

UniGR-CBS Working Paper Vol. 24

On the Reintroduction of Temporary Controls at EU Internal Borders

Developments and Challenges 40 Years After the Schengen Agreement

Christian Wille

Christian Wille

University of Luxembourg

Department of Geography and Spatial Planning

christian.wille@uni.lu

UniGR-CBS 2025

Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.15575146



A more comprehensive version of this text will be available in German in: Brodowski/Dittel/Weber (Eds.): 40 Jahre Schengener Übereinkommen. Europa und seine inneren Grenzen. Baden-Baden, Nomos.

On the Reintroduction of Temporary Controls at EU Internal Borders. Developments and Challenges 40 Years After the Schengen Agreement

Abstract – Schengen countries are increasingly relying on the Schengen Borders Code to make internal borders less permeable. This Working Paper focuses on the ongoing reintroduction of temporary internal border controls within the EU between 2015 and 2024, as well as the justifications provided by Schengen countries for these measures. The analysis identifies four phases, reflecting a gradual displacement of the Schengen spirit—established 40 years ago—by a prevailing border spirit. While open borders and free movement remain guiding principles of the European Union, national border regimes are gaining ground and are continuously being adapted to fluctuating threat perceptions. Migration, terrorism, public health, and hybrid threats serve as discursive resources to legitimize a Schengen reality that can no longer be regarded as exceptional, but rather as part of a normalized, security-oriented European order. This trajectory is characterized by a re-nationalization of border policy within the EU, an ever-expanding rhetoric of crisis, political instrumentalization, and an ambivalent mode of EU border governance.

Schengen, border, bordering, Europe, crisis

Sur la réintroduction de contrôles temporaires aux frontières intérieures de l'UE. Évolutions et défis quarante ans après la Convention de Schengen

Résumé – Les États Schengen s'appuient de plus en plus sur le Code frontières Schengen afin de rendre les frontières intérieures moins perméables. Ce Working Paper analyse la réintroduction continue de contrôles temporaires aux frontières intérieures de l'UE entre 2015 et 2024, ainsi que les justifications avancées par les États Schengen pour légitimer ces mesures. L'analyse distingue quatre phases au cours desquelles s'opère une transformation progressive : l'« esprit de Schengen », instauré il y a quarante ans, est progressivement remplacé par un « esprit des frontières » dominant. Bien que les frontières ouvertes et la libre circulation demeurent des principes directeurs fondamentaux de l'UE, les régimes frontaliers nationaux gagnent en importance et sont continuellement adaptés aux perceptions changeantes des menaces. La migration, le terrorisme, la santé publique et les menaces hybrides servent de ressources discursives pour légitimer une réalité Schengen qui ne peut plus être perçue comme exceptionnelle, mais plutôt comme partie intégrante d'un ordre européen normalisé et axé sur la sécurité. Cette dynamique se caractérise par une renationalisation des politiques frontalières au sein de l'UE, une rhétorique de crise en expansion constante, une instrumentalisation politique et une gouvernance ambivalente des frontières intérieures.

Schengen, frontière, frontiérisation, Europe, crises

Zur Wiedereinführung temporärer Kontrollen an den EU-Binnengrenzen. Entwicklungen und Herausforderungen nach 40 Jahren Schengener Übereinkommen

Zusammenfassung – Die Schengen-Länder berufen sich zunehmend auf den Schengener Grenzkodex, um die Binnengrenzen undurchlässiger zu machen. Das Working Paper analysiert die fortdauernde Wiedereinführung temporärer Kontrollen an den EU-Binnengrenzen zwischen 2015 und 2024 sowie die von den Schengen-Ländern hierfür angeführten Legitimierungen. Die Analyse deckt vier Phasen auf, in denen sich ein schrittweiser Wandel vollzieht: Der vor 40 Jahren etablierte Schengen-Spirit wird zunehmend von einem Border-Spirit verdrängt. Zwar bleiben offene Grenzen und Freizügigkeit zentrale Leitprinzipien der Europäischen Union, doch gewinnen nationale Grenzregime an Bedeutung und werden an wechselnde Bedrohungslagen fortlaufend angepasst. Migration, Terrorismus, Gesundheitsschutz und hybride Bedrohungen stellen dabei diskursive Ressourcen, um eine Schengen-Realität zu legitimieren, die nicht länger als Ausnahme verstanden werden kann, sondern vielmehr als eine normalisierte, sicherheitsorientierte europäische Ordnung. Diese Entwicklung ist von einer Renationalisierung der EU-Grenzpolitik, sich stetig ausweitenden Krisenrhetorik, politischen Instrumentalisierung und einem ambivalenten Grenzmanagement gekennzeichnet.

Schengen, Grenze, bordering, Europa, Krisen



1 Introduction

This anniversary should not be a ceremony of mourning but rather a big party – this was the sentiment expressed by Luxembourg’s Minister of the Interior in January, 2025 regarding the upcoming celebrations that will mark the signing of the Schengen Agreement. Signed on June 14, 1985, by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany, the agreement initiated the gradual abolition of controls at internal borders in Europe and has since been considered a great success. To date, 29 countries have joined the agreement. However, very near to the precise location where the Schengen Agreement was signed, controls have now been reinstated. At the “Schengen Viaduct,” which connects German and Luxembourgish highways over the Moselle River, temporary controls have been reinstated on the German side. The German government has justified the reactivation of controls with ongoing migration pressure. Luxembourg, however, questions the legality of these temporary controls and is examining whether they are legally sustainable (Javel, 2025).

Germany is not alone in utilizing the option to introduce temporary controls at EU internal borders “in the event of a serious threat to public policy or internal security.” Other Schengen countries are increasingly relying on Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation, 2016/399) to make internal borders less permeable – a trend that has persisted for a decade. This development is the focus of this UniGR-CBS Working Paper, which discusses the emerging border spirit in the Schengen Area on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Schengen Agreement. The paper examines the reintroduction of temporary EU internal border controls since 2015, the resulting challenges to European free movement, and concludes with some considerations on the future of the Schengen regime.

2 Re-Bordering: Normalization and Consolidation

This study focuses on the reintroduction of temporary EU internal border controls between 2015 and 2024 and the justifications provided by Schengen countries for these measures. We analyze notifications submitted by Schengen countries to the European Commission regarding the reintroduction of temporary internal border controls that had been received by January 14, 2025 (EC, 2025a). These notifications provide information on the number and reasons for the reintroduction based on the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation, 2016/399) between 2006 and 2024. The analysis reveals a gradual but steady normalization and consolidation of temporary EU internal border controls over four phases, gradually displacing the Schengen spirit of open borders established 40 years ago.

Throughout the entire period of time (2006–2024), 457 temporary internal border controls were introduced (Figure 1). A sharp increase occurred in 2015 and remained at an unprecedented level until 2019, with an average of 17.5 reintroductions reported per year. Another significant surge happened again in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which lasted until 2021. Since then, temporary internal border controls have become increasingly prevalent in the Schengen Area and they are no longer exceptional. Between 2022 and 2024, Schengen countries reported an average of 45.3 reintroductions per year. Austria led with an average of 9.6 reports per year, followed by Germany (6.0) and Norway (3.7) (Figure 2). The threats cited by Schengen countries to justify controls correspond with current events, reflecting a return to borders in Europe. While the migration-security nexus played a minor role before the long summer of migration (2015), Schengen countries have since attributed nearly two-thirds of all temporary internal border controls to it (Table 1). Thus, 2015 marked a turning point in the Schengen regime, in which the Schengen spirit was replaced with an emerging border spirit. This development will be examined in the following four phases.




Figure 1: Registered notifications between 2006 and 2024 concerning the reintroduction of temporary controls at EU internal borders, by year – Source: EC, 2025a (as of January 14, 2025), my analysis.

Threats reported, listed by percentage	2006-2024	2006-2014	2015-2024
<i>Coronavirus COVID-19</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Migration-security nexus</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>64</i>
Influx of migrants	27	0	28
Terrorism, infrastructures	19	0	20
Smuggling, crime	12	0	13
Strain on reception facilities	4	9	4
<i>Major events</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>6</i>
Meeting of leading politicians and officials	8	69	5
Sporting events	1	6	1
Meetings of dangerous groups, protests	1	17	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

Table 1: Reported threats to public order or internal security by Schengen countries, expressed as a percentage of notifications per time period – Source: EC, 2025a (as of January 14, 2025), my analysis.

Crisis of EU's Migration Governance as a Turning Point (2015–2016) – Until 2015, internal border controls within the European Union were relatively rare and typically limited to a few days, often in the context of major events (e.g. political summits or sporting events). In 2015, however, several EU Member States – notably Germany, Austria, and Norway – introduced, for the first time and with increasing frequency, more prolonged controls (Figure 2) in response to refugee movements coming from Syria, Afghanistan, and African countries via the Balkan and Mediterranean routes. Migration, the evident shortcomings in the EU's migration governance, and terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) provided fertile ground for new societal ordering processes based on narratives of incapacity, control erosion, and nationalist self-assertion. This situation, initially framed as a state of emergency, lent significant momentum to right-wing populist forces: the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) party made its way into several state parliaments, the “Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs” (FPÖ) party came close to winning the 2016 presidential election with nearly 50 percent of the vote, and the “Rassemblement National” (RN) party in France and “Lega Nord” party in Italy gained further prominence. Hungary played a key role in this shift by erecting a border fence with Serbia and Croatia in 2015, adopting restrictive asylum laws, and reinforcing the narrative of national sovereignty in opposition to Brussels. This phase thus marks a turning point in the evolution of the Schengen regime, as reflected in the 37 instances of reintroduced internal border controls during the 2015–2016 period.




Figure 2: Registered notifications between 2015 and 2024 concerning the reintroduction of temporary controls at EU internal borders, by country, including declared threats and duration – Source: EC, 2025a (as of 14 January 2025), my analysis; concept: Christian Wille, implementation: Malte Helfer.

Normalization of the Exception (2017–2019) – Although the admission of persons seeking international protection had stabilized across Europe by this time, the exceptional situation at many internal borders was not reversed. Rather, through continuous extensions – particularly by Austria, Germany, France, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden (Figure 2) – internal temporary controls gradually became normalized. This was also due to the progressive expansion of the officially cited threats: while (irregular) migration remained the primary justification, it was increasingly supplemented – against the backdrop of growing secondary movements and terrorist attacks in Barcelona (2017) and Strasbourg (2018) – by references to the threat of terrorism, human smuggling, and organized crime. At the same time, the European Commission augmented resources for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) at the EU’s external borders and issued the reminder that: “In an area in which the free movement of persons is ensured, the reintroduction of internal border controls must remain an exception.” (EK, 2017, p. 2). Nonetheless, right-wing populist groups such as the “Europe of Nations and Freedom” and “Identity and Democracy” political groups in the European Parliament took a firm stance against returning to the pre-2015 Schengen regime. On the national level, the “Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs” (FPÖ) party entered the federal government in 2017, and in Italy a government was formed in cooperation with the “Lega Nord” – which soon faced international criticism for closing ports to ships operated by non-governmental organizations. This phase – in which 52 temporary internal border control notifications were recorded between 2017 and 2019, despite the Commission’s reminder – illustrates the normalization of what was once considered an emergency measure and paved the way for the emergence of a new border spirit at the EU’s internal borders.

Health Risk as Catalyst (2020–2021) – In the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic emergency on March 11, 2020, provoking “the second great border disruption” (Alden & Trautmann, 2025, p. 113) in Europe since 2015. Within a matter of weeks, strict entry restrictions and mass controls associated with them were introduced at EU internal borders (Reitel et al., 2020; Wille & Weber, 2020). Each Member State defined unilaterally who was permitted to cross the border for what (legitimate) reason; control and management practices also varied widely, ranging from the reactivation of decommissioned border infrastructure to basic police checks and health screenings. The justification for reintroducing internal border controls increasingly shifted toward public health risks, thereby complementing migration- and security-related arguments (Figure 2). While the influx of migrants declined due to the pandemic, it did not cease entirely, as illustrated by the threats reported – particularly in Austria, Norway, France, and Denmark (Figure 2). Right-wing populists capitalized on the pandemic: the parties “Alternative für Deutschland (AfD),” “Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ),” and Hungary’s “Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség”, for example, called not only for stricter health controls but also for the consolidation of border controls.

The European Commission sought to coordinate the measures and internal border controls implemented by the Member States. In May 2020, it launched the “Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures” (EC, 2020), followed in March 2021 by the introduction of the “Digital Green Certificate” (EC, 2021). In December 2021, the Commission proposed a revision of the Schengen Borders Code aimed at establishing more precise criteria for the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls, enhancing reporting obligations, and instituting a structured monitoring mechanism (EC, 2021). Finally, in February 2022, the European Council recommended that Member States lift travel restrictions imposed due to the pandemic. The 97 internal border controls reintroduced between 2020 and 2021 contributed (outside of border regions) to a broader public acceptance of such measures and encouraged some Schengen countries to continue employing this instrument as a seemingly viable response to declared external threats.

Permanent Exception as a Schengen Reality (2022–2024) – The restrictions imposed during the pandemic and their consequences did not prove to be “a wakeup call for Europe” (Alden & Trautmann, 2025, p. 111). Rather, they paved the way for the continuation of temporary internal border controls, initially justified once more by migration-related arguments. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, served as a new catalyst, prompting the displacement of over six million people, primarily to Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Although the European Union organized a solidarity-based reception framework, several Schengen states used the opportunity to introduce or extend temporary internal border controls – now including the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Netherlands (Figure 2).

The legitimizing threat scenarios were broadened. Particularly in Germany and Austria, the influx of migrants was systematically linked to risks such as terrorism, threats to critical infrastructure, the strain on the reception systems, human smuggling, and organized crime. Key contributing factors were the energy

crisis and heightened anxieties – especially in Northern Europe – about sabotage targeting critical infrastructure. The Israel-Hamas war that began in 2023 further intensified terrorism-related anxieties, due to rising tensions between Jewish and Arab communities in Europe. Additionally, hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and instrumentalized migration flows aimed at destabilization, were increasingly invoked by Schengen states.

In this context, right-wing populist parties saw further electoral success: Giorgia Meloni became Prime Minister of Italy in 2022, Geert Wilders won the Dutch parliamentary elections in 2023, and the “Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)” party reached record levels in opinion polls in 2024. In May 2024, the European Council adopted a revised version of the Schengen Borders Code intended to “strengthen the Schengen area’s resilience to present and future crises at its external borders” (EK, 2024, p. 1). This revised framework aims to safeguard the freedom of movement within the Schengen Area, albeit by strengthening the EU’s external borders – an objective also pursued through the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum expected from 2026 onward. While the 136 internal border control notifications between 2022 and 2024 continued to be justified primarily by “migration pressure,” Schengen countries have increasingly mobilized a wider and more multifaceted set of threats used as justification. These referred to risks emanating from energy and geopolitical disruptions, which often resonate with the preferences of a security-oriented electorate (Crouch, 2025).

The trajectory of EU internal border controls from 2015 to 2024 thus reflects the displacement of the Schengen spirit by a prevailing border spirit. While open borders and free movement remain official guiding principles of the European Union, national border regimes are gaining ground and are continuously adapted to fluctuating perceptions of threat. Migration, terrorism, public health, and hybrid threats serve as discursive resources to legitimize a Schengen reality that can no longer be understood as exceptional, but rather as part of a normalized, security-oriented European order.

3 Re-Nationalizations and Other Challenges

The border spirit diagnosed here manifests in the transversal developments identified throughout this analysis, which are outlined below and reflect current and future challenges for the Schengen regime.

Re-Nationalization of Border Policy Weakens European Free Movement – The analysis of the reintroduction of temporary internal border controls has revealed a trend towards the re-nationalization of internal border policy. Prior to the 2015 migration crisis, such controls were considered rare and genuinely exceptional within the Schengen Area. This changed with the so-called “long summer of migration,” as temporary controls were increasingly reactivated. Despite declining migratory inflows in subsequent years, the practice continued, and in some countries, temporary internal border controls became a routine instrument of (domestic) political governance. It is foreseeable that some Schengen states will continue to resort to such controls in the future – even in the absence of clearly identifiable threat scenarios – in order to respond to domestic political pressures and expectations.

Persistent Crisis Rhetoric Undermines the Principle of Exceptionality – The analysis has also highlighted a cumulative logic of threats that effectively result in a perpetual state of emergency. The so-called “migration crisis” was only the starting point. Subsequent events – such as the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Barcelona, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine – were each invoked anew to justify the reintroduction of temporary internal border controls. This development has undermined the principle that such controls should only be introduced as a last resort under exceptional circumstances. Instead, a governance practice has emerged that absorbs crises and uncertainties while subordinating free movement to a logic of security. Temporary internal border controls are therefore likely to be reinstated in response to future crises or other declared threats. This is all the more probable, as some Schengen states are already experienced and well-equipped to flexibly reactivate such controls, and no decline in climate-related risks, geopolitical tensions, or other disruptive factors is currently foreseeable.

Proliferation of Threat Narratives Dilutes Legitimation Resources – Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that Schengen states have progressively expanded and diversified the threat narratives, underpinning internal border control justifications. Initially centered on migration-related arguments, these justifications were subsequently extended to include the fight against terrorism, human smuggling, and organized crime, and later also health risks, the protection of critical infrastructure, and hybrid threats.

This evolution has allowed internal border controls not only to persist across various and shifting crisis contexts but also to become normalized. At the same time, it has led to a practice of increasingly arbitrary justification, thereby diluting the normative and legal foundations of the Schengen regime. It is likely that the spectrum of threat narratives will continue to expand, incorporating climate-related risks, cybersecurity, and disinformation alongside the more “traditional concerns.”

Political Instrumentalization of Internal Border Controls – The findings also point to the political instrumentalization of the internal border issue by right-wing populists. In several Schengen countries, internal border controls have been framed as expressions of national sovereignty, with populist parties campaigning for their permanent implementation (e.g. in Austria, Germany, Italy, and France). Due to increasing domestic pressure, similar positions have partially permeated mainstream political discourse, thereby contributing to a normalization of right-wing rhetoric concerning migration, security, and national assertion. It is foreseeable that the political instrumentalization of internal border controls will intensify, given the growing electorate with security-oriented preferences and the symbolic meaning of borders in relation to national identity and sovereignty – especially as these are increasingly challenged across multiple policy domains.

Ambivalent EU’s Border Management Erodes Schengen Principles – Finally, the analysis has uncovered a trend of ambivalence. On the one hand, the European Union has attempted to preserve the normative foundations of the Schengen regime and to coordinate the reintroduction of temporary controls. On the other hand, it has imposed few effective constraints on Member States’ scope of action regarding internal border controls – with some countries operating beyond the legal framework without facing significant consequences. Although the principle of free movement formally remains in place, it has, in practice, been eroded. As a result, the principles underpinning the Schengen regime have been subordinated to nationally driven ordering processes. A full return to an open Schengen Area akin to that of the pre-2015 period appears increasingly unlikely.

4 Outlook: Situational Free Movement and Further Fragmentation

The development of temporary internal border controls and the challenges related to it show that the reintroduction of such measures over the past decade has not been the result of simple administrative acts. Rather, these measures are the product of multifaceted societal processes contextualized within specific political moments. While this UniGR-CBS Working Paper cannot fully unpack these processes, it has illustrated that they are characterized by a re-nationalizing border policy within the EU, a continuously expanding crisis rhetoric, political instrumentalization, and an ambivalent mode of EU border governance.

The introduction of longer-term internal border controls in 2015 marked the shift from an open to a more controlled Schengen Area. At that time, migration flows, the failure of EU-level migration management, and terrorist threats became discursively entangled, giving rise to national narratives of incapacity and loss of control. This shift marked the beginning of the re-nationalization of internal border policies and laid the foundation for subsequent order configurations. Although immediate migratory dynamics subsided, the repeated extensions of temporary border controls from 2017 onwards, the expansion of legitimizing threat narratives, and the rise of right-wing populist actors ensured that the exception of controlled internal borders became normalized. Starting in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic engendered new ordering processes oscillating between national self-assertion and European coordination. It also fostered (outside border regions) a general acceptance of internal border controls and reinforced risk narratives extending beyond public health concerns. From 2022 onwards, societal orderings increasingly drew on geopolitical disruptions and were used across the Schengen Area to consolidate measures that were initially introduced as temporary. The future of the Schengen regime in a Europe compelled to respond to global power shifts and geopolitical uncertainties remains unclear. A pragmatically realistic and politically shared action perspective is required – one that re-integrates the normative foundations of the Schengen spirit, addresses future challenges, and remains operational. Against this backdrop, a return to the pre-2015 Schengen system appears as unlikely as the complete abolition of free movement. The future of the Schengen regime will likely unfold between these two scenarios and may continue to shift towards a model of situational free movement – underpinned by a modified border regime. It will be embedded in a revised legal framework that allows for flexible, context-specific modifications in response to unforeseen developments and challenges, thereby contributing to a further fragmentation of the Schengen Area.

Recent initiatives by the European Commission suggest a move in this direction. For example, the revised Schengen Borders Code is now framed as an “updated framework for the reintroduction of internal border controls, with clearer deadlines and stricter monitoring and reporting obligations” (EC, 2025b, p. 19). Furthermore, the latest “State of Schengen Report” (EC, 2025b) stresses the need to adapt Schengen to the changing geopolitical and security environment and to reinforce it for future challenges. With regard to the “Schengen Cycle 2025–2026,” the report states: “Forty years after Schengen was set up, it is essential to acknowledge that the geopolitical and security landscape has shifted and to take the steps needed to ensure that Schengen’s foundations are resilient enough to meet future challenges” (EC, 2025b, p. 20). In this spirit, Schengen governance will be enhanced in the coming years – meaning more coordinated political action, intensified police cooperation, and accelerated digital registration procedures at the EU’s external borders (EC, 2025b, pp. 20–21). Whether these measures will suffice to jointly cultivate a renewed Schengen spirit in times of uncertainty remains to be seen.

REFERENCES

- Alden, E. & Trautman, L. (2025). *When the world closes its doors: the Covid-19 Tragedy and the Future of Borders*. Oxford University Press.
- Crouch, C. (2025). *Rethinking Political Identity. Citizens and Parties in Europe*. Edward Elgar.
- EC 2025a – European Commission. (2025a). Full list of Member States' notifications of the temporary re-introduction of border control at internal borders pursuant to Article 25 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control_en (14/01/2025).
- EC 2025b – European Commission. (2025b). 2025 State of Schengen Report. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2025) 185 final.
- EC 2021 – European Commission. (2021). Coronavirus: Commission proposes a Digital Green Certificate. Press release, 17/03/2021.
- EC 2020 – European Commission. (2020). Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures. Official Journal of the European Union C 126/01.
- EK 2024 – Europäische Kommission. (2024). Schengen-Raum: Rat nimmt Aktualisierung des Schengener Grenzkodex an. Press release 445/24, 24/05/2024.
- EK 2017 – Europäische Kommission. (2017). Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat. Schengen bewahren und stärken. COM(2017) 570 final.
- Javel, F. (2025). Wie die Regierung vor den deutschen Grenzkontrollen klein beigt. *Luxemburger Wort*, 08/04/2025, pp. 2–3.
- Regulation 2016/399 – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification). <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/399/oj> (20/01/2025).
- Reitel, B., Peyrony, J. & Wassenberg, B. (2020). Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on European Borders, Cross-Border Cooperation and European Integration. In B. Wassenberg & B. Reitel (Eds.), *Critical Dictionary on Borders, Cross-Border Cooperation and European Integration* (pp. 830–847). Peter Lang.
- Wille, C. & Weber, F. (2020). Analysing border geographies in times of COVID-19. In Mein, G. & Pause, J. (Eds.), *Self and Society in the Corona Crisis. Perspectives from the Humanities and Social Sciences* (pp. 361–385). Melusina Press. <https://doi.org/10.26298/phs9-t618>

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Christian Wille (Dr.) is a Senior Researcher in Border Studies at the University of Luxembourg and Head of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Expertise "UniGR-Center for Border Studies (UniGR-CBS)". With a strong interdisciplinary background, Wille is a cultural studies scholar who combines approaches to borders from migration studies, geography, sociology, and anthropology. He teaches Cultural Border Studies, works on border theories, and has published extensively on (de)bordered lifeworlds. www.wille.lu

cbs.uni-gr.eu
borderstudies.org

