wollen unsere Tendenz, in Massenmedien informierende Konsumwerbung zu betreiben, nicht aufgeben.”

¹⁰³³ Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 53. Other industries of course also opted for the promotional practices most suitable for their products. For a comparative example, see for instance the strategies of Swiss publishing houses as discussed by Vallotton, F. (2022). Entre promotion et diversification Stratégies publicitaires et médiatiques des éditeurs romands 1945-1980. In A. Glinöer (Ed.), *Les maisons d'édition francophones au prisme de leurs archives* (pp. 241–254). Éditions des archives contemporaines.

serving as the markers of reliability and trustworthiness that should instill consumers with the necessary confidence to commit to purchasing a product of a given make.¹⁰³⁴ As the head of *Braun*'s communication department pointed out in 1973, "[a]ny launch of unknown, absolutely new product ideas is made easier by our logo."¹⁰³⁵ This was a trait consumer electronics shared with many other mass-produced goods, as the practice of bridging the gap between consumers and manufacturers of consumer goods by branding products and advertising them through mass media channels had emerged as early as the 19th century.¹⁰³⁶ Due to this general characteristic, mass media advertising was key (in most cases) for consumer electronics manufacturers to reach potential customers.

Print mass media advertising had a particular significance. Although there were of course exceptions,¹⁰³⁷ it was usually the most important individual item of consumer electronics advertising budgets. The exact share allocated to print depended on strategic considerations, the type of budget (there were ad budgets for individual campaigns,¹⁰³⁸ departments/units,¹⁰³⁹ and for whole companies¹⁰⁴⁰), and on how exactly the percentual shares were calculated (some

¹⁰³⁴ Himmelmann & Schenk, 1953, p. 245.

¹⁰³⁵ Schmittel, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

¹⁰³⁶ Haas, 2003, pp. 294-297. Although it sold mass-produced goods, this causality did, for instance, not apply to the records industry. According to Müller, a manufacturer's image played no decisive role in consumer purchasing decisions when it came to vinyl records and pre-recorded tapes, Müller, 2020, p. 208.

¹⁰³⁷ One such exception was *Telefunken France* in 1965, as the company had been hesitant to allocate budget to nationwide print advertising because of parallel imports, see chapters 2.2.1.6 & 2.2.2.4. There are of course also departments/divisions for which this finding does not apply due to deviating responsibilities that put their priorities elsewhere. For instance, neither *Telefunken*'s marketing department (1964) nor *Loewe*'s sales abroad division (1967) directly commercialized consumer electronics to consumers and accordingly set differing priorities for their ad budgets – although both nonetheless also financed print ads, see Martenson & von Auw (1965, March 30). *Kosten der Werbung. Ist 1964. Fach-Bereich Telefunken/Gesamt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116; *Loewe Opta GmbH Verkauf Ausland* (1967, January 30). Entwurf eines Werbebudgets 1967 der Abteilung Verkauf Ausland. Enclosure of Fabry to Griesmeier (1967, January 30). *Internal letter without subject*. LOA, Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972.

¹⁰³⁸ In 1962, *Philips France* allocated 55,8 % of its television set campaign budget for that year to print, G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 77. In 1964, this figure rose as high as 69,48 %, G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, p. 64. These percentual shares only pertain to campaign-specific media spending, however.

¹⁰³⁹ In the business year 1962/63, *Telefunken*'s business unit *GM* spent an estimated 1,14 million DM to advertise tape recorders (3,5 % of its estimated tape recorder revenue) – 26,77 % of this budget had been allocated to magazine advertisements (only small sums had been spent on ads in dailies and trade publications). This source also lists the overall advertising costs of the unit and its other divisions, Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976. In 1967, *Telefunken*'s *G* business unit planned to spend 2,5 million DM (or 53,4 %) of its 4,68 million DM ad budget on print advertising with at least 1,7 million DM going to illustrated magazines, von Dellingshausen & Mätze (1966, November 29). *Ergebnisprotokoll der Werbebesprechung am 23.11.1966 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, pp. 1-2. In 1970 and 1971, *AEG-Telefunken*'s consumer electronics business unit *R* respectively allocated 53 % and 45 % of its total ad budget to print advertising (excluding cooperative ads as well as processing/personnel costs), AEG-Telefunken (undated). *Werbung 1971. Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 15.

¹⁰⁴⁰ In contrast to 1965, *Telefunken France* had spent as much as 48 % of its total 1,6 million FF ad budget in 1964 (4 % of its revenue) on print advertising, FM/Wb (1965, March 22). *Kosten der Werbung. Hauptplan/Schätzung/Ist 1964/65 Fach-Bereich TELEFUNKEN FRANCE*. Enclosure of Martenson & von Auw to Fahrner (1965, March

budget breakdowns included processing, personnel, or cooperative retailer advertising costs, while others did not). The variance introduced by these factors renders direct comparisons across years, brands, or countries challenging and often even impossible: the percentual share of the overall ad expenditure allocated to print ads varies between 25-70 % across sources – depending on the budget type, calculation, and underlying strategy. Nonetheless, it can be established that mass media print advertising was a crucial component of many German and French consumer electronics advertising budgets and thus a key channel for consumers to encounter consumer electronics brands, product groups, and devices. This was only consequential given the mass appeal of consumer electronics and that print was still the leading advertising medium in Germany and France throughout the long 1960s.¹⁰⁴¹ Consumer electronics companies seem to have had a particular preference for magazine advertising.¹⁰⁴² The industry, of course, also made use of all other mass advertising possibilities offered by the German and French media landscapes; *Telefunken* consumer electronics were heavily promoted on the widely listened-to German-language broadcast of *Radio Luxembourg* in 1971,¹⁰⁴³ *Schneider* television sets and record players were among the very first products advertised on French television after the ban on television advertising was lifted on the 1st of October

22). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1964. The German company *Loewe* planned to allocate 28,06 % of its total 1972 ad budget (which included agency fees and ad spending on foreign and retail partners) to print ads, Beyer (1972, February 29). Werbeetat 1972. Enclosure of Beyer to mailing list (1972, February 29). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Einladung unserer Werbeagentur nach Gut Schlickerried/Oberbayern*, 3. – 5. März 1972. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972.

¹⁰⁴¹ In France, the printed press consistently accounted for above 40 % of all advertising spending between 1959 and 1973, and for roughly two thirds of the advertising spending on mass media (press, outdoor advertising, cinema, radio, television), Martin, 2012, p. 87. In Germany, at least 80 % of the yearly mass media advertising expenditure between 1960 and 1971 was allocated to dailies and magazines, GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung (1973). *Zahlen und Daten für die Werbe-Planung 1973*. GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung e.V., p. 16. The figures for both Germany and France are corroborated (until 1968) by IREP, 1970, pp. 21, 23. While television became increasingly important, its development as an advertising medium was hampered by legislation restricting the amount of broadcasted advertising minutes in both Germany and France during the long 1960s. France did only allow very limited quantities of brand advertising on national television from 1968 onward. Between 1968 and 1985, the first French channel saw an expansion of two to 25 ad-minutes per day, Parasie, 2010, p. 118. The first German regional broadcasters, in contrast, had already allowed advertising in the mid-1950s. Nonetheless, there were upper limits on the advertising airtime in the 1960s. The second German television channel, for instance, had initially not been allowed to broadcast more than 20 minutes of advertising per working day, Hans-Bredow-Institut (1974). *Internationales Handbuch für Rundfunk und Fernsehen 1973/75* (Vol. 13). Hans-Bredow-Institut, p. A 43, A 57. On television advertising limits and the impact of television on advertising in the press in 1960s Germany, see further Dussel, 2004, pp. 240–241.

¹⁰⁴² According to a 1964 quantitative analysis by *Telefunken*, all analyzed consumer electronics brands on the German market strongly preferred magazines to dailies and trade publications. Some brands, such as *Graetz*, *Grundig*, and *Nordmende*, even near exclusively advertised in magazines, N.N. (undated). *Insertionsaktivität % Anteil d. Mediagruppen*. Enclosure 3 of Martenson to Seydlitz (1965, January 12). *Internal letter*. Subject: *Aufwendungen für Produktwerbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120.

¹⁰⁴³ AEG-Telefunken (undated). *Werbung 1971. Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 15.

1968,¹⁰⁴⁴ and *Philips* introduced its color television sets to the French public not only through print ads but also through cinema advertising spots and large colorful billboards in the metro stations of Paris in 1967.¹⁰⁴⁵ Although the use of mass media channels varied depending on a range of factors such as the goals of a campaign, the available budget, the media advertising possibilities, or a company's overall strategy, consumers in France and Germany could have generally encountered consumer electronics advertisements when watching television, listening to the radio, taking public transport, going to the cinema, and particularly when reading magazines and newspapers.

In their mass media advertisements, consumer electronics companies either promoted one device in particular, a product group, certain parts, or all of their product portfolio. These advertisements were frequently planned for and inserted in mass media as parts of larger marketing campaigns, which consisted of much more than just mass media advertising. Public relation efforts, trade fair appearances, sales promotion measures, and advertising at the point of sale in the form of window displays or posters could all be highly important elements as well. As was the case for the mass media component, the resources allocated to those means varied between campaigns. Not everything was promoted everywhere. In exceptional cases, companies even conducted marketing campaigns completely outside of mass media when it made sense for a product or target group. Generally, however, marketing campaigns combined nationwide mass media advertising and localized measures at the points of sale, as has been shown throughout this chapter. Larger firms such as *Telefunken* conducted several such integrated campaigns of varying scope throughout the year, which could be tailored to devices and product groups or structured around seasonal themes, and which were coordinated across media and with one another – on a national scale.¹⁰⁴⁶

¹⁰⁴⁴ Schneider (1968, October 1). *Advertisement Schneider: gamme d'appareils audiovisuels : le jeu*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3867236.004. A list of all ads aired during the first week can be found in Duchet, 2005, Chapter 10.

¹⁰⁴⁵ G.A.D. (1968). *Philips S.W. Numann award 1967-1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, France Colour Television Campaign, non-paginated. It should be noted, however, that other sectors made even greater use of public transport advertising, at least in France. According to *IREP* data, the category "Radio, television, disques" only accounted for 2,61 % of the total public transport advertising spending in 1970, with ads for "Appareils ménagers" being responsible for another 5,71 %. Food products, on the other hand, accounted for 31,62 % of the overall (when totaled up), *IREP* (1971). Informations statistiques : La publicité transports en France en 1970, in *Bulletin d'Information de l'IREP*, 12. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Dossiers personnels sur l'IREP, ID 12834-0001, Dossier N°1 IREP 1960-1975, p. 35.

¹⁰⁴⁶ During the first half-year of 1971 alone, *Telefunken*, for instance, planned five campaigns that combined mass media advertising with point of sale advertising and sales measures. Two of them introduced new devices, the transistor radios *bajazzo universal* and *partner universal*. Two others were respectively geared toward music playing devices for parties and consumer electronics devices suitable to be gifted (around Easter), and the last was a "summer campaign" ("Sommeraktion"). The planning for the second half of the year was not completely fixed yet and would then be concretized at a later point, AEG-Telefunken (undated). *Werbung 1971. Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, pp. 6–15, 32. For *Telefunken*'s 1974 campaigns, see *Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH* (undated). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, pp. 26–31. Smaller

This importance placed on combining mass media advertising with measures at the point of sale was related to a particularity of the consumer electronics sector, which attributed an exalted role to specialist retailers as intermediaries. Although the long 1960s would see an influx of new actors such as department stores, discounters, or (particularly in Germany) mail order businesses challenging specialist retailers, the latter would largely retain their importance for consumer electronics distribution in Germany and France alike.¹⁰⁴⁷ Manufacturers were convinced that specialist retailers decisively influenced not only what precise type or brand a consumer opted for by offering in-person consultations and device-demonstrations, but also whether a consumer electronics device was purchased at all.¹⁰⁴⁸ Indeed, according to a 1969 study cited by *Telefunken*, the counsel of a salesman was the most important source of information leading up to a consumer electronics purchase – even ahead of the recommendations by friends and the self-study of brochures or window displays.¹⁰⁴⁹ The fact that a third party could affect commercial success so strongly had significant implications for the advertising of consumer electronics manufacturers.

3.4.1.2 The Importance of Advertising to and with Retailers

As a *Philips* advertiser explained at a meeting of the company's international advertising council in 1960, consumer-facing product advertising was supposed to start a “chain reaction – winning the attention of the reader or viewer; arousing his interest and creating desire”. This crucial step of transforming desire into a tangible purchasing action, however, was largely in the hands of retailers.¹⁰⁵⁰ In a best-case scenario, brand advertising for a consumer electronics product would manage to not only inform a reader about a device but also entice them to visit

companies like *Loewe* also conducted combined mass media advertising with measures at the point of sale, but they needed to be more targeted in allocating their budget. This is, for instance, evident from *Loewe's* 1967 advertising planning and budget, Heye Werbeagentur (1967, April 13). Marketing-Konzeption Loewe Opta für die Jahre 1967/69. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972, pp. 10–15. This source is discussed more extensively by Steiner, 2023, pp. 108–111.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Teupe, 2016a, pp. 122, 128; Gaillard, I. (2013a). An Unknown, but Key Player in the Television Market. The Television Retailer and the Case of Black and White TV Sets in France (1950-1987). *VIEW. Journal of European Television History and Culture*, 2(4), 79–88, p. 80.

¹⁰⁴⁸ This belief was seemingly consistent across companies and time, see for instance Himmelmann & Schenk, 1953, p. 247; Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 9.

¹⁰⁴⁹ The study had been conducted by the German research institute *Marplan*, AEG-Telefunken (undated). *Werbung 1971. Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Jones, A. (1960). Advertising/Promotion Relationship. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1960). *Report of the second meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council held in Eindhoven on the 7th and 8th of November 1960*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 1. Braun similarly stated that advertising should inform, convince, and motivate, Schmittel, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

a specialist dealer to inquire about it.¹⁰⁵¹ That was about the full extent of the influence consumer electronics manufacturers believed that they could exert through their mediated communications with consumers by way of mass media advertising for their products. Retailers spoke of devices being “pre-sold” through intensive manufacturer advertising in such instances –¹⁰⁵² but even then, the final step remained in their responsibility. In less ideal cases, it would only be “[...] through shop windows, salesrooms and arguments made by salesmen that consumers remember any advertising claims they have heard or read” as *Loewe*’s advertising agency assumed in 1967.¹⁰⁵³ Accordingly, *Braun* and *Philips* both underlined the importance of having adequate retail partners so that their consumer-facing advertising measures would not simply “fizzle out”.¹⁰⁵⁴

Advertising presented consumers with preliminary information about a device (or product group). At best, it also provided them with arguments and justifications for why they wanted a device,¹⁰⁵⁵ by, for instance, selling consumers on the idea that a device had a practical benefit or that it would bring them prestige.¹⁰⁵⁶ As *Telefunken*’s advertisers put it rather bluntly in 1971: “There must not be any stupid TELEFUNKEN customers who do not know why they bought a TELEFUNKEN device.”¹⁰⁵⁷ At the same time, consumer electronics advertisers needed to also make sure that retailers were convinced of a brand, were knowledgeable of its products, and ideally knew how to argue in favor of a device: “But there must also be no ill-informed TELEFUNKEN dealer who is not sufficiently familiar with TELEFUNKEN arguments [...]”¹⁰⁵⁸ Besides reaching consumers, it was hence also an important task for manufacturers to educate and enthuse retailers through advertising and direct communication regarding new

¹⁰⁵¹ As sketched out by *Telefunken* for instance, Himmelmann & Schenk, 1953, p. 247.

¹⁰⁵² Braun (undated). *Das Sortiment des Fachhandels: Struktur, Umfang, Angebot. Braun Ideen-Service für Fachpartner*. BS, magazine file Fachhandel II, pp. 16–17. In the original German: “vorverkauft”.

¹⁰⁵³ Heye Werbeagentur (1967, April 13). Marketing-Konzeption Loewe Opta für die Jahre 1967/69. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972, p. 2. In the original German: “[...], daß der Verbraucher [...] erst durch Schaufenster, Verkaufsraum und Verkäuferargumente an irgendwelche Werbeaussagen erinnert, die er gehört oder gelesen hat.”

¹⁰⁵⁴ Jones, A. (1960). Advertising/Promotion Relationship. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1960). *Report of the second meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council held in Eindhoven on the 7th and 8th of November 1960*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 1. While *Philips* used the English term, *Braun* utilized the German-language equivalent “verpufft”, N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*. BS, p. 22.

¹⁰⁵⁵ AEG-Telefunken (undated). *Werbung 1971. Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵⁶ N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*. BS, p. 17.

¹⁰⁵⁷ AEG-Telefunken (undated). *Werbung 1971. Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 5. In the original German: “Es darf keinen dummen TELEFUNKEN-Kunden geben, der nicht weiß, warum er ein TELEFUNKEN-Gerät gekauft hat.”

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid. In the original German: “Aber es darf auch keinen schlecht informierten TELEFUNKEN-Händler geben, der mit TELEFUNKEN-Argumenten nicht hinreichend vertraut ist [...]” The importance of advertising to retailers and convincing them of a product’s qualities had already been emphasized by the company’s advertisers nearly two decades earlier, Himmelmann & Schenk, 1953, p. 246.

products, ongoing marketing campaigns, and the argumentation they should employ with customers. At the same time, the industry also collaborated with specialist retailers on consumer-facing advertising efforts – after all, coordinating mass media advertising with measures at the point of sale necessitated the retailer to be involved.

Manufacturers would get in touch with retailers about their product portfolio, as well as about ongoing advertising and sales promotion efforts through letters, visits, trade fair meetings, house magazines, and advertising in consumer electronics retail trade publications. They would further provide retailers with pre-print templates for their local advertising, as well as campaign-specific sales aids and promotional material, merchandise, printed advertising matter (i.e. product brochures), posters, and shop window display material. They also sought to incentivize their collaboration and foster brand loyalty by holding retailer prize contests and even paying direct subsidies for cooperative local advertising measures that referenced both the brand and the local retail partner.¹⁰⁵⁹ Retailer shop windows could serve as a complementary counterpart to a brand's mass media advertising, facilitating brand-consumer encounters that allowed consumers to get a more tangible impression of a device's dimensions and design (see Figure 44).¹⁰⁶⁰

¹⁰⁵⁹ This is a compilation of examples introduced previously in this work. For a (quite similar) contemporary overview of advertising support offered to retailers by a consumer electronics company, see Himmelmann & Schenk, 1953, p. 247. Of course, manufacturer-retailer relations were at the same time also governed by questions of pricing policy, payment terms (for consumers and retailers), purchasing agreements, after-sales service, etc. As has been discussed at various points of chapter 2.2, such issues could intersect with questions of advertising. For a study focused exclusively on these topics and more broadly on the role of retailers in the consumer electronics market, see Teupe, 2016a.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Philips (1962). *Shop window audio and television devices, France, 1962* [Photograph]. PCA, Z9509-1. More broadly on the role of retailer shop windows as an important advertising medium in the emergent French mass consumer society, see Leymonerie, C. (2006). *La vitrine d'appareils ménagers. Reflet des structures commerciales dans la France des années 1950. Réseaux*, 135–136(1), 93–123.



Figure 44: Philips (1962). Shop window audio and television devices, France, 1962. Image © Royal Philips. Used with permission. PCA, Z9509-1.

Consumer electronics advertisers evidently believed that such efforts were of crucial importance to their overall success. This made sense given that not only the final impression on consumers happened at the point of sale, but that retailers would also actively intervene in their decision-making. As a result of a field market research inquiry by *Loewe's* ad agency in 1967, which had seen the agency's staff visit various retail businesses and pose as consumers inquiring about different brands, it was concluded that: "Every salesperson immediately recommends one or more devices from a particular brand. These are usually identical to the devices in the shop window and the devices prominently displayed in the salesroom."¹⁰⁶¹ The importance of maintaining favorable retailer-relations was also reflected in the proportional share allocated to retailers in advertising budgets: *Telefunken* spent half of its consumer electronics advertising budget in 1964 on printed advertising matter, promotional material, sales

¹⁰⁶¹ Heye Werbeagentur (1967, April 13). Marketing-Konzeption Loewe Opta für die Jahre 1967/69. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972, pp. 1–2. In the original German: "Jeder Verkäufer empfiehlt sofort ein oder mehrere Geräte einer bestimmten Marke. Diese sind meist identisch mit den Geräten im Schaufenster und den besonders herausgestellten Geräten im Verkaufsraum." Teupe has accordingly noted that, in the German television set market, the decision which devices were presented to consumers in what form was in the hands of the retailers, Teupe, S. (2014). Kontrolldenken: Vertikale Preisbindung, Hersteller-Händler-Beziehungen und die Transformation des Wettbewerbs im Markt für Fernsehgeräte zwischen den 1950er und 80er Jahren. *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte / Journal of Business History*, 59(1), 47–72, p. 72.

aids, and merchandise,¹⁰⁶² while subsidies for domestic and foreign retail partners accounted for more than 20 % of *Loewe*'s total 1972 advertising budget.¹⁰⁶³

The overall process of advertising consumer electronics hence involved promoting both with as well as to retailers alongside (print) mass media advertising directed to consumers. In addition to these manufacturer-initiated advertising measures, retailers further also conducted locally effective advertising for their business – partially on their own accord, partially in cooperation with a brand – for instance, through shop window decorations, cinema advertising, or insertions in the local press.¹⁰⁶⁴ While shop window decorations could simply be a means to profit from manufacturer advertising measures by displaying the same products and linking to the themes present in mass media advertising, a retailer's advertising efforts in local media were not solely meant to inform about a product. As *Braun* pointed out in a publication for its affiliated retail partners, “[t]he advertising message must convey not only why it is good to buy product A, but also why people should buy this product A from you.”¹⁰⁶⁵ The main objective of retailer advertising was to thus convince and subsequently remind consumers in the catchment area where best to buy consumer electronics:

“In the imagination of your customers, whose capacity is limited like that of every human being, you must occupy one of the top places when it comes to deciding where to buy an item. Consistent advertising ensures, among other things, that you are not forgotten.”¹⁰⁶⁶

Consumers would have thus come across advertisements for consumer electronics devices and product groups in national mass media as well as in local publications – albeit the framing would likely have been different. They would have further encountered connected advertising and sales measures at the points of sale and were potentially presented with sales arguments for a device that a retailer had adopted from the separate advertising measures manufacturers conducted for the specialist trade.

¹⁰⁶² Martenson & von Auw (1965, March 30). *Kosten der Werbung. Ist 1964. Fach-Bereich Telefunken/Gesamt*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

¹⁰⁶³ Beyer (1972, February 29). Werbeetat 1972. Enclosure of Beyer to mailing list (1972, February 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Einladung unserer Werbeagentur nach Gut Schlickerried/Oberbayern, 3. – 5. März 1972*. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972.

¹⁰⁶⁴ For concrete examples of these measures, see the preceding case studies in this part. For a comprehensive overview of possible retailer advertising measures, see also Braun AG (undated). *Werbung des Fachhandels: Planung, Gestaltung, Durchführung. Ideen-Service für Fachpartner*. BS, magazine file Fachhandel II.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Id., p. 12. In the original German: “Die Werbebotschaft muß aussagen, warum es nicht nur gut ist, das Produkt A zu kaufen, sondern auch, warum man das Produkt A bei Ihnen kaufen sollte.”

¹⁰⁶⁶ Id., p. 16. In the original German: “In der Vorstellungswelt Ihrer Kunden, deren Fassungsvermögen wie das jedes Menschen begrenzt ist, müssen Sie einen der vorderen Plätze einnehmen, wenn es um die Entscheidung geht, wo man einen Artikel kauft. Beständige Anzeigenwerbung sorgt unter anderem dafür, daß Sie nicht vergessen werden.”

3.4.1.3 Corporate Identity and the Cumulative Effects of Advertising

What most of these different advertising communications had in common was the fact that they did not solely relate to the product group(s) or device(s) they advertised. As they were communications in the name of a brand, they simultaneously contributed to shaping the overall image of the company, whose brand identity markers adorned the poster in the retailer shop window, television advert, or merchandise. The sole exception was the advertising retailers conducted fully on their own. Mass media advertisements for consumer electronics products could hence not just create awareness of, inform about, and potentially arouse desire for a radio or tape recorder. They inevitably also served – or detrimentally affected – larger brand related goals which were detached from any advertising aims for devices or product groups. Consumer electronics advertisers were acutely aware of this. According to the resolutions passed at *Philips's* 1959 international advertising convention, for instance, all advertising should “[...] also aim at the creation of a sound ‘corporate image’, meaning the sum total of associations with the name of Philips in the mind of the consumer.”¹⁰⁶⁷

Consumer electronics advertisers would thus also set image-related goals for their product advertisements by banking on their aggregate effect: *Loewe's* advertising agency, for instance, wanted to achieve greater brand recognition and set *Loewe* apart from its competition through its domestic, product-focused mass media advertising in 1967.¹⁰⁶⁸ And *Telefunken* posited in its 1971 advertising plan that the entirety of its domestic consumer electronics advertising efforts that year would help to distinguish the company from the competition as each advertising communication contributed a small part to shaping the company image. Paired with the quality of *Telefunken's* products, this would in turn create “the necessary bond of trust ‘consumer – retailer – manufacturer’” in a longer-term perspective.¹⁰⁶⁹ *Braun*, too, notably saw the creation and preservation of trust as the long-term goal of its advertising.¹⁰⁷⁰ For the infrequently occurring purchase of a television set or record player, companies hence seemingly

¹⁰⁶⁷ N.N. (1959), *Resolutions of the Philips international advertising convention held in Eindhoven from April 27th until May 2nd, 1959*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, non-paginated. This notion that all advertising communications contributed to shaping the corporate image was shared by other companies and was articulated at different points in time, see for instance AEG-TELEFUNKEN Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono (undated). *Werbung 1971*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 2; Black, G. (1977, November). *Braun. A Corporate Advertising Programme*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 7. Clients 1977-1978, Braun Corporate Identity (3 of 3). Hartman Center, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Heye Werbeagentur (1967, April 13). Marketing-Konzeption Loewe Opta für die Jahre 1967/69. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972, p. 8.

¹⁰⁶⁹ AEG-TELEFUNKEN Geschäftsbereich Rundfunk, Fernsehen, Phono (undated). *Werbung 1971*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 2. In the original German: “das notwendige Vertrauensverhältnis ‘Verbraucher – Händler – Hersteller.’”

¹⁰⁷⁰ Braun [1968]. *Richtlinien für die visuelle Gestaltung von Information und Werbung*. BS, p. 3.

believed that it was not only the product's features or price but also the confidence consumers (and the retailer informing them) placed in the make that could co-determine the final decision – and they sought to actively influence this trust-relationship through advertising.

Consumer electronics advertisers believed that product advertising was a component that influenced a company's overall corporate image with regards to brand awareness, differentiation, and consumer confidence. But to more directly communicate to consumers about their company image, they sometimes also conducted supplemental institutional advertising. This advertising form, which was also called corporate advertising, did not feature any particular products and rather focused on a brand's achievements, tradition, success, size, company philosophy, or its commercial activities in non-consumer related fields.¹⁰⁷¹ Its goal was thus to shape the corporate image in complementarity to dedicated product advertising on a national or ideally even on a transnational scale. In the resolutions of *Philips's* 1959 international advertising convention, it was established that the corporate headquarters conducted brand-focused campaigns in international media while it fell to *Philips's* national organizations "to support this effort with, for instance, well-planned prestige or institutional advertising campaigns which are adapted to the national requirements."¹⁰⁷²

Though the practice to advertise consumer electronics products nationwide through mass media seems to have been understood as an imperative – *Loewe's* 1967 advertising plan, for instance, simply posited that there was "no need to waste words" on explaining its necessity –¹⁰⁷³ complementary institutional advertising was more divisive. According to *Braun's* advertising agency *J. Walter Thompson*, institutional advertising had the unique advantage of being able to explicitly expound the company's philosophy whereas product advertisements could only

¹⁰⁷¹ See for instance Telefunken (1962, September 9). Advertisement. Tagline: 1958: TELEFUNKEN bringt Stereophonie. *Stern*, 36, 85. There were certainly also instances where consumer electronics companies managed to elegantly link their consumer- and business-to-business activities, blurring the boundaries between institutional and product advertising. This was, for instance, the case for *Thomson's* 1971 advertising campaign on French television. It centered on testimonials by different professionals working with *Thomson* equipment and cameras in film and television production. These were used as an argument to convince viewers at home that *Thomson* was an expert in the field of color television, and that they could also profit from this experience by buying a *Thomson* color television set, see Thomson (1971, October 9). *Advertisement Thomson Ducretet: téléviseur couleur*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212129.029. See further the ads broadcasted on the 13th and 16th of October, Thomson (1971, October 13). *Advertisement Thomson Ducretet: téléviseur couleur*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212129.042; (1971, October 16). *Advertisement Thomson Ducretet: téléviseur couleur*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212129.053.

¹⁰⁷² N.N. (1959), *Resolutions of the Philips international advertising convention held in Eindhoven from April 27th until May 2nd, 1959*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention, non-paginated.

¹⁰⁷³ Heye Werbeagentur (1967, April 13). Marketing-Konzeption Loewe Opta für die Jahre 1967/69. LOA Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972, p. 8. In the original German: "Über ihre Notwendigkeit braucht man keine Worte zu verlieren."

“imply, but never state directly.”¹⁰⁷⁴ In contrast, *Telefunken*’s advertisers claimed in 1974 that such advertising was unnecessary, as it would be possible to achieve their image-related aims through product advertising alone.¹⁰⁷⁵ This was a sharp departure from the position taken by *Telefunken*’s then head of marketing a decade earlier. In his view, the company’s institutional advertising insertions in print media helped to sharpen *Telefunken*’s profile in the public perception, maintain existing goodwill, and amplify the product advertising.¹⁰⁷⁶ The idea was that readers would factor in what they had learned about the company from institutional ads in their next consumer electronics purchasing decision.¹⁰⁷⁷

Irrespective of the precise stance on complementary institutional advertising, it is clear that, from a company perspective, advertising consumer electronics in the long 1960s did not only involve inserting ads for a television set or tape recorder in mass media channels. Manufacturers believed that this was but one component of a larger set of brand-related communicative efforts (albeit a crucial one). By the mid-1970s, *Braun* and *Telefunken* both explicitly characterized their various forms of outward communication as being “interdependent”.¹⁰⁷⁸ This notably not just applied within a marketing campaign but also in a longer-term perspective. Advertisers understood each individual advertising measure to be interconnected with the corporate image, being influenced by preconceived notions about a brand among retailers and consumers, while also acting as one small additional building block in the construction of said image. As the head of *Braun*’s communication department, Wolfgang Schmittel, underlined in 1973 taking a company’s corporate image as the common point of departure for all advertising was a matter of cost-benefit efficiency:

“Braun has the great advantage that its corporate identity has grown with it. [...] Much money would be thrown out of many windows by disregarding the built-up Braun-pedestal by starting with each ad or campaign at point zero.”¹⁰⁷⁹

¹⁰⁷⁴ Black, G. (1977, November). *Braun. A Corporate Advertising Programme*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 7. Clients 1977-1978, Braun Corporate Identity (3 of 3). Hartman Center, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (undated). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Seydlitz to [Heyne] (1963, July 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Meinungsbildende Werbung FM 1963*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷⁷ N.N. (undated). Wer kauft schon Hubschrauber? In FM/Wb (undated). *auf gleicher Welle 2, 2*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. J. Walter Thompson later similarly contended that “Corporate advertising can add a framework to all Braun advertising within which each individual product advertisement is more easily understood.”, Black, G. (1977, November). *Braun. A Corporate Advertising Programme*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 7. Clients 1977-1978, Braun Corporate Identity (3 of 3). Hartman Center, p. 4. Highlighting in the original.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (undated). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, non-paginated diagram. In the original German: “Interdependenz der Kommunikationsbereiche”; Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 49.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Schmittel, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989. Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

Awareness did not necessarily equate enduring success, however. A few years later, Schmittel compiled examples of domestic and foreign *Braun* print advertisements under the heading “A brief indication of today’s mess” in reference to their disparate nature.¹⁰⁸⁰ As was demonstrated for *Braun* and *Telefunken*,¹⁰⁸¹ aligning all advertising communications to establish and subsequently maintain a coherent company image proved to be a challenging task for multinational, decentralized consumer electronics companies in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, their organizational structure and the agency of the many individual actors involved in implementing a brand’s strategy could put them at odds with how they wanted to be perceived.

3.4.1.4 The “Prospective User De-Signs” Shaping Advertising Argumentation and Imagery

Despite the diversity of media combinations, market positionings, retailer collaborations, and brand strategies, most consumer electronics advertising efforts thus shared certain fundamental structural characteristics concerning how and where they were advertised. To a certain extent, this also holds true for the argumentative approaches and imagery used to promote consumer electronics. As has been demonstrated throughout this part, advertising argumentation and imagery could be just as uniquely tailored to devices, market environments, and target groups as was the overall advertising concept. Consumer electronics devices each came with their own toolbox of possible arguments, visual ideas, and positionings that could be used to advertise them. But only some components in those toolboxes were highly specific to a market context or a device’s features, such as in the cases of *Philips’s* 1962 television set campaign and *Telefunken’s Magnetophon Automatic*. However, there were also imagery and arguments that were shared within or even across product groups.

According to Heike Weber’s framework for historical studies of technological devices, manufacturers develop what she calls “prospective user de-signs” for their products: they have certain preconceived notions about the potential usage forms and user groups of a device, which are, for instance, formed by assumptions about cultural norms or by market research. Crucially, manufacturers communicate these prospective user de-signs to consumers, particularly through advertising.¹⁰⁸² Weber consequently notes that: “Advertisements ultimately reveal the uses that producers suggested for their products. They also illustrate the socio-cultural values associated with a technology, [...]. On a more subtle level, they also display the scarcely questioned

¹⁰⁸⁰ Schmittel, W. (1979, August 9). *Thoughts for Lorne Waxlax from Wolfgang Schmittel about Braun communication philosophy*. BS, magazine file Werbung bei Braun allgemein.

¹⁰⁸¹ See chapters 2.1.1 & 2.1.2.2.

¹⁰⁸² Weber, 2008, pp. 52–58.

stereotypes and ideals of an era, [...].”¹⁰⁸³ It should be noted, however, that “the manufacturers’ intended purposes of use” as presented in advertisements were not necessarily congruent with how a device was then used in practice, as Karin Bijsterveld and Annelies Jacobs have demonstrated for the tape recorder.¹⁰⁸⁴

The consumer electronics commercialized during the long 1960s could each only offer a finite number of possible use cases. Television sets, to give but one example, would have always been bought to watch television broadcasts, no matter the make, precise screen size, or additional features. Advertisers working for different brands in France or Germany had to contend with similar constraints imposed by the characteristics of what was to be advertised, producing recurring patterns. In past studies on the cultural history of consumer electronics product groups in the 1960s, scholars have accordingly identified common themes, imagery, and argumentative approaches in German and French consumer electronics advertising respectively.

According to Elvina Fesneau, for instance, ads for transistor radios in late 1950s/early 1960s France frequently positioned them as transportable everyday companions.¹⁰⁸⁵ Weber has come to a similar conclusion for transistor radio ads published in early 1960s Germany: they often emphasized that the devices could be used everywhere and underpinned this notion with appropriate imagery.¹⁰⁸⁶ As Weber further points out, the advertising approaches employed for portable (transistor) radios were then readopted for cassette recorders in the late 1960s.¹⁰⁸⁷ Advertisements could thus draw on the same arguments and accompanying imagery not only between brands within a class of media devices but potentially also across product groups and, if Weber’s and Fesneau’s findings are compared, across national borders – provided that there were overlaps between devices concerning their usage possibilities.

Advertisers tasked with promoting different devices by different brands from different product groups or in different countries could thus independently arrive at the same conclusions what to emphasize in their respective advertisements. They worked with a shared toolbox of

¹⁰⁸³ Weber, 2008, pp. 78–79. In the original German: “Werbeanzeigen legen letztlich offen, welche Verwendungsweisen die Produzenten für ihr Angebot vorschlugen. Darüber hinaus verdeutlichen sie, welche gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Werte mit einer Technik verknüpft wurden, [...]. Auf subtiler Ebene zeigen sie außerdem kaum hinterfragte Stereotype oder Ideale einer Zeit, [...]” This conceptualization is corroborated by other researchers in the field. As Monika Röther has observed for phono products in 1960s Germany, advertisements presented these types of devices in concrete usage situations. Röther further notes that particular devices would then also be more precisely aimed at certain target groups, Röther, 2012, p. 41.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Bijsterveld & Jacobs, 2009, p. 26. See further Bijsterveld, 2004. Indeed, although prospective user de-signs can influence actual usage forms, consumers of course had their own agency in how they used the technological devices they purchased. Weber addresses this through the complementary concept of “practiced user de-signs” (“Praktizierte user de-signs”), Weber, 2008, pp. 47–52.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Fesneau, 2011, p. 307.

¹⁰⁸⁶ As Weber points out, the usage contexts – and thus the spaces – in which portable radios were depicted in advertisements opened up further throughout the long 1960s, Weber, 2008, pp. 135–136.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Id., pp. 167–168.

argumentative and visual approaches predetermined by the features and usage possibilities of a consumer electronics device and/or product group; their prospective user designs. This causality must be distinguished from transnationally shared positionings for a certain device resulting from deliberate, coordinated company-internal processes, such as in the case of the *Philips Cassetophone*, for instance,¹⁰⁸⁸ as any such transnational congruities arose inadvertently.

As to Weber's second observation that advertisements for technological devices also reflect connected socio-cultural values, she has noted that portable consumer electronics devices, for example, were associated with the notions of "'freedom' and 'independence'."¹⁰⁸⁹ Given the universality of these values, it seems evident that they, too, could be shared across time and national borders.

A case in point is *Philips France's* overarching television set advertising concept during the first half of the 1960s, which revolved around the theme of reliability across multiple years (despite the deviating yearly advertising plans and designs). Although the precise advertising approaches taken by *Philips France* for its television sets were simultaneously linked to the specific market situation of television in 1960s France and influenced by the brand's market position, this was an obvious theme given that television sets were expensive devices purchased perhaps once a decade.¹⁰⁹⁰ This notion of reliability was not exclusive to *Philips France* nor to the French context: although the television sets commercialized in 1960s Germany were considerably cheaper than in France, they, too, remained costly devices purchased for the whole family,¹⁰⁹¹ and at least some German television set advertisements of various brands would thus also underline their reliability.¹⁰⁹²

Regarding Weber's third point of advertising revealing something about a period's commonly held beliefs and standards to strive for, it may be tentatively assessed that at least some of these stereotypical depictions evolved along the same lines in Germany and France alike, although

¹⁰⁸⁸ See chapter 2.1.2.1.2.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Weber, 2008, p. 78. In the original German: "'Freiheit' und 'Unabhängigkeit'."

¹⁰⁹⁰ See chapter 3.2.1.

¹⁰⁹¹ On the television set pricing difference between France and Germany, see chapter 3.2.1. As König has noted for the German context, it would take until the 1980s for television to transition from a family medium to an individually used one, König, 2013, p. 203.

¹⁰⁹² In 1962, *Loewe*, for instance, claimed that its television sets were "built for the future" ("für die Zukunft gebaut"), while *Kuba Imperial* focused on promoting its extended warranty as a proof of quality, noting the devices' "high operational reliability" ("hohe Betriebssicherheit"), *Kuba Imperial* (1962, September 23). Advertisement. Tagline: 2 Jahre Garantie der beste Qualitätsbeweis. *Stern*, 38, 7; *Loewe Opta* (1962, October 14). Advertisement. Tagline: Prädikat: besonders wertvoll. *Stern*, 41, 9. This notion would then also be picked up again in the color era. *Schaub-Lorenz's* 1974 advertising campaign, for example, revolved around the reliability ("Betriebssicherheit") and dependability ("Zuverlässigkeit") of its color television sets, *Schaub-Lorenz* (1974, January 31). Advertisement. Tagline: ITT Schaub-Lorenz bietet Ihnen mehr: Zuverlässigkeit. *Stern*, 6, 84–85. *Schaub-Lorenz's* campaign continued throughout 1974. See the *Stern* issues 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 43, 45, and 51.

this has not been investigated systematically and can only be illustrated based on examples. As Röther has noted in her study on music playing devices in Germany during the long 1960s, advertisements for record players/changers regularly depicted the devices in festive contexts, thus positioning them as a prerequisite for a successful party. This argumentative theme remained constant even as the imagery evolved alongside socio-cultural values, thereby producing new stereotypical, idealized depictions of record-player-powered parties: from the late 1960s onward, the consumers shown in such record player ads were “younger, more fashionable, and more funky.”¹⁰⁹³ Given that the nascent youth culture of the 1960s was a transnational phenomenon that shaped new values alongside introducing new music and fashion styles,¹⁰⁹⁴ a similar evolution of record player ad imagery may be established for France. French record player ads, too, would not only make use of the same argumentative theme as their German counterparts but also came to pair it with a new, funkier stereotypical party imagery derived from shifting socio-cultural values (see Figures 45 & 46).¹⁰⁹⁵



Figure 45: Pathé Marconi (1963, December). Advertisement. Tagline: C'est parti...pour 20 danses sans arrêt ! *Salut les Copains*, 17, 8.




Figure 46: Teppaz (1973, December). Advertisement. Tagline: Ambiance NonStop. *Salut les Copains*, 136, 139.

¹⁰⁹³ Röther, 2012, p. 298. In the original German: “jünger, modischer und flippiger.” For an early example of such an advertising approach, see Elac (1959, December). Advertisement. Tagline: Von Ihrer Party wird man sprechen. *Bravo*, 49, 17.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Mrozek, 2019, pp. 49, 735.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Compare for instance, Pathé Marconi (1963, December). Advertisement. Tagline: C'est parti...pour 20 danses sans arrêt ! *Salut les Copains*, 17, 8; Teppaz (1973, December). Advertisement. Tagline: Ambiance NonStop. *Salut les Copains*, 136, 139.

Consumer electronics advertisements could hence draw on the same stereotypical or idealized depictions, refer to the same socio-cultural values associated with a given technology, and – most importantly – converge on the same imagery and argumentative positioning not only across brands but also on a transnational scale as advertisers worked off similar prospective user de-signs. Previously in this work, the concept of consumer electronics advertising has been examined through the lens of deliberately composed, individually tailored national multi-media advertising campaigns and as a brand specific organizational practice shaped by (trans)national company structures and market environments. But it is important to acknowledge that, at the same time, consumer electronics advertising in the long 1960s also shared themes, imagery, or arguments across brands, across individual devices, and sometimes even across product groups or national borders. These elements were of course not static and subject to change over time. The media ensemble at the disposal of French and German households evolved considerably during the long 1960s as consumer tastes changed and new technologies complemented or superseded the old. The rising adoption rates of radios, television sets, record players, and tape recorders, paired with continuous technological progress – which led to the introduction of portable transistor radios, cassette recorders, color television sets, and stereos –¹⁰⁹⁶ fundamentally impacted what kinds of product groups were advertised how heavily: by the early 1970s, the advertisements for radios, tape recorders, record players, and B/W television sets of the late 1950s and early 1960s had largely given way to ads for stereos, cassette devices, and color television sets when comparing issues of illustrated magazines like *Paris Match* and *Stern*.

As the media ensemble's composition evolved, so did each individual product group. Observing far-reaching changes to a product group's societal perception, usage contexts, product design, functionalities, connected media infrastructure, and popularity is a constant across German and French works exploring the cultural history of various consumer electronics product groups and technologies during the long 1960s.¹⁰⁹⁷ While the national deviations and transnational convergences of these trends cannot be detailed for each type of consumer electronics device, it is important to underline that such factors strongly impacted the consumer electronics advertising of the long 1960s not only in individual cases (as outlined previously in this part)

¹⁰⁹⁶ Government institutions hence collected data on a steadily increasing number of types of media devices. For French adoption rates, see Secrétariat d'État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1975; Ministère de la Culture et de l'Environnement, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1977. For German adoption rates, see Statistisches Bundesamt, 1964; Statistisches Bundesamt (1974). *Ausstattung privater Haushalte mit ausgewählten langlebigen Gebrauchsgütern 1973* (Fachserie M, Preise Löhne Wirtschaftsrechnungen. Reihe 18, Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben). Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/DEHeft_mods_00127996. Statistisches Bundesamt, 1979.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Weber, 2008; Röther, 2012; Fesneau, 2011; Gaillard, 2012a.

but also on a macro-scale, as the industry's advertisers found similar responses to shared market conditions or even adapted their strategies to the competition's advertising.

Advertisements were not conceived in a vacuum. This produced overlaps and (national) industry trends as technological advances or changing media environments opened up – or even necessitated – new argumentative approaches. In the early 1960s, for instance, the notion that a brand's television sets were ready for the second French television channel was repeated so often in advertisements from across the French industry that *Philips France* in turn referenced this circumstance in its advertising.¹⁰⁹⁸ And in 1963, *Telefunken*'s advertisers insisted that it had been absolutely necessary for their ads to emphasize that the company's television sets contained transistors because *Grundig* had done so earlier in the year and *Telefunken*'s ads had thus needed to demonstrate “[...], that *Telefunken* naturally offers modern devices, i.e., devices that are just as modern as those offered by the competition.”¹⁰⁹⁹

In a longer-term perspective, consumer electronics advertising approaches would have also reflected that technologies and devices underwent domestication processes.¹¹⁰⁰ As advertisers working for *Sony* outlined in 1975 in reference to the company's past global campaigns meant to introduce transistor radios or “micro TV sets” to a wider public, their initial approach had been to create consumer demand by demonstrating “[...] the product's versatility and usefulness in everyday life – a campaign of education.”¹¹⁰¹ During a technology's market entry period, it was thus necessary to explain a device's advantages and convince consumers of its worth. *Telefunken*, for instance, accordingly expected its retail partners to help “spark purchasing desire” for its stereos in the late 1960s by demonstrating their sound advantages as most German consumers were still unfamiliar with concepts such as “HiFi” or “stereo”.¹¹⁰²

As consumer electronics technologies matured and new product groups such as color television sets or cassette recorders entered the societal mainstream, thereby modifying the media ensemble's overall balance, it became necessary to adjust and realign advertising and sales strategies – regardless of the brand or precise features of a device. Such shifts also affected distribution networks, as Gaillard has noted for television sets in France:

¹⁰⁹⁸ See chapter 3.2.2.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Seydlitz to Bereichsleitung RÖ (1963, March 18). *Internal letter. Subject: Werbung für Transistoren im Fernsehempfänger*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899. In the original German: “[...], daß Telefunken selbstverständlich moderne Geräte anbietet, d.h. genau so moderne Geräte wie die Konkurrenz.”

¹¹⁰⁰ For a concise introduction to the concept of domestication, which is used to describe how technological devices are appropriated by consumers to become a part of everyday life, see Röther, 2012, pp. 30–33.

¹¹⁰¹ Omura, M., & Takahashi, Y. (1975). *Sony*. In Schmittl, W. (Ed.), *Design concept realisation* (pp. 169–196). ABC, p. 174.

¹¹⁰² *Telefunken* claimed that only 3 % and 7 % of consumers knew what “HiFi” and “stereo” meant, respectively, N.N. (1968). Das fehlt Ihnen noch: HiFi-Stereo-Umschaltpult U 250. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 46, 23–24. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1968-2/>. In the original German: “Kaufwünsche zu wecken”.

“[...] at the beginning of the seventies the black and white TV set was not the costly and technically demanding object it had been during the last two decades. The colour TV set was arriving and the commonplace black and white television set was becoming less and less sold by the ‘traditional’ retailers.”¹¹⁰³

Consumer electronics advertising was then shaped by enduring traits and structural changes within and across product groups. Despite advertising strategies being individually tailored concerning timing, positioning, or media composition, most media devices were advertised and promoted through largely the same channels from a structural point of view, and advertisers could draw on the same fundamental arguments, imagery, or associated values not only between brands and devices but even across time, product groups, and national borders. In her study of music playing devices in Germany during the long 1960s, Röther has accordingly established that:

“[...] manufacturers consistently drew on a stable repertoire of metaphors in their advertisements, and their visions of the users were similar. Regardless of the product group being marketed, the advertising strategies followed similar paths.”¹¹⁰⁴

At the same time, however, consumer electronics advertisements nonetheless shifted in accordance with societal and technological conditions, which is why Röther also notes that:

“In a longer-term view from the second half of the 1950s to the early 1970s, advertisements provide insights into the strategies of manufacturers, which changed in line with technological progress, socially accepted uses of phono products, and, in particular, the changing values and consumer preferences of target groups.”¹¹⁰⁵

Consumer electronics advertising during the long 1960s was shaped by individualized advertising strategies – which accounted for the particularities of a national market at a given point in time, the features and characteristics of a device and/or product group, the market position and public perception of a brand, socio-cultural values, the possibilities and constraints of an advertising channel, and the overall media environment – on the one hand, and by user de-signs and structural logics that nonetheless recurred across time, national borders, brands, product groups or devices on the other. Notably, this dichotomy also becomes evident when quantitatively analyzing consumer electronics advertisements published in German and French mainstream media publications.

¹¹⁰³ Gaillard, 2013a, p. 84.

¹¹⁰⁴ Röther, 2012, p. 461. In the original German: “[...] griffen die Hersteller in ihren Werbeanzeigen durchgängig auf ein stabiles Repertoire an Metaphern zurück und ihre Nutzervisionen ähnelten sich. Die Werbestrategien folgten – unabhängig davon, welche Gerätegattung vermarktet wurde – ähnlichen Bahnen.”

¹¹⁰⁵ Id., p. 124. In the original German: “In einer längerfristigen Betrachtung von der zweiten Hälfte der Fünfziger- bis zum Beginn der Siebzigerjahre geben die Werbeanzeigen Einblicke in die Strategien der Produzenten, die sich entsprechend des technischen Fortschritts, entsprechend der gesellschaftlich akzeptierten Nutzungen von Phonogeräten und insbesondere entsprechend der veränderten Werte und Konsumwünsche der Zielgruppen wandelten.”

3.4.2 Reaching the Mainstream. Advertising in Illustrated Magazines

To reach the societal mainstream, consumer electronics advertisers frequently relied on illustrated magazines such as *Stern* and *Paris Match*. During the long 1960s, mass media print advertising – particularly in magazines – was the most important element of many consumer electronics advertising budgets.¹¹⁰⁶ Magazine advertising allowed brands to promote their evolving portfolios of mass-market compatible durable consumer goods to a broad, regionally dispersed public at a relatively low cost per thousand contacts.¹¹⁰⁷ The illustrated magazines *Stern* and *Paris Match* were particularly interesting advertising media due to their popularity – the *Stern* was read by around 20 % of the German adult population during the long 1960s,¹¹⁰⁸ with *Paris Match* not far behind for France with ca. 18,5 % –¹¹⁰⁹ and widespread appeal among male and female audiences alike.¹¹¹⁰ Indeed, according to Martin, *Paris Match* was “the king of advertising media of the periodical press [and] the best instrument for major national campaigns” from the 1950s onward,¹¹¹¹ while the *Stern* proved so popular among German advertising professionals that it even became the leader “in pages of advertising sold by publications in the entire world” by 1975.¹¹¹²

Given their significance as advertising media, *Paris Match* and *Stern* accordingly saw a high frequency of advertising communications by consumer electronics brands throughout the long

¹¹⁰⁶ This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.4.1.1. Advertising budget allocation is further addressed in the subchapters of 3.2 and in chapter 3.1.2.2.5.

¹¹⁰⁷ On the importance of mass media as a mediating factor for brands in mass consumer societies, see chapter 3.4.1.1. On the question of regional audience dispersion and the economic logic of magazine advertising, see chapter 3.1.2.2.5. To add further perspective on the question of cost: while the *Stern*, for instance, asked for 29.920 DM for a B/W ad insertion in 1972, its cost per thousand reader contacts was only 3,07 DM because of its high readership, GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 26.

¹¹⁰⁸ In 1972, the *Stern* reached 9,75 million readers (or 20,4 % of the German population aged 14 or older) with a circulation of 1.616.000 issues, GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 26. According to Axel Schildt, the *Stern* was read by around 20 % of the German population as early as 1951, with a circulation of more than a million copies by the early 1960s, Schildt, 1995, pp. 130–131.

¹¹⁰⁹ In 1972, *Paris Match* reached 6,68 million French readers with a circulation of 810.700 issues. This would mean that *Paris Match* was read by 18,55 % of French adults given France’s adult population (15 or older) of 36,3 million, GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 58. In 1963, *Paris Match* self-declared a readership of 6,64 million, *Paris Match* (1963, June 22). Advertisement. *Paris Match*, 741, 131. This would put *Paris Match*’s reach in 1963 at 18,87 % of French adults given an adult population of 35,18 million for metropolitan France according to the national statistics institute INSEE. For the population data, see INSEE (2024, January 16). *Demographic balance sheet 2023. Population change and structure, metropolitan France*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/7748118?sommaire=7751503#titre-bloc-11>.

¹¹¹⁰ The *Stern* reached 22,6 % and 18,5 % of the total German male and female adult population respectively in the early 1970s, GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 27. *Paris Match* seems to have also had an equal distribution. The magazine claimed to have 3.268.000 female and 3.378.000 male readers in 1963, *Paris Match* (1963, May 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Destinataires: 6646000 Lecteurs. *Paris Match*, 736, 26–27.

¹¹¹¹ Martin, 1992, p. 324. In the original French: “le roi des supports de la presse périodique, le meilleur instrument des grandes campagnes nationales”.

¹¹¹² In 1975, the *Stern* sold 4.306 pages of advertising for a total of ca. 100 million USD, N.N. (1976, June). West Germany: A Special Section. *Advertising World*, 31. J. Walter Thompson Company. Advertising Vertical File, 1950-1994. Box 51. ADV – International Europe – Germany. Hartman Center.

1960s. Of course, these magazines did not represent the full spectrum of advertising efforts by consumer electronics companies, which also made use of more targeted print media channels, other mass media advertising formats, and measures at the points of sale. Not everything was advertised through all channels. Nonetheless, these illustrated magazines offer the most accurate approximation of what mainstream advertising for consumer electronics looked like during this period. Having previously explored consumer electronics advertising through company-, device-, product group-, target group-centric perspectives, as well as through an analysis of its structural characteristics across brands or products, this subchapter shifts the focus to the structural traits of mainstream media advertising.

It addresses the topic of consumer electronics advertising in mainstream media primarily through a longitudinal comparative quantitative analysis of advertisement metadata. This analytical approach enables the identification of macro-level characteristics and trends invisible in the qualitative source material used throughout the rest of the work. The subchapter hence offers a complementary approach to consumer electronics advertising that deviates methodologically – while keeping with the chapter theme of identifying overarching patterns despite the diversity of advertising approaches.

In line with the focus on the media level, the quantitative analysis centers not on brands or product groups but rather on the media-specific properties of French and German consumer electronics advertisements in the long 1960s, meaning their visuals (namely format, color usage, and the relation of text and imagery), as well as their recurrence and distribution within the illustrated magazines *Paris Match* and the *Stern* throughout the calendar year. Both these topics are explored in transnational and temporal comparison, with a contextualization through secondary literature and qualitative source material. The quantitative analysis reveals that consumer electronics advertisements were shaped by transnational structural patterns intrinsic to the characteristics of consumer electronics as a distinct subclass of durable consumer goods – some of them temporally stable, others subject to change over time. However, the subchapter also demonstrates that product-group specificities, transnational differences, market circumstances, and media factors nonetheless remained important, which again highlights the dichotomy of consumer electronics advertising.

The data collection process underpinning this analytical approach followed a systematic sampling strategy. To adequately capture long-term temporal trends, every third year's issues of the weekly illustrated magazines *Paris Match* and *Stern* between 1959 and 1974 were consulted, collecting ads from 1959, 1962, 1965, 1968, 1971, and 1974. This collection pattern was chosen to ensure that even- and odd-numbered years were both represented in the dataset,

as large-scale sporting events taking place in even years (Olympiads, World Cups) might have otherwise distorted the data. Such events were major sales drivers particularly on the television market¹¹¹³ and could thus potentially impact advertising strategies and advertising media presence.

To ensure a sufficiently broad data basis and to account for seasonally disparate advertising patterns throughout a calendar year, 98,7 % of all possible issues of *Paris Match* and all but one issue of the *Stern* published during those years were consulted. All advertisements for radios, (color) television sets, and phono products inserted in those magazine issues by a consumer electronics brand were then recorded in a database.¹¹¹⁴ This resulted in a dataset of 728 ads from 302 issues of *Paris Match* and 894 ads from 311 issues of *Stern*.¹¹¹⁵ Advertisements for consumer electronics devices inserted in *Paris Match* or *Stern* by mail-order businesses and retailers were excluded from the quantitative analysis, as these types of companies did not adhere to the brand advertising logic outlined above, which means that these ads would have required a distinct analytical approach.

Each of the collected brand ads was classified using several metadata categories.¹¹¹⁶ It was decided to abstain from interpretative, semantic categories; metadata was only recorded for largely unambiguous structural and content-based criteria to ensure encoding consistency and

¹¹¹³ Sporting events also had a positive impact on the industry's production cycles according to Overhoff, J. (1986). *Farbe für Fernsehen und Wirtschaft, II. Die Entwicklung des Farbfernsehgerätemarktes und die Folgen. Rundfunk und Geschichte*, 12(1), 62–73, p. 65. The role of sporting events is discussed further in chapter 4.5.3. Sporting events were not the sole potentially distorting factor, however. The most important industrial fair in Germany for consumer electronics at the time, for instance, usually took place only in uneven years (1970 being the exception), Wiesinger, 1994, pp. 154–161. This event, too, of course influenced the consumer electronics advertising on the German market. To give but one example: in 1965, the whole German industry conducted a joint print media advertising campaign on occasion of the fair to boost radio sales, Franzke to Horlitz (1965, November 12). *Internal letter. Subject: Radio-Gemeinschaftswerbung 1965*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2116.

¹¹¹⁴ The full list of device-types includes radio, television, color television, cassette recorder, tape recorder, radio recorder, radiogram, stereo, multiple devices, and other devices (such as an alarm-clock-radio-combination or a cassette player, for instance). The latter two types of entries were then classified further in a separate category. Dictaphones were not admitted to the dataset, as were loudspeakers, cassettes, vinyl records, or products belonging to adjacent product categories such as washing machines. A concrete reference to a consumer electronics device or product group was a necessary prerequisite to be included, even though ads for loudspeakers or washing machines by brands that were also actively advertising their consumer electronics portfolio would have certainly influenced the overall impression a consumer had of a brand (this would have been especially relevant for *Philips*, which was active across multiple sectors). Advertorial content for a consumer electronics device was counted, but advertisements by companies outside the industry which promised to raffle off a consumer electronics device were usually not included in the set. While there are a few edge cases where an argument could have been made for inclusion as well as for exclusion, this encoding scheme generally allowed for conclusive classification.

¹¹¹⁵ Only the first issue of 1965 is missing for the *Stern*. For *Paris Match*, four issues could not be consulted – three from 1974 and one from 1959. All other years are complete. However, there are two short periods during the early summer of 1968 and in winter 1974 where no issues were published, resulting in the *Paris Match* set being another six issues shorter overall.

¹¹¹⁶ The set of categories and the controlled vocabulary used during the encoding process was conceived in a hybrid approach combining deductive and inductive reasoning; after compiling a sample and encoding it based on preliminary criteria premised on the research interests, the criteria and vocabulary were then adjusted based on the sample-analysis.

reproducibility. The most important metadata categories hence pertain to the year and month of publication, the source (magazine, issue), the type of advertised device(s), the brand,¹¹¹⁷ and the visual identity. In addition, it was recorded whether an ad was recurring and/or if it was part of a larger campaign based on obvious visual and thematic relatedness.¹¹¹⁸

While the size of the dataset (n=1.622) allowed for the identification of general trends and co-occurrence patterns across years and between countries, its explanatory power diminishes when sliced too thin: an individual company or product type might have only been advertised a handful of times in a magazine in a certain year, making brand or product group focused quantitative analysis not overly meaningful. The analytical focus of this chapter remains hence on the macro-level, exploring advertising rhythms and visuals across time in transnational comparison. All statements, analysis, and visualizations¹¹¹⁹ in this subchapter are based on the dataset from *Paris Match* and *Stern* and the criteria outlined above, if not explicitly stated otherwise.

3.4.2.1 Rhythms of Exposure: A Transnational Comparison of Advertising Patterns

3.4.2.1.1 Campaigns and Reprints. The Nationally Distinct Logics of Repeat Advertising

Throughout the long 1960s, the millions of French and German consumers reading *Paris Match* and *Stern* regularly encountered consumer electronics brands and devices. On average, 2,42 ads were inserted per issue in *Paris Match* and 2,87 ads in *Stern* by manufacturers promoting their radios, television sets, or phono products. Based on these averages across the six analyzed years, it can be extrapolated that consumers who read every issue of *Paris Match* or *Stern* between 1959 and 1974 would have seen around 2.000 and 2.400 consumer electronics ads, respectively.¹¹²⁰ Although these point estimates should be understood as approximations, they nonetheless illustrate the scale of advertising exposure: avid readers of either magazine were confronted with hundreds of advertisements for radios, television sets, or phono products by various brands in one print media publication alone. Although the advertising pressure in *Stern*

¹¹¹⁷ The brand's initial country of origin was recorded as a separate category, revealing an asymmetry between German and French brand presence in the other country. The results are briefly discussed in chapter 2.2.

¹¹¹⁸ This classification into campaigns involved a greater degree of interpretation than the other categories due to the necessity to apply it to several ads of a brand across issues of a magazine and identify a common visual approach and theme. However, given that companies would have had an active interest in repeat effects from similarly styled ads on consumers, interrelationships between ads were usually made relatively obvious through a shared tagline, layout, imagery, etc.

¹¹¹⁹ Excel was used to record and explore the data. The results were visualized with Flourish.

¹¹²⁰ The averages were calculated by dividing the number of ads (728 for *Paris Match*, 894 for *Stern*) by the number of issues (302 and 311, respectively). These averages were then multiplied with the approximate number of issues published throughout the timeframe (16 years x 52 issues/year = 832). The resulting figures are approximations, as actual publication patterns varied; some years had 53 issues (*Stern* in 1967, for instance), while at least *Paris Match* also saw issue cancellations (at least in 1968 and 1974). In addition, annual ad volumes may have potentially fluctuated considerably.

appears to have been slightly higher than in its French counterpart, advertisements for consumer electronics were clearly a prominent feature of the reader experience in both countries.

Far from all of the thousands of consumer electronics ads readers could have encountered in either magazine were unique, however. An overwhelming majority of consumer electronics ads inserted in the illustrated magazines *Stern* and *Paris Match* in the timeframe 1959-1974 stood in direct relation to other consumer electronics ads published in the same magazine during the same year. Regular readers in France and Germany alike would have repeatedly seen similar or identical ads. This repetition took two main forms: either ads were reprinted, or companies inserted related designs, which were visibly part of the same campaign – sharing a layout, theme, and/or visual language. These two forms could overlap; an ad could be both a reprint and part of a larger campaign, for instance.¹¹²¹

Around one in five consumer electronics ads in both magazines were first appearances of a new design which would then go on to be repeated at least once. In *Paris Match*, 40 % of all inserted ads were exact repeats of such previous insertions. This was also the case for around 30 % of consumer electronics ads in the *Stern*.¹¹²² Reprinting an ad was hence common in both countries, but even more prevalent in France. Standalone ads were the exception: only 16,6 % of ads in *Paris Match* and 10,6 % in the *Stern* were neither repeated nor part of a campaign. The remaining share missing for 100 % was made up by ads which varied a broader campaign theme without being reprinted in an identical manner. This ad category accounted for nearly four out of ten consumer electronics ads compared to only 22,7 % of ads in *Paris Match*. German consumer electronics advertising in illustrated magazines during the long 1960s was

¹¹²¹ This analysis on ad-recurrence is based on two separately encoded metadata-categories: the first recorded whether an ad appeared for the first time and would be repeated later on, was a repeat of an earlier ad, or appeared only once in its exact form. The second category was encoded using the same three possibilities but tracked campaign-recurrence – meaning ads that were part of a visually and thematically related set of ads by the same company. If an ad was only repeated identically, and did not also recur within a larger campaign together with other design variants, it was only encoded in the first category. This also applied vice versa. Given this encoding approach, these categories could only be retroactively finalized once all ads from a full year's set of issues had been incorporated in the database. A third combined category was then derived from the three possible encoding variants (first appearance = F, recurring = Y, non-recurring = N) for each of the two initial categories, resulting in eight possible combinations: F/F, F/N, F/Y, Y/N, Y/Y, N/F, N/N, N/Y. F/F: ads that appeared for the first time, would appear in an identical manner later on, and would also be part of a larger campaign that included other designs as well. F/N: ads that would reappear in a later issue without being part of a broader campaign that also included other designs. F/Y: ads that appeared for the first time in a later recurring design while being part of an already running campaign. Y/N: repetition of an earlier ad but not part of a broader campaign with other designs. N/F: Unique ad that starts a campaign without being identically repeated. N/N: not repeated and not part of a campaign. N/Y: Unique ad that is part of a recurring, already running campaign without being identically reused itself. Y/Y: Repetition of an earlier ad within a recurring campaign. This combined category allowed for a more granular analysis as it, for instance, made it possible to systematically identify one-offs in the first place.

¹¹²² Accordingly, around 60 % of all consumer electronics ads in *Paris Match* and half of the ads in the *Stern* involved identical repeat insertion in some form (regardless of whether those ads were also part of a larger campaign or not).

thus more frequently structured in a campaign format, in the sense that readers were presented several alternate versions of an overall design (see Figures 47 & 48).



Figure 47: Philips (1962, July 29). Advertisement. Tagline: Eine Freundin für Dur+Moll. *Stern*, 30, 67.



Figure 48: Philips (1962, June 24). Advertisement. Tagline: Eine Freundin für Dur+Moll. *Stern*, 25, 43.

The *Stern* offered readers a higher visual diversity – although within a framework –, while French consumers were more likely to repeatedly encounter the same ad multiple times. This higher prevalence of campaign-based structuring is also evident when considering this data separately: in total, around 70 % of all ads in the *Stern* were campaign-associated in some way (regardless of the question if they were being identically repeated or not), while this was only the case for 54 % of consumer electronics ads inserted in *Paris Match*. German readers hence more often encountered variances of a theme than their French counterparts (although some of these variations could be rather small, such as using a slightly different photo or printing in B/W instead of in color). Readers of *Paris Match*, on the other hand, were comparatively more likely to see an ad either only once or repeated without any variation.

Both magazines offered a high degree of repetition, whether it was exact or campaign based; ads rarely appeared in isolation. This was likely due to cost-saving strategies, as consumer electronics advertisers in both countries may have reused designs out of financial considerations, and/or due to a desire to recurrently expose consumers to an advertising communication or campaign to achieve a more lasting impact. Regardless of the motivation, the result was that routine readers would have often had the feeling that they had already seen an ad for a consumer electronics device before – or at least an ad very similar to it. In fact, this impression would have been even more strongly pronounced from a reader's point of view than

the figures imply, given that cross-year¹¹²³ or cross-media recurrences¹¹²⁴ could not be statistically accounted for, even though these, of course, regularly took place as well.

In addition, even small changes in format or coloring were encoded as being non-identical repeats but rather as belonging to the same campaign to ensure consistent encoding. This means that any potential feeling of repeatedly encountering the same ads, which readers may have experienced, would have been even stronger than the already considerable percentage share of identical repeats implies. Consumer electronics ads were thus not meant to make an isolated impression as companies in Germany and France alike relied on cumulative impact and reinforcing messages across multiple issues of the same illustrated magazine. However, their presence was not evenly distributed throughout the calendar year, as the average number of ads per issue conceals significant seasonal variation: issues with zero ads coexisted with others that featured up to 15 or even 17 consumer electronics ads within the same year.¹¹²⁵

3.4.2.1.2 Predetermined by the Calendar: the Industry's Seasonal Advertising Patterns

The industry's sales fluctuated seasonally,¹¹²⁶ as did its advertising spending.¹¹²⁷ Accordingly, the advertising patterns for consumer electronics in *Stern* and *Paris Match* mirrored this rhythm across years and countries (see Figure 49): consumer electronics advertising in both magazines ramped up from a slow start at the beginning of the calendar year until early summer. Then, after a sharp decline of advertising frequency during the summer months, a second wave of even more intensive advertising took place in the months leading up to Christmas. Germany and France hence shared a fundamentally similar seasonal macro-pattern. However, despite this common tendency for consumer electronics advertising to peak in two waves, certain temporal, product-group, and country-specific factors nonetheless influenced their precise curvatures or led to deviations from the overall pattern.

¹¹²³ For a campaign design which was used across years, see UHER (1967, September 17). Advertisement. Tagline: Wie klingen Ihre Urlaubs-Dias? *Stern*, 38, 41; (1968, September 22). Advertisement. Tagline: Wozu braucht man ein Mischpult? *Stern*, 38, 189. For a near-fully identical ad reprinted across calendar years, see Philips (1967, October 21). Advertisement. Tagline: Quand Philips surpassa Philips... *Paris Match*, 967, 32–33; (1968, January 13). Advertisement. Tagline: Quand Philips surpassa Philips... *Paris Match*, 979, 12–13.

¹¹²⁴ See for instance the cross-media appearance in illustrated magazine *Stern* and youth magazine *Bravo* of a *Dual* ad, *Dual* (1965, February 21). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie können mehr von Ihren Platten hören! *Stern*, 8, 118; (1965, October 4). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie können mehr von Ihren Platten hören! *Bravo*, 41, 49. Such cross-mediatic recurrences seem to not only have been highly common but could have of course also involved measures at the point of sale or non-print media channels, see the campaigns in chapters 3.1.2, 3.2.2 & 3.2.3.

¹¹²⁵ To give but one example each: in 1959, *Paris Match*'s issue 542 saw zero consumer electronics ads while issue 558 featured 15; in 1971, *Stern*'s issue 34 had zero consumer electronics ads compared to 17 in issue 49.

¹¹²⁶ For France, see Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 89–90, 194. For Germany, see Gliese, 2023, p. 138.

¹¹²⁷ While the advertising spending of each of the nine consumer electronics companies analyzed by *Telefunken* in 1964 fluctuated differently throughout the year, August, for instance, was a rather weak month for most of them, N.N. (undated). Aufwendungen für Produktwerbung 1964. Aufteilung nach Monaten. Enclosure 2 of Martenson to Seydlitz (1965, January 12). Internal letter. Subject: Aufwendungen für Produktwerbung 1964. DTMB/AEG, GS 2120.




Figure 49: Seasonal advertising patterns for consumer electronics devices in *Stern* and *Paris Match*. Visualization by the author.

The first important country-specific factor concerned the diverging approaches to the large advertising wave in the pre-Christmas period. In France, the month of December saw the most intense advertising by the industry, with a precipitous decline in January and February. In Germany, however, the advertising frequency was chiefly concentrated in October and November with a noticeable drop-off already in December. One possible explanation would be a difference in advertising culture. Even though sales – as *Grundig*, for instance, noted for its tape recorders – were strongest in the last few weeks directly before Christmas,¹¹²⁸ there seem to have been concerns in the German industry that ads could not take their full effect if inserted too close to Christmas; at least *Telefunken*'s marketing department was clearly wary of advertising immediately before the holidays.¹¹²⁹ The quantitative data implies that the French industry had no such apprehensions. German consumers thus faced the yearly barrage of consumer electronics advertisements earlier than their French counterparts, which were targeted during – instead of before – the Christmas shopping period.

¹¹²⁸ *Grundig* pointed this out in an ad aimed at German retailers, encouraging them to order tape recorders early before Christmas-based consumer demand would outstrip their supply on hand, Grundig (1963, October). Advertisement. Tagline: Tonbandgeräte sind sichere Umsatzträger. *Funk-Technik*, 19, 707.

¹¹²⁹ Seydlitz & Horlitz (1962, October 18). Internal letter. Draft. Subject: Zusammenarbeit GM mit FM. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

The second large country-specific difference pertained to the shape and timing of the summer slump in consumer electronics advertising. While it lasted three months in both countries, it was considerably more pronounced in France. All examined years saw at least some ads being published during every summer month in the *Stern*, which was not the case for *Paris Match*. In certain years, readers of the French illustrated magazine would have not encountered a single ad for a radio, television set, or phono product during July or August. The summer low points were also not synchronized between countries. In Germany, the weaker periods lasted from June to August with the lowest point in July. In France on the other hand, the summer slump lasted from July to September with the nadir being in August.

Both the timing and the more distinct manifestation in France must at least in part be attributed to summer holiday timings. In France, the summer school break during the 1960s and early 1970s typically lasted from the end of June to mid-September with only minor variations between regions. All French families could have hence been on vacation around the same time.¹¹³⁰ In contrast, German vacation timings were considerably more staggered between the federal states: the much shorter, regionally varied German summer breaks started anywhere between late June and the end of July and would accordingly last until early August to mid-September depending on the state and year. Unlike in France, there was no single point in time where all German families could have simultaneously been on summer vacation.¹¹³¹

It should be noted that seasonality in advertising was not a phenomenon exclusive to the analyzed magazines,¹¹³² nor to the consumer electronics industry. The amount of editorial content published in a magazine typically expanded or contracted in tandem with the ad volume during the long 1960s.¹¹³³ The overall length of magazine issues thus varied considerably throughout the year in line with seasonal advertising patterns. In the case of *Paris Match*, for instance, summer issues were often half as long (or even shorter) than the longest issues

¹¹³⁰ The exact dates varied slightly from year to year. Additionally, there were certain years where pupils were divided along geographical zones, resulting in minor staggered start and end dates for the summer break. Nonetheless, the overall tendency remained consistent throughout the whole timeframe, see Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (2025, July). *Les archives du calendrier scolaire*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.education.gouv.fr/les-archives-du-calendrier-scolaire-12449>.

¹¹³¹ For the German data, see Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (undated). *Sommerferien 1955 bis 2003* [PDF]. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.kmk.org/fileadmin/pdf/Ferienkalender/Sommerferienregelung_1955bis2003.pdf.

¹¹³² The German magazine *Der Spiegel*, for instance, had seen a marked increase in ad insertion frequency in the weeks leading up to Christmas and a subsequent drop-off after as early as 1954, Augstein, R. (1955, January 25). Lieber Spiegelleser. *Der Spiegel*, 5. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/lieber-spiegelleser-a-30b0898c-0002-0001-0000-000031969015>.

¹¹³³ This connection stemmed from the fact that most magazines at the time did not cover their production costs through their sales price, but rather in large part through advertising revenue. Magazines openly communicated this causal link to their readers, see for instance Jordan, J. (1971, June). La publicité...en question !!! *Salut Les Copains*, 106, 86–87, 121; N.N. (1964, June). Autour du magnétophone: La publicité. *Salut Les Copains*, 23, 106–107, 119, 121, 123, 125; Nannen, H. (1967, February 19). «Lieber Sternleser!». *Stern*, 8, 15.

published during peak advertising periods.¹¹³⁴ The many other sectors vying for consumer attention in illustrated magazines hence evidently also refrained from large-scale advertising at certain points of the year. In 1963, *Paris Match* accordingly implored its advertising clientele to continue its insertions during August, rhetorically asking them: “Do you seriously believe that the 6.646.000 readers of MATCH are more receptive to advertising ...in the fall ...in winter, or in spring than they are in August?”¹¹³⁵

The advertisers working for the consumer electronics industry clearly did believe that print advertising would lead to less success in the summer (or in January/February) compared to other parts of the year. Although the German and French seasonal patterns didn’t completely align regarding their timing, and even though seasonality manifested itself more extremely in France than in Germany, advertisers in both countries were evidently convinced that they would not be able to interest consumers in a television set or record player immediately after Christmas or during the summer due to the characteristics of these products. This suggests that the seasonal suitability of consumer electronics devices was considered a more decisive factor for advertising timing than the potential advantage of reduced competition for reader attention during quieter periods.

Despite the general consistency of the industry’s seasonal advertising rhythm, its precise shape varied across years and countries. These variations were the cumulative result of each consumer electronics company individually adjusting their advertising approach due to technological advancements, rising product adoption rates, changing market environments, exceptional events, or changes to a company’s direction. In certain cases, this could result in noticeable divergences from the overall trend direction as multiple companies found similar responses to shifting conditions. This dynamic may be best illustrated through such an instance where the advertising frequency in one of the two magazines deviated noticeably in cross-year and cross-national comparison.

April and May 1974 immediately stand out in the *Stern* when compared to the same period in other years due to the extraordinary insertion frequency. This must in large part be attributed to a sporting event. It has already been noted that Olympiads and international football tournaments could have a significant effect on the advertising approach and insertion frequency

¹¹³⁴ In 1958, *Paris Match*’s longest issue of the year – n° 496, published in late autumn – was around double in size (131 pages) compared to the shortest ones (n° 488–490, 67 pages each) released a few weeks earlier during the summer. In 1974, this disparity was even more pronounced, with some of the summer issues being 75 pages only (n° 1317–1319) while the longest one, issue n° 1333, published in December, reached 171 pages.

¹¹³⁵ *Paris Match* (1963, June 22). Advertisement. Tagline: une question qui vaut des millions. *Paris Match*, 741, 131. In the original French: “Pensez-vous sérieusement que les 6.646.000 lecteurs de MATCH sont plus réceptifs à la publicité ...en automne en hiver ou au Printemps qu’au mois d’Août ?” Highlighting in the original.

– and in 1974, the World Cup was held in Germany between June and early July. Given that the German color television set adoption rate was still only at 18 % in spring 1974,¹¹³⁶ advertisers working for *Grundig*, *Saba*, *Loewe*, *Sony* or *National* identified this home tournament as a perfect opportunity to try and encourage readers of the *Stern* to seize the occasion and make the switch from B/W to color TV sets of their brand – more than half a decade after the technology had first been introduced to the German market.¹¹³⁷ Accordingly, one third of all consumer electronics ads published in those two months in the *Stern* advertised color television sets, many of them containing references to the upcoming tournament (see Figure 50). This was of course not a phenomenon exclusive to the *Stern*. *Telefunken*, for instance, promoted their color TVs in the run-up to the 1974 World Cup by advertising in other media and through measures at the point of sale.¹¹³⁸



Figure 50: Grundig (1974, May 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Weil 1978 wieder eine Fußball-WM ist. Und 1982... *Stern*, 21, 42–43.

No comparable trend can be discerned for *Paris Match*. Although the French color television market also had a lot of growth potential, as only 7,7 % of households were equipped with a color TV by 1973,¹¹³⁹ only three color television set ads were inserted in *Paris Match* in

¹¹³⁶ DIVO INMAR, 1974, p. 150.

¹¹³⁷ Regular color broadcasts had started on German television in August 1967, Fickers, 2007, p. 13. According to Dussel, the 1972 Olympics in Munich and the 1974 World Cup were the two events that would jointly bring the “big breakthrough” (“große Durchbruch”) for color television after a slow start for the technology’s consumer adoption due to high prices and a limited offer of color broadcasts in the late 1960s, Dussel, 2004, pp. 242–243. On color television set pricing in Germany, see further Teupe, 2016a, pp. 73–74.

¹¹³⁸ Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (undated). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, pp. 30–31.

¹¹³⁹ Ministère de la Culture et de l’Environnement, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1977, p. 62.

April/May 1974, none of which referenced the World Cup. The absence in those months becomes even more remarkable when considering that no other group of consumer electronics devices was advertised more often in the magazine during the whole calendar year 1974 than color television sets. However, 75 % of those ads were published in *Paris Match* between October and December. For the *Stern*, in contrast, this period only accounted for 46 % of all color television ads published in the magazine in 1974, which was chiefly due to the strong presence in the run-up to the World Cup.

The fact that German and French consumer electronics advertisers had apparently come to opposite assessments regarding the importance of this World Cup for color television set sales may be explained by the fact that West Germany was not only the host nation but also one of the title favorites after winning the European Football Championship two years earlier,¹¹⁴⁰ while France on the other hand had not even managed to qualify.¹¹⁴¹ It follows that French advertisers evidently did not believe that the 1974 World Cup could be a strong driver of color television set sales in the country and instead focused their advertising for this product group on the traditionally strong pre-Christmas period. This divergence reveals that the industry would adjust its seasonal advertising rhythms if required by nation- and/or product group-specific market circumstances. In general, however, consumer electronics advertising in illustrated magazines varied in frequency mainly across the seasons each year and less so between years for structural reasons. Its visuals, on the other hand, underwent a substantial evolution over time in Germany and France alike.

3.4.2.2 The Visual Transformation of Consumer Electronics Advertisements

3.4.2.2.1 Taking up Space. The Evolution of Advertising Formats

Consumer electronics advertisements changed visibly during the long 1960s. In 1959, they were usually printed in black and white in *Paris Match* and *Stern* alike, the majority did not yet occupy a full page, and a noticeable share was still using drawings in supplementation or even instead of photographs. By 1974, color had become much more prevalent, ads occupied significantly larger spaces, and large-format photography dominated the visual design. Although this was a shared trend-direction in Germany and France, its development was asynchronous between *Stern* and *Paris Match* – and shaped by small, but impactful differences,

¹¹⁴⁰ N.N. (1972, June 11). Weltmeister auf Vorschuß. *Der Spiegel*, 25. Accessed December 29, 2025. www.spiegel.de/sport/weltmeister-auf-vorschuss-a-8e1cbd60-0002-0001-0000-000042928491. West Germany would then indeed go on to win the 1974 tournament.

¹¹⁴¹ For the qualified nations and the course of the tournament, see FIFA (undated). *1974 FIFA World Cup Germany*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.plus.fifa.com/en/showcase/1974-fifa-world-cup-germany-tm/1ecb4c7d-284a-47d7-8205-c3edf144d31c>.

which would have resulted in distinct consumer experiences. Both these points are particularly evident when considering advertising formats (see Figure 51).

Consumer electronics ads in *Paris Match* could either be in a small format, half-paged (horizontally or vertically), full-paged or two-paged. Seldom, ads would also occupy one-and-a-half, three, or four pages. The *Stern* offered the same formats, but many ads in the collected corpus also occupied two-thirds or three-quarters of a page, as well as 1,25 or 1,75 pages in certain cases. The magazine thus seems to have provided advertisers with a greater variety of choice in advertising formats compared to *Paris Match*. While it cannot be conclusively established that this divergence in possibilities influenced the precise trajectories of the transition to ever-larger-format consumer electronics advertising, the *Stern*'s transitory process between formats was in any case much more gradual compared to *Paris Match*.




Figure 51: Evolution of format sizes in consumer electronics advertising, *Stern* and *Paris Match*. Visualization by the author.

In 1959, full-page ads were not yet dominant in either magazine. Although there already was a slightly higher tendency to insert such ads in *Paris Match* (38 %) compared to the *Stern* (around 30 %), most ads were smaller. The main difference between the publications at the time stemmed from the absence of intermediary formats in *Paris Match*: ads of a half-page in size accounted for nearly half of *Paris Match*'s total and for less than 20 % in the *Stern*, as around a third of all ads occupied two thirds or three quarters of a page in the German magazine. Readers would thus have encountered full-sized and half-paged ads more often in the French magazine, as many advertisers opted for a format in-between in the *Stern*.

By 1962, a clearly visible divide had opened between both magazines. In *Paris Match*, one-page ads now accounted for around 71 % of all ads, with half-page ads making up nearly all the remaining total. In contrast, the share of one-page ads had barely increased for the *Stern*, and the proportion of half-page ads had only decreased slightly. The key change in the German magazine concerned the near-disappearance of small-format ads in favor of ads with a 0,66 or 0,75 size format, which increased their share to around half of the total. Consumer electronics ads had thus become larger on average between 1959 and 1962 in both magazines. The process had been much more pronounced for *Paris Match*, however, as French consumer electronics advertisers already embraced full-page ads by this point.

The one-page-format would go on to dominate the rest of the decade in *Paris Match*, making up between two thirds (1968) and three-quarters (1965, 1971) of the total. By 1974, it again dropped to 52,7 % percent, as nearly two in five consumer electronics in *Paris Match* now occupied two pages instead, up from an already respectable share of 11-16 % in previous years. While small and half-page formats did not disappear completely, French readers hence encountered full-page consumer electronics ads in a large majority of cases throughout the 1960s, with an even larger format also attaining a considerable share in the latter parts of the decade and then especially by the mid-1970s.

The *Stern*'s development was much more incremental in comparison. While the percentage of half-page ads remained largely consistent between 1959 and 1968, the 0,66 and 0,75 sized ads dominant in 1962 were superseded by full-page ads during the 1960s. By 1968, close to one in two ads was a full page in size. The format's share then reached 68,4 % in 1971 – a bit lower than it had been in *Paris Match* nearly a decade earlier. It was thus only by the late 1960s/early 1970s that the majority of consumer electronics ads seen by readers of the *Stern* occupied a full-page. At the same time, an increasing share of consumer electronics ads published in the *Stern* were larger than one page. Here, again, the implementation was gradual and lagged the French development.¹¹⁴²

Consumer electronics ads increasingly used large formats in German and French illustrated magazines alike. During the 1960s, it became the norm to advertise on a full page. The precise timing differed starkly between *Paris Match* and *Stern*, however, with the latter clearly trailing the former. Change between formats in the *Stern* was much more incremental compared to *Paris Match*, where a large majority of ads inserted by consumer electronics advertisers was already full-sized by 1962. Although the *Stern*'s greater variety of ad formats enabled

¹¹⁴² Ads of 1,25-1,75 pages in size accounted for 13,5 % and 3,8 % of the total in 1971 and 1974 respectively, while two-page ads raised their share from 5,8 % to 18 %.

advertisers to opt for uncommon layouts and to more precisely reach their desired ratio of format to insertion-frequency given their budget, the ads in *Paris Match* were larger on average (except for 1959). French ads may thus have made a grander impression on readers as they would have been more visually striking on average than their German equivalents. A similar transnational divergence can be discerned for the use of color.

3.4.2.2.2 Is the Attention Worth the Price? The Use of Color as a Strategic Choice

Consumer electronics advertisements in illustrated magazines became much more colorful during the long 1960s in Germany and France alike, as the ascendancy of black and white advertising was eroded between 1959 and 1974. Nonetheless, black and white ads remained a regular sight in both magazines even by the mid-1970s. Given this continuous coexistence, ads which mixed color and B/W were an important additional advertising possibility throughout the long 1960s in both magazines (see Figure 52).

Such hybrid ads could come in one of two forms: first, there were a few occurrences where one page of a multi-page ad was printed in color and the other(s) in B/W. The second option, however, was much more common. It entailed the combination of elements printed in black and white with others printed in a primary color within the same page. Mixing B/W and color elements in this fashion took place on a spectrum. While some ads incorporated accents in one of the primary colors into a predominantly black and white ad to highlight certain elements – such as a tagline or a layout-feature, for instance –, other ads were predominantly printed in one color but also included elements printed in black and white. Notably, any such accentuations were usually in red in *Paris Match*, while they could also be blue or yellow in the *Stern*. While the *Stern* seems to thus have again offered more possibilities for variation, it was *Paris Match* that saw the far more widespread adoption of color during the analyzed timeframe.




Figure 52: Evolution of color usage in consumer electronics advertising, *Stern* and *Paris Match*. Visualization by the author.

In 1959, more than four out of five consumer electronics ads in *Stern* and *Paris Match* were in black and white. Following advancements in (color) printing technology during the 1950s,¹¹⁴³ both magazines already offered the option to print ads in color. However, it was still a rather uncommon practice for advertisements inserted by the consumer electronics industry: Only 7,6 % of ads in *Paris Match* and 2,5 % of ads inserted by a manufacturing brand in the *Stern* in 1959 were fully colored. Hybrid ads accounted for the rest. A color ad – and even those that only used color accents – for a television set or tape recorder would have hence stood out from the competition. In the following 15 years, consumer electronics ads printed fully in color would then become an increasingly common sight both in the *Stern* and *Paris Match*, albeit to different extents and following divergent dynamics.

In the *Stern*, the share of color ads increased consistently from its low 1959 starting point. Nonetheless, the data suggests that the adoption of color in the *Stern* happened in phases. During the first half of the 1960s, the share of B/W ads decreased only very slightly. By 1965, 78 % of ads were still in B/W, as the share of color ads had mainly increased at the expense of hybrid ads up until this point, reaching 14 %. The consumer electronics ads published in the magazine had hence become more colorful, but the overall share of ads using color in any capacity had not increased by much.

¹¹⁴³ Kriegeskorte, M. (1992). *Werbung in Deutschland 1945-1965. Die Nachkriegszeit im Spiegel ihrer Anzeigen*. DuMont, p. 49; Schmidt & Spieß, 1996, p. 140.

It was only between 1965 and 1968 that the share of B/W ads in the *Stern* dropped meaningfully: by 1968, only one in two consumer electronics ads inserted in the magazine was in B/W, as the percentage of hybrid ads, which incorporated at least some color accentuations, had risen significantly. In a pattern reminiscent of the first half of the 1960s, fully colored ads would then subsequently again take over the hybrid ads' share, while the percentage of fully B/W ads remained relatively constant at least until the mid-1970s. The average consumer electronics ad in the *Stern* for much of the analyzed timeframe was hence in B/W, with considerable staying power well into the 1970s. By 1974, a small majority of ads (51,2 %) were printed fully in color.

Although B/W ads had been similarly prevalent in both magazines in 1959, the turn toward color in *Paris Match*'s consumer electronics advertising took place much earlier and was considerably more pronounced overall (albeit slightly less linear). Over the first half of the 1960s, the share of B/W ads dropped as low as 30 % (1965). While German readers at the time still encountered B/W ads in four out of five cases, French readers regularly saw hybrid ads (24,4 % in 1962, 31 % in 1965) – i.e. mostly black and white ads with prominent red accentuations – and increasingly also ads fully in color: by 1965, the latter already comprised a plurality (39 %) of the total. Their share would only increase from this point on, even though there were interruptions in the trend concerning the – otherwise declining – percentage of B/W ads in 1968 and 1974, the reasons for which are unclear.

Going off the example of *Paris Match*, consumer electronics advertising in illustrated French print magazines entered the color era during the latter part of the 1960s. By 1971, the trend of 1959 had been reversed; more than four out of five ads were in color, and even with the decline in 1974, they still accounted for nearly 70 % of all examined ads. This was in stark contrast to the *Stern*. During the 1960s, regular readers of *Paris Match* would have seen the use of color in an ad for a television set or record player develop from being an exception to being the rule. While B/W ads retained a base level of importance as a supplemental advertising format into the 1970s, hybrid ads became less common after the first half of the 1960s, as standing out with a red accentuation would have become harder in a magazine issue full of colored ads – and increasingly colored pages of editorial content.¹¹⁴⁴

Flicking through any issue of either magazine from the late 1950s and any other from the mid-1970s immediately makes it clear that the transition to color was not exclusive to the consumer electronics sector. Other industries of course increasingly embraced color during the long 1960s

¹¹⁴⁴ French magazines, for instance, increasingly printed the images and photographs of their editorial content in color from the late 1960s onward, d'Almeida & Delporte, 2010, p. 265.

as well. Each would have done so at their own pace, however, as strategic decisions to use color in advertising were also shaped by product characteristics according to a 1966 assessment by the *Philips International Advertising Council*, a body of senior advertising executives from various national *Philips* organizations and the corporate headquarters:

“As to the question of the use of colour in advertising, opinions differ. Logically, for textiles or food the use of colour is of much more importance than for most Philips products. In this respect, Philips Netherlands has the experience that the use of colour in advertising results in an increase of 50 % in terms of attention value. However, by means of increasing the frequency of black/white ads, comparatively more attention value was obtained. The Council feels that the available information acquired in this field so far is rather poor.”¹¹⁴⁵

By the mid-1960s, there thus seems to still have been a degree of uncertainty among advertisers whether the considerable color premium – on average, color ads were 60 % more expensive in Germany in 1967 –¹¹⁴⁶ was truly worth it for the types of products the consumer electronics industry commercialized, or if the money was not better spent on more frequent advertising instead. As a tentative follow-up report to the same council pointed out, full-color ads were indeed read more often and remembered better. However, it still needed to be decided on a case-by-case basis if this balanced out the hefty surcharge.¹¹⁴⁷

While color was more expensive no matter the magazine, the exact price premium varied between publications. In fact, the more pronounced turn toward color in *Paris Match* compared to the *Stern* may have been related to the magazines’ divergent pricing policies. In 1971, inserting a one-page color ad in *Paris Match* was 58 % more expensive than one printed in B/W.¹¹⁴⁸ In the *Stern*, however, the upcharge for color in 1971 was as high as 90 %.¹¹⁴⁹ While this would have certainly had an impact on the macro-level, and serves as a reminder to remain conscious of the influence of media-specific characteristics, it was not the only relevant factor governing each individual decision to advertise in color or not.

Consumer electronics advertisers clearly accounted for campaign objectives or product group-specific factors when it came to the decision to advertise in B/W or color in a particular case.

¹¹⁴⁵ Given this uncertainty, it was decided to conduct research on the question, Philips International Advertising Council (1966). *Report of the sixth meeting of the Philips International Advertising council held in Eindhoven on June 22nd/23rd, 1966*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council, p. 6.

¹¹⁴⁶ van Stiphout, H.A. (1968, January 12). Proposal for colour advertising research. Enclosure of G.A.D. (1968). The advertising function and the advertising policy within the Philips concern. Enclosure of Philips International Advertising Council (1968). *Report of the 8th meeting of the Philips International Advertising Council. Held in Eindhoven on Tuesday January 16, 1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA, 75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁸ In 1971, a full-page color ad in *Paris Match* cost 39.500 FF, while an equivalent B/W ad was priced at 25.000 FF, J. Walter Thompson Company (1971). *Media Information France. 1971*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Advertising Vertical File, 1950-1994. Box 51. ADV– International Europe – France. Hartman Center, p. 6.

¹¹⁴⁹ In 1971, advertisers would have needed to pay 56.787 DM for a one-page color ad in the *Stern* and 29.888 DM for a one-page B/W ad, J. Walter Thompson Company (1971). *Media Information West Germany. 1971*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Advertising Vertical File, 1950-1994. Box 51. ADV– International Europe – Germany. Hartman Center, p. 7.

This is especially evident when considering color television, which was introduced in Germany and France in 1967. While a radio or record player could usually be advertised just as well in B/W or color, only color advertising could ensure that the key advantage of the new color television sets was adequately conveyed in advertising. Indeed, a significantly above average 72,7 % and 87,2 % of all color television set ads inserted respectively in the *Stern* and in *Paris Match* in 1968, 1971, or 1974 were in color, suggesting that the introduction of color television may have accelerated the pre-existing tendency of the consumer electronics industry to increasingly advertise in color.

Although there was a shared trajectory toward more color in consumer electronics advertising in *Stern* and *Paris Match*, the latter's advertising was consistently more colorful in a year-by-year comparison; as was the case regarding size, the *Stern* similarly lagged *Paris Match* when it came to color. Despite the similar audience profiles of both illustrated magazines, there was no synchronous shift toward color across countries. This may at least in part have been related to their divergent color pricing premium, although it seems possible that there was also a cultural component to it. In any case, the *Stern*'s consumer electronics ads transitioned in a gradual, seemingly phase-based process throughout the long 1960s, which was by no means completed by the mid-1970s, while there was a seemingly haphazard albeit quicker turn toward color for *Paris Match*. For both magazines, this process involved consumer electronics ads which mixed B/W and color elements as a transitional phenomenon.

3.4.2.2.3 Presenting Products. Photography and the Relation of Text and Image

In both *Stern* and *Paris Match*, the rise of color in consumer electronics advertising was preceded by the introduction of photography. This development, too, must be seen in connection with a larger photographic turn in print advertising in Germany and France alike. According to Michael Kriegeskorte, photographs gradually displaced drawings in German advertisements from the 1950s onward, with this "replacement process" lasting well into the 1960s. During this transitional period, many ads also paired photos and drawn content.¹¹⁵⁰ For France, Hultquist states that "[...] it would not be until the middle of the 1960's when photographs outnumbered drawings in advertisements."¹¹⁵¹ While Kriegeskorte's assessment of a gradual transition that involved ads which paired both forms of visual design can be corroborated for the German consumer electronics industry, Hultquist's assertion does not equally hold true when considering French consumer electronics advertisements, however.

¹¹⁵⁰ Kriegeskorte, 1992, pp. 126–128. In the original German: "Verdrängungsprozess". This was a process that had already begun in the pre-war era. As early as 1927, a quarter of all ads that had any kind of illustration used a photograph, Reinhardt, 1993, pp. 222–223.

¹¹⁵¹ Hultquist, 1996, p. 302.

In 1959, consumer electronics ads which used both drawings and photographs were still commonplace in both magazines;¹¹⁵² they accounted for 31 % and 39 % of all sectoral ads in the *Stern* and *Paris Match* respectively. Fully drawn ads had already become the exception, with shares below 15 % in both magazines. Thus, by the late 1950s, already around one in two consumer electronics ads in *Paris Match* and about 55 % in the *Stern* solely made use of photography. Photographs would then become the dominant visual style in consumer electronics advertising in France and Germany alike during the 1960s. This, too, was not a completely synchronous process between countries.

By 1962, more than four out of five ads in *Paris Match* only used photographs, while the percentage of completely drawn ads had fallen below 3 %. Ads featuring photographic and drawn elements accounted for 13 %. From this point on, photography became ubiquitous in French consumer electronics ads, consistently accounting for between 88 % (1965) and 98,5 % (1971) of all ads. Drawn content, which had still been a very common sight in the late 1950s, became an exception – without ever disappearing completely during the analyzed timeframe.

In the *Stern*, photography would reach a similar dominance (> 90 %) only during the second half of the 1960s. While the percentage of ads in the *Stern* that used drawings or mixed techniques declined from 1959 onward, their combined share remained above a third of the total in 1962 and 1965. During the first half of the 1960s, it was thus much more likely for German readers to still encounter drawn content in consumer electronics advertisements. These figures for 1962 and 1965 are somewhat misleading, however, as they do not account for a qualitative transformation: a significant share of those ads used detailed technical illustrations, which strongly resembled photographs if regarded in passing, or placed drawings as a smaller, supplemental element beside a dominant photograph. In practice, readers of the *Stern*, too, mostly encountered ads where photography (or a drawing that closely resembled a photograph) dominated the visual profile already during the first half of the 1960s.

Consumer electronics advertisers in Germany and France alike embraced photography during the first half of the 1960s, with any remaining difference in transnational comparison definitely being leveled by the second half of the decade. This finding does not necessarily invalidate Hultquist's assessment that drawings generally remained more common than photographs in

¹¹⁵² While drawings and photographs could generally be distinguished with a high degree of confidence during the encoding-process, there were a few edge cases where it was not possible to determine with complete certainty whether a product depiction was a photograph or a highly detailed technical illustration in a realistic style. If no definitive verdict could be reached, they were encoded as using photographs, as this would have presumably been how they appeared to the audience at the time. It further needs to be noted that one small drawn element somewhere in an ad was not sufficient by itself to classify an ad as mixed. Rather, the ad's drawn content needed to have a modicum of visual prominence. Both required subjective assessments on a case-by-case basis during the encoding process. The percentages given in this section are thus to be understood as reference values.

French advertisements until the mid-1960s,¹¹⁵³ as the transition may have been slower in other sectors. The comparatively quick adoption of photography in the consumer electronics sector was probably related to its advantage of making advertisements more precise and “true-to-life” in their product depiction than drawings,¹¹⁵⁴ as the design and dimensions of a consumer electronics device could be an integral part of its selling proposition – much more so than in the case of toothpaste or detergent, for instance. Many consumer electronics devices doubled as items of furniture and thus needed to aesthetically integrate into the home environment,¹¹⁵⁵ while others sought to impress through their compact design and portability.¹¹⁵⁶ Such qualities were best conveyed through expressive photography, as explained in a 1973 presentation on the characteristics of *Braun*’s advertising, a producer of consumer electronics and other durable consumer goods famed for its design,¹¹⁵⁷ by its head of communications:

“We offer highly qualified technical goods whose appeal lies very much in their refined appearance. Photography is the one reasonable means to display such products. It would be against the demand for credibility, honesty, intelligent information to show such products in drawings.”¹¹⁵⁸

It seems likely that such rationales were also part of the reason why nearly half of all analyzed advertisements featured no characters at all and instead focused only on the product(s). While a noticeable share of consumer electronics advertisements depicted a device in the hands of a young woman¹¹⁵⁹ or happy couple, German and French consumer electronics advertisers even

¹¹⁵³ Hultquist, 1996, p. 302.

¹¹⁵⁴ Kriegeskorte, 1992, pp. 126–128. In the original German: “lebensnah”.

¹¹⁵⁵ This connection is discussed extensively for television sets by Miggelbrink, 2018. Companies of course also used this dual role as an argument in their advertising, see for instance *Grundig* (1968, May 12). Advertisement. Tagline: Die Geschichte eines Radios... *Stern*, 19, 205. While the question of aesthetic integration was particularly pertinent for stationary devices such as television sets or stereos, it could also apply to other consumer electronics devices. During the development of *Telefunken*’s portable record changer *TW 517*, for instance, it was stipulated that the device’s design should not only convey portability but also harmonize with the décor of a teenager’s room, Oerding & Seydlitz to mailing list (1962, November 27). *Marketingempfehlung für den automatischen Plattenwechsler “TW 517”*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975, pp. 3–4. The *TW 517* is discussed more extensively in the chapters 3.1.1.2 & 3.1.1.3.

¹¹⁵⁶ See for instance Saba (1965, March 21). Advertisement. Tagline: Handgepäck der guten Laune. *Stern*, 12, 183; Philips (1965, November 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Avez-vous un “Ministor” dans votre poche? *Paris Match*, 867, 114–115.

¹¹⁵⁷ On *Braun*, see chapter 2.1.2.2.

¹¹⁵⁸ Schmitt, W. (1973). *Braun specifics in advertising. A summary of the G-K sound slide show 3rd International Meeting, Munich 1973*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968–1989. Box 4. Clients 1973–1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2). Hartman Center, non-paginated.

¹¹⁵⁹ The many different roles occupied by women in 1960s advertising for technological devices are discussed by Weber, H. (2006). Von “Lichtgöttinnen” und “Cyborgfrauen”: Frauen als Techniknutzerinnen in Vision und Werbung. In M. Heßler (Ed.), *Konstruierte Sichtbarkeiten. Wissenschafts- und Technikbilder seit der Frühen Neuzeit* (pp. 317–346). Fink. On gender stereotypes in ads for radios, see Weber, H. (2007). Vom Ausflugs- zum Alltagsbegleiter: Tragbare Radios und mobiles Radiohören 1950–1970. In J. Röser (Ed.), *MedienAlltag. Domestizierungsprozesse alter und neuer Medien* (pp. 129–138). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 135. On gender stereotypes in cassette recorder advertisements, see Fruth, 2018, pp. 189–190. On gender and technology in advertising, see further Dalibert, M., & De Iulio, S. (2015). The Representational Intertwinement of Gender, Age and Uses of Information and Communication Technology: A Comparison Between German and French Preteen Magazines. In V. Schafer & B. G. Thierry (Eds.), *Connecting Women. Women, Gender and ICT in Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (pp. 89–100). Springer; Tympas, A., Konsta, H., Lekkas, T., & Karas, S.

more frequently decided to focus an ad's visuals exclusively on a device's design or opt for a "technical-factual"¹¹⁶⁰ style. The dual nature of consumer electronics as both technical and design-oriented durable consumer goods notably also influenced the ratio of textual to visual elements of magazine advertisements.

Generally, many consumer electronics ads followed what Kriegeskorte has termed "the 1960s formula": the magazine ads published at the time – no matter the advertised product – often centered on a photograph which occupied the upper three parts of a page, which was then paired with small-typed text placed below against a white background, and often also a secondary product image that was usually situated in the bottom-right corner.¹¹⁶¹ Although visual elements dominated most consumer electronics ads published during the analyzed timeframe in both magazines, ads with a more balanced text-to-image ratio or even a text-heavy layout were nonetheless a recurring sight (see Figures 53 & 54).

Der Weg zum naturgetreuen Farbfernseh-Bild ist noch weit. Mit der TRINITRON-Bildröhre hat SONY ihn um ein gutes Stück verkürzt.

Das menschliche Auge ist eines der kompliziertesten optischen Systeme. Und es ist unbestechlich: Niemand ist heute in der Lage, dem Auge den Unterschied zwischen einem Farbfernseh-Bild und der natürlichen Vorlage zu verheimlichen. Aber: Man kann sich bemühen, durch intensive und aufwändige Forschung diese Differenz immer geringer werden zu lassen. Wichtig dabei ist, daß – nach dem heutigen Stand der Technik – diese Verbesserung nur in der Bildröhre stattfinden kann. Das Ergebnis dieser Erkenntnis und der SONY-Forschung ist die TRINITRON-Bildröhre. Sie erreicht eine Übereinstimmung zwischen Natur und Farbfernseh-Bild, die von keiner anderen Bildröhre übertroffen wird. Das liegt an ihrem Arbeits-Prinzip. Der Unterschied: Andere Bildröhren arbeiten mit drei elektronischen Kanonen – für jede Farbe eine. Die TRINITRON-Röhre hat eine elektronische Kanone – für alle drei Farben zusammen.

Der Vorteil: Die TRINITRON-Röhre kann mit einer großen elektronischen Linse arbeiten, wo die

gewöhnlichen Röhren drei kleine brauchen. Dadurch werden die Elektronen-Strahlen zur Erzeugung des Farbbildes exakter gebündelt. Resultat: ein ungewöhnlich scharfes und brillantes Bild. Dazu kommt eine zweite SONY-Entwicklung:

Das verringert die Strombelastung und erhöht so die Lebensdauer der Röhre.

Nun glauben wir aber nicht, daß auch die farbigste Schilderung unserer Geräte Sie dazu veranlassen kann, sofort einen SONY-Farbfernseher zu kaufen. Daher unsere Bitte: Suchen Sie Ihren Fachhändler auf – er zeigt Ihnen gern, wie klein heute die Differenz zwischen Natur und Farbfernseh-Bild durch SONY geworden ist.

PAL und TRINITRON: Deutschland besitzt mit PAL das beste Farbfernseh-Übertragungs-System der Welt. Ein System, das seine Qualität auf dem Weg vom Sender bis zum Empfänger im Farbfernseh-Gerät beweist. Dieser Weg ist bei allen Farbfernseh-Geräten gleich. Die endgültige Qualität des Bildes aber entscheidet sich auf dem Weg zwischen Empfangsteil und Bildschirm: in der Bildröhre. Dieser Weg führt nur bei SONY durch eine TRINITRON-Bildröhre.

die Streifenmaske. Sie hat gegenüber der üblichen Lochmaske eine um 30% gesteigerte Lichtdurchlässigkeit. Das bewirkt eine ungewöhnliche Leuchtkraft der Farben. Durch dieses Plus an Licht ist es möglich, die SONY Farbfernseher mit verminderter Helligkeits-Abgabe zu betreiben.

SONY KV-1210E: Bildröhrendiagonale 32 cm. Gehäuse weiß. Maße: 47,5 x 32,3 x 40,3 cm (H/B/T).

Der KV-1210E hat als erstes Farbfernsehgerät eine 48 cm Bildröhre mit 114° Ablenkung. Ergebnis: noch einfacher in Regel-Systemen zu integrieren. Gehäuse weiß oder schwarz. Maße: 51,7 x 40,2 x 36,1 cm (H/B/T).

SONY
Vorgewendet für die multimediale Zukunft.
SONY GmbH & Co. KG, München-Grugge-Str. 75/77

Figure 53: Sony (1974, April 4). Advertisement. Tagline: Der Weg zum naturgetreuen Farbfernseh-Bild ist noch weit. *Stern*, 15, 35.

Es liegt uns mehr, großartige Farbfernsehgeräte zu machen, als großartige Worte darüber. Zum Beispiel: Farbfernsehgerät Wega color 3022.

WEGA

Mit einer Bildröhre, Bestrahlungsanode, Ultrahoch-Farbintensitätssystemen durch WEGA-TFT-Filter.

Figure 54: Wega (1974, May 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Es liegt uns mehr, großartige Farbfernsehgeräte zu machen, als großartige Worte darüber. *Stern*, 23, 83.

(2010). Constructing Gender and Technology in Advertising Images. Feminine and Masculine Computer Parts. In T. J. Misa (Ed.), *Gender Codes. Why Women Are Leaving Computing* (pp. 187–209). John Wiley & Sons.

¹¹⁶⁰ This is how *Telefunken*'s advertisers described the ideal look of their advertisements in 1967, Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1967, June 23). Letter. Subject: *Linie der Werbung 1966*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. In the original German: "technisch-sachlich". In her analysis of French television set advertisements, Isabelle Gaillard has similarly noted that these ads often "placed the object in the center" ("L'objet est souvent place au centre."), frequently choosing a product-oriented, technical approach, Gaillard, 2012a, pp. 88–89.

¹¹⁶¹ Kriegeskorte, 1992, p. 135.

Advertisers working in the sector evidently seem to have felt a need for more thorough explanations in certain cases, which made sense given the technical, sometimes rather complex nature of consumer electronics devices – even more so when also considering that consumer electronics purchases were usually high-involvement. As a result, consumer electronics advertising spanned a spectrum of approaches: ads that conveyed their product pitch chiefly through visuals, for instance, in those cases where a product had an extraordinary design, coexisted with more technical, text-driven argumentative approaches. Consumer electronics advertisers would employ either strategy even within the same product group depending on their respective advertising goal and market positioning. According to Röther, this could also be a question of familiarity. She posits that consumer electronics ads gave less weight to technical explanations and more strongly emphasized a device’s “experiential dimension” as consumers became more acquainted with a new technology or consumer electronics product group.¹¹⁶²

3.5 Part Conclusion: Diverse Approaches, Recurring Patterns

The case studies on media devices, product groups, and target groups introduced in this part are testimony of the variety of methods, means, and channels used in consumer electronics advertising and marketing. Yet, a rather coherent picture emerges when considering all pieces of the puzzle. Consumer electronics companies employed a wide range of advertising and sales means overall, sometimes even deviating completely from regular distribution networks and advertising channels. The precise composition of measures taken in a specific case depended on the device or product group that was to be marketed and/or the target audience. In developing tailored solutions, companies took the market environment, the media landscape, socio-demographic factors, and a device’s technical conception into account. Naturally, these considerations resulted in strongly varying outcomes; while one record player was deemed a mass-market device necessitating an extensive marketing campaign, another was advertised only to a niche audience without ever appearing in mass media advertisements. In a similar sense, the same device could be framed quite differently depending on the target group.

No matter the precise budget and scale of a campaign, consumer electronics companies did not devise measures in isolation. Rather, they were precisely timed and coordinated: the insertion of advertisements in a print media publication was not only aligned with other print insertions in design, approach, and timing but also with corresponding cinema advertising, television spots, or radio commercials. Besides these consumer-facing mass media advertising measures,

¹¹⁶² Röther, 2012, p. 42. In the original German: “Erlebnisdimension”.

consumer electronics companies made efforts to inform retail partners through letters, trade publication advertisements, or in-person demonstrations. They provided sales aids, window displays, and brochures to advertise and facilitate sales conversations at the point of sale and potentially reached out to the press. Even though campaigns followed a coherent overarching strategy, companies retained a degree of flexibility concerning adjustments to the overall theme and approach whenever it made sense for a certain format.

Despite the case studies' variety, it is notable that the campaign- and product-specific sources consistently adopt a predominantly or even exclusively national perspective. Even in multinational companies, the practical implementation of marketing and advertising campaigns was usually the domain of national actors.¹¹⁶³ Transnational perspectives were not completely absent: marketers considered export markets when deciding on product names during product development processes, and ideas for campaigns and measures were sometimes shared with colleagues abroad. But overall, consumer electronics marketing and advertising campaigns were designed taking nation-specific factors such as market position, technological barriers, or peculiarities of the media landscape into account. Company actors individually tuned the argumentation, positioning, and imagery to a device, product group, or target group, selecting advertising channels and adjusting the messaging between media formats under consideration of socio-economic and cultural contexts. Even in cases where the product positioning or argumentative approach was transnationally usable (which was not always the case), campaigns were generally national – and in some cases local – in nature.

Nevertheless, it is possible to identify common characteristics shaping most consumer electronics advertising across brands, on a transnational scale, and throughout the long 1960s: first, concerning the structure and logic behind many campaigns, and second, with regards to product positioning and visual language. Consumer electronics devices were generally mass-produced, technical and design-oriented branded durable consumer goods. This translated into shared advertising characteristics on a structural level: given their broad appeal, consumer electronics were usually advertised through mass media, which mediated the brand-consumer-relationship. Although campaigns could make use of the whole media ensemble depending on goals and budget, magazine advertising was particularly important to reach wider publics in France and Germany alike. This advertising format offered the possibility to show a device's design but also provide necessary technical explanations. Not every advertising channel was well-suited for consumer electronics; stadiums or boxing rings were more appropriate for

¹¹⁶³ As has also been shown from an organizational perspective throughout the first part.

frequently purchased goods and less for the high-involvement, occasional purchase of a consumer electronics device.

Given this high involvement, media advertising was not sufficient by itself to induce a purchase; consumer manufacturers generally needed to simultaneously rely on their retail partners as the last and crucial link in the sales process. Retailers demonstrated devices and gave purchasing advice. Manufacturers thus needed to convince them of a brand and its product, and to maintain cordial relations. It follows that consumer electronics advertisers not only coordinated mass media advertising with measures at the points of sale aimed at consumers but also advertised to retailers and sought to entice them with incentives and subsidies. Retailers would have simultaneously conducted consumer-facing advertising for their own business; for them, advertising also meant convincing consumers that their shop was the right place to buy consumer electronics. Consumer electronics advertisers working for manufacturers had to keep a different long-term goal in mind. Their advertising campaigns for retailers and consumers did not solely pertain to a device, product group, or target group, but rather also impacted a brand's overall image. This identity was shaped by the aggregate of all previous advertising and sales measures and, in some cases, also by flanking institutional advertising campaigns.

Due to the shared characteristics of consumer electronics as a particular subclass of durable consumer goods, advertising campaign compositions could be comparable between brands and products – and potentially even on a transnational scale. In a quantitative perspective, this also applied to the industry's advertising pattern, which followed the seasons in Germany and France alike, differing in detail rather than nature. Notably, a similar conclusion may be drawn concerning advertising imagery, positioning, and argumentation. Different consumer electronics devices could be positioned identically or be advertised using the same fundamental argumentative patterns, as they usually shared considerable parts of their argumentative toolbox with other devices. As consumer electronics advertisers needed to stay within the confines predetermined by the possibilities of each product group and the features and characteristics of a particular device, advertisements for consumer electronics frequently drew on the same imaginaries and arguments on national and transnational scales between devices and sometimes even across product groups and/or time. German and French consumers were not exposed to the same advertising, but the consumer electronics advertising and sales measures they encountered often followed the same logic across borders.

Although many of the structural characteristics outlined above were stable throughout the long 1960s, it is important to acknowledge changes over time. Consumer electronics manufacturers came to prioritize new consumer electronics devices during the analyzed timeframe, as

technology progressed and product groups such as the B/W television set underwent domestication processes which modified their societal role. At the same time, the advertising itself also underwent a radical visual transformation: ads in illustrated German and French print magazines progressively occupied ever-larger spaces, used photographs instead of drawings, and were increasingly printed fully in color.

While none of these visual trends was exclusive to the consumer electronics industry, the pace of the transitions to photography and color were seemingly influenced by the characteristics of the products the sector commercialized. At the same time, the visuals of consumer electronics advertisements in *Paris Match* and *Stern* may have also been shaped by country-specific cultural or market factors: the ads in *Paris Match* were on average of a larger format as well as more colorful in transnational comparison on a year-by-year basis, which may reflect broader cultural tendencies in advertising aesthetics. As Martin has pointed out, “France [...] remains the country of advertising posters, which also means, as we have seen, a country where advertising expression has certain links with artistic expression.”¹¹⁶⁴ German consumer electronics advertisers seem to have favored insertion frequency and design variation instead, with *Telefunken*’s advertisers for example believing that “frequency takes precedence over format”.¹¹⁶⁵

Sector characteristics and cultural/market-specific factors were thus the two primary forces shaping the visual identity of consumer electronics advertisements in German and French illustrated print magazines. A third, complementary factor was the range of advertising options and the pricing schemes offered by each magazine, which both influenced advertising presentation. Together, these three dimensions shaped the French and German reader experiences in distinct ways. If a consumer browsed through an issue each of *Paris Match* and *Stern* in the same calendar year, he or she would have probably found the consumer electronics ads to be more eye-catching in the French magazine. But readers of the *Stern* saw a greater number of ads overall, with more variation in format, hybrid color usage, and designs within overarching advertising campaign structures. Despite these contrasts, the overarching visual trends remained comparable between both magazines due to the shared traits of the products being advertised.

Due to the apparent impact of product traits on advertising visuals, it would be a potentially interesting avenue of future research to systematically study such connections in quantitative,

¹¹⁶⁴ Martin, 2012, p. 93. In the original French: “La France reste donc le pays de l’affiche, ce qui signifie aussi, nous l’avons vu, un pays où l’expression publicitaire a certains liens avec l’expression artistique.”

¹¹⁶⁵ For this reason, *Telefunken* chose to primarily advertise through half-page B/W ads in Germany in 1967, von Dellingshausen & Mätze (1966, November 29). *Ergebnisprotokoll der Werbebesprechung am 23.11.1966 in Berlin*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949, p. 3. In the original German: “Frequenz geht vor Format”.

cross-sectoral comparison. And given the industry's tendency to tailor advertising to target groups and media formats, it is further plausible that the magazines' audience compositions also played a role in shaping macro-level trends in consumer electronics advertising. The qualitative findings of this part suggest that youth magazines, women's magazines and illustrated magazines, for instance, would have each featured different product groups more prominently. However, this could not be explored quantitatively. It further remains uncertain to what extent advertising visuals – i.e. depicted characters, color, format, etc. – were affected by a medium's target audience. It may thus be potentially worthwhile to investigate such questions not only in transnational but also cross-mediatic quantitative comparison. This would contribute to a better understanding of how the socio-demographic characteristics of a media publication's audience – such as its gender or age distribution – co-shaped the quantitative patterns of an industry's advertising across media.

No marketing campaign or product positioning was exactly alike due to device specificities, brand characteristics, budget considerations, sales channels, national media landscapes, media-specific traits, and socio-cultural factors. The production contexts were decidedly not transnational in that regard. Western European consumers were accordingly exposed to locally and nationally different campaigns concerning the precise timing, presentation, measures, and media channels, and would have encountered deviating consumer electronics advertising depending on what target audiences they belonged to. But for all this diversity, recurring patterns emerged on multiple levels. Devices were often advertised using similar prospective user de-signs across brands and countries, the industry generally followed a transnationally shared seasonal advertising rhythm, and most campaigns revolved around the same core elements regardless of their precise composition, extent, and timing. There was no widespread intentional convergence on a company level between the German and French consumer electronics markets with regards to campaigns. But due to the shared structural characteristics, advertising nonetheless mediated production and consumption in unintentionally convergent ways between these Western European consumer electronics markets.

4 Local and Transnational. Media, Advertising, and Consumer Electronics in Luxembourg

Even though the characteristics inherent to most consumer electronics advertising outlined in the previous parts still applied, consumer electronics advertising in Luxembourg did not function the same way as it did in France or Germany. The Grand Duchy broadly mirrored Western European trends in consumer electronics ownership during the long 1960s, and many of the consumer electronics devices and brands available on the Luxembourgish market were identical to those found in Germany or Belgium. However, the unique media consumption patterns of Luxembourg's inhabitants, together with the structural conditions of its media landscape and consumer electronics market, fundamentally set it apart from its larger neighbors. These differences resulted in a distinctly Luxembourgish experience with consumer electronics advertising.

This part argues that Luxembourgers encountered consumer electronics advertising through two distinct channels. First, due to the country's geographical position and multilingualism, they engaged with domestic and foreign media content in three languages. This exposed them to print, radio, and television advertising not primarily intended for them and hence not always tailored to their context. Second, they were deliberately targeted by Luxembourgish consumer electronics advertising efforts, which differed from that of neighboring countries due to the specific structure of Luxembourg's media landscape and the configuration of its consumer electronics market. These local conditions influenced the form and content of advertising aimed at Luxembourgish consumers.

By analyzing these two dimensions in conjunction, the part shows how transnational media flows and local market structures co-determined the advertising of consumer electronics and the ways in which Luxembourgers engaged with it during the long 1960s. Given that media, advertising, and the consumer electronics market are all aspects of Luxembourg's history in the second half of the 20th century that have remained largely or completely unexplored,¹¹⁶⁶ this part discusses these topics in depth before turning to consumer electronics advertising in the narrower sense. It is structured in five chapters.

The first chapter explores Luxembourg's media history between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s from two angles. The ownership rates of consumer electronics devices are traced insofar possible for the Grand Duchy, to give an idea of what the media ensemble at the disposal of Luxembourgish households would have looked like during that time. Then, the media offer in

¹¹⁶⁶ This is also discussed in the introduction, see chapter 1.2.2.

Luxembourg and the media consumption patterns of the country's inhabitants are traced across the mass media forms press, radio, and television, which reveals a unique mixture of localized and transnational content reception. The second chapter then examines advertising in Luxembourg during the long 1960s. The extent to which Luxembourgers would have come in contact with foreign advertising is explored, as are the advertising possibilities in Luxembourg itself. These first two chapters hence provide an overview of media and advertising in Luxembourg previously missing from the literature.

In a third step, the Luxembourgish consumer electronics market is discussed. It is detailed where goods would have been imported from, what brands were present on the market, and what roles retailers and importers played. The chapter also delves into the question of where Luxembourgers would have shopped for consumer electronics and briefly describes how after-sales service would have functioned. The fourth chapter is devoted to consumer electronics advertising. Print advertising in the country's leading illustrated magazine is analyzed regarding advertising forms, brands, and language. It is asked what influence the particularities of Luxembourg's media landscape exerted on these print advertisements. Television spots for consumer electronics and other advertising possibilities are discussed as well insofar the sources allow for it.

The last chapter explores the interrelationship between advertising for consumer electronics, media technology, and reception patterns based on a concrete example, presenting a case study focused on the network technology of television. It analyzes the reasons for the unusual timing of the introduction of color television in the Grand Duchy and why the country built several communal antenna cable television networks. It then details the general process of commercializing and advertising color television sets in the country. Lastly, it discusses how the country's unique reception circumstances – coexisting color television standards and communal antenna cable television networks – contributed to shaping some of the Luxembourgish advertising for this group of media devices.

Given the range of covered topics, and the absence of comprehensive secondary literature for most of the discussed aspects, this part makes use of a wide range of primary sources, including numerous press articles, reports compiled by the Luxembourgish statistical office, foreign-produced market research studies, the Grand Duchy's laws, internal sources from consumer electronics companies, printed and audiovisual advertisements, the advertising guides for Belgium and Luxembourg and the country's directories of trade, industry, and commerce. Despite this broad source basis, certain topics could not be treated in depth due to a scarcity of data, such as the country's consumer electronics trade patterns or the phono product equipment

rates of the Grand Duchy's households. These limitations will be discussed throughout the part whenever appropriate.

4.1 Multilingual and Transnational: Media Consumption in Luxembourg

4.1.1 The Media Ensemble at the Disposal of Luxembourgish Households

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is very small compared to its neighbors: its territory spans 2.586 square kilometers, and in 1947, the country only had 290.992 inhabitants. The population would grow in the following decades, reaching 339.841 by 1970.¹¹⁶⁷ As was the case for other Western European states, Luxembourg experienced a period of significant economic growth from the 1950s until the steel crisis in the mid-1970s, becoming wealthy in the process.¹¹⁶⁸ By 1969, the Luxembourgish median household income was 62 USD per week, slightly higher than Germany's 55 USD and significantly more than France's 44 USD.¹¹⁶⁹ This economic prosperity was concomitant with a shift in lifestyle; from the late 1950s onward, Luxembourgish society embraced mass consumption.¹¹⁷⁰ Economic growth translated into rising living standards for the country's inhabitants and the equipment rates of durable consumer goods rose across the Grand Duchy's households.¹¹⁷¹

Historical research about consumer electronics in Luxembourg is constrained by a scarcity of sources, which limits the extent to which cultural practices or device ownership rates can be traced. Unlike in Germany or France, where a greater availability of surveys and statistics allows for granular analysis, it is impossible to provide insights into the Luxembourg media ensemble during the long 1960s in terms of year-by-year developments, segmentations according to socio-economic factors, or internal differentiations within a product group.¹¹⁷² The

¹¹⁶⁷ STATEC (1990). *Statistiques Historiques 1839-1989*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://statistiques.public.lu/en/publications/series/statistiques-historiques/2014/statistiques-historiques.html>, pp. 1, 22.

¹¹⁶⁸ Throughout this timeframe, the country's economy remained largely dependent on its domestic steel industry, Wey, 1999, pp. 63–64. On the importance of the steel industry for the country's economy in the post-war period, see also Trausch, 2017, p. 230. It was only from the 1970s onward that Luxembourg would diversify its economy by facilitating the development of an international banking sector in the country through favorable legislation and tax incentives, Begasse, 1994, p. 39.

¹¹⁶⁹ Sélection du Reader's Digest (1970). *Radioscopie de l'Europe. 325 millions d'Européens, une enquête conçue et réalisée sous le patronage de Sélection du Reader's Digest*, pp. 54–55.

¹¹⁷⁰ Wey, 1999, p. 69. Thewes also situates the advent of mass consumption in Luxembourg in the 1950s, Thewes, G. (1999). L'avènement de la société de consommation dans le pays le plus riche d'Europe. Les années 50. *Forum*, 194, 32–36.

¹¹⁷¹ Wey, 1988, p. 15.

¹¹⁷² For France, see Secrétariat d'État à la Culture, Service des Études et de la Recherche, 1975. For Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt (1970). *Ausstattung privater Haushalte mit ausgewählten langlebigen Gebrauchsgütern 1969* (Fachserie M, Preise Löhne Wirtschaftsrechnungen. Reihe 18, Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben). Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.statistischebibliothek.de/mir/receive/DEHeft_mods_00127993.

most complete dataset comes from household declarations of television and radio set ownership to the Luxembourg postal service (see Figure 55). The dataset ends in 1972 as it ceased to be a legal requirement to register devices with the post. The national statistics institute *STATEC* had relied on these figures for its annual reports without collecting more granular data on its own, which differentiated by household size or income, for instance. As a result, *STATEC* did not update its data on radio and television set adoption rates for the rest of the decade: in the 1980 annual report, the most recent figures still dated from 1972.¹¹⁷³




Figure 55: Relation of the number of households to the number of radios & television sets in Luxembourg 1956-1972. Visualization by the author. For radio and television set declaration figures, see STATEC, 1973, p. 432. For households 1956-

¹¹⁷³ Because the state abolished the license fees its postal service collected for both devices, the requirement to register them was scrapped as well, STATEC (1980). *Annuaire statistique du Luxembourg 1980*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/cfmgh9n5g7/>, pp. 269, 299. See also *Loi du 23 décembre 1972 portant abrogation des articles 1 à 11 de la loi du 22 février 1963 déterminant la redevance sur les appareils récepteurs de radiodiffusion sonore et de télévision ainsi que la protection des réceptions radio-électriques contre les perturbations parasites*. A 80 Mémorial 2115 (1972, December 23). Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/1972/12/23/n2/jo>. It became a legal obligation to register radios with the Luxembourgish post and pay a license fee from the 1st of January 1939 onward, see *Arrêté grand-ducal du 23 décembre 1938 fixant les conditions de perception de la taxe sur les appareils récepteurs radio-électriques à lampes*. A 90 Mémorial 1357-1362 (1938, December 28). Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/agd/1938/12/23/n5/jo>.

1964, see STATEC, 1965, p. 50. For households 1965-1971, see STATEC, 1972, p. 37. For households 1972, see STATEC, 1973, p. 2. All data has the 31st of December of the respective year as the reference date. The number of households was estimated by STATEC, except for 1960 and 1966, when a census was held.

Only broad trends can be extrapolated from this data: In 1956, 83.241 radios were registered across an estimated 92.435 households, meaning nearly nine out of ten households owned a device. By 1960, the number of radios in the country surpassed the number of households, and by 1972, an estimated 112.500 households possessed 175.546 radio sets – an average of 1.5 radios per household,¹¹⁷⁴ or one for every second Luxembourgish inhabitant.¹¹⁷⁵ This corresponds to the results of a representative survey from 1972, which found that 97,7 % of Luxembourgish households owned a radio, with 60,5 % owning two or more.¹¹⁷⁶ The radio had thus already been a mass consumer good in the 1950s when it came to household ownership. It would then increasingly become an individually owned device during the 1960s.

Television followed a different trajectory. Like elsewhere in Europe, there had been virtually no television sets in the Grand Duchy in the mid-1950s. According to a newspaper report, there had been 33 television sets in the whole country in 1954.¹¹⁷⁷ By 1961, 10.236 sets were registered in the country, putting the household adoption rate at around 10 %. The new medium rapidly found its way into an ever-increasing number of Luxembourgish living rooms. On the 31st of December 1966, 37.643 television sets were registered with the post – meaning more than a third of all households possessed one. And by 1972, 84.901 devices were registered across an estimated 112.500 Luxembourgish households.¹¹⁷⁸ Television would thus develop into a commonly owned mass consumer good during the 1960s. According to a 1972 survey, 83,9 % of Luxembourgish households had at least one TV set, although multi-device ownership remained rare.¹¹⁷⁹

¹¹⁷⁴ For radio and television set declaration figures, see STATEC (1973). *Annuaire Statistique Retrospectif du Luxembourg*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/7q8zgh2kqk>, p. 432. For households 1956-1964, see STATEC (1965). *Annuaire Statistique 1965*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/ts03vdcrms/>, p. 50. For households 1965-1971, see STATEC (1972). *Annuaire Statistique 1972*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/fb64nbjz4h/>, p. 37. For households 1972, see STATEC, 1973, p. 2. All data has the 31.12 of the respective year as the reference date. The number of households was estimated by STATEC, except for 1960 and 1966, when a census was held.

¹¹⁷⁵ STATEC, 1980, p. 299.

¹¹⁷⁶ Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft (1972). *Hörer und Seher beiderseits der Grenze. Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativerhebung im Saarland, in Rheinland-Pfalz, in Luxemburg und Ostfrankreich. Band I: Bericht*, p. 13.

¹¹⁷⁷ N.N. (1959, September 3). 92 000 Rundfunkgeräte im Großherzogtum. *Luxemburger Wort*, 4.

¹¹⁷⁸ For radio and television set declaration figures, STATEC, 1973, p. 432. For households 1956-1964, STATEC, 1965, p. 50. For households 1965-1971, STATEC, 1972, p. 37. For households 1972, STATEC, 1973, p. 2.

¹¹⁷⁹ Out of those 83,9 %, only 3,4 % owned two or more television sets, Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, p. 17.

It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this dataset. The reported figures likely lagged actual ownership rates as not everyone (immediately) registered their device,¹¹⁸⁰ and the dataset did not differentiate between device types (transistor radios, radiograms, stereos; B/W and color television sets) or by socio-economic factors. Most notably, however, it excluded phono products. Contemporary studies by public and private institutions thus usually referred to another dataset instead (see Table 3),¹¹⁸¹ which was originally compiled by *Sélection du Reader's Digest*¹¹⁸² and provided figures for Luxembourg and other European countries, enabling comparisons.

Table 3: Share of Western European households owning selected consumer electronics devices, 1963/1969.

Percentage of households owning a	Television set (incl. color TVs for 1969)		Radio (without portable devices)	Transistor radio		Record player (stereo or mono)		Tape recorder (incl. cassette recorders)	
	1963	1969		1963	1969	1963	1969	1963	1969
Germany	41	82	90	12	46	29	47	8	23
France	27	69	72	30	72	30	40	2	9
Luxembourg	21	64	92	23	56	25	41	6	15

As is evident from this data, Luxembourg's consumer electronics household equipment rates were not completely aligned with either France or Germany. It is thus not just the small scale concerning the overall number of devices sold in each product group – tens of thousands instead of millions – that made the Luxembourgish market particular. Rather, the country's adoption processes also seem to have been unique. By 1969, for instance, the overall Luxembourgish household adoption rate of record players was similar to France's while the ownership rate of stereo record players in particular was closer to Germany's: 15 % of Luxembourgish households owned a stereo record player in 1969, compared to 19 % for Germany and 7 % for France.¹¹⁸³ Concerning tape recorders and transistor radios,¹¹⁸⁴ the Luxembourgish equipment

¹¹⁸⁰ N.N. (1971, January 16). Kino und Konzert zuhause. *Revue*, 3, 27–35, p. 27. See also Jaans, J. (1957, March 22). Zwischenbilanz des Fernsehens. TELE LUXEMBOURG – heute und morgen. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 12, 3.

¹¹⁸¹ The dataset – or parts of it – was, for instance, cited in a report of the Committee of extracurricular education and cultural development of the Council of Europe, in a study by a German market research institute conducted for the European Commission, and by the studies and research department of the French ministry of cultural affairs, Conseil de l'Europe, comité de l'éducation extrascolaire et du développement culturel (1972). *Techniques nouvelles pour la communication et la culture*. Straßbourg. INAthèque, ID 4915, pp. C–G; IFO Institute Munich, 1970, p. 37; Service des études et recherches du ministère des affaires culturelles, 1971. *Reader's Digest* is not explicitly cited as the original source by the studies and research department, but the individual datapoints and the dataset's structure match with the other two sources which do reference it.

¹¹⁸² Sélection du Reader's Digest (1964). 221.750.000 consommateurs. *France - Hollande - Belgique - Luxembourg - Allemagne - Italie - Grande-Bretagne*, p. 109; 1970, pp. 68–69, 104–109.

¹¹⁸³ Sélection du Reader's Digest, 1970, pp. 108–109.

¹¹⁸⁴ German transistor radio adoption rates lagged those of other Western European countries in the 1950s and early 1960s due to the prevalence of ultra-short wave radio broadcasting in Germany, which necessitated technical requirements that transistor radios were only able to fulfill by the late 1950s, Fickers, 1998, pp. 2, 48, 51.

rates were situated between those of its two bigger neighbors, while television ownership lagged behind both France and Germany in 1963 and 1969.

Consumer electronics devices were on average more expensive in Luxembourg than in Germany, though cheaper than in France. According to a transnational retail price comparison undertaken by the Statistical Office of the European Communities in 1967, an exemplary record player cost around a third more in Luxembourg than in Germany after taking all discounts into account that merchants usually offered customers on the listing price. The precise markup varied by device and was usually in the realm of 10 to 50 % (although 30-35 % seems to have been most common).¹¹⁸⁵ Television sets were an exception. Luxembourgish consumers expected their devices to be capable of receiving not only the Luxembourgish program, but also all French, Belgian, and German programs. Because these were broadcast using different line norms, Luxembourgish television sets needed to be quite complex devices,¹¹⁸⁶ as *Telefunken* pointed out in 1962:

“Due to the total of 5 television programs broadcasted in different norms that can be received in Luxembourg, this area proves to be a very difficult market to operate in. The competition also has to contend with these difficulties, and since each four-norm set represents a technical compromise, satisfying particularly critical customers often causes considerable difficulties.”¹¹⁸⁷

The situation would not fundamentally change for color television sets. Again, there were two competing standards in Europe (PAL/SECAM) with the Grand Duchy caught in-between the two. This led manufacturers to begin producing dual-standard, multi-norm devices for the Luxembourgish market only a few months after Germany and France had started to broadcast in color in late 1967.¹¹⁸⁸ Their complexity made Luxembourgish television sets expensive. Multi-norm black and white sets cost slightly more than their already expensive French counterparts, and around twice as much as a comparable German television set in 1967.¹¹⁸⁹

¹¹⁸⁵ These figures were not adjusted for purchasing power, which somewhat limits their significance, Statistical Office of the European Communities (1968). *General Statistical Bulletin 1968 No. 3*. Accessed December 5, 2025. <https://aei.pitt.edu/65973/>, pp. 18–19, 30–31.

¹¹⁸⁶ The Luxembourgish television landscape is discussed further in the chapters 4.5.1, 4.5.2, and 4.5.3.

¹¹⁸⁷ Olufs to Seydlitz (1962, March 27). *Internal letter. Subject: Beschwerde des Kunden Jos. Diedrich, Bergem/Post Bettembourg/ Luxemburg*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983. In the original German: “Wegen der insgesamt 5 Fernsehprogramme, die, in verschiedenen Normen ausgestrahlt, in Luxemburg zu empfangen sind, erweist sich dieses Gebiet als sehr schwierig zu bearbeitende Verkaufszone. Auch die Konkurrenz hat mit diesen Schwierigkeiten zu kämpfen, und da jedes Viernormen-Gerät technisch einen Kompromiß darstellt, macht die Befriedigung besonders kritischer Kunden oft erhebliche Schwierigkeiten.”

¹¹⁸⁸ Singer (1968, January 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Luxemburg, Knotenpunkt des Farbfernsehens. *Luxemburger Wort*, 8.

¹¹⁸⁹ The two Luxembourgish multi-norm black and white television set models chosen by the Statistical Office of the European Communities for its comparison in October 1967 would have cost 287 USD (14.350 Luxembourgish francs) and 359,10 USD (17.955 Luxembourgish francs) respectively. Equivalent German models – one-norm television sets with otherwise comparable qualities – were priced at 148,43 USD (593,72 DM) and 164,02 USD (656,06 DM), Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1968, pp. 18–19, 30–31.

Dual-standard, multi-norm color television sets were even more costly.¹¹⁹⁰ Given that Luxembourgish households did not earn significantly more than their German counterparts,¹¹⁹¹ it is probable that the comparatively high prices contributed to the Grand Duchy's rather low television set adoption rates during the 1960s.

Despite these differences, adoption rates in Luxembourg, Germany, and France all moved in the same general direction. Radio was already a ubiquitous media technology at the beginning of the 1960s, and hi-fi systems were gradually becoming more important on the Grand Duchy's market by the latter part of the decade.¹¹⁹² Television sets would continuously become more pervasive throughout the 1960s and 1970s, transitioning from luxury goods to items of mass consumption. As a newspaper article pointed out in 1971: "Just a few years ago, television was still a status symbol and the privilege of the more or less rich, but it has rapidly become a commodity: [...]."¹¹⁹³ In fact, a quarter of all Luxembourgish households bought their first television set between 1965 and 1968.¹¹⁹⁴ By the late 1970s, the question was no longer whether a household owned a television set, but rather if it had already made the switch to color: In 1977, 20,7 % of Luxembourgish "worker" households and 26,6 % of "employee" households owned a color set, according to *STATEC*.¹¹⁹⁵ The media ensemble at the disposal of Luxembourgish households would have also increasingly come to encompass a record player and/or a tape or cassette recorder during the 1960s. However, neither attained the same ubiquitousness as the mass media technologies television and radio, which decisively shaped the Luxembourgish media landscape together with the press.

¹¹⁹⁰ In October 1968, a dual-standard, multi-norm color TV was priced at 39.950 Luxembourgish francs, Neckermann (1968, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein Ereignis für jung und alt! *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹¹⁹¹ Sélection du Reader's Digest, 1970, pp. 54–55.

¹¹⁹² Solura-Luxembourg S.A. (1968, June 4) *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Solura-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale ordinaire du 4 Juin 1968*, AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 868. In the following report, Solura remarked that there was still a certain reluctance among Luxembourgers regarding hi-fi systems, although the company continued to place great hopes on the sector, Solura-Luxembourg S.A. (1969, June 3) *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Solura-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale ordinaire du 3 Juin 1969*, AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 868, p. 2.

¹¹⁹³ N.N. (1971, January 16). Kino und Konzert zuhause. *Revue*, 3, 27–35, p. 28. In the original German: "Vor wenigen Jahren noch Statussymbol und Privileg der mehr oder weniger Reichen, ist das Fernsehen rapide zum Volksgut geworden: [...]."

¹¹⁹⁴ Sélection du Reader's Digest, 1970, pp. 104–105.

¹¹⁹⁵ 77,8 % of "worker" households and 70,7 % of "employee" households still used a B/W TV, STATEC (1982). *Annuaire statistique du Luxembourg 1981/82*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/hbq8jhdsdq/articles/DIVL14>, p. 316. In the original French: "Ouvriers", "Employés".

4.1.2 National Media with a Local Reach and a Readership Looking Beyond Borders: Press in Luxembourg

The Luxembourgish press landscape was rather static in the post-war decades. Households subscribed to one of a handful of dailies depending on their political affiliation,¹¹⁹⁶ with the Christian conservative *Luxemburger Wort* being the most successful by far.¹¹⁹⁷ In 1960, the *Luxemburger Wort* contended to reach “the whole Luxembourgish people” with its circulation of 66.784 copies per issue.¹¹⁹⁸ Given that there were 95.552 Luxembourgish households at the end of the year,¹¹⁹⁹ this was not too far from the truth. The *Wort*’s ascendance would continue throughout the 1960s: by September 1972, it had a circulation of 72.501¹²⁰⁰ for an estimated 112.500 Luxembourgish households,¹²⁰¹ and a readership of 207.000 per issue.¹²⁰² Although *Luxembourg* had a few other notable dailies such as the *Tageblatt* or the *Lëtzeburger Journal*, none of them had a reach close to the *Wort*.¹²⁰³ The *Revue*, the country’s only weekly illustrated magazine until the late 1970s,¹²⁰⁴ was the other dominant force in the print media space. Given its circulation of 25.000-29.000¹²⁰⁵ and a readership of above 130.000 per issue throughout the long 1960s,¹²⁰⁶ the magazine adopted the tagline “Every 2nd Luxembourger reads the *Revue*”.¹²⁰⁷

¹¹⁹⁶ Hilgert, 2004, pp. 205–206.

¹¹⁹⁷ Id., p. 67.

¹¹⁹⁸ N.N. (1960, September 20). Stadt Luxemburg. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5. In the original German: “das ganze Luxemburger Volk”.

¹¹⁹⁹ STATEC, 1965, p. 50.

¹²⁰⁰ Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité (Ed.) (1973). *L’indicateur publicitaire 1973 Belgique / G.D. de Luxembourg. De reclamegids België / G.D. de Luxembourg*, p. 90.

¹²⁰¹ STATEC, 1972, p. 37.

¹²⁰² GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 60.

¹²⁰³ Circulation of the *Tageblatt*: 33.500 in 1959 and 32.000 in 1969. Circulation of the *Lëtzeburger Journal*: 22.000 in 1959, 13.100 in 1973, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité (Ed.) (1959). *L’indicateur publicitaire édition 1959. Reclame Aanwijzer*, pp. 102–103; 1973, p. 90. The annually released *indicateur publicitaire* compiled by the Belgian chamber of advertising agents provides a comprehensive overview of the Luxembourgish media landscape, also listing smaller print publications.

¹²⁰⁴ The *Télécran* competed with it from 1978 onward, Hilgert, 2004, p. 231. For the *Revue*’s history, id., p. 215.

¹²⁰⁵ By 1956, the *Revue* already reached a circulation of over 25.000, Morn, J.P. (1956, January 7). *Ons Administratioun. Revue*, 1, 43. By 1959, it was 26.000, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1959, p. 346. In 1964 as in 1969, its circulation was reported to be around 29.000, N.N. (1964, October 3). *Mitteilung an unsere Leser und Vertreter. Revue*, 40, 14; Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1973, p. 191.

¹²⁰⁶ In 1956, the magazine declared in an advertisement that it had over 150.000 readers per issue, *Revue* (1956). Advertisement. Tagline: Le seul hebdomadaire illustré du Grand-Duché avec plus de 150 000 lecteurs. In Reyland, R. (1956). *Guide du marché luxembourgeois avec listes des producteurs et importateurs / Einführung in den Luxemburger Import- und Exportmarkt mit Adressenangabe der Produktions- und Importfirmen* (3rd ed.). Bourg-Bourger, p. 136. Another self-report in 1967 gave a readership of 136.700 per issue, *Revue* (1967). Advertisement. Tagline: 136 700 voient plus. In Publi-Lux (Ed.) (1967). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1967*. Bourg-Bourger. Unnumbered page. In 1972, an independent German publication put it at 132.000, GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 60.

¹²⁰⁷ See for example *Revue* (1965, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Jeder 2. Luxemburger liest die *Revue*. *Revue*, 42, 103. In the original German: “Jeder 2. Luxemburger liest die *Revue*”. In 1959, the magazine had even (exaggeratedly) claimed to be “Practically read by all Luxembourgers”, *Revue* (1959). Advertisement. Tagline:

Due to the composition of the audience Luxembourgish press publications catered to, one of their defining characteristics has been their concurrently local and national orientation.¹²⁰⁸ The leading magazine and leading daily of the country both had a very high penetration within the Grand Duchy and can be considered mass media publications for the market they were operating in. But neither was read outside of Luxembourg,¹²⁰⁹ and their circulations were only impressive in a relative and not in an absolute sense. Unlike German or French mass media print publications, which reached several million readers per issue and were distributed over an extensive geographical space, even the largest Luxembourgish press publications still only targeted a numerically and geographically limited audience. On the other end of the Luxembourgish print media spectrum were highly specialized publications for certain target groups, like a trade magazine for the country's bakers (circulation: 800-1.000).¹²¹⁰

German was the predominant language of the Luxembourgish press during the long 1960s, followed by French. Luxembourgish was only used occasionally.¹²¹¹ At the same time, the multilingualism of Luxembourgers facilitated transnational media consumption patterns: in the year 1962, 243.000 issues of several French weekly magazines were imported to the country and around five times as many German-language magazines such as *Stern* and *Quick*.¹²¹² Belgian print media was read in Luxembourg as well.¹²¹³ While transnational media flows were

Revue Illustré Luxembourgeois. In Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1959, p. 347. In the original French: "Pratiquement lu par tous les Luxembourgeois".

¹²⁰⁸ Hilgert, 2004, p. 5.

¹²⁰⁹ 100 % of circulation of the *Luxemburger Wort* and of the *Revue* stayed within the geographical confines of Luxembourg in 1959 according to data provided by the Belgian chamber of advertising agents. The same was true for the *Tageblatt*, for instance. In 1959, there was little overlap in general between the Belgian and Luxembourgish press landscapes, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1959, pp. 866–867, 869. This was still the case around a decade later. In 1972, all of the *Wort*'s circulation was attributed to the Grand Duchy. For the *Revue*, it was 98 % in 1969, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1973, pp. 90, 191.

¹²¹⁰ The magazine named *Onst Bro't* self-reported a circulation of 800 copies in 1961 and 1.000 by 1973, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité (Ed.) (1961). *L'indicateur publicitaire édition 1961. Reclame Aanwijzer*, p. 557; 1973, p. 241. The Luxembourgish statistics office estimated that there were around 80 small publications in the country by 1974 that addressed members of various trades, STATEC (1977). *Les dépenses publicitaires au Luxembourg en 1974 et 1975. La Commission des prix a trente ans* (Vol. 23, No. 6; Bulletin Du STATEC). Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:/70795/vs2zbx1m44/articles/DIVL6>, p. 215.

¹²¹¹ This can be verified through a search on the Luxembourgish press database eluxemburgensia.lu, which allows to filter by language. For the timeframe 01.01.1959-31.12.1974, the database gives 813.361 articles in German, 172.441 in French and 14.000 in Luxembourgish when filtering for press articles in the *Revue* and the *Luxemburger Wort*. The assessment fits with the results of Berg's analysis of the languages used in the Luxembourgish press in 1988, Berg, 1993, p. 42. On the societal role of the Luxembourgish language for the Grand Duchy since the 19th century, see Péporté, P., Kmec, S., Majerus, B., & Margue, M. (2010). *Inventing Luxembourg. Representations of the Past, Space and Language from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century*. Brill, pp. 267–335.

¹²¹² Begasse, 1994, p. 72. According to a press-article from 1968, over a 1000 different foreign press publications were sold in Luxembourg at the time, Anders, J. (1968, May 24). Nos loisirs. Un phénomène socio-économique. *D'Letzeburger Land*, 21, 5, 11, p. 5. This also extended to youth magazines, for instance. The German *Bravo* and the French *Salut les Copains* were both present at the country's kiosks, O.L. (1964, August 5). Bulletins et Périodiques. *Luxemburger Wort*, 4. Regarding the prevalence of the *Bravo* in Luxembourg, see also P.N. (1967, January 20). «Fahrenheit 451». *D'Letzeburger Land*, 4, 6.

¹²¹³ For instance, around 1,1 % of the circulation of 25.000 of the Belgian print publication *Les Sports* reached the Grand Duchy in the early 1970s, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1973, p. 90.

certainly not exclusive to Luxembourg, press publications from abroad were often limited in their success due to language barriers.¹²¹⁴ Not so in the Grand Duchy. Given the country's small population, the figures available for 1962 imply that German magazines in particular would have been a rather common sight in Luxembourgish households at the time (although not quite as prevalent as the *Revue*). This would have still been the case by the mid-1970s, when the Luxembourgish statistics office pointed out that there were “numerous German illustrated weekly magazines, which are widely read in Luxembourg.”¹²¹⁵ The extent to which foreign publications supplemented the local/national press was a unique characteristic of the Luxembourgish press media landscape.

The Luxembourgish press landscape was hence defined by two phenomena during the long 1960s. The first concerned the offer: while the country's leading publications achieved a deep penetration of the local market, they did not manage to find readership beyond the Grand Duchy's geographical confines. The national print mass media was heavily limited concerning its scope. The second phenomenon pertained to the readership: Luxembourgers regularly supplemented their readership of national print mass media publications with foreign press, leading to uniquely multilingual and transnational reception patterns. A similar phenomenon can be observed for the radio.

4.1.3 Radio (in) Luxembourg. A Case of Multilingual Coexistence

Luxembourgers were avid radio listeners: in a representative 1972 survey, only 3,8 % declared that they did not listen to the radio at all.¹²¹⁶ Yet, the country had no public service broadcaster. Instead, a private company, the *Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion* (CLT), had acquired exclusive television and radio broadcasting concessions from the Luxembourgish state.¹²¹⁷ Its radio broadcasts under the name of *Radio Luxembourg* attracted millions of listeners across Europe with its advertisement-supported commercial programs. Having already found huge success in France with French-language programming during the 1950s, *Radio Luxembourg* started a German-language broadcast in 1957, which quickly became popular among millions of German listeners as well.¹²¹⁸

¹²¹⁴ In 1968, 15.000 issues of the French youth magazine *Salut les Copains* were sold to German readers, for instance, Siegfried, 2006, p. 542.

¹²¹⁵ STATEC, 1977, p. 210. In the original French: “[...] nombreux hebdomadaires illustrés allemands, qui sont beaucoup lus au Luxembourg.”

¹²¹⁶ In the German federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate, for instance, this figure was 8,7 %, Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, p. 20.

¹²¹⁷ On the particularity of the Luxembourgish radio and television system and its financing, see Jager, R. (1988). *La télévision au Luxembourg*. In Ministère des affaires culturelles (Ed.), *Le cinéma et la télévision au Luxembourg* (pp. 39–43).

¹²¹⁸ Maréchal, 2010, pp. 177–183. See also Berg, 2021; Jehle, 2018.

Luxembourg's radio broadcaster was hence transnationally successful and had its core markets outside the country. Nonetheless, Luxembourgish radio listeners were offered at least an hour of programming in their own language on weekdays on medium wave since 1949 at the latest.¹²¹⁹ On the 19th of October 1959, this offer was considerably expanded as the *CLT* began broadcasting in Luxembourgish on frequency modulated ultra-short wave. These broadcasts catered to the local population only,¹²²⁰ and proved to be highly popular: in 1966, nine out of ten surveyed listeners indicated that they listened to the Luxembourgish program at least once per day,¹²²¹ and by 1972, around 70 % of Luxembourgers aged 15 or older listened at least once a week.¹²²² This made it the country's most popular channel, while it had little appeal elsewhere due to the language barrier and limited reach. As the Luxembourgish magazine *Revue* put it in 1971, Luxembourgers had "our own FM transmitter for the almost 350.000 of us alone [...]."¹²²³ This success impacted the type of equipment owned by Luxembourgers: 98,4 % of all radios in Luxembourgish households in 1972 were capable of receiving frequency modulated ultra-short wave broadcasts – compared to 55,2 % in Eastern France.¹²²⁴

This is not to say that Luxembourgers exclusively listened to the Luxembourgish channel. After all, it was not broadcasting the whole day, even by the early 1970s.¹²²⁵ As per the 1972 survey, 56,4 % of Luxembourgish adults also tuned in to the German-language variant of *Radio Luxembourg* at least once a week. The German *Europawelle Saar* and the French language variant of *Radio Luxembourg* followed behind with 35,7 % and 25,1 % respectively. While French public radio stations had a considerably lower reach, they still found a regular audience.¹²²⁶ Luxembourgers would thus also listen to a range of foreign programs – and to

¹²¹⁹ N.N. (1949, November 5). *Unsere Radio-Auslese. Luxemburger Wort*, 12. This would last throughout the 1950s, *Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité*, 1959, p. 841.

¹²²⁰ E.F. (1968, March 9). Letzeburg UKW. *Revue*, 11, 20–26, p. 21. Broadcasting on medium wave was concurrently continued for a while before being eventually discontinued in favor of ultra-short wave broadcasting, R.K. (1959, October 23). *Kultur auf Aetherwellen. d'Letzeburger Land*, 43, 5. Initially *Radio Lëtzeburg* broadcasted for an hour at lunchtime and three hours in the evening on weekdays on frequency modulated ultra-short wave, E.F. (1968, March 9). Letzeburg UKW. *Revue*, 11, 20–26, p. 21. Regarding the broadcasting hours, see also *Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité*, 1961, p. 917. *Radio Lëtzeburg* would remain the only legally operated Luxembourgish radio channel until 1992, Berg, 1993, p. 52.

¹²²¹ Berg, 1993, p. 53. Accordingly, the channel also contributed to an increase of radio sales in the country during its first year of operation, Philips Luxembourg S.A. (1960, June 7). *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Philips-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires du 7.6.1960*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431.

¹²²² Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, p. 25.

¹²²³ N.N. (1971, January 16). *Kino und Konzert zuhause. Revue*, 3, 27–35, p. 27. In the original German: "Zudem ausgestattet mit einem eigenen UKW-Sender für uns knapp 350.000 ganz allein, [...]."

¹²²⁴ Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, p. 16.

¹²²⁵ By 1973, *Radio Lëtzeburg* broadcasted between 6 and 8.30 am, 11 am and 2 pm, and 6 to 10.30 pm on weekdays. On Sundays, broadcasts now lasted from 8 to 11 am and from 2 to 6 pm, *Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité*, 1973, p. 386.

¹²²⁶ *France Inter* scored 16,9 %, and *France Musique* 12,9 %. The study lists a total of eleven radio channels that were listened to by at least 5 % of the Luxembourgish population once per week, among them *Europe n°1* and the three channels of the German *SWF*, Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, pp. 20, 25.

those originating from the Grand Duchy but not aimed at them, tuning in alongside listeners in Germany or France. This coexistence of local and transnational reception patterns was made possible by the country's favorable geographical location and its multilingualism.

Luxembourgers consumed radio content in Luxembourgish, German, and French. This set them apart from their neighbors in the border regions of Germany and France, where no foreign-language station made the top four of the most listened to radio programs. Luxembourgish listening habits were nonetheless shaped by language preference: the Luxembourgish-language channel was the most listened-to station for 44,9 % of radio users in 1972. The German version of *Radio Luxembourg* came in second with 30,9 %, with the German *Europawelle Saar* and the French version of *Radio Luxembourg* following at a large distance. This marks a clear hierarchy of content preference by language. Luxembourgish and then German were both clearly more popular than French-language programming.¹²²⁷ This was also reflected in Luxembourgish television viewing patterns.

4.1.4 A National Channel for Foreign Audiences and Foreign Channels for the National Audience: *Télé-Luxembourg* and Television Viewing Patterns

From the 14th of May 1955 onward, the *CLT* also offered a regular television program.¹²²⁸ *Télé-Luxembourg* broadcast daily in French during the evening hours.¹²²⁹ It was a transnational endeavor from the outset. During the channel's opening ceremony in 1955, the managing director claimed that *Télé-Luxembourg*'s transmitter near Dudelange covered a territory of 12.000 square kilometers with a population of four million people across the Grand Duchy, and parts of Belgium, France, and Germany.¹²³⁰ However, very few people in this catchment area would have owned a television set in the mid-1950s.

¹²²⁷ Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, p. 27. This is not to say that listening to foreign language stations was a practice exclusive to Luxembourg. In Saarland and in Eastern France, a small percentage of listeners at least once per week tuned in to stations in French and German respectively. Overall, however, it was much more uncommon than in Luxembourg, where it was a widespread practice, see id., pp. 24–25.

¹²²⁸ N.N. (1955, May 14). Aujourd'hui samedi : Soirée d'inauguration de Télé-Luxembourg. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5.

¹²²⁹ The program is detailed in the *Luxemburger Wort*. The broadcasting times during the first week were between 6.50 pm and 9.30 pm (Wednesday) and 5.10 pm and 10 pm (Thursday), N.N. (1955, May 18). *Télé-Luxembourg. Luxemburger Wort*, 11. In 1964, *Télé-Luxembourg* broadcasted between 4 and 9.30 pm on Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays. On the other four days of the week, broadcasting began at 6 pm, Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1964, p. F 96. By the mid-1970s, *Télé-Luxembourg* broadcasted from 5 to 10.30 pm on Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays. On the other days, broadcasting started at 5.45 pm instead. Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1974, p. F 90. According to a study on its competitor by the *ORTF*, *Télé-Luxembourg* deliberately limited itself to the evening hours as the potential audience was then at its largest, providing the best return on investment for the rather expensive production of television programs, Service des études d'opinion de l'O.R.T.F. (1971). *Télé-Luxembourg. Son écoute - ses programmes*. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Versement 2006, ID 15045-0020, p. 2.

¹²³⁰ Experimental broadcasts had already taken place beforehand, every evening between 8 and 10 pm from the 23rd of January 1955 onward, P.W. (1955, May 17). Die Eröffnungsfeier bei Tele-Luxemburg. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5. The very first television set had been registered with the Luxembourgish post a few days earlier, on the 14th of

In March 1957, it was estimated that around 10.000 French and 3.000 Belgian television owners regularly tuned in to *Télé-Luxembourg*. In addition, there were the viewers in Luxembourg itself. At the time, there were a bit more than a thousand devices in the country's households. *Télé-Luxembourg*'s viewership was anticipated to grow not only due to rising television set ownership rates, but also because the transmission strength of the transmitter of *Télé-Luxembourg* had recently been upgraded. By this point, its signal reached as far away as Nancy,¹²³¹ with a total range of up to 150 kilometers.¹²³² In 1959, its maximum potential viewership – i.e. all television viewers in its zone of reception – was slightly above 200.000.¹²³³ By 1973, the channel's geographical reach had not increased further. But due to the rapid proliferation of television set ownership, there were now around a million television sets in its radius that were capable of receiving *Télé-Luxembourg* – 565.000 in France, 360.000 in Belgium, 80.000 in Luxembourg, and 8.000 in Germany.¹²³⁴ By the mid-1970s, *Télé-Luxembourg* regularly reached an audience of several hundred thousand viewers in its regional catchment area: the regional news magazine, for instance, drew around 250.000 viewers, while the evening film broadcast on regular weekdays was even watched by more than 800.000 people.¹²³⁵

January 1955, Jaans, J. (1957, March 22). Zwischenbilanz des Fernsehens. TELE LUXEMBOURG – heute und morgen. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 12, 3.

¹²³¹ Jaans, J. (1957, March 22). Zwischenbilanz des Fernsehens. TELE LUXEMBOURG – heute und morgen. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 12, 3.

¹²³² N.N. (1971, October 30). Farbe nun auch bei Télé-Luxembourg. *Revue*, 44, 35–36, p. 35.

¹²³³ 160.000 in France, 32.000 in Belgium, a bit more than 10.000 in Luxembourg, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1959, p. 841. By 1961, it had risen to a total of ca. 435.000, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1961, p. 918. According to another estimate, *Télé-Luxembourg* even had a maximum potential viewership of 700.000 by late 1961/early 1962, Proscop, 1962, p. V 165.

¹²³⁴ These figures pertain to the 31st of March 1973, Proscop media (1973). *Le marché français 1973*, p. 233. The figures given in a similar publication by the Belgian chamber of advertising agents deviate slightly for 1973, although their total, too, is close to a million: 600.000 television sets capable of receiving *Télé-Luxembourg* in France, 300.000 in Belgium, and 84.000 in Luxembourg. No mention is made of Germany, Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1973, p. 386. The market research department of the French public service broadcaster ORTF estimated that *Télé-Luxembourg* reached around 830.000 viewers in 1970. As noted in the study, the quality of reception varied wildly: in the French town of Metz, for instance, it depended on the weather and the building, Service des études d'opinion de l'O.R.T.F., 1971, p. 1. From the early 1970s onward, *Télé-Luxembourg* would not just be broadcasted per transmitter but would also be directly fed into the Wallonian cable network according to Mario Hirsch. In his account, this contributed to making the television channel profitable, Hirsch, 1989, p. 931.

¹²³⁵ Informations et Publicité (1976). Part d'audience de Télé-Luxembourg. *Actual IP septembre 1976*. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Les médias audiovisuels, ID 12841-0041, Dossier Pré-tests et Post-tests TV et Radio (Tests de programmes et de publicités) 1971-1981. Series and films accounted for nearly 60 % of the total program in 1971, Informational content for comparison only accounted for around 10 %, Service des études d'opinion de l'O.R.T.F., 1971, pp. 2–4, 9. Films had already been a cornerstone of *Télé-Luxembourg*'s programming in the early 1960s, N.N. (1963, February). Pour une télévision populaire. *Le Monde diplomatique*, 17. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1963/02/A/25201>. This made sense given that the focus on films seems to have been popular with viewers. Hourly television viewing figures for regular weekdays in March 1971 for those parts of France where viewers received both *Télé-Luxembourg* and the first channel of the ORTF show that neither channel managed to hold the attention of the majority of viewers throughout the whole evening. While a much higher percentage of viewers watched ORTF between 7 and 8.30 pm, there was a shift in ratings toward *Télé-Luxembourg* in the later parts of the evening when the channel showed its feature film, Ifop–

Throughout the long 1960s, *Télé-Luxembourg*'s core viewership resided in the border regions of France and Belgium, namely in parts of Lorraine and Wallonia. There was no dedicated, separate offer for Luxembourgers like in the case of *Radio Luxembourg*. Because *Télé-Luxembourg* was a commercially operated channel that relied on advertising revenues (and thus on ratings) to finance itself,¹²³⁶ its broadcasted content was largely oriented toward French audiences. As early as 1957, this prompted complaints that *Télé-Luxembourg* was lacking Luxembourg-centric programming,¹²³⁷ a sentiment echoed in an open letter to the government published in the *Luxemburger Wort* in 1965 by a "regional committee of TV-owners":

"The majority of Luxembourgers are not satisfied with *Télé-Luxembourg*'s programs and advertising broadcasts, which are almost entirely tailored to the neighboring French territory, and the majority of Luxembourgers are also unable to watch and enjoy the exclusively French programs in a relaxed manner due to language difficulties!"¹²³⁸

This complaint makes evident that it was not just the orientation of the broadcasted content, but also *Télé-Luxembourg*'s language of choice that bothered Luxembourgers, as it seemingly hindered many of them from follow along without too much mental effort. Accordingly, it was pondered in the Luxembourgish press during the mid-1960s if it would not make sense for *Télé-Luxembourg* to at least offer some content in Luxembourgish given the considerable success of the Luxembourgish radio.¹²³⁹ The first Luxembourgish-language television programming then aired on the 21st of September 1969. The two-hour long magazine *Hei elei, kuck elei* was broadcast each Sunday¹²⁴⁰ and would prove to be highly popular in the country –¹²⁴¹ just like the radio content in Luxembourgish. On *Télé-Luxembourg*, this remained the exception, not the rule. The overwhelming majority of transmissions continued to be in French.

Due to Luxembourg's geographical location, *Télé-Luxembourg* was not the only option for the country's viewers. Already in the mid-1950s, television sets sold on the Luxembourgish market were commonly capable of handling four television broadcasting norms, effectively enabling those devices to receive French, Belgian, German, and Luxembourgish television channels.¹²⁴²

Etmar (1971). *Radio et télévision. Évolution de l'écoute entre 1966 et 1971 en France. Écoute de la télévision en mars 1971 dans la zone de diffusion de Télé-Luxembourg*. INAthèque, ID 9790, p. 19.

¹²³⁶ Begasse, 1994, p. 94.

¹²³⁷ Jaans, J. (1957, March 22). Zwischenbilanz des Fernsehens. TELE LUXEMBOURG – heute und morgen. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 12, 3. Despite this orientation toward France, *Télé-Luxembourg* was apparently not allowed to record content in the country due to the monopoly of the French public broadcaster according to Jaans.

¹²³⁸ Keiser & Schmit (1965, July 9). Fernsehempfang. Offener Brief an den zuständigen Herrn Minister. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11. In the original German: "Die Großzahl der Luxemburger ist nun einmal nicht zufrieden mit den fast ganz aufs französische Nachbargebiet zugeschnittenen Programmen und Reklamesendungen von *Télé-Luxembourg*, und die Mehrzahl der Luxemburger kann auch infolge Sprachschwierigkeiten nicht die ausschließlich französischen Sendungen geruhsam verfolgen und genießen!"

¹²³⁹ N.N. (1964, January 10). Du côté de *Télé-Luxembourg*. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 2, 9.

¹²⁴⁰ Berg, 1993, p. 55.

¹²⁴¹ Begasse, 1994, p. 94.

¹²⁴² P.W. (1955, March 10). "Der ideale Fernsehempfang." *Luxemburger Wort*, 6.

This would remain the case in the following years, including after the introduction of color television broadcasting.¹²⁴³ While this multi-norm capability did not automatically equate good reception, 80 % of Luxembourgish television set owners could receive at least three television programs by 1966 (with only one of them originating from within the country) while 64 % could even receive six.¹²⁴⁴ Luxembourg was thus in the transmission range of multiple television channels and Luxembourgish television set owners were equipped with devices that enabled such a reception. Neither was necessarily the norm: in 1966, only half of French inhabitants lived in a coverage area of the country's second channel, and in 1965, only 30 % of French television sets were capable of receiving it.¹²⁴⁵

Luxembourgers had an unusual number of options at their disposal – and language played a decisive role in their channel preference. A representative study from 1972 found that Luxembourgers watched German television far more often than the French-language broadcasts produced in Luxembourg or France. The German second channel *ZDF* was watched regularly by 45,6 % of viewers on a given evening between 6 and 8 pm, while *Télé-Luxembourg* and French television attracted only 25,2 % and 12,5 % regular viewership respectively. In addition, multiple German regional broadcasting channels also reached decent regular viewership rates in Luxembourg.¹²⁴⁶ *Télé-Luxembourg* did hence not replicate the domestic dominance of *Radio*

¹²⁴³ By 1972, 93,8 % of Luxembourgers living in a household that owned any kind of television set had access to a B/W multi-norm device, and another 5,5 % to color multi-norm devices. In the German federal states of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, multi-norm television sets played basically no role. In Eastern France, they were somewhat more common, but not as widespread as in Luxembourg, Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, pp. 18–19. The figures given for Luxembourg add up to 103,4 %, as 3,4 % of households had two or more TVs, id., p. 17.

¹²⁴⁴ N.N. (1967, September 16). Um eine Verbesserung des Fernsehempfangs. Die staatliche Kommission empfiehlt die Errichtung von Gemeinschaftsantennen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 20. Reception seems to have improved already during the second half of the 1950s. In 1957, reception problems had still hindered television set sales, Jaans, J. (1957, March 22). Zwischenbilanz des Fernsehens. TELE LUXEMBOURG – heute und morgen. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 12, 3. By 1959, another article claimed that Luxembourgish television viewers were able to receive German television broadcasts in good quality “since recently” (“seit kurzem”), N.N. (1959, September 3). 92 000 Rundfunkgeräte im Großherzogtum. *Luxemburger Wort*, 4. There are particularly detailed figures available for 1969: 64 % of Luxembourgish households owned a television set that year, 61 % of all households – so nearly every household owning a TV – could receive *Télé-Luxembourg* and the first German TV channel. The Belgian television channel and the first French channel followed closely behind at 53 % and 55 % respectively. The second German TV channel and the second French channel attained 45 % and 33 %. Remarkably, this put the reception capability of Luxembourgish households for the second French channel not too far behind French households, which reached 44 % in this metric that same year, Sélection du Reader's Digest, 1970, pp. 106–107.

¹²⁴⁵ Gaillard, 2012a, p. 124.

¹²⁴⁶ The combined program of the German regional broadcasters *Südwestfunk* (SWF) and *Süddeutscher Rundfunk* (SDR) was watched regularly by 25,2 %. The channel of the *Saarländische Rundfunk* (SR) and the third program *Südwest – 3* (jointly run by the SR, the SWR, and the SDR) were watched by 16,8 % and 15,6 % of viewers regularly or at least from time to time. These results pertain to viewers aged 15 or older, Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, p. 159. As the 1972 study only considered the timeframe between 6 and 8 pm, the figures for *Télé-Luxembourg* may slightly understate the tendency over the whole evening because its nightly movie at 9 pm drew the biggest crowd of viewers, Informations et Publicité, 1976. However, the general empirical finding of the 1972 study is, for instance, also corroborated by a report in the Luxembourgish *Revue*, which stated that “It is well known that the majority of Luxembourg television viewers mainly watch German programs, [...]” (“Es ist allbekannt, daß die Mehrzahl der Luxemburger Fernsehzuschauer hauptsächlich die deutschen Programme

Luxembourg's Luxembourgish program. Instead, German television was most popular in the country due to *Télé-Luxembourg's* choice to broadcast near-exclusively in French. This tendency was most likely not a new development of the 1970s; the 1966 open letter to the government had already linked language and viewing habits.¹²⁴⁷

Luxembourg's television broadcasting solution was somewhat uncommon in European comparison. While many other Western European countries opted for public service broadcasters oriented toward serving the nation-state during the post-war period,¹²⁴⁸ Luxembourg had a private broadcaster which primarily targeted foreign regional audiences. The country's television reception situation, too, was unusual. Not only was the Grand Duchy in the range of multiple foreign television broadcasting signals enabling transnational television reception in the first place, but its inhabitants also had the necessary language proficiency (particularly in German) to understand foreign broadcasts and the equipment to overcome the technical confines of differing broadcasting standards and norms. As *Télé-Luxembourg* pursued foreign audiences, the Luxembourgish audience turned to foreign channels.

In his evaluation of the state of Luxembourgish media history, Paul Lesch has pointed out that little to no reliable surveys and polls regarding media consumption patterns of Luxembourgish inhabitants were carried out before the 1990s.¹²⁴⁹ Based on the existing data, it can nonetheless be established that the media consumption patterns of Luxembourgers in the long 1960s were transnational and trilingual in print, radio, and television. The precise extent to which inhabitants of the Grand Duchy consumed content on a transnational scale varied between media and depended on language (the hierarchy of preferences was Luxembourgish, German, French). These characteristics seem to have been relatively consistent throughout the long 1960s. This made for a unique media landscape in which foreign content played an unusually important role, which created an equally unique advertising environment in which foreign campaigns reached unintended audiences: Luxembourgers would have encountered advertising not primarily meant for them across German, Belgian and/or French print media, radio, and television.¹²⁵⁰

sieht, [...]”), l.m. (1972, October 28). Schwarz raus Farbe rein. *Revue*, 44, 86–90, 93–94, p. 89. This preference remained stable. In the early 1990s, German TV programs were still “considerably more popular” (“wesentlich beliebter”) in Luxembourg than their French and Belgian competitors, Begasse, 1994, p. 97, Footnote 502.

¹²⁴⁷ Keiser & Schmit (1965, July 9). Fernsehempfang. Offener Brief an den zuständigen Herrn Minister. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11.

¹²⁴⁸ Fickers, A., Mustata, D., & Weber, A.-K. (2020). The Rise of Television. Institutionalization and the Forming of National Audiences. In K. Arnold, P. Preston, & S. Kinnebrock (Eds.), *The Handbook of European Communication History* (pp. 239–255), p. 243.

¹²⁴⁹ Lesch, 2011, p. 98.

¹²⁵⁰ Sebastian Reddeker has noted the same causal relationship between transnational media consumption and a familiarity with foreign advertising for modern day Luxembourg, Reddeker, 2014, p. 302.

4.2 Targeted or Unintended? Advertising Reception in a Transnational Media Environment

4.2.1 Reaching Unexpected Audiences: Luxembourgers and Foreign Advertising

In Germany and France, marketing campaigns for consumer electronics devices during the long 1960s were ideally planned in a manner that ensured that consumers would come in contact with nationally, regionally, and locally effective measures, layering the different components. In Luxembourg, however, the national press, radio, and television had a decidedly local or regional orientation. Thus, for inhabitants of the Grand Duchy, any advertising for consumer electronics through Luxembourgish media channels would have been supplemented by the national (and sometimes the regional) media components of German, French, and possibly also Belgian campaigns. These would have reached Luxembourgish inhabitants due to their transnational media consumption patterns. Such transnational interconnections should, however, be understood as incidental, not intentional; German and French campaigns targeted German and French consumers respectively.

As has been shown for the *Magnetophon Automatic*,¹²⁵¹ the marketing approach for German-produced consumer electronics devices was adjusted to nationally distinct media landscapes and market contexts. *Telefunken*'s marketing plan for the *Automatic* had exclusively been concerned with the German market introduction and had thus only made use of German mass media channels. While *Telefunken France* adopted certain elements of the German campaign in 1962, the company acted in a significantly different environment, which impacted how the *Automatic* would be advertised – and through which channels.¹²⁵² On paper, this made for nationally separate spheres of advertising influence through mass media. But despite the fact that the *Magnetophon Automatic* was not advertised in the *Revue*,¹²⁵³ or the *Luxemburger Wort*¹²⁵⁴ (where a press release for the *Automatic* had been published in April 1962),¹²⁵⁵ many Luxembourgish inhabitants would have seen German or even French print advertisements for the *Magnetophon Automatic* due to their transnational media consumption patterns.

Remarkably, this also holds true for the television advertising for the *Automatic*. In 1962, a not insignificant part of Luxembourgish television viewers would have been able to receive the broadcasts emitted by the German regional broadcaster *Südwestfunk* and by the *Saarländischer*

¹²⁵¹ See chapter 3.1.2.2.

¹²⁵² See chapter 3.1.2.3.2.

¹²⁵³ All issues of the *Revue* from 1962 were consulted.

¹²⁵⁴ The newspaper is fully searchable on eluxemburgensia.lu. Multiple searches using French or German keywords did not yield any results about the *Magnetophon Automatic* (articles or advertisements) besides the press release article published on the 27th of April 1962 (see footnote just below).

¹²⁵⁵ N.N. (1962, April 27). Erstes automatisches Tonbandgerät. *Luxemburger Wort*, 2.

Rundfunk.¹²⁵⁶ Although no precise viewership figures can be given, the Luxembourgish disposition toward German-language television makes it likely that quite a few inhabitants of the Grand Duchy would have seen the ads for the *Magnetophon Automatic* which *Telefunken* had booked with both broadcasters – unlike consumers in certain parts of the German state of Bavaria, whose regional television broadcaster did not show any ads for the *Automatic*.¹²⁵⁷ At the time, various retailers in the country sold *Telefunken* branded devices.¹²⁵⁸ Although the sources do not explicitly reference the device, it is probable that a certain number of units of the *Magnetophon Automatic* found their way onto the Luxembourgish market as well. After all, there was nothing about the *Automatic*'s technical conception that would have impeded *Telefunken* from selling the device abroad in Luxembourg – just as it did in France, for instance. Furthermore, *Telefunken*'s unique sales proposition for the *Automatic* (automation and the resulting ease of use) would have likely appealed to Luxembourgers as well. This meant that the German or even the French advertisements for the *Magnetophon Automatic* would not just have been seen by inhabitants of the Grand Duchy; the ads could have also had an impact on them with regards to informing about the device or even motivating a purchase decision despite not being primarily intended for them.

Why this distinction is necessary becomes clear when considering *Philips France*'s television set advertising campaigns of 1962 and 1964. These, too, had been conceptualized based on the requirements of the French market, and *Philips France* had made use of the French national media landscape for its advertising. Certain parts of the campaigns, such as the advertisements in regional dailies and in cinemas, or the outdoor advertising measures, would have only been seen by spatially limited audiences throughout France. The print advertising in *Paris Match* on the other hand, as well as the radio advertising messages on *Radio Luxembourg*, for instance,

¹²⁵⁶ For the *Südwestfunk*, see P.W. (1963, October 12). Fernseh- und Rundfunkversorgung im Moselgebiet. Besuch im Fernseh-Großsender Haardtkopf. *Luxemburger Wort*, 20. See also the map provided with the newspaper article on UHF television broadcasting, N.N. (1962, December 8). Les Émissions de Télévision en UHF. *Luxemburger Wort*, 14. For the *Saarländischer Rundfunk*, see N.N. (1964, November 7). Keine Änderung für den Empfang des Saarländischen Fernsehens. *Luxemburger Wort*, 21. See also N.N. (1961, March 18). Umsetzer für das Moseltal geplant. *Luxemburger Wort*, 19. The *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF)* only started broadcasting on the 1st of April 1963, N.N. (1963, March 23). Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen ab 1. April aus Mainz. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹²⁵⁷ Telefunken (1962). Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das *Magnetophon automatic*”. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

¹²⁵⁸ See for example Fr. Kill-Krein (1961, October 6). Advertisement. Tagline: Unser grosser Erfolgsschlager. RADIO PICK-UP-MÖBEL in Luxusausführung. *Luxemburger Wort*, 12; Fr. Schultz (1962, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Die Radio-Saison. *Luxemburger Wort*, 8. That *Telefunken*-branded tape recorders made it into the hands of Luxembourgish consumers is also evident from private sales offers of such devices through classified advertisements, N.N. (1963, July 11). Advertisement. Tagline: 1 Magnetophon (Telefunken). *Luxemburger Wort*, 8.

would have been seen and heard not only nationwide in France,¹²⁵⁹ but also by the minority of Luxembourgers consuming these media.

With its “main theme” – *Philips* TVs were reliable products –, *Philips France*’s 1962 and 1964 television set campaigns could have been able to positively influence the attitudes of Luxembourgish consumers toward the *Philips* brand. However, these campaigns would have been severely limited in their impact on Luxembourgish consumers due to diverging technical requirements between the two countries concerning television sets: consumers in early 1960s France expected their television sets to be able to receive the first and second French channel, while Luxembourgish consumers demanded multi-norm devices. The “secondary theme” of *Philips France*’s 1962 campaign – *Philips* TVs are ready for the 2nd channel without further adjustments –¹²⁶⁰ would thus have been of no importance to Luxembourgish consumers, who expected their *Philips* television set to be able to receive five programs from four countries.¹²⁶¹ It follows that none of the television sets depicted as part of *Philips France*’s advertising campaigns would have been sold in Luxembourg. The *Philips* TVs sold in the Grand Duchy were different devices altogether. Some of the foreign consumer electronics advertising unintentionally reaching Luxembourgish audiences would hence have been irrelevant to the Grand Duchy’s consumers due to the local media environment.

The extent to which foreign advertising campaigns were effective among their unintended Luxembourgish audience must certainly be questioned. As a 1969 press article pointed out, the Grand Duchy’s consumers could never be sure whether a product they had seen advertising for in a foreign media publication was actually available for purchase in their country, which supposedly made them less receptive to foreign media advertising than to advertising in Luxembourgish media:

“Due to this large number of advertising media, the Luxemburgish consumer is exposed to a plethora of different advertisements that is ultimately not intended for him.

Since introductory advertising campaigns are particularly impressive, but the advertised goods do not actually reach the Luxembourgish market or only do so after an advertising campaign [...], the Luxembourgish consumer generally remains reserved towards these advertising media. He only feels addressed by advertising aimed at him.”¹²⁶²

¹²⁵⁹ See chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

¹²⁶⁰ See chapter 3.2.2. For *Philips France*’s 1964 campaign, see further chapter 3.2.3.

¹²⁶¹ This requirement would have been reflected in the advertising for *Philips* television sets. See for instance Radio Sachs (1962, October 23). Advertisement. Tagline: Ligne 1963. *Luxemburger Wort*, 10. Furthermore, Luxembourg would not receive the second French program until April 1965 when the transmitter in Metz began broadcasting, P.W. (1965, February 20). Europäisches Farbfernsehen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 20.

¹²⁶² This assertion seems reasonable and was probably accurate. However, it should be noted that the *Revue* was dependent on advertising revenue and would thus have profited from this being the dominant narrative, N.N. (1969, May 31). Die Luxemburgerin als Käuferin. *Revue*, 22, 96–102, p. 102. In the original German: “Durch diese grosse Anzahl von Werbeträgern ist der Luxemburger Verbraucher einer Fülle von verschiedenartigen Werbungen ausgesetzt, die letzten Endes nicht für ihn bestimmt sind. Da besonders Einführungswerbungen eindrucksvoll gestaltet werden, die angepriesenen Güter jedoch nicht oder erst nach der Werbekampagne auf dem

This phenomenon was of course not exclusive to consumer electronics devices. What was particular to this product group, however, was the fact that the German or French advertising for some devices would have presumably been (nearly) as effective in Luxembourg, while others would not have made sense at all, for instance, due to the non-applicability of the mediatic conditions referenced in the advertising.

4.2.2 Great Variety, Limited Scope. The Grand Duchy's Advertising Market

French or German consumer electronics advertising would have reached Luxembourgish audiences without explicit intent due to transnational media flows. But it was of course also possible to deliberately target Luxembourgers through advertising channels proper to the Grand Duchy. Although the domestic advertising market was small even relative to the country's size, it nonetheless offered a wide range of advertising possibilities across print, radio, television, cinema, outdoor spaces, trade fairs, and direct advertising. Companies were able to precisely address the geographically concentrated and numerically limited Luxembourgish audience through various means and could even enlist the support of an equally small but increasingly professionalized domestic advertising industry.

The *Luxemburger Wort* and the *Revue* were particularly well-suited to reaching nearly the entire country, and advertisers embraced this opportunity: in an issue of the *Revue* in November 1970 around a third of all pages were ads.¹²⁶³ These print mass media – by Luxembourgish standards – were supplemented by more specialized print publications which allowed advertisers to reach niche audiences such as Luxembourgish craftsmen, hunters, or car enthusiasts.¹²⁶⁴ Advertisers could also insert spots in *Radio Luxembourg*'s Luxembourgish-language program to precisely target the local audience in their own language or book slots on *Télé-Luxembourg* – albeit ads broadcasted there would have usually been seen primarily by consumers in the greater region and less by those in Luxembourg in particular (with the exception of *Hei elei, kuck elei* from 1969 onward).¹²⁶⁵ Audiovisual advertising to Luxembourgish audiences was further possible in the country's cinemas, which saw a noticeable decline in attendance during the 1960s but remained a viable advertising venue.¹²⁶⁶

luxemburgischen Markt erscheinen [...], bleibt der luxemburgische Verbraucher diesen Werbemitteln gegenüber allgemein verschlossen. Angesprochen fühlt er sich erst durch eine Werbung, die sich an ihn richtet.”

¹²⁶³ Binsfeld, G. (1970, December 18). Werber am Werk. *Revue*, 51, 78–87, p. 78.

¹²⁶⁴ *D'Handwierk*, *De Letzeburger Jeer*, and the *Autorevue* all accepted advertisements, *Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité*, 1973, pp. 198, 272, 309.

¹²⁶⁵ For radio and television advertising prices and formats, see *Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité*, 1961, pp. 917–919; 1973, p. 386. Advertising during *Hei elei, kuck elei* is discussed again in chapter 4.4.3, while *Télé-Luxembourg*'s audience composition is detailed in chapter 4.1.4.

¹²⁶⁶ e.f. (1971, October 2). Kinos in der Krise. *Revue*, 40, 28–31, p. 29. The decline of cinema in Luxembourg was linked to the ascendance of television and the accompanying trend to increasingly spend leisure time at home (like

Outdoor advertising possibilities were available throughout the country on billboards, public transport vehicles, street clocks, or sports grounds.¹²⁶⁷ By 1972, there were an estimated 3.000 locations.¹²⁶⁸ Trade fairs – particularly the *Foire Internationale de Luxembourg*, which drew around 200.000 visitors in the early 1970s – offered advertisers the possibility to come into personal contact with Luxembourgish consumers.¹²⁶⁹ Direct advertising was also a viable option. By the mid-1960s, the country had its first private service provider for the nationwide distribution of leaflets or product samples to all households of the Grand Duchy.¹²⁷⁰ Shop window display design as an important localized advertising form similarly underwent professionalization, with the Luxembourgish chamber of commerce officially recognizing window dressing as a profession in 1963.¹²⁷¹ The Luxembourgish advertising landscape also allowed for more unusual advertising forms specifically tailored to the market, such as company-branded parking discs meant as promotional gifts,¹²⁷² which were introduced because the City of Luxembourg began requiring parking discs in certain areas.¹²⁷³

Luxembourg's advertising infrastructure was increasingly supported by a domestic advertising industry, which underwent a process of professionalization and expansion in the post-war decades. The number of Luxembourgish businesses offering advertising-related services increased from less than a dozen in the late 1950s¹²⁷⁴ to 34 in 1974,¹²⁷⁵ new trade organizations were founded in 1959 and 1975,¹²⁷⁶ and the number of services available to clients increased particularly with the founding of the country's first full-service agency in the mid-1960s.¹²⁷⁷

in other Western European countries). This was already pointed out by Luxembourgish contemporaries, Anders, J. (1968, May 24). Nos loisirs. Un phénomène socio-économique. *D'Letzeburger Land*, 21, 5, 11, p. 5.

¹²⁶⁷ Regarding billboards and public transport vehicles, Aschman, P. (1957, November 16). Von Plakaten und Litfaßsäulen. *Revue*, 46, 6–9, 18–19, p. 19. For street clocks and sports grounds, Binsfeld, G. (1970, December 18). Werber am Werk. *Revue*, 51, 78–87, p. 81.

¹²⁶⁸ GWA Institut für Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Werbung, 1973, p. 60.

¹²⁶⁹ Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1973, p. 405.

¹²⁷⁰ The service employed some 30 deliverers, N.N. (1971, December 11). 'Relax' für Michel Gillen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9. For the fact that the service did not only deliver brochures but also advertising samples of new products see N.N. (1965, June 26). Als Geschenk ins Haus gebracht. *Luxemburger Wort*, 8.

¹²⁷¹ Jaans, J. (1965, September 25). Der Schaufenster-Dekorateur. *Revue*, 39, 52.

¹²⁷² Publi-Lux (1965, June 11). Advertisement. Tagline: Disques de stationnement pour ZONE BLEUE Luxembourg-Ville. *Luxemburger Wort*, 17.

¹²⁷³ N.N. (1965, July 3). Wo Ihr Fahrzeug abstellen? *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹²⁷⁴ United States Department of Commerce (1959). *A Directory of Foreign Advertising Agencies and Marketing Research Organizations for the United States International Business Community*. U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 82; Publi-Lux (Ed.) (1960). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1959/60*. Bourg-Bourger, p. 535.

¹²⁷⁵ STATEC, 1990, p. 170. This figure would have included everything from full-service agencies to self-employed graphic designers; STATEC still counted only six advertising agencies in the country, STATEC, 1977, p. 217. The 1974 directory of trade, industry, and commerce accordingly listed seven advertising agencies, Publi-Lux (Ed.) (1974). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1974-75*. Bourg-Bourger, p. 602.

¹²⁷⁶ N.N. (1958, December 29). Gründung einer „Fédération Luxembourgeoise de la Publicité“. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5; (1975, February 18). Association luxembourgeoise de Marketing (ALMA). *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹²⁷⁷ Reddeker, 2014, pp. 127–128; Binsfeld, G. (1970, December 18). Werber am Werk. *Revue*, 51, 78–87, p. 80.

Still, the overall weight of Luxembourg's domestic advertising industry should not be overstated. Belgian ad agencies often handled Luxembourg on the side in the 1950s and well into the 1960s,¹²⁷⁸ and smaller Luxembourgish companies frequently conducted their advertising without the help of professionals.¹²⁷⁹ As a spokesman of the industry noted in 1970,

“[...], advertising has developed more slowly in Luxembourg than in other modern industrialized countries, both in terms of advertising expenditure, i.e. the money invested in advertising, and the professional handling of advertising work. The advertising profession is still relatively young in our country, [...]”¹²⁸⁰

This assessment raises the question of the overall size of the Luxembourgish advertising market and how expenditure was distributed across its diverse formats. Quantitative historical reconstructions of the Luxembourgish advertisement landscape during the 1960s are constricted by a lack of data: *STATEC*'s first dataset dates from 1977 and covers 1974/75 (see Figure 56). However, it pertained only to Luxembourgish advertising in the narrowest sense: it could not account for the advertising Luxembourgers encountered when reading foreign print publications, listening to radio programs chiefly meant for non-Luxembourgish audiences, and watching German or French television. Similarly, the study only considered expenditures incurred by domestic advertising agencies. Expenditures of foreign advertising agencies were excluded, as were those of independently acting Luxembourgish companies (for instance in the case of window displays). All figures given in the study must thus be understood as being on the lower end due to a certain degree of under-reporting. In the case of radio and television advertising, this distortion was explicitly pointed out by *STATEC*, which had only counted advertisements in the Luxembourgish language¹²⁸¹ due to the following reasoning: “While it is to be assumed that advertising on other programs (especially German) has a real impact on the Luxembourg consumer, we have not taken it into consideration, because in principle it is aimed at the foreign consumer.”¹²⁸² This again highlights the dual nature of advertising

¹²⁷⁸ United States Department of Commerce, 1959, pp. 22–23, 82. This practice was also highlighted by Jaans, J. (1963, December 14). *Der Werbefachmann. Revue*, 50, 55. By 1967, *Philips*'s Luxembourgish advertisements were still signed by the Belgian agency *Publicem* for example, Philips (1967, January 21). Advertisement. Tagline: ce nouveau Philips enregistre 4 heures sans surveillance. *Revue*, 3, 23. On the history of advertising and advertising agencies in Belgium, see Pouillard, 2005b.

¹²⁷⁹ Jaans, J. (1963, December 14). *Der Werbefachmann. Revue*, 50, 55.

¹²⁸⁰ Binsfeld, G. (1970, December 18). *Werber am Werk. Revue*, 51, 78–87, p. 87. In the original German: “[...], hat sich die Werbung in Luxemburg langsamer entwickelt als in anderen modernen Industriestaaten, dies, sowohl was den Werbeaufwand, d. h. die in Werbung investierte Gelder, als auch die fachmännische Abwicklung der Werbearbeit betrifft. Der Beruf des Werbefachmannes ist in unserem Lande noch relativ jung, [...]” Reddeker also mentions that the Luxembourgish advertising market developed comparatively late, Reddeker, 2014, pp. 127–128.

¹²⁸¹ *STATEC*, 1977, pp. 210, 214–215.

¹²⁸² *Id.*, p. 217. In the original French: “S’il est à supposer que la publicité faite aux autres programmes (surtout allemand) a un impact réel sur le consommateur luxembourgeois, nous ne l’avons pas prise en considération, parce qu’en principe elle est destinée au consommateur étranger.”

communications to Luxembourgish consumers, who were reached by both targeted and unintended messages due to their local and transnational media consumption patterns.




Figure 56: Luxembourgish advertising expenditure in 1974. Visualization by the author. Data from: STATEC, 1977, p. 210.

According to *STATEC*, the Luxembourgish advertising market proper was worth 340 million lux. Franc in 1974. The country's press was the dominant advertising channel, accounting for two thirds of that total. Other advertising forms were considerably less important. Outdoor advertising (meaning poster advertising, public transport advertising, or advertising columns) accounted for only 10 % of the market, while television, radio and cinema advertising added up to around 11,2 % of the overall. Sales promotion measures and direct advertising played an even smaller role at 6,76 % and 6,05 % respectively. The former included samples, stands at

trade fairs, product demonstrations or displays at the point of sale, while direct advertising encompassed leaflets, brochures and letters.¹²⁸³

Luxembourgish advertising spending was low in international comparison, not only concerning absolute sums, which was to be expected given its population, but also in relative terms. In 1974, Luxembourgish advertising spending was around 24 USD per capita, compared to 41 USD in Germany and 38 USD in France. However, this figure does not accurately reflect the full extent of advertising exposure experienced by Luxembourgish consumers. For one, *STATEC* itself did acknowledge that it was likely underreported.¹²⁸⁴ But more importantly, there was also the (inadvertent) impact that advertising primarily aimed at foreign audiences had on Luxembourgish consumers.

The companies that actively invested in advertising measures specifically targeting the Grand Duchy's inhabitants were, for the most part, based in Luxembourg; they accounted for over four-fifths of the advertising expenditure recorded by *STATEC*.¹²⁸⁵ This constituted the second dimension of the Luxembourgish advertising experience: locally established firms making use of local channels, primarily print. Notably, for the Luxembourgish consumer electronics sector, there is a fundamental differentiation to be made between two types of companies that resided in Luxembourg and advertised to Luxembourgish consumers: representatives of foreign companies and retailers. In order to explain why this distinction matters, and how it manifested itself in practice, the Luxembourgish consumer electronics distribution system needs to be addressed first.

¹²⁸³ *STATEC*, 1977, pp. 210, 214–215. *STATEC* provided comparative data on the percentual allocation between advertising forms for various countries it had taken from the magazine *Advertising Age*. However, this dataset does not really allow for detailed transnational comparisons, as it had not been standardized between countries: costs for trade fairs, direct advertising, or sales promotion measures were, for instance, included to varying degrees depending on the country, distorting the data. Based on what is given, however, the Luxembourgish figures for outdoor and sales promotion advertising formats were rather low in international comparison.

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid.* The figure provided for Germany by *Advertising Age* and cited by *STATEC* seems to have been too low as well. The total German advertising spending for 1974 given by *STATEC/Advertising Age* was 2,5 billion USD. This was around 6,48 billion DM according to the 1974 USD-DM exchange rate provided in Antweiler, 2024. However, according to the German market research institute *DIVO INMAR*, German advertising spending was already more than nine billion DM in 1971, *DIVO INMAR*, 1974, p. 386. This is corroborated by similar data for 1972 from the magazine *Media Perspektiven* as cited by Schmidt & Spieß, which puts the gross German advertising expenditure as being well above nine billion DM as well, Schmidt & Spieß, 1996, p. 201. The figure provided by *STATEC* for France on the other hand (38 USD per capita) was roughly in line with the data provided for 1973 and 1974 by the French advertising research institute *IREP*: according to its data, advertising spending per capita was 173 FF in 1973, and it was estimated to be 177 FF in 1974; this equated 38,8 USD per capita in 1973 and 39,7 USD in 1974 as per the exchange rates given by Antweiler. Similarly, the total sum of 1,98 billion USD given by *STATEC* for the French advertising market in 1974 – around 9,12 billion FF – also matches with the nine billion FF given by *IREP* for 1973 and the 9,3 billion FF estimated for 1974, *IREP* (1974). Le Marché Publicitaire Français en 1973, in *Bulletin d'Information de l'IREP*, 16, 3–14. INAthèque, Fonds Jacques Durand. Dossiers personnels sur l'IREP, ID 12834-0001, Dossier N°1 IREP 1960-1975, p. 8.

¹²⁸⁵ It is impossible to assess to what extent this finding was distorted by the dataset's compilation, as it did, for instance, not include the Luxembourgish expenditures of foreign advertising agencies (which might have worked more often with foreign companies), *STATEC*, 1977, pp. 212–213.

4.3 Imported Goods and Local Networks. The Structure of the Luxembourgish Consumer Electronics Market

4.3.1 No National Champion. Luxembourg's Dependency on Consumer Electronics Imports

The Luxembourgish consumer electronics market was the exclusive domain of foreign manufacturers throughout the long 1960s. In the after-war period, there had been one consumer electronics manufacturer in the Grand Duchy, *Ducal Radio*, which had produced a few hundred radios per month. But after *Ducal Radio* ceased production in the mid-1950s to focus on import and wholesaling instead,¹²⁸⁶ Luxembourg became completely dependent on imports in the consumer electronics market. It is, however, rather difficult to ascertain Luxembourgish trade patterns. Due to the economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg, the UEBL, only combined trade data is usually available for the timeframe in question.¹²⁸⁷ What is more, the UEBL artificially inflated Luxembourgish-Belgian trade figures, as Luxembourgish trade with third countries often went through Belgium as an intermediary.¹²⁸⁸ Only rather general statements can hence be made.

In the early 1950s, around 50 % of all Luxembourgish imports (by value) had come from – or through – Belgium, with another 31-32 % coming from West Germany. France was a distant third at around 4-6 %. By 1960, Belgium's share had fallen to 37,3 %, while imports from France had taken on a greater importance, now accounting for 13,6 % of imports by value. West Germany's share had risen as well to 36,9 %. This percentage allocation would then only fluctuate slightly during the 1960s.¹²⁸⁹ Luxembourg's neighbors hence were the country's most important trade partners by far concerning imports. No trade statistics could be located for consumer electronics products that pertained to Luxembourg only, as foreign publications usually listed the UEBL as one entity. It is thus not possible to say with absolute certainty what

¹²⁸⁶ Raymond Stein, one of the company's founders, would later explain the decision to cease production with the increased competition from the industries in the neighboring countries, namely Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as with a lack of support from the Luxembourgish state, Tholl, R. (undated). *Ducal-Radio*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://rtholl.jimdoweb.com/ducal-radio/>. According to an article in *d'Letzeburger Land* from 1990, *Ducal Radio* produced 200-300 radios per month after the war before then pivoting to importing and wholesaling instead, N.N. (1990, October 5). *Firmenjubiläum. d'Letzeburger Land*, 40, 19. In another article in the *Revue* from 1967, a monthly production figure of 400 radios is given instead, N.N. (1967, December 23). *DE KIERZTE SAZ E SLOGAN FIR DUCAL. Revue*, 51, 100.

¹²⁸⁷ Walker, R. H. (1968). *Basic Data on the Economy of Luxembourg* (No. 68–60; Overseas Business Reports). United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, p. 12.

¹²⁸⁸ STATEC (1969). *Le commerce extérieur du Luxembourg* (Vol. 25, No. 5; Bulletin Du STATEC). Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/mv4h9wsr2w/articles/DIVL6>, p. 100.

¹²⁸⁹ By 1968, Belgium accounted for 36,5 %, West Germany for 34,2 % and France for 12,7 %, STATEC, 1969, p. 100. See also Walker, 1968, p. 13. West Germany would overtake Belgium concerning imports by value in 1969, STATEC (1970). *Le commerce extérieur du Luxembourg en 1968 et en 1969* (Vol. 26, No. 7; Bulletin Du STATEC, p. 185). Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/b3zb1phtj9/>.

percentage of overall consumer electronics devices sold in Luxembourg were imported from what country. Based on the UEBL data, however, it seems highly likely that imports from Germany played a much bigger role than imports from France.

In 1962, the French industry exported 42.000 radios and 900 television sets to the UEBL.¹²⁹⁰ That same year, German companies exported 71.470 radios and 6.386 television sets to Luxembourg and Belgium.¹²⁹¹ Nearly a decade later, in 1971, French exports had only seen a minor increase in absolute figures,¹²⁹² while German exports on the other hand had grown considerably: in 1971, the industry exported 221.402 radios, 31.019 black and white television sets and 17.394 color TVs to the UEBL.¹²⁹³ Just as consumer electronics imports to the UEBL increased during the 1960s, so did Belgian domestic production. *Philips*, for instance, had significant production capabilities in the country to complement its Dutch factories.¹²⁹⁴ It is very difficult to precisely ascertain the importance of Belgian consumer electronics production for the Luxembourgish market. However, it stands to reason that Belgian-sourced radios, phono products or television sets occupied a sizable market share, particularly given that *Philips*, a key player on the consumer electronics market, maintained a complex, entangled Belgo-Luxembourgish network of companies.¹²⁹⁵ *Philips Luxembourg*, a daughter company of

¹²⁹⁰ Landau, 1973, pp. 52, 55.

¹²⁹¹ HM/PRI (undated). *Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Zahlen bis 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1142. Sheet 22. Geräte-Ausfuhr der Bundesrepublik Deutschland einschließlich West-Berlin (Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Geräte). Januar – Dezember 1962.

¹²⁹² France exported 68.000 radios and 3.100 television sets to the UEBL in 1971, Landau, 1973, pp. 52, 55.

¹²⁹³ HM/PRI (undated). *Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Zahlen bis 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1142. Sheet 22. Geräte-Ausfuhr nach EUROPA (Rundfunk- und Fernseh-Geräte). Jan. – Dez. 1971.

¹²⁹⁴ Hallet, J. (1973). *Étude sur l'évolution de la concentration dans l'industrie de la construction électrique en Belgique. Construction d'appareils électriques, radios, télévision, électro-acoustique (N.I.C.E. 375). Fabrication d'appareils électrodomestiques (N.I.C.E. 376)*. European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <http://aei.pitt.edu/40410/>, p. 70. Hallet does not explicitly mention *Philips* by name. Instead, he writes about a “very large company” (“très grande firme”) with significant production capabilities in Belgium and the Netherlands alike – which only applied to *Philips*.

¹²⁹⁵ It goes beyond the scope of this work to detail the rather complex evolution of *Philips*'s Belgo-Luxembourgish network of companies. Only a few general indicators can be given to show its sprawl and degree of transnational integration with no claim to completeness. *Philips* was present on the Grand Duchy's market through *Philips Luxembourg*, a daughter of the *Philips Belgium*. This company had evolved out of *Philips Belgium*'s Luxembourgish branch office in 1956. *Philips Luxembourg* hence initially kept very close ties with *Philips Belgium*, who continued to perform certain services on behalf of *Philips Luxembourg*. This transition is discussed in detail in AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 427 & 428. Devices of the *Siera* brand on the other hand were sold by *Solura* in Belgium, which was another part of *Philips*'s company network. *Solura* was closely interwoven with *Philips Belgium*: while its advertising was done separately, its repair service and its depot, for instance, were both handled by *Philips Belgium* in the early 1950s, N.N. (1950, December 2[1]). *Administration Solura*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 860. *Solura* had its own, separate daughter company in Luxembourg from 1963 onward. Before that, *Solura* had only maintained a servicing station in the country. This new Luxembourgish daughter was supposed to act only as a “façade” with limited personnel, Ghislain, E. (1963, June 20). *Note à Monsieur van den Heule*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 866. At some point, *Philips* also acquired *Novak*. From 1972 onward, *Siera*- and *Novak*-branded devices were both commercialized in Luxembourg by a new company, the *S. A. Associated Consumer Brands – Luxembourg*. Its shares were owned by *Sedena*, which ultimately, too, seems to have been part of *Philips*'s network of companies, N.N. (undated). “S.A. Associated Consumer Brands – Luxembourg” en abrégé “A.C.B.–Luxembourg”. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 171. In 1973, another new company, *Servinter Luxembourg*, was set up by *Philips*

Philips's Belgian enterprise, accordingly identified German enterprises as its main competitors on the Luxembourgish market.¹²⁹⁶

As Luxembourg had no national champion in the consumer electronics industry, most of the media devices available for purchase to Luxembourgish consumers during the long 1960s were manufactured either by *Philips* or by one of several Belgian and German companies. The *Société Luxembourgeoise Telefunken*, for instance, imported all kinds of consumer electronics from its German mother company. Luxembourgish consumers would thus have been able to largely buy the same *Telefunken*-branded radios or tape recorders as their German counterparts – with the notable exception of multi-norm television sets, which were instead sourced from the Belgian company *Carpentier* in the early 1960s.¹²⁹⁷ By 1970, the *Société Luxembourgeoise Telefunken* reached a total revenue of just below two million DM. In comparison, *Telefunken France* and *Telefunken Belge* reached revenues of 27 million DM and 15 million DM respectively that same year.¹²⁹⁸ The Luxembourgish consumer electronics market thus made up only a small portion of the overall foreign business of transnationally active consumer electronics companies, but was still substantial enough to warrant attention.

Luxembourg, Philips Belgium, Associated Consumer Brands Belgium, Associated Consumer Brands – Luxembourg, Sedena, and Servinter Belgium. It was supposed to rationalize the repair process of products commercialized in Luxembourg by companies in the *Philips* company network – *Philips's* Belgo-Luxembourgish company network thus still closely cooperated on a transnational level in the 1970s, Baden, F. (1973, October 29). *Acte de constitution de la S.A. Servinter-Luxembourg du 29 octobre 1973 – No 602/73.* AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 844. In the 1980s, *Philips* also acquired the *Sogel S. A.*, an important player in the distribution of consumer electronics on the Luxembourgish market, see the archival folders AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 873–880. In *Philips's* overall strategy, brands such as *Novak* and *Siera* were supposed to “complement the activities of the Philips-brand” (“rôle de complément des activités de la marque Philips”), N.N. (undated). *Solura.* AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 863. Besides the AGR2 archival fonds on *Philips Belgium*, the official journal of the Grand Duchy, which is digitized and searchable on the eluxemburgensia-database, offers insights into the development of *Philips's* Luxembourgish company network.

¹²⁹⁶ In 1959 as in 1969, *Philips Luxembourg* pointed to German companies being its strongest competition, *Philips Luxembourg S.A.* (1959, June 2). *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Philips-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires du 2 Juin 1959.* AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431; (1969, June 3). *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Philips-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale ordinaire du 3 Juin 1969.* AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431. *Solura Luxembourg* also highlighted the strong German competition on the radio market in 1965, *Solura-Luxembourg S. A.* (1965, June 1) *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Solura-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale ordinaire des actionnaires du 1.6.1965,* AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 868.

¹²⁹⁷ FM/Exk-Ulm (1963, April 3). *Telefunken Export und Vertrieb in der EWG und evtl. zukünftigen EWG-Partnerländern.* Enclosure of Ackermann to Weblus (1963, April 24). *Internal letter. Subject: E W G. DTMB/AEG, GS 1951.* *Carpentier* also supplied a very limited quantity of its multi-norm devices to *Telefunken France*, Mößner (1967, July 18). *Notiz. Subject: Gespräche mit Telefunken France am 13./14.7.1967 und zweitweilig mit zwei Herren von G/RV.* DTMB/AEG, GS 7954, p. 4.

¹²⁹⁸ *Telefunken Geschäftsbereich R* (undated). *Hauptplan 1972 der Europäischen Mehrheitsbeteiligungen. Erfolgsrechnung Geschäftsbereich R (Wertangaben in DMT).* DTMB/AEG, GS 1467; (undated). *Hauptplan 1972 der Europäischen Mehrheitsbeteiligungen. Fachbereichszahlen Fachbereich R1 (Wertangaben in DMT).* DTMB/AEG, GS 1467; (undated). *Hauptplan 1972 der Europäischen Mehrheitsbeteiligungen. Fachbereichszahlen Fachbereich R2 (Wertangaben in DMT).* DTMB/AEG, GS 1467.

4.3.2 The Two Models of Foreign Brand Presence in Luxembourg

Foreign consumer electronics manufacturers were usually present in Luxembourg through one of two forms during the long 1960s: either companies founded their own subsidiaries in the country or they formed an import partnership with a Luxembourgish company. The Luxembourgish directory of trade, industry, and commerce offered important guidance in that regard, although it was certainly not exhaustive. In its 1959/60 edition, it listed 18 importers and wholesalers specialized in the radio and television trade. Among them were a handful of subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers such as *Telefunken*, *Philips*, *Siemens* or the Belgian *Ateliers de Constructions Électriques de Charleroi (ACEC)*. But most were local companies that had entered a partnership with a foreign manufacturer to serve as their exclusive importer and agent in Luxembourg. These usually concerned German brands: *Blaupunkt*, *Grundig*, *Braun*, *Körting*, *Nordmende*, *Saba*, *Loewe*, *Tonfunk*, *Schaub-Lorenz*, and *Graetz* all had a Luxembourgish presence through such partnerships. The same was true for the Belgian brand *Novak*, for instance. French brands were notably absent,¹²⁹⁹ corroborating the tendencies established with the trade figures.

Many partnerships would last throughout the whole timeframe in question. By 1974, the directory listed 20 such radio and television importers and wholesalers. Most of them had already been on the list some 15 years earlier.¹³⁰⁰ This is not to say that changes did not happen at all. *Arno Zuang*, for instance, lost his longstanding mandate for *Graetz* to the *Sogel S.A.* in the late 1960s.¹³⁰¹ Furthermore, a number of consumer electronics wholesalers entered the market without it being recorded in the directory.¹³⁰² But the general logic of having an agent/importer or a subsidiary would have applied in the late 1950s as well as in the mid-1970s.

¹²⁹⁹ Publi-Lux, 1960, pp. 310–311. At least in the case of *Philips*'s Belgo-Luxembourgish network, the establishment of Luxembourgish subsidiaries had been preceded by a different organizational setup: until 1956, *Philips*'s Luxembourgish business had been handled by a branch office of *Philips Belgium*. *Solura* similarly only established a proper subsidiary for *Siera*-branded devices in the Grand Duchy in 1963, Ghislain, E. (1963, June 20). *Note à Monsieur van den Heule*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 866. While both enterprises remained dependent on their Belgian mother companies, these developments were nonetheless a step toward greater autonomy of the Luxembourgish actors. Giving *Philips Luxembourg* more maneuvering room than the branch office had enjoyed previously was necessary as *Philips Belgium* wanted the Luxembourgish public to perceive *Philips Luxembourg* as an autonomously acting company, van Pevenage, R. (1956, February 28). *Rapport à Monsieur Clauset. Concerne: Philips Luxembourg*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 428.

¹³⁰⁰ This did not just apply to the subsidiaries of *Telefunken*, *Philips*, *Siemens*, or *ACEC*, but also to partnerships: *Albert Loschetter & Fils*, for instance, still exclusively imported *Saba*-devices. The same was true for *Henri Schmit* and *Loewe*, *Camille Klein* and *Körting*, or *Lessel Frères* and *Nordmende*, Publi-Lux, 1974, p. 339.

¹³⁰¹ *Arno Zuang* had already been the Luxembourgish partner of *Graetz* in 1959 and would remain so at least until 1967. By 1970, *Graetz* had partnered with the *Sogel S.A.* instead, even though *Arno Zuang* had not gone out of business, Publi-Lux, 1960, pp. 310–311; 1967, p. 491; (1970). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1969-1970*. Bourg-Bourger, p. 306.

¹³⁰² STATEC counted 19 wholesalers of “electrical equipment, radios, household appliances, televisions” (“Matériel électrique, radios, appareils électro-ménagers, télévisions”) for 1960, and 30 for 1970, STATEC, 1973, p. 306.

Following the importation of goods, the representatives would engage in the distribution and sale of these consumer electronics products to the country's retailers. While these import partners and subsidiaries usually functioned exclusively as wholesalers, some were dual-channel businesses that also sold directly to consumers – such as *Blaupunkt*'s partner *Central Radio*,¹³⁰³ *Nordmende*'s partner *Lessel Frères*,¹³⁰⁴ and *Grundig*'s partner *Aly Beck*.¹³⁰⁵ Although Luxembourgish retailers were the first point of contact for any type of servicing, adjustments, or simpler repairs,¹³⁰⁶ the manufacturer representatives were usually also the ones ultimately responsible for repairing and servicing devices of Luxembourgish consumers no matter the precise distribution arrangement. This applied to import partners¹³⁰⁷ as well as to the subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers. In the case of *Telefunken*'s Luxembourgish subsidiary, the regular procedure if a problem did arise would have been the following: consumers were supposed to contact the retailer where they had bought the device, who would then bring it to the repair service of the subsidiary (if he could not rectify the defect himself), which would repair it and return it to the retailer for pick-up within two days. This did not, however, stop individual Luxembourgish consumers from directly contacting the mother company abroad with their complaints.¹³⁰⁸ Local partners and subsidiaries were hence key intermediary actors.

¹³⁰³ *Central Radio* was *Blaupunkt*'s “Agent exclusif” and importer in Luxembourg, see for instance *Central Radio* (1971, January 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Blaupunkt Autoradios. *Revue*, 3, 35. This did not impede the company from selling directly to consumers, *Central Radio* (1958, August 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Braderie am 1.9.58. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. In the early 1960s, service and import were technically done by *Central Radio* and *Jos. Brandenbourger* respectively, *Central Radio* (1960, November 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Überzeugend in Leistung und Ton. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9. However, Mr. Brandenbourger seems to also have worked at *Central Radio* as it was his family's business. After his death in 1963, import and service for *Blaupunkt* were both handled by *Central Radio*, see N.N. (1963, September 20). In memoriam. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5; *Central Radio* (1964, November 21). Advertisement. Tagline: BLAUPUNKT Rundfunkgeräte. *Luxemburger Wort*, 27; N.N. (1966, March 12). “Central Radio”. *Revue*, 11, 9.

¹³⁰⁴ *Nordmende* products were imported by *Lessel Frères* and sold by Luxembourgish retailers, *Lessel Frères* (1970, June 3). Advertisement. Tagline: NordMende Radio Television. *Luxemburger Wort*, 24. At the same time, the Lessel family had three electronics retail businesses in the Grand Duchy, N.N. (1960, October 8). *Revue-Gléckspolice*. *Revue*, 41, 25.

¹³⁰⁵ *Aly Beck*, exclusive importer of *Grundig* devices, sold directly to consumers at “wholesale prices” (“Großhandelspreise”), *Aly Beck* (1970, October 13). Advertisement. Tagline: ACHTUNG – ACHTUNG. *Luxemburger Wort*, 16. See also *Aly Beck* (1966, April 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Sehr wichtige Mitteilung! *Luxemburger Wort*, 8. Other Luxembourgish retailers of course also carried *Grundig* products, see for instance *Fr. Kill et Fils* (1965, November 20). Advertisement. Tagline: Große TELE- und RADIOSCHAU 66. *Luxemburger Wort*, 28.

¹³⁰⁶ *Beck, A.* (1975, August 23). Preissenkung in der Elektrobranche. *Luxemburger Wort*, 3. More broadly on the history of repair in Luxembourg, see *Krebs, S.* (2023). Zum vermeintlichen Verschwinden des Reparierens in Luxemburg, 1956–1987. *Technikgeschichte*, 90(2), 93–110.

¹³⁰⁷ *Albert Loschetter & Fils*, for instance, also used their quick customer service performed by “manufacturer-trained technicians” (“werksgeschulte Techniker”) as an argument in their advertising, *A. Loschetter & Fils* (1973, April 26). Advertisement. Tagline: SABA Fernseh-Modelle 1973. *Luxemburger Wort*, 15. *Aly Beck* was similarly given as *Grundig*'s local warranty service partner, *Aly Beck* (1972, December 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Weihnachts-Angebot. *Luxemburger Wort*, 22.

¹³⁰⁸ *Olufs & Barth* to *Diedrich* (1962, March 27). Letter. Subject: Fernsehgerät. Enclosure of *Olufs* to *Seydlitz* (1962, March 27). Internal letter. Subject: Beschwerde des Kunden *Jos. Diedrich, Bergem/Post Bettembourg/Luxemburg*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1983.

They bridged the gap between foreign manufacturers and Luxembourgish retailers by not only facilitating imports but also by ensuring adequate after-sales service – a necessity in the consumer electronics business at the time. Luxembourg's retailers, in turn, were responsible for bridging the gap between importers and consumers.

4.3.3 Regional Structure, National Law, and Transnational Links. Retailing Consumer Electronics in the Grand Duchy

A study for the European Commission estimated that there were around 450 wholesalers and 4.200 retailers in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in total in 1958. These were usually small businesses, which, in 1960, had an average of 1.5 employees.¹³⁰⁹ This would not change much throughout the decade: by 1971, there were around 600 wholesalers and 4.238 retailers in the country, employing 1.675 and 4.375 people respectively.¹³¹⁰ The precise figure of retailers active in the consumer electronics trade is harder to determine. The Luxembourgish directory of trade, industry, and commerce may again serve as a first point of reference. In its 1959/60 edition, 256 retailers were listed as selling radios, television sets, and/or electric household articles. Dozens of them were located in the City of Luxembourg, while smaller towns only had one or two such businesses.¹³¹¹ The total number of such retail merchants listed in the directory declined during the 1960s, with the 1974 directory counting only 209.¹³¹²

The actual number of businesses in Luxembourg which had consumer electronics in their product range would have certainly been higher, as the directory was not exhaustive: a 1968 newspaper article for example estimated that over 300 retail businesses in the country sold radio and television sets.¹³¹³ There would thus have been a few hundred retail shops throughout the country that carried consumer electronics in the long 1960s. It was not only classical electronics

¹³⁰⁹ 4.200 retailers equated one retail business per 78 inhabitants – a similar proportion as in Germany, Commission D.G. Marché Intérieur (1961). *Les appareils commerciaux des pays de la C.E.E. Deuxième partie: Les États membres* (Working Document III/D/6021/61-F). European Commission. Accessed December 5, 2025. <http://aei.pitt.edu/37432/>, pp. 119–121. The Luxembourgish directory of trade, industry, and commerce gives slightly different figures for 1958: 3.866 retail businesses and 494 wholesalers, Publi-Lux, 1960, p. 49.

¹³¹⁰ Reyland, R. (1973). *Guide du Marché Luxembourgeois 1973* (10th ed.). Bourg-Bourger, p. 67.

¹³¹¹ Publi-Lux, 1960, pp. 311–317.

¹³¹² Publi-Lux, 1974, pp. 340–344. The 1963/64 edition had still listed 223 such retailers, Publi-Lux (Ed.) (1964). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1963/64*. Bourg-Bourger, pp. 310–313. In 1967, their number was down to 217, Publi-Lux, 1967, pp. 289–293.

¹³¹³ Anders, J. (1968, May 24). *Nos loisirs. Un phénomène socio-économique. D'Letzeburger Land*, 21, 5, 11, p. 5. In 1975, the president of the Luxembourgish retailers' federation (who happened to be in the consumer electronics business as well) estimated that there were around a total of 350 business owners trading in electrical devices, Beck, A. (1975, August 23). *Preissenkung in der Elektrobranche. Luxemburger Wort*, 3. The figures given so far roughly correspond to the number of local clients *Philips Luxembourg* did business with in 1956 in terms of order of magnitude. At the time, *Philips Luxembourg* had around 600 clients, with 250 of them regularly purchasing from the company. Far from all of those 600 clients would have been in the consumer electronics trade, however, as *Philips Luxembourg* was also very active in professional electronics and lighting, Philips Luxembourg S.A. (1956, November 17). *Aperçu d'Activité*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431, p. 3.

retail merchants that could have a range of consumer electronics on offer. Some furniture stores, for instance, also sold television sets,¹³¹⁴ while car accessory shops carried car radios.¹³¹⁵ In addition, there seems to have been a phenomenon of private citizens obtaining a trading authorization to purchase consumer electronics from wholesalers to then sell them to their acquaintances as a side business.¹³¹⁶

Electronics retailers of varying sizes throughout the country usually carried a selection of household appliances and consumer electronics from multiple brands, presenting them in their stores and shop windows.¹³¹⁷ Committing to one brand was the exception,¹³¹⁸ and in many smaller Luxembourgish towns, the local communities were served by the same retail merchant in 1959 as in 1974.¹³¹⁹ Generalist electronics retailers that sold fridges as well as radios seem to have been the norm throughout the long 1960s. This meant that not every consumer electronics device would have been easily available for purchase in all cities and villages.

Luxembourg's consumer electronics retail distribution structure was effectively akin to that of a French or German region due to the country's size: a limited number of stores were spread throughout the whole country with a higher concentration of retailers in the cities of Luxembourg and Esch, where it would have been possible to obtain certain consumer electronics devices not available for purchase elsewhere in the country. Unlike in Germany or France, however, certain devices might have necessitated a trip across the Grand Duchy's borders, as was pointed out when the country's first specialist retailer for high-fidelity and stereo opened in 1965: "Until now, owners of a stereo system had to buy their equipment abroad. These devices didn't quite fit the framework of an electronics retail store, because

¹³¹⁴ See for instance Galerie Moderne (1962, March 31). Advertisement. Tagline: Zoppas. Le meilleur frigo. *Luxemburger Wort*, 15.

¹³¹⁵ N.N. (1970, August 12). Eröffnung eines Geschäftes für Autozubehör in der Bädergasse. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹³¹⁶ According to an accusation by the president of the Luxembourgish retailers' federation, there was a "vast" ("unübersehbar") number of private citizens active in the Luxembourgish trade for consumer electronics and other electrical devices by the mid-1970s. As he told it, these worked in other fields but had obtained a trading authorization, which enabled them to place orders with Luxembourgish wholesalers. And as they had no operating expenditures, they were then able to undercut the prices of electricians and other specialist retailers, offering their friends and acquaintances the same products for better prices, Beck, A. (1975, August 23). Preissenkung in der Elektrobranche. *Luxemburger Wort*, 3.

¹³¹⁷ See for instance Fr. Kill-Krein (1963, November 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Nein, ein Fernsehapparat ist nicht teuer!!! *Luxemburger Wort*, 14; N.N. (1966, August 18). Geschäftseröffnung in Bergem. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5; Iy. (1969, October 14). Wiedereröffnung des Elektro-Geschäfts Linster. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11; N.N. (1970, May 27). Elektro-Fachgeschäft Raymond König in Esch/Lallingen eröffnet. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7; M.-L. E. (1973, May 14). 25 Jahre Electro Hauser. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹³¹⁸ It was explicitly pointed out as a novelty on the Luxembourgish market that the new electronics retailer in Kayl near exclusively carried ACEC-products and was closely affiliated with this particular brand, E.R. (1965, April 23). Eröffnung eines Elektrowaren-Geschäftes in Kayl. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6.

¹³¹⁹ A comparison of names in the two directories shows significant overlaps, Publi-Lux, 1960, pp. 311–317; 1974, pp. 340–344.

household appliances of all kinds are sold there in addition to music playing devices.”¹³²⁰ Retailers outside the country would even actively encourage cross-border shopping, at least by the mid-1970s. In 1974, a *Carrefour* hypermarket opened in the Belgian municipality of Messancy, a few kilometers beyond the Luxembourgish border.¹³²¹ Within a few weeks, it began to advertise its product range in the *Luxemburger Wort*, promising Luxembourgish consumers cheaper prices on everything from cheese to cassette recorders.¹³²²

It was not only Luxembourg’s small size that shaped the country’s consumer electronics retail landscape: the Grand Duchy’s nationhood directly impacted its character as well, as Luxembourg set its own consumer electronics pricing regulations,¹³²³ and restricted certain retail forms to privilege small enterprises. This combination of size and sovereign legislative power is perhaps best illustrated by the example of the Luxembourgish subsidiary of the German mail order company *Quelle*.

Quelle offered more than 20.000 articles in its mail order catalog in the early 1960s. German consumers could consult the catalog at home and have their orders delivered directly to them. But mail order businesses were forbidden in Luxembourg at the time. So, when *Quelle* opened its Luxembourgish subsidiary in summer 1962 – which had only been possible in the first place due to a liberalization concerning the freedom of establishment for businesses in the EEC –, it did not offer mail order services. Neither did it have the whole array of products in stock that the company usually had on offer: businesses with more than seven salespersons were forbidden to carry products from more than two different classes of goods in early 1960s Luxembourg (effectively prohibiting large department stores). Thus, *Quelle* instead opted for a retail shop in the City of Luxembourg, which only sold electrical appliances and consumer electronics (“Elektroapparate”), and cameras and photography related accessories (“Photoartikel”). What

¹³²⁰ ly. (1965, May 21). “Audio-Center”, ein Unternehmen neuer Art. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. In the original German: “Besitzer einer Musik-Anlage mußten ihre Geräte bisher im Ausland erwerben. Die Apparaturen paßten nicht so recht in den Rahmen eines Elektro-Fachgeschäftes, weil hier neben Geräten musikalischer Natur auch Haushaltsapparate jeder Art verkauft werden.” The concept of this specialist retailer proved to be successful, as it expanded to another location in Esch, the country’s second city in 1971. According to a newspaper article reporting on this expansion, these two stores were the country’s only locations where consumers would have found brands such as *Bang & Olufsen*, *Toshiba*, or *Thorens*, which implies that this retailer had taken it upon himself to import devices of those brands, At-t. (1971, October 16). Jetzt auch “Audi-Center” in Esch/Alzette. *Luxemburger Wort*, 8. It would not have been completely unusual for Luxembourgers to go abroad to visit a Belgian retail store, von Kunitzki, N. (1971, July 16). Le commerce extérieur de l’UEBL. *D’Letzeburger Land*, 29, 11.

¹³²¹ c. j. (1974, October 16). Hypermarché Carrefour-Messancy. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11.

¹³²² Carrefour (1974, December 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Carrefour Messancy. *Luxemburger Wort*, 13.

¹³²³ See for instance *Arrêté ministériel du 19 mars 1957, relatif aux prix maxima des appareils ménagers, électro-ménagers, radio-électriques et téléviseurs*, A 17 Mémorial 233-234 (1957, March 19). Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/amin/1957/03/19/n1/jo>; *Règlement grand-ducal du 13 juin 1975 relatif aux prix maxima des appareils ménagers, électro-ménagers, radio-électriques, des téléviseurs, des antennes, des accessoires et pièces de rechange, ainsi que du matériel d’éclairage et d’installation électrique*, A 38 Mémorial 790-792 (1975, June 13). Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rgd/1975/06/13/n2/jo>.

is more, *Quelle* was limited to this singular location in Luxembourg; chain stores, too, were forbidden in most circumstances.¹³²⁴

Due to Luxembourgish legislation, the German mail order company was only able to establish itself in the Grand Duchy as an electronics retailer with a single location, which sold consumer electronics devices and provided after-sales service first through contracted Luxembourgish partners and later through its own technicians on site.¹³²⁵ But this did not mean that *Quelle* was not also present in Luxembourg with its core business: *Quelle* had already had around 1.000 customers in the Grand Duchy before the retail store had even been opened. They circumvented the Luxembourgish ban on mail order businesses by placing their order directly with the German company. With the *Quelle* store, this state of affairs became even more odd: the retail store in the City of Luxembourg would prominently display the catalogs on its premises but would not take any orders for legal reasons. Interested customers still needed to take their order to the post and send it to the German *Quelle* (who would also do the billing) without any further involvement of the Luxembourgish subsidiary.¹³²⁶

Luxembourg's consumer electronics retail landscape during the long 1960s was concurrently shaped by an interplay between its region-like structure, sovereign legislation, and transnational links. Due to the country's small size and population, the scope of Luxembourg's consumer electronics retail network resembled that of a French or German region: a few hundred generalist retailers anchored in their local communities, with broader product availability concentrated in the cities of Luxembourg and Esch. Yet, this retail landscape was also markedly influenced by the Grand Duchy's capability to enact its own legislative framework by virtue of being a sovereign nation: the country, for instance, restricted certain retail forms such as mail order services. Such constraints were softened by the country's size, however, which facilitated transnational advertising and cross-border shopping – in person or even per mail; the Grand Duchy's consumers did not always need to rely on domestic retail infrastructure to purchase a radio or record player.

4.3.4 Show don't Sell. Consumer Electronics Showrooms in Luxembourg

The small family businesses common in Luxembourg's electronics retail trade at the time typically lacked the space to put a wide range of electrical appliances or consumer electronics

¹³²⁴ Kr. (1962, November 23). QUELLE - Kunden und Konkurrenz. *D'Letzeburger Land*, 47, 3. For the legislation at the time, see *Loi du 2 juin 1962 déterminant les conditions d'accès et d'exercice de certaines professions ainsi que celles de la constitution et de la gestion d'entreprises*, A 31 Mémorial 488-492 (1962, June 2). Accessed December 29, 2025. <http://data.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/1962/06/02/n1/jo>.

¹³²⁵ Kr. (1962, November 23). QUELLE - Kunden und Konkurrenz. *D'Letzeburger Land*, 47, 3; J.G. (1967, December 8). Fünf Jahre "Quelle" in Luxemburg. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹³²⁶ Kr. (1962, November 23). QUELLE - Kunden und Konkurrenz. *D'Letzeburger Land*, 47, 3.

devices on display. In response, consumer electronics wholesalers set up showrooms from the mid-1950s onward, in which products would be displayed and demonstrated to private customers. While such showrooms were also explicitly meant for consultations, no sales were made there that bypassed the retail trade. These showrooms were only supposed to enable consumers to compare a larger selection of devices against each other to make an informed choice. Any sale would then still involve the local electrician or consumer electronics retailer,¹³²⁷ who would even often visit those showrooms with their customers.¹³²⁸

The local subsidiaries of *Siemens*,¹³²⁹ *Philips*¹³³⁰ or *Telefunken*¹³³¹ all still had such no-sale showrooms in the City of Luxembourg by the early 1970s, as did *Saba*'s import partner *Albert Loschetter & Fils*¹³³² or *Braun*'s agent *Ducal Radio*.¹³³³ Given their similarity to retail locations, it follows that accessibility mattered for the success of those showrooms; *Philips Luxembourg*, whose old showroom had seen six to seven visitors per day on average in the mid-1950s,¹³³⁴ experienced a marked increase in traffic after opening a new showroom in a location where

¹³²⁷ Such showrooms were introduced in the press as an innovation, N.N. (1955, June 7). *Moderner Ausstellungsraum für Elektro-Artikel*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11; J.L. (1955, June 3). *Dort, wo der Kunde König ist*. *d'Letzeburger Land*, 22, 6. According to a 1971 newspaper article, *Siemens* would have been one of the first in the trade to construct such a showroom in the city of Luxembourg in 1955, m.k. (1971, December 24). *Neue Ausstellungsräume der 'Siemens S.A. Luxembourg' in der Glesenerstraße*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6. Having an electrician also sell (basic) consumer electronics was not an exclusively Luxembourgish phenomenon. In the French countryside, too, it was "the local electrician who sold the television sets" as Isabelle Gaillard has noted, Gaillard, 2013a, p. 83.

¹³²⁸ N.N. (1967, December 23). *DE KIERZTE SAZ E SLOGAN FIR DUCAL*. *Revue*, 51, 100. This seems to have been common practice in the adjacent electrical household appliances sector as well. In the case of a showroom of a Luxembourgish wholesaler in that line of business, sales to consumers were made under the condition that they either were in possession of a purchase voucher issued for a device by their local retailer, or that said retailer accompanied them to the showroom, Wagner & Reding (1969, December 27). *Brauchen Elektro-Grosshändler einen Ausstellungsraum?* *Revue*, 52, 40–41. It should be underlined that consumer electronics showrooms were not exclusively a Luxembourgish phenomenon. *Sony*, for instance, opened its first consumer-oriented showroom in France on the Avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris in 1971 (following showrooms in New York and Tokyo), Omura & Takahashi, 1975, p. 175. And in Germany, *Telefunken*, for instance, opened several "information centers" from 1966/67 onward where consumers received consultations and demonstrations. Like the Luxembourgish showrooms, these centers were supposed to funnel consumers to the retail trade, which is why no sales were made there, N.N. (1968). *AEG-TELEFUNKEN-Informationscenter*. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 45, 26. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1968-3/>.

¹³²⁹ *Siemens* (1960, December 8). Advertisement. Tagline: *Siemens Radiogeräte*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. See also m.k. (1971, December 24). *Neue Ausstellungsräume der 'Siemens S.A. Luxembourg' in der Glesenerstraße*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6.

¹³³⁰ *Philips* (1957, December 27). Advertisement. Tagline: *Aktualität!* *Luxemburger Wort*, 4. See also *Philips* (1961, December 8). Advertisement. Tagline: *Geschenke-Ausstellung*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 5; (1972, April 13). Advertisement. Tagline: *Première Communion*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 10.

¹³³¹ *Telefunken* (1972, April 8). Advertisement. Tagline: *Nummer 1*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 39.

¹³³² A. Loschetter & Fils (1973, April 26). Advertisement. Tagline: *SABA Fernseh-Modelle 1973*. *Luxemburger Wort*, 15.

¹³³³ *Ducal* definitely had a showroom in 1967. It stands to reason it would have still been around in the early 1970s as the company remained in business, N.N. (1967, December 23). *DE KIERZTE SAZ E SLOGAN FIR DUCAL*. *Revue*, 51, 100.

¹³³⁴ This new showroom was opened in December 1957, *Philips Luxembourg S.A.* (1958, June 3). *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Philips-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale des Actionnaires du 3 Juin 1958*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431, p. 2.

parking was easier to find.¹³³⁵ At least some of these showrooms were sizable, impressive exhibition spaces – such as the one opened by *Siemens* in the early 1970s (see Figure 57) –¹³³⁶ that offered Luxembourgish consumers a completely different shopping experience (albeit minus the actual purchase if visited without one’s retailer) to their local retail store: instead of being faced with a very limited selection from a range of brands, they would have been shown and consulted on the product range of one brand in particular. Of course, this did not make sense for brands distributed through dual-channel businesses. *Grundig*’s import partner *Aly Beck*, for example, would have demonstrated and sold *Grundig* products directly to consumers in the same location.¹³³⁷



Figure 57: Siemens (1971, December 25). Advertisement. Tagline: SIEMENS im neuen Ausstellungsraum. *Revue*, 52, 44. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:/70795/r5k1f8nwf4/pages/44/articles/DIVL3005>].

¹³³⁵ Philips Luxembourg S.A. (1956, November 17). *Aperçu d'Activité*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431, p. 3.

¹³³⁶ Siemens (1971, December 25). Advertisement. Tagline: SIEMENS im neuen Ausstellungsraum. *Revue*, 52, 44.

¹³³⁷ Aly Beck (1966, April 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Sehr wichtige Mitteilung! *Luxemburger Wort*, 8.

These showrooms served a dual function. First, they were a means of advertising the brand and its product range to potential customers. In the best-case scenario, a visit and consultation would result in a purchase; whether directly on site, if the local retailer had tagged along, or indirectly if the consumer had come alone. And if a visit did not lead to a purchase decision, it might at least have raised a consumer's brand awareness and appreciation. Second, the showrooms effectively were also a service for smaller retailers that ensured a continued good relationship. They put a greater product selection at a retailer's disposal without the financial or spatial burden, while effectively tying him closer to the brand. Inversely, the manufacturer representatives benefited from the credit of trust local retailers accrued in their communities. The showrooms are testament that Luxembourgish manufacturer representatives seem to have held the conviction that retailers were indispensable partners to find success in the country's consumer electronics market – even though its small size would have facilitated direct selling. Another essential component was advertising in Luxembourg's mass media.

4.4 Advertising Consumer Electronics to a Geographically Clustered, Multilingual Audience

4.4.1 Print Advertising: the Coexistence of Brands, Import Partners, and Retailers

To assess how consumer electronics brands, companies, and devices were advertised to consumers in the Grand Duchy during the long 1960s, all issues of the Luxembourgish magazine *Revue* were consulted for the years 1959, 1962, 1965, 1967,¹³³⁸ 1968, 1971, and 1974 – a total of 364 issues. Every advertisement and advertisement-like form of company communication published in any of these issues was collected as long as it decidedly fulfilled advertisement purposes for a specific consumer electronics device or group of devices. This was done to reflect the totality of consumer electronics-related advertisement communications that Luxembourgish consumers would have been subjected to when reading the *Revue* as closely as possible.

In practice, this meant that any advertisement-like coverage of prize contests by consumer electronics companies or of their trade fair booths was counted, as were advertisements by furniture stores that explicitly mentioned their consumer electronics assortment. Advertisements that exclusively referred to vinyl discs or tapes were not included, as were ads for brands, electricians or electronics retailers that only referred to other products they commercialized – such as refrigerators or washing machines – if they did not also reference

¹³³⁸ Every third year was consulted with the exception of 1967, which was consulted in addition due to the year's significance for the case study on color television in Luxembourg.

their consumer electronics product range in some form. This resulted in a collection of 352 ads. All following statements are based on this collection. Individual advertisements are only cited by way of example. The advertisements in the collection can be classified into three distinct categories: brand-centric, cooperative, and retailer-focused. This coexistence of three forms of consumer electronics advertising was a direct result of the characteristics of Luxembourg's consumer electronics market, and of the *Revue*'s localized mass media reach.

The first category encompasses advertisements that may be classified as advertising for the products of a specific consumer electronics brand. These normally advertised a device or a group of products of a manufacturer while also making use of a brand's typographic and/or logotype trademarks (see Figure 58).¹³³⁹ Some of these ads would employ product-oriented argumentation and imagery, whereas others focused solely on the brand and its product portfolio without introducing any specific arguments. This group only seldom referred to locations within the Grand Duchy and most closely resembled the consumer electronics advertisements found in German or French mass media publications. Brands like *ACEC*, *Philips*, *Graetz*, or *Telefunken* were present in the *Revue* through such advertisements. It stands to reason that these were inserted by their subsidiaries or local partners to strengthen the brand and/or support the sales efforts of their associated retailers for a particular device or product group(s).

While it is impossible to know what precise percentual share of such ads published in the *Revue* had been designed and/or inserted with the help of foreign advertising agencies, this would have been the case for at least some of them: *Philips*'s consumer electronics ads published in the *Revue* in the mid-1960s, for instance, were designed by *Publicem*, the agency of *Philips Belgium*.¹³⁴⁰ This was logical, given the historically close ties between *Philips Belgium* and *Philips Luxembourg*. At least in the mid-1950s, *Philips Luxembourg* had also sourced its catalogs and matrixes for simpler press advertising from its Belgian mother company, and had at the time planned to continue doing so for the foreseeable future.¹³⁴¹ *Philips* was not the only one that made use of foreign assistance. At least *ACEC*'s advertising in the *Revue*, too, had been

¹³³⁹ See for instance Philips (1967, January 28). Advertisement. Tagline: clic! clac! la révolution cassette Philips continue... *Revue*, 4, 23.

¹³⁴⁰ See for instance the small *Publicem* tag near the bottom-right, Philips (1967, January 21). Advertisement. Tagline: ce nouveau Philips enregistre 4 heures sans surveillance. *Revue*, 3, 23. For the relation between *Publicem* and *Philips Belgium*, see van Geel, C. J. (1963, July 10). *Organisation of advertising departments and advertising agencies in the European Philips companies*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. 721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D., p. 10.

¹³⁴¹ Soethoudt, H. (1956, February 29). *Note à Monsieur TONDEUR*. AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 428.

conceived with the participation of a Belgian agency.¹³⁴² The creators of these ads are known because these two Belgian ad agencies signed their creations – a practice widespread in France,¹³⁴³ but highly unusual in Germany.¹³⁴⁴ Both variants coexisted in Luxembourg's transnational advertising landscape, albeit not evenly matched: sometimes ads in the *Revue* were signed, considerably more often they were not.¹³⁴⁵

Brand advertisements underwent a significant qualitative transformation and became more common between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. It is obvious that the precise advertised devices and product groups changed through 15 years of technological progress in consumer electronics. But the ads themselves also changed: in 1959, only two ads for consumer electronics brands were published in the *Revue* in the whole year, one of them for a *Telefunken* television set. Both ads were in black and white, made use of simple graphical illustrations, and did not even take up a full page.¹³⁴⁶ In 1974, *Telefunken*'s color TV set *PALcolor 7043* alone was advertised ten times in the magazine throughout the second half of the year. These ads were in color, used a large photograph of the device, and occupied a full page or even 1½ pages each.¹³⁴⁷ Although it was still not the norm for consumer electronics brands to insert color advertisements in the *Revue* by 1974, this example may serve to illustrate the general direction.

¹³⁴² ACEC used the *Vanypeco* agency, see for instance ACEC (1965, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Mit ACEC sind Sie dabei ! *Revue*, 42, 35. *Vanypeco* had its headquarters in Brussels, Jourdain, C. (1966, November 14). Grossstädte aus der Martini-Schau. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6.

¹³⁴³ Hultquist, 1996, p. 282. This is corroborated by the database compiled for this work. A large majority (albeit far from all) of the 728 consumer electronics ads systematically collected from the French magazines *Paris Match* for the timeframe 1959-1974 were signed by the responsible advertisement agency.

¹³⁴⁴ Only a handful of the 894 consumer electronics ads systematically collected from the German magazine *Stern* for the timeframe 1959-1974 were signed by an ad agency.

¹³⁴⁵ 43 out of 354 advertisements collected from the *Revue* were signed, about one in eight.

¹³⁴⁶ ACEC (1959, January 10). Advertisement. Tagline: La Télévision automatique ACEC. *Revue*, 2, 37; Telefunken (1959, December 12). Advertisement. Tagline: TELEFUNKEN. *Revue*, 50, 25.

¹³⁴⁷ See for instance Telefunken (1974, June 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 23, 107.

clac! clac! la révolution cassette Philips continue...

avec le 1er enregistreur automatique extra-plat



PUBLICITÉ 6/79/994

Même sans mode d'emploi, vous enregistrez du 1er coup. Avec une seule main! Poussez une cassette dans son casier, enfoncez une touche, l'appareil fait le reste.

Pour écouter vos cassettes enregistrées ou les musicassettes (en vente comme des disques), c'est tout aussi simple: clac, clac. A chaque audition, la perfection du rendement sonore vous enchantera.

Et que dites-vous de la ligne de ce nou-

veau Philips? 9 cm de haut, socle de teck compris.

Type EL 3310 sur secteur, fourni avec micro, câble de raccordement (enregistrement direct), et une musicassette, complet: 5.495 F
Modèle EXTRA-PLAT, 36,5x27,5x9 cm.

Pas de couvercle à enlever ou à remettre. Haut-parleur avec réflecteur de son. Contrôle automatique ou manuel du niveau

d'enregistrement. Compte-tours. Prise pour haut-parleur supplémentaire.

Demandez la documentation spéciale des enregistreurs à cassettes à Philips Luxembourg, s.a. 11, bd de la Foire, Luxembourg (Grand Duché).

PHILIPS 

...c'est plus sûr!

DE PROGRÈS - PHILIPS - 75 ANS DE PROGRÈS - PHILIPS - 75 ANS DE PROGRÈS - PHILIPS - 75 ANS DE PROGRÈS - PHILIPS - 75 ANS DE PROGRÈS

Figure 58: Philips (1967, January 28). Advertisement. Tagline: clic! clac! la révolution cassette Philips continue... *Revue*, 4, 23. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/5n0j6pk5t5/pages/23/articles/DIVL2098>].

The second group of advertisements simultaneously advertised a brand – sometimes also referencing a certain device or product group – as well as a local Luxembourgish partner including their address and potentially their logo (see Figure 59).¹³⁴⁸ How precisely brand and partner were set in relation to one another varied strongly. This type of cooperative ad could be predominantly brand focused and only include a short line of text at the bottom that indicated a local point of contact, while in other cases, equal amounts of space were afforded to both the brand and the Luxembourgish company. Especially the latter variant seemingly followed the same fundamental logic as the cooperative advertisements published in German regional or local newspapers: a retailer with a limited catchment area added their address to a manufacturer-supplied preprint advertising a device or product group for a combined ad that was published in media with a readership (predominantly) situated in that same area.¹³⁴⁹ In terms of design and layout, most such ads published in the *Revue* were relatively simple or evidently based on pre-print matrixes supplied by foreign manufacturers, which implies that they would not necessarily have required the assistance of a local ad agency or graphic designer.

To insert such ads in the *Revue* made sense given that its geographically limited dissemination ensured that its readers would be able to visit a location in the Grand Duchy. However, it was mostly the Luxembourgish import partners that published such advertisements in the magazine. While some were published by *Loewe*'s exclusively wholesaling partner company *Henri Schmit*, for instance,¹³⁵⁰ particularly the dual-channel businesses *Central Radio* and *Lessel Frères* – the associates of *Blaupunkt* and *Nordmende* respectively – were present in the *Revue* with such advertisements throughout the whole timeframe.¹³⁵¹ It is evident that they had a vested interest in simultaneously advertising the brand(s) they were responsible for and their own business, as they profited from consumer sales at their own location as well as from a

¹³⁴⁸ See for instance *Central Radio* (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: *Blaupunkt Fernseher*. *Revue*, 44, 36.


¹³⁴⁹ On cooperative advertising, see chapter 2.1.1.5. On retailer advertising in catchment areas, see chapter 3.3.3.1.

¹³⁵⁰ See for instance *Henri Schmit* (1965, December 4). Advertisement. Tagline: *Loewe Opta*. *Revue*, 49, 29. *Saba*'s importer *Albert Loschetter & Fils*, for instance, too, included a reference to its business in the advertising for the brand they represented, *A. Loschetter & Fils* (1965, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: *Seit 1933 auf dem Luxemburger Markt ist und bleibt SABA*. *Revue*, 42, 45. This was not the case for every wholesaling business. *Arno Zuang* for example, *Graetz*'s long-time import partner, was usually not mentioned in advertisements for *Graetz* in the *Revue*, see for instance *Graetz* (1965, August 28). Advertisement. Tagline: *Jetzt ist es Zeit an Ihr Transistor-Gerät zu denken*. *Revue*, 35, 71. It seems plausible that some wholesaling companies may have chosen to include their name and address in their consumers-facing brand advertisements to let consumers know that a brand was represented by a local Luxembourgish enterprise which consumers would be able to contact in a warranty case. Another reason may have been that these wholesalers might have wanted consumers to come visit their showrooms for demonstrations and consultations despite not selling to them.

¹³⁵¹ See for instance *Lessel Frères* (1959, January 3). Advertisement. Tagline: *Der Zeit voraus*. *Revue*, 1, 38; *Central Radio* (1962, September 1). Advertisement. Tagline: *Für Auto und Reise*. *Revue*, 35, 4. Both companies continued this advertising throughout the whole timeframe, *Lessel Frères* (1974, December 28). Advertisement. Tagline: *NordMende Weihnachtsangebot*. *Revue*, 52, 117; *Central Radio* (1974, December 7). Advertisement. Tagline: *Blaupunkt*. *Revue*, 49, 81.

stronger brand presence that potentially resulted in higher sales with the country's retailers. The precise advertising approach for a given brand in the *Revue* was thus also linked to how the responsible entity approached distribution.

Blaupunkt Fernseher



Studioqualität in
Schwarzweiß und Farbe.
(Nicht umsonst liefert
Blaupunkt die Chassis zu
den Farb-Monitoren der

Fernsehstudios!)
Unser Programm:
Tisch- und Standgeräte,
tragbare und regalfähige
Fernseher.

CENTRAL

Emile Kunsch

RADIO

Agent exclusif de

BLAUPUNKT

27, Bd. Prince Henri - LUXEMBOURG - Tél. 225 18 & 222 86

Figure 59: Central Radio (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Blaupunkt Fernseher. *Revue*, 44, 36. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/5nrpxfm17g/pages/36/articles/DIVL2122>].

The third group of advertisements were published by the country's various electricians and electronics retailers. These were usually small-sized ads that always included the retailer's address and a short description of the range of goods the business had on offer ("Gas stoves,

washing machines, portable radios, televisions, floor lamps, etc.”).¹³⁵² Often, these ads would also contain a telephone number. They thus did not promote a particular brand or device but a place of business in the Grand Duchy that sought to remind the readers in its catchment area of its existence. Many of the ads in this category were text only. If an image was included, it depicted a nondescript radio, television, or radiogram. This makes it seem unlikely that such ads would have required much creative input from an advertising agency. These ads inserted in the *Revue* by consumer electronics retailers remained relatively static in terms of layout, design, and content between the late 1950s and early to mid-1970s; some of them could have just as well been published in 1959 or 1971, which was of course facilitated by the absence of imagery for many of the ads in this category.

It needs to be underlined that advertisements belonging to the second and third categories would not have been published in French or German mass media magazines such as *Paris Match* or *Stern*. Their equivalents would rather have been found in local or regional newspapers. They were published in the *Revue* because it catered to a geographically limited audience – despite being a mass media publication for Luxembourgish standards –, which meant that local businesses could reasonably expect that (nearly) every reader would have been able to visit their location. Full-page advertisements for consumer electronics products manufactured by a foreign brand coexisted with small ads for a retailer in the City of Luxembourg in the same magazine throughout the long 1960s. Most advertisements for consumer electronics devices, retailers, or brands published in the *Revue* fell into one of the three categories, albeit not all. Occasionally, furniture stores would also insert advertisements in the *Revue* that made mention of the fact that they carried radio and television sets for example.¹³⁵³ And, from time to time, companies active in the Luxembourgish consumer electronics market also reached consumers not only through classical print ads but through other communications published in the *Revue* that fulfilled advertising purposes such as prize contest advertising,¹³⁵⁴ or presentations of their booths at the *Foire Internationale de Luxembourg*.¹³⁵⁵

Even though consumer electronics brands, import partners, and retailers all advertised in the *Revue* (or promoted prize competitions), a total of 352 consumer electronics advertising

¹³⁵² Electricité Fernand Dichter (1971, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Cuisinières à gaz. *Revue*, 32, 37. In the original French: “Cuisinières à gaz Machines à laver Radios portatives Télévisions Lampadaires, etc.” See for instance also Jos. Hoffmann (1959, April 25). Advertisement. Tagline: Elektro-Fachgeschäft. *Revue*, 17, 31.

¹³⁵³ See for instance Willy Capus (1967, December 2). Advertisement. Tagline: Meubles. *Revue*, 48, 82.

¹³⁵⁴ See for instance N.N. (1959, October 10). *Revue-Glückspolice*. *Revue*, 41, 21; (1959, November 14). Überreichung des SBR-Televisionsapparates aus dem Hause LESSEL. *Revue*, 46, 32; (1974, June 8). 2. Preis ein Telefunk Farbfernseher. *Revue*, 23, 39.

¹³⁵⁵ See for instance N.N. (1962, June 2). Eröffnung der Internationalen Messe. *Revue*, 22, 36–39, p. 38; (1967, June 3). Musterung auf Limpertsberg. *Revue*, 22, 15–18, p. 16.

communications across 364 issues means that, on average, not even one was inserted per issue. For comparison, *Paris Match* averaged 2,4 over the same timeframe, and the *Stern* nearly 2,9.¹³⁵⁶ The publication frequency in the *Revue* was thus comparatively low for an illustrated magazine, which supports the assertion that Luxembourgish advertising spending was underdeveloped, at least in the consumer electronics sector. Although Luxembourgish consumers would not always have encountered an ad for a consumer electronics device and/or company when they read the newest issue of the country's leading illustrated magazine, they would have undoubtedly come into contact with advertising by companies active in the Luxembourgish consumer electronics market through other channels as well.

Albeit no comprehensive collection has been undertaken for the country's leading daily newspaper, the *Luxemburger Wort*, selective sampling shows that consumer electronics brands,¹³⁵⁷ import partners,¹³⁵⁸ and retailers¹³⁵⁹ all advertised in the newspaper throughout the late 1950s to the mid-1970s in German and/or French. There appears to have been a certain degree of overlap between the *Luxemburger Wort* and the *Revue* concerning which brands and consumer electronics companies were advertised. Consumers would have encountered advertising by actors such as *Philips*, *ACEC*, *Central Radio*, *Radio Sachs* or *Roger Reisch* in both media. It follows that at least in some cases, similar or identical advertisements were disseminated through both media outlets,¹³⁶⁰ while other ads only made use of one of the two. The consumer electronics businesses operating in Luxembourg certainly also inserted ads in many of the other print publications read by Luxembourgers, including the directory of trade, industry, and commerce¹³⁶¹ or the *Autorevue*, where consumer electronics advertisements specifically targeting drivers were published.¹³⁶² This shows that Luxembourgish consumer electronics companies differentiated their advertising even further within the already

¹³⁵⁶ 728 advertising communications by producing companies were collected for the years 1959, 1962, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974 across 302 issues of *Paris Match*, and 894 across 311 issues of the *Stern*. The actual number of consumer electronics advertising communications of course varied heavily between issues.

¹³⁵⁷ See for instance Philips (1960, November 26). Advertisement. Tagline: 12.750 F. *Luxemburger Wort*, 14; (1971, October 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Comparez votre téléviseur actuel à ce tout nouveau Philips 71. *Luxemburger Wort*, 24.

¹³⁵⁸ See for instance Central Radio (1960, November 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Überzeugend in Leistung und Ton. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9; (1972, August 21). Advertisement. Tagline: Blaupunkt Fernseher. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹³⁵⁹ See for instance R. Reisch (1959, December 21). Advertisement. Tagline: TELEFUNKEN Modell 1960. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11; (1974, January 2). Advertisement. Tagline: Électricité – Radios – Télévision. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹³⁶⁰ See for instance Philips (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Achetez en toute sécurité votre TV couleur Philips. *Revue*, 44, 44; (1971, October 2). Advertisement. Tagline: Achetez en toute sécurité votre TV couleur Philips. *Luxemburger Wort*, 30; Schaub-Lorenz (1967, December 9). Advertisement. Tagline: verliebt. *Revue*, 49, 13; (1967, June 2). Advertisement. Tagline: verliebt. *Luxemburger Wort*, 18.

¹³⁶¹ See for instance Arno J.H. Zuang (1964). Advertisement. Tagline: Graetz. In *Publi-Lux*, 1964, p. 310.

¹³⁶² See for instance Graetz (1965, August). Advertisement. Tagline: Der hatte kein Transistor-Radio an Bord! *Autorevue*, 8, 64.

geographically and numerically limited Luxembourgish target group in certain cases to cater to particular interests.

Luxembourgers would thus have encountered consumer electronics advertising in various contexts throughout the long 1960s. Not all product groups were advertised equally often, however: 39 tape recorders were advertised in the *Revue* in the same timeframe that saw a single record player advertisement. It also needs to be noted that only around half of all consumer electronics advertising communications collected from the *Revue* for the timeframe 1959-1974 actually referred to a device – or multiple – per name. Particularly the insertions of Luxembourgish retailers often did not pertain to any product and instead focused on promoting their local business, although subsidiaries and import partners did not necessarily mention devices by name in their advertisements either, instead choosing to advertise certain product groups or the whole portfolio. The advertisements that did refer to specific consumer electronics devices could potentially draw on the same arguments and imagery as their German or French equivalents: tape recorders got the party going by providing hours of music to dance to in the *Stern*¹³⁶³ and the *Revue*¹³⁶⁴ alike in the mid-1960s, while transistor radios were associated with relaxation on vacation both in the *Revue*¹³⁶⁵ and *Paris Match*.¹³⁶⁶

4.4.2 French-Language Advertising but no French Brands. The Question of Brands and Language(s)

The consumer electronics brands that maintained a strong advertising presence in the *Revue* between 1959-1974 were largely congruent with those that had a Luxembourgish subsidiary or import partner. German brands such as *Graetz*, *Nordmende*, *Blaupunkt*, *Telefunken* or *Saba* were the most prevalent by far. There were only a handful of other relevant brands; among them *Philips* (the company with the highest advertising presence), *Philips*'s sub-brand *Siera*, the Belgian brand *ACEC*, and – at least during the mid-1960s – the Japanese brand *National* (belonging to the *Matsushita*-concern). Although there were exceptions, such as in the case of *National*, whose import partner was located in Brussels,¹³⁶⁷ it made sense that the brand advertising presence in Luxembourg's leading magazine largely mirrored the composition of the Grand Duchy's network of local subsidiaries and import partners. These actors ensured the development and maintenance of a brand's Luxembourgish distribution network, as well as the

¹³⁶³ Grundig (1965, February 21). Advertisement. Tagline: Star der Faschingsparty... *Stern*, 8, 67.

¹³⁶⁴ Philips (1965, February 13). Advertisement. Tagline: Le magnétophone Philips : ton ambiance ! *Revue*, 7, 71.

¹³⁶⁵ National (1965, April 17). Advertisement. Tagline: RF 820 L. *Revue*, 16, 26.

¹³⁶⁶ Clarville (1962, July 7). Advertisement. Tagline: Quand il fait bon vivre ! *Paris Match*, 691, 16.

¹³⁶⁷ See for instance National (1965, April 17). Advertisement. Tagline: RF 820 L. *Revue*, 16, 26.

warranty and repair of its devices, which were necessary prerequisites for consumer-facing consumer electronics advertising to be fruitful.

Given that French consumer electronics manufacturers seem to have had no Luxembourgish import partners or subsidiaries (at least none were recorded in the Luxembourgish directory of trade, industry, and commerce), it is not overly surprising that no French consumer electronics brand was advertised in the *Revue* in any of the analyzed years, be it by a subsidiary or a local partner. Notably, this absence of French brand advertising was not exclusive to the *Revue* but rather applied to the Luxembourgish press landscape at large during the long 1960s.¹³⁶⁸ Luxembourgish consumers would thus not only have been more exposed to German consumer electronics brand advertising due to their transnational media consumption patterns favoring German media, but also when reading the Grand Duchy's own print media.

There is evidence that the odd French-produced consumer electronics device did find its way into Luxembourgish households.¹³⁶⁹ But given France's low exports of radio or television sets to the UEBL and the apparent absence of connections between French manufacturers and Luxembourgish wholesalers or retailers, it seems very unlikely that French consumer electronics devices would have been available for sale in large quantities nor in many of the Grand Duchy's consumer electronics retail locations – to say nothing of showrooms or the customer service provided by subsidiaries and partners. What is more, due to the lack of advertising in the country's press, the brand recognition for French brands among Luxembourgish consumers would have also been considerably worse compared to brands like *Philips*, *Blaupunkt*, or *Telefunken*, further limiting their sales potential. The combination of these facts makes it reasonable to assume that consumer electronics devices of French brands would have been uncommon in Luxembourgish households during the long 1960s.

French consumer electronics brands did not have a significant presence in Luxembourg. The French language was nonetheless still regularly used in Luxembourgish consumer electronics advertisements, albeit only as a distant second to German, which was the predominant language used in the consumer electronics advertising published in the *Revue* during the long 1960s. Luxembourgish played no discernible role.¹³⁷⁰ German brands normally advertised in German.

¹³⁶⁸ Searches in the Luxembourgish press database eluxemburgensia.lu filtered for advertisements in the timeframe 01.01.1959-31.12.1974 across all available publications yielded little to no results for the French brands *Thomson*, *Océanic*, *Ribet Desjardins*, *Pizon Bros.*, *Clarville*, *Pathé Marconi*, *Tevea* and *Teppaz*.

¹³⁶⁹ A *Teppaz* record player was sold at a 1964 estate auction, for instance, Steichen, R. (1964, June 10). *Mobiliar-Versteigerung. Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹³⁷⁰ Notably, according to an analysis of the languages used in Luxembourgish print advertisements conducted by Berg for the year 1988, French was by then the dominant language clearly ahead of German, with Luxembourgish behind both of them. As he points out, advertising in Luxembourgish was still very uncommon in print advertising in the early 1970s, Berg, 1993, pp. 43–44, 48–49. Between 1959 and 1974, the ratio of using German or French in Luxembourgish press advertisements was different, even when looking beyond the consumer electronics

Others would make use of both languages, such as the Belgian manufacturer *ACEC*¹³⁷¹ or *Philips*. French and German seem to have been used rather interchangeably: in 1965, *Philips* advertised its tape recorder *EL 3552* in French in the *Revue* and its sister model *EL 3551* in German two issues later. Although both ads had been created by *Publicem*, *Philips*'s Belgian advertising agency, the German-language ad made use of the slogan of the *Deutsche Philips* (“...nimm doch Philips”) while the French-language ad employed a slogan also used by *Philips France* (“...c’est plus sûr !”).¹³⁷² This effectively affiliated those advertisements for *Philips* devices and the corresponding brand positioning with the ads for *Philips* that Luxembourgish consumers would have inevitably encountered in the German or French media publications they consumed, providing continuity in the transnationally influenced Luxembourgish market. Luxembourgish import partners and retailers, too, made use of both languages (with an overall disposition toward German). While some consistently stuck to either French or German in their advertising, others, such as electrician and consumer electronics retailer *Roger Reisch*, published ads in French and in German throughout the years.¹³⁷³ It would also occur that consumer electronics ads mixed German and French to varying degrees. While the ads of *Central Radio* for *Blaupunkt* devices were particularly striking in that regard, indiscriminately mixing both,¹³⁷⁴ other Luxembourgish companies active in the consumer electronics trade would also include at least some French vocabulary in their predominantly German-language

industry. A search on the Luxembourgish press database *eluxemburgensia.lu* filtered for advertisements published in the *Revue* and the *Luxemburger Wort* in the timeframe 01.01.1959-31.12.1974 returns 243.169 ads in German, 156.217 in French, and 4.680 in Luxembourgish. There are, however, media-specific differences and changes within this timeframe hidden in this overview. When only looking at the year 1959, the ratio between German and French-language advertisements was roughly 2:1. By 1974, this gap had closed. The ratio was now nearly 1:1, and the number of ads in French even narrowly eclipsed number of German ads for the first time (in 1973, ads in German had still been slightly more common). But when looking only at the *Revue* for the year 1974, the ratio remains at 2:1 in favor of German – for this publication, too, the gap would have closed until 1988, with the number of French-language advertisements then narrowly eclipsing the number of ads in German. Although German was thus the dominant language in advertising in the *Revue* and the *Luxemburger Wort* during the long 1960s, these figures and ratios reveal a general tendency that French grew in importance in Luxembourgish print advertising. In an oral history interview conducted by Sebastian Reddeker, a Luxembourgish advertising professional explains this growth in importance of French in Luxembourgish print advertising with an influx of francophone immigrants, Reddeker, 2014, p. 249, Footnote 40. Despite Luxembourgish being rather uncommon, there are of course singular examples of businesses in the consumer electronics trade using it in their advertising, see for instance Paul Diederich-Eischen (1958, January 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Fir eng gudd Qualité’t a Radio’en. Wäschmaschinen. Frigo’en. *d’Letzeburger Land*, 2, 6.

¹³⁷¹ ACEC (1959, January 10). Advertisement. Tagline: La Télévision automatique ACEC. *Revue*, 2, 37; (1965, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Mit ACEC sind Sie dabei ! *Revue*, 42, 35.

¹³⁷² Philips (1965, February 13). Advertisement. Tagline: Le magnétophone Philips: ton ambiance ! *Revue*, 7, 71; (1965, February 27). Advertisement. Tagline: ein Philips Tonbandgerät mit neuem Profil. *Revue*, 9, 2. To what extent such German-language advertisements created in collaboration with a Belgian advertising agency were also used in the German-speaking parts of Belgium may be a potentially fruitful area for future study.

¹³⁷³ See for instance R. Reisch (1961, November 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Radio- u. Televisions-Geräte. *Revue*, 46, 47; R. Reisch-Kinnen (1974, January 12). Advertisement. Tagline: Applications générales d’électricité. *Revue*, 2, 29.

¹³⁷⁴ See for instance Central Radio (1968, December 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Autoradios Kofferradios von BLAUPUNKT. *Revue*, 52, 18.

ads.¹³⁷⁵ This seemingly haphazard approach of Luxembourgish businesses concerning the question what language to use in their consumer electronics advertising is best epitomized by a set of three ads published on the same page of a 1971 issue of the *Revue*: *Radio Sachs* advertised in German, *Electricité Fernand Dichter* in French, and *Central Radio* used both equally.¹³⁷⁶ Although it was not quite as prevalent as German, French thus played a significant role in the print advertisements of brands, import partners, and retailers alike. Luxembourgish on the other hand did not. But this was not necessarily the same in other media.

4.4.3 Local Productions for a Local Audience. Advertising Consumer Electronics on Luxembourgish Television

Luxembourgers also encountered advertising for consumer electronics companies on *Télé-Luxembourg*. Although Luxembourg's only television channel was mainly aimed at audiences abroad, the advertising breaks during *Hei elei, kuck elei*, the channel's popular – and only – Luxembourgish-language program, enabled advertisers to very precisely target Luxembourgish audiences from 1969 onward. At least *Philips's* and *Telefunken's* Luxembourgish subsidiaries made use of this possibility in the first half of the 1970s, as did *Radio Sachs*, a consumer electronics retailer from the City of Luxembourg. More nuanced statements are impossible due to archival constraints.¹³⁷⁷

Radio Sachs's spot ran at least once during an ad break of *Hei elei, kuck elei* in October 1971. It was a low-budget production: across its thirty-second runtime, it only used three different still images. The first depicted a text with *Radio Sachs's* name and address (this was displayed twice, at the beginning and the end). The other two shots showed consumer electronics devices. Meanwhile, a voiceover in Luxembourgish highlighted that *Radio Sachs* sold radios and television sets for 1.990 and 8.900 Luxembourgish francs respectively, and that the business also competently installed and repaired devices, ending with a reminder of *Radio Sachs's* address. This was the whole spot.¹³⁷⁸ It is evident that a local business with a very limited catchment area could not have spent large sums on producing (and inserting) television

¹³⁷⁵ See for instance Henri Schmit (1967, December 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Radio – Télévision LOEWE OPTA. *Revue*, 52, 63.

¹³⁷⁶ *Electricité Fernand Dichter* (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Cuisinières à gaz. *Revue*, 44, 36; *Radio Sachs* (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Philips Siera. *Revue*, 44, 36; *Central Radio* (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Blaupunkt Fernseher. *Revue*, 44, 36. As Berg has pointed out, mixing languages was still “quite common and popular” (“recht üblich und beliebt”) by 1988 for the advertisements published in the Luxembourgish daily press irrespective of the advertised good or service, Berg, 1993, p. 49.

¹³⁷⁷ The advertisements that ran on *Télé-Luxembourg* during the long 1960s are archived by the Luxembourgish *Centre National d'Audiovisuel* (CNA). However, most of this material has not yet been systematically inventoried and digitized. It was only possible to gain access to parts of the corpus already processed by the CNA.

¹³⁷⁸ N.N. (1971, October 17). Advertisement *Radio Sachs*. *Hei Elei Kuck Elei*. *Hei Elei Hebdo du 17.10.1971*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003213.

advertisements. But the ads for the large consumer electronics brands *Philips* and *Telefunken*, too, consisted only of a few simple shots, and had apparently been made or commissioned by their local subsidiaries.

Telefunken's black and white television advertisement spot took place within a nondescript consumer electronics store. It centered on the idea of various consumer electronics devices – a color television, a radio, a stereo, a tape recorder, a record player – quickly introducing themselves to a male customer. This was realized by motionless close-up shots of those devices paired with a Luxembourgish voiceover, which were interspersed by shots of the man looking at whatever device was 'speaking'. The ad was aired during at least one ad-break of *Hei elei, kuck elei* in 1971.¹³⁷⁹ It was filmed in one location, and made do without a lot of actors, action, or special effects, which means that it would have been relatively cheap. Unlike *Telefunken*'s Luxembourgish subsidiary, the German mother company did not advertise with television spots during the years 1970-1973,¹³⁸⁰ making it highly unlikely that this spot was a repurposed German ad with a new voiceover. Instead, the Luxembourgish *Telefunken* office had apparently produced a TV spot out of its own volition with the limited means at its disposal to specifically target the Luxembourgish audience.

Philips Luxembourg's color spots, which ran during *Hei elei, kuck elei* in 1973 and 1975 respectively, had evidently been made on a very low budget as well. The 1973 spot began and ended with a still shot of *Philips*'s Luxembourgish address. Apart from that, the ad consisted of three shots of a color TV: two showing the device in full (one zooming in, one zooming out) and a close-up of its control panel with a zoom-out. A Luxembourgish voice-over praised the quality and price of *Philips*'s television sets, which were capable of receiving both the PAL and SECAM standards.¹³⁸¹ The 1975 spot consisted of slideshow of five stills (see Figure 60) depicting a compact stereo system, a radio recorder, a car radio, a cassette recorder, and a television set, which was paired with an overlay of *Philips Luxembourg*'s address, while a Luxembourgish voiceover introduced *Philips*'s consumer electronics product range.¹³⁸² *Philips Luxembourg* also inserted similar spots for other products such as coffee machines on *Télé-Luxembourg*.¹³⁸³

¹³⁷⁹ N.N. (1971, October 17). *Advertisement Telefunken. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 17.10.1971*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003213.

¹³⁸⁰ Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (1974). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, p. 17.

¹³⁸¹ N.N. (1973, March 4). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 04.03.1973 (Carnaval)*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003212.

¹³⁸² N.N. (1975, October 26). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei n°18 du 26.10.1975*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_006759.

¹³⁸³ N.N. (1973, June 3). *Advertisement Philips. HEI ELEI HEBDO du 03.06.1973*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003218.

Philips's spots, too, were most likely produced or commissioned by the subsidiary itself. Although it was repeatedly tried, *Philips's* national organizations did not systematically exchange television commercials in the 1960s and early 1970s, leading to redundant productions.¹³⁸⁴ What is more, Belgian television did not allow commercial advertisements at the time,¹³⁸⁵ making it less likely that these ads would have been produced with the involvement of *Philips Belgium*. The strongest argument in favor of *Philips Luxembourg* autonomously producing its television spots, however, is to consider their production quality in contrast to those of the spots produced by *Philips France* around the same time.



Figure 60: Screenshot from N.N. (1975, October 26). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei n°18 du 26.10.1975. 00:10:38.* Archives: Centre national de l'audiovisuel (CNA), Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_006759.

In early 1972, *Philips France* advertised one of its cassette recorders on French TV through what was effectively an elaborate sketch. This ad, which had been developed in cooperation with the advertising agency *Intermarco Elvinger*, centered on a ceremonial military drill on the waterfront. A boy present in the drill's audience recorded the commander on a *Philips* cassette recorder and then used it to play back the commands, tricking the army sailors into marching

¹³⁸⁴ Höfer, 2024.

¹³⁸⁵ RTBF (undated). Notre histoire. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.rtbf.be/et-vous/article/notre-histoire-11528522>.

off a quay and into the water. The spot was filmed on location, involved dozens of actors, and consisted of numerous shots from a variety of camera angles. It also told an actual story that humorously exaggerated a realistic use of the advertised device, showcasing its ability to capture and replay sounds.¹³⁸⁶ Such an ad necessitated an exorbitant amount of production effort in comparison to the ads of *Philips Luxembourg*, making it considerably more expensive. This would have been the case for other TV spots for consumer electronics brands and/or devices broadcasted on French television in the early 1970s as well. They were usually of a higher production quality than the above-cited ads on *Télé-Luxembourg*.

In his analysis of the modern Luxembourgish media and advertising landscape, Sebastian Reddeker has pointed out that the substantial costs of producing high-quality TV advertising spots has led to a situation where advertisements on Luxembourgish television are typically not specifically created for the Luxembourgish market but instead adapted from international versions.¹³⁸⁷ This was apparently not yet the case for the consumer electronics advertising on *Télé-Luxembourg* in the early 1970s. Instead, it seems like companies active on the comparatively small Luxembourgish market autonomously produced or commissioned their own spots, clearly making do with very limited budget.

The low production quality makes sense considering the TV spot's target audience; *Hei elei, kuck elei* was solely of interest to Luxembourgish viewers due to the language barrier, confining the viewership for these ads to the around 80.000 Luxembourgish households that owned a TV set capable of receiving *Télé-Luxembourg* in 1973.¹³⁸⁸ This was a negligible figure compared to the over twelve million TV sets in French households by the end of 1972 that were potentially reached by advertising on French television.¹³⁸⁹ The ads during *Hei elei, kuck elei* thus had a geographical and numerical reach that was more akin to that of an ad running in several cinemas across a region than to a TV spot on German or French television – which was not only reflected in their production quality, but also explains why *Philips Luxembourg* and *Radio Sachs* included their addresses.

It is of note that the voiceovers of all three spots were in Luxembourgish – instead of French, *Télé-Luxembourg*'s usual language of choice. This differentiates these spots from print advertisements, which did not really make use of Luxembourgish during the long 1960s. Of course, these spots were aired in breaks of *Hei elei, kuck elei*, which was popular precisely because it was the only television show in Luxembourgish. It follows that the other ads aired

¹³⁸⁶ Philips (1972, January 1). *Advertisement Philips: magnétophone: fanfare de la marine*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212571.053.

¹³⁸⁷ Reddeker, 2014, p. 141.

¹³⁸⁸ Proscop media, 1973, p. 233.

¹³⁸⁹ Id., p. 230.

during the same *Hei elei, kuck elei* broadcast of 1971 as the ads of *Radio Sachs* and *Telefunken* were in Luxembourgish as well – whether they were for *Coca-Cola*¹³⁹⁰ or for the toy store *Sternberg Frères*.¹³⁹¹ According to Reddeker’s analysis of advertising in modern day Luxembourg, Luxembourgish is more common in audiovisual than in print advertising to this day, which he attributes to the fact that Luxembourgish has long been used in oral communication and less in writing.¹³⁹² This makes it plausible to assume that at least some of the radio advertisements aired on the Luxembourgish-language radio station during the long 1960s would have been in Luxembourgish as well, as these ads would have addressed an exclusively Luxembourgish listenership by way of oral communication. This assertion is of course equally applicable for any ads that ran in Luxembourgish cinemas at the time.

Televised advertisements for Luxembourgish consumer electronics companies could also take other forms besides the classical spot. On the occasion of the annual *Foire Internationale de Luxembourg*, for instance, *Télé-Luxembourg* offered to show paid-for coverage (a so-called “reportage”).¹³⁹³ In practice, this took the following form: impressions from company-booths recorded by Luxembourgish filmmaker Philippe Schneider were paired with a voiceover (and potentially an additional image at the end showing an address) to produce advertisement-like content for local consumer electronics companies such as *Aly Beck*, *Sogel S.A.* and *Lessel Frères*. Notably, in at least one such instance, the voiceover was in Luxembourgish – well before *Hei elei, kuck elei* started airing.¹³⁹⁴

For advertisers wanting to capture the attention of the Luxembourgish audience of *Télé-Luxembourg*, it made sense to address them in their mother tongue, as this would have immediately signaled to Luxembourgish viewers that they – and not the viewers in Belgium or France – were the main target group. But given that *Télé-Luxembourg*’s core audience outside of *Hei elei, kuck elei* was not Luxembourgish, it is also evident that not all (consumer electronics) advertisements aired on the channel were in Luxembourgish or by companies situated in the Grand Duchy. Consider, for instance, the French-language ad of the retailer *Au*

¹³⁹⁰ N.N. (1971, October 17). *Advertisement Coca-Cola. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 17.10.1971*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003213.

¹³⁹¹ N.N. (1971, October 17). *Advertisement Sternberg Frères. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 17.10.1971*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003213.

¹³⁹² Reddeker, 2014, p. 256.

¹³⁹³ Chambre des agences-conseils en publicité, 1961, p. 919.

¹³⁹⁴ Since these were filmed in color years before *Télé-Luxembourg* started its color television broadcasting in 1972, it seems possible that this ad-like content might have also been shown in the Grand Duchy’s cinemas. More importantly, while the 1958 ad of *Lessel Frères* was still in French, the 1967 ad of *Aly Beck* had a Luxembourgish voiceover – two years before *Hei elei, kuck elei* went on air, Schneider, P. (Director) (1958). *Advertisement Lessel Frères*. 10^e F.I.L.: 1958. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_PUB_001288; (1967). *Advertisement Grundig*. 19^e F.I.L.: 1967. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_PUB_001276; (1974). *Advertisement Sogel S.A.* 26^e F.I.L.: 1974. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_PUB_001283.

Roy de la Télévision situated in the French city of Metz, who advertised its product range of tape recorders, television sets, radios, stoves, fridges, and other electronics on *Télé-Luxembourg* at an unspecified point during the 1960s or 1970s. This, too, was a low-budget ad for a local electronics retailer that made mention of its address.¹³⁹⁵ However, its primary target group would not have been Luxembourgers but rather the share of *Télé-Luxembourg*'s viewership that lived in this part of France. This highlights the transnational nature of advertising on *Télé-Luxembourg*, which was used by local businesses from different nations to reach their respective regional audiences.

4.4.4 Attending Fairs and Holding Contests: Alternative Advertising Channels

The companies active on the Luxembourgish consumer electronics market of course made use of various other means besides print or television to promote their products and business. One such opportunity were trade fairs. *Lessel Frères*,¹³⁹⁶ *Sogel S.A.*,¹³⁹⁷ *Telefunken*,¹³⁹⁸ or *Aly Beck*¹³⁹⁹ all had booths at the country's main trade fair, the *Foire Internationale de Luxembourg*, at certain points during the 1960s and early 1970s to promote the consumer electronics brands they respectively represented. Luxembourgish consumer electronics subsidiaries and import partners also attended more specialized fairs, such as Luxembourg's first women's and children's fair in 1974.¹⁴⁰⁰ The presence of consumer electronics companies in the country also extended to more localized events: in 1962, visitors of the festivities for the 50th anniversary of the choir of Rumelange would have encountered a *Philips* banderole as a form of temporary outdoor advertising.¹⁴⁰¹

Promotional efforts such as prize contests were another possibility to advertise a consumer electronics company specifically to the Luxembourgish public and build customer loyalty.

¹³⁹⁵ This ad was published on the official channel of *RTL* on the online platform *Dailymotion* as part of a series of ads from *Télé-Luxembourg*'s history. While the precise date it aired is not given, the design of the devices depicted in the spot makes it evident that it must have been from the 1970s at the latest, N.N. (undated). Advertisement Au Roy. CLT/RTL, archives personnelles Christian Masson. In *1995 40 ans de publicité 08 (RTL TV)*, uploaded by RTL Canal 21. Dailymotion video. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://dai.ly/x6a7sw>.

¹³⁹⁶ N.N. (1962, June 2). Eröffnung der Internationalen Messe. *Revue*, 22, 36–39, p. 38.

¹³⁹⁷ N.N. (1967, June 3). Musterung auf Limpertsberg. *Revue*, 22, 15–18, p. 16.

¹³⁹⁸ N.N. (1973, June 2). Auf der Foire gesehen... *Revue*, 22, 29–32, p. 32.

¹³⁹⁹ Schneider, P. (Director). (1967). *Advertisement Grundig. 19^e F.I.L.: 1967*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA PUB_001276.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Société des Foires Internationales de Luxembourg S.A. (1974, November 2). Ons fraen ons kanner. *Revue*, 44, supplement, pp. 2–3, 29, 33, 36.

¹⁴⁰¹ The *Philips* logo is visible on a banderole seen in the background of two photos belonging to the article about the festivities. The corresponding slogan, however, is not visible in full, N.N. (1962, July 28). Stiftungsfest der Chorale 'Hémécht'. *Revue*, 30, 21.

ACEC,¹⁴⁰² *Telefunken*¹⁴⁰³ or *Lessel Frères*,¹⁴⁰⁴ for instance, raffled off devices either on their own or in collaboration with the *Revue*. These contests were usually particular to Luxembourg. But in at least one case, a television set prize contest coordinated by *Philips Belgium* was also open – and advertised – to Luxembourgish consumers.¹⁴⁰⁵ This shows that even such measures could potentially be subject to transnational collaborations due to Luxembourg's limited size. Subsidiaries and import partners would also act as sponsors for local activities to garner goodwill in the community and improve their brand presence.¹⁴⁰⁶

The Luxembourgish import partners and subsidiaries of consumer electronics manufacturers were thus present in the country's print publications, on television, as sponsors of events and raffles, and at the fairs of the Grand Duchy during the long 1960s. Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain to what extent Luxembourgish consumer electronics did make use of the Grand Duchy's other advertising channels such as its cinemas or its Luxembourgish-language radio station. The same goes for direct advertising or measures at the point of sale. But given their presence in other advertising forms, there is no reason to believe that Luxembourgish subsidiaries, import partners, and retailers would not have also frequently redecorated the window displays of their showrooms and stores, advertised their brand or retail location on the airwaves of *Radio Luxembourg*'s Luxembourgish channel, or distributed product brochures to interested consumers.

4.5 “A Truly Magical Device” for the “Hub of Color Television”. Adopting and Advertising Color Television in Luxembourg's Transnational Media Environment

It has been a recurring topic throughout this part that the situation in Luxembourg was often rather exceptional, be it concerning the country's media landscape, the local and transnational advertising seen and heard by its inhabitants, or the languages used in Luxembourgish print and television advertisements. Yet, the process of introducing the network media technology of color television to the country and the concurrent development of a Luxembourgish network of

¹⁴⁰² N.N. (1962, January 13). Concours ACEC. *Revue*, 2, 32.

¹⁴⁰³ N.N. (1974, June 8). 2. Preis ein Telefunken Farbfernseher. *Revue*, 23, 39.

¹⁴⁰⁴ N.N. (1959, October 10). Revue-Glückslos. *Revue*, 41, 21; (1959, November 14). Überreichung des SBR-Televisionsapparates aus dem Hause LESSEL. *Revue*, 46, 32.

¹⁴⁰⁵ The address consumers should return their coupon to was in Brussels, not in the City of Luxembourg where *Philips Luxembourg* was located, Philips (1962, September 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Drücken Sie die Taste ein... *Luxemburger Wort*, 5.

¹⁴⁰⁶ *Henri Schmit* (Loewe's import partner), the *Sogel S.A.* and *Philips Luxembourg*, for instance, all were sponsoring partners for the 1968 edition of the bicycle race *Tour de Luxembourg*, Association des Organisateurs du Tour de Luxembourg (1968, June 14). Die Veranstalter danken. *Luxemburger Wort*, 17. *Philips Luxembourg* even permanently sponsored a basketball team from 1971 onward, which was renamed to *Black Star Philips*, N.N. (1971, December 11). Black Star-Philips. *Revue*, 50, 84.

communal antennas for television reception stand out among the Grand Duchy's particularities. Luxembourg's unique trajectory not only determined what kind of color television sets were sold in the country in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s, but also how certain models were advertised. The following case study disentangles these interwoven threads, showing how Luxembourg's multilingualism and geography shaped the country's television infrastructure and reception patterns, which in turn heavily influenced the timing and content of local color television set advertising.

4.5.1 Transmissions from Abroad. Color Television in Luxembourg without *Télé-Luxembourg*

Télé-Luxembourg started broadcasting in color on the 6th of November 1972 using the SECAM standard.¹⁴⁰⁷ But the advent of the Luxembourgish color television era predates this transition of the country's only broadcaster to color by five years. Due to the transnational television viewing patterns of Luxembourgish inhabitants, who had long been accustomed to the uncommon privilege of being able to choose between more than two or three channels, it was 1967 that effectively marked the advent of color television for "television parasite Luxembourg".¹⁴⁰⁸ That year, two of Luxembourg's three neighboring countries began color television broadcasting: Germany regularly aired programs in color using the PAL standard from the 25th of August 1967 onward. France followed suit a few weeks later, debuting its regular SECAM standard color broadcasting on the 1st of October 1967.¹⁴⁰⁹ Luxembourg's third

¹⁴⁰⁷ *Télé-Luxembourg* filmed in PAL and used a transcoder to convert the signal to SECAM before broadcasting, M.-L. E. (1972, December 9). *Télé-Luxembourg sendet in Farbe. Luxemburger Wort*, 29. Curiously, Luxembourgish and Belgian communal antennas then again used transcoders to reconvert this SECAM signal back into PAL. Such two-step conversions resulted in a loss of quality, which is why *Télé-Luxembourg* took the decision in 1979 to broadcast its program twice, through separate *PAL* and *SECAM* transmitters; one for its Luxembourgish/Belgian and one for its French viewership, N.N. (1979, January 26). Un nouvel émetteur pour *Télé-Luxembourg. Luxemburger Wort*, 7. It also bears mentioning that up until the 14th of January 1980, not every household that received *Télé-Luxembourg* would have been able to see it in color even if they owned a SECAM color television set. Before this date, *Télé-Luxembourg*'s color signal had only been broadcasted in ultra high frequency (UHF) in a range of around 100 kilometers, while its black and white signal had travelled up to 50 kilometers further as it was broadcasted in very high frequency (VHF). This meant that a significant part of the French east would have received only black and white transmissions until January 1980, when *Télé-Luxembourg* began to also broadcast in color using its VHF-transmitter. From this moment onward, *Télé-Luxembourg* thus had three different coverage areas for PAL, SECAM UHF, and SECAM VHF, N.N. (1980, January 5). RTL Couleur: le 14 Janvier 80, le Canal 7 en SECAM. *Revue*, 1, 92–93. Regarding the line-standards: *Télé-Luxembourg* broadcasted using the Belgian variant of the 819-line norm until the 1st of September 1971, when the switch was made to 625 lines. This change did not impact Belgian or Luxembourgish viewers. But it would have made it impossible for a small minority of French viewers (those with rather old television sets) to receive the channel, N.N. (1971, April 17). Changement de norme à *Télé-Luxembourg. Revue*, 16, 59.

¹⁴⁰⁸ P.N. (1967, December 22). Bunt-TV auch bei uns? *d'Letzeburger Land*, 51, 5. In the original German: "Fernseh-Parasit Luxemburg".

¹⁴⁰⁹ Fickers, 2007, p. 13.

neighbor Belgium would take a few years longer: its national television channel only began broadcasting in color in January 1971.¹⁴¹⁰

Particularly the debut of color television in Germany seems to have played a key role. At least one Luxembourgish retailer offered consumers the possibility to watch the German color test transmissions broadcasted in the weeks leading up to the official start,¹⁴¹¹ the *Revue* published an overview of the upcoming German color television programming on the 12th of August “[i]n response to the interest that the forthcoming color television program is already attracting today,”¹⁴¹² and a few Luxembourgish inhabitants bought devices in time to tune in for the first broadcast on the 25th of August.¹⁴¹³ Public interest was high between August and Christmas 1967. Color television was discussed in the country’s cafés¹⁴¹⁴ and in its media. In November 1967, the *Revue* dedicated a cover story to its current state in the country.¹⁴¹⁵ Public displays of color television sets reportedly attracted crowds, and Luxembourgish pub- and café-owners purchased devices to draw in customers;¹⁴¹⁶ even advertising the possibility that patrons might “spend a few pleasant hours every day” watching PAL color television in their establishment.¹⁴¹⁷ This effectively constituted a temporary return to the collective reception patterns common in the early days of television.¹⁴¹⁸

By the 30th of September 1967, a day before the debut of French color television broadcasting, around a hundred color television sets had been sold in Luxembourg, including the ones purchased by cafés and bars. All of them were PAL-devices, which were not capable of receiving Belgian, Luxembourgish, or French television. If a report published by the *Revue* is to be believed, there were no SECAM-devices in the country by this point. A pub-owner interviewed for this article attributed this to problems with the reception: “As far as I know,

¹⁴¹⁰ RTBF (undated). *Notre histoire*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.rtb.be/et-vous/article/notre-histoire-11528522>.

¹⁴¹¹ N.N. (1967, July 5). Vorführung von Farbfernsehen in Esch-Alzette. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹⁴¹² N.N. (1967, August 12). Das farbige Angebot 1967 im Deutschen Fernsehen. *Revue*, 32, 39. In the original German: “Um dem Interesse entgegenzukommen, das das kommende Farbfernsehprogramm schon heute findet, [...]”

¹⁴¹³ P.N. (1967, December 22). Bunt-TV auch bei uns? *d’Letzeburger Land*, 51, 5.

¹⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴¹⁵ th. l., (1967, November 18). Die Bildröhre bekennt Farbe. *Revue*, 46, 13–17.

¹⁴¹⁶ P.N. (1967, December 22). Bunt-TV auch bei uns? *D’Letzeburger Land*, 51, 5.

¹⁴¹⁷ Fr. Kill & Fils (1967, September 13). Advertisement. Tagline: TELEFUNKEN ORIGINAL PAL-COLOR FARBFERNSEHEN. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. In the original German: “jeden Tag einige gemütliche Stunden verbringen”.

¹⁴¹⁸ In the mid to late 1950s, before the television developed into a good of mass consumption owned by individual households, many Luxembourgers watched television in the country’s cafés and pubs, Jaans, J. (1957, March 22). Zwischenbilanz des Fernsehens. TELE LUXEMBOURG – heute und morgen. *d’Letzeburger Land*, 12, 3. This had been a common practice in mid-1950s France and Germany as well, Fickers, A. (2005). Radio und Fernsehen als nationale Sozialisierungsinstanzen? Der Rundfunk im Rahmen der westdeutschen und französischen Wiederaufbaumodernisierung der 1950er Jahre. In H. Miard-Delacroix & R. Hudemann (Eds.), *Wandel und Integration. Deutsch-französische Annäherungen der fünfziger Jahre. Mutations et intégration. Les rapprochements franco-allemands dans les années cinquante* (pp. 291–307). R. Oldenbourg, p. 298.

nobody has such a device yet. Apparently, a retailer had a French set delivered for a trial, but the reception was so poor, so distorted, that he had to do without it.”¹⁴¹⁹ There are three other factors that possibly also contributed to this disparity: first, German television sets were significantly cheaper than their French equivalents.¹⁴²⁰ Second, the lack of presence of French brands in Luxembourg would have resulted in less advertising for SECAM through media and at the point of sale.¹⁴²¹ The third and possibly most important reason besides the lacking reception of SECAM broadcasts was the general inclination of Luxembourgers toward German television for language reasons.

Initially, there were no television sets that were capable of receiving PAL and SECAM as well as the various black and white line-norms available on the Luxembourgish market. In late July 1967, right before the introduction of color television, the *Luxemburger Wort* reported that consumers would in fact need to purchase two devices from now on:

“The question repeatedly arises as to whether there are also color television sets that can receive the black and white broadcasts of Luxembourg, Belgium and France. No, this would require devices that are too complicated and too expensive. In practice, therefore, if you want to watch color television programs, you will have to have two sets, one, the current one, for the black and white broadcasts of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, and another for the color broadcasts of the two German channels, with which you can also receive their black and white broadcasts.”¹⁴²²

Later on, in mid-November 1967, the *Revue* established that it was now actually not two but three television sets that any Luxembourgers wanting to continue having the full choice needed to purchase: one for the German color television programs, one for the French ones, and a third one for the Luxembourgish and Belgian programming in black and white. While owning and using three sets was of course unrealistic – not merely because color television sets were incredibly expensive, but also due to the impracticality – certain Luxembourgish early adopters in fact made use of two devices: a pub owner quoted by the *Revue* indicated that he utilized both his old black and white tv and his new PAL color television set, only turning the latter on for select occasions. By this point, however, it was already clear that devices capable of

¹⁴¹⁹ F. J. (1967, November 18). Die 3 Geräte der Luxemburger. *Revue*, 46, 18. In the original German: “‘So weit ich weiß hat noch niemand ein solches Gerät. Ein Händler hatte anscheinend ein französisches Gerät versuchsweise kommen lassen, aber der Empfang war so schlecht, so verzerrt, daß er darauf verzichten mußte.’”

¹⁴²⁰ Taking purchasing power into account, a contemporary trade magazine estimated that a German secretary would have needed to spend the equivalent of two months of salary to purchase a color television set, while it would have been four months of salary in France, W.S. (1967, October). La télévision couleurs à Berlin. *Radio-Constructeur*, 232, 250–251, p. 250.

¹⁴²¹ On the absence of French brands in Luxembourg, see chapters 4.3.2. and 4.4.2.

¹⁴²² N.N. (1967, July 24). Farbfernsehen in Clerf. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6. In the original German: “‘Immer wieder taucht die Frage auf, ob es auch Farbfernsehgeräte gibt, mit denen man die Schwarzweiß-Sendungen Luxemburgs, Belgiens und Frankreichs empfangen könne. Nein, dies würde zu komplizierte und zu teure Apparate bedingen. In der Praxis wird man also, sofern man Farbfernsehsendungen sehen will, zwei Geräte besitzen müssen, eines, das bisherige, für die Schwarzweiß-Sendungen Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Belgiens und Luxemburgs, und ein anderes für die farbigen Sendungen der beiden deutschen Programme, mit dem man jedoch auch deren Schwarzweiß-Sendungen empfangen kann.’”

receiving PAL and SECAM would be brought to market in the near future, which is why the *Revue* recommended its readers to wait for a bit longer before purchasing a set. Yet, the *Revue* insisted that Luxembourgers would nonetheless continue to need two devices: one for the German and French broadcasts, and another for the Luxembourgish and Belgian ones.¹⁴²³ This quickly turned out not to be the case.

In 1966, a Luxembourgish journalist reporting on PAL and SECAM had remarked that the consumer electronics industry would need to build “a truly magical device”¹⁴²⁴ for the Luxembourgish market, given that the competing color television standards added another layer of complexity on top of the already tricky multi-line-norm devices. By the turn of the year 1967/68, mere months after color television sets had first come to market and only weeks after the *Revue*’s claims about needing two devices, this was achieved. In an advertisement in the *Luxemburger Wort* on the 18th of January 1968, *Novak*’s new color television set was announced to “Luxembourg, hub of color television”: it was capable of receiving both PAL and SECAM, as well as the various black and white norms, eliminating the need to buy more than one device.¹⁴²⁵

Such dual-standard, multi-norm television sets increasingly became the norm over the next few years as the competition followed suit. By October 1968 at the latest, *Neckermann*, for instance, carried such a dual-standard, multi-norm device.¹⁴²⁶ *Philips* did so as well by the end of the year,¹⁴²⁷ with *Saba*¹⁴²⁸ and *Telefunken*¹⁴²⁹ also offering such devices by 1969 at the latest. Any Luxembourgers wanting to purchase a color television set would thus have been able to do so from the beginning of 1968 onward without needing to fear that they would miss out on any current or future programs. This latter point should not be overlooked: at the turn of the year 1967/68, it had not yet been clear what color standard *Télé-Luxembourg* would choose nor when it would begin broadcasting in color.¹⁴³⁰

¹⁴²³ F. J. (1967, November 18). Die 3 Geräte der Luxemburger. *Revue*, 46, 18.

¹⁴²⁴ N.N. (1966, November 7). Farbfernsehen in der Villa Louvigny. *Luxemburger Wort*, 14. In the original German: “ein wahres Zaubergerät”.

¹⁴²⁵ Singer (1968, January 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Luxemburg, Knotenpunkt des Farbfernsehens. *Luxemburger Wort*, 8. In the original German: “Luxemburg, Knotenpunkt des Farbfernsehens.” See also Singer (1968, February 10). Advertisement. Tagline: ACHTUNG !!! Fernschkunde. *Luxemburger Wort*, 14.

¹⁴²⁶ Neckermann (1968, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein Ereignis für jung und alt! *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹⁴²⁷ *Philips* planned to add such a color television set to its portfolio in the second half of the year 1968, *Philips-Luxembourg S.A.* (1968, June 4). *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Philips-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale ordinaire du 4 Juin 1968*, AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431. For the corresponding advertising, see *Philips* (1969, June 7). Advertisement. Tagline: N'oubliez jamais QUALITÉ et SERVICE APRÈS-VENTE ! *Luxemburger Wort*, 29.

¹⁴²⁸ *Saba* (1969, October 25). Advertisement. Tagline: SABA COLOR PAL-SECAM. *Revue*, 43, 121.

¹⁴²⁹ *Telefunken* (1969, June 6). Advertisement. Tagline: Farbfernseher für Europa. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11.

¹⁴³⁰ However, contemporary press reports (correctly) guessed that the broadcaster would opt for SECAM in the end, th. l. (1967, November 18). Die Bildröhre bekennt Farbe. *Revue*, 46, 13–17, p. 17; P.N. (1967, December 22). Bunt-TV auch bei uns? *d'Letzeburger Land*, 51, 5.

Luxembourgers who purchased a color television set between 1968 and 1972 accordingly opted for a dual-standard, multi-norm set, which effectively meant that *Télé-Luxembourg*'s decision was of no import to them. On the occasion of *Télé-Luxembourg* beginning its SECAM color television broadcast in late 1972, the *Revue* reported that the large majority of color television sets installed in Luxembourgish households were capable of receiving PAL and SECAM alike (despite Luxembourgers mainly watching German television), with the exception being those few early adopters that had bought a PAL set back in 1967.¹⁴³¹ The Grand Duchy's inhabitants did not want to relinquish the choice between channels originating in different countries they had come to appreciate and expect since the 1950s.

Although dual-standard, multi-norm sets removed one inhibiting factor – program choice – for potentially interested Luxembourgish consumers, they exacerbated another: “[...] we are located between both color fronts and therefore have to effectively buy two color televisions in one set and pay accordingly in order to be able to experience everything.”¹⁴³² This was not an exaggeration. Normal color television sets already were costly, and early dual-standard, multi-norm sets were literally twice as expensive. *Neckermann*'s cheapest ordinary one-standard color television set cost 20.972 Luxembourgish francs in October 1968; around double the price of its least expensive black and white television set capable of receiving six television channels. The dual-standard, multi-norm color television *Neckermann* offered was then again double that, being sold at a price-point of 39.950 Luxembourgish francs.¹⁴³³ At the time, this equated 799 USD,¹⁴³⁴ which meant that a Luxembourgish household earning the 1969 median weekly income of 62 USD¹⁴³⁵ would have needed to spend around a quarter of a years' worth of its total household income to purchase a dual-standard, multi-norm color television set – an

¹⁴³¹ I.m. (1972, October 28). Schwarz raus Farbe rein. *Revue*, 44, 86–90, 93–94, p. 89. That the number of Luxembourgish households buying single-standard color televisions sets was completely negligible is also supported by data compiled for a 1972 representative study, which indicated that 0 % of Luxembourgish households owned color television sets that were exclusively capable of receiving the German or French norm respectively, although there were a few households that owned black and white sets that could only receive French or German television, Institut für Sozialforschung und Sozialwirtschaft, 1972, pp. 18–19. The absurdity that could result from such a time-delay between the viewers and a broadcaster is perhaps best summed up by the following anecdote: *Télé-Luxembourg* had started to film in color a few weeks before the 6th of November 1972 in preparation but had continued to broadcast in black and white for the time being. This, for instance, applied to its show *Grand Prix RTL*. However, *Télé-Luxembourg* had also shared this show with the German ZDF, where it was shown in color – while it was still broadcasted in B/W on *Télé-Luxembourg*. Luxembourgers that already owned a dual-standard, multi-norm color television sets would thus have been able to watch a show produced by Luxembourg's only television broadcasting company in color before the channel began to broadcast in color – by watching it on German television instead, I.m. (1972, October 28). Schwarz raus Farbe rein. *Revue*, 44, 86–90, 93–94, p. 94.

¹⁴³² N.N. (1971, January 16). Kino und Konzert zuhause. *Revue*, 3, 27–35, p. 29. In the original German: “Mit dem Ergebnis, daß wir zwischen beiden Farb-Fronten liegen und deshalb, um alles miterleben zu können, quasi zwei Color-Fernseher in einem Apparat kaufen und entsprechend bezahlen müssen.”

¹⁴³³ Neckermann (1968, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein Ereignis für jung und alt! *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹⁴³⁴ Calculated based on the exchange rates given by Antweiler, 2024.

¹⁴³⁵ Sélection du Reader's Digest, 1970, pp. 54–55.

exorbitant amount. Only a negligible percentage of Luxembourgish households could thus actually afford to purchase a color television set. In 1969, color television set ownership rates were not even at 1 %.¹⁴³⁶ Adoption rates would then only noticeably rise during the 1970s: ten years after the advent of color television, in 1977, a fifth of Luxembourgish working-class and a quarter of white-collar households owned one.¹⁴³⁷

4.5.2 Specialized Infrastructure for Unique Reception Patterns. Communal Antennas in Luxembourg

As of September 1971, there was notably one subset of Luxembourgish households which were the exception to the case outlined above: although they received all possible channels in color and black and white, they did not need dual-standard, multi-norm color television sets to do so, instead using much cheaper regular one-norm PAL television sets.¹⁴³⁸ To understand how this was possible, a connected phenomenon needs to be discussed first. It has been established that the Grand Duchy generally was in a geographically advantageous position concerning the reception of foreign-origin television broadcasts. However, inhabitants living in certain parts of the country were not capable of receiving certain or most foreign programs, usually due to a disadvantageous local topography blocking signals. To overcome this problem, Luxembourgers living in such areas would install “oversized and costly individual antennas”; a solution that did not always bring the desired success.¹⁴³⁹

From the second half of the 1960s onward, so-called communal antennas were increasingly built throughout the country instead (see Figure 61). These communal antennas were installed in elevated positions, received the different broadcasting signals and transmitted them to households via cable. This made individual antennas obsolete and ensured high quality interference-free reception of all Belgian, German, French, and Luxembourgish television channels,¹⁴⁴⁰ providing a push to television sales in the country as a growing number of

¹⁴³⁶ Sélection du Reader’s Digest, 1970, pp. 68–69.

¹⁴³⁷ STATEC, 1982, p. 316. These adoption rates put Luxembourg roughly on par with France, but significantly behind Germany. According to Gaillard, 19 % of French households owned a color television set in 1976 compared to 39 % of German households, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 276. The overall adoption rates of television sets in Luxembourg in 1977 were at 74,3 % for B/W TVs and 23,7 % for color TVs for the 676 households questioned by STATEC. By 1986/87, the ratio had reversed: 25 % owned a B/W television set while 93,1 % owned a color television set (288 questioned households), STATEC, 1990, p. 472. The 1980s hence saw the definitive widespread adoption of color television in Luxembourg, with some households even owning a B/W and a color television set.

¹⁴³⁸ N.N. (1971, June 26). Aus dem Minett. *Luxemburger Wort*, 12.

¹⁴³⁹ Be (1965, November 6). Wie kann der Fernsehempfang in Luxemburg verbessert werden? *Luxemburger Wort*, 19. In the original German: “das Anbringen übergroßer und kostspieliger Einzelantennen”. These individual antennas could reach heights of up to 46 meters and cost up to 40.000 Luxembourgish francs, e.f. (1967, August 19). Antennen im Sturm. *Revue*, 33, 14–18, p. 17.

¹⁴⁴⁰ By 1964, there were only two large-scale communal antennas in Luxembourg with a joint capacity of 800 household connections, Baer (1964, October 3). Fernsehempfang über Gemeinschaftsantennen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 18. By August 1967, communal antennas were in the planning stage or had already been built in more than

geographically disadvantaged communities came to have an acceptable reception.¹⁴⁴¹ Communal antennas turned out to be such an advantageous technological solution in comparison to individual antennas that even Luxembourgish households that could already receive all programs became interested in being connected to a communal antenna.¹⁴⁴² Particularly in the late 1960s and then throughout the 1970s, a growing number of communal antennas were installed and villages connected to existing ones. This resulted in the formation of multiple Luxembourgish cable television networks of vastly varying sizes.¹⁴⁴³




Figure 61: Communal antenna in Bonnevoie, Luxembourg, 1973. Section of *Eltrona* (1973, October 20). Advertisement. Tagline: In diesem Haus wohnen 10 Familien. *Revue*, 42, 66. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/g1j0qhtdmj/pages/66/articles/DIVL1636>].

a dozen towns and villages throughout the country, e.f. (1967, August 19). *Antennen im Sturm. Revue*, 33, 14–18, pp. 16–18. And in October 1969, an engineer working for the Luxembourgish company *Eltrona*, one of the key actors in the Luxembourgish communal antenna market, remarked that he had been involved in building communal antennas for 28 different villages and towns so far, N.N. (1969, October 30). *Einweihung der Gemeinschaftsantenne in Untereisenbach. Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹⁴⁴¹ Philips-Luxembourg S.A. (1969, June 4). *Rapport du Conseil d'Administration de la S.A. Philips-Luxembourg à l'Assemblée Générale ordinaire du 3 Juin 1969*, AGR 2, Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004), 431.

¹⁴⁴² The interference-free image was one important argument in that regard. Another was the fact that connected households needed to not anymore worry about repairing or replacing their individual antenna. Instead, local technicians would quickly repair the communal antenna in case of damages. In addition, the connection to a communal antenna was not necessarily more expensive than a normal-sized individual antenna, e.f. (1967, August 19). *Antennen im Sturm. Revue*, 33, 14–18, p. 17. According to the article, communal antennas also enabled certain Luxembourgish households to receive frequency-modulated ultra-short wave radio broadcasts for the first time.

¹⁴⁴³ In the Luxembourgish village of Untereisenbach, a communal antenna was installed in 1969 to serve but 18 households, N.N. (1969, October 30). *Einweihung der Gemeinschaftsantenne in Untereisenbach. Luxemburger Wort*, 7. Other cable networks would connect dozens or even hundreds of households: in 1972, the newly installed communal antenna in Canach served 63 households, while the one installed in Remich in 1977 served around 300, b. (1972, March 18). *Einweihung einer Gemeinschaftsantenne in Canach. Luxemburger Wort*, 10; N.N. (1977, August 26). *Mast der Remicher Gemeinschaftsantenne errichtet. Luxemburger Wort*, 6. By 1977, the company *Coditel* had installed around 500 kilometers of cable to connect around 15.000 households through six different cable television networks. Luxembourgish cable networks would thus come to serve thousands of households, mk. (1977, April 7). *Gemeinde Niederanven an den TV-Empfänger der Coditel angeschlossen. Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

One such cable network was built in the Luxembourgish city of Esch-sur-Alzette, where a new communal antenna was installed at the end of 1970 to serve a few of the city's districts. From the outset, it was envisioned to continuously expand its reach over the following years.¹⁴⁴⁴ By June 1971, 700 households were connected to it.¹⁴⁴⁵ Eight years later, this figure had increased tenfold for Esch alone, which meant that the communal antenna served 71,5 % of all households in the city. By this point, the cable network had also been expanded to multiple neighboring communities.¹⁴⁴⁶

Most notably, however, this communal antenna started to operate a transcoding and norm-changing system on the 8th of September 1971,¹⁴⁴⁷ which converted all incoming television broadcasting signals (B/W and color) into the same type of signal. It was this innovation that enabled the hundreds – and later thousands – of households connected to this particular communal antenna to not require a dual-standard, multi-norm (color) television set anymore. This system allowed its users watch all black and white television channels receivable in Luxembourg with an ordinary black and white 625-line norm television set, and all color programs with a standard PAL color television set; the same types of devices that would have been found in German households. This made the acquisition of a television set much more affordable.¹⁴⁴⁸ At the time, the system installed in Esch constituted a novelty – not only for Luxembourg, but also for the fractured European television broadcasting landscape as a whole:

“Everyone knows that there are numerous television programs around us with different systems. [...]. The idea of converting these different systems to a single norm, namely the European CCIR-norm and the PAL color television system, in the head station of a communal installation therefore suggested itself.

The Eurovision broadcasts are already operated on this basis. For the first time, the two BOSCH companies, Fernseh GmbH and Bosch-Elektronik, have now developed a commercial, i.e. financially justifiable system, as it has now been installed in the head station of the Escher system.”¹⁴⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴⁴ E.J. (1970, December 11). Eine neue Gemeinschaftsantenne für die Stadt Esch/Alzette. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. See also N.N. (1971, June 26). Aus dem Minett. *Luxemburger Wort*, 12.

¹⁴⁴⁵ L. (1971, June 12). Eine TV-Gemeinschaftsantenne für die Stadt Rümelingen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 10.

¹⁴⁴⁶ P.G. (1979, October 30). Gemeinschaftsantenne Monnerich in Betrieb genommen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹⁴⁴⁷ N.N. (1971, September 6). Amtliche Mitteilung Stadtverwaltung Esch-Alzette. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6.

¹⁴⁴⁸ The article estimated that such television sets were 30-50 % cheaper than their multi-norm alternatives, N.N. (1971, June 26). Aus dem Minett. *Luxemburger Wort*, 12. A cable connection to this particular antenna would have normally cost households a one-time fee of 8.700 Luxembourgish francs, and another 75 Lux. francs maintenance charge per month (prices varied between cable networks), E.J. (1970, December 11). Eine neue Gemeinschaftsantenne für die Stadt Esch/Alzette. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. Given that this connection enabled households to opt for considerably cheaper television sets and relieved them of the necessity to also pay for an individual antenna, this investment would have paid for itself. If households opted for a color television set, the price difference between a multi-standard and a PAL-only device alone could even be greater than 8.700 Luxembourgish franc, see for instance Radio Télévision Electricité Gehlen (1971, May 5). Advertisement. Tagline: SW-Fernseher Farb-Fernseher. *Luxemburger Wort*, 14.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Although the technical solution itself had been developed by *Bosch*, a German company, they worked with a Luxembourgish partner, *Eltrona*, to build the actual antenna and cable-network. As a European first, it was presented at the 1971 edition of the trade fair *Internationale Funkausstellung Berlin*, N.N. (1971, October 30). Ein Kabelfernsehnnetz für Esch-Alzette. *Revue*, 44, 42–43, p. 42. In the original German: “Es ist jedem bekannt, daß

Users connected to the communal antenna in Esch in autumn 1971 could receive a total of seven programs using simple one standard, one norm devices.¹⁴⁵⁰ After the communal antenna in Esch had been the first to have such a system installed, other Luxembourgish communal antenna projects followed suit. The communal antenna in Differdange, for instance, had a similar system implemented in the autumn of 1972.¹⁴⁵¹ Similarly, the communal antennas of Mamer and Dudelange, which were still in the planning stage in 1972, were both foreseen to be fitted with a transcoding and norm conversion system.¹⁴⁵² The number of programs receivable by Luxembourgish communal antennas concomitantly continued to increase during the 1970s. Households connected to the newly built cable television network of the commune of Niederanven in 1977 could receive ten programs overall, including the *American Forces Network (AFN)* television program aired from the American military base near the German town of Bitburg.¹⁴⁵³

4.5.3 Complex Devices for Transnational Reception. Advertising and Commercializing Color Television Sets in Luxembourg

The unique circumstances of Luxembourgish television reception shaped the commercialization and advertising for color television sets in Luxembourg. In Germany and France, consumer electronics manufacturers had synchronized their marketing and advertising for color television sets with the debut of regular color television broadcasting in the country. The first advertisements for color television sets were inserted in *Paris Match* in late August/early September –¹⁴⁵⁴ mere weeks before the 1st of October 1967, and *Philips France*'s large multi-media color television advertising campaign debuted at the beginning of September.¹⁴⁵⁵ German consumer electronics manufacturers had even agreed to a moratorium

es um uns herum zahlreiche Fernsehprogramme gibt mit unterschiedlichen Systemen. [...]. Der Gedanke drängte sich darum auf, diese verschiedenen Systeme in der Kopfstation einer Gemeinschaftsanlage auf eine einzige Norm und zwar auf die europäische CCIR-Norm und auf das PAL- Farbfernseh-System umzuwandeln. Bei den Eurovisionssendungen arbeitet man bereits auf dieser Basis. Zum ersten Male entwickelten nun die beiden BOSCH-Firmen Fernseh GmbH und Bosch-Elektronik eine kommerzielle, d. h. finanziell vertretbare Anlage, so wie sie nun in die Kopfstation der Escher Anlage eingebaut worden ist."

¹⁴⁵⁰ N.N. (1971, October 30). Ein Kabelfernsehnnetz für Esch-Alzette. *Revue*, 44, 42–43, p. 43.

¹⁴⁵¹ In this case, however, the antenna's system could not convert the first French program. It was planned to add this capability at a later date, jm. (1972, June 28). Das Differdinger Fernseh-Verteilernetz. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6.

¹⁴⁵² a. (1972, September 7). Mamer erhält TV-Gemeinschaftsantenne. *Luxemburger Wort*, 6. It was not foreseen to implement a solution for the first French television channel in Dudelange, as it was believed that the channel would soon make the switch to 625-lines, N.N. (1972, December 8). Düdelingen erhält eine Kollektiv-Fernsehantenne. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹⁴⁵³ mk. (1977, April 7). Gemeinde Niederanven an den TV-Empfang der Coditel angeschlossen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

¹⁴⁵⁴ See for instance Telefunken (1967, August 26). Advertisement. Tagline: du bleu des Bermudes, au rose indien... *Paris Match*, 959, 61; Schneider (1967, September 9). Advertisement. Tagline: SCHNEIDER va toujours un peu plus loin... *Paris Match*, 961, 12–13.

¹⁴⁵⁵ G.A.D. (1968). *Philips S.W. Numann award 1967-1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. France Colour Television Campaign, non-paginated.

until the 1st of July 1967. No color television sets were distributed to retailers,¹⁴⁵⁶ and no advertising took place before this date.¹⁴⁵⁷

Accordingly, the first color television advertisement in the *Stern*, for instance, was inserted in the issue published on the 2nd of July,¹⁴⁵⁸ less than two months before the 25th of August 1967. There was no similar causal link between the debut of color television broadcasting on *Télé-Luxembourg* in 1972 and the onset of color television set advertising in the country. Due to the widespread reception of foreign television channels, Luxembourgish consumer electronics companies were not dependent on the Grand Duchy's only television broadcaster. Thus, by 1972, color television sets had already been commercialized and advertised in the country for a few years.

Notably, although Luxembourgish public interest in color television had been high in the second half of 1967, and a few Luxembourgers did purchase devices, there was no color television set advertising in the *Revue* in the latter part of the year 1967. Nor seem there to have been any ad insertions in other Luxembourgish print publications.¹⁴⁵⁹ This conspicuous absence was even recognized by the press around Christmas:

“[...], it is astonishing to note that very little advertising has been carried out for devices of this or that brand. There is even a certain reluctance to be felt on the part of the companies in question, for which we have found only one explanation: their maintenance services are not yet prepared for the complicated devices. [...]. Ultimately, however, it will have been the uncertainty caused by the two different color systems, Pal and Secam, that may have somewhat dampened the initial enthusiasm of the first potential buyers.”¹⁴⁶⁰

This assessment seems to have had some merit. The Luxembourgish subsidiary of *Quelle*, for instance, had only announced some two weeks earlier, in early December 1967, that it would

¹⁴⁵⁶ Overhoff, J. (1985). Farbe für Fernsehen und Wirtschaft, I. Warum das Fernsehen eingeführt wurde. *Rundfunk und Geschichte*, 11(4), 324–340, pp. 332–333.

¹⁴⁵⁷ This moratorium for color television set advertising had been agreed upon by the members of the German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association ZVEI. Accordingly, *Telefunken* did not insert any product advertising before the 1st of July. However, the company had not been prohibited from advertising the fact that it had developed the PAL-system, which is precisely what it did during the first half of the year, Horlitz & Martenson to mailing list (1967, April 29). *Internal letter. Subject: Imagewerbung zum Thema PAL*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1949. Public color television demonstrations organized by manufacturers would have also already taken place before this date, for instance, G.A.D. (1968). *Philips S.W. Numann award 1967-1968*. Unpublished Manuscript. PCA. Germany Colour Television Campaign, non-paginated. Notably, some manufacturers had started to prepare for this date years in advance. The *Deutsche Philips*, for instance, had begun its planning process with its internal “Marketing conference colour TV” in November 1965, *ibid*.

¹⁴⁵⁸ *Blaupunkt* (1967, July 2). Advertisement. Tagline: Mehr als 1.200.000 farbige Punkte hat jeder Farbfernseher. *Stern*, 27, 33.

¹⁴⁵⁹ All issues of the *Revue* in 1967 were consulted, finding no such ads. A search on the Luxembourgish press database eluxemburgensia.lu for the keywords “Farbfernseher”, “PAL”, “SECAM”, or “téléviseur couleur” filtering for the second half of the year 1967 and for advertisements yielded no relevant results either.

¹⁴⁶⁰ P.N. (1967, December 22). Bunt-TV auch bei uns? *d'Letzeburger Land*, 51, 5. In the original German: “Hinzu kommt die erstaunliche Feststellung, daß bei uns sehr wenig Reklame für dieses oder jenes Markengerät gemacht wurde. Bei den in Frage kommenden Firmen verspürt man sogar eine gewisse Zurückhaltung, für die wir nur eine Erklärung gefunden haben: die Wartungsdienste sind noch nicht auf die komplizierte Apparatur eingestellt. [...]. Letzten Endes aber wird es die Unsicherheit wegen der zwei verschiedenen Farbsysteme, Pal und Secam, gewesen sein, die die ersten potentiellen Käufer in ihrer anfänglichen Begeisterung etwas gebremst haben mag.”

“in the near future” employ a technician trained by a manufacturer to work on both systems to better service its color television customers.¹⁴⁶¹ Given that early PAL color television sets were prone to failure,¹⁴⁶² it is understandable that companies would have been cautious to advertise highly expensive devices for which they could not yet provide the adequate maintenance and repair services consumers expected.

The fact that no company was initially able to offer a device in line with Luxembourgish market requirements would have not only curbed consumer interest but also contributed to this absence of advertising. The first advertisements for color television sets then appeared in the Luxembourgish press in 1968,¹⁴⁶³ with several important actors in the consumer electronics market following suit in 1969 – advertising dual-standard, multi-norm devices.¹⁴⁶⁴ It is evident that the Luxembourgish preference for dual-standard color television sets not only impacted what kind of color television devices were marketed in the country but also influenced the content of ads: unlike in Germany and France, where it was not a question that any color television sets advertised in national media would have been PAL- and SECAM-devices respectively, Luxembourgish color television set advertisements often made (prominent) mention of the fact that the advertised devices were able to receive both PAL and SECAM as well as the various black and white channels.¹⁴⁶⁵

The Luxembourgish color television set market – and the advertising connected to it – differed from Germany and France with regards to devices and timing. But although Luxembourgers had a broader selection of (color) television channels at their disposal than their German or French neighbors, color television sets would not have occupied a fundamentally different role in a Luxembourgish household compared to a German or French one. It follows that there were

¹⁴⁶¹ J.G. (1967, December 8). Fünf Jahre “Quelle” in Luxemburg. *Luxemburger Wort*, 7. In the original German: “in nächster Zeit”.

¹⁴⁶² A German study conducted in the early 1970s found that consumers needed to expect that their PAL color television set would break down at least once in the first half year of ownership, Teupe, 2016a, p. 124. This of course then also applied to those early adopters in Luxembourg that bought PAL-sets. It stands to reason that the technologically more complex dual-standard, multi-norm color television sets prevalent in Luxembourg would have been even more susceptible to defects.

¹⁴⁶³ See for instance Singer (1968, January 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Luxemburg, Knotenpunkt des Farbfernsehens. *Luxemburger Wort*, 8; Neckermann (1968, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein Ereignis für jung und alt! *Luxemburger Wort*, 7; Novak (1968, November 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Etwas Neues im Grossherzogtum! *Revue*, 48, 125.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Telefunken (1969, June 6). Advertisement. Tagline: Farbfernseher für Europa. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11; Philips (1969, June 7). Advertisement. Tagline: N’oubliez jamais QUALITÉ et SERVICE APRÈS-VENTE ! *Luxemburger Wort*, 29; Quelle (1969, September 13). Advertisement. Tagline: Mit Barco-Colorstar bringt Quelle Ihnen die Zukunft ins Haus! *Revue*, 37, 36; Saba (1969, October 25). Advertisement. Tagline: SABA COLOR PAL-SECAM. *Revue*, 43, 121.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Ibid. This also applied to advertising in other media. Philips’s 1973 ad on Luxembourgish television, for instance, was solely focused on this point, N.N. (1973, March 4). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 04.03.1973 (Carnaval)*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003212. Even in the late 1970s, Luxembourgish color television set advertisements would still make mention of it, Telefunken (1978, May 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Les avantages du Colorimage 8609 supercontrol, *Luxemburger Wort*, 12.

overlaps between Luxembourg and its neighbors concerning the argumentative approach of color television set advertisements. Topics of universal relevance such as image quality¹⁴⁶⁶ or value for money¹⁴⁶⁷ were raised as the respective key points in German, French, and Luxembourgish color television set ads alike. This could even apply to company-specific argumentative patterns. *Philips*, for instance, positioned itself as a brand with years of experience in color television technology in Germany, France, and Luxembourg alike,¹⁴⁶⁸ while *Telefunken* drew on its role as the developer of the PAL-system for its German¹⁴⁶⁹ and Luxembourgish¹⁴⁷⁰ color television set advertisements. Unlike in Luxembourg, where consumers were familiar with PAL and SECAM alike, this approach was not feasible in France: *Telefunken France* made no mention of *Telefunken* developing PAL in its color television set advertising, as it was of no import in a country that exclusively used SECAM.¹⁴⁷¹

There were also transnational congruities with regards to the content televised in color that advertisements would refer to in order to entice purchases. Due to the large public interest they garnered, international sporting events – such as the Olympic Games or football World Cups – were important drivers of television set sales in Germany¹⁴⁷² and Luxembourg.¹⁴⁷³ Consumer electronics companies in both countries hence framed such events as the perfect opportunity to buy a color television set in the weeks and months leading up to it.¹⁴⁷⁴ Luxembourgish

¹⁴⁶⁶ Siemens (1971, January 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Stelldichein für zukünftige Farbfernseher. *Revue*, 3, 28; Imperial (1971, February 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Der TÜB* zum Thema: Farbbrillanz. *Stern*, 10, 75; Barco (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: BARCO TV LA COULEUR VERITE. *Paris Match*, 1173, 103.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Radio Télévision Electricité Gehlen (1972, February 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Es dreht sich jetzt um kleine Preise! *Luxemburger Wort*, 21; Quelle (1974, April 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Nur 898 Mark. Ein brillanter Quelle-Preis für einen brillanten Farbfernseher. *Stern*, 17, 142; Pathé-Marconi (1971, October 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Les possesseurs d'un téléviseur couleur Pathé Marconi* ne sont pas plus riches que les autres. *Paris Match*, 1171, 25.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Philips (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Achetez en toute sécurité votre TV couleur Philips. *Revue*, 44, 44; (1967, September 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Als erste europäische Geräte haben sich Philips Farb-Fernsempfänger bei Tests auf dem nordamerikanischen Kontinent behauptet. *Stern*, 37, 55; (1967, September 2). Advertisement. Tagline: il y a 25 ans nous avons déjà l'œil fixé sur la télévision couleur... *Paris Match*, 960, 10–11.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Telefunken (1967, December 24). Advertisement. Tagline: Wir haben allen Grund, stolz zu sein. *Stern*, 52, 163; (1974, January 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Wer ein Farb-Portable will, kann es jetzt vom Erfinder des PAL-Systems haben. *Stern*, 2, 55.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Telefunken (1969, June 6). Advertisement. Tagline: Farbfernseher für Europa. *Luxemburger Wort*, 11; (1971, January 16). Advertisement. Tagline: TELEFUNKEN-PAL – das perfekte Farbfernsehsystem. *Revue*, 3, 26.

¹⁴⁷¹ Telefunken (1967, August 26). Advertisement. Tagline: du bleu des Bermudes, au rose indien... *Paris Match*, 959, 61.

¹⁴⁷² Teupe, 2016a, p. 388.

¹⁴⁷³ Anders, J. (1968, May 24). Nos loisirs. Un phénomène socio-économique. *D'Letzeburger Land*, 21, 5, 11, p. 11.

¹⁴⁷⁴ There are numerous examples for Germany. See for instance Blaupunkt (1968, October 13). Advertisement. Tagline: Mexico im Olympiajahr 1968... *Stern*, 41, 231; Grundig (1974, May 15). Advertisement. Tagline: Weil 1978 wieder eine Fußball-WM ist. Und 1982... *Stern*, 21, 42–43. Consumer electronics companies would not only publish print advertisements but rather structure marketing campaigns around sporting events. For the 1974 World Cup, for instance, Telefunken inserted ads in the football magazine *Kicker*, advertised on the German variant of *Radio Luxembourg*, developed two window decorations, and held prize contests for retailers and consumers, Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (1974). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, pp. 22, 26, 30–31.

consumers would have encountered this advertising argumentation for color TV sets in the run-up to the 1968 Olympics,¹⁴⁷⁵ the 1970 World Cup,¹⁴⁷⁶ or the 1972 Olympics.¹⁴⁷⁷ But unlike in Germany, Luxembourgish companies making use of this advertising approach were not dependent on their national broadcaster covering the event in color. Notably, even the 1972 Olympics took place before *Télé-Luxembourg* started its color broadcasting. Instead, companies relied on the fact that Luxembourgers would tune in to one of the color television programs originating abroad to watch these sporting events in color. Until November 1972, all Luxembourgish color television viewing was necessarily transnational.

4.5.4 Tailoring Color Television Advertising to Unique Circumstances

Luxembourgish color television set advertising in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s could share argumentative approaches with its equivalents abroad. In other cases, however, ads clearly reflected the particular requirements and possibilities of the Luxembourgish color television set market. An illustrative example in this regard is the advertising approach chosen by *Telefunken* for its color television set *PALcolor 7043*. In 1973/74, the company repeatedly inserted ads for it in the *Revue* (see Figure 62),¹⁴⁷⁸ and especially in 1974, the product was clearly the main focus of *Telefunken*'s Luxembourgish advertising and marketing efforts. The company inserted ten large, colored ads for the product in the *Revue* with a concentration of insertions in the months leading up to the 1974 football world cup in Germany,¹⁴⁷⁹ and even raffled one *PALcolor 7043* off during a prize competition the *Revue* had organized on occasion

Using sports – and football tournaments in particular – to advertise television sets was already done in the 1950s, see for instance Telefunken (1958). Poster. Tagline: Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft mit TELEFUNKEN Fernseh-Empfängern. DTMB/AEG, GS 3508. Folder Allgemein 1958/59. According to Isabelle Gaillard, large sporting events were also an important contributing factor in increasing television set sales in France in even years (1958, 1960, etc.), as it was only during those that an edition of the Olympic Games (summer or winter), a football World Cup, and/or a European Football Championship took place, Gaillard, 2012a, p. 257. Surprisingly, this is not reflected in advertising for television sets found in *Paris Match*. Unlike for the *Stern*, for which it is easy to find examples of TV set ads that directly referred to sporting events, the consulted issues of *Paris Match* are relatively devoid of television set ads referring to sports. It seems to have been a considerably less prevalent print advertising strategy than in Germany, although it is unclear why this was the case. In 1974, however, it may have been related to the fact that the world cup took place in Germany, while France was not qualified.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Neckermann (1968, October 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein Ereignis für jung und alt! *Luxemburger Wort*, 7.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Saba (1970, May 23). Advertisement. Tagline: SABA COLOR PAL-SECAM. *Revue*, 21, 90. See also Saba (1970, June 6). Advertisement. Tagline: SABA COLOR PAL-SECAM. *Revue*, 23, 51.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Central Radio (1972, July 29). Advertisement. Tagline: Dauerkarte für alle Wettkämpfe. *Revue*, 31, 26.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Telefunken (1973, October 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 43, 56; (1973, December 29). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 52, 58; (1974, February 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 7, 4; (1974, November 2). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 44, 40. For reasons of space, only the first and last ads of the year are cited for 1974. The remaining eight can be found by keyword search for *PALcolor 7043* on eluxemburgensia.lu.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Out of ten ads for the *PALcolor 7043* published in the *Revue*, six were published between April and mid-June. The world cup began on the 13th of June 1974. The remaining four ads were published in February, March, October, and November respectively.

of said world cup. This provided another six opportunities to show the device off in the magazine.¹⁴⁸⁰

As has been discussed previously, advertising (color) television sets in the run-up to major sporting events with reference to those events was common at the time. Despite the timing of *Telefunken*'s extensive advertising efforts for the *PALcolor 7043*, and even though *Telefunken* did indeed realize a television set marketing campaign related to the world cup in Germany that year,¹⁴⁸¹ this was not the argumentative approach the Luxembourgish subsidiary opted for. Instead, the ads in the *Revue* focused exclusively on an allegedly unique but unspectacular feature of the device: "Would you like a color TV set that allows you to store 16 programs? The Palcolor 7043 fulfills this wish. In fact, it's the only one on the market to do so!"¹⁴⁸²



Figure 62: Telefunken (1974, June 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 23, 107. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/qrg5qbd6wc/pages/107/articles/DIVL2366>].

¹⁴⁸⁰ The *Revue*'s prize competition began in early May (issue n° 19) with a *PALcolor 7043* as its prize for second place. In this issue and the following five, until the begin of the world cup/end of the prize competition, the *PALcolor 7043* – and *Telefunken* – were presented by the *Revue*'s editorial team in an advertising-like manner, N.N. (1974, May 11). 2. Preis ein Telefunken-Farbfernseher. *Revue*, 19, 33.

¹⁴⁸¹ Telefunken Fernseh und Rundfunk GmbH (1974). *Werbung 1974*. DTMB/AEG, GS 5923, pp. 30–31.

¹⁴⁸² Only the first ad for the device published in the *Revue* made mention other features as well, Telefunken (1973, October 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 43, 56. All following ads focused exclusively on the 16 programs. See for instance Telefunken (1974, June 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 23, 107. In the original German: "Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? Der Palcolor 7043 erfüllt Ihnen diesen Wunsch. Übrigens als einziger auf dem Markt!"

The configuration process for most television sets sold at the time involved carefully tuning into channels and saving them to the device's internal program storage. Those pre-set channels could then be accessed at the press of a button, making it easy to switch between them. The control unit used in the initial tuning process on the other hand was not necessarily accessible during everyday usage.¹⁴⁸³ For comparison, only few devices available on the German market in 1974 allowed to pre-set more than eight channels.¹⁴⁸⁴ There simply was no need for more given the limited number of television channels available to the average German viewer. This was of course different in Luxembourg. By autumn 1971, the communal antenna in Esch, for instance, already offered connected households seven different television programs, and it was clear that the number of programs distributed to households through the antenna's cable network would only continue to increase from this point on. This would eventually lead to a bottleneck at the receiving end, as the *Revue* pointed out: "Modern communal antennas, such as the one in Esch, are of course capable of transmitting a multitude of additional programs simultaneously. However, with off-the-shelf television sets, it will not be possible to select more than eight **pre-set** programs."¹⁴⁸⁵

Indeed, within a few years, a television set allowing for eight pre-set channels only would not have been sufficient anymore to conveniently access all channels offered by (at least some) Luxembourgish cable television networks.¹⁴⁸⁶ Consumers would have needed to go through the tedious manual tuning process each time they wanted to access a non-pre-set channel. Not so for the *PALcolor 7043*. The device's 16 buttons allowed for it to be positioned as a future-proof solution given the prospect of a continuously rising number of available channels. Consumers purchasing an expensive color television set – the *7043* was priced at 43.950 Luxembourgish francs – could be sure that their new device would be able to keep up with the proliferation of

¹⁴⁸³ For a detailed description how this set up process could function, see for instance the manual of *Telefunken's PALcolor 614*, Telefunken (1974). *Operating Instructions PALcolor 614*. DTMB/AEG, I.2.060 P-Tfk 03371. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://berlin.museum-digital.de/object/47204>.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Most devices offered in German product brochures had eight buttons – or fewer – to pre-save channels, see for instance Blaupunkt (1974). *Brochure "Blaupunkt Programm 74/75"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Blaupunkt/1974-2/>; Telefunken (1974). *Brochure "Telefunken Report Programm 74"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1974/>. This was also reflected in advertisements. See for instance Interfunk (1974, October 10). Advertisement. Tagline: "Genießer" schalten um auf interfunk. *Stern*, 42, 142–143.

¹⁴⁸⁵ In 1971, *Bosch* – who had devised the transcoding and norm-conversion system for Esch's communal antenna – solved this issue through an accessory device which consumers to save and select up to 26 channels, N.N. (1971, October 30). Ein Kabelfernsehnnetz für Esch-Alzette. *Revue*, 44, 42–43, p. 43. Highlighting in the original. In the original German: "Moderne Gemeinschaftsantennen wie die in Esch, sind natürlich in der Lage, eine Vielzahl von weiteren Programmen gleichzeitig zu übertragen. Mit handelsüblichen Fernsehgeräten aber wird es nicht möglich sein, mehr als acht **vorher eingestellte** Programme auszuwählen."

¹⁴⁸⁶ By 1977, the newly built cable television network of the Luxembourgish municipality of Niederanven already offered ten program choices, see for instance, mk. (1977, April 7). Gemeinde Niederanven an den TV-Empfang der Coditel angeschlossen. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9.

television channels.¹⁴⁸⁷ It is in this sense that the advertising for the *7043* which centered on its capability to save up to 16 pre-set channels as the device's standout feature needs to be understood. The feature itself, as well as the advertising approach connected to it, were both directly linked to the conditions of the Luxembourgish television media landscape in the early to mid-1970s.

Increasing the number of pre-set programs a television set could save and then highlighting this fact in advertising was of course not unique to the Luxembourgish context per se. Prior to the 1974 football world cup, *Grundig*, for instance, offered German consumers the choice between television sets that could save seven or twelve pre-set programs respectively, and similarly framed the latter option as being future-proof.¹⁴⁸⁸ However, the way *Grundig* advertised this feature deviated noticeably from the Luxembourgish advertising for the *PALcolor 7043*. Not only was it merely one subpoint instead of being the advertising's sole focus, but it also was framed in a completely different manner: "You think 12 channels are too many? Not for 1982. [...] with Tele-Pilot 12 you can already have reserves for cable TV today – because then there will be many channels via large [communal] antennas."¹⁴⁸⁹

As of 1974, communal antennas and cable television were still largely topics for the future in Germany despite first forays.¹⁴⁹⁰ *Grundig's* advertising hence sought to anticipate a potential lack of appreciation among German consumers for the benefit this feature would bring in the long term by preemptively addressing this with a forward-looking argument that referred to future changes to the media landscape. The Grand Duchy was ahead of the curve in comparison. Luxembourgish consumers would have been much more aware of cable television and the ongoing and prospective proliferation of receivable channels. Thus, *Telefunken* did not need to persuade Luxembourgish consumers that the capability to pre-set more channels was a valuable feature. Instead, the advertising for the *PALcolor 7043* presupposed a fundamental awareness among consumers in that regard and appealed to an assumed current, existing desire. In other words, *Grundig's* advertising reflected a belief that German consumers had to be convinced of needing the option to pre-set twelve channels while *Telefunken's* advertising assumed that Luxembourgish consumers wanted sixteen.

¹⁴⁸⁷ That the number of pre-set program buttons made the device future proof was explicitly mentioned by the *Revue* as an argument for the *PALcolor 7043*, N.N. (1974, May 11). 2. Preis ein Telefunken-Farbfernseher. *Revue*, 19, 33.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Grundig (1974). Brochure "Grundig Fernsehgeräte-Programm". Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Grundig/1974-TV/>.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Grundig (1974, April 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Weil 1978 wieder eine Fußball-WM ist. Und 1982... *Stern*, 16, 122–123. In the original German: "Sie meinen, 12 Programme wären zu viel? Nicht für 1982. [...] mit Tele-Pilot 12 heute schon Reserven fürs Kabelfernsehen – denn dann gibt's viele Programme über Großantennen."

¹⁴⁹⁰ Tetzner, K. (1974, July 5). Die Medienlandschaft ändert sich. *Funkschau*, 14, 1583.

Luxembourgish color television set advertising was formed by characteristics inherent to the media network technology of (color) television and by the particular way in which this network technology manifested itself in the Grand Duchy. In the case of print advertising, these factors could intersect with the characteristic local appeal of Luxembourgish national print media: because the transcoding and norm-conversion system in Esch's communal antenna allowed connected households to buy regular PAL color television sets and still receive all programs, some retail businesses¹⁴⁹¹ and brand representatives¹⁴⁹² referenced this communal antenna from 1971 onward in their advertising in the *Revue* and the *Luxemburger Wort*. These ads would, for instance, indicate that the company in question not only offered multi-standard, multi-norm devices but also cheaper one standard, one norm color television sets as a "special offer for communal antenna Esch/Alzette".¹⁴⁹³

The hundreds – and later thousands – of households connected to one particular communal antenna in one part of the country were thus addressed separately in some color television set ads published in Luxembourg's national print publications in the early to mid-1970s. This was the result of an interplay of two factors: first, due to the country's size and small population, Luxembourgish national print media was simultaneously locally relevant, which is why it made sense in the first place to insert ads in the *Revue* or the *Luxemburger Wort* that targeted such a spatially limited audience. Second, Luxembourg's geographical location and the multilingualism of its inhabitants allowed for the reception of and interest in television channels from multiple countries, which had made multi-standard, multi-norm color television sets, communal antennas, and ultimately also Esch's transcoding and norm-conversion system necessary in the first place. This system, in turn, allowed connected households to buy basic one-norm, one-standard television sets – ironically making them an exceptional case in Luxembourg.

¹⁴⁹¹ Radio Télévision Electricité Gehlen (1972, February 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Es dreht sich jetzt um kleine Preise! *Luxemburger Wort*, 21; Paul Kill (1973, April 4). Advertisement. Tagline: NEU EINGETROFFEN Oster- u. Kommuniongeschenke. *Luxemburger Wort*, 9. Such advertising even took place before the transcoding and norm-conversion system was operational, Radio Télévision Electricité Gehlen (1971, May 5). Advertisement. Tagline: SW-Fernseher Farb-Fernseher. *Luxemburger Wort*, 14.

¹⁴⁹² Telefunken (1971, December 25). Advertisement. Tagline: TELEFUNKEN. *Revue*, 52, 35; A. Loschetter & Fils (1973, April 21). SABA Fernseh-Modelle 1973. *Luxemburger Wort*, 29.

¹⁴⁹³ Telefunken (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: PALCOLOR mit 110° Technik. *Revue*, 44, 39. In the original German "Sonderangebot für Gemeinschaftsantenne Esch/Alzette". One retailer also advertised one-norm B/W television sets specifically for households connected to this communal antenna, Radio Télévision Electricité Gehlen (1972, December 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Gehlen-Preise sind Mittelpunkt! *Luxemburger Wort*, 25. It should be pointed out that technicians offering installation services for individual antennas advertised in Luxembourgish print publications as well. As did *Eltrona*, for instance, one of the companies building communal antennas, see Fred Nimax (1964, October 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Tele-ANTENNE-Montage. *Luxemburger Wort*, 15; Eltrona (1972, October 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Bosch-Gemeinschaftsantennen-Anlagen lösen Fernseh-Empfangsprobleme wirtschaftlich und zukunftssicher! *Revue*, 44, 92.

4.6 Part Conclusion: Across Borders and Languages. Advertising and Consumer Electronics in Luxembourg's Transnational Media Landscape

Luxembourgers increasingly came to own consumer electronics devices during the 1960s. While the country's household adoption rates followed roughly the same pattern as those of their German and French counterparts, the media consumption patterns of the Grand Duchy's inhabitants were quite unique. They were simultaneously local, national, and transnational in character, as Luxembourgers regularly chose from a wide range of Luxembourgish, German, and (less often) French-language media content. This applied to press, radio, and television alike. Foreign press supplemented the national Luxembourgish press landscape, in which the *Luxemburger Wort* and the *Revue* played exalted roles. Both were effectively locally limited mass media publications with a geographically concentrated audience. The only radio station broadcasting in Luxembourgish fulfilled a similar role among the receivable radio channels, whereas the country's television channel was less focused on its Luxembourgish clientele but rather oriented toward a francophone regional audience. Luxembourgers, in turn, opted for television sets that also enabled them to watch television from abroad.

Due to these transnational media reception patterns,¹⁴⁹⁴ Luxembourgers would have encountered foreign print, radio, and television advertisements for consumer electronics devices not specifically tailored to them throughout the long 1960s. Foreign advertising content played an unusually large role, though a question mark should be put over its efficacy given that not all foreign advertising was relevant to the inadvertently reached Luxembourgish audience. At the same time, Luxembourgers were explicitly targeted by domestic advertising measures. These were shaped by the structural characteristics of the country's advertising and media landscape, as well as by the particularities of its consumer electronics retail market.

Luxembourg offered a full range of advertising opportunities that enabled companies to precisely reach local consumers through shop window dressing, outdoor advertising, and cinema spots alike. Limits pertained to scope rather than variety. Although Belgian advertising agencies did play a significant role on the Luxembourgish market at least until the early 1960s, and even though some Luxembourgish companies would have continued to take care of their advertising without involving an agency, the country developed its own small advertising industry. Luxembourgish advertising expenditure was largely concentrated on the country's

¹⁴⁹⁴ Begasse has similarly noted in his analysis of Luxembourg's media in the late 20th century that transnational influences traditionally play an outsized role for the Grand Duchy due to its geographical position – nestled in between its three larger neighbors – and the multilingualism of its inhabitants, Begasse, 1994, p. 151.

press, and not exorbitant overall. It would have mainly been companies based in the Grand Duchy that spent on advertising their brand, goods, and services through Luxembourgish advertising channels.

The Luxembourgish consumer electronics market was rather small in international comparison. It seems to have been dominated by imports from Germany and Belgium. Brands from these two countries – together with *Philips* – were usually represented on the Luxembourgish market by subsidiaries or by local companies with whom they had entered partnerships. French brands played no discernible role, again pointing toward an asymmetrical convergence in Western European consumer electronics consumption. The second group of relevant actors were the country's electronics retailers, of which there were a few hundred in total. The country's showrooms are evidence that manufacturer representatives believed in the importance of maintaining strong links with Luxembourgish retailers. Restrictive legislation hampered the expansion of chain stores, which meant that Luxembourgish consumer electronics retail was dominated by small businesses, although foreign department stores and mail order businesses made inroads nonetheless by targeting the country's consumers from abroad. Despite its regional character, Luxembourg's consumer electronics retail landscape was hence also shaped by the Grand Duchy's sovereignty and by transnational links.

Apart from encountering media devices in the country's shop windows and showrooms, Luxembourgers would have been exposed to consumer electronics advertising at the country's trade fairs, on outdoor banners, and notably in the Grand Duchy's press. When opening the leading illustrated magazine, its readers would have seen three different forms of advertising for consumer electronics products, brands, and businesses. The *Revue* featured product ads similar to those found in German or French illustrated magazines – primarily from those brands that had local import partners or subsidiaries. French brands were accordingly absent. Although uncommon in German or French national media publications, cooperative advertising forms and ads for local retailers also had a prominent presence in the *Revue*. This may be explained by the local character of Luxembourg's national media. The *Revue* featured basically no Luxembourgish-language advertisements between the late 1950s and mid-1970s. Television advertisements, by contrast, regularly made use of Luxembourgish. Locally produced advertising spots for Luxembourgish consumer electronics companies coexisted on *Télé-Luxembourg* with those of French companies targeting another regional audience.

The coexistence of consumer electronics advertising variations inserted by different actors across Luxembourg's media formats again highlights the importance of considering the contextual embedding when analyzing advertising. This is perhaps most apparent when

considering how the Grand Duchy's geographical location, multilingualism, and distinct media reception patterns shaped the country's color television set adoption process and its network of communal antennas, which in turn influenced not only the type of color television sets available in the country but in certain cases also the argumentation used in the Grand Duchy to advertise color television sets in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s.

As France and Germany began to broadcast in color in the second half of 1967, Luxembourg followed along with great public interest due to the multilingualism of the country's inhabitants and its geographical location both facilitating transnational media reception patterns. By 1968, devices were available on the market which could receive both the German and French color television standards and hence fulfilled the requirements of Luxembourgish consumers. By the time the only Luxembourgish television channel started broadcasting in color in late 1972, color television had already been present in the country for five years, although only few households could have afforded to purchase a color television set in this timeframe. This development coincided with the increasing adoption of communal antennas in the country, which considerably improved the reception of foreign television broadcasts.

Widespread color television advertising began as soon as dual-standard devices were available. Luxembourgish consumers were advertised other devices as their German and French neighbors, but they would have used these devices to watch German and French color television content in the first few years. While this led to transnational congruity in advertising argumentation in certain cases, color television advertisements in Luxembourg could also be dependent on both transnational and local elements in a way that was unique to the Grand Duchy; such as in the case of those advertisements that referenced the communal antenna of Esch, whose transcoding and norm-conversion system allowed households to purchase an ordinary PAL television set.

As a small European market, Luxembourg was more strongly permeated by transnational influencing factors than Germany or France. Luxembourgish consumers would have been exposed to a mixture of consumer electronics advertisements of German, French, Belgian, or Luxembourgish provenance. Often these ads were in German, less frequently also in French or Luxembourgish. Sometimes they would have been produced locally, sometimes abroad. The Grand Duchy's inhabitants would have been sold the same products by the same brands as their neighbors, through similar channels, with ads that would have looked like those in Germany or France, using the same arguments. In other cases, however, the form and copy of consumer electronics advertising were tailored to the country's particular mediatic conditions, as were the television sets sold in the Grand Duchy. The tension between transnational entanglements and

local influences shaped Luxembourg's media landscape, advertising, and consumer electronics market during the long 1960s, resulting in consumer experiences that were often similar to those in Germany, Belgium, or France when considered individually – yet remarkably unique in their sum.

5 Conclusion

In the Western European mass consumer societies of the long 1960s, advertising enabled consumer electronics manufacturers to directly communicate to consumers about their brand and products. Advertising professionals working for consumer electronics multinationals developed brand- and product-specific strategies based on economic objectives and market environments. These deliberations in turn informed the creative work, as a *Braun* executive pointed out in a presentation “on strategy and execution of advertising” at the company’s 1971 *International Marketing Meeting*:

“[Advertising] strategy is based on science (economic trends, market data, consumer research etc.) [...] these facts are the basis of establishing the strategy but then the execution in the form of advertising is based on art rather than science. Advertising must create attention and inform consumers about product benefits in an interesting way but the creativity must be directed to the product benefit.”¹⁴⁹⁵

The creative work involved in developing an ad’s layout, copy text approach, and imagery was not completely unrestrained. Rather, the creativity of the responsible ad agency or company department was fenced in by company-specific frameworks, the constraints of a medium, and by what was to be advertised. But most importantly, individual advertisements for a media device or consumer electronics product group were developed as part of campaigns that involved coordinated advertising across multiple media channels and promotional measures at the points of sale. These campaigns, in turn, were the result of larger strategic deliberations taking place within a company’s structure and in a particular market environment. Advertising was hence predominantly a strategic endeavor. In this perspective, the agency in devising brand advertising for durable consumer goods shifts from advertising agencies to the many advertisers and marketers working for multinational companies.

The production of advertising was a decentralized process in such companies. It involved central departments, product departments, export departments, subsidiaries and partners, and external advertising agencies as service contractors. The plethora of advertising communications published by a company was the result of their collective (but not always collaborative) work. Even though advertising was produced by many actors, company advertisers were aware that consumers would have usually perceived all their advertising communications as originating from the same entity, i.e. the brand. To alleviate this tension between internal reality and external perception, actors installed in key positions sought to

¹⁴⁹⁵ N.N. (1971, March). Consumer Response to Braun Marketing Programs. *spotlight*, 1, 1–2. BS, lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformation international, p. 2.

foster cohesion through standardizing corporate image markers and/or a uniform company style while simultaneously aiming to conserve the freedom of advertisers to find creative solutions and answer to market conditions. However, the enduring implementation of such frameworks could be inhibited by organizational challenges such as shifting internal structures, rapid company growth, or resistance by those required to ultimately act upon them.

Advertisements and attendant advertising campaigns were contingent on a set of interrelated predetermining factors. They were co-shaped by external influences, company specificities, and product group- and device-specific factors. The broader state of an economy and the particularities of a national media landscape shaped advertising, as did brand guidelines, a company's market position and internal structure, and a device's price and design. As this work demonstrates, it is possible for historians to make the connections between published advertisements and these underlying aspects resurface by drawing on contextual and company sources. Crucially, meeting minutes, marketing plans, and internal letters further allow to explore the roads not taken.

Such a methodological approach simultaneously makes it feasible to reconstruct facets of the historical everyday life experience with advertising and sales measures that are nigh-impossible to investigate otherwise; company sources allow to trace consumer exposure. Consumers not only saw print ads. They also encountered media devices in television commercials, in the cinema, on billboards, or walking by the shop window of their local retailer. Depending on their needs and interests, consumers were also addressed through tailored marketing, advertising, and sales promotion measures that took place partially or completely outside the mass media mainstream. Advertising was interwoven with other promotional practices in company planning and in the consumer experience alike. Personal interactions in the marketplace, such as sales conversations with retailers acting as intermediaries, were integral counterparts to brand communications through mass media. In the best case, companies managed to reach consumers through multiple, complementary channels to layer communications about a brand and/or its products. The process of selling consumer electronics in the long 1960s was far more diverse than magazine advertising alone would suggest.

Consumer electronics companies precisely adjusted their marketing campaigns and advertising measures to the respective market environment in a national (or sometimes even local) context at a particular point in time – and to each device, product group, or target audience. All examined campaigns were hence highly specific concerning budget, extent, measures, channels, timing, imagery, and argumentation. The advertising positioning would even be adjusted between target groups or media channels for the same device. It follows that the

advertising of multinational consumer electronics companies retained a distinctly national component: designing advertisements and planning campaigns generally remained nationally separated endeavors. Differences in culture, law, language, product adoption rates, a brand's market position, media and retail environments made it necessary to adapt approaches to each national market. Coordination between the sales promotion efforts of a company and its advertising, too, would have predominantly taken place on a national scale.

Each national market had its own distinct mix of consumer electronics brands, which the Europeanization tendencies since the early 1960s affected asymmetrically: German brands expanded into France after the trade liberalization, while French manufacturers did not establish a presence in Luxembourg or Germany. Consumer electronics companies saw advertising as a crucial step in opening up a market, but it required them to also have a competitive and market-adequate product portfolio, and to have built up a distribution network as well as a proper after-sales service. The product portfolios of transnationally available brands at least partially differed between countries as technical standards could hinder importation; a factor specific to the consumer electronics sector. Consumer electronics companies locally produced devices, imported from their factories abroad, and sold third-party products under their branding – a fact they sought to hide in their advertising and sales material.

Yet, there was a noticeable overlap as to what brands and devices consumers in all three examined Western European countries could encounter in their nationally distinct media publications and retail stores. *Philips* or *Telefunken* were known across Western Europe, and the same *Grundig* tape recorder model may have very well found its way into French, German, and Luxembourgish households alike under the conditions of the European Common Market. As large consumer electronics companies increasingly turned their attention toward European and global markets, they selectively pursued transnational convergences in advertising.

Although consumers would not have seen the same ads, multinational consumer electronics companies attempted to establish and maintain a consistent corporate identity across national borders. These attempts need to be distinguished from efforts to transnationally standardize product-related advertising materials, approaches, and concepts. As products increasingly crossed frontiers, so did centrally produced marketing and advertising materials. Both types of transnational coherence would have involved different actors within a company and would have been pursued for different reasons. The extent to which consumer experiences with consumer electronics advertising were shared between countries becomes more pronounced when also considering unintentional similarities.

No matter the country, consumer electronics were technical and design-oriented durable consumer goods purchased infrequently. As high interest products, they necessitated explanations, demonstrations, and accurate depictions. They were thus usually advertised through mass media (particularly print) and sold primarily in specialist retail stores. Due to their importance for reaching and convincing consumers in their catchment area, manufacturers targeted retailers with separate advertising measures to win them over and harness the relationship of trust retailers had with their local consumer base. While media channels and stores were not identical between countries and would then differ further on the local level, most consumer electronics advertising campaigns followed a shared logic. This resulted in functionally similar consumer experiences concerning how and where this class of devices was presented. In the Luxembourgish case, transnational overlaps in consumer electronics advertising could even be more direct. Due to their media consumption patterns, Luxembourgish consumers would have regularly – albeit inadvertently – encountered the exact same ads as their originally targeted counterparts in Germany, France, or Belgium.

When proposing ideas about and usage forms for consumer electronics products to consumers, advertisers were limited by the possibilities offered by a product group and the traits of a device. Shifts in the media ensemble's overall balance, technological advancements, and modified societal roles for consumer electronics technologies allowed for or even required new argumentative approaches and changes in focus. Other elements remained static; a record player fulfilled the same functional purpose in 1959 as in 1974. In developing campaigns and advertising concepts, consumer electronics advertisers could thus have common points of departure, which sometimes resulted in similar positionings across brands, devices, and national borders. The same applied to sector-specific macro patterns, as consumer electronics advertisers generally followed the industry's seasonal cycles and relied on photographic presentation. The consumer experience with advertising for media devices would have shared more similarities between brands and across national borders than there were intentional transnational transfers and collaborations between consumer electronics advertisers. Any assessment on the degree of Europeanization in advertising is necessarily dependent on the perspective: coherence in exposure often exceeded coherence in production.

The extent of deliberate and inadvertent transnationalization in advertising during the long 1960s had a distinctly sector-specific component, with the interrelation of media infrastructures and media devices having a particular influence in the case of consumer electronics advertising. The contemporary trade literature also differentiated between sectors: it recommended transnational standardization in advertising particularly for the cheap, nondurable goods of

everyday life.¹⁴⁹⁶ Cross-sectoral comparisons would thus seem a fruitful avenue for future research. It seems likely that the Europeanization of consumption would have also spurred efforts to reshape advertising organization and transnationalize aspects of advertising practice in other consumer goods sectors, as they faced the same challenges posed by the structural conditions of the time – rapidly changing market environments, growing revenues, the introduction of marketing thought, and an intensification of transnational trade and brand competition in mass consumer markets. The potential financial and image-related benefits of standardizing advertising in 1960s Western Europe were not specific to consumer electronics. No matter the industry, advertisers would have needed to account for the influence of language barriers and nationally separate media and distribution landscapes on advertising planning. Certain findings of this work may thus be generalizable to other branded durable consumer goods; others were highly specific to individual devices.

Each case examined in this work reflects only a fragment of the broader barrage of advertising and sales measures for television sets, record players, radios, and tape recorders that German, French, and Luxembourgish consumers would have seen, heard, and experienced. Despite the outlined structural similarities and intentional transnational overlaps, there was still a distinctly national dimension to consumer electronics advertising – but in the Western European mass consumer societies of the long 1960s, the experiences of each individual consumer would have been fundamentally different as well. Depending on their interests, media consumption patterns, and place of residence, consumers might have been simultaneously targeted as motorists, language learners, rural residents, cinemagoers, and as one of millions of readers of *Stern* or *Paris Match*.

This study's contribution is methodological as much as it is historical. Advertising as a historical practice cannot be traced through advertisements alone, as it was embedded in broader contexts for companies and consumers alike. By investigating both the production of advertising and consumer exposure, it demonstrates how corporate structures and strategies shaped concrete marketing materials and advertising approaches – and where those could in turn be encountered across a variety of media and retail contexts. To truly understand advertising as an economic mediator and cultural phenomenon in mass consumer societies, historians must analyze how companies developed advertising and trace the many instances where people could have experienced it in their everyday lives.

¹⁴⁹⁶ De Iulio, 2002, p. 31.

6 Tables and Figures

6.1 Tables

Table 1: Weekly distribution of *Telefunken* advertisements in the *Stern*, business year 1962/63.

Table 2: Percentual allocation of total mass media advertising spending in France and Germany, 1962.

Table 3: Share of Western European households owning selected consumer electronics devices, 1963/1969.

6.2 Figures

Figure 1: Telefunken (1962, September 9). Advertisement. Tagline: 1958: TELEFUNKEN bringt Stereophonie. *Stern*, 36, 85.

Figure 2: Telefunken (1962, November 18). Advertisement. Tagline: Musik wie im Konzertsaal mit der Stereo-Anlage »Concertino«. *Stern*, 46, 59.

Figure 3: Telefunken (1962, November 25). Advertisement. Tagline: Für schöne Stunden... den TELEFUNKEN Musikus. *Stern*, 47, 145.

Figure 4: Telefunken (1964). Advertisement. Tagline: “Flieg sicher mit Telefunken!”. Printed in Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 4–5.

Figure 5: Telefunken (1964). Advertisement. Tagline: Bei Licht besehen.... Printed in Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 6–7.

Figure 6: Telefunken (1964). Advertisement. Tagline: Nur ein Tastendruck. Printed in Telefunken (1964). *Linie der Werbung 1964*. DTMB/AEG, GS 7748, pp. 16–17.

Figure 7: Telefunken (1962, November 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Regardez bien, et vous en conviendrez : avec TELEFUNKEN quelle finesse d'image. *Paris Match*, 709, 43.

Figure 8: Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: trudelsicher. *Bravo*, 41, 21.

Figure 9: Telefunken (1964, October 10). Advertisement. Tagline: Même sens dessus dessous, il enregistre fidèlement. *Paris Match*, 809, 160.

Figure 10: Telefunken (1964, October). Advertisement. Tagline: N’importe où N’importe quand... *Salut les Copains*, 27, 118.

Figure 11: Telefunken (1967, June 17). Advertisement. Tagline: même sur un toboggan il enregistre. *Paris Match*, 949, 119.

Figure 12: Telefunken (1967, April 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Stereo-Effekte... *Stern*, 18, 11.

Figure 13: Telefunken (1968, September 16). Advertisement. Tagline: Ein heißer Tip. *Bravo*, 38, 17.

Figure 14: Telefunken (1969, September 22). Advertisement. Tagline: BRAVO! *Bravo*, 39, 21.

Figure 15: Telefunken (1970, March 30). Advertisement. Tagline: „mister hit“. *Bravo*, 14, 17.

Figure 16: Telefunken (1971, April 19). Advertisement. Tagline: Telefunken “mister hit 71”. *Bravo*, 17, 27.

Figure 17: Philips (1968, June 16). Advertisement. Tagline: cassettophon. *Stern*, 24, 143.

Figure 18: Philips (1968, July 6). Advertisement. Tagline: en 1968 la musique c'est... *Paris Match*, 1000, 143.

Figure 19: Philips (1968). *Packaging for the Philips Cassettophone*. Image © Andreas Garitz. Used with permission. Initially published in the online exhibition “Vom Wesen der Dinge”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.verschwundene-dinge.de/zu-den-themen/musikwiedergabe/kassettenrekorder-philips-cassettophon.html>.

Figure 20: Philips (1968). *Belgian box content for the Philips Cassettophone*. Image © Andreas Garitz. Used with permission. Initially published in the online exhibition “Vom Wesen der Dinge”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.verschwundene-dinge.de/zu-den-themen/musikwiedergabe/kassettenrekorder-philips-cassettophon.html>.

Figure 21: N.N. (undated). *Organisationsschema BRAUN*. Braun Archiv Braun-Sammlung, red magazine file Organigramme.

Figure 22: Braun (undated). *Communication Guidelines for Braun*. J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers. Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun. Hartman Center, p. 32.

Figure 23: Grundig (1962, April 28). Advertisement. Tagline: Ce qu'il y a derrière GRUNDIG. *Paris Match*, 681, 110.

Figure 24: Philips (1957, May). Advertisement. Tagline: Viele Gründe sprechen für Mignon. *Funkschau*, 9, 243.

Figure 25: AEG (1962). *Tonbandgerät AEG Magnetophon Automatic*. DTMB, 1/1997/0753 0. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://berlin.museum-digital.de/object/46215.3_07135500696.jpg: © Deutsches Technikmuseum; License: CC BY.

Figure 26: Section of N.N. (undated). *Ablaufplan Magnetophon automatic*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

Figure 27: N.N. (undated). Script for retailer visits “das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt”. DTMB/AEG, GS 1975.

Figure 28: Telefunken (1962). Brochure “Zu neuen Verkaufserfolgen durch unsere Werbung für das Magnetophon automatic”. DTMB/AEG, GS 5899.

Figure 29: Telefunken (1962, May 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Träumen Sie auch vom idealen Tonbandgerät? *Stern*, 21, 117.

Figure 30: Telefunken (1962). Brochure “Tonbandgeräte Magnetophon 1962/63”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1962/telefunken62-10.jpg>, p. 10.

Figure 31: Geschäftsbereich Geräte Mechanik (undated). *Kosten der Werbung Geschäftsjahr 1963/64*. DTMB/AEG, GS 1976.

Figure 32: Telefunken (1962, November 3). Advertisement. Tagline: Appuyez sur une touche ... C'est tout ! *Paris Match*, 708, 36.

Figure 33: Philips (1962, November 17). Advertisement. Tagline: Ni “prêt”, ni “prévu”, ni “adaptable”, mais entièrement équipé pour la 2^{ème} chaîne sans aucune modification ultérieure“. *Paris Match*, 710, 17.

Figure 34: Philips (1964, September 26). Advertisement. Tagline: Épreuve... et preuve ! La chute libre. *Paris Match*, 807, 31.

Figure 35: Philips (1964, September 27). Advertisement. Tagline: Gratis zwei Fernseh-Faltmodelle für die Stellprobe zu Haus. *Stern*, 39, 117.

Figure 36: Philips (1965). Brochure “Tape Recorders Record Players Radio Receivers”. Enclosure of von Dellingshausen to Seydlitz (1965, December 13). *Internal letter without subject*. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118.

Figure 37: Telefunken (1965). Brochure “Sizi tenvir ediyorum!”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118, non-paginated.

Figure 38: Telefunken (1965). Brochure “Sizi tenvir ediyorum!”. DTMB/AEG, GS 2118. Cover page.

Figure 39: Telefunken (1964). Brochure “report '64/65”. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1964/20.jpg>, p. 20.

Figure 40: Continental Edison (1959, October 3). *Advertisement*. Tagline: *CITROËN a choisi CONTINENTAL EDISON*. *Paris Match*, 547, 90.

Figure 41: Telefunken (1966). *Brochure "Hören und Lernen mit Telestop R/AS"*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

Figure 42: Section of Sarach & Grünthal (1966). Letter. Subject: Sie schicken Ihren Schülern den Sprachlehrer in die Wohnung ... Enclosure F to Mätze & Noltemeyer (1966, September 30). *Werbeinformationen 41/66*. Subject: *Direktwerbeaktion für den Telestop R/AS an Fernunterrichtsschulen, Sprachschulen und Lehrmittelverlage*. DTMB/AEG, GS 6019.

Figure 43: Philips (1966). *Sales promotion vehicle, France, 1966* (*Sales Promotion Monitor*, Sept 1966, p. 17). Image © Royal Philips. Used with permission. PCA, Z9508-2.

Figure 44: Philips (1962). *Shop window audio and television devices, France, 1962*. Image © Royal Philips. Used with permission. PCA, Z9509-1.

Figure 45: Pathé Marconi (1963, December). *Advertisement*. Tagline: C'est parti...pour 20 danses sans arrêt ! *Salut les Copains*, 17, 8.

Figure 46: Teppaz (1973, December). *Advertisement*. Tagline: Ambiance NonStop. *Salut les Copains*, 136, 139.

Figure 47: Philips (1962, July 29). *Advertisement*. Tagline: Eine Freundin für Dur+Moll. *Stern*, 30, 67.

Figure 48: Philips (1962, June 24). *Advertisement*. Tagline: Eine Freundin für Dur+Moll. *Stern*, 25, 43.

Figure 49: Seasonal advertising patterns for consumer electronics devices in *Stern* and *Paris Match*.

Figure 50: Grundig (1974, May 15). *Advertisement*. Tagline: Weil 1978 wieder eine Fußball-WM ist. Und 1982... *Stern*, 21, 42–43.

Figure 51: Evolution of format sizes in consumer electronics advertising, *Stern* and *Paris Match*.

Figure 52: Evolution of color usage in consumer electronics advertising, *Stern* and *Paris Match*.

Figure 53: Sony (1974, April 4). *Advertisement*. Tagline: Der Weg zum naturgetreuen Farbfernseh-Bild ist noch weit. *Stern*, 15, 35.

Figure 54: Wega (1974, May 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Es liegt uns mehr, großartige Farbfernsehgeräte zu machen, als großartige Worte darüber. *Stern*, 23, 83.

Figure 55: Relation of the number of households to the number of radios & television sets in Luxembourg 1956-1972.

Figure 56: Luxembourgish advertising expenditure in 1974.

Figure 57: Siemens (1971, December 25). Advertisement. Tagline: SIEMENS im neuen Ausstellungsraum. *Revue*, 52, 44. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/r5k1f8nwf4/pages/44/articles/DIVL3005>].

Figure 58: Philips (1967, January 28). Advertisement. Tagline: clic! clac! la révolution cassette Philips continue... *Revue*, 4, 23. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/5n0j6pk5t5/pages/23/articles/DIVL2098>].

Figure 59: Central Radio (1971, October 30). Advertisement. Tagline: Blaupunkt Fernseher. *Revue*, 44, 36. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/5nrpxfm17g/pages/36/articles/DIVL2122>].

Figure 60: Screenshot from N.N. (1975, October 26). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei n°18 du 26.10.1975*. 00:10:38. Archives: Centre national de l'audiovisuel (CNA), Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_006759.

Figure 61: Communal antenna in Bonnevoie, Luxembourg, 1973. Section of Eltrona (1973, October 20). Advertisement. Tagline: In diesem Haus wohnen 10 Familien. *Revue*, 42, 66. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/g1j0qhtdmj/pages/66/articles/DIVL1636>].

Figure 62: Telefunken (1974, June 8). Advertisement. Tagline: Sie wünschen ein Farbfernsehgerät, mit dem Sie 16 Programme speichern können? *Revue*, 23, 107. [Digitized by the National Library of Luxembourg, accessed December 29, 2025. <https://persist.lu/ark:70795/qrg5qbd6wc/pages/107/articles/DIVL2366>].

7 Bibliography

7.1 Archives & Primary Sources

7.1.1 Company-Related Archival Material

Due to the large number of sources, company-related archival materials are only listed individually in the bibliography if they do not form part of a larger set. To ensure clarity, archival material is always cited in full in the footnotes.

7.1.1.1 *Deutsches Technikmuseum Berlin. Historisches Archiv (DTMB)* – Berlin, Germany

Company Archive AEG-Telefunken (AEG)

Archive reference codes:

GS 0057, GS 1052, GS 1099, GS 1142, GS 1397, GS 1467, GS 1949, GS 1951, GS 1635, GS 1636, GS 1964, GS 1973, GS 1974, GS 1975, GS 1976, GS 1983, GS 1986, GS 2009, GS 2019, GS 2020, GS 2028, GS 2031, GS 2116, GS 2118, GS 2120, GS 2502, GS 2503, GS 2699, GS 2794, GS 2795, GS 3055, GS 3508, GS 4585, GS 5899, GS 5922, GS 5923, GS 5932, GS 6019, GS 6049, GS 7748, GS 7954, GS 7972, JB 0815, JB XA 898.

7.1.1.2 *Philips Company Archives (PCA)* – Eindhoven, the Netherlands

Archive reference codes:

75: 823 Philips International Advertising Convention

75: 823 Philips International Advertising Council

721.15 General Advertising Department G.A.D.

811.31: 822 televisietoestellen (marketing)

823 marketing

Individual sources:

G.A.D. (1963). *Philips international advertising award 1962-1963*.

G.A.D. (1965). *Philips international advertising award 1964-1965*.

G.A.D. (1968). *Philips S.W. Numann award 1967-1968*.

Philips (1962). *Shop window audio and television devices, France, 1962* [Photograph]. Z9509-1.

Philips (1966). *Sales promotion vehicle, France, 1966 (Sales Promotion Monitor, Sept 1966, p. 17)*. Z9508-2.

7.1.1.3 *State Archives of Belgium, National Archives 2 - Joseph Cuvelier Repository (AGR 2)*
– Brussels, Belgium

Groupe Philips en Belgique (1919-2004)

Archive reference codes:

171, 427, 428, 431, 844, 860, 863, 866, 868, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880.

7.1.1.4 *Braun Archiv BraunSammlung (BS)* – Kronberg im Taunus, Germany

The archive did not have reference codes at the time of consultation. Sources were held in lever arch files and magazine files or stored individually.

Lever arch files and magazine files:

Lever arch file BRAUN “Kontakte” Händlerinformation

Lever arch file Braun “Spotlight”. Vertriebsinformationen International

Magazine file Fachhandel II

Magazine file Organigramme

Magazine file W. Schmittel Abt. Visuelle Kommunikation

Magazine file Werbung bei Braun allgemein

Individual sources:

Braun Geschäftsberichte: 1959, 1960, 1961/62, 1964/65, 1965/66, 1966/67, 1968/69, 1969/70, 1970/71, 1974/75, 1975/76, 1977/78, 1979/80, 1980/81.

Braun [1968]. *Richtlinien für die visuelle Gestaltung von Information und Werbung*.

Braun (1975, June). *Factbook AB – E. 2. Ausgabe (Juni 1975)*.

Braun (1979). *Leitlinien für die Korrespondenz bei Braun*.

Eichler, F. (1966, July 11). *Braun – das Gesicht einer Firma. Vortrag zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung in der Neuen Sammlung München am 11.7.66*.

N.N. (1955, June). *Grundsätzliches zur Geschäftspolitik Nr. 1*.

N.N. (1955, August). *Rundfunkgerät wird zum Möbel. Braun Betriebsspiegel. Sonderausgabe August 1955, 2-12*.

N.N. (1959, June). *Neuorganisation der Unternehmensführung. Braun Werksnachrichten Juni 1959*.

N.N. (1960, March). *Unternehmensleitung neu gegliedert. Braun Werksnachrichten Sonderausgabe März 1960*.

N.N. (1960, June). *Werner Dube Vorsitzender der Geschäftsleitung. Braun Werksnachrichten Juni 1960*.

N.N. (1963). *Neuorganisation der Braun AG. Braun Betriebsspiegel 1/63*.

N.N. (1966). In- und Ausland rücken zusammen. *Braun Betriebsspiegel* 1/66.

Semmel, H. (1972). Nicht mehr bei Braun – und doch lächeln. *Braun Betriebsspiegel* 7-8/72. Reprinted in Max Braun Stiftung (Ed.) (2000). *Mehr als Erinnerungen. Eine Dokumentation der Max Braun Stiftung*, 147.

Spiegel, B. (1971, January 2). *BRAUN AG – as it is – as it would like to be – as it wants to be known*.

7.1.1.5 *John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising & Marketing History. David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University (Hartman Center) – Durham, USA*

Archive Reference Codes:

J. Walter Thompson Company. Advertising Vertical File, 1950-1994.

Box 51. ADV – International Europe

Box 51. ADV – International Europe – France

Box 51. ADV – International Europe – Germany

J. Walter Thompson Company. Donald Johnston Papers, 1964-1996, and undated.

Box 20. File Braun (2/2)

J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The George Black Papers, 1968-1989.

Box 3. Clients Braun, 1973 (4 of 4)

Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, Braun, 1974 (4 of 5)

Box 4. Clients 1973-1974, BRAUN Philosophy (1 of 2)

Box 5. Clients 1974-1977, Braun Philosophy (1 of 2)

Box 5. Clients 1976, Braun

Box 7. Clients 1977-1978, Braun Corporate Identity (3 of 3)

J. Walter Thompson Company. Frankfurt Office. The Harry Clark Papers, 1945-1992 and undated.

Box 11. Clients: Braun Correspondence with other JWT-Offices, A-Z, 1972

Box 11. Clients: Braun, Correspondence with other JWT-Offices, 1973

7.1.1.6 *Loewe-Opta Archiv (LOA) – Kronach, Germany*

Archive reference codes:

Griesmeier Bestand 13.00/2 Organisation 1971-72

Griesmeier Bestand, 24.70 Werbung 1967-1972

Marketingunterlagen Dr. Meissner 1950-1973

21.27 Brockdorff

7.1.1.7 Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) – Florence, Italy

Archive reference codes:

CJUE-0886, CJUE-0887, CJUE-0888, CJUE-0889, CJUE-0890.

7.1.1.8 Digitally Accessed Company Sources

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Blaupunkt (1974). *Brochure “Blaupunkt Programm 74/75”*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Blaupunkt/1974-2/>.

Grundig (1974). *Brochure “Grundig Fernsehgeräte-Programm”*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Grundig/1974-TV/>.

N.N. (1962). Magnetophon automatic – das erste automatische Tonbandgerät der Welt. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 6–8. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bucket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962.

N.N. (1962). Wir werben für Magnetophon automatic. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 18, 21. Accessed December 29, 2025. https://www.radiomuseum-bucket.de/wiki/index.php?title=Der_Telefunken_Sprecher_Heft_18_1962.

N.N. (1968). AEG-TELEFUNKEN-Informationscenter. *Telefunken Sprecher*, 45, 26. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1968-3/>.

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Philips (1963). *Brochure “Freund der Familie”*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Philips/Philips-1963-Programm/>.

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Telefunken (1962). *Brochure "Tonbandgeräte Magnetophon 1962/63"*. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://www.hifi-archiv.info/Telefunken/1962>.

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7.1.2 Print Advertising Collections

This list indicates only magazine and newspaper issues used for the quantitative and/or qualitative analysis of advertising content. Individual advertisements are not cited separately and in full due to their volume, with bibliographical information being given in the footnotes.

7.1.2.1 *Stern*, Germany

1959: 1-52	1965: 2-52
1961: 1-10, 12-52	1967: 1-53
1962: 1-52	1968: 1-52
1963: 1-14, 39, 42	1971: 1-53
1964: 4, 14, 39	1974: 1-52

7.1.2.2 *Bravo*, Germany

1960: 20, 50	1967: 1-53
1961: 42	1968: 1-52
1962: 17-52	1969: 39
1964: 41	1970: 14, 41
1965: 1-52	1971: 17
1966: 1-52	1975: 47

7.1.2.3 *Paris Match*, France

1958: 488-490, 496	1964: 807, 809, 811, 813
1959: 508-524, 526-559	1965: 821-872
1960: 600	1967: 946, 949, 959, 960, 961, 967, 971
1961: 624, 649	1968: 978-1025
1962: 665-716	1971: 1130-1181
1963: 736, 737, 741, 756, 764	1974: 1287-1304, 1307-1319, 1321-1335

7.1.2.4 *Salut les Copains*, France

1962: 6-17	1971: 103
1964: 27	1975: 154
1968: 70-76	

7.1.2.5 *Revue*, Luxembourg

1959: 1-52	1969: 37, 43
1961: 46	1970: 21, 23
1962: 1-52	1971: 1-52
1965: 1-52	1972: 31, 44
1967: 1-52	1973: 43, 52
1968: 1-52	1974: 1-52

7.1.2.6 *Luxemburger Wort*, Luxembourg

1957: December 27	1967: June 2, September 13
1958: August 30	1968: January 18, February 10, October 3
1959: December 21	1969: June 6, June 7
1960: November 26, December 8	1970: June 3, October 13
1961: October 6, December 8	1971: May 5, October 2, October 7
1962: March 31, September 26, October 16, October 23	1972: February 3, April 8, April 13, August 21, December 8, December 19
1963: July 11, November 15	1973: April 4, April 26
1964: October 28, November 21	1974: January 2, December 19
1965: June 11, November 20	1978: May 18
1966: April 27	

7.1.2.7 Advertisements in Other Print Publications

7.1.2.7.1 Other German Print Media

Funk-Technik. 1963: 19

Funkschau. 1957: 9; 1961: 9

7.1.2.7.2 Other French Print Media

Le Haut-Parleur. 1964: 1073

Revue du Son. 1965: 142

7.1.2.7.3 Other Luxembourgish Print Media

Autorevue. 1965: 8.

d'Letzeburger Land. 1958: 2

Reyland, R. (1956). *Guide du marché luxembourgeois avec listes des producteurs et importateurs / Einführung in den Luxemburger Import- und Exportmarkt mit Adressenangabe der Produktions- und Importfirmen* (3rd ed.). Bourg-Bourger.

Publi-Lux (Ed.) (1964). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1963/64*. Bourg-Bourger.

Publi-Lux (Ed.) (1967). *Annuaire luxembourgeois. Commerce, Industrie, Artisanat. Édition 1967*. Bourg-Bourger.

7.1.3 Television Advertising Spot Collections

7.1.3.1 Centre national de l'audiovisuel (CNA) – Dudelange, Luxembourg

N.N. (1971, October 17). *Advertisement Coca-Cola. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 17.10.1971*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003213.

N.N. (1971, October 17). *Advertisement Radio Sachs. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 17.10.1971*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003213.

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N.N. (1973, March 4). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei. Hei Elei Hebdo du 04.03.1973 (Carnaval)*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003212.

N.N. (1973, June 3). *Advertisement Philips. HEI ELEI HEBDO du 03.06.1973*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_003218.

N.N. (1975, October 26). *Advertisement Philips. Hei Elei Kuck Elei n°18 du 26.10.1975*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_ETV_006759.

Schneider, P. (Director) (1958). *Advertisement Lessel Frères. 10^e F.I.L.: 1958*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_PUB_001288.

Schneider, P. (Director) (1967). *Advertisement Grundig. 19^e F.I.L.: 1967*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_PUB_001276.

Schneider, P. (Director) (1974). *Advertisement Sogel S.A. 26^e F.I.L.: 1974*. CNA, Collection CLT-UFA. IA_PUB_001283.

7.1.3.2 INAthèque – Paris, France

Philips (1972, January 1). *Advertisement Philips: magnétophone: fanfare de la marine*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212571.053.

Schneider (1968, October 1). *Advertisement Schneider: gamme d'appareils audiovisuels : le jeu*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3867236.004.

Thomson (1971, October 9). *Advertisement Thomson Ducretet: television couleur*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212129.029.

Thomson (1971, October 13). *Advertisement Thomson Ducretet: téléviseur couleur*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212129.042.

Thomson (1971, October 16). *Advertisement Thomson Ducretet: téléviseur couleur*. Première Chaîne ORTF. INAthèque, ID 3212129.053.

7.1.3.3 Other Collections

N.N. (undated). *Advertisement Au Roy*. CLT/RTL, archives personnelles Christian Masson. In *1995 40 ans de publicité 08 (RTL TV)*, uploaded by RTL Canal 21. Dailymotion video. Accessed December 29, 2025. <https://dai.ly/x6a7sw>.

7.1.4 Newspaper and Magazine Articles

Due to their volume, newspaper and magazine articles are not listed with full bibliographic detail, which is given in the footnotes instead.

7.1.4.1 German Press Publications

7.1.4.1.1 *Der Spiegel*

1955: 5

1964: 41, 45

1963: 48

1972: 25

7.1.4.1.2 *Funkschau*

1956: 21	1966: 12
1960: 23	1967: 13
1961: 10	1968: 2
1962: 3, 12	1974: 14
1963: 14	

7.1.4.1.3 Other Publications

Absatzwirtschaft. 1969: 4

Die Zeit. 1966: 2

Funk-Technik. 1962: 12, 14

Graphik. Das Magazin für Werbegestaltung. 1975: 8

Neckar-Bote. 1962: November 9.

Stern. 1967: 8

7.1.4.2 French Press Publications

7.1.4.2.1 *Le Monde*

1959: December 7

1960: December 29

1967: March 17

7.1.4.2.2 Other Publications

Le Monde diplomatique. 1963: February

Radio-Constructeur. 1967: 232.

Salut les Copains. 1964: 23; 1971: 106

7.1.4.3 Luxembourgish Press Publications

The Luxembourgish press was accessed through the database eluxemburgensia.lu.

7.1.4.3.1 *d'Letzeburger Land*

1955: 22	1967: 4, 51
1957: 12	1968: 21
1959: 43	1971: 29
1962: 47	1990: 40
1964: 2	

7.1.4.3.2 *Luxemburger Wort*

1949: November 5	1967: July 5, July 24, September 16, December 8
1955: March 10, May 14, May 17, May 18, June 7	1968: June 14
1958: December 29	1969: October 14, October 30
1959: September 3	1970: May 27, August 12, December 11
1960: September 20	1971: June 12, June 26, September 6, October 16, December 11, December 24
1961: March 18	1972: March 18, June 28, September 7, December 8, December 9
1962: March 10, April 27, December 8	1973: May 14
1963: March 23, September 20, October 12	1974: October 16
1964: June 10, August 5, October 3, November 7	1975: February 18, August 23
1965: February 20, April 23, May 21, June 26, July 3, July 9, November 6	1977: April 7, August 26
1966: August 18, November 7, November 14	1979: January 26, October 30

7.1.4.3.3 *Revue*

1956: 1	1968: 11
1957: 46	1969: 22, 52
1959: 41, 46	1970: 51
1960, 41	1971: 3, 16, 40, 44, 50
1962: 2, 22, 30	1972: 44
1963: 50	1973: 22
1964: 40	1974: 19, 23, 44
1965: 39	1978: 37
1966: 11	1980: 1
1967: 22, 32, 33, 46, 51	

7.1.5 Contemporary Publications and Historical Data

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I declare that this thesis:

- is the result of my own work. Any contribution from any other party, and any use of generative artificial intelligence technologies have been duly cited and acknowledged;
- is not substantially the same as any other that I have submitted, and;
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With my approval I furthermore confirm the following:

- I have adhered to the rules set out in the University of Luxembourg's Code of Conduct and the Doctoral Education Agreement (DEA)¹, in particular with regard to Research Integrity.
- I have documented all methods, data, and processes truthfully and fully.
- I have mentioned all the significant contributors to the work.
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I acknowledge that if any issues are raised regarding good research practices based on the review of the thesis, the examination may be postponed pending the outcome of any investigation of such issues. If a degree was conferred, any such subsequently discovered issues may result in the cancellation of the degree.

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¹ If applicable (DEA is compulsory since August 2020)