



PhD-FHSE-2024-036
Faculty of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences

DISSERTATION

Defence held on 14 October 2024 in Esch-sur-Alzette

to obtain the degree of

DOCTEUR DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG

EN HISTOIRE

by

Johanna Maria JASCHIK

Born on 26 December 1991 in Münster (Germany)

DIGITALLY RECONSTRUCTING MENTAL MAPS
FROM L'VIV DURING THE TRANSFORMATION,
1989–1995

Dissertation defence committee

Prof. Dr. Machteld Venken, dissertation supervisor
Professor, Université du Luxembourg

Prof. Dr. Astrid Fellner, vice chair
Professor, Universität des Saarlandes

Dr. Thomas Cauvin, president
Associate Professor, Université du Luxembourg

Dr. Lorella Viola, member
Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Dr. Markian Prokopovych, member
Associate Professor, Durham University

Abstract

With Ukraine's independence in 1991, mental maps about Ukraine have re-emerged with the processes of post-communist nation-building and state-building. In the post-Cold War period, these mental maps have been shaped by a variety of foreign and national actors, propagating simplistic narratives that imply spatial fragmentations of Ukraine based on history, political orientation, ethnicity, language, and socio-economic differences – unfolding in spatial terms such as Malorossiya, Novorossiya, Galicia, Transcarpathia, Bukovina, and the East-West divide. Particularly, mental maps about Ukraine's western regions, with L'viv at its centre, have been shaped by the region's historical spatial fragmentation from Galicia under Austro-Hungarian rule to Soviet incorporation. The perception of these regions varies significantly based on historical perspectives, often characterized as patriotic, nationalist, Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking, pro-European, or as fascist, anti-Polish, anti-Soviet, and anti-Russian. This doctoral thesis tells a local and historical story of mental maps by centralizing the perspective of young borderland inhabitants from the western Ukrainian city L'viv during 1989 to 1995. Focusing on the borderland city of L'viv during the transformation years of 1989 to 1995, this thesis digitally reconstructs two mental maps of young borderland inhabitants through a digital analysis of two youth newspapers, *Postup* and *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*. The study critically examines the spatial meanings young L'vivians attributed to locations during the transformation and their evolution over time to reconstruct their mental maps. The findings show how both groups navigated the socio-political and socio-economic transformations of Ukraine, attributing diverse meanings to locations like L'viv, Russia, the Baltics, and the USA, which evolved into complex mental maps. These maps are visualized in conceptual representations, illustrating how these places were perceived beyond mere geographic entities. The analysis reveals that young borderland inhabitants framed their spatial perceptions within national and regional narratives while emphasizing Ukraine's place within Europe. This study contributes to the interdisciplinary field of border studies and the social dimension of historical transformation research.

Acknowledgements

When I began my PhD in 2020, I could not have foreseen the challenges that lay ahead. The global Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine profoundly impacted my research in ways I never could have imagined when I started in March 2020. Despite these obstacles, I am deeply grateful to have been able to complete this project.

First, I want to thank my supervisor, Machteld Venken. Without your expertise, encouragement, patience, flexibility, and guidance, this project would not have been able to come to an end. Thank you for listening to my ideas, encouraging me to pursue new approaches to my research, offering me detailed feedback, and providing me with endless opportunities to grow as a researcher. I especially want to thank you for not only guiding my academic journey but also for mentoring and encouraging other female researchers in the field of academia. I also want to thank Astrid Fellner and Thomas Cauvin for providing me with feedback on my thesis and always having an open mind about my approach.

Another huge thank you goes to my fellow PhD researchers at the C2DH, especially to Suzana, Carmen, Aida, Matthias, Veronique, Sarah-Maya, Rebecca, and Thomas, but also former PhD researchers who welcomed me in the first months of my PhD journey: Richard, Elisabeth, Aurelia, and Florian. You are amazing individuals and brilliant researchers, and I hope our paths will cross again in the future.

Then I want to thank the C2DH and the University of Luxembourg for giving me the opportunity to pursue a research project in such a vibrant and international environment. A special thanks goes to our secretary and communications team, Audrey and Morgane, Vanessa, Brigitte, and Noëlle, who truly represent the backbone of the department. Then, I want to thank Estelle Bunout and Christoph Brüll for always having an open ear and providing me with advice and feedback.

In the last two years, I was also able to participate in a fascinating leadership programme that has shown me what interdisciplinary work truly means. I want to thank my fellow Europaeum scholars from the 2022/2023 cohort for having shared this journey with me, especially Sašo, Caroline, Iris, Marie, Sophie, Toine, Jens, Bradley, and Savannah. Thank you, also, to Tracey Sowerby for making this opportunity truly incredible, and Andrew Graham for being a source of inspiration and wisdom.

I am also grateful for my family and friends, who kept motivating me throughout the last four years. My biggest thank you goes to my partner, Santiago Diaz, who has not only been incredibly supportive of my research but also encouraged me to tap into the world of coding. Thank you for helping me structure my thoughts, for patiently answering every silly question, for guiding me in my first steps in coding – from learning what a Terminal is to writing my own code – for tolerating my late-night writing sessions, and for constantly reminding me that there is more to life than work.

Table of Contents

List of Tables.....	3
List of Figures.....	4
List of Maps.....	6
I. Introduction.....	7
II. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework.....	17
2.1 Mental Maps as a Concept.....	17
2.2 Post-Communist Transformation Research.....	22
2.2.1 Spatial and Temporal Considerations of Post-Communist L'viv.....	32
2.2.2 The Role of the Historical Actor: Young Borderland Inhabitants from L'viv.....	39
2.3 Youth Mobilization in L'viv: Komsomol/Democratic Youth Union of L'viv and Tovarystvo Leva.....	50
2.3.1 From Komsomol to Democratic Youth Union of L'viv: The Transformation of a Youth Organization and its Newspaper.....	50
2.3.2 Tovarystvo Leva, Postup and Post-Postup: The Emergence of a Youth Union and its Newspaper.....	54
III. Methodology.....	58
3.1 Source Introduction and Criticism.....	60
3.2 Mixed-Method Analysis: Computational Processes and Historical Content Analysis ..	66
3.2.1 A Computational Quantitative Method and Digital Source Criticism.....	70
Collection, Digitalization and Pre- and Post-OCR Processing of Newspapers.....	71
Identifying Place: Named-Entity Recognition.....	72
Identifying Meaning: Topic-Modeling.....	75
IV. Exploratory Analysis of Computational Methods.....	78
4.1 Exploratory Data Analysis of NER Output.....	79
4.2 Exploratory Data Analysis of TM Output.....	85
4.3 Combining Exploratory Analysis Results of NER and TM.....	91
V. Mental Maps 1989–1991: Embracing Perestroika within and beyond Soviet Ukraine's borders.....	97
5.1 Postup: 1989–1991.....	98
L'viv.....	100
1989 to 1990: A Place of Historical Legacy.....	100
1989.....	103
The Blue-Yellow Flag.....	103
Ukraine's Long Path for Independence and Ukrainian Nationalism.....	111
1990.....	122
The Ukrainian Insurgent Army.....	122
The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.....	134

Concluding Remarks	143
The Baltics	143
1989: A Place of Democratic Progress	144
1989: Inspiration	147
1989: Cooperation	152
Concluding Remarks	156
Poland	157
1989 to 1991: A Place of Democratic Guidance and Historical Reconciliation?	158
1989 to 1991: Lessons of Renewal	160
1989 to 1990: Historical Reconciliation?	166
Concluding Remarks	170
Russia	171
1989 to 1991: From a Place of Democratic Comradery to Authoritarian Adversary	171
1989: Unity of Ukrainians and Russians	172
1990: Strategic Partnership	176
1991: Political Foe	178
Concluding Remarks	181
5.2 Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna: 1989–1991	182
L’viv	183
1990 to 1991: A Place of Revived Regional History	184
1990 to 1991: Historical Events and the Importance of Historical Preservation ..	187
1990 to 1991: Reviving Regional History	189
Concluding Remarks	191
Moscow	192
1989 to 1991: From a Physical Place on the Map to the Embodiment of the Soviet Union	192
Concluding Remarks	196
Russia	197
1991: A Place of Democratic Partnership	197
Concluding Remarks	201
Lithuania	201
1990 to 1991: Democratic Support	202
Concluding Remarks	205
VI. Mental Maps 1992–1995: Navigating the Post-Communist Transformation	205
6.1 Postup: 1992–1995	206
Russia	208
1992 to 1993: Concerns over Crimea and the Donbas	212
1994 to 1995: Energy Dependency	221
Concluding Remarks	227
United States of America	228
1992–1994: Unstable Economic and Political Partnership	228
A False Friend – Denuclearisation and Favouritism of Russia	230
Concluding Remarks	242
Europe	242
1992–1995: Wanted but Unreachable Partnership	242
The Desire for Economic and Political Cooperation and Incorporation	245
Concluding Remarks	253
6.2 Moloda Halychyna: 1992–1995	254

Russia	257
1992 – 1995: A Place of Economic, Political and Cultural Adversity	258
The Narrative of Russian Imperialism	263
Concluding Remarks	276
Poland	276
1992 – 1995: A Place of Neighbourly Partnership	276
Emphasis and Reassurance of Mutual Economic and Political Cooperation	285
Opportunities and Challenges of (Cross-Border) Cooperation	291
Practice of Cooperation	292
Concluding Remarks	299
Europe.....	299
1992–1993: Political Interdependence: Europe needs Ukraine and Ukraine needs	
Europe.....	301
1995: Approaching European Integration.....	309
Concluding Remarks	312
VII. Concluding Chapter – Mental Maps in Transformation	313
Bibliography.....	328
Appendix.....	350
Appendix 1 – Topic Modeling. List of Keywords, Topic Name and Topic Categories in	
Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna and Postup	350
Appendix 2 – List of Top 15 Location Frequencies in Leninska Molod’/Moloda	
Halychyna and Postup (1989–1995)	358
Appendix 3 – Names of Topic Categories and Number of Topics per Category	359

List of Tables

TABLE 1 NUMBER OF LOCATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE POST-NER DATA CLEANING PROCESS.	75
TABLE 2 EXCERPT OF TOPICS GENERATED BY THE TM PROCESS ON THE NEWSPAPER POSTUP SHOWING THE DETECTED KEYWORDS, TOPIC TITLE AND THE CATEGORY.	78
TABLE 3 NUMBER OF DETECTED UNIQUE LOCATIONS PER NEWSPAPER IN A GIVEN YEAR.	81
TABLE 4 DATA ANALYSIS EXTRACT DISPLAYING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TOPICS POSTUP PER YEAR.	85
TABLE 5 NUMBER OF ALL NEWSPAPER ISSUES AND OF NEWSPAPER ISSUES RELEVANT FOR THIS STUDY.....	92
TABLE 6 LIST OF IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS AND PLACE CREATION FROM 1989 TO 1991 IN POSTUP.....	99
TABLE 7 LIST OF IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS AND PLACE CREATION FROM 1989 TO 1991 IN LENINSKA MOLOD' /MOLODA HALYCHYNA.	183
TABLE 8 LIST OF IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS AND PLACE CREATION FROM 1992 TO 1995 IN POSTUP.....	208
TABLE 9 LIST OF IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS AND PLACE CREATION FROM 1992 TO 1995 IN MOLODA HALYCHYNA.	257

List of Figures

FIGURE 1 POSTUP: MONTHLY AND YEARLY DISTRIBUTION OF NEWSPAPER ISSUES AVAILABLE IN THIS STUDY.	62
FIGURE 2 LENINSKA MOLOD’/MOLODA HALYCHYNA: MONTHLY AND YEARLY DISTRIBUTION OF NEWSPAPER ISSUES AVAILABLE IN THIS STUDY.....	63
FIGURE 3 ALL LOCATIONS WITH A SINGLE OCCURRENCE DISTRIBUTED PER COUNTRY IN ALL NEWSPAPERS FROM 1989 TO 1995.	81
FIGURE 4 HEATMAP DISPLAYING THE TOP 15 LOCATIONS DETECTED IN THE NEWSPAPERS LENINSKA MOLOD’/MOLODA HALYCHYNA AND POSTUP FROM 1989 TO 1995.....	84
FIGURE 5 LM/MH: DISTRIBUTION OF TOPIC CATEGORIES OVER TIME, 1989–1995.	87
FIGURE 6 POSTUP: DISTRIBUTION OF TOPIC CATEGORIES OVER TIME, 1989–1995.	87
FIGURE 7 LM/MH: DISTRIBUTION OF TOPICS OVER TIME, 1989–1995.....	88
FIGURE 8 POSTUP: DISTRIBUTION OF TOPIC CATEGORIES OVER TIME, 1989–1995.	89
FIGURE 9 LM/MH: DISTRIBUTION OF RELEVANT TOPIC CATEGORIES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES OVER TIME, 1989–1995.....	94
FIGURE 10 POSTUP: DISTRIBUTION OF RELEVANT TOPIC CATEGORIES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES OVER TIME, 1989–1995.....	94
FIGURE 11 SANKEY DIAGRAM: POSTUP 1989–1991.....	99
FIGURE 12 POSTUP: L’VIV – FREQUENCY OF HISTORICAL THEMATIC CONTEXT, 1989–1991.	102
FIGURE 13 FLAG OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR FROM 1949 TO 1991. SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA. COPYRIGHT: PUBLIC DOMAIN.....	110
FIGURE 14 ON THE LEFT: THE LYRICS OF THE FOLK SONG ‘OH IN THE MEADOW, RED VIBURNUM’ PUBLISHED IN СТО УМОВЛЕНИХ ПІСЕНЬ, КИЇВ ‘МУЗИЧНА УКРАЇНА’ 1992P (LIBRARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES), 14. ON THE RIGHT: TRANSLATION OF THE LYRICS OF THE FOLK SONG ‘OH IN THE MEADOW, RED VIBURNUM’ OFFERED BY AUTHOR OF THIS THESIS.	113
FIGURE 15 POSTUP: THE BALTICS – FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1989–1991.....	145
FIGURE 16 POSTUP: POLAND – FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1989–1991.....	158
FIGURE 17 POSTUP: RUSSIA – FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1989–1991.....	172
FIGURE 18 SANKEY DIAGRAM: LENINSKA MOLOD’/MOLODA HALYCHYNA 1989–1991...	183
FIGURE 19 MH: L’VIV - FREQUENCY OF PRACTICES CONNECTED TO REGIONAL HISTORY, 1989–1991.....	186
FIGURE 20 MH: L’VIV - FREQUENCY OF HISTORICAL THEMATIC CONTEXTS, 1989–1991.....	189
FIGURE 21 MH: MOSCOW - FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1989–1991.....	194
FIGURE 22 MH: RUSSIA - FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1989–1991.....	198
FIGURE 23 MH: LITHUANIA - FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1989–1991.	202
FIGURE 24 SANKEY DIAGRAM: POSTUP 1992–1995.....	207
FIGURE 25 POSTUP: RUSSIA – FREQUENCY OF THEMATIC CONTEXT, 1992–1995.	210
FIGURE 26 POSTUP: RUSSIA – FREQUENCY OF THREE THEMATIC CONTEXT, 1992–1995.	211
FIGURE 27 RESULTS OF DATA FROM ALL RESPONDENTS BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: OPINIONS AND VIEWS OF THE RESIDENTS OF UKRAINE: DECEMBER 1993, KYIV INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY, SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	215
FIGURE 28 RESULTS OF DATA FROM THE RESPONDENTS FROM L’VIV OBLAST BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: OPINIONS AND VIEWS OF THE	

RESIDENTS OF UKRAINE: DECEMBER 1993, KYIV INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY, SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	216
FIGURE 29 RESULTS OF DATA FROM ALL RESPONDENTS BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION AND FUTURE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE, NOVEMBER 1993, DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES FUND. SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	217
FIGURE 30 POSTUP: USA – FREQUENCY OF THREE THEMATIC CONTEXT, 1992–1995.	230
FIGURE 31 RESULTS OF DATA FROM THE RESPONDENTS FROM L'VIV OBLAST BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: OPINIONS AND VIEWS OF THE RESIDENTS OF UKRAINE: DECEMBER 1994, KYIV INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY, SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	239
FIGURE 32 RESULTS OF DATA FROM THE RESPONDENTS FROM L'VIV OBLAST BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: OMNIBUS 1995: VIEWS OF THE POPULATION OF UKRAINE ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS (SEPTEMBER TO OCTOBER), SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	240
FIGURE 33 MH: EUROPE - FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1992–1995.	244
FIGURE 34 RESULTS OF DATA FROM THE RESPONDENTS FROM L'VIV OBLAST BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: OMNIBUS 1995: VIEWS OF THE POPULATION OF UKRAINE ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS (SEPTEMBER TO OCTOBER), SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	246
FIGURE 35 SANKEY DIAGRAM: MOLODA HALYCHYNA 1992–1995.	256
FIGURE 36 MH: RUSSIA - FREQUENCY OF SENTIMENT, 1992–1995.	259
FIGURE 37 MH: RUSSIA - FREQUENCY OF THEMATIC CONTEXT, 1992–1995.	260
FIGURE 38 MH: RUSSIA - FREQUENCY OF THEMATIC CONTEXT WITH NEGATIVE SENTIMENT, 1992–1995.	261
FIGURE 39 MH: RUSSIA - USAGE OF WORD "IMPERIAL", 1992–1995.	264
FIGURE 40 RESULTS OF DATA FROM ALL RESPONDENTS BETWEEN THE AGE OF 18 AND 35. DATA TAKEN FROM SURVEY: POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF UKRAINE AND ELECTIONS TO THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE, FEBRUARY–MARCH 1994, DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES FUND. SOURCE: NATIONAL RESEARCH BANK.	271
FIGURE 41 MH: POLAND - FREQUENCY OF ARTICLES FOR 'EMPHASIS' AND 'PRACTICE', 1992–1995.	282
FIGURE 42 MH: POLAND - FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1992–1995.	283
FIGURE 43 MH: EUROPE - FREQUENCY OF NARRATIVES, 1992–1995.	301

List of Maps

MAP 1 CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE AND A HISTORICAL MAP OF UKRAINE FROM THE 19TH CENTURY: THE DIVISION INTO CONTEMPORARY OBLASTI (WHITE LINES) AND THE HISTORICAL TERRITORY (BLUE LINES) OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (GALICIA, TRANSCARPATHIA, BUKOVINA) IN THE WEST AND THE TSARIST RUSSIAN TERRITORY TO ITS EAST. (COPYRIGHT: INTERACTIVE MAP FROM REGION, NATION AND BEYOND: REGION, NATION AND BEYOND: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND TRANSCULTURAL RECONSIDERATION OF UKRAINE, UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN, 2022).....	35
MAP 2 THE STATE BORDERS OF GALICIA FROM 1772 TO 1918 AND CONTEMPORARY STATE BORDERS OF POLAND AND UKRAINE (COPYRIGHT: PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI AND CHRISTOPHER HANN; MAP FROM PREFACE OF MAGOCSI, PAUL ROBERT AND HANN, CHRISTOPHER (EDS), GALICIA: A MULTICULTURED LAND (2009)).....	37
MAP 3 CONCEPTUAL MENTAL MAP - POSTUP	326
MAP 4 CONCEPTUAL MENTAL MAP - LENINSKA MOLOD' / MOLODA HALYCHYNA.....	327

I. Introduction

When the former administrative borders of the Soviet Union turned into international political borders of eighteen independent countries in the early 1990s, processes of nation-building and national identity became apparent. As part of broader societal development in the spatial post-Cold War world, in an attempt to politically legitimise the origin of these ‘new’ state borders, special attention was paid to their historical constitution.¹ According to Ilkka Liikanen, James W. Scott and Tina Sotkasiira, this historical emphasis resulted in the unfortunate creation of spatial imaginaries, that are potentially harmful:

In many cases, this search for original and natural borders has evolved into an examination of stereotypical historical patterns and models, Eastern and Western nationalism, European and non-European models of democracy, civil society, political institutions and values. [...] [T]hese conceptualisations are not only clumsy tools of analysis but tend to reproduce spatial imaginaries that are politically hazardous.²

Those spatial imaginaries, also called mental maps, are representations of space, that can, for example, refer to region known on a global scale, as in ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Western Europe’, or ‘Eurasia’, or be described on the level of national spatial containers, such as in ‘East Germany’ and ‘West Germany’.³ In the context of Ukraine, mental maps regained significance in the 1990s, when questions of nation building and nationality became apparent during the transformation from communism to post-communism.⁴ Similar to Liikanen, Scott and Sotkasiira, I claim that these mental maps of Ukraine are charged with symbolic significance that transcends the boundaries of identification processes and shape its understanding on a larger scale. Mental maps are spatial representations that can propagate cultural divide and suggest artificial affiliations. In the context of Ukraine, examples of such spatial representations portray post-communist Ukraine as a country that is ethnically, politically, and culturally torn in-between its Eastern and its Western regions. Other simplistic spatial notions consider

¹ Ilkka Liikanen, James W. Scott and Tina Sotkasiira, “The End of Wider Europe? The EU, Changing Borders and Spatial Imaginaries of Post-Soviet Space,” in *The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Migration, Borders and Regional Stability*, ed. Ilkka Liikanen, James W. Scott and Tina Sotkasiira (Routledge, 2016), 5; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kolosov and Marek Więckowski, “Border Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: An Introduction,” in *Border Changes in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kolosov and Marek Więckowski (Geographia Polonica, 2018), 6; Volodymyr Kravchenko, “Fighting Soviet Myths: The Ukrainian Experience,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 34 (2016), 36.

² Liikanen, Scott and Sotkasiira, “The End,” 5.

³ Diana Mishkova, “Spatial Configurations. Regional Intellectual Imaginaries in Twentieth-Century Central and Eastern Europe,” in *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Włodzimierz Borodziej, Joachim von Puttkamer, and Ferenc Laczó, Volume 3: Intellectual Horizons, The Routledge Twentieth Century History Handbooks (Routledge, 2020), 1.

⁴ In the academic literature the terms ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ are used interchangeably. For reasons of coherency, I will use the term ‘communism’ and ‘communist’ to refer to the ideology and to describe the former Soviet Republics and Soviet satellite states.

Ukraine as part of a greater Russian World, *Russkii Mir*, in which it is claimed that this understanding is historically justified by the legacies of the Kievan Rus', tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Within this spatial narrative, Ukraine's eastern regions are presented as historically and ethnically bound to contemporary Russia where the heroic 'Russian East' fought off National Socialist Germany during the Second World War, while western Ukraine and its inhabitants were deemed as Nazi-collaborators. Again, another spatial imaginary of Ukraine considers the country as a buffer zone between modern Europe to its West, associated with democratic values of freedom, and an authoritarian Eurasia to its East.⁵

Foreign and national actors have contributed to the creation of these mental maps, that centralize Ukraine's territorial changes over the centuries and propose divergent internal boundaries of Ukraine, depending on economic, ethnic, historical, geographical, political, international, or linguistic characteristics.⁶ In 1992, Mykola Riabchuk, one of Ukraine's most renowned intellectuals, published his work 'Two Ukraines?', in which he manifested the idea of an Ukrainian East/West divide.⁷ Allegedly, due to Ukraine's regional fragmentation in the past, in which the western territories temporarily belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian empire and the rest of what was in 1992 Ukraine was under tsarist Russia's rule, the country is compiled of two different sets of people.⁸ Riabchuk shaped the notion of a divide of two geopolitical entities, 'East vs West,' in which Western Ukraine stands for liberal values of Western societies, such as those practices within European, and Eastern and Southern Ukraine resembles Russia's Slavic and Eurasian authoritarian values.⁹ His article contributed to an international 'widespread discourse' on Ukraine, right at the beginning of post-Cold War independent statehood, as political scientist Tatiana Zhurzhenko has noted, in which 'skepticism about the viability of Ukraine as a nation state' dominated foreign and national intellectual and political debates and do so, until today.¹⁰ Several reproductions of Riabchuk's claims dominated intellectual debates around the newly independent post-communist country, most famously reiterated in publications by US-American political scientist Samuel Huntington, first, in 1993 with an essay in *Foreign Affairs* called 'The Clash of Civilizations?'

⁵ Kravchenko, "Fighting Soviet Myths," 36.

⁶ Gwendolyn Sasse, "Ukraine: The Role of Regionalism," *Journal of Democracy* 21 (3) (2010): 101.

⁷ Mykola Ryabchuk, "Two Ukraines?" *East European Reporter* 5 (4) (1992): 18–22.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁹ Lodewijk Smoor, "Understanding the Narratives Explaining the Ukrainian Crisis: Identity Divisions and Complex Diversity in Ukraine," *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: European and Regional Studies* 11 (1) (2017): 63–96, 68.

¹⁰ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "The Myth of Two Ukraines. A Commentary on Mykola Riabchuk's 'Ukraine: One State, two Countries?'" *Eurozine* (2002).

followed by a book in 1996 with a similar title *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*.¹¹ Political scientists and sociologists have identified a Ukrainian ‘regional divide’ by juxtaposing the outcome of parliamentary elections in post-Soviet Ukraine with data on ethnicity (e.g. Ukrainian vs Russian), language use (e.g. Ukrainian vs Russian) and religion (e.g. Orthodox vs Catholic), and affiliations to historical regions (e.g. Austro-Hungarian Empire, Tsarist Russia, Soviet Union), as sociologist Sabine von Löwis has argued.¹² In 1998, sociologist Valeriy Khmelko and political scientist Andrew Wilson, for example, in a book chapter on Ukraine’s parliamentary elections of 1994, suggested a spatial fragmentation of Ukraine’s regions by identifying four political regions according to mandates won for left-winged and right-winged parties: right winged parties were dominant in the west and left winged parties in the east, a balance between right winged and left winged parties was determined in central Ukraine and a stronger support for left winged parties could be found in the South.¹³ These scholars concluded that the ‘regional polarization’ found in the election results can be explained based on linguistic factors. According to their analysis, Ukrainian-speaking citizens voted for the right-winged candidate Kravchuk, and Russian speaking citizens voted for the left-winged candidate Leonid Kuchma.¹⁴ Such mental maps were also reproduced outside of academic debates. For example, in 2005, when famous Ukrainian writer Yurii Andrukhovych published an essay in which he determined an inner Ukrainian cultural border along the river Zbruč, the former border of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Russian empire.¹⁵ Or in 2013 and 2014, when many commentators of western media, portrayed the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan Protests) ‘as a conflict between the Russian-speaking East and Ukrainian-speaking West’¹⁶, rather than as a nationwide discontent with the political elites.

A remaining question is, why these mental maps matter? They matter because they homogenise and simplify space, as Konrad Mitchell Lawson, Riccardo Bavaj, and Bernhard Struck

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, 1996).

¹² For an overview of these scholars see, Sabine von Löwis, “Phantom Border in the Political Geography of East Central Europe: An Introduction,” *Erdkunde* 69 (2), 2015: 99–106.

¹³ Andrew Wilson and Valeriy Khmelko, “Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine,” in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio (M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 60–80, 66.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Yurii Andrukhovych, *Engel und Dämonen der Peripherie* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007), as cited in Sabine von Löwis, *Das Phantom der Alten Grenze am Zbruč Kontinuitäten und Brüche Sozialräumlicher Strukturen in der Westukraine* (Wallstein, 2017), 2.

¹⁶ Joanna Fomina, “Language, Identity, Politics – the Myth of Two Ukraines,” *Bertelsmann Stiftung – Policy Brief* (2014), 4.

mentioned.¹⁷ The ‘*who* we are is inextricably linked to *where* we are, have been or are going.’¹⁸ In other words, public spatial representations of *where*, and the meaning attached to them, form our understanding of the *who*, how we identify as an individual, as a member of a group or community, of culture, ethnicity or religion, a region or nation, and of the world. Mental maps become important in processes of region-building and nation-building, inclusion and exclusion, the identification of who we are and who we are not. They matter because they are rarely challenged. In the public sphere, ‘geography is typically presented as factual and apolitical, a timeless backdrop to the unfolding of history’ meaning that mental maps tend to be ‘taken for granted, their assumptions and intentions left unquestioned.’¹⁹

In the context of Ukraine, mental maps matter more than ever because they have acquired a geopolitical dimension, transcending their traditional role in identity processes and intellectual debates. They now bear geopolitical significance, posing challenges to the stability of internationally agreed state borders. In the context of Ukraine, this has most explicitly been conducted by Russian president Vladimir Putin, who has put forward multiple historical representations of space of Ukrainian regions to justify contemporary geopolitical decisions. Most prominently, a historical map of *Novorossija* (New Russia)²⁰, that supposedly serves as a justification for the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the following inter-state war in the Donbas basin and recently for the ongoing Russian War in Ukraine that began in February 2022. The spatial term *Novorossija* was a 18th century creation of Russian tsar Catherine the Great for the steppes areas north of the Black and Azov Seas, which were occupied and incorporated into the Russian Empire following the three partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Today, these territories correspond, more or less, to the Ukrainian eastern and southern oblasts Kharkiv, Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovs’k, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Donetsk and Luhans’k.²¹ Claiming that, historically, these regions were Russian and mainly

¹⁷ Konrad Mitchell Lawson, Riccardo Bavaj, and Bernhard Struck, *A Guide to Spatial History: Areas, Aspects, and Avenues of Research* (Olsokhagen Publishing, 2022), 18.

¹⁸ Bethan Benwell and Elizabeth Stokoe, *Discourse and Identity* (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 210.

¹⁹ Lawson, Bavaj, and Struck, “A Guide,” 8.

²⁰ *Novorossija* represents a historic spatial term introduced by empress of Russia Catherin the Great to name the the steppelands north of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea after their annexation by the Russian Empire in the 18th century. See, Oleksandr Zabirko, “Russkij Mir Und Novorossija. Theologische und Nationalistische Konzepte Russier (Außen-)Politik,” in *Kampf um die Ukraine: Ringen um Selbstbestimmung und Geopolitische Interessen*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Studien zur Friedensethik* 61 (Aschendorff Verlag, 2018), 63.

²¹ John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal and Vladimir Kolosov, “The Rise and Fall of ‘Novorossiya’: Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 33 (2) (2017): 132.

inhabited by ethnic Russians, as part of *Novorossija*, Putin has repeatedly (2014²², 2021²³, 2022²⁴) questioned the sovereignty of these Ukrainian oblasts and begun to act upon his claims, by annexing Crimea in 2014, financially and militarily supporting the separatists groups in the Donbas basin since 2014,²⁵ and by invading Ukraine in February 2022. Putin's irredentism has been very well documented, debated and deconstructed by multiple scholars, ever since the Russian annexation of Crimea of 2014.²⁶ It has become evident, that Putin utilizes past imaginaries of space, and the historical narratives attached to them, to historically justify contemporary territorial claims to Ukraine, that politically would not uphold international law. There is no doubt, that the reasons for the Russian aggression against Ukraine are more manifold and complex – and arguably are rather of economic nature – than the territorial claims Putin bases on his adventurous imaginations of Eastern European history.

Nevertheless, the mental maps the Russian president propagates in his speeches and through Russian media, have reinforced harmful regional imaginaries about Ukraine in the public sphere. One example is the Soviet/Russian narrative about 'Nazis' in Ukraine that is spatially

²² Vladimir Putin, "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin," *Kremlin.ru* (17 April 2014), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796> (last accessed 25.08.2024): *Regarding the question of what should come first: a constitutional referendum followed by elections, or elections first to stabilise the situation and then a referendum. The essential issue is how to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the southeast of Ukraine. I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows. They were won by Potyomkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known wars. The centre of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained.* [Official English version from Kremlin.ru]

²³ Vladimir Putin, "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," *Kremlin.ru* (12 July 2021), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (last accessed 25.08.2024): *In the second half of the 18th century, following the wars with the Ottoman Empire, Russia incorporated Crimea and the lands of the Black Sea region, which became known as Novorossiya. [...] The incorporation of the western Russian lands into the single state was not merely the result of political and diplomatic decisions. It was underlain by the common faith, shared cultural traditions, and – I would like to emphasize it once again – language similarity.* [Official English version from Kremlin.ru]

²⁴ Vladimir Putin, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation," *Kremlin.ru* (21 February 2022), <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828> (last accessed 25.08.2024): *Also in the 18th century, the lands of the Black Sea littoral, incorporated in Russia as a result of wars with the Ottoman Empire, were given the name of Novorossiya (New Russia). Now attempts are being made to condemn these landmarks of history to oblivion, along with the names of state and military figures of the Russian Empire without whose efforts modern Ukraine would not have many big cities or even access to the Black Sea.* [Official English version from Kremlin.ru]

²⁵ Julia Kazdobina, Jakob Hedenskog, and Andreas Umland, "Why the Donbas War Was Never 'Civil'," *SCEEUS Report* 6 (2024).

²⁶ For example, Marlene Laruelle, "The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32 (1) (2 January 2016): 55–74; Mikhail Suslov, "The Production of 'Novorossiya': A Territorial Brand in Public Debates," *Europe-Asia Studies* 69 (2) (7 February 2017): 202–21; John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal and Vladimir Kolosov, "The Rise and Fall of 'Novorossiya': Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 33 (2) (2017): 124–44; Frank Golczewski, "Unterschiedliche Geschichtsnarrative zur Ukraine im Kontext der aktuellen Kris," in *Kampf um die Ukraine: Ringen um Selbstbestimmung und Geopolitische Interessen*, ed. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Studien Zur Friedensethik 61 (Aschendorff Verlag, 2018), 35–60; Michael Cox (ed.), *Ukraine: Russia's War and the Future of the Global Order* (LSE Press, 2023).

connected to the contemporary western Ukrainian border region, which has been utilized by Putin to justify the invasion of Ukraine.²⁷ On the day of the Russian full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, Russian media websites have substantially increased writing articles about Ukraine that included references to ‘Nazism,’ from roughly 100 articles per day before the invasion to more than 2.000 articles on the day of the invasion.²⁸ But also western journalists have contributed to the distribution of these claims by continuously confronting Ukrainian scholars, journalists and politicians about these supposedly Ukrainian ‘Nazis’, asking whether there are far-right forces in the Ukrainian army.²⁹ Ukrainian historian Olesya Khromeychuk has addressed this issue in the foreword of a publication from 2023 on Ukraine, which could be seen as representative of the frustration many Ukrainians have felt with the international reaction following Russia’s full-scale invasion:

Yet, somehow, it is the Ukrainian armed forces that are being dissected by journalists and scholars today: does the Azov regiment hold far-right views or does it not? This discussion is being had [sic!] in a great many articles I have read about Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, few of these texts point out that, in 2019, after Putin had already attacked Ukraine and long after the formation of Azov and its incorporation into the National Guard, all the Ukrainian nationalist parties put together received just above 2% of the vote in Ukraine, meaning that they did not meet the 5% threshold for admission to parliament. Few point out that, at the same time, in France, Italy and Germany the far right won between 10% and 17% of the vote. Not to mention the popularity of a certain presidential candidate who delivered the biggest ever share of the French vote to the far right in her race against President Emmanuel Macron in France’s recent (April 2022) general election.³⁰

Khromeychuk does not refute the claim if some members of the Azov regiment hold fascist or anti-Semitic views or not. Instead, she criticizes the double standard applied to Ukraine by foreign journalists and scholars. The question she raises is why Ukrainians, who unlike many of their European neighbours have not voted for a strong political far-right and who are under attack by its neighbour, should be expected to justify the ideology of every member of its army

²⁷ Eleanor Knott, “The Securitised ‘Others’ of Russian Nationalism in Ukraine and Russia,” in *Ukraine: Russia’s War and the Future of the Global Order*, ed. Michael Cox (LSE Press, 2023), 103–105.

²⁸ Charlie Smart, “How the Russian Media Spread False Claims about Ukrainian Nazis,” *The New York Times* (2 July 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/07/02/world/europe/ukraine-nazis-russia-media.html> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

²⁹ For a few examples see, Gideon Rachman, “Ukraine’s nationalists and the Azov battalion. Why has Russia repeatedly claimed to be fighting neo-Nazis?” *Financial Times* (19 May 2022), <https://www.ft.com/content/9f9a7ace-04e7-45ce-871c-f5d157e08d08> (last accessed 25.08.2024); Deutschlandfunk, ‘Rechtsextremisten in der Ukraine und ihr Einfluss im Land’, <https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/asow-regiment-stepan-bandera-ukraine-100.html> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

³⁰ Olesya Khromeychuk, “Foreword. Where Is Ukraine? How a Western Outlook Perpetuates Myths about Europe’s Largest Country,” in *Ukraine’s Many Faces: Land, People, and Culture Revisited*, ed. Olena Palko and Manuel Férez Gil, New Europe’s 1 (transcript, 2023), 21–27, 25. The Azov battalion, an initially self-funded military unit, formed in May 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and beginning of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Leader of the Azov battalion was Andriy Biletsky, who later in 2016 became founder and head of the far-right party National Corps. The battalion was shortly after its formation included into the National Guard of the Ukrainian state and became known as the Azov regiment.

during wartime. Despite clear far-right elements and antisemitic views articulated by Azov leader Andriy Biletsky in the past,³¹ it is crucial to note that many Azov members who held extremist views, left the Azov battalion when it was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine in late 2014. Moreover, prior to Russia's full-scale invasion, the Azov regiment comprised approximately 1,500 members, a relatively small fraction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which are estimated to number around 200,000 soldiers.³² As the German Bundestag research service concluded in 2022, the available evidence suggests that the Azov regiment 'is not a monolithic unit characterized by neo-Nazism, ultranationalism, or anti-Semitism.'³³ In spite of the aforementioned facts, the news coverage following the Russian full-scale invasion of 2022 has proven that Russian propaganda successfully established a distorted image of a fascist Ukrainian army in parts of the international media and scholarship.

In recent years, more and more researchers have published studies and conducted projects that put their emphasize on deconstructing mental maps and the meanings they convey of Ukraine, rather than reproducing them.³⁴ These studies do not argue that regional differences do not exist, but they reset their analytical focus from centralizing regional differences to unravelling nuances in differences. Such an approach frees them from thinking in spatial containers, and in doing so, they overcome binary assumptions. One example is the research project 'Region, Nation and Beyond. An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconceptualization of Ukraine' by the research platform 'Ukrainian Regionalism' at the University of St. Gallen. The collective of scholars in this study achieved to challenge simplistic depictions of Ukraine's regional fragmentation through modifications in the research methodology of social surveys. The project members collected statistical data based on quantitative surveys with Ukrainian citizens, for the years 2013 and 2015, so before and after the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine, with an

³¹Oleksiy Kuzmenko, "Ukrainian Far-Right Fighters, White Supremacists Trained by Major European Security Firm," *Bellingcat* (30 August 2018), <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/08/30/ukrainian-far-right-fighters-white-supremacists-trained-major-european-security-firm/> (last accessed 12.12.2024).

³² Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, "Zum ukrainischen 'Regiment Asow' und zur möglichen Verstärkung durch deutsche Freiwillige aus dem rechtsextremistischen Milieu Ausgewählte Quellen und Faktenübersicht," Dokumentation WD 2 - 3000 - 025/22 (21 April 2022), 1–27, 12–13.

³³ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁴ For example, Zhurzhenko, "The Myth"; Von Löwis, "Phantom der alten Grenze,"; Cedric De Coning and Mateja Peter, eds., *Ukraine in Histories and Stories: Essays by Ukrainian Intellectuals* (Internews Ukraine, 2019); Oleksandra Seliverstova, "Consuming' National Identity in Western Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 45 (1) (January 2017): 61–79; Eleanor Knott, "Identity in Crimea before Annexation: A Bottom-up Perspective," in *Russia Before and After Crimea*, by Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 282–305; Ulrich Schmid and Oksana Myshlovska, *Regionalism without Regions: Reconceptualizing Ukraine's Heterogeneity*, Leipzig Studies on the History and Culture of East Central Europe, vol. 5 (Central European University Press, 2019); Andrii Melnikov, Iryna Ignatieva, and Katerina Nastoyasha, "An Empirical Application of Mental Mapping to Analyze National Identity Among Ukrainian Students," *SAGE Open* 14 (1) (January 2024).

average survey sample that is larger (N=6000) than commonly (N=1800–2000). They offer their survey results in an interactive map that displays the data not only on the level of Ukraine's macro-regions (East, West, South, Central) and administrative subdivisions (*oblasti*) but also on the level of its local administrative boundaries (*rayons*). The combination of both methodological modifications has led to a more nuanced outcome in the so-called regional fragmentation of Ukraine. For example, considering survey questions of self-identity on the peninsula Crimea, which was often propagated as homogenously ethnic Russian before and after the annexation by Russia in 2014, the interactive maps indicate that inhabitants on Crimea identified as almost much as Ukrainian (average factor of 3.7, on a scale from 1–5) than they did as Russian (3.8). Breaking this down to the level of rayons showed that inhabitants from the North, bordering the mainland, identified more as Ukrainian (Ukrainian 4.1; Russian 3.6) and in the South, including the largest city Sevastopol, more as Russian (Russian 4.2; Ukrainian 3.7).³⁵

Another example is a recent study analysing the, what the researchers called, 'national identity' among 942 Ukrainian students from Kyiv, Odesa and L'viv which has deployed the method of mental mapping to study how these students perceive their national identity against the backdrop of significant socio-political changes and conflicts within Ukraine. The study found that the so-called national identity among Ukrainian students in all regions can be characterized by a mixture of local and national feelings of belonging, with a trend towards a unified civil-national identity.³⁶ The scholars argue that the methodology of mental mapping – letting participants draw geographic spaces and fill them with what they connect to these places – was particularly useful for exploring national identity due to its ability to visually unfold inherent, symbolic, and spatial dimensions of identity. This, in turn, they claim, provides

³⁵ Interactive Map from *Region, Nation and Beyond: Region, Nation and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconsideration of Ukraine*, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland (2022), <http://mapsukraine.ch/> (last accessed 25.08.2024). The survey asked the respondents to answer the question: 'People respond to the question 'Who am I, who do I feel like?' in different ways. To what extent do you feel?'. The respondents were given the options, among other, to evaluate how much they felt 'Ukrainian' and 'Russian' based on a scale from 1 to 5: Definitely not (score of 1), Rather not (score of 2), Hard to say (score of 3), Rather yes (score of 4) and Definitely yes (score of 5). The numbers presented in the text represent the average of all respondents from L'viv. The interactive map does challenge the narrative that the idea of identifying as Russian automatically excludes a self-identification as Ukrainian and vice versa. Moreover, for the case of Crimea, it should be noted that other forms of identity markers seem more appropriate, such as identifying as Crimean, as has been proposed by Eleanor Knott, "Identity in Crimea before Annexation: A Bottom-up Perspective," in *Russia Before and After Crimea*, by Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 282–305.

³⁶ Andrii Melnikov, Iryna Ignatieva, and Katerina Nastoyasha, "An Empirical Application of Mental Mapping to Analyze National Identity Among Ukrainian Students," *SAGE Open* 14 (1) (January 2024).

unique access into how individuals navigate and interpret the complex landscape of national belonging that transcends traditional research methods.³⁷

With this thesis I want to tell a different story of mental maps, that centralises a local and historical perspective, set within the disciplines of border studies and historical transformation research, with a focus on the social dimension. With the use of a computational, bottom-up approach, it generates mental maps, that are representations of space, and the meaning attached to them, of young borderland inhabitants in the western Ukrainian borderland city L'viv. The idea is to unravel the collective mental maps of groups of people, in this case youth groups from L'viv, in text-based sources to gain an understanding of how they spatially placed themselves in the world and what meaning they attributed to places. Instead of assuming that the collective mental map of inhabitants from L'viv corresponds to the spatial imaginaries that re-emerged about L'viv as part of the greater region of western Ukraine following Ukraine's independence – such as those discussed before – I reconstruct the mental maps of inhabitants from L'viv based on the meanings they attribute to places. Such an approach to mental maps can be found in historical research, where historians analyse different text-based sources to reconstruct the underlying mental map in these texts.³⁸ Additionally, these collective mental maps, that are reconstructed from text sources, will not only be discussed in writing, but also visualized as conceptual maps, with the aim 'to understand the contingent apperception of the world contained in those maps.'³⁹ For that, I specifically investigate content generated in two newspapers by two groups of young inhabitants in L'viv from 1989 until 1995. The first group of young people gathered in the youth organisation *Tovarystvo Leva* (Lion Society) and its newspaper *Postup* (later *Post-Postup*) and the second group of young people is the L'viv branch of the communist youth group *Komsomol* and its newspaper *Leninska Molod'*, that in 1990 transformed into the organisation *Democratic Youth Union of L'viv* and renamed its newspaper to *Moloda Halychyna*. The findings are complemented by the analysis of historical social surveys produced throughout the 1990s in Ukraine and oral history interviews with former students from L'viv.

The focus in this study is put on the young for two reasons. First, in the study of the social dimension of post-communist transformation, age plays a role as it is a factor that shows how

³⁷ Melnikov, Ignatieva, and Nastoyasha, "An Empirical Application," no page.

³⁸ Schenk, "Mental Maps.,"; Götz and Holmén, "Introduction," 158.

³⁹ Götz and Holmén, "Introduction," 158.

the transformation was experienced differently. Younger and older generations often have contrasting perspective due to their unique past experiences.⁴⁰ The younger generation centralized in this study in Ukraine from 1989 to 1995 came of age during the beginning of *perestroika* and the fall of communism. This implies that they experienced different values and more liberal social norms, than their parents and grandparents. The young people in this study were forming their personal understanding of the world during a time of political change and had to adapt to the shifting political and economic circumstances. This was reflected in their engagement in new forms of political participation, such as protest, social movements or openly expressing critique toward the communist system. This leads me to my second points which is that young people from L'viv actively participated in the post-communist transformation of Ukraine. Informal youth groups and students are determined as driving forces that contributed to the transformation of Ukraine in field of culture and politics.⁴¹ Students from L'viv are considered the main organisers of the Revolution on Granite, a hunger strike that occurred on the Maidan (central place) in Kyiv from 2 to 17 of October 1990, organised numerous protests in L'viv before Ukraine's independence, and contributed to the revival of historical memory and cultural traditions.⁴² This implies that they experienced the transformation of Ukraine differently, than for example their parents, as they were actively involved in the restructuring of Ukraine.

With the study of mental maps and a local focus on L'viv as a western Ukrainian borderland city, this study aims to contribute to the interdisciplinary field of border studies. The questions guiding this study in this regard are, how have borderland inhabitants in L'viv spatially mapped the world around them? What meaning did they attribute to these places and how have these mental maps evolved over time? This research also aims to contribute to the growing body of historical transformation research. Within a timeframe covering the years 1989 to 1995 placed in the social, political, and economic processes of Ukraine's post-communist transformation, and with a focus on the perceptions of young people, this research provides insights to the social dimension of transformation research. Which processes of the transformation affected young

⁴⁰ Friederike Kind-Kovács and Machteld Venken, "Childhood in times of political transformation in the 20th Century: An Introduction," *Journal of Modern European History*, 19 (2) (2021): 155–165.

⁴¹ Oleh Muravskyi "“Neformal’ni” Molodizhni Orhanizatsii L’vova: Osoblyvosti Stvorennia, Napriamy Diial’nosti (1987–1990)” *Ukraina: kul’turna spadshchyna, natsional’na svidomist’, derzhavnist’* 27 (2015): 364–365.

⁴² Padraic Kenney, "Lviv's Central European Renaissance, 1987–1990," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24 (2000): 303–312; Nadia Diuk, "Youth as an Agent for Change: The next Generation in Ukraine," *Demokratizatsiya* 2 (2013); Olga Onuch, *Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina* (Palgrave MacMillan 2014).

borderland inhabitants, which were important? What socio-political and socio-economic processes of the post-communist transformation influenced their mental maps, and, as such also their understanding of the world? How did such influences evolve over time, and what affected potential changes? And finally, what does the analysis of mental maps reveal about the social dimensions of post-communist transformation in Ukraine?

Before I start with the analysis, I will delineate the underlying theoretical and conceptual framework of this study in chapter 2. Here I explain mental maps as a concept and a method, how mental maps are understood, produced, and analyzed in historical research and how they are utilized in this study. This is followed by an introduction to the theory underlying this thesis, which is embedded in the fields of historical transformation research and border studies and draws from the discipline of political science. I also introduce the two youth organizations and their newspapers by providing the context of their emergence and existence, along with detailed information about each newspaper. Chapter 3 offers a delineation of the methodological approach in this study, that is split into the computational analysis of the newspapers and a brief description of the applied qualitative analysis. In chapter 4, I provide the results from the exploratory analysis of the computational data, that functioned as the basis for the qualitative analysis I provide in chapter 5 and 6. The last chapter summarizes the analysis results from chapters 4, 5 and 6 by providing written and visual representations of the mental maps from the two youth organisations from 1989 to 1995. The last chapter also reflects on the notion what these two mental maps reveal about the social dimension of Ukraine's post-communist transformation.

II. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Mental Maps as a Concept

Mental Maps are defined as forms of 'textual, visual or performative representations' of space that 'reduce complexity and shape identities.'⁴³ They appear in various forms, for example, in territorial categories, such as 'Eastern Europe', 'Southeastern Europe' or 'Central Europe', cultural-linguistic categories, such as the 'Slavic World', or in liminal spaces, such as metaphors of *bridges* or *in-betweenness*.⁴⁴ They are collective concepts of spatial knowledge that are formed by actors such as politicians, intellectuals, and the media, within specific socio-political

⁴³ Lawson, Bavaj and Struck, "Guide," 68.

⁴⁴ Mishkova, "Spatial Configurations," 1.

environments. They are socially produced, shaped in processes of inclusion and exclusion, and exist to represent a spatial ‘container’, an understanding of the direct and/or more distant environment that individuals, communities, and groups of people can identify with.⁴⁵

The concept of mental maps originates in the works of US-American cognitive psychologist Edward C. Tolman, who in the 1940s first introduced the term ‘cognitive map’ to demonstrate how spatial knowledge is represented in human brains.⁴⁶ Since then, the concept has been grasped by other disciplines, such as geography and urban planning. In the last 25 years, it has entered the discipline of history under the term ‘mental map’.⁴⁷ Different from the discipline of psychology that analyses how individuals spatially orient themselves and map their environment, mental maps in historical research are also used to investigate collective forms of spatial knowledge.⁴⁸ Based on the assumption that not only individuals map space, but also communities and groups of people develop culturally and historically specific ideas about the spatiality of their lived and imagined environment, historical research focuses on the ‘collective concepts of the spatial structuring of the world and its constituent regions’.⁴⁹ These collective understandings are the result of social productions, that form, change and gain or lose meaning over time depending on the social and political circumstances and on the actors that apply meaning to them.⁵⁰ In a chapter on spatial imaginaries in Europe in *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Diana Mishkova has demonstrated the constructive character and temporality of mental maps. In her chapter, the historian deconstructs spatial terms, such as ‘Eastern Europe’ or ‘the Balkans’, from the perspective of various Central and Eastern European intellectuals, among them Milan Kundera, Sorin Antohi and Mykhailo Hrushevsky. She determines how regional intellectuals held a crucial level of agency in the creation of ‘their own mental maps, symbolic geographies and maps of civilization’⁵¹ that at times could support or contradict the national course, but always took place in a reciprocally discourse between West and East.⁵² After the fall of state-communism, for example, the formation of the Visegrád Group, encompassing Czechoslovakia, Poland and

⁴⁵ Norbert Götz and Janne Holmén, “Introduction to the Theme Issue: ‘Mental Maps: Geographical and Historical Perspectives’,” *Journal of Cultural Geography* 35 (2) (2018): 159.

⁴⁶ Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, “Mental Maps: The Cognitive Mapping of the Continent as an Object of Research of European History,” *European History Online* (2013), no pages.

⁴⁷ Götz and Holmén, “Introduction,” 159.

⁴⁸ Schenk, “Mental Maps.”

⁴⁹ Schenk, “Mental Maps. Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002): 495.

⁵⁰ Mishkova, “Spatial Configurations,” 1, 65–66; Götz and Holmén, “Introduction,” 159.

⁵¹ Mishkova, “Spatial Configurations,” 66.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 66.

Hungary, brought back the discourse of spatially determining these countries as Central European. These states were considered as a ‘semi-periphery’, whose most important common feature was ‘their heroic struggle for freedom, especially when they became subordinate part of empires’.⁵³ However, this debate changed in the second half of the 1990s with the continuing western-oriented political and economic transformation of these countries.⁵⁴ The spatial imaginary of ‘Central Europe’ was now considered to represent a ‘spectre of provincialism’.⁵⁵ In Poland the discourse on ‘Central Europe’ was substituted with imaginaries of ‘returning to *Western Europe*’, by emphasising Poland’s Western European affiliation through debates on Polish history and intellectualism. In Hungary, debates on ‘Central Europe’ receded and terms such as the ‘Danubian Region’ or ‘East Central Europe’ emerged instead.⁵⁶

To construct an understanding of space of individuals or groups of a specific time and geographic space, historians draw from a variety of archival documents, such as travel guides, maps, or cartographies. The primary focus is however on textual sources.⁵⁷ Research on text-based sources seek to decipher and understand the mental map (concepts of space with attributive meaning) that underlies the text at hand. In addition, scholars have begun to visualize mental maps from collective understandings of space articulated in textual sources. This ‘meta-perspective’ adds a new dimension to studying mental maps as they are ‘graphically articulate[d] conceptual notions of space.’⁵⁸ Here, researchers are not interested in how these mental maps can be used to navigate or physically move through space. Instead, the focus is on understanding how people perceive, interpret and mentally represent their world. So visualising mental maps is not seen as a practical guide but as a visual reflection of how people conceptually understand and connect with different places.⁵⁹

Such an approach has been implemented, for example, by the historian Janne Holmén, who asked secondary school students from ten different countries to ‘write down the name of as many historical figures as possible within five minutes’ and to add the country or city they believe these figures to be affiliated with. Based on the quantitative results, the historian digitally

⁵³ Mishkova, “Spatial Configurations,” 1.

⁵⁴ Radim Hladík, “A Theory’s Travelogue: Post-Colonial Theory in Post-Socialist Space,” *Teorie Vědy/Theory of Science* 33 (4) (2011): 561–90, 563.

⁵⁵ Mishkova, “Spatial Configurations,” 62.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Schenk, “Mental Maps.”

⁵⁸ Götz and Holmén, “Introduction,” 158.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

created cartograms, that functioned as the mental maps, revealing the collective historical consciousness of these young students.⁶⁰ A group of France-based researchers asked non-European students to draw the boundaries of Europe on a map according to their personal opinions to explore the students' spatial perspective of Europe. The students' self-drawn maps from each country were then digitalised and overlapped using the geospatial software ArcGis. Subsequently, these maps were compared with maps collected in an earlier research project on spatial imaginaries that was based on the perception of European students.⁶¹ Lorella Viola, a migration scholar and linguist, mapped spatial references in Italian diaspora newspapers. She digitalised her results in form of an interactive map, called *ChroniclItaly 2.0*, to better understand which places migrants apply meaning to and how spaces are shaped.⁶²

This study approaches mental maps as a collective representation of spaces that are compiled of the meanings groups attach to different places. These spaces are created from the meanings young people in the borderland city L'viv attributed to locations in Ukrainian newspapers published in L'viv from 1989 to 1995. But how do we get from identifying locations/places and their attributed meaning to the creation of spaces and finally to the reconstruction of a mental map? According to geographer John A. Agnew, space, in its simplest sense, is as a general term that refers to any boundless, three-dimensional expanse. It is often described as an abstract concept, devoid of any inherent meaning or significance. Space is simply the container or framework in which physical objects and phenomena exist and interact. Place on the other hand, is a more specific concept. It refers to a particular location that has been attributed with significance through human experience, memory, and social interactions. A place is as much a physical location as it is a site of identity, belonging, and cultural expression.⁶³ By considering the locations mentioned in the youth newspapers in their physical form as places, so as a geospatial boundary on a map, and through identifying the meaning attached to these locations within their thematic context in the newspapers (topics), these locations detach from their geospatial definition and are turned into meaningful places. Place therefore has two definitions: the first is 'a location somewhere' with 'an address' and the second is 'the occupation of that

⁶⁰ Janne Holmén, "Mapping Historical Consciousness: Mental Maps of Time and Space among Secondary School Students from Ten Locations around the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas," *Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies* 1 (1) (2017): 46–75.

⁶¹ Clarisse Didelon, Sophie de Ruffray, and Claude Grasland, "Mental Maps of Students," *HAL* 1 (2011): 1–34.

⁶² Lorella Viola, "ChroniclItaly 2.0. A Corpus of Italian American Newspapers Annotated for Entities, 1898–1920," (Utrecht University, 2019).

⁶³ John Agnew, "Space and Place," in *The SAGE Handbook of Geographical Knowledge*, ed. John Agnew and David N. Livingstone (SAGE Publications 2011), 318.

location’ referring to what it means ‘living at that address’. The latter definition, place as ‘the occupation of that location’ represents the meanings applied to a place. These meanings are manifold, implying that a place as a location can have multiple meanings attached to it, depending on the spatial and temporal environment of the agent who attributes the meaning.

For example, a citizen (agent) of Moscow (spatial environment) during the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in the 1970s (temporal environment) can attribute different meanings to the location ‘Moscow’, turning it into different meaningful places. The location Moscow can be attributed with personal imaginaries, for example as a place of feeling at home and belonging, a place of employment and economic stability, or as a place of social interactions, friendships and community engagement. Moscow during the Soviet Union can also be identified as the place of the political centre of the Soviet Union since it housed the Soviet government institutions, such as the Kremlin. Another example is Moscow as a place of the intellectual and cultural capital of the Soviet Union that fostered literature, arts and education through schools, museums, or scientific research institutions located in the city. Thus, by identifying different meaning of places, the empty container of space is filled with significance, ‘thus place becomes a particular or lived space.’⁶⁴

This lived space, that is compiled of meaningful places, represents one moment of the mental map. A collection of multiple lived spaces from different moments in time, form the mental map as a whole. Lived spaces can therefore be circumscribed with the metaphor of a ‘photograph’. They represent a specific moment in time, a snapshot, during which places have been attributed with specific meanings present or dominant at that time. When time advances, the meaning attached to places shifts, evolves, vanishes or remains, which affects the lived space. Taking several snapshots of these lived spaces from different moments in time to construct mental maps, on the one hand, upholds the spatial aspect in mental map, and on the other hand breaks the perception of mental maps as fixed and static representations of space, underlining the fluidity of spatial perception throughout time, as Mishkova has suggested.⁶⁵

Such a mental map needs to be contextualised in its local and temporal framework. *Local* in the sense that mental maps are considered to be a type of story, originating from a specific place (in this study L’viv) and emphasizing the meanings that people attribute to their spatial

⁶⁴ Agnew, “Space and Place,” 318.

⁶⁵ Mishkova, “Spatial Configurations,” 1, 65–66.

environment. *Temporal* in the sense that mental maps are dynamic concepts, as they represent the outcomes of social processes that evolve over time, influenced by the socio-political and socio-economic context.⁶⁶ By focusing on the period from 1989 to 1995 in Ukraine, we can observe how the meaning attributed to places contained in mental maps shifted in response to the transitional, political and economic processes that accompanied the country's post-communist transformation, affecting 'all spheres of life'.⁶⁷ Thus, in this study, mental maps are understood as temporal frames, that depict the evolving spatial perceptions of a group of actors, in their spatio-temporal context.

In this research, two mental maps are reconstructed based on frequently mentioned locations (places) in two Ukrainian youth newspapers published by two youth organisations from L'viv from 1989 to 1995 and the meanings attributed to these locations. The first mental map reflects the newspaper *Postup* and covers the years 1989 to 1995 and the second mental map reflects the newspaper *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna* temporally cover years 1989 to 1995 (excluding the year 1994, see Chapter 3.1). To draw a cohesive picture of the youth's mental maps in the 1990s from L'viv, the meanings attributed to locations within the newspapers are contextualised and complemented by meanings attributed to locations by young L'vivians found in oral history interviews and social surveys conducted from 1992 to 1995.

2.2 Post-Communist Transformation Research

Following the events of 1989 to 1991 in Europe, in post-communist transformation research often referred to as the turning point,⁶⁸ the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia collapsed, and the former post-communist countries turned into independent states. This political disruption turned upside down the geopolitical order of the world, that was formerly shaped by the Cold War. Post-communist countries entered an all-encompassing transition process, that initially aimed to 'catch up' by 'returning to the West'.⁶⁹ The goal was to transition from planned economy to market economy, from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments and the

⁶⁶ Mishkova, "Spatial Configurations," 1, 62.

⁶⁷ Florian Kühner-Wielach and Sarah Lemmen, "Transformation in East Central Europe: 1918 and 1989. A Comparative Approach," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 23 (4) (3 July 2016): 573–79, 574; Philipp Ther, *Europe since 1989: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

⁶⁸ Aleksandra Galasińska and Michał Krzyżanowski, eds., *Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁶⁹ Vera Trappmann, "Externe Transformationsanker," in *Handbuch Transformationsforschung*, ed. Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagoner (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015), 541–46, 542.

establishment of modified constitutional states and welfare systems.⁷⁰ With the re-shuffling of the global world order, scholars took an interest in the challenges post-Cold War countries were facing. While ‘all post-communist countries have opened their economies to the world market, privatised public assets, organised electoral polyarchies, monetarised social provision, and established free labour markets’⁷¹, the extent to which these individual steps were implemented as well as the path that was chosen, varies amongst post-communist countries. With the growing temporal distance towards the year 1989, scholars can reassess these paths.

The concept of transformation originates in the philosophical discourse on social, political, and economic dynamics emerging in the 18th century. It initially sparked from social theoretical ideas of philosophers, such as Karl Marx, Max Weber and Joseph Alois Schumpeter, on societal and economic development in light of evolutionary and revolutionary forms of crisis, change and progress.⁷² A scholarly work of transformation research can be found in Karl Polanyi’s publication ‘The Great Transformation’ on 19th and 20th century European societies. In his critique on the political and economic shift from an ‘economy being embedded in social relations’ to ‘social relations [being] embedded in the economic system’, Polanyi for the first time introduced the term ‘transformation’.⁷³ With the emergence of profound social changes in Europe following the collapse of state socialism at the end of the 20th century, the term found its ways into academic discourse as a concrete concept, especially in the political sciences.⁷⁴

At the beginning, these political scientists were mostly interested in the greater political and economic processes of this transformation. Most of the literature published, concentrated on consolidation processes of democracy and nation-building, institutional structures, economic and political reform changes, the implementation of new political and electoral systems, the privatization of the economic market, shifts in the industrial sectors or corruption and unemployment rates.⁷⁵ In East Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic attention was paid

⁷⁰ Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener, “Transformation Und Transformationsforschung: Zur Einführung,” in *Handbuch Transformationsforschung*, ed. Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015), 11–27, 17; Dieter Segert, *Transformationen in Osteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert* (utb 2013), 13; Kerstin Brückweh, “Wissen über die Transformation. Wohnraum und Eigentum in der langen Geschichte der ‘Wende’,” *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History* 16 (2019): 19–45, 21.

⁷¹ David Lane, “Divergent Social and Economic Consequences of Transformation in Post-Communist States,” in *Crises in the Post-Soviet Space*, ed. Felix Jaitner, Tina Olteanu, and Tobias Spori (Routledge, 2018), 39–60, 42.

⁷² Kollmorgen, Merkel and Wagener, “Transformation,” 12.

⁷³ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Beacon Press 2001), 60.

⁷⁴ Kollmorgen, Merkel and Wagener, “Transformation,” 16.

⁷⁵ Kollmorgen, Merkel and Wagener, “Transformation,” 17; Segert, “Transformationen,” 13; Brückweh, “Wissen,” 21.

to tracking the economic development following the implementation of ‘shock therapy’.⁷⁶ In Ukraine, studies on the political transformation were published concentrating on nationalism and national identity, on political systems and parties, on the emergence of corruption and geopolitical relations, especially between Ukraine and Russia.⁷⁷ Later, comparative analyses of post-communist countries emerged, that differentiated the development of the transformation according to economic and political alliances following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Difference were drawn, for example, between those post-communist countries, that joined the Visegrád Group formed in 1991, such as Poland, Hungary and former Czechoslovakia, or those that joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereafter – CIS), founded in 1991 by the Republic of Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.⁷⁸ Other scholars, in turn, differentiated between post-communist countries that actively worked towards becoming a member of the European Union and countries that joined the CIS, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁷⁹ Here, the former group is compiled of previous Soviet satellite states such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but also the former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which all would officially join the European Union in 2004.⁸⁰ The second group encompasses (current and former) CIS member states Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Georgia.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Johannes Stephan, *Economic Transition in Hungary and East Germany* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Jeffrey Sachs, “Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Utah: University of Utah, 6 April 1994).

⁷⁷ Andrew Wilson and Artur Bilous, “Political Parties in Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 45 (4) (1993): 693–703; Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Volodymyr Polokhalo, ed., *The Political Analysis of Postcommunism: Understanding Postcommunist Ukraine*, Eastern European Studies 6 (Texas A&M University Press, 1997); Taras Kuzio, ed., *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation* (M.E. Sharpe, 1998); Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, eds. *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*.

⁷⁸ Elżbieta Kuźlewska, Adam R. Bartnicki, and Ryszard Skarżyński, “Origins of and Perspectives for the Future for the Visegrád Group,” in *Ten Years of the Visegrád Group Member States in the European Union*, ed. Agnieszka Piekutowska and Iwona Wrońska (Oficina Wydawnicza Aspra, 2015), 145–147; Paul Kubicek, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Example of Failed Regionalism?,” *Review of International Studies* 35 (2009): 237–56, 237.

⁷⁹ Lane, “Divergent,” 39–40; David Lane, “Post-Communist States and the European Union,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23 (4) (December 2007): 470.

⁸⁰ Other former communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 were Slovenia (former part of Yugoslavia 1944–1991), and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (formerly Czechoslovakia). Bulgaria (formerly People’s Republic of Bulgaria 1946–1991) and Romania (Romanian People’s Republic and Socialist Republic of Romania 1947–1989) and joined in 2007 and Croatia (formerly belonging to Yugoslavia 1944–1991) in 2013. See, André De Munter, “The Enlargement of the Union,” European Union, April 2024, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/167/the-enlargement-of-the-union> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁸¹ The CIS was founded in 1991 and was an international alliance that attempted to continue economic, political and military relationships amongst former Soviet republics despite the Soviet break-up. Kubicek, “Commonwealth,” 237.

For some time, the academic interest remained limited to the challenges politics, governments and the economies had to undergo in post-communist countries, and only little attention was paid to the impact of the transformation on individuals and groups in society. Social and political scientists in Europe would only later concentrate on the social dimension of the post-communist transformation. In their short paragraph about the social transformation of post-communist societies, scholars Claire Wallace and Christian Haerpfer argued that it involved a shift from enforced equality under communist regimes to increasing social differentiation driven by market forces. Wealth, rather than political affiliation, became the primary source of social status, leading to a divide between ‘winners’ (young entrepreneurs, urban residents, and the highly educated) and ‘losers’ (the unemployed, public-sector workers, and marginalized groups). This period saw persistent corruption, emerging inequalities, and the slow development of civil society, highlighting a complex and uneven transformation of social structures.⁸² Including the social dimension in an analysis of post-communist transformation meant to understand the social outcome, that is, how the processes have affected its citizens, and everything connected to them.

For instance, Paul Kubicek has investigated the role of trade unions in post-communist Russia and Ukraine, arguing that they need to be considered as part of broader civil society. He has demonstrated that Ukrainian trade unions, like their Russian counterparts, inherited a legacy from the Soviet-era trade unions, which served more to the state and management rather than truly representing workers. This historical baggage negatively impacted the unions’ ability to transition into independent entities in the post-communist period. Also due to a slower pace of economic reform in Ukraine, compared to Russia, and the economic deprivation, corruption, and centralization of presidential power, Ukrainian unions faced declining membership and a lack of public support. Kubicek has argued that this was indicative of deeper issues with the political and economic structures of these post-communist states.⁸³ Sociologist and political scientist Victor Stepanenko, has also identified that the inherited legacy of Soviet-era social structures hindered the development of civil society in Ukraine. He argued that, in Ukraine, an inherited distrust from the Soviet era, reliance on informal networks, and disillusionment with

⁸² Claire Wallace and Christian Haerpfer, “Three Paths of Transformation in Post-Communist Central Europe,” *IHS Sociological Series* 28 (May 1998): 8–9.

⁸³ Paul Kubicek, “Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post-Soviet Democratisation: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (4): 603–24.

‘pseudo-democratic’⁸⁴ reforms negatively impact Ukrainians willingness to participate in organised civic activities. In his article he emphasizes that members of civic organizations tend to develop stronger values associated with democratic political culture, self-realisation, and self-expression compared to those not involved in such groups. However, this civic engagement often remains limited due to the dominance of elite networks and a weak institutional foundation for civil society. Stepanenko suggests that although there are signs of emerging civic ethos and a shift towards more self-reliant social activities in Ukraine, the wider impact on society is hindered by persistent social and cultural obstacles, such as low public trust in political institutions.⁸⁵ This research pays attention to this social dimension of post-communist transformation research. It analyses the processes within and the impact of the post-communist transformation on the perspectives of young people in the western Ukrainian city of L’viv.

More than thirty years after the peaceful revolutions and beginning of national statehood in the post-communist countries, the transformation is still tangible. Even if new political regulations and economic reforms have been successfully implemented shortly after the fall of state socialism, as it has been the case in the Baltic States after approximately five years, scholars have emphasized that this does not entail an end to post-communist transformation.⁸⁶ Based on research conducted on earlier societal transformations such as the state-communist transformation at the beginning of the 20th century marked by the Russian Revolution in 1917, Kollmorgen estimates that these processes can last up to fifty years.⁸⁷ In the case of the post-communist transformation certain processes are still ongoing, and the extent to which varies from country to country and depends on the area that is being investigated.⁸⁸ Kerstin Brückweh argues in regard to post-communist East Germany for example, that the transformation of consumption has come to an end in the former GDR, while the mental impact of the transformation remains tangible in people’s mindset until this day.⁸⁹ In Ukraine, the revolutionary upheavals in 2004 (Orange Revolution) and 2013/2014 (Revolution of Dignity) have indicated that the political transformation since national statehood in 1991 has not come

⁸⁴ Victor Stepanenko, “Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework of Corrupted Sociality?” *East European Politics and Societies* 20 (4) (2006), 1–27, 10.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ther, *Europe*, 78.

⁸⁷ Raj Kollmorgen, “Postsozialistische Transformationen des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts,” in *Handbuch Transformationsforschung*, ed. Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener (Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015), 421–42, 434.

⁸⁸ Ther, *Europe*, 78.

⁸⁹ Kerstin Brückweh, Clemens Villinger, and Kathrin Zöller, *Die lange Geschichte der Wende. Geschichtswissenschaft im Dialog*, (Ch. Links Verlag, 2021), 49.

to an end yet. The extensive and at times violent demonstrations have shown that the political structures in the 2000s did not meet the expectations of a large part of Ukrainian society. And the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 has officially marked the end to the peaceful political transformation of Ukraine.⁹⁰

In sight of the growing temporal distance to the events of 1989 to 1991, more and more historians have begun to research the years following the dissolution of state socialism.⁹¹ Spatially, research mostly focuses on post-communist countries east of the Iron Curtain, such as Poland, Ukraine or Hungary, but can also refer to countries considered ‘Western’, such as Sweden, (United) Germany and Finland, or countries in the Eastern part of the world, such as China and Vietnam;⁹² temporally, it has initially focused on the years following the collapse of state socialism, but with historians entering the debate also started to consider time long before 1989, thereby endorsing, for example, analyses of continuity and discontinuity, and multiple layers of temporalities.⁹³ Also in the context of Ukraine, historians have begun to include analyses chapters covering post-communist Ukraine in their publications. For example, British

⁹⁰ Ther, *Europe*, 78–79.

⁹¹ See Panagiotidis, *Postsovietische Migration in Deutschland* (Beltz Juventa, 2020); Włodzimierz Borodziej, Stanislav Holubec, Joachim von Puttkamer, eds., *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century Volume 1: Challenges of Modernity* (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020); Włodzimierz Borodziej, Joachim von Puttkamer, Stanislav Holubec, Sabina Ferhadbegović, Ferenc Laczó, Jochen Böhrer, eds., *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century: Volume 2: Statehood* (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020); Włodzimierz Borodziej, Joachim von Puttkamer, and Ferenc Laczó, eds., *The Routledge Twentieth Century History Handbooks. Volume 3: Intellectual Horizons*, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020); Jochen Böhrer, Włodzimierz Borodziej, Joachim von Puttkamer, eds., *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century Volume 4: Violence* (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022).; Ther, “Europe.”; James Krapfl, *Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989–1992* (Cornell University Press, 2013).; Berend, *From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union. The Economic and Social Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973* (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton University Press 2006; Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989* (Princeton University Presse, 2003). For an outline of political scientists who have included a historical dimension in their analyses, see Jan Kubik “From Transitology to Contextual Holism: A Theoretical Trajectory of Postcommunist Studies,” in Jan Kubik and Amy Linch, eds., *Post-Communism from Within: Social Justice, Mobilization, and Hegemony* (New York University Press, 2013), 27–94.

⁹² See chapter 9 in Ther, *Europe*; See chapter 2 and 7 in Wing Thye Woo, Stephen Parker, and Jeffrey Sachs, eds., *Economies in transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe* (MIT Press, 1997); Sheng Peng, *Making a New World? China and the end of the European Cold War, 1979–1991*, Research Project, <https://www.recet.at/our-team/detail/sheng-peng>. Ther recently delineated in ‘Europe since 1989: a history’ how the consequences of the post-communist hegemonic shifts incentivised a, what he terms, ‘co-transformation’, in United Germany. Woo, Parker and Sachs already in 1997, in the anthology ‘Economies in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe’ demonstrated what consequences states such as China and Vietnam faced following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and how they politically and economically adapted to their new realities. Sheng Peng’s current research project ‘Making a New World? China and the end of the European Cold War, 1979–1991’ explores how China actively reconsidered its international political and economic role during the Cold War with the goal to ‘make Chinese-European relations a major pillar of the post-Cold War multi-polar world order.’

⁹³ Kührer-Wielach and Lemmen, “Transformation,” 574.

historian Andrew Wilson, who in 2000 published *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, examines the history of Ukrainians and their struggle to form a cohesive nation amidst the legacies of imperial and Soviet rule through a historical lens.⁹⁴ Including also the post-communist period, he argues that Ukraine's modern trajectory is shaped by its historical position as a crossroads between East and West, navigating internal diversity and external pressures from Russia. Key events such as the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests would push Ukraine toward European alignment, while conflicts like the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas have paradoxically strengthened national unity. Historian Serhii Plokhy examines the tensions concerning state borders between Ukraine and Russia that re-emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union in a 2008 publication. He specifically pays attention to the continuity of history, by discussing the role historical narratives played in shaping post-communist political discourses regarding territorial claims between Ukraine and Russia.⁹⁵ In a more recent publication from 2015, Plokhy provides in only a little more than 60 pages, a brief overview of the main events and developments in Ukraine's shift from communism to post-communism, beginning with the incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet Union following the Second World War and ending with Russia's annexation of Crimea.⁹⁶ Another example is the Ukrainian-Canadian historian Serhy Yelekchuk who shortly after the Russian annexation of Crimea dedicated a whole book to answer the most common question regarding Ukraine. In his concise 166-page publication, structured around 71 questions such as 'Is it true that Ukraine is split into pro-Western and pro-Russian halves?' and 'Why did the Bolsheviks create a Ukrainian republic within the Soviet Union, and how did they determine its borders?' Yelekchuk not only provides brief yet comprehensive answers to the most pressing questions about Ukraine for an international audience but also constructs his answers from multiple temporal layers, interweaving historical and contemporary political perspectives.⁹⁷

This dissertation follows an historical approach to the post-communist transformation. More specifically, this research considers the transformation processes in post-communist countries as a historical period. What this entails is that, first, sources for analysing the transformation period can be found outside of physical archives.⁹⁸ Considering that the internet has become a

⁹⁴ Andrew J. Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (Yale University Press, 2000).

⁹⁵ Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia. Representations of the Past* (University of Toronto Press, 2008).

⁹⁶ Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine* (Basic Books, 2015), 291–354.

⁹⁷ Serhy Yelekchuk, *The Conflict in Ukraine. What Everyone needs to Know* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁹⁸ James Curran, "Rethinking Internet History," In James Curran, Natalie Fenton, Des Freedman, eds., *Misunderstanding the Internet* (Routledge, 2012), 40–71, 34.

‘mainstream’ commodity in the mid-1990s, researchers can now browse the World-Wide-Web to gain digital access to data, such as websites of political campaigns or of government institutions. The former US-president Bill Clinton, for example, launched the first online election campaign in 1996.⁹⁹ In post-communist Ukraine, the website of the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) was launched in 1994.¹⁰⁰ Today, the Ukrainian government website hosts declarations, laws, decrees, reports and many other governmental documents from the communist period to modern times.¹⁰¹ Earlier sources are also available through the Internet Archive project that was launched in 1996, as a mean to preserve everything that has been and will be produced on the internet. Since 1996, the Internet Archive has crawled over 782 billion web pages and can be accessed through the ‘WayBackMachine’.¹⁰² The website of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada was for the first time saved on the Internet Archive on 27 November 1999.¹⁰³

Second, knowledge and data produced by scholars on the post-communist transformation in the early 1990s must be considered as historical sources that require a historical contextualisation.¹⁰⁴ This does not imply that the data and literature produced was necessarily subjected to bias or inaccuracy, but rather that all research is conducted within a particular context that can shape its outcome. Factors such as the political climate, dominant ideologies and personal experiences and beliefs of scholars can influence the focus, interpretation and presentation of data. Historical contextualisation can be a mean to identify potential biases by addressing the complexities in the production of their works within their historical context.

Third, not only considering the year 1989 as a caesura, a moment in time that suddenly changed the world, but also looking at time before 1989, can broaden an understanding of the transformation discontinuities and continuities of certain phenomena of the transformation processes, such as the importance of past local history in national identity processes or the impact of economic reform changes in the 1970s and 1980s. Freeing the post-communist transformation process from its temporal limitation, also allows to consider layers of temporalities, that are not bound to the immediate time before and after 1989. Historians and

⁹⁹ Stromer-Galley, This is What, 20 March 2014, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/campaign-websites-1996-104827/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

¹⁰⁰ Website, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1994–2023, <https://www.rada.gov.ua/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

¹⁰¹ Website of Archive, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

¹⁰² Website, Internet Archive, About, 1996–2023, <https://archive.org/about/> (last accessed 15.08.2023).

¹⁰³ Website, Wayback Machine on [www.rada.gov.ua, https://web.archive.org/web/19990801000000*/https://www.rada.gov.ua/](https://web.archive.org/web/19990801000000*/https://www.rada.gov.ua/) (last accessed 15.08.2023).

¹⁰⁴ Ther, *Europe*, 21.

scholars including a historical perspective have approached this, for example, in comparative studies of the years 1918, 1945 and 1989 in Europe,¹⁰⁵ in analyses of seeking traces of long-dissolved empires in post-communist societies, that are termed ‘phantom borders’,¹⁰⁶ or in studies on memory.¹⁰⁷

Nowadays, historical transformation research still struggles to be acknowledged as part of the broad field of disciplines involved in understanding the transformation period,¹⁰⁸ even though more and more historians pay attention to this period.¹⁰⁹ This research seeks to contribute to this growing field of historical transformation research. But ‘defining ‘transformation’ remains a subjective act’,¹¹⁰ as the word can have a different meaning depending on the temporal and spatial context. The transformation encompasses everything in life and several transformation processes, such as the development towards a democratic voting system and the creation of a market economy, can occur in parallel, start at different times, increase at different moments, slow down, stop or reverse.¹¹¹ In this study I propose to approach post-communist transformation on three dimensions: on a spatial, a temporal and in form of the historical actors. Such an understanding is inspired by the holistic approach to post-communist transformation introduced by political scientist Jan Kubik under the term ‘contextual holism’.¹¹²

‘Contextual holism’ is considered to ‘emphasize the complexity and multidimensionality of the postcommunist transformation’ in political analyses. This approach is an attempt to study the divergence of post-communist countries and their location on the map, historical considerations beyond the Soviet past, a focus on locality, and to include the ordinary citizens affected by the

¹⁰⁵ Kührer-Wielach and Lemmen, “Transformation,” 574; Kind-Kovács and Venken, “Childhood,” 155–165.

¹⁰⁶ Béatrice von Hirschhausen, Hannes Grandits, Claudia Kraft, Dietmar Müller, Thomas Serrier, eds., *Phantomgrenzen. Räume und Akteure in der Zeit neu denken* (Wallstein, 2015); Sabine von Löwis, eds., *Umstrittene Räume in der Ukraine Politische Diskurse, literarische Repräsentationen und kartographische Visualisierungen* (Wallstein Verlag, 2019).

¹⁰⁷ Alena Pfoser, “Between Russia and Estonia: Narratives of Place in a New Borderland,” *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 2 (2014): 269–85; Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Borders and Memory,” in Doris Wastl-Walter, ed., *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies* (Routledge, 2011).

¹⁰⁸ Christopher Banditt, “Quantitative Erforschung der ostdeutschen Transformationsgeschichte,” *Zeitgeschichte* (18 March 2019), <https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/quantitative-erforschung-der-ostdeutschen-transformationsgeschichte> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

¹⁰⁹ See Panagiotidis, “Postsowjetische,”; Borodziej, Holubec, von Puttkamer, *Challenges of Modernity*; Borodziej, Puttkamer, Holubec, Ferhadbegović, Laczó, Böhler, *Statehood*; Borodziej, von Puttkamer, and Laczó, *Intellectual Horizons*; Ther, *Europe*; Kührer-Wielach and Lemmen, “Transformation,” 574; Krapfl, “Revolution.”; Berend, “Soviet Bloc.”; Kenney, *Carnival*.

¹¹⁰ Kührer-Wielach and Lemmen, “Transformation,” 578.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Kubik, “Contextual Holism,” 27–94.

transformation. Even though this approach is embedded in the discipline of political science, I argue, it offers a conceptually well-defined framework that, if complemented with concepts from border studies and historical transformation research, can facilitate an interdisciplinary angle to study post-communist transformation. Kubik defines five principles that need to be considered when addressing post-communist transformation, which will be briefly outlined below: relationism, history, constructivism, formality, and informality, and localism.¹¹³

The principle of *relationism* refers to the relationship between structure and agency. It proposes to move away from a concentration on the agency of historical elite actors in the transformation to post-communist societies, and instead shed light on the role of ordinary citizens.¹¹⁴ The principle of *history* suggests a ‘return to history’ in a political understanding of the post-communist societies by focusing on the ‘deep causal chains’ from history to contemporary decisions, taking into consideration the nonlinear character of time in different aspects of the post-communist transformation, and at last, examine the significance of historical memory. The third principle, *constructivism*, refers, again, to a greater focus on the experiences of ordinary citizens, who are part of a political landscape that is embedded in a historic-cultural context. A constructivist approach is based on the idea that the ways in which people construct their understanding of the world – through language, symbols, and other meaning-making processes – are not just passive reflections but have actual political implications. This approach involves examining how these perceptions of understanding are created, shared, sustained, and accepted within a society. It also looks at the role of culture in shaping these perceptions and how they, in turn, can influence or be influenced by changes in political and economic conditions. The fourth principle urges for an examination of the significance of *formal and informal mechanisms* during state socialism and their persistent, weakened and fading character in post-communist societies. The last principle of *localism* asks to pay greater attention to micro-mechanisms in relation to macro processes of post-communist transformation, in which micro-mechanisms are equated to processes in local communities while macro-mechanism take place on the national level. According to Kubik, local communities tend to grasp and engage with the transformation at different speeds in contrast to the national level, which ‘may influence, derail, or even halt macro changes.’¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Kubik, “Contextual Holism,” 45.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 49–51.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Such a conceptual framework to approach post-communist transformation processes correlates with concepts from other disciplines, which do not have a long-standing tradition in post-communist transformation research. I put forward four of Kubik's principles: *relationism*, *history*, *constructivism*, and *localism*, as a point of venture to form an interdisciplinary conceptual framework for this study. Drawing on conceptual considerations from the disciplines of history and border studies, I seek to analyse the social dimension of post-communist transformation on three levels: spatial (local vs national), temporal (multiple layers of temporalities) and the level of historical actors (historical locals, ordinary people who experienced the post-communist transformation). The principles of *localism* and *history* are addressed in spatial and temporal considerations of the transformation processes by focusing on the role of L'viv as a city embedded in a borderland, and the changing nature of transformation in itself. *Relationism*, *constructivism* and *localism* become important when attending to the role of the historical actors.

2.2.1 Spatial and Temporal Considerations of Post-Communist L'viv

Ukraine as an independent state emerged in the year 1991 on the world map. This year did not only officially mark the end of communist Ukraine but also the beginning of an independent Ukrainian state. For the first time in its history, Ukraine had internationally recognised state borders, that marked its political territory. Spatially, this research deals with these new state borders that emerged in 1991 but zooms in on the city of L'viv in the western Ukrainian border region. Temporally, this research concentrates on the seven years leading up to and during Soviet independence, beginning with the events in 1989 and ending in the year 1995. Considering this spatial and temporal frame through the disciplinary lenses of history and border studies, it seems impossible to conceptualize them separately. The spatial dimension is inherently connected to the temporal and vice versa. The spatial role of L'viv, as a borderland city in the west of Ukraine, requires dealing with time at two scales. First, to look at the transformation period as *time passing*, as a process that is in a constant state of evolvement and change, and second, to consider the *passed time* of L'viv, that is the multiple layers of temporality attached to a borderland city, as an impacting feature of the transformation. In the following I will delineate this conceptual framework in detail.

Contemporary Ukraine borders seven independent countries and one de-facto state: Russia to its East, Belarus to its North, Moldavia and Transnistria (de-facto state that is militarily controlled by Russia) to its South, Romania to its borders in the South-West, and Hungary, Slovakia and Poland to its West. Officially, independent Ukraine consists of four macro-

regions: East, West, Central and South, with twenty-four *oblasti* (administrative subdivisions), the Autonomous Republic in Crimea and the cities Kyiv and Sevastopol', that each hold their own jurisdiction. These territorial-administrative units neither mark the historical nor the ethnical boundaries of Ukraine but are inherited by the Soviet demarcation system.¹¹⁶ One example in which the historical borders do not correspond to the contemporary administrative units are the historical borders of the Austro-Hungarian territories (Galicia, Transcarpathia, Bukovina) in the West of Ukraine, that existed until 1918. As shown in Map 1, the historical borders of these territories in Western Ukraine (blue lines) and the contemporary administrative units (white lines) do not overlap evenly. The territories of the *oblasti* Ternopil and Chernivtsi extend the former historical region.¹¹⁷ During communism, the Soviet government introduced a, what the historian Orest Subtelny called, 'pseudo-federal' system, in which administrative units (*oblasti*) were introduced into Soviet republics to create a sense of self-governing and peaceful coexistence of multiple nationalities, while the real power and decision-making processes remained in Moscow.¹¹⁸ Moreover, in the case of Ukraine, the system was implemented gradually, since the territory of Ukraine was incorporated over time into the Soviet Union, implying that also the individual administrative units were created and added bit by bit, adding to the level of arbitrariness. Only the central, eastern and southern territories of contemporary Ukraine became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1922. The rest of the country was incorporated following the events of the Second World War: in the interwar period the Second Polish Republic encompassed the contemporary territories of the *oblasti* Lutsk, Rivne, L'viv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk until 1939. In the years following, these regions were occupied by the Soviet Union until 1941 and by National Socialist Germany from 1941–1944. After the defeat of National Socialist Germany, these regions were again under Soviet rule as part of the Ukrainian SSR. Contemporary Chernivtsi, as well as the southern part of modern Odesa oblast were part of Romania in the interwar period until the territories were incorporated into the USSR in 1944.¹¹⁹ The territory of current Uzhgorod oblast formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary until the empire's dissolution in 1918, then became part of Czechoslovakia until 1938, lived through a short period as independent Republic of Carpatho-

¹¹⁶ Sasse, "Regionalism," 101.

¹¹⁷ Even though the administrative territory of the Chernivtsi oblast does not match the borders of the former historical region of East Galicia, it corresponds to the political boundaries that were part of Romania in the interwar period.

¹¹⁸ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (University of Toronto Press, 2009), 386.

¹¹⁹ Władysław Serczyk, "Die sowjetische und die polnische Ukraine zwischen den Weltkriegen," in Frank Golczewski, ed., *Geschichte der Ukraine* (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1993), 202–223, 202; Sasse, "Regionalism," 83.

Ukraine (1938–1939) until it was handed over to Hungary after Nazi Germany’s occupation. In 1945, the territory was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR under the name Uzhgorod oblast.¹²⁰

The city L’viv is the capital city of L’viv oblast bordering Poland, located in the macro-region western Ukraine, which officially consists of seven *oblasti* (administrative subdivisions) (see Map 1): Lutsk, Rivne, L’viv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Uzhgorod and Chernivtsi. During communism, the border between Poland and L’viv was a sealed, without any relations between the local authorities.¹²¹ With Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the state of the border would change, and Ukraine’s border in the West opened. Post-communist Poland was the first country to officially recognise the new state borders of its neighbour in the East, and the first country to sign mutual cooperation treaties with Ukraine in May 1992,¹²² which was shortly after followed by Hungary, and Canada, which had a large Ukrainian diaspora community.¹²³ The border territories of Western Ukraine turned from a ‘hermetically sealed and an exceptionally well-guarded frontier’¹²⁴ into a place of economic, political and cultural cooperation, a state which lasted until Poland’s and Hungary’s admission to the European Union in 2004.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ Andreas Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (C.H.Beck Paperback, 2009), 213–214.


¹²¹ Roman Szul, “Poland and Ukraine against the background of changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,” in Andrzej Jakubowski, Andrzej Miszczuk, Bogdan Kawałko, Tomasz Komornicki, Roman Szul (eds.), *The EU’s New Borderland: Cross-Border Relations and Regional Development* (Routledge, 2017), 6–57, 22.

¹²² Katarzyna Stokłosa, “Neighborhood relations on the Polish borders: the example of the Polish–German, Polish–Ukrainian and Polish–Russian border regions,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 27 (3) (2012): 245–255. 248.

¹²³ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 583.

¹²⁴ Stokłosa, “Neighborhood,” 246.

¹²⁵ Poland became a member state candidate for the EU in 1998 and joined the EU in 2004. Since then, Poland has become Europe’s fortress. For a detailed description of how the EU enlargement affected the Polish–Ukrainian relationship, see Karolina Szmagańska-Follis, *Building Fortress Europe: The Polish–Ukrainian Frontier* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).



Map 1 Contemporary Ukraine and a historical map of Ukraine from the 19th century: The division into contemporary oblasti (white lines) and the historical territory (blue lines) of Austria-Hungary (Galicia, Transcarpathia, Bukovina) in the West and the tsarist Russian territory to its East. (Copyright: Interactive Map from *Region, Nation and Beyond: Region, Nation and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconsideration of Ukraine*, University of St. Gallen, 2022).

In this study L'viv is considered a borderland city. Borderlands are peripheries on the one hand, 'as they mark the outskirts of a state and its sovereignty' and function as 'strategically and militarily essential' frontiers towards neighbouring countries, on the other hand.¹²⁶ But in processes of historical contextualisation of borders, border scholars have demonstrated that borderlands not only have a spatial and social dimension, but also a temporal.¹²⁷ L'viv, as a borderland city, was the centre of different political entities, whose borders were '(re-)negotiated and (re-)drawn'¹²⁸, every time the political hegemony shifted. In the 13th and 14th century, L'viv was the capital of the Galician-Volhynian principality. From the 14th to the 18th century L'viv belonged to the Kingdom of Poland, which was later incorporated into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under the Partition of Poland in 1772, L'viv was for almost 150 years annexed by the Habsburg Empire (later the Austro-Hungarian Double Monarchy), as capital

¹²⁶ Von Löwis, "Post-Soviet Borders. A Kaleidoscope of Shifting Lives and Lands. An Introduction," in Sabine von Löwis and Beate Eschment, eds., *Post-Soviet Borders. A Kaleidoscope of Shifting Lives and Lands* (Routledge, 2023), 1–8, 1.

¹²⁷ Carolin Leutloff-Grandits, "Die zeitlichen Dimensionen von Grenzen und Grenzüberquerungen," in *Grenzforschung. Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, ed. Dominik Gerst, Maria Klessmann, and Hannes Krämer (Nomos, 2021), 419–435, 419.

¹²⁸ Zhurzhenko, "Borders and Memory," 78.

of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (see Map 2). With the dissolution of empires on the European continent at the end of the First World War, L'viv was at the centre of a short-lived episode of Ukrainian independence, as the capital city of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in Galicia (1918–1919). Such an attempt for independence was internationally not recognised by the Entente powers.¹²⁹ As a result, under the Treaty of Riga in 1921, the Western regions of contemporary Ukraine, Galicia and Western Volhynia, including L'viv, became part of Second Polish Republic until 1939. During the Second World War, L'viv was, as part of the invasion of the Second Polish Republic, temporarily occupied by the Soviet Union (1939–1941) and by National Socialist Germany (1941–1944). After the war, L'viv's political affiliation changed again. Following Poland's westward movement according to the Curzon Line, East Galicia and Western Volhynia were merged into the Soviet Union as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.¹³⁰ The Ukrainian SSR was split into *oblasti*, and the city of L'viv became the capital of L'viv *oblast*.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 378.

¹³⁰ Dávid Karácsonyi, Károly Kocsis, Katalin Kovály, József Molnár, and László Póti. 2014, "East-West Dichotomy and Political Conflict in Ukraine - Was Huntington Right?" *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 63 (2), 99–134, 109.

¹³¹ For a detailed historical contextualisation of L'viv during the 20th century, see Tarik Cyril Amar, *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv. A Borderland City between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists* (Cornell University Press, 2015). For a stronger focus on L'viv during the interwar period and German occupation see, Christoph Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City* (Purdue University Press, 2016).



Map 2 The state borders of Galicia from 1772 to 1918 and contemporary state borders of Poland and Ukraine (Copyright: Paul Robert Magocsi and Christopher Hann; map from preface of Magocsi, Paul Robert and Hann, Christopher (eds), *Galicia: A Multicultural Land* (2009)).

These territorial changes in the past have left traces in the post-communist world, that with the dissolution of state socialism gained, again, significance.¹³² While during communism, Soviet citizens were encouraged to regard the Soviet Union as their *sovetskaia rodina* (homeland) and were homogenized under the term *sovetskii narod* (Soviet people),¹³³ debates on regional divergence re-emerged in post-communist Ukraine.¹³⁴ So, in the context of post-communist transformation, L'viv needs to be perceived as borderland city. A borderland city is a place inhabited by people who hold some degree of agency over the city's territory and political

¹³² Vladimir Kolosov, "Phantom borders: the role in territorial identity and the impact on society," *Belgeo* 2 (2020), <https://journals.openedition.org/belgeo/38812#quotation>. See, Daphne Berdahl, *Where the World Ended: Re-unification and Identity in the German Borderland* (University of California Press, 1999); Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna (ed.), *Living (with) Borders: Identity Discourses on East-West Border in Europe* (Ashgate, 2002); Hannes Grandits, Béatrice von Hirschhausen, Claudia Kraft, Dietmar Müller, and Thomas Serrier, "Phantomgrenzen im Östlichen Europa. Eine Wissenschaftliche Positionierung," in *Phantomgrenzen. Räume und Akteure in der Zeit neu Denken*, ed. Béatrice von Hirschhausen, Hannes Grandits, Claudia Kraft, Dietmar Müller, and Thomas Serrier (Wallstein Verlag, 2015), 13–56.

¹³³ Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, Edward Allworth, "Post-Colonialism and Borderland Identities," in *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, ed. Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, Edward Allworth (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–20, 6–7.

¹³⁴ Sasse, "Regionalism," 101.

administration,¹³⁵ a place of multiple, overlapping and hybrid identities,¹³⁶ in which notions of history and historical memory, symbols and myths persist.¹³⁷ Such an understanding of L'viv as part of a borderland, requires a dynamic conceptualisation of its spatial and temporal dimensions regarding the post-communist transformation.

Against the background of Kubik's principles of *localism* and *history*, telling the story of transformation from the viewpoint of L'viv is considered to provide a local perspective on the transformation embedded in its own socio-historic context. As part of a borderland, L'viv is also a '[zone] of mixture, contact and conflict, [that has its] own geographies that distinguish them from their states.'¹³⁸ Hence, L'viv needs to be considered both, as a *borderland city* in transformation and as *part of a state* in transformation. This means that the mental maps emerging from post-communist L'viv need to be, first, contextualised in their historical, socio-economic environment as part of the borderland (*passed time*). And second, considering that the word 'transformation' in itself suggests a constant state of change (*time passing*), this also means that the mental maps are subject to changes throughout time.

To summarise, based on the administrative changes Ukraine's contemporary regions have undergone over the last 700 years, in the analytical chapters of this study, I will refer to Ukraine and its region from different moments in time, as they are referred to today, while acknowledging the complex and layered past that has shaped post-communist independent Ukraine, and especially L'viv as a city located in the borderland. For example, I will refer to L'viv's region during the Second World War, as western Ukraine, instead of detailing its temporal administrative status under the occupation of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This has the purpose to simplify the complex nature of the historical affiliations the city and its region had in the past and help to provide clarity when discussing L'viv's place within the broader narrative of Ukrainian history.

¹³⁵ Dominik Gerst and Hannes Krämer, "Methodologie der Grenzforschung," in *Grenzforschung. Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, ed. Dominik Gerst, Maria Klessmann, and Hannes Krämer (Nomos, 2021), 121–140.

¹³⁶ Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera. The New Mestiza* (Aunt Lute, 1987).

¹³⁷ Zhurzhenko, "Borders and Memory," 87–90, 93; Daphne Berdahl, *Where the world ended: Re-unification and identity in the German borderland* (University of California Press, 1999).

¹³⁸ Luiza Bialasiewicz and John O'Loughlin, "Re-ordering Europe's eastern frontier: galician identities and political cartographies on the Polish-Ukrainian border," *Boundaries and place: European borderlands in geographical context* (2002): 217–38.

2.2.2 The Role of the Historical Actor: Young Borderland Inhabitants from L'viv

This dissertation centralizes the perspectives of young borderland inhabitants from L'viv. They are of interest because they represent the younger generation, that came of age during the shift from communism to post-communism. Drawing from what scholar Raili Nugin has argued in the context of the experience of children in Estonia in the 1990s, in which parents experienced the transformation period as a 'political rupture' in contrast to children who experienced it as a 'period of transformation,'¹³⁹ turns the factor of age into a social category that is relevant to consider for an assessment of the social dimension in transformation research. I centralize the perceptions of the youth in Ukraine, to give voice to how they have experienced the transformation from communism to post-communism. It can be argued that the young borderland inhabitants in L'viv also may have experienced the transformation as a continuing process. In Ukraine, already in the 1980s, at a time when the young borderlanders from L'viv were still growing up, a new atmosphere of change swept through the country. This atmosphere was the result of the Gorbachev era but particular because of the Chernobyl disaster that happened in 1986, which to Ukrainian society represented an even greater threat than the oppressive communist regime. This accident 'forced people to stop fearing.'¹⁴⁰ The youth in the 1980s began to feel confident to act publicly against the communist rule and produce written material to express their opinions, beliefs, and thoughts. This unfolded in the (re)formation of numerous youth groups across Ukraine during this period. Therefore, the young borderland inhabitants from L'viv formed their understanding of the world at a time, when society in Ukraine was already moving away from their strict adherence to communist structures.

Bottom-up movements became a driving force for independence. Young Ukrainians, such as students and graduates, became politically active all over the country. They participated in the formation of new organisations, held public gatherings, founded youth-led newspapers and reincarnated local histories through cultural activities. In Kyiv an unofficial organisation under the name *Hromada* was formed in spring of 1988 with the aim to 'broaden opposition circles beyond the elder generation of former-political prisoners.'¹⁴¹ In Kharkiv the Union of Ukrainian Youth was established in July 1989, as an alternative to the All-Union Leninist

¹³⁹ Raili Nugin, as cited in Kind-Kovács and Venken, "Childhood," 164.

¹⁴⁰ Kenney, *Carnival*, 124.

¹⁴¹ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 74–75.

Communist League of Youth, which was under the control of the communist party. This was followed by the L'viv Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (UIUY) in August 1989, by the Kyiv branch in September and the Ternopil branch in October that same year.

In L'viv the emergence of alternative youth organisations was especially striking in the late 1980s. Several youth organisations re-emerged, repositioned themselves or were newly formed.¹⁴² Traditional organisations such as the scout club *Plast* – which already existed in pre-war western Ukraine but was banned in the Soviet Union – formally remerged in 1989; the once communist conformist L'viv branch of the *Komsomol*, formally broke its ties with the Communist Party Union and transformed into the *Democratic Youth Union of L'viv* in 1990, a process which drained its memberships to only 22.000 members.¹⁴³ New youth organisations such as the Student Brotherhood and *Tovarystvo Leva*, or Lion Society, were formally established in 1989 and 1987. The Brotherhood initially aimed at supporting the development of the students' national consciousness and democratic thinking but quickly evolved into a radical political movement, that advocated for the incorporation of religious holidays and national symbols, called for the shutdown of nuclear power stations and sought repercussions for those deemed responsible for the Chornobyl disaster.¹⁴⁴ In December 1989, the Student Brotherhood even initiated a protest at the L'viv Polytechnic University that was accompanied by a student strike with the goal to abolish state exams in the social sciences, which according to them was built on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁴⁵ The Lion Society's main goal at the beginning of its formation was to preserve national heritage in Ukraine, such as the famous Lychakiv cemetery, and the organisation of cultural events.¹⁴⁶ However, over time, the group turned into a significant political actor, by organising concerts with politically active bands¹⁴⁷, political rallies¹⁴⁸ and through the publications of a monthly *samizdat* gazette named *Postup*, later *Post-Postup*, propagated their political beliefs and opinions.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴² K. I. Levchuk and L. M. Spiridonova "Development of youth organizations of Ukraine under the influence of socio-political transformations (1985–2000)," *Colloquium-Journal* 31 (83) (2020): 14–16.

¹⁴³ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 148.

¹⁴⁴ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 146.

¹⁴⁵ Levchuk and Spiridonova, "Development," 16.

¹⁴⁶ Muravskiy, 'L'viv Informal Youth Organisations.'

¹⁴⁷ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 93.

¹⁴⁸ Muravskiy, 'L'viv Informal Youth Organisations', 365.

¹⁴⁹ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 78. A samizdat, or 'self-publishing' newspaper is an unofficial newspaper that is illegally produced and distributed. Samizdat newspapers were often used to disseminate information that was censored or suppressed by the government. They were also used to promote political dissent and to mobilize opposition to the government. See Friederike Kind-Kovács and Jessie Labov, 'Samizdat and Tamizdat. Entangled Phenomena?,' in *Samizdat, Tamizdat, and beyond: Transnational Media during and after Socialism*, ed. Friederike Kind-Kovács and Jessie Labov (Berghahn Books, 2013), 1–23.

In October 1990, one of the most significant political activities of the youth unfolded. Member of the Student Brotherhood in L'viv and of Kyiv's Ukrainian Students' Union initiated a hunger strike on the Maidan (central place) in Kyiv from 2 to 17 of October 1990. Reasons for the more than two-weeks long demonstration were rising tensions regarding domestic political issues and decisions regarding the union's future impact on Ukraine.¹⁵⁰ The protesters demanded 'the resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine Vitaliy Masol, early elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ukraine's refusal to sign the Union Treaty, nationalization of Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Komsomol's property, return to Ukraine of young men who served in the military abroad.'¹⁵¹ Around 150 students participated in the protests, and several hundred other citizens joined from different cities in Ukraine to show their solidarity with the students. The student hunger strike was accompanied by several protests across the country, and thousands of new people joining in every day in Kyiv. The Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko in an interview with scholar Georges Mink (conducted between 2016 and 2018) described the protests followingly:

There were one hundred and fifty people laying there on a hunger strike along with the security and medical staff who were just staying there. The security was on the watch out for provocations, for example, so nobody would bring vodka and start drinking. Well, I was there only for one day, as part of the group of young writers that came there for a day with banners saying 'Ukrainian writers express their solidarity with Ukrainian students'. [...] Different people came there. Eventually a lot of people gathered there and on Maidans this is the key thing – the quantity of people, and they begin their attempts of repressions... But the crowd got so big that it was technically impossible.¹⁵²

After more than two weeks of protests, factory workers from the pro-communist company 'Arsenal' dropped their work and joined the protestors, which eventually forced the communist leadership to give in to the students' demands. The communist regime removed Vitaliy Masol from his political position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, and was replaced by Vitold Fokin in the same year; a referendum to assess public confidence in the parliament was planned; a commission to elaborate nationalization of the Party's and Komsomol's property; commitment was articulated to ensure that Ukrainian soldiers would not be mandated to serve outside of Ukraine and lastly, a pledge was made to defer the signing the Union treaty until the adoption of a new republican constitution.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Levchuk and Spiridonova, "Development," 17.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Interview with Oksana Zabuzhko, in Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity*, (Ibidem Verlag, 2019), 450.

¹⁵³ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 314.

But why did young people in Western Ukraine turn politically active in the late 1980s? The reasons for that are manifold but three are especially striking. First, the Soviet economy was in a state of stagnation, and there was a growing sense that the system was no longer capable of meeting the needs of its people. Young Ukrainians were increasingly frustrated with the social consequences of the Union's economic decline. With Gorbachev's reforms of glasnost and perestroika in 1985, a space for political dissent and debates was created, with a new understanding of nationality.¹⁵⁴ Young Ukrainians began to test the boundaries of the new freedoms and opportunities unravelling in front of them.

Second, the Chornobyl disaster did interrupt the political order of the Ukrainian society and of the Soviet Union as a whole. In April 1986, a reactor at a nuclear plant in the city Chornobyl exploded and released a huge cloud of radioactive material that spread throughout the North-Eastern parts of Europe. Initially, the Soviet government tried dismissing any information about the catastrophe, but later, considering the unfolding catastrophic consequences, with more than 135.000 people forced to leave their homes, had to admit to the catastrophe and seek help from international governments to get control of the situation.¹⁵⁵ In the aftermath of the disaster, demonstrations throughout Central Europe took place, people in Poland and Czechoslovakia began to speak up about environmental issues, and against Soviet propaganda events that caused environmental damages, such as a prominent auto race planned by the Soviet government in the Moravian forests.¹⁵⁶ The accident forced Soviet citizens to rethink to what extent Moscow would hold control over decisions that affect the territory of their respective Soviet republics.¹⁵⁷ Apart from the dramatic environmental, health and social consequences Ukrainian citizens faced following the Chornobyl disaster, the accident also brought forth boiling resentment towards the communist elite. Subtelny argues, that the construction of the nuclear plant on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, and especially the circumstance that it was built in close proximity to Kyiv, was a decision forced on Ukraine by the central committee in Moscow, and that this perception stuck with the public in the Ukrainian SSR. So, after the accident occurred in 1986, Ukraine's citizens sought to blame the Soviet system and communist government for the devastation, implying that such a catastrophe could have been avoided on Ukrainian soil if the plant had not been constructed in the first

¹⁵⁴ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 64.

¹⁵⁵ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 334.

¹⁵⁶ Kenney, *Carnival*, 78-79.

¹⁵⁷ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 60.

place.¹⁵⁸ Similar to Subtelny does Nahaylo portray the reaction of Ukrainian society following the Chornobyl disaster. Nahaylo notes that especially Ukrainian writers, such as Oles Honchar and Ivan Drach, began to speak up about the nuclear catastrophe by directly blaming the CPU leadership for the disaster, as at the Ninth Congress of the Writers Union of Ukraine in June 1986. The same writers and others later formed an unofficial ecological organisation, the ‘Green World’, shortly before the communist leadership in Moscow had announced to reinstate reactors and the Chornobyl plant as well as continue with the expansion of nuclear energy in Ukraine.¹⁵⁹ So, while the nuclear disaster in Ukraine ‘first traumatized the population’ it also later ‘galvanized it.’¹⁶⁰

A third significant factor contributing to the rise of youth activism in L’viv during the late 1980s was the cross-border connections established between young Ukrainians and their counterparts in neighbouring and other Soviet countries, particularly Poland and the Baltics. As political scientist Orest Zajcew has outlined in his thesis on the democratic party Rukh, a democratic movement that turned into a political opposition party to the communists in 1989, these interactions served not only as a source of inspiration but also as a means of practical guidance and support for Ukrainian activists seeking to emulate the success of their Baltic counterparts. One notably example of this cross-border engagement occurred in the summer of 1989, when Ivan Drach, the future leader of Rukh, met with members of the Baltic popular fronts, including Latvian poet Janis Peters and Lithuanian poet Al’himantas Baltakay. During this meeting, Drach received valuable insights into the organisational strategies and tactics employed by the Baltic fronts, particularly the role played by writers and artists in mobilizing public support for democratic change. This information was subsequently disseminated among the young thinkers in L’viv, further incentivising their activism.¹⁶¹

By 1988, just three years after the introduction of glasnost and perestroika, all three Baltic countries had already established independent popular fronts – the Lithuanian *Sąjūdis*, the Estonian *Rahvarinne*, and the Latvian *Tautas fronte* – in contrast to Ukraine’s Rukh, which only began to organise in 1989. The Baltic fronts emerged as strong democratic forces challenging the prevailing communist narratives by emphasizing the importance of national languages and

¹⁵⁸ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 334.

¹⁵⁹ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 67, 97.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹⁶¹ Orest Wasyl Zajcew, *Rukh: The Social Construction of Protest 1988–1992*, PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1998, 156, 173.

histories. Membership numbers of these fronts surpassed those of the communist parties in each country. With at least 100,000 members in each front, they gained significant political influence, even before the first official democratic elections in 1990 in the Baltics. The success of the Baltic popular fronts and the cross-border interactions between young Ukrainians and their Baltic counterparts increased the mobilization of youth activism in L'viv. These exchanges enabled a sense of shared purpose and provided a foundation for action, inspiring Ukrainian youth to engage in their own struggle for democracy and national self-determination.¹⁶²

Generally, it seemed it was easier for young Ukrainian citizens to establish contact with like-minded people in the Baltics, than it was with people right across the border, such as in Poland or Hungary. The state border between Poland and Ukraine, for example, was very well guarded, and leaving the Soviet Union required an extra passport for international travels, even though a border agreement signed between Poland and the USSR in 1987 to regulate border crossing for borderland inhabitants.¹⁶³ Travelling to other Soviet republics such as the Baltics, was easier, as a former student from L'viv and leader of the Student Brotherhood, Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, revealed in an interview with scholar Olesya Yaremchuk (conducted between 2016 and 2018): 'I travelled mostly on the territory of the Soviet Union. If there was a meeting with the Poles, it was held in the Baltic states. It was easier for them to get there, and for us too. To gain a foreign passport at that time it was almost impossible.'¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the Solidarność movement in Poland and Fidesz, the Alliance of Young Democrats, in Hungary, remained a huge influence for the structure of the individual organisations in L'viv. Zajcew, who held several interviews with former Rukh leaders, for example noted, that Rukh turned from a democratic movement into a political party 'following in the footsteps of other movement organisation in other places, such as *Sąjūdis* in Lithuania and Solidarność in Poland.'¹⁶⁵ Former L'viv student Markiyan Ivashchyshyn confirmed the inspiration sparking from independence movements of Ukraine's western neighbours:

For the hunger strike specifically, we already had the experience of the Polish Solidarity movement and their students. We had a close contact with the Hungarian organisation Fidesz, which then grew into a liberal party and won elections. It was a model for us. Poland also helped us a lot.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Hackmann, "Baltic national movements, 1986-1992. Origins, trajectories, agendas," *Studies on National Movements* 6 (2020): 1–26, 12–13.

¹⁶³ Stokłosa, "Conflict and Co-operation: Poland's Border Regions in the Cold War and After," *Austrian Journal of Political Science* 42 (1) (2013): 65–81, 71.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 87.

¹⁶⁵ Zajcew, *Rukh*, 301.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 87.

And also Yaroslav Hrytsak, prominent Ukrainian historian and former member of the Lion Society, confirmed in an interview taken in 2014 that by 1988, members of the Lion Society ‘already knew a lot about Polish Solidarity.’¹⁶⁷

Direct contact between young western Ukrainians and young people from across the western border – even though not impossible – was however more complicated. A few occurrences have been noted by Kenney who explained how the first Polish students from Lublin visited Kyiv in 1986 and in L’viv in 1987. Kenney mentions how the Polish and Ukrainian students exchanged remarks about political change, and that ‘these students [from Poland] would become an outlet for L’viv students to communicate with the West’ but how and to what extent, remains unclear in his argumentation.¹⁶⁸ From a fragment of a speech of a former member of the Lion Society, Yuriy Voloshchak, cited much later in Kenney’s book, we can conclude that young Polish citizens indeed were able to occasionally visit L’viv and interact with their peers. In the fragment Voloshchak explains how he has met Polish girls in the city centre of L’viv and informed them about some of the activities of the Lion Society: ‘Today in the city I met some girls from Poland. I told them about how the Lion Society is taking care of the graves of Polish cultural figures in the Lychakiv cemetery here in L’viv. I asked that they do the same for the neglected graves of well-known Ukrainian cultural figures in Krakow or Przemyśl.’¹⁶⁹ More insights about border crossings between Soviet Ukraine and communist Poland can be found in Zbigniew Wojnowski’s paper on cross-border travel to Soviet Western Ukraine. Even though he does not provide any personal details about the people that crossed the border, Wojnowski demonstrates how cross-border travelling between Western Ukraine and Poland increased under Khrushchev’s Thaw and continued to grow until the 1980s: ‘For example, eight buses of friendship travelled between L’viv and Rzeszow every year.’¹⁷⁰ Both, Poles and Ukrainians were involved in illegal activities of smuggling goods across the border, which turned out to be a great problem in the 1970s. Furthermore, in the late 1970s and early 1980s Polish citizens began to visit western Ukraine, and especially the city of L’viv, on their own, without organised tourist groups. On the basis of official Soviet reports, Wojnowski identified how in early 1981 more than 110.000 Polish citizens went on a transit train to the Chernivtsi oblast, of which

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Yaroslav Hrytsak, *The Ukrainians* (April 2024), <https://theukrainians.org/yaroslav-hrytsak/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

¹⁶⁸ Kenney, *Carnival*, 125.

¹⁶⁹ As cited in Kenney, *Carnival*, 232.

¹⁷⁰ Zbigniew Wojnowski, “An Unlikely Bulwark of Sovietness: Cross-Border Travel and Soviet Patriotism in Western Ukraine, 1956–1985,” *Nationalities Papers* 43 (1) (2015): 82–101, 89.

3.575 overstayed their transit visas, with many of them making up excuses to be able to visit the city of L'viv. Following the Solidarność protests in Poland in the early 1980s, Soviet authorities became increasingly concerned about smuggling goods containing 'anti-Soviet' content, such as non-Soviet literature. And by 1981, the KGB implemented special procedures to stop Polish tourists to enter L'viv, for example, by deploying additional guards to make sure Polish citizens would not leave the Warsaw-Bucharest train.¹⁷¹ Based on this one could assume that the growing illegal activities performed by Polish and Ukrainian citizens in the borderland and with that the greater restrictions put on travellers, made it more complicated for ordinary young people to engage with their neighbouring peers on Soviet Ukrainian territory or across the border. It was however not impossible. The young people found other ways to meet their like-minded peers, as by travelling to countries easier accessible for everyone: the Baltics.

Despite a limited physical connection between western Ukrainians and their peers in the West, western Ukrainians were still able to consume news about political events happening across the Iron Curtain. One mean was Western radio stations, such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a radio station that was founded at the beginning of the Cold war and aimed to broadcast news from the world beyond the Iron Curtain.¹⁷² It was for the first time broadcasted into Soviet Ukraine on 16 August 1954.¹⁷³ A former student from L'viv and head of the faculty Komsomol in Kyiv, Mykola Kniazhytskyi, recalled in an interview (conducted between 2016 and 2018) with scholar Paweł Pieniążek, how he, as many other people in L'viv, listened to Radio Liberty growing up and how it impacted their perception of space:

Well, first of all, my father used to listen to Western radio stations all the time. A lot of people did that, I guess. We listened to Ukrainian Freedom, and Russian Freedom, the BBC and The Voice of America. The Ukrainian and Russian emigres who would be on those radio stations and they were like celebrities to us. So obviously we lived in some kind of inner migration, even then. A lot of people did back then. I'm not sure about the rest of the country, but the people in L'viv lived like that.¹⁷⁴

It is undeniable, that Ukraine's youth in the western regions were active participants during the early years of the post-communist transformation in Ukraine, but only rarely have their

¹⁷¹ Wojnowski, "An Unlikely Bulkmark, 2014," 93–98.

¹⁷² Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <https://www.rferl.org/>.

¹⁷³ Kyiv Post, "68 Years Ago Today – First Radio Liberty Broadcast to Ukraine," *Kyiv Post* (16 August 2022, n.p., https://archive.kyivpost.com/us_1/68-years-ago-today-first-radio-liberty-broadcast-to-ukraine.html (last accessed 25.08.2024).

¹⁷⁴ An exception here is the publication of oral history interview by Paweł, Mink, and Iwona Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, that centralizes the perceptions and experiences of former students from western Ukraine, which are also part of this study.

experiences and perceptions been discussed in the academic realm.¹⁷⁵ Political scientist Taras Kuzio has offered a short paragraph in his book ‘Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence’ to the formation of youth groups during the late 1980s, however with little insights into their experiences and perspectives.¹⁷⁶ Similarly, historian Oleh Muravskiy has offered a brief analysis of the formation and activities of informal youth groups in Lviv during the late 1980, but also without paying attention to the perspectives of the youth.¹⁷⁷ His article examines how these informal youth groups, such as the Lion Society and the Student Brotherhood, emerged independently of party-state control and argues that they played a critical role in the socio-political transformation of Western Ukraine as the Soviet Union was collapsing. Muravskiy mentions how the Lion Society, among others, helped revive and promote Ukrainian cultural and historical traditions that had been suppressed under Soviet rule, and later gradually shifted their focus from cultural activities to political engagement. This became evident in their activities that opposed local authorities and in their participations in demonstrations calling for political and social reforms. Finally, Muravskiy concludes that the participation of these youth organizations in public political life was important in shaping the developing civil society in L’viv and the western Ukrainian regions.¹⁷⁸ Political scientists Olga Onuch and Nadia Diuk, who have greatly contributed to the research on the “Revolution of Granite” in 1990, have acknowledged the leading role students from L’viv played during the revolution in Kyiv, however their study focus remains within the framework of this event.¹⁷⁹ Diuk, for instance, in her book ‘The Next Generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan: Youth, Politics, Identity, and Change’¹⁸⁰ that studies youth movements in Ukraine, Russia and Azerbaijan, shows how youth movements in Ukraine were active agents in times of political crises, such as in 1990 or during the Orange Revolution of 2004. However, her research does not centralize the activities and perceptions of the youth in the western region, but rather contributes to the scholarship of nation-wide Ukrainian youth activism.

¹⁷⁵ The oral history interviews derives from the collection of interviews published in ‘Three Revolutions: Mobilizations and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolutions of Granite, Orange Revolutions and Revolutions of Dignity’ edited by Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt. The interviews were collected as part of a research project that aimed at understanding the Ukraine’s development since independence through the perspective of ‘three revolutions’, which were the Revolution of Granite in 1990, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013/2014.

¹⁷⁶ Kuzio, *Perestroika*.

¹⁷⁷ Oleh Muravskiy “‘Neformal’ni’ Molodizhni Orhanizatsii L’vova: Osoblyvosti Stvorennia, Napriamy Diial’nosti (1987–1990)” *Ukraina: kul’turna spadshchyna, natsional’na svidomist’, derzhavnist’* 27 (2015): 363–369.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 363–369.

¹⁷⁹ Diuk, “Youth.”; Onuch, *Mapping Mass Mobilizations*.

¹⁸⁰ Nadia Diuk, *The next generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan: Youth, politics, identity, and change* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

A rare historical analysis, written by Padraic Kenney in titled ‘Lviv’s Central European Renaissance, 1987–1990’, included the perspectives of the youth in the later 1980s and early 1990s.¹⁸¹ In this paper, Kenney focuses, among others, on the activities of the Lion Society, arguing that the group played a significant role in Ukraine’s transformation from communism to post-communism. He underlines their cultural activities, highlighting their revival of local traditions, such as organizing *subbotniks* (Saturday volunteer work) to restore Lviv’s historical landmarks, staging *vertepy* (a folk theatre procession with elaborately costumed figures), and hosting *Zelena Toloka* (Green Voluntary Work Day) to connect people with Ukrainian culture. In his descriptions of the Lion Society, he centralizes the perceptions of former members and other people associated with the youth groups, drawing from oral history interviews, he conducted with them, such as Ihor Koliushko or Orest Sheika, a Komsomol member and former student. Kenney’s articles gives insights into the activities of youth movements and their reasons of why they became politically active. According to Kenney, the Lion Society’s support for opposition parties and their newspaper *Postup* contributed to the country’s political transformation. Kenney specifically concludes, ‘Indeed, if we search for the path that has led Ukraine back to a place in Central Europe, we can begin with the Lion Society cleaning graves in Lychakiv Cemetery.’¹⁸²

In this study I put forward to consider the newspapers published by *Tovarystvo Leva* (Lion Society) and the *Komsomol/Democratic Union of Youth* as cultural products reminiscent of their time. What this implies is that the newspapers’ content, that was chosen by the young editors for publication, is reflective of their attitudes towards the new political and social atmosphere in L’viv from 1989 to 1995. For *Tovarystvo Leva* this is the case, because the newspaper *Postup* emerged out of a need for an independent newspaper that reflects the opinions of an evolving L’vivian youth embodied through *Tovarystvo Leva*. The editors make that clear in the text in their first issue of *Postup* published in April 1989 (see Source 1), in which they say

Many people know about us. Even more – have only heard. And rumours do not always go hand in hand with the truth. Sometimes we would like to express our thoughts not only in general, but also discuss certain issues with everyone together. Is this possible without our own printed publication? Therefore, the Lion Society is starting another form of its public activity – the information bulletin ‘*Postup*’. Frequency – arbitrary. Topics – everything related to the Society. To the happy hour!¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Kenney, “Lviv’s.”

¹⁸² Kenney, “Lviv’s,” 311.

¹⁸³ *Postup*, ‘Інформаційний вісник Товариства Лева’ (April 1989, no. 1): 1.



Source 1 Snippet from the top of the first page of the first issue of the newspaper *Postup* published in April 1989.¹⁸⁴

In the case of the Komsomol newspaper, the reflection of the editors' opinions and perception in the newspapers is reflected through the break of the L'viv Komsomol and its newspaper *Leninska Molod'* with the communist tradition, by rebranding the youth organisation to *Democratic Union of Youth* and the newspaper to *Moloda Halychyna* in 1990. The newspaper has been changed to *Moloda Halychyna* to formally cut ties with communist ideology, but also 'due to the new political conditions in the country' which emphasized 'the desire of young people to know different, alternative points of view on certain problems of the political and economic life of the state.'¹⁸⁵

Following Yndigegn's understanding that the border shapes people living at the border as much as they are shaped by the border,¹⁸⁶ I argue that by considering the youth newspapers as cultural products reflective of the young people's opinions and perceptions, I can reconstruct how the youth in L'viv were active agents in the borderland, who followed their own political and social agenda in a time of upheaval and change. Reconstructing the mental maps of the youth in L'viv from their newspapers, unravels what processes of the post-communist transformation were important for young people in local communities, and how the impact of these processes shifted, faded or evolved over time. From that we can draw conclusions on the

¹⁸⁴ Arkhiv samvydavu posla Pyatrasa Vaitiekunasa, read and received from <https://avr.org.ua/viewDoc/21475>. Copyright granted by the current head of the Lion Society Andriy Nechyporuk.

¹⁸⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Постанова' (April 1990, no. 40): 1.

¹⁸⁶ Yndigegn, "Between debordering and rebordering Europe: Cross-border cooperation in the Øresund region or the Danish-Swedish border region," *Eurasia Border Review* 2 (1): 47–59, 48.

consequences of post-communist transformation, that shape contemporary political, economic, social and cultural Ukraine.¹⁸⁷

2.3 Youth Mobilization in L'viv: *Komsomol/Democratic Youth Union of L'viv* and *Tovarystvo Leva*

2.3.1 From *Komsomol* to *Democratic Youth Union of L'viv*: The Transformation of a Youth Organization and its Newspaper

The major youth organisation in communist Ukraine and within the Soviet Union was the Komsomol. The Komsomol (short for Коммунистический Союз Молодёжи), officially named *All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth*, was the Soviet umbrella organisation under which all youth organisations within the Soviet Union were grouped together. The organisation represented the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was founded based on individual youth movements that emerged before and during the communist revolutionary assumption of power in 1917 throughout the Union's member states. The official date of its foundation was the First Congress of the Komsomol from 20 October to 4 November 1918 in Moscow. At the beginning of its formation the Komsomol counted a little more than 22.100 members between the age of 14 and 26.¹⁸⁸ It reached its maximum number of members from all around the Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1980s with around 40 million people until it was officially dissolved in 1991.¹⁸⁹ In Ukraine, by 1986, around 6.7 million young people were part of the Komsomol. The official name of the Ukrainian branch of the Komsomol was *Lenin's Communist Union of the Youth of Ukraine* (hereafter – LKSMU).¹⁹⁰

The Komsomol was an integral part of the Soviet education system. Its main function in Ukraine and in the Soviet Union was to form a youth according to Soviet ideology and to

¹⁸⁷ For an overview on the impact of the political and economic transformation on the social dimension, see Alberto Veira-Ramos, Tetiana Liubyva, Evgenii Golovakha, *Ukraine in Transformation. From Soviet Republic to European Society* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

¹⁸⁸ Merle Fainsod, "Zur Geschichte des Komsomol," *Ost-Probleme* 3(31) (August 1951): 937–951, 939.

¹⁸⁹ Amy Tikkannen, "Komsomol," 2009, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Komsomol>. Within the constraints of the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union, Komsomol membership was a prerequisite for career advancement. Consequently, the organization recorded forty million members by the 1980s. However, this substantial membership figure primarily reflects systemic pressures rather than genuine engagement. See, Jim Riordan, "The Komsomol," *Soviet Youth Culture*, ed. Jim Riordan (Palgrave Macmillan London, 1989) 16–44, 16.

¹⁹⁰ Valerii Vailiev, "Leninska komunistychna spilka molodi Ukrainy," *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* (2009), http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?Z21ID=&I21DBN=EIU&P21DBN=EIU&S21STN=1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=eiu_all&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=TRN=&S21COLORTERMS=0&S21STR=L_eninska_komunistichna_spilka_molodi (last accessed 25.08.2024).

prepare its members for a potential future profession in the communist party. In theory, their members were guided by the ideology of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, trained to choose collectivism over individualism and had to be self-disciplined, courageous, and physically active servants of the people, communist party, and the communist government.¹⁹¹ In practice, Soviet youth organisations such as the Komsomol ‘helped control the population’ and membership enabled access to ‘certain privileges’ and later ‘was a precondition for continuing to work in one’s profession.’¹⁹²

The structure of the Komsomol was similar to the one of the communist party, with a primary organisation at the lowest level (a minimum of three members), followed by a district or town committee, a regional committee, republic committee and a central committee that overlooked the whole organisation. The function of the Komsomol members was to receive training in various mental and physical activities, such as dancing, swimming, skiing, or playing chess, to be prepared for military service and, as a political organisation, propagate the communist ideology and the communist party programme towards other members of society.¹⁹³ During the Second World War, millions of Komsomol members fought at the front against Nazi Germany or were active in underground and partisan movements. Following the war, more than 500.000 Komsomol members in the Ukrainian SSR became permanent workers in the industry economically rebuilding the union.¹⁹⁴ As a mainly political organisation, the Komsomol also published several newspapers and magazines. The All-Union newspaper published throughout the Soviet Union was the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and the Ukrainian Komsomol published additionally republic newspaper’s such as the Ukrainian-speaking *Youth of Ukraine* and the Russian-speaking *Komsomolskoye znamya*. Moreover, each oblast in Ukraine had its own publication.¹⁹⁵ In the western Ukrainian oblast L’viv, the City Committee of the LKSMU under the supervision of the L’viv Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine published its youth newspaper called *Leninska Molod’*. The newspaper was first released in 1940 and circulated until March 1990, when it continued issue publications under its new name *Moloda Halychyna*.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹¹ Karel Hulicka, “The Komsomol,” *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 4 (1962): 365–368.

¹⁹² Mick, *Lemberg*, 262.

¹⁹³ Hulicka, “The Komsomol,” 365–368.

¹⁹⁴ Vailyev, “Leninska.”

¹⁹⁵ Yevgeniy Borodin, “Youth Work in Ukraine: from Soviet model to international integration,” *The history of youth work in Europe* (2019), 175–190, 179.

¹⁹⁶ L. Syrota, “Hazeta *Leninska Molod’*: osoblyvosti problematyky publikatsii 1940–1941 rr,” *Zbirnyk prats Naukovo-doslidnoho instytutu presoznavstva* 1 (2011): 85–101.

The purpose of the newspaper in Western Ukraine was to increase attention to the communist ideology, inform about and invite to Soviet mass activities, print government programmes and party announcements as well as orders, showcase speeches of politicians and reprint article from other communist newspapers. However, the function of the newspaper could change depending on the socio-political situation. During the Second World War, for example, the focus of the newspaper was to support the idea of the Soviet system in Western Ukraine.¹⁹⁷ Since the end of the First World War, Western Ukraine had been the epicentre of Ukrainian nationalism and the fight for a Ukrainian independent state that propagated a negative reputation of the Soviet system. From 1918 to 1919 Western Ukraine even experienced a short episode of independence in Galicia as the West Ukrainian People's Republic, which did not gain international support at the time.¹⁹⁸ What would follow was the progressive integration of eastern Galicia (Galicia and Western Volhynia) into Poland in the interwar period and as a result of this, as well as in wake of the ever-growing fear of the influence of Soviet powers, Ukrainian nationalism grew stronger. In 1929 the individual nationalistic movements in Western Ukraine consolidated their forces and created the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).¹⁹⁹ The organisation functioned as the main driver for nationalistic tendencies with the main goal to fight for an independent Ukraine, even after the Second World War, when Western Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR. In order to achieve their goal, the OUN continuously changed political affiliations. During their struggle for independence, for example, they fought against the Polish bourgeoisie in Western Ukraine and against Nazi-Germany but also collaborated with the latter during the German occupation of Ukraine and participated in pogroms against the Jewish population and mass killings of Polish citizens. And after the Second World War the OUN sought help from the allies, mainly from the USA and Great Britain.²⁰⁰ Arguably, the only constant that remained throughout their struggle for state independence was their fight against the occupation of the Soviet Union. So, when by 1945 the territories of today's western Ukraine were completely incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, the Komsomol newspaper represented a useful mean for the communist elites to support the Sovietization of the nationalistic-oriented Western Ukrainian society. The strategy of the editors of *Leninska Molod'* included to give prominence to propaganda events, such as public holidays and parades, on the front page of the newspaper; to print 'Thank-You-

¹⁹⁷Syrota, "Hazeta," 85–87.

¹⁹⁸ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 378.

¹⁹⁹ Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939* (Schöningh 2010), 547.

²⁰⁰ Golczewski, "Geschichtsnarrative," 54.

Letters' from citizens to politicians; include articles about Eastern Soviet Ukraine and Eastern Ukrainians (who had been part of the Soviet Union since 1922); print interviews with Komsomol member that have recently joined and inform about the importance of quality-assurance before elections. But the newspaper also informed about more controversial topics, that were not necessarily in accordance with the ideology of the communist party. It reported on the economic situation of the USSR, including excessive money spending by individuals, publicly exposed company manager that did not implement new regulations or raised concerns about the work-overtime of labourers.²⁰¹

The late 1980s brought a new atmosphere to Soviet Ukraine and to its western oblast L'viv that would change the course of the Komsomol and its members, as well as its newspaper. The Komsomol entered a stage of crisis. Membership numbers continued to drop and alternative youth groups emerged all over the country.²⁰² In 1988, the Kyiv branch of the Komsomol, challenged the silence surrounding political developments in the Baltic republics by breaking the news of these events in its newspaper 'Youth of Ukraine', with a circulation of approximately 600.000 issues. This initiative reflected the growing awareness and desire for openness within the Ukrainian Komsomol, even while the broader Soviet press remained largely subdued on these matters.²⁰³ In L'viv, the Komsomol, whose membership was gradually diminishing due to the emergence of alternative youth organisations, underwent a symbolic transformation in April 1990 under the editorship of Mykhailo Batig, who headed the newspaper from 1985 to 1993 and who was deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from 1990 to 1994.²⁰⁴ On the plenary session of the L'viv Regional Komsomol Committee on 30-31 March 1990, the Komsomol members voted on a resolution that changed the name of the newspaper from *Leninska Molod'* to *Moloda Halychyna*, which was later followed by the name change of the L'viv Komsomol branch into 'Democratic Youth Union of L'viv'.²⁰⁵

This shift was not merely a cosmetic change but represented a significant departure from the communist ideology and a move towards democratic values. The new name of the youth

²⁰¹ Syrota, "Hazeta Lenins'ka Molod'," 90–93.

²⁰² Levchuk and Spiridonova, "Development," 15.

²⁰³ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence* (C. Hurst & Co, 1999), 152–153.

²⁰⁴ Yana Shekeryak, "Mykhailo Batih: "Zhurnalyst mozhe i povynen buty patriotom. Osoblyvo u suchasniy kryzovii sytuatsii," *Lysty do pryiateliv* (18 January 2019), <https://lysty.net.ua/batig/> (last accessed 20.04.2024).

²⁰⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'IV пленум Львівського обкому ЛКСМ України' (April 1990, no. 40): 1. The first newspaper issue with the new name at hand in this study is issue no. 40 from 3 April 1990, which was published three days following the resolution.

organisation included the word ‘democratic’ and mirrored the atmosphere of the time, which was still influenced by the semi-democratic parliamentary election that took place one month prior, in March 1990, which for the first time included an opposition party. Changing the name of the communist newspaper to *Moloda Halychyna* can be interpreted as a tribute to the local heritage and historical significance of the region, as it references the historical region of former Galicia (Halychyna). The editors explained how the name shift was reflective of the ‘new political conditions in the country’ and supposed to highlight the organisation’s commitment to promote and participate in ‘the national and cultural revival of the region.’²⁰⁶ These transformations within the Komsomol served as a manifestation of the growing dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime in the western Ukrainian borderland city and a desire for greater autonomy and self-determination. The *Democratic Youth Union of L’viv*, despite remaining structurally affiliated with the *Komsomol* until May 1991, had signalled its break with the communist ideology.²⁰⁷ The newspaper ended its publications in 2005.²⁰⁸

2.3.2 *Tovarystvo Leva*, *Postup* and *Post-Postup*: The Emergence of a Youth Union and its Newspaper

On 19 October 1987, the youth organisation *Tovarystvo Leva*, translating from Ukrainian into English to *Lion Society*, was official founded by university students, graduates, young artists and other young citizens in L’viv.²⁰⁹ The name suggests a reference to the city emblem of L’viv, a lion. The impetus for the formation of the Society was an article published in a Ukrainian newspaper that reported on the vandalism and the destruction of graveyards at the Lychakiv cemetery in L’viv. Following the article, public volunteers began to organise clean-up missions to the cemetery, out of which the Lion Society evolved.²¹⁰ The organisation consisted of students and graduates that were also in part Komsomol members and resided under the formal structures of the Komsomol. As Kenney has explained it in one whole chapter dedicated to the Lion Society in his book ‘A Carnival of Revolution’: ‘Each side needed the other. The Komsomol hoped to avoid the isolation that official organisations had already experienced in the Baltic republics. The Lion Society, in turn, needed an umbrella and funding for the

²⁰⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Постанов’ (April 1990, no. 40): 1.

²⁰⁷ Levchuk and Spiridonova, “Development,” 16–17.

²⁰⁸ M. V. Mishchenko, “*Moloda Halychyna*” *Encyclopedia of Modern Ukraine* (2019), <https://esu.com.ua/article-69003> (last accessed 20.08.2024).

²⁰⁹ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 77.

²¹⁰ Muravskyi “‘Neformal’ni’ Molodizhni Orhanizatsii L’vova,” 364.

concrete projects that it would pursue.²¹¹ Even though, the organisation was founded and headed by senior Komsomol members Orest Sheika, it acted independently of the Komsomol.

Initially, the main purpose of the organisation was the reintroduction of Ukrainian tradition and local histories into Ukrainian society as well as the preservation of local cultural heritage, such as the restoration of the historic Lychakiv cemetery in L'viv.²¹² The Lychakiv cemetery was opened in 1786 and held graveyards of mostly noble families.²¹³ In first half of the 20th century the cemetery turned into a military burial side for fallen soldiers of the Austrian arms, with Ukrainian and Polish soldiers who died during the fight for L'viv in 1918 as well as soldiers who fought for Ukraine's independence from 1918 to 1950, most notably the UPA (*Ukrajinska powstanska armija*) soldiers.²¹⁴ Other cultural activities included the revival of Ukrainian events, such as the winter carol tradition of *Vertep* during the Christmas days in January 1988, the traditional folk dance *Hayivky* during the Easter celebrations in 1989,²¹⁵ the documentation and preservation of traditional black pottery making, a vanishing Ukrainian artisanry, in the Havarechchyna, approximately 80 km east of L'viv,²¹⁶ or an ethno-folkloric and ecological expedition to the river Dniester during the summer of 1988.²¹⁷

Even though the Lion Society 'attempted to concentrate upon non-political issues',²¹⁸ a pure focus on cultural aspects of Ukrainian society seemed impossible during the times of turmoil in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. The historian Hrytsak, who became a member of the Lion Society early on and who contributed with his expertise in Ukrainian historiography to the society's newspaper, recalled in an interview how in 1988 the society under the leadership of Ihor Hryniv decided to shift its focus from cultural to more pressing political issues: 'The head of that Society was Ihor Hryniv, a man of very pragmatic intellect. [...] And then, in 88, he

²¹¹ Kenney, *Carnival*, 125. The Komsomol's strategy of supporting independent local youth organisations was not a new phenomenon. Already during Khrushchev's Thaw, the L'viv branch of the Komsomol supported the L'vivian Club of Artistic Youth from 1963 to 1965, that promoted Ukrainian culture and history. William Jay Risch, *The Ukrainian West: culture and the fate of empire in Soviet Lviv* (Harvard University Press, 2011), 183.

²¹² Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 77.

²¹³ Olena Stasyuk, "Cemetery and church: Art environment and spiritually-functional symbiosis," *Architectural Studies* 6 (1) (2020): 18–25, 21.

²¹⁴ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "The border as pain and remedy: commemorating the Polish–Ukrainian conflict of 1918–1919 in Lviv and Przemyśl," *Nationalities Papers* 42 (2) (2013): 252; Chmelyk and Khakhula, "Ukrainian-Polish Intercultural Communication," 254. The *Ukrajinska powstanska armija* (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) was a paramilitary wing of the pro-independent party Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). See, Pavlenko, *Die Ukrainische Aufständischenarmee*, 2002, 73–90.

²¹⁵ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 78.

²¹⁶ Kenney, *Carnival*, 127.

²¹⁷ Muravskyi "Neformal'ni' Molodizhni Orhanizatsii L'vova," 365.

²¹⁸ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 78.

told us it was time to grow up. In addition to cultural, innocent issues, in his opinion, it was time for us to engage in political activities.²¹⁹ Over time, the Lion Society became known for their political engagement in Ukraine's independence movement and as Kenney concluded 'no other movement in Central Europe so thoroughly combined local concerns and national politics.'²²⁰

The Society's most prominent examples of political activism included the publication of its samizdat newspaper *Postup* in April 1989, and its support for the regional non-communist political candidate Ivan Drach and Rostyslav Bratun in the all-Union election of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union from March to May 1989.²²¹ Other activities with a political character can already be observed earlier, such as the organisation of a concert on 30 October 1987. Newly formed bands who played traditional Ukrainian folk music, as well as bands such as 'Ne Zhurys', who performed songs spiked with political satire and protest were invited.²²² One more obvious example of political activism occurred during the Lion Society's first anniversary in October 1988. The society attempted to hold a conference and invited different independent movements from all over the Soviet Union to attend. But shortly before the event was about to begin the KBG and communist officials physically blocked the entry to the venue which the society had reserved. More than one thousand people had to find a new location.²²³ Sheika suggested to move the crowd to the Lychakiv cemetery but not to 'clean gravestones' but to 'dig a grave, for the era of stagnation that perestroika had promised to end.'²²⁴

Around the same time, members of the Lion society created a performance that eventually would set the building stone for the publication of the society's first issue of its *samizdat* newspaper *Postup*. In an interview conducted by Vakhtang Kipiani with Oleksandr Kryvenko, one of *Postup's* founders and first editor-in-chief, revealed how the first issue of *Postup* came to be. Kryvenko together with two other members, Igor Markov and Taras Stetskiv, in the fall of 1988 began to write the script of a musical performance that intertwined historical references to Ukraine's history of the early 20th century with theatrical elements. The performances

²¹⁹ The Ukrainians, Yaroslav Hrytsak, April 2024. <https://theukrainians.org/yaroslav-hrytsak/>.

²²⁰ Kenney, L'viv's Central European, 2000, 306.

²²¹ *Postup* (April 1989, no. 1); *Postup*, Title Page, (May 1989, no. 3): 1.

²²² Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 93.

²²³ Kuzio, *Perestroika*.

²²⁴ Kenney, *Carnival*, 129.

premiered in the Young Audience Theatre in L'viv, with many follow up performances. A part of the money that was collected for tickets to the event went to the Lion Society, and another part into the foundation of *Postup*. Already then, was the idea of a newspaper part of the society's agenda. Eventually, their performance attracted international attention, and the society was invited to perform a show in Vilnius. Kryvenko recalled how in Vilnius, he met Vasyl Kapkan, a member of the Community of Ukrainians in Lithuania, who was key to the existence of *Postup*. Kapkan offered the technology that made it possible for the society to print their newspaper in Vilnius.²²⁵

Back in L'viv, Kryvenko together with Markov, Stetskiv, Roman Turii and one of the Society's leaders Hryniv, began to create the first layout for the first issue. The members acted independently from the rest of the Lion Society and were thereby able to produce the newspaper even before its publication was officially declared by the council of the Society. So, while on 12 April 1989, the council voted for the publication of a self-published newspaper, Roman Turii was already on a plane to Vilnius with the first official layout, ready for printing. The first issue was written on a portable typewriter with Ukrainian font that was smuggled from the Ukrainian diaspora into L'viv. The student dormitories of Turii and Kryvenko were the main locations for writing the articles. After the articles were ready to be shipped, Turii volunteered to take them abroad to Vilnius, with two members following him and help him return with the printed issues. With the advancing circulation of the newspaper in Ukraine, additionally four people were sent to Vilnius by train, a trip that lasted about two days.²²⁶ When the newspapers arrived in L'viv, they were packed into big bags and brought to the historical 16th century Gunpowder Tower in the centre of L'viv's old town, where an issue was sold for 15 to 20 kopecks. The money was used to pay a small wage to the editors, typists and the couriers, as well as to cover the transportation costs between Ukraine and Vilnius.²²⁷

The first issue of *Postup* was published in April 1989 and was circulated around L'viv on 27 April 1989 and continued to be publish under this name until 1990. In the meantime, the editorship shifted from Kryvenko to Volodymyr Pankeyev, a graduate journalist and member of the Student Brotherhood (Bratstvo). The new editor-in-chief Pankeyev managed to turn

²²⁵ Vakhtang Kipiani, "Zhyttya u 'Postupi'," Interview with Oleksandr Kryvenko, *Ukrainian Truth* (31 April 2002), <https://web.archive.org/web/20111002190129/http://www.kipiani.org/samizdat/index.cgi?245> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

Postup from a samizdat newspaper into a legalised publication. Kryvenko at that time had become a deputy of the L'viv's regional council of people's deputies of the first democratic convocation, following the semi-democratic parliamentary elections in March 1990. And in his new role as a deputy of the regional council he became the chairman of the Permanent Commission on Youth Affairs and pushed for the publication of his own newspaper. Considering reusing the name *Postup* resulted in an internal conflict within the Lion Society. Eventually, *Postup* dissolved and was rebranded under the new name *Post-Postup*. Even though *Post-Postup* at that point was officially separated from the Lion Society and part of a new youth commission, the editorship did not drastically change, now in collaboration between Kryvenko, Pankeyev and another journalist, Ihor Tkalenko.²²⁸ Officially, the beginning of 1991 the newspaper continued to be published under the name *Postup* for six issues, which was managed by Pankeyev. The seventh issue in 1991 then continued under the name *Post-Postup* and was published immediately after the August Putsch in Moscow. *Post-Postup* remained in this framework of editorships until 1995, when it was eventually turned into a limited liability company.²²⁹

III. Methodology

In the same way this research is conceptually inspired by multiple disciplines, it is methodologically embedded in-between the academic fields of historical research and digital humanities. The interdisciplinary methodological approach is reflected in the choice of sources on the one hand, and in the processing and analysis of the sources on the other hand. The variety of primary sources used in historical research has no clearly defined limit. Sources can range from manuscripts, census data, legal documents over newspapers, diaries, letters and postcards to (oral history) interviews, photographs or maps.²³⁰ Historical post-communist transformation research has the advantage that this period initially has been greatly researched by social and political scientists not so long ago. Historians have now not only access to large volumes of raw data that was collected by these scholars, such as statistics and metrics on economic growth, interviews with contemporary political actors or answers from social surveys, but also to the scholarship published in this period.²³¹ As historian Philipp Ther notes, many publications by scholars published in the 1990s are 'part of the transformation discourse' and

²²⁸ Kipiani, "Zhyttya u 'Postupi'."

²²⁹ Andriy Kvyatkovsky, "Nevhamovnyi," *Ukrainian Truth* (19 May 2003), <https://web.archive.org/web/20111002185331/http://www.kipiani.org/samizdat/index.cgi?492>.

²³⁰ Ann Danto, *Historical Research*, 61.

²³¹ Brückweh and Zöller, *Transformation Research*, 2019, 88.

require ‘critical appraisal’.²³² These publications need to be considered in the historical context of their time. In this sense, both, the collected unanalysed data as well as published secondary literature during the 1990s can function as primary sources to analyse post-communist transformation from a perspective of history. However, in order to handle the analysis of these data accurately, historians have to acquire skills from other disciplines, such as basic statistical analysis with software programmes such as Statistical Package für Social Science (SPSS), a skill that is rather uncommon in historical trainings at universities.²³³

Historian Jannis Panagioditis has recently demonstrated how a historical study on post-communist transformation that includes sources and analysis methods from various disciplines can look like. In his publication from 2021 on post-Soviet migrants in Germany he ‘combines historical approaches with methods from quantitative and qualitative social research’ to create a ‘fine-grained and differentiated understanding of post-soviet life in Germany’.²³⁴ In his research he includes quantitative data from Germany’s yearly published micro census to determine socioeconomic features that distinguish migrants apart from other population groups and moves on to qualitative interviews conducted with seven students with a Russian migration background from a German university to paint a picture of their local *Lebenswelten*.²³⁵ Another example is the well-renowned publication ‘Europe Since 1989: a history’²³⁶ by Philipp Ther. The historian primarily focuses on the neoliberal discourse to assess the economic post-communist transformation in CEE countries by including quantitative data such as statistics on the ‘new business boom’ in Warsaw and Berlin,²³⁷ on company formations²³⁸, on population²³⁹ or on unemployment rates²⁴⁰ to complement his analysis. He combines these statistics with archival material, newspaper reports, expert opinions, and oral history interviews to determine a holistic picture of the transformation period.²⁴¹ Against this background, an historical analysis of mental maps in Western Ukraine in the post-communist transformation must be complemented by empirical data produced by other disciplines. The methodology of this project adapts such a multidisciplinary source approach, including archival material (historical

²³² Ther, *Europe*, 21.

²³³ Brückweh and Zöller, Transformation Research, 2019, 74.

²³⁴ Panagioditis, “Postsowjetische,” 21–22.

²³⁵ Panagioditis, “Postsowjetische,” 22.

²³⁶ Ther, *Europe*.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 94.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 131.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

newspapers from 1989–1995), oral history interviews (three interviews with former students from L'viv) and a variety of statistics taken from quantitative surveys conducted in Ukraine in the 1990s.

3.1 Source Introduction and Criticism

The source corpus consists of archival material (historical newspapers from 1989–1995), oral history interviews (three interviews with former students from L'viv) and several statistics taken from quantitative surveys from the 1990s. The archival material represents the main source to explore mental maps in Western Ukraine, the oral history interviews and statistics are treated as complementary sources to facilitate a nuanced analysis. Most of the historical newspaper issues were retrieved from the archive of the Widener Library at Harvard University. Only ten issues in total derive from the digital archive 'Electronic Archive of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement'.²⁴² The newspaper collection encompasses two newspapers: The newspaper *Postup* and later named *Post-Postup* with a total of 209 issues from 1989 to 1995 by the youth organisation *Tovarystvo Leva* (Lion Society).²⁴³ And the newspaper *Leninska Molod'*, renamed in 1990 into *Moloda Halychyna*, with a total of 19 issues from 1989 to 1990 as part of *Leninska Molod'* and 396 issues as part of *Moloda Halychyna* by the youth group *Democratic Youth Union of L'viv* (former L'viv branch of the communist youth organisation Komsomol).²⁴⁴ The newspaper *Postup* started out as a monthly newspaper until it turned into a weekly newspaper in 1992. The page range of the newspaper issues varies throughout the years. The first issues of *Postup* encompassed each four pages, which changed with the 6th issue published in 1989 in which the number of pages was doubled to 8. This lasted until the beginning of 1991, when each newspaper issue was, for a few exceptions, 12 pages long. From 1992 to 1995, the number of pages ranged from 12 to 32, with most of the issues within this period encompassing 16 pages (143 out of 172). The newspapers *Leninska Molod'* as *Moloda Halychyna* were published three days a week (Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays), with most issues covering 4 pages, and a few exceptions that offered 6 pages.

²⁴² Електронний архів Українського визвольного руху, website, <https://avr.org.ua/> (last accessed 10.08.2023).

²⁴³ The change from *Postup* to *Post-Postup* represented a formal change. The editorship remained the same, and therefore only the name *Postup* will be used throughout this thesis.

²⁴⁴ Sometimes *Postup* and in *Moloda Halychyna* published two issue numbers at the same time, as for example *Moloda Halychyna* 1992, no. 142–143. This, however, did not affect the length of the newspaper issue, meaning the number of pages remained the same as in a single numbered newspaper issue. Therefore, newspaper issues that indicate two issue numbers are here counted as one issue.

The collection of historical newspaper issues spans the years 1989 to 1995 but is incomplete. Detailed presentations of the monthly newspaper issues per year for *Postup* can be found in figure 1, and for *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* in figure 2. Several issues of both newspapers are missing from the collection. For *Postup*, issues from October to December 1990, December 1991, and July and August 1993 are absent from the dataset in this study. The missing bar charts for August 1990, January and February 1991, and January 1994 do not indicate missing data but rather represent months when *Postup* did not publish any issues. *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna* published consistently throughout the years, but more issues are missing in this study, as indicated in the bar chart. The year 1994 is entirely absent from this study due to a lack of archival access and time constraints. Additionally, the collection of *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna* issues from 1989 to 1990 accessed in this research remains relatively small.

Postup: Monthly Issue Count per Year (1989–1995)




Figure 1 *Postup*: Monthly and yearly distribution of newspaper issues available in this study.

Leninska Molod/Moloda Halychyna: Monthly Issue Count per Year (1989–1995)



Figure 2 *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*: Monthly and yearly distribution of newspaper issues available in this study

Despite the incomplete and imbalanced nature of the newspaper collection, making a precise and comprehensive analysis of its contents challenging, its impact on the research process and outcomes can be minimised for several reasons. This research, that focuses on identifying the meaning attached to frequently mentioned locations, draws conclusions from the analysis of the newspapers based on patterns of meaning attached to locations over time and not on individual cases. By concentrating on broader trends in meaning, the entire collection of newspapers gains significance, as opposed to isolating attention on specific issues that may not be included in the overall collection. Nevertheless, it is crucial to approach this methodology cautiously, as it may reveal patterns without providing a clear trace of their origins or contextual nuances, due to the incomplete newspaper compilation. To address this potential limitation, the newspaper analysis is complemented by examinations of oral history interviews and statistical data from social surveys. The intent is to provide a more detailed understanding and, elaborate on the specific meaning found during the newspaper analysis.

The oral history interviews derive from a collection of interviews published in ‘Three Revolutions: Mobilizations and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolutions of Granite, Orange Revolutions and Revolutions of Dignity’ edited by Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt. The interviews were collected as part of a reasearch project that aimed at understanding the Ukraine’s development since indepedence through the perspective of ‘three revolutions’, which were the Revolution of Granite in 1990, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013/2014. The interviews offered in this collection that are considered in the analysis as well as some background information to the interviewees, can be found in the following:

Markiyan Ivashchyn. Student in the 1990s at Polytechnic Institute L’viv and founder of the Student Brotherhood at the same university. He also was involved in the activities of the Lion Society. He was one of the organisers of the hunger strike demonstrations and active participant, who went on the hunger strike in Kyiv in 1990.

Natalia Klymovska. Student from at Polytechnic Institute in L’viv in the 1990s and active participant at the Revolution of Granite in Kyiv. She did not participate in the hunger strike, but she was responsible for encouraging more female students from L’viv to join the protests, for providing tea and communicating with the protestors and participants in the hunger strike.

Mykola Kniazhytskyi. Born and raised in L'viv, he studied in Kyiv before he returned for his postgrad to Ivan Franko National University of L'viv. He was head of the Komsomol faculty in Kyiv and responsible for its dissolution in 1988. In 1990, he was a journalist and head deputy of the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News (UNIAN), a Kyiv-based Ukrainian news agency.²⁴⁵

The interviews were collected between May 2016 and December 2018. Even though the context of the interviews evolve around three specific political moments in post-communist Ukrainian history, they are of interest for in this study, because the interviewees articulate their experiences as young borderland inhabitants in L'viv in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Due to the temporal proximity between their time as students and their life as adults, at the time of the interviews, and due to the open-ended questions from the interviewer, the conversations not only contain reflections about the interviewees' role during the tumultuous years of political change in the early 1990s, but also include perceptions on the years following Ukraine's independence.

The last set of primary sources consists of social surveys and public opinion polls on the dynamics of socio-economic and socio-politic processes in Ukraine. These surveys were conducted throughout the 1990s. A list of the surveys used in this study can be found in the following:

1993	November	The current political situation and future political and economic development of Ukraine	Evgenii Golovakha (Democratic Initiatives Fund)
1993	December	Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine	Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
1994	February – March	Political portrait of Ukraine and elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	Evgenii Golovakha (Democratic Initiatives Fund)

²⁴⁵ Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt, eds. *Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity* (Ibidem Verlag, 2019).

1994	December	Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine	Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
1995	September – October	Omnibus: Views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems	Kyiv International Institute of Sociology

They are of interest because they contain large data sets that offer regional and local differences, and cover perceptions of different age-cohorts. The data has been collected and made digitally available to researchers by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Center for Social Indicators in cooperation with the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.²⁴⁶

3.2 Mixed-Method Analysis: Computational Processes and Historical Content Analysis

This study constructs mental maps of young borderland inhabitants from L'viv from 1989 to 1995. The mental maps derive from investigating how young borderland inhabitants in the 1990s placed themselves in the world by identifying frequently mentioned locations (places), the meaning attached to these places and how this meaning changed over time. Based on the conceptual framework of mental maps elaborated in a previous chapter (see Chapter 2.1) – in which places and the meaning attributed to them create spaces, and collective representation of spaces at different moments in time form mental maps – the frequently mentioned locations in the Ukrainian youth newspapers represent these places. In this study, the places/locations extracted from the newspapers are continents, countries, regions, federal states/oblasts, districts, cities, and historical boundaries that represent a point or area on earth that can be identified using a system of coordinates, such as latitude and longitude. Even though, the NER process also identified words as locations that cannot necessarily be determined by a system of coordinates, but that contain more conceptual meanings such as, ‘the West’, ‘the Wild West’ or ‘the Orient’. These locations were not considered for further investigation for two reasons. First, the number of occurrences of these locations was not significant to be considered for in-depth analysis (e.g. ‘the West’ occurred 380 times across all newspapers). Second, to be coherent I opted to only include locations that in the past or in the present represented administrative boundaries on a geographic map. Locations such as ‘the West’ or ‘the Orient’ represent

²⁴⁶ The list of surveys: USIA 1991–1992; Opinions and Views of People of Ukraine 1993; KIIS Omnibus 1995–1999. Access via Website, Національний банк досліджень, <https://ukraine.survey-archive.com/data#user-research>. The surveys have been conducted between December 1991 and November 1995. All surveys were randomly sampled and either conducted in the form of face-to-face interviews or within a questionnaire.

complex, abstract concepts of space that do not have a fixed pure administrative boundary and contain multiple conceptual understandings. The location ‘the West’ for example, during the time of the Cold War, emerged as a multifaceted concept. It contained political meaning, primarily signifying a political and ideological bloc united in opposition to the Soviet Union and its communist allies. This bloc encompassed countries in Western Europe and North America, and sometimes other regions aligned with these powers. ‘The West’ was not merely an unspecified geographical entity but also embodied a shared set of values. These often included democracy, capitalism, individual liberty, and a commitment to Western civilization, frequently associated with Judeo-Christian traditions and Enlightenment ideals. Furthermore, ‘the West’ was often associated with modernity and industrialization, seen as a model of technological advancement, economic prosperity, and a progressive social order. The Cold War solidified the concept of ‘the West’ as a distinct entity with a shared identity and common interests in the face of the perceived external threat from Communism.²⁴⁷

These places, as defined by the study, are essential elements of geographical space, such as the city of L’viv, specific parks, schools, or other identifiable locations. By employing computational methods like Named Entity Recognition (NER) to identify the most frequented locations in the newspapers and Topic Modeling (TM) to decipher the associated meanings, spaces are conceptually created. Each of these spaces reflects the dynamic meanings attributed to places, evolving over time and through interactions. The collections of space, or mental maps, are thus formed through the compilation of these diverse spaces at different points in time. The mental maps become a tapestry of the meanings attached to various locations, offering insights into the conscious perception of the world by young people in L’viv during the specified period. By combining an approach of NER and TM, the locations, that are representative of administrative boundaries, are filled with meaning that moves beyond viewing them solely in their functional definition as markers of administrative boundaries.

In order to form the mental maps, a mixed method analysis method referred to as ‘explanatory sequential design’ is deployed. The design encompasses to, first, use quantitative methods to identify patterns and trends, and in a second step, to use qualitative methods to elaborate on the outcome from the first step.²⁴⁸ The quantitative method is conducted on a collection of

²⁴⁷ Riccardo Bavaj, “‘The West’: A Conceptual Exploration,” *European History Online* (21.11.2011): n.p., <https://www.ieg-ego.eu/bavajr-2011-en> (last accessed 28.11.2024).

²⁴⁸ John Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches* (Sage Publications, 2013), 38.

youth newspapers from L'viv in form of two computational analysis processes of Natural Language Processing (NLP): Named-Entity-Recognition (NER) and Topic Modeling (TM). The NER process extracted all locations articulated in the newspapers, while the TM process identified consistent thematic trends within the newspapers. The data outputs of both processes were analysed for irregular and regular patterns in form of an exploratory data analysis, that determined the trajectory of the qualitative analysis (see Ch. 5 and Ch. 6). It is important to stress in this context, that the exploratory analysis only served as a guide for the qualitative analysis with the primary goal to narrow down the data set for in-depth analysis, as well as to provide guidance on which locations and topic categories to focus on throughout the years.

The exploratory analysis of the NER data resulted in a list of the most relevant locations and their frequencies throughout the years. The outcome of the exploratory analysis of the TM output resulted in a list of the most relevant topics and their evolvement over time. Following the exploratory analyses of the computational methods, the newspapers were analysed qualitatively, by elaborating the trends and patterns, that were identified during the quantitative analyses. A combination of these two computational processes allowed for a focused investigation into the meanings attributed to the most frequented locations within the most discussed themes, narrowing down the analytical scope.

After the extent of the computational outputs was narrowed down by means of the exploratory analyses, a historical content analysis was applied on the newspaper articles in the remaining newspaper issues. The understanding of historical content analysis in this study follows Klaus Krippendorff's definition of 'a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.'²⁴⁹ The historical content analysis aims to understand the significance of locations as portrayed in the newspaper issues, considering the socio-political and socio-economic context of each article. What makes the content analysis *historical*, is that it centralizes historical documents and identifies changes in patterns of specific words, themes, or concepts within the texts over time. The analysis uncovers the meanings assigned to various locations, identifies recurring patterns, and supports the understanding how these patterns shape the mental maps.

²⁴⁹ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, (SAGE Publications, 2019), no page, online: <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/content-analysis-4e> (last accessed 25.08.2024).


The historical content analysis was complemented by the analysis of three oral history interviews from former students of L'viv in the early 1990s as well as public opinion surveys with young respondents from L'viv oblast. These oral history interviews and surveys were utilized as complementary sources to situate the perspectives of the newspaper's writers and editors in the broader social context. They provided insights into whether the perceptions depicted in the newspapers aligned with those of young inhabitants of the region and added depth to the views expressed in the publications. The oral history interviews, in particular, offered detailed accounts of perceptions and the various processes influencing the activities of young people in L'viv and its regions in the early 1990s. They reflections on what it meant to grow up or live in L'viv as part of western Ukraine, views on the Ukrainian democratic movements of the 1990s, and a broader sense of the spirit of the time.

As a result of the historical content analysis, the mental maps of *Postup* and *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* were delineated in a detailed analysis (see Chapter 5 and 6). To offer a visual summary of the analytical chapters, that, in writing, demonstrate what the mental map of each newspaper is compiled of, I visualised the two mental maps in form of conceptual maps. What this means is that the analysis results from the analytical chapters are put together in two conceptual maps, one representing the mental map based on *Postup*, and another one representing *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna*. The purpose of these visualizations is twofold: to make the complexities of the mental maps, as revealed in the written analysis, more accessible, and to present them within a single, integrated space. This approach to visualizing mental maps draws inspiration from Giorgia Lupi's data humanism, which emphasizes integrating a human perspective into data visualization, moving beyond merely representing raw numbers.²⁵⁰ This approach, for example, manifests in practices such as adding context to visualizations through annotations and explanations on how to interpret the visuals, collecting data manually, or by initially hand-sketching the visualizations to ensure they are not solely driven by quantitative data.²⁵¹ The visualizations of the two mental maps in this study are composed of data manually generated from the analytical chapters, include annotations for added context, and were initially hand-sketched to ensure that all desired layers of information were accurately represented.

²⁵⁰ Giorgia Lupi, "Data Humanism, The Revolution will be Visualized," *Giorgialupi* (no date), <http://giorgialupi.com/data-humanism-my-manifesto-for-a-new-data-world> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

²⁵¹ Guillaume Meigniez, "Data Humanism – A Case Study," *Medium* (14 May 2019), <https://medium.com/nightingale/data-humanism-a-case-study-c16d0efef533> (last accessed 25.08.2024)

3.2.1 A Computational Quantitative Method and Digital Source Criticism



Graph 1 Workflow of Digital NLP Processes: Named-Entity Recognition and Topic Modeling.

For the quantitative method the main sources of analysis are the newspapers *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* and *Postup*. The newspapers are digitally processed with two computational methods: NER and TM. NER is a form of automated text annotation that extracts persons, organisations and locations from a digital text-based data set.²⁵² TM is a computational text-mining technique that identifies high correlations between a group of words. In computer science these groups of words are referred to as 'topics' because they are statistically connected in a text and compose a topic. The naming of the topics requires human judgement and is commonly performed by a researcher.²⁵³

Both computational processes resulted in two sets of quantitative data. The NER process generated a list of locations and their frequencies per newspaper and year, while the TM processes resulted in a list of topics and their distribution across the individual newspaper issues. The workflow of the computational quantitative method was conducted in eight steps (see Graph 1): The first step encompassed the collection and digitalisation of the newspapers. In the second step, the digitised newspapers were prepared for the Optical Character Recognition process (OCR), by trimming and rotating the documents and by removing unnecessary information. The third step consisted of processing the scanned newspapers using OCR to ensure digital readability. The fourth step entailed the post-OCR processing, including the transfer of the newspapers' content into text files and semi-automated

²⁵² Rahul Sharnagat, "Named entity recognition: A literature survey," *Center For Indian Language Technology* (2014): 1–27, 1.

²⁵³ Andrew J. Torget, "Mapping Texts: Examining the Effects of OCR Noise on Historical Newspaper Collections," in ed. Estelle Bunout, Ehrmann, Maud and Clavert, Frédéric. *Digitised Newspapers – A New Eldorado for Historians?: Reflections on Tools, Methods and Epistemology* (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023), 56.

word correction. In step number five the workflow for the two NLP processes split. The pre-preparation of the input files (text files with newspapers' content) differs for both NLP processes and was therefore conducted separately. In the sixth step, NER and TM was applied to the newspapers in two different procedures and their outcomes were processed in step seven, which mainly focused on cleaning the NER data set and restructuring the TM data. The last step of the computational quantitative method was a first explanatory analysis of both data sets with the help of visualizations. The aim was to reduce the data set and highlight relevant data.

Each step of the above-described workflow preceded a reflection of best practices as described in Lorella Violas's guidelines called 'post-authentic framework'.²⁵⁴ NER and TM both derive from the discipline of computer science and have increasingly gained popularity in the digital humanities. However, as Viola has stated, it is often researchers in the humanities who are not fully aware of the technical implications computational methods can have on the data outcome.²⁵⁵ More and more researcher working at the intersection of computer science and humanities, have begun to advocate for a more critical approach to automated text-analysis methods.²⁵⁶ The 'post-authentic framework' is a set of guidelines that encourages scholars from the humanities to engage more critically with computational methods in their research. These guidelines enforce scholars to reflect the individual steps that are being taken once an NLP process is applied, such as the post- and pre-processing of the OCR, NER and TM input and output, the modifications of the parameters of the NLP techniques or even the structure of the text files. In the following, I will demonstrate how the 'post-authentic framework' has navigated the workflow of the two computational processes NER and TM in this study.

Collection, Digitalization and Pre- and Post-OCR Processing of Newspapers

A small number of historical newspapers were obtained from an online archive, with 10 issues being downloaded from the internet. The vast majority of the newspapers were, however, sourced from the archives of the Widener Library at Harvard University. These newspapers were provided in both print and microfiche formats. To digitize the print copies, a V-shaped semi-automatic scanning device was utilized, and the resulting images were saved to an USB drive. The microfiche newspapers were accessed through a connected microfiche reader and

²⁵⁴ Viola, "The Humanities," 94 ff.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., xi.

²⁵⁶ Viola, "The Humanities.," Estelle Bunout, Ehrmann, Maud and Clavert, Frédéric *Digitised Newspapers – A New Eldorado for Historians?: Reflections on Tools, Methods and Epistemology* (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023).

were scanned using a microfiche software provided by the archive. The resulting images were then saved to a USB drive.

Following the collection and digitization of the newspapers, the scanned documents had to be prepared for the OCR process (Step 2). This involved trimming and rotating the scanned documents into the correct position, as well as removing any fingerprints, stains, stickers and handwritten notes to increase the performance of the OCR. The format of these newspapers was diverse and changed throughout the years. It includes written texts on various number of topics, comics and caricatures, photographs, statistics and in later issues, advertisements, and TV programmes.

Following the digitization, the newspapers were processed using OCR (Step 3), a process in which scans or photographs of documents are scanned by a computer and searched for letters and numbers, making the sources digitally readable.²⁵⁷ The content of the individual issues was extracted and saved into separate text files (per newspaper, year and issue). As common in newspapers, the format of most of the content was displayed in newspaper-style columns. In most cases, the OCR software recognized the column format and as a result the text could be extracted in the same format. In cases in which the OCR did not recognize the newspaper-style columns, which on average happened two to three times per page, the text was manually copied from the OCR'd document and pasted into the text file in its correct composition. The subsequent step involved a semi-automated post-OCR refinement process of the newspaper content (Step 4). This process utilized Regular Expressions (RE) to perform tasks such as correcting word errors, removing numbers and unnecessary characters, as well as deleting empty lines and double spaces. One example of word corrections was to merge syllables of words that initially belonged together but were either not recognised by the OCR software as one word or that were split by a hyphen in the original document. Before the text files could be fed into the NER and TM model, additional adjustments were made to the text files, which were tailored to the specific requirements of the NLP process.

Identifying Place: Named-Entity Recognition

Newspapers can be computationally processed with the NLP tool Named-Entity-Recognition (NER). NER is a text-annotation tool commonly used in the field of digital humanities and

²⁵⁷ Torget, "Mapping Text," 50.

‘involves processing structured and unstructured documents and identifying expressions that refer to peoples, places, organisations and companies.’²⁵⁸ For the NER process in this study, only the locations were of interest. Before the digitised and OCRed documents were subjected to the NER process, decisions regarding their pre-preparation had to be taken (Step 5). Referencing the ‘post-authentic framework’ by digital humanities scholar Viola, any technical automation process, such as lemmatisation, stemming or removal of punctuation, impacts the outcome of an NLP process, and what technique is applied strongly depends on the data set.²⁵⁹ For the NER process, I opted for not applying any additional automated text preparation process. Reasons for that are the following. First, operations such as lemmatisation and stemming are not suitable for data sets in the Ukrainian and Russian language. Ukrainian and Russian are both highly inflectional languages and editing the texts by utilizing lemmatisation or stemming would have potentially led to losing information carried in the suffixes as well as to the loss of the words’ context.²⁶⁰ Second, another technique, especially when dealing with multi-lingual texts, is to transform the whole data set into a single language to increase the performance of the model. In this case, the majority of the articles in the newspapers were written in Ukrainian and only a minor number of articles were written in Russian.²⁶¹ However, the use of different languages in the newspapers, can imply a reflection of the cultural identification of the writers and publishers. Especially when newspapers were published in a spatial-temporal context in which language plays a sensitive role. Eliminating the ability to spot differences in language usages could potentially affect the interpretation of the data outcome. Third, I abstained from the removal of stop words and punctuations to ensure the context of the texts and the persistence of semantic information. Removing punctuations (as for example the ‘-’ in the Ukrainian city Івано-Франківськ or the ‘.’ in the Ukrainian short version of the word oblast, as in Київської обл.) and stop words (such as на, від or до) could have interfered with the quality of the NER outcome.

To extract locations from the newspapers, the NER model was applied on the newspapers using the open-source library ‘spaCy’, after testing out a different library.²⁶² SpaCy’s library was

²⁵⁸ Alireza Mansouri, Lilly Suriani Affendey, Ali Mamat, “Named Entity Recognition Approaches,” *International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security* 8(2) (2008): 339–344, 339.

²⁵⁹ Viola, “The Humanities,” 97–98.

²⁶⁰ For example, suffixes of nouns can contain meaning about direction: Я живу у Львові (en. I live in L’viv) or Я зі Львова (en. I am from L’viv). The same applies for Russian: Я живу во Львове (en. I live in L’viv) or Я из Львова (en. I am from L’viv).

²⁶¹ Articles printed in Russian encompassed mostly letters from readers, interviews or speeches.

²⁶² spaCy, website, <https://spacy.io/usage/spacy-101#whats-spacy> (last accessed 08.11.2023). Before settling for spaCy’s library the newspapers were run on another library, ‘Polyglot’ by Rami Al-Rfou. However, after

especially useful in this research, since it offers an NER model that worked on multi-lingual texts, as in this case Ukrainian and Russian, and that is trained on newspapers, for Ukrainian the ‘Leipzig Corpora Collection for Ukrainian Language’²⁶³ and for Russian the online newspaper ‘lenta.ru’.²⁶⁴ SpaCy also offers the option to adjust the NER pipeline for ‘accuracy’ or for ‘efficiency’. A pipeline set for ‘efficiency’ would include a smaller model and therefore run faster, while a pipeline set for ‘accuracy’ would include a larger model but run slower. The latter pipeline was chosen for purposes of accuracy.²⁶⁵ Applying NER on the youth newspapers resulted in the tagging of locations in the newspaper corpus. For example, the newspaper *Postup* in the year 1989 had seventeen issues. The named locations of each issue of the year 1989 were extracted and listed in an Excel-File (Step 6). In total, the NER process before ‘cleaning’ extracted 231.759 entries of which 34.463 were unique.

Following the NER process, a semi-automated post-NER ‘cleaning’ of the outcome was applied (Step 7).²⁶⁶ The term ‘cleaning’ refers here to deleting, merging, or modifying the outcome. First, all entries with less than two characters, entries containing only numbers, and incomplete entries were deleted. This was followed by extracting all unique locations and their frequencies per year per newspaper. The list of unique locations (per year, per newspaper) was cleaned by operations such as merging locations that occurred in different spellings into a single spelling (Russian spelling ‘Київ’ → Ukrainian spelling ‘Київ’), or that occurred in all capitals (АМЕРИКИ → Америки), deleting entries that were wrongly tagged as a location, or substituting short version of locations with their full version (Сумська обл. → Сумська область).

Following the cleaning of the NER outcome, the locations were tagged with their geocode by making use of the open-source API ‘Nominatim’ that is based on OpenStreetMap.²⁶⁷ This step provided the longitude and latitude coordinates for the locations and information about the country of the geocoded location (L’viv → Ukraine; Washington → USA). However, this

comparing both library outcomes I settled for spaCy since the performance of identifying locations was higher for my specific data set. See, Al-Rfou, *Polyglot: A Massive Multilingual Natural Language Processing Pipeline*, PhD Dissertation, Stony Brook University (2015). For project see website, <https://sites.google.com/site/rmyeid/projects/polyglot-ner> (last accessed 08.11.2023).

²⁶³ Ukr-Models, website, <https://huggingface.co/datasets/ukr-models/Ukr-Synth> (last accessed 08.11.2023).

²⁶⁴ Nerus, website, <https://github.com/natasha/nerus> (last accessed 08.11.2023).

²⁶⁵ spaCy, Installation instructions, <https://spacy.io/usage> (last accessed 08.11.2023). Opting for ‘accuracy’ resulted in a pipeline process of three days.

²⁶⁶ The original outcome was kept in a separate file.

²⁶⁷ Nominatim, website, <https://nominatim.org/release-docs/develop/api/Overview/> (last accessed 08.11.2023).

process was not flawless and manual correction had to be applied, which resulted in another cleaning of the data set. For example, the location ‘Kotowsk’, occurred only once in the whole data set and exists in the modern world in three different countries: Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. The Nominatim API automatically tagged the city in Russia. Only a qualitative analysis of the text sequence in the newspaper could contextualise the correct geocoordinates of the city. However, such a process is tedious and time-consuming for locations with only low frequencies when dealing with a large amount of data. Therefore, only locations with high frequencies were manually checked. Moreover, 84 unique locations were not geocoded, which were mainly historical references, such as ‘Soviet Union’ or ‘Little Russia’ (Малоросія)²⁶⁸. These locations were tagged with a spatial-ID called ‘historical’. In total, seven spatial categories were semi-automatically added to the location list: continents (e.g. Europe, Asia), countries (e.g. Poland, Ukraine), regions (e.g. Western Ukraine, Southern Ukraine), federal states/*oblasts* (Yaroslavl Oblast, L’viv Oblast), districts (Sokal’s’kyi district, Kiliis’kyi district) cities (e.g. L’viv, Moscow) and historical (Austro-Hungarian Empire, East Prussia). As a result of the cleaning, geocoding, and spatial categorizing of the NER outcome, the list of unique words decreased from 34.463 to 7.829 (see Table 1).

<i>Number of Entries BEFORE Cleaning</i>	<i>Number of Unique Entries BEFORE Cleaning</i>	<i>Number of Unique Locations AFTER Cleaning</i>
231.759	34.463	7.829

Table 1 Number of locations before and after the post-NER data cleaning process.

Identifying Meaning: Topic-Modeling

TM is a computational text-mining technique increasingly used in the digital humanities, that can be utilized to identify topics in large data sets of text documents. Through statistical models, this NLP technique scans text documents and creates several chains of words that make up a ‘topic’. These words statistically correlate to each other as they are, for example, part of the same text, even if they are not next to each other. Topic modeling aims to expose general thematic structures across multiple text documents that would remain hidden through an in-depth reading of the same texts.²⁶⁹ In this study, topic models were applied to define larger thematic structures in the two newspapers across seven years (1989–1995). The topic model

²⁶⁸ The historic name of the South-Western region of the Kievan Rus’ that today mostly corresponds to the borders of Ukraine.

²⁶⁹ Torget, “Mapping Text,” 57.

used was the open-source package Mallet.²⁷⁰ The Mallet toolkit has implemented the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), that represents a generative probabilistic model which means that the output of the topic model differs with each rerun.²⁷¹ Even though Mallet is a commonly used toolkit for scholars in the humanities, Viola has criticized the model for presenting an unsupervised technique that imposes ‘a distance [...] between the sources and the analyst’ which can cause ‘disconnection and increases the risk to attribute meaning to spurious patterns.’²⁷² To have a more critical engagement with the topic model, Viola has argued to consider certain specifications regarding the pre-processing of the source material, the corpus preparation and the number of topics. Such modifications were applied to the newspapers in this study and will be delineated in the following.

Before the digitized and OCR-ed newspaper documents were fed into the topic model algorithm, they underwent a preparatory stage of data pre-processing (Step 5). This process differed from the one required for the NER technique, as it involved specific modifications tailored to the characteristics of the Ukrainian language. First, the text files containing text material in Ukrainian and Russian, were translated and transliterated into Ukrainian script. This step aimed to eliminate the possibility of redundant words with the same meaning appearing in the word chain of the topics, ensuring that each word represented a unique meaning. Additionally, this step addressed potential OCR errors, such as misidentifying the Ukrainian letter H (la. N) as the Latin letter H. Subsequently, the text files underwent lemmatization, which transformed inflected words into their corresponding base forms. This process was crucial for Ukrainian, a highly inflectional language, as it prevented the occurrence of the same word in different spellings. For instance, the Ukrainian word for ‘Ukraine’ – that can appear in various forms depending on its context, such as Україну or України – was reduced to a single base form, Україна. This standardization ensured that the topic model algorithm accurately captured the semantic meaning of each word. The data pre-processing steps tailored to Ukrainian language considerations played a vital role in enhancing the effectiveness of the topic model algorithm.

²⁷⁰ Andrew McCallum, “Mallet: MAchine Learning for Language Toolkit,” *Mallet* (2002), <https://mimno.github.io/Mallet/index> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

²⁷¹ Viola, “The Humanities,” 83; Estelle Bunout and Milan van Lange, “Nibbling at text: identifying discourses on Europe in a large collection of historical newspapers using topic modelling,” Blog Post (21 June 2019), no page, <https://www.c2dh.uni.lu/thinkering/nibbling-text-identifying-discourses-europe-large-collection-historical-newspapers-using>.

²⁷² Viola, “The Humanities,” 113.

Subsequently, topic modeling was employed in two distinct processes (Step 6). One process included the newspapers *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna*, and the other process focused on *Postup*, which resulted in two sets of topics per newspaper. Applying the TM process separately was done to prevent generalized topics. Given the fact, that *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna* represented very well-established newspapers with a clear lay-out and distinct newspaper rubrics, and *Postup* was initially considered a *samizdat* newspaper, that aimed at publishing articles with a political purpose without a clearly structured outlet, a joint topic model approach could have resulted in topics with little specificity that would not have grasped such nuances.

The newspapers were processed per issue to detect changes in the distribution of topics over time. The number of issues in the newspapers *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna* is more than twice as large (434) as the number of issues in *Postup* (212). The number of words, however, are similar in both newspapers with *Leninska Molod'/Moloda Halychyna* covering 5.755.219 and *Postup* 5.009.774 words. Consequently, the parameters of the topic model were modified individually for each newspaper. After several rounds of code modification that were followed by a quick introspection of the topic output, I settled for 20 keywords per topic, an iteration of 4000, an optimization interval of 5 and a total of 25 topics for *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna*, and 20 keywords per topic, an iteration of 5000, an optimization interval of 5 and 25 topics for *Postup*. These parameters offered a balanced set of topics that appeared comprehensible, and that carried meaningful keywords of this specific data set. Moreover, running the topic model several times revealed common OCR mistakes. Identified errors were added to the stop word list for the final topic modeling procedure.

Running the TM with Mallet created two relevant files per process: a list of the topics consisting of 20 keywords per topic and a list that indicates the distribution percentage of each topic in a newspaper issue. For the post-processing of the output, the topic and keyword lists were of relevance (Step 7). The distribution list was important for the exploratory analysis (Step 8, see Ch. 5.2). The topic list for *Leninska Molod'/Moloda Halychyna* consisted of 30 lines, each encompassed 20 keywords that were representative of one topic. In *Postup* the topic list consisted of 25 lines with 20 keywords. To find significance in the keywords and define a topic, each line in the topic lists were labelled with a topic name that best represented the keywords (Step 7). In *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna*, 20 out of 25 were able to be termed with a topic name, while in *Postup* a total of 15 out of 25 were determined. The aim was to find topic names that

encompassed a lot of detail by taking into consideration most of the keywords. In *Postup*, topic number 4, for example, contained keywords such as *system, computer, network, communication, station, server, user, software, Windows*. This list of keywords best represented a technology-related topic and was therefore labelled: Technological Advances (see Table 2, for the full list see Appendix 1). The same applied for topic number 10 with keywords such as *people, election, day, reconstruction, society, USSR, flight, work, movement, people, program, flag, apparatus, election, comrade, or candidate*. Topic number 10 was labelled ‘Political Reconstruction and Elections’. Topics that could not be identified were labelled as ‘unclear’, mostly because the combination of keywords in that topic were too ambivalent to indicate a common theme, as demonstrated in the following example:

topic 14 (ua) кучма генштафт жінка марьян прем'єр луїс запах шахтар бето март федор
прем'єра пльберто парфуми шкіра клінтон вивих коханець вольський
меджліс

topic 28 (eng) Kuchma Genshaft woman Marian Premier Luis smell miner Beto March Fedor
Premier Plberto perfume leather/skin Clinton dislocation lover Volsky Mejlis

In a next step, the topics were grouped into different categories based on their thematic focus, such as Economy, State Development, Activism and Entertainment (for examples see Table 2, for the full list see Appendix 1). The highest number of topics per category in *Postup* were Entertainment (3 topics) and Activism (3 topics) and State Development (2 topics) and Economy (2 topics). In *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna* the categories State Development (3 topics) and Entertainment (3 topics) were dominant.

Distribution	Topic_Number	Keywords	Translation	Topic_Name	Topic_Categories
3.77595	8	україна новий стати український президент уряд справа світ росія день останній країна слово пост великий голова місце політика економічний російський	Ukraine new become Ukrainian president government matter world Russia day last country word post large head place politics economic Russian	08 Political and Economic Transition of State and International Relations with Russia	State Development
1.88723	21	політичний партія україна український рада влада національний народ рух організація держава народний член державний питання сила повинний демократичний львів львівський	political party Ukraine Ukrainian council power national people movement organization state folk member state question force must democratic Lviv Lvivian	21 Political Movements for Democracy	Activism
1.69741	9	україна банк україна підприємство державний крба млн ціна ринок фонд фірма російський український компанія росія міністр питання діяльність приватизація акція	Ukraine bank Ukraine enterprise state abbreviation unclear million price market fund firm Russian Ukrainian company Russia minister question activity privatization share	09 Ukraine's Economy and Industry	Economy

Table 2 Excerpt of topics generated by the TM process on the newspaper *Postup* showing the detected keywords, topic title and the category.

IV. Exploratory Analysis of Computational Methods

This research makes use of two computational processes to explore mental maps of young borderland inhabitants from the Western Ukrainian borderland city L'viv (1989–1995) during the post-communist transformation in Ukraine: Named Entity Recognition and Topic

Modeling. The NER and TM processes are utilized as computational tools to guide a closer reading of the newspapers. This chapter presents and discusses the results of the exploratory analysis of the computational output of both processes (Step 8). The first section focuses on the NER process and the second discusses observations from the TM process. The aim of this chapter is to motivate analytical decisions that were taken to narrow down the data sets as part of the explanatory sequential mixed-method design. This step is crucial when dealing with large sets of quantitative data that provide the basis for qualitative analysis. To draw first analytical conclusions from the quantitative data output, I made use of visualizations to turn the data visually accessible and navigate the workflow.

4.1 Exploratory Data Analysis of NER Output

This section focuses on the NER process that computationally extracted all locations mentioned in the youth newspapers. After a first exploration of the cleaned data outcome of the NER process, I was able to identify that the data set was skewed. What this means is that the majority of the locations were in the low frequency range and only a minority were in the high frequency range. In total, the cleaned output consisted of 7.829 unique locations. The variations of frequencies ranged from 1 to 41.117. The majority of locations, with 57.88 percent, occurred only once across all newspapers, while approximately 40 percent occurred at least twice. For an in-depth analysis, locations with lower frequencies are not considered relevant. Only the top 15 locations per newspaper in a given year were regarded for the in-depth analysis and determined the spatial frame of the closer reading. If a location at position 15 contained the same number of occurrences as the following locations, then all locations with these number of occurrences were included in the in-depth analysis. For example, for the newspaper *Leninska Molod'* 1990 a total of 16 locations (instead of 15) were considered for the in-depth analysis, because the location at position 15 (Federal Republic of Germany) and at position 16 (Russia) contained the same number of occurrences (8).

The underlying rationale for choosing the top 15 entries is, that locations appearing with lower frequencies in a newspaper throughout an entire year lack substantive information for further qualitative inquiry. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that a quantitative analysis of locations with lower frequencies can provide some information about spatial trends. For example, multiple locations that have low frequencies but occur within the same region, indicate a spatial orientation towards that specific region. Consequently, it becomes necessary

to explore locations with lower frequencies in greater detail, before continuing with the in-depth analysis. In the following, I will explore spatial trends based on locations that only occurred once through data visualizations, and in a second step elaborate on the top 15 locations per newspaper in a given year for closer reading.

Exploration of Low-Frequency Locations

One mean to explore data is to make use of data visualizations. Data visualizations of large data sets can help to formulate hypotheses and unravel patterns, such as regularities and irregularities. By making use of visualizations such as scatter plots, histograms or maps, the data becomes visually accessible, setting the basis for further analytical investigation.²⁷³ A first attempt to visualize locations with only one occurrence detected in the newspapers is conducted by plotting cartographic maps with the help of Google Sheet's chart function. The locations are plotted according to their corresponding countries, except for the historical locations that were not included in the plot. Geolocated cities such as 'Paris' or 'L'viv', for example, correspond to the countries 'France' and 'Ukraine'. Federal states such as 'L'viv oblast' or districts such as 'Chernihiv district' correspond to the country Ukraine. The visualization of all locations in a given country on a cartographic map are plotted according to the absolute numbers (see figure 3). What can be observed in the cartographic map is that most of the locations that occurred only one time in the total data set of all newspapers from 1989 to 1995 were in the United States, followed by Ukraine, Russia and the United Kingdom. Countries in the low to middle ranges are France, Germany, Poland, Italy and Spain in Europe, and Canada, China, India, Brazil, Japan and Australia outside of Europe. To summarize, the cartographic map indicates that single occurrence locations were mainly placed in Europe (including Russia) and in the United States. The distribution of these single occurrence locations in Europe is, with the exception of Ukraine, Poland and Russia, mostly centred in Western and Southern Europe, and less present in Northern and Central Europe. A conclusion that can be drawn for this map is that locations referenced in the newspapers indicate a Eurocentric and 'Western' spatial orientation and a strong orientation towards Russia.

²⁷³ G. Cardazone and R. Tolman, "Data visualization," in eds. L. A. Jason and D. S. Glenwick, *Handbook of methodological approaches to community-based research* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 293.




Figure 3 All locations with a single occurrence distributed per country in all newspapers from 1989 to 1995.

Identifying Relevant Locations

For the in-depth analysis, the examination of locations exhibiting high-frequency occurrences holds relevance. The recurrence of individual locations indicates their significance in the spatial orientation of borderland citizens. By exploring the meaning attached to these frequently referenced locations, we can draw conclusions for the mental map of young people from L'viv. Methodological decisions to exclusively consider the top 15 locations identified for each newspaper in a given year were made, despite the uneven number of unique locations among the newspapers (see, Table 3).

<i>Newspaper_Year</i>	<i>Number of Unique Locations</i>
LM_1989	437
LM_1990	294
MH_1990	522
MH_1991	971
MH_1992	1926
MH_1993	1726
MH_1995	1997
POSTUP_1989	302
POSTUP_1990	307
POSTUP_1991	331
POSTUP_1992	1790
POSTUP_1993	1614
POSTUP_1994	1448
POSTUP_1995	1115

Table 3 Number of detected unique locations per newspaper in a given year.

For example, in 1991 in the newspaper *Moloda Halychyna* 971 unique locations were identified, while the number was more than twice as large one year later in 1992. The number of unique locations per newspaper per year differed due to the variance in the number of pages per newspaper, the temporal publication cycles of the newspaper and the number of newspaper issues available to this study. For example, the newspaper *Postup* was a monthly published newspaper from 1989 to 1991 and turned into a weekly newspaper in 1992. Moreover, the newspaper issues of *Postup* in 1989 and 1990 were 4 and 8 pages long, what in the year 1991 increased to 12 pages and from 1992 to 1995 the page range was between 12 and 32 pages long. As the computational output of the NER process is purely utilized to unravel those locations that were of most interest to the young writers which is synonymously to a high frequency, only the top 15 locations were used for qualitative analyses. Considering the top 15 locations per newspaper each year seemed appropriate for this specific data set, as it covered recurring locations such as L'viv, Ukraine, or the USSR, but also indicated sufficient variance in the data set to provide nuance. For example, the location 'Ukrainian SSR' was part of the top 15 locations in *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna* from 1989 until 1991 but was only among the top 15 locations in *Postup* in 1989 (see Appendix 2).

To show the distribution of the locations in the top 15 lists per newspaper per year, and to spot patterns among the newspapers as well as the evolvement of locations over time, I plotted a heatmap (see figure 4).²⁷⁴ Heatmaps are visualizations in which underlying values of variables can be represented through a gradient change in colour. Heatmaps are not spatial maps, but they help identifying patterns in data and are used in this exploratory analysis approach to identify regularities and irregularities in the frequencies of the locations over time.²⁷⁵ The heatmap in figure 4 displays the top 15 locations in the newspapers *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* and *Postup* from 1989 to 1995, in which darker colours correspond to high frequencies and lighter colours to low frequencies. To ensure that the data is comparable over the years the frequencies of the individual locations were scaled and normalized according to the number of issues. To scale the data, the frequencies of the locations were divided by the number of issues of the given newspaper per year. For example, the location 'Europe' occurred 27 times in

²⁷⁴ To plot the heatmap I used the open-source data visualization library 'Plotly'. The code was written with the support of the conversational Artificial Intelligence ChatGPT, see OpenAI. (2023). ChatGPT: A Conversational AI Model. <https://chat.openai.com>. The darker colours indicate a higher frequency, and lighter colours indicate lower frequency. The colour scale on the right represents the logarithmic value of the frequencies and not absolute numbers. The heatmap is sorted according to the frequencies of locations in *Postup* Year 1989 in descending order.

²⁷⁵ Lisa Charlotte, "Introducing heatmaps for Datawrapper tables," *Datawrapper* (2020), <https://blog.datawrapper.de/heatmaps-for-tables/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Leninska Molod' 1989 across 12 issues, which resulted in the calculation $27/12=2.25$, and the data was normalized to reshape the distribution of data, which proves to be useful when visualizing skewed data sets. In the context of this specific data collection, the normalization visually narrowed the span of frequencies, bringing the higher frequency values in closer proximity to the lower frequency ranges. Additionally, a logarithmic scale was applied to the data during the visualization process, that reduced the skewness of the data set further by compressing the data range. As a result, a heatmap revealing enhanced nuances between diverse locations was rendered. To enable a representation of both newspapers in a single heatmap and thereby ensure their comparability, the heatmap shows a set of gradient colours. Darker colours correspond to higher frequencies and lighter colours correspond to lower frequencies. It should be noted in this context that the heatmap does not represent absolute numbers of frequencies, but only indicates the differences in frequencies by indicating different shades of colour. The heatmap served as a visual anchor throughout the qualitative analysis, allowing me to maintain a holistic perspective of the spatial data and to track shifts in the significance of locations over time. Exploring the heatmap revealed recurring trends that guided a closer reading of the newspapers. A few of these patterns will be highlighted in the following.

Locations that appeared consistently throughout the years in all newspapers, indicating their significance for further qualitative investigation, were Ukraine, Kyiv, L'viv, Moscow, Poland, and the USSR. Locations that were less consistent but still frequently mentioned included Russia, USA, Europe, Germany, Galicia, France, L'viv Oblast, and Carpathian Mountains, with Galicia being the sole historical location. The heatmap also revealed a distinct cluster of locations that appeared in *Postup* in 1989 and 1990 but not in *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna*. This cluster consisted of countries that were formerly Soviet Socialist Republics, including the Baltics, Estonia, Lithuania, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh region in the South Caucasus. In *Moloda Halychyna*, only references to Lithuania and the Baltics were particularly frequent in 1990 and 1991. Finally, a notable pattern that emerged from the heatmap was the increasing interest in the peninsula of Crimea, which began in both, *Postup* and *Moloda Halychyna* in 1992.




Figure 4 Heatmap displaying the top 15 locations detected in the newspapers *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* and *Postup* from 1989 to 1995.

4.2 Exploratory Data Analysis of TM Output

This chapter explores the output of the computational TM process. After the topics were named and categorized (see Appendix 1) for a full list of all topics and topic categories), data visualizations were utilized to explore patterns and reveal thematic tendencies within and differences between the newspaper. For that, the lists containing the distribution percentages of each topic in a newspaper issue, that were created as part of the Mallet TM pipeline, was used. The distribution percentages for each topic per year was calculated, the data was scaled according to the number of newspaper issues per year and added into a new file, of which a sample can be found in the following:

	00 Stock Exchange	01 UNCLEAR	02 UNCLEAR	03 Youth and Student Movements	04 Technology, Computers and the Internet
PO_1989	0.07%	0.01%	0.07%	1.89%	0.01%
PO_1990	0.04%	0.06%	0.06%	0.05%	0.01%
PO_1991	0.26%	0.03%	0.00%	14.37%	0.00%
PO_1992	3.26%	0.08%	0.14%	0.39%	0.01%
PO_1993	0.17%	0.32%	1.93%	0.15%	1.05%
PO_1994	0.04%	0.95%	0.04%	0.01%	1.80%
PO_1995	0.04%	1.25%	0.09%	0.14%	0.33%

Table 4 Data analysis extract displaying the distribution of topics *Postup* per year.

For a first exploration of this data, the distribution percentages of the topics were normalized and then visualized according to their categories in form of stacked area charts²⁷⁶. In these stacked area charts, the relative coverage of different categories in the newspapers is represented by the proportion of the area they occupy over time. This visualization was chosen to illustrate the distribution and evolvement of each topic category throughout the years (see figures 5 and 6). Comparing the two stacked area charts from *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* (see figure 5) and *Postup* (see figure 6) several striking observations can be made.

²⁷⁶ How to read a stacked area chart: A stacked area chart shows how different categories contribute to a total over time. Each coloured area represents a different category, and the size of that area shows how much it add to the overall total. The bottom colours start from zero, and the next colour stacks on top of it, which adds more to the total. To see how much one category contributes, one must look at the height of its colours above the one below it. The total height at any points shows the combined amount of all categories.

First, topics from *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* were placed into a total of 12 categories while topics from *Postup* matched 9 categories. The thematic range of categories in *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* was more versatile than in *Postup*, including categories encompassing broader societal and political themes such as, State Development, Politics, and Social Welfare, cultural and social categories, such as Culture, Religion, Region and Youth, Soviet Youth and Education, as well as categories that focused on personal and lifestyle related topics, such as Media and Entertainment, Sports, Life, and Agriculture, even though their distribution was in the lower ranges. Topics in *Postup* showed less versatility, even though *Postup*’s highest scoring category from 1989 to 1991 did not occur in *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna*: ‘Activism’.

Leninska Molod/Moloda Halychyna: Distribution of Topic Categories over Time, 1989–1995 (area coverage in %)




Figure 5 LM/MH: Distribution of Topic Categories over Time, 1989–1995.

Postup: Distribution of Topic Categories over Time, 1989–1995 (area coverage in %)




Figure 6 Postup: Distribution of Topic Categories over Time, 1989–1995.

Another observation is, that the category ‘(State) Development’ has a high area coverage in both newspapers. In *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* the category ‘State Development’ has the second highest coverage area second highest from 1989 to 1990, only the category ‘Region and Youth’ has a greater area. From 1991 to 1995, the topic category ‘State Development’ has the greatest coverage. In *Postup*, the same topic category has the greatest coverage of all categories from 1992 to 1995, and second greatest from 1989 to 1991, only the category ‘Activism’ indicates more coverage in the early 1990s.

Considering the trends of the stacked area chart over time, the data from *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* suggest a more continuous coverage of its categories over time. The chart shows that the coverage of categories such as ‘(State) Development’ and ‘Media and Entertainment’ occupies a larger portion of the total area from 1989 to 1995, which indicates an increasing focus on these topics. In contrast, the areas representing ‘Region and Youth’ and ‘Soviet Youth’ shrink over time, reflecting a decreasing emphasis on these categories. For *Postup*, the chart indicates that the coverage of ‘Culture’, ‘State Development’, ‘Society’, and ‘Activism’ decreases towards 1995, with ‘Activism’ showing a particularly steep decline. On the other hand, the areas for ‘Economy’, ‘Entertainment’, ‘Legal and Governance’ and ‘Environment’ expand, suggesting these topics gained more prominence over time.

Identifying Relevant Topics




Figure 7 LM/MH: Distribution of Topics over Time, 1989–1995.




Figure 8 Postup: Distribution of Topic Categories over Time, 1989–1995.

Based on the above-described observations, methodological decisions were taken to narrow down the number of categories regarded relevant for the qualitative analysis. As the study focuses on the evolvement of meaning attached to locations over time, I was particularly interested in topic categories that occurred frequently and that indicated any kind of change throughout the years. Referring back to the stacked area charts, topic categories that matched such descriptions were, in *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*, the categories 'State Development' and 'Region and Youth' and 'Activism', 'Religion', 'Economy' and 'State Development' in *Postup* (see figure 5 and 6). These categories have an area coverage above 20 percent in at least one year and an increasing or decreasing coverage trend over time.

The 20 percent threshold was chosen as it separates prominent topics from those that are mentioned less frequently. It distinguishes topics that consistently hold a significant presence in the newspapers' discussions from those that appear more sporadically. In *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*, a total of 5 topics corresponded to the two categories (see figure 7), and in *Postup* a total of 8 topics corresponded to 4 categories (see figure 8). A full list of topics, their corresponding topic categories can be found in Appendix 1.

Each topic category is derived from the specific topics and keywords identified through the topic modeling process. To clarify how the articles in the newspapers correspond to the topic categories, I provide a definition of each topic category considered in the in-depth analysis, which are five in total. These definitions offer a clearer understanding of the content the articles

needed to convey to be classified under one of these categories. The following paragraphs define each category, drawing on the related topics and keywords as part of the topic that emerged from this TM process.

State Development refers to articles which discussed aspects of the political and institutional development of Ukraine during the post-communist transition period. This category includes articles related to the establishment of Ukraine's governmental structures, legal frameworks, but also markers of national belonging. It also covers the broader processes of nation-building, such as the development of democratic institutions, the drafting of a constitution, and efforts to assert Ukraine's sovereignty internationally.

The **Economy** category encompasses articles that deal with the economic challenges and transformation Ukraine faced during its transition from a Soviet republic to an independent state. This includes discussions on privatization, market reforms, inflation, unemployment rates and industries. Articles within this category also explore Ukraine's economic relationships with other countries, the struggle to establish a stable national currency, and the role of international financial aid.

The category **Religion** includes discussions on the revival of religious practices and the role of religious institutions, such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Topics also address the re-establishment of religious institutions, and the challenges they faced in the post-communist context of Ukraine.

Activism covers the various forms of social and political engagement among Ukrainian youth and broader society during the period of 1989 to 1995. This category includes topics related to democratic movements, protests, and the organization of civil society groups advocating for political or social change.

Region and Youth focuses on issues specifically relevant to L'viv and the surrounding region, with a particular emphasis on the experiences and perspectives of the local youth. This category includes topics related to local cultural and educational events, regional concerns, and the challenges and opportunities faced by young people in L'viv.

4.3 Combining Exploratory Analysis Results of NER and TM

Following the exploratory analyses of the NER and TM outcomes, the next step was to conduct an in-depth qualitative analysis of the newspaper content. The selection of relevant newspaper issues for this qualitative analysis was informed by the results of the exploratory analyses of both computational approaches. The NER analysis generated 14 lists of at least 15 locations along with their frequencies for each newspaper in a given year (see Appendix 2). The TM analysis provided two sets of relevant topics (see figure 7 and 8), topics categories (see figure 5 and 6) and their distribution across newspaper issues. Specifically, for each newspaper and year, I considered the locations from the top 15 lists and the topics and topic categories identified as relevant. The following sections provide a detailed account of how the in-depth analysis was conducted.

Only newspaper issues showing a high distribution rate of the topics were considered for a qualitative analysis. Some topics were more prominent than others, so the distribution of a topic within an individual newspaper issue and in relation to the other topics strongly varied. For example, considering the stacked area chart from *Postup* (see figure 8) topic 19 ‘Miners’ Strike’ peaks briefly in 1993. The topic has a relatively low overall distribution rate within the newspaper and in relation to other topics, ranging from 0 to approximately 15 percent. The highest distribution of this topic can be found in several consecutive issues in the year 1993 with a distribution rate ranging from approximately 9 to 15 percent. On the other hand, topics such as number 8 in the same newspaper and year ‘Political and Economic Transition of State and International Relations’ indicate a consistently high distribution rate within the individual newspaper issues as well as in relation to other topics, with the lowest rate of approximately 16 percent (*Postup* 1989 No. 17) and the highest of approximately 47 percent (*Postup* 1993 No. 9).

Due to this uneven variance in the distribution rates of the topics, no single percentage threshold, that was applicable to all topics, could be determined. Therefore, to ensure the relevance of the selected topics, a determining factor was established using the 0.75 percentile of the distribution rate. The 0.75 percentile represents the value below which 75 percent of the data falls. It’s a point in the distribution such that 75 percent of the values are below it, and 25 percent are above it. If you have a dataset of, for example, 100 values, the 0.75 percentile would be the value at the 75th position when the data is sorted. This criterion helped identify topics with a distribution rate higher than 75 percent of the observed values. Additionally, a minimum

distribution rate of 10 percent was set, ensuring that topics had a substantive presence within the newspaper issues. Because for some topics, which only occurred in a few issues in a specific year, such as the above-mentioned topic ‘Miners’ Strike’, that only appeared in several issue in the year 1993 in *Postup*, the 0.75 percentile was approximately 0.02 percent. This means that the 75 percent of the newspaper issues had a distribution rate of the topic ‘Miners’ Strike’ that was below 0.02 percent and 25 percent a distribution rate of above 0.02 percent. Newspaper issues that indicate such a low rate do not hold any significant content about the topic. Therefore, a minimum distribution rate of 10 percent was set, to ensure that only newspaper issues with a minimum of 10 percent distribution in topics with a low percentile were considered for the analysis. The combination of the 0.75 percentile and the 10 percent minimum provided a nuanced approach to selecting relevant issues for the qualitative analysis (see table 5 for number of relevant newspaper issues).

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Total Number of Newspaper Issues</i>	<i>Relevant Number of Newspaper Issues</i>
<i>Leninska Molod'</i>	19	19
<i>Moloda Halychyna</i>	396	283
<i>Postup</i>	209	154

Table 5 Number of all newspaper issues and of newspaper issues relevant for this study.

The 0.75 percentile parameter resulted in two lists of newspaper issues, one for *Postup* and one for *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* that were considered for the in-depth analysis. Although these lists are initially based on the distribution of individual topics within the newspapers, I decided to focus on topic categories instead. This methodological choice was made for several reasons.

The first and most important reason is that the digital analysis of the newspapers, as previously emphasized, was intended to serve only as a guideline for identifying key locations and topics. By considering only the topic categories for the in-depth analysis, which encompass multiple related topics, rather than individual topics, I was able to reduce the complexity of the analysis. Topic categories cover broader themes and narratives, reflecting their development over time, rather than being limited to specific topics. A second reason is that concentrating on topic categories made it easier to identify patterns and differences across the different newspapers. For example, the topic category ‘State Development’ appeared in all newspapers, even though the specific topics within this category varied from one newspaper to another. Finally, the

content of the newspapers was fed into the topic modeling process according to entire newspaper issues rather than individual articles, which resulted in less detailed topics. While this approach allowed for the identification of trends across different years – the primary goal of the topic modeling in this study – it also led to broader, less precise topics. As a result, the topic categories, which grouped these broader topics, became more significant for the in-depth analysis. However, the individual topics were not completely disregarded. Instead, they played a secondary role and were used to double-check patterns identified during the in-depth analysis. For instance, the topic ‘Miner’s Strike’ was important in *Postup* in 1993 – something that would have been more difficult to pinpoint without considering the individual topics.²⁷⁷

As previously established, the relevant topic categories for *Postup* were ‘State Development’, ‘Religion’, ‘Economy’, and ‘Activism’, while for *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna*, they were ‘State Development’ and ‘Region and Youth’. Following the applications of the 0.75 percentile parameter on the individual newspaper issues, I plotted two stacked area charts to show the distribution of these topic categories over time. The stacked area charts provide two pieces of information: first, it indicates which months and years were selected for in-depth analysis; second, it shows the distribution of topic categories across these periods. Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of topic categories in *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* by showing the relevant newspaper issues per month per year, while figure 10 provides the same information for *Postup*. The visualized stacked areas in both figures represent the newspaper issues selected for in-depth analysis based on historical content analysis, making it clear how these issues were distributed across different months and years. Specifically, when a newspaper issue from a given year scored within the 0.75 percentile for a particular topic category, that topic’s distribution is reflected in the stacked area chart.

²⁷⁷ The topic of ‘Miners’ Strike’ is discussed in chapter 6.1.

Leninska Molod/Moloda Halychyna: Distribution of Relevant Topic Categories and their Frequencies over Time, 1989–1995




Figure 9 LM/MH: Distribution of Relevant Topic Categories and their Frequencies over time, 1989–1995.

Postup: Distribution of Relevant Topic Categories and their Frequencies over Time, 1989–1995




Figure 10 Postup: Distribution of Relevant Topic Categories and their Frequencies over time, 1989–1995.

After the relevant newspaper issues had been chosen for the in-depth analysis according to the 0.75 percentile parameter, in a next step, these issues were skimmed for the locations identified

on the top 15 list of locations. While acknowledging that each location was attributed with a spectrum of different meanings over time – ranging from geographic locations of sport events to discourses on local policies – my primary focus was directed towards the meanings of these locations that corresponded to the topic categories that were identified via the topic modelling process. For example, in *Postup* 1989, topic categories that indicated a high distribution rate were *Activism* and *State Development* (see figure 10), while the topic category *Religion* only scored relatively high (approximately 12 percent) in the newspaper issue no. 15 from November 1989 and the topic category *Economy* remained low with all newspaper issues scoring below 6 percent. Only the meanings of those relevant locations that occurred in the context of the above-mentioned topic categories in the newspaper issues were of interest for the analysis of the year 1989 of *Postup*. To determine whether a meaning attributed to a location was relevant to be considered for the qualitative analysis, I looked at two dimensions: relevance of the location's thematic context for the topic category and consistency of reoccurrence.

First, considering that the newspapers were processed during the topic modelling according to their newspaper issues and not according to the individual articles in the newspapers, I scanned each newspaper issues for relevant locations with the keyword search function and identified the contextual meaning of their occurrence. During this step, I analysed whether a location occurred in the thematic context of one of the relevant topic categories for that specific newspaper in that specific year. While the process of determining whether a location was discussed in a specific topic category, such as *State Development*, was straightforward in articles with, for example, a clear political thematic focus that contained a majority of the keywords identified for that topic category, such as articles debating the content of the party programmes of the democratic party Rukh for the L'viv region; it was less pronounced in articles whose thematic focus were primarily on historical events with a low rate of matching keywords, such as in essays about the Nazi-German and Soviet occupation of Ukraine during the Second World War. Solely relying on a straightforward keyword search in the articles, with the goal of identifying a high number of matching terms within the relevant topic categories, therefore proved to be inadequate for a comprehensive historical content analysis.

To circumvent this problem, I did not solely rely on keyword matches, but also examined the intention behind the meaning attributed to locations in the articles. While articles that focus on events from the distant past and have a limited number of keywords related to the topic category *State Development* may initially appear irrelevant, they can still be significant when

analyzed for their underlying intent. For instance, articles published during the tumultuous events of 1989/1991 in Western Ukraine that portray the arrival of the Soviet Army in 1939 and its return in 1944 in a negative light could indicate a perception of western Ukraine's incorporation into the Soviet Union as a negative experience, with the intention of promoting Ukraine's shift from Soviet affiliation to independence. On the other hand, articles that cover the same events but employ positive terminology to describe the Soviet Army, such as referring to the Soviets as 'liberators' might suggest a more negative stance on the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 and Ukraine's transformation to an independent state. While this example presents a simplified and binary view of a complex topic, its purpose remains clear: the intention behind the attribution of meaning to locations plays a critical role in determining the relevance of that meaning.

The second dimension I considered in the decision-making process of finding relevant locations for further qualitative inquiry was the consistency of meanings and their intent, as well as the extent in which they were discussed. In newspapers, locations are mentioned in several thematic contexts, such as in providing the location to indicate where an event took place or in discussions about sport clubs, but also in more detailed discussions surrounding a specific thematic focus, such as the historical role of a location. The location 'Carpathia', for example, occurred frequently in articles in *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* throughout 1989 to 1995. Most of these references to the location 'Carpathia' however referred to the game results of L'viv's local football club with the same name, instead to its geographic meaning: the 1.500 kilometres long mountain range stretching throughout Central Europe, on Ukrainian territory located in the South-West. Only on a few occasions, the term 'Carpathia' occurred in its geographic meaning, as for example in the context of the construction of a dam in the Carpathian region, which stretches across the administrative borders of Zakarpattia oblast, L'viv oblast, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast and Chernivtsi oblast.²⁷⁸ While some meanings appeared continuously throughout the years 1989 to 1995, others intensified, receded, evolved, or even vanished. An example in which meaning receded can be found in references to the Baltics in *Postup*. Here, political meaning to the Baltics' democratic movements was applied frequently throughout the year 1989 but was less relevant from 1990 onwards. An example in which meaning evolved were references to the location Russia. The location was frequently mentioned from 1989 to 1995 in *Postup*, but its meaning shifted from being perceived as a

²⁷⁸ *Leninska Molod'*, 'Building myself a scaffold' (13 March 1990, no. 31): 2.

strategic partner during the transformation in 1990, to being perceived as a threat to democratic renewal beginning in 1991.

Considering the above-mentioned strategy to identify relevant locations and topics, it is necessary to stress again, that the exploratory analysis of the computational outcome solely guided the historical discourse analysis. At times, I identified specific meaning attributed to a location that did not match the corresponding topic category for that year. In such cases, I moved beyond the limitations set by the exploratory analysis.²⁷⁹

V. Mental Maps 1989–1991: Embracing Perestroika within and beyond Soviet Ukraine's borders

This analytical chapter reconstructs the first part of the two mental maps of the regional newspapers *Postup* and *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* by examining the meanings attributed to locations and their processes of place creation from 1989 to 1991. By considering the output of the exploratory analyses of the NLP processes, I analyse how young L'vivians ascribed meaning to frequently mentioned locations in the newspapers, and if and how this meaning evolved from 1989 to 1991. During this transformative period, young L'vivians' spatial representations were shaped by two key conceptual patterns: the historical heritage of their region and the significance of external actors for Ukraine's political and economic transformation.

I demonstrate how the borderland city L'viv from 1989 to 1991 was ascribed with historical meaning that revived its regional history and how regional historical narratives were utilized to justify the historical foundation for an independent Ukrainian state. I continue to delineate how the young L'vivians sought allies in, draw inspiration from and indicated support for external actors, beyond Soviet Ukrainian borders, to navigate the complexities of the political transformation in Ukraine by applying political meaning to the democratic movements in

²⁷⁹ One example is the use of the term 'Moscow' in *Moloda Halychyna*. While scanning relevant newspaper issues from 1990 and 1991 that matched the topic category 'State Development', I observed that 'Moscow' was attributed with political meaning, personifying the city as the governing body of the Soviet Union. However, when reviewing issues of *Leninska Molod'* under the same topic category for the same period, this was not the case. In *Leninska Molod'*, references to 'Moscow' were primarily used to indicate the location of communist meetings or events, without the political connotation of equating the city with the Soviet government. 'Moscow' was used simply as a geographic entity. However, the number of *Leninska Molod'* issues corresponding to the 'State Development' category was limited (only 3 out of 19 issues scored high in the topic category 'State Development'), making it difficult to draw a definitive conclusion. To verify my observation, I cross-checked it with the remaining issues of *Leninska Molod'* (see Chapter 5.2).

Poland from 1989 to 1991 and the Baltics in 1989. Moreover, I reconstruct how as part of the evolving political transformation in Ukraine initial geographic meaning attributed to Moscow in 1989 shifted to political meaning from 1990 onward that personified the place as the centre of the Soviet governing body. Finally, I demonstrate how political meaning attributed to a transforming Russia, on the one hand, unfolded perceptions of political partnership in 1989 and 1990, and on the other hand, showed patterns of political adversary by mid 1991.

5.1 *Postup*: 1989–1991

A comprehensive analysis of meaning attributed to locations in the Ukrainian newspaper *Postup* from 1989 to 1991 revealed five distinct patterns of place creation allocated to four different locations (See Table 6). While all of the locations from the list of top 15 locations for the timeframe from 1989 to 1991 were examined, several locations emerged as particularly significant for place creation. This selection was informed by the previously delineated methodology for identifying relevant locations (see chapter 5.3). What this means is that the locations that will be discussed in the following met the conditions of (1) being referenced within thematic contexts that corresponded to one or multiple topic categories relevant for the years 1989 to 1991, which were, State Development, Religion and Activism; and (2) of including attributed meanings that occurred consistently, therefore creating a pattern. The locations in *Postup* for the years 1989 to 1991, which conformed to these criteria, included L'viv, the Baltics (Lithuania and Estonia)²⁸⁰, Poland and Russia. In total I identified 89 relevant articles and references that contributed to the creation of places from 1989 to 1991. The Sankey diagram in figure 11 illustrates the relationship between topic categories and locations.

²⁸⁰ The location Baltics in this study does not take into account the country Latvia, since the locations was not as frequently referenced as the other two Baltic States: Lithuania and Estonia.

Postup 1989–1991: Relationship between Locations and Topic Categories
number of references




Figure 11 Sankey Diagram: Postup 1989–1991.

The chart can be read as follows: The left side of the chart displays the topic categories – State Development, Activism and Religion – while the right side shows the locations that were identified in articles within these categories: L'viv, the Baltics, Poland and Russia. The chart highlights how frequently each location is associated with each topic category. For instance, State Development is predominantly connected with L'viv and Russia, indicating that articles referencing these two locations occurred predominantly in articles that discussed aspects of Ukraine's state development. In the following, I will analyse the relationship between the locations and topic categories within the articles in detail and demonstrate what and how meanings were attributed to the locations, which resulted in the creation of specific places.

Location	A Place of...	Year
L'viv	Historical Legacy	1989 to 1990
the Baltics	Democratic Progress	1989
Poland	Democratic Guidance and Historical Reconciliation?	1989 to 1991
Russia	Democratic Comradery	1989 to mid 1990
Russia	Authoritarian Adversary	mid 1990 to 1991

Table 6 List of identified locations and place creation from 1989 to 1991 in Postup.

L'viv

The locations from the top 15 list that were centralized during the analysis of this chapter were 'L'viv', 'L'viv oblast', 'Galicia' and 'western Ukraine'.²⁸¹ The topic categories in which these locations were referenced in *Postup* from 1989 to 1991 were 'State Development' and 'Religion'. The analysis of these locations in *Postup* from 1989 to 1991 has revealed that the locations were attributed with historical meaning that contributed to its creation of a place of historical legacy.

1989 to 1990: A Place of Historical Legacy

The years 1989 to 1991 were the beginning of official political change in Ukraine. In 1989, for example, Ukraine experienced its first semi-free elections in March 1989, that was followed by the declaration of its state sovereignty in 1990 and eventually state independence in 1991. These political events and the paths leading to their manifestation concerned the fate of the whole of Ukraine and the USSR, however, the writers of *Postup* discussed and actively shaped them through the regional lens of their borderland city L'viv. To underline the Lion Society's political efforts that supported the transformation of Ukraine into a sovereign state, *Postup* engaged in the reawakening of pre-Soviet local history of L'viv and its region. Throughout the years 1989 and 1990, *Postup* reintroduced narratives of local history of L'viv and its region. The newspaper achieved that through articles that discussed the history of L'viv and its region in the context of the formation of Ukrainian nationalism in the western borderlands of Ukraine in the 1910s and 1920s, the history of the blue-yellow Ukrainian flag, the role of the political party OUN and their military wing UPA during the Second World War, and as part of the history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

The editors of *Postup* therewith followed a strategy that historian Georgiy Kasianov later termed the 'nationalization' of history.²⁸² Kasianov argued that in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Ukraine experienced a 'nationalization' of its history, in which historians seeking to establish a distinct Ukrainian national identity were involved in the reconstruction of the nation's past, focusing on periods that highlighted Ukrainian sovereignty. This revisionist

²⁸¹ Although 'western Ukraine' was not among the top 15 most frequently mentioned locations in the dataset, it was identified during the NER process. Given the recurring association of 'western Ukraine' with L'viv within the context of newspaper articles in *Postup*, I opted to include it in the analysis of L'viv.

²⁸² Georgiy Kasianov, "The 'Nationalization' of History in Ukraine," *The Convolutions of Historical Politics* (2012): 141–174.

approach aimed to challenge the Soviet narrative of Ukrainian history, which had portrayed the nation as an integral part of the Soviet state and everything that defines it. Kasianov stated that the ‘nationalization’ of history served to justify the existence of an independent Ukrainian state by providing a historical foundation for its sovereignty. It promotes national unity to create a sense of shared identity and national consciousness among Ukrainians. At the centre of the ‘nationalization’ of Ukrainian history are four dimensions, the creation of a teleological narrative, the concept of essentialism, the focus on ethnocentrism and cultural exclusivity. The creation of a teleological narrative refers to a linear progression of a master narrative from the past to the present that leads inevitably to the establishment of a Ukrainian nation-state. This master narrative emphasizes the nation’s historical roots as a sovereign state, for example by centralizing historical periods such as the Kyivan Rus’, the Central Rada and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) or the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR) as evidence of its historically deep-rooted identity. The concept of essentialism refers to processes of portraying the Ukrainian nation as a natural entity with distinct characteristics. This essentialist view advocates for a sense of belonging and shared identity among Ukrainians, reinforcing the notion of a shared destiny. This national narrative is further solidified by a focus ethnocentrism and cultural exclusivity. Ukrainian history was framed as a unique story of the Ukrainian people, that downplayed the contributions of other ethnic groups, by emphasizing the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture in contrast over others.²⁸³ By stressing the local history of L’viv and advocating for a national consciousness rooted in regional history, the writers of *Postup* not only supported the actions and political and economic claims of Ukraine’s transformation but also applied historical meaning to L’viv which turned it into a place with historical legacy. In the following I will delineate this strategy performed by the writers of *Postup* in detail for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991.

²⁸³ Kasianov, “Nationalization,” 141–145.

L'viv: Frequency of Historical Thematic Contexts in Postup over Time, 1989–1991 (frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 12 Postup: L'viv – Frequency of Historical Thematic Context, 1989–1991.²⁸⁴

In the years 1989 and 1990, I identified 31 articles published in *Postup* within the topic category ‘State Development’ and ‘Religion’ that centralised the regional history of L'viv and its importance for the unfolding transformation of Ukraine, a tendency that vanished with the year 1991. Figure 12 illustrates the frequency and distribution of the historical thematic contexts that were discussed by *Postup*'s authors. As the figure illustrates in the year 1989, *Postup*'s main historic focus was put on discussing the history of the origins of the blue and yellow flag of Ukraine as well as its function as a national symbol for all of Ukraine, Ukraine's liberation struggle before the First World War and the creation of Ukrainian nationalist thought in the first half of the 20th century. The thematic context of the blue-yellow flag also appeared briefly in 1990 and 1991, however they did not offer a historical discussion.²⁸⁵ In 1990, the historic focus shifted more and more to historical essays about Ukrainian nationalism in the context of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as well as to the history of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox churches (with the exception of one article in 1989). In the following I will discuss the historical topics except for, excluding the article on ‘Red Terror’, due to its single occurrence in the newspaper.

²⁸⁴ The stacked area charts used in the analysis chapters of this study serve as storytelling tools, illustrating how articles on different themes and narratives were distributed over time. Instead of providing absolute numbers, these charts display the average frequency of these themes per newspaper issue, highlighting how the newspaper's focus shifted over the years. The primary purpose of the stacked area charts is to show the development of these themes over time, allowing readers to see how the significance of different topics varied in relation to each other across different periods. This approach helps to visualise the overall story of how the newspaper's content evolved.

²⁸⁵ These articles can be found in *Postup* 1990, issues no. 1, 3, 10 and *Postup* 1991, issue no. 7.

1989

The Blue-Yellow Flag

The blue-yellow flag has been mentioned in a total of 18 articles in the years 1989, 1990 and 1991. Out of these publications, 14 articles were published in 1989²⁸⁶, three articles in 1990²⁸⁷ and one article in 1991²⁸⁸. Only three articles from the year 1989 were chosen for in-depth analysis because they represent historical essays about the origin of the blue-yellow flag, focusing on its symbolism and cultural significance with the primary aim to educate, inform or analyse the flag. These three articles stand out, because they discussed the flag, first, in the context of L'viv and its region and second, were either fully dedicated to the history of the flag (two articles by Andrii Hrechylo) or contributed half of the article (article with fragments) to the history of the flag (one article by Klymentii Darmohgrai). The remaining articles mentioned the blue-yellow flag as a secondary element, with the main purpose to support or illustrate the main argument of the articles. For example, the flag has been mentioned in an article that reported on demonstrations taking place in L'viv and other cities in Western Ukraine in 1989, during which the blue-yellow flag was raised by protestors.²⁸⁹ One of these articles discussed the injustice three protestors faced after their participation in a demonstration in Chernivtsi in October 1989 for the upcoming democratic elections in March 1990. One of the participants, a history student, had raised the blue-yellow flag during the rally and was sentenced to 15 days imprisonment.²⁹⁰ In these remaining articles, discussions about the flag were not the primary focus, but rather the flag's presence was simply acknowledged, without extensive discussion. Arguably, *Postup's* approach to reference the appearance of the national blue-yellow flag on multiple occasions could be interpreted as an attempt to raise awareness about its existence in the perception of L'viv's residents. In the following the three historical articles on the blue-yellow flag will be discussed in further detail.

Articles nationalizing the usage of the blue-yellow flag for the first time appeared in the second issue published by *Postup* in May 1989. This newspaper issue was published after the First of May demonstrations in L'viv, to which the writers of *Postup* dedicated the front page of its

²⁸⁶ These articles can be found in *Postup* 1989, issues no. 2, 5, 7–12, 14–16.

²⁸⁷ These articles can be found in *Postup* 1990, issues no. 1, 3, 10.

²⁸⁸ This article can be found in *Postup* 1991, issue no. 7.

²⁸⁹ *Postup*, no headline (May 1989, no. 2): 1; *Postup*, Section 'Requiem' (September 1989, no. 10): 5; *Postup*, 'Echo of 'Chervona Ruta'' (November 1989, no. 15): 5.

²⁹⁰ *Postup*, 'Echo of 'Chervona Ruta'' (November 1989, no. 15): 5. The article does not specify the location or the exact facility of the imprisonment.

periodical and which could have triggered the Lion Society to publish a lengthy article about the history of the blue-yellow flag as a national symbol. In a detailed chronological outline of the event, the authors explain how ‘several dozen men with folded flags’ met at 8 o’clock in the morning on the 1 May 1989 at the Kropyvnytskyi Square in L’viv, a plaza in the western part of L’viv, that nowadays is home to a 30 meters tall arch showcasing the golden Ukrainian trident and a steel monument of the Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera in its centre. By 9 o’clock the square was filled by ‘about two thousand people’ shouting slogans and holding up banners saying “Freedom’, ‘Unity’, ‘We are for Drach’, ‘The People’s Movements is under fire’’. Shortly after, the head of the city executive committee appeared and convinced ‘the people not to go past the tribune with blue and yellow flags.’ By 10.40 am the number of protestors reached beyond 8.000 which resulted in the violent clearance of the demonstrations by the police.²⁹¹ According to Kenney, the First of May demonstration was the second event in L’viv in over 50 years, in which the blue and yellow flag was raised. Only a few days earlier, in a demonstration initiated by the Lion Society on the third anniversary of the Chornobyl catastrophe in front the City Hall, a member of the Lion Society raised the flag for the first time during the mayor’s speech.²⁹² The violent dispersal of the protest under the blue-yellow flag and the demand by local authorities to dismiss its use, may have caused the young writers to inform its readers about the history of the flag.

One of the main contributors in *Postup* with two articles on the historical origin of the blue-yellow flag was Andrii Hrechylo, who later would become a historian of Ukrainian heraldry and founder of the Ukrainian Heraldry Society²⁹³. He published a total of two articles on the history of the flag. His first article called ‘The Flag of the Ukrainian People’²⁹⁴ published in May 1989 explained the complex origin story of the blue-yellow flag. The main intention of Hrechylo’s first article was to provide a comprehensive overview of the history of the Ukrainian flag that emphasizes its historic significance in all-Ukrainian history, stretching beyond spatial and temporal limitations. Hrechylo argued that the historic significance of the flag has been lost in Ukraine of 1989, with the incorporation of Ukraine into the USSR. Here, with the dominance of communism, Ukrainian national symbols, such as the blue-yellow flag, were labelled as reactionary and subjected to various forms of repression, labels that ‘have persisted

²⁹¹ *Postup*, no headline (May 1989, no. 2): 1.

²⁹² Kenney, L’viv’s Central European, 2000, 310. See also Ihor Melnyk, “Persha demonstratsiia z syno-zhovtymy praporamy,” *Zbruc* (01.05.2014), <https://zbruc.eu/node/21879> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

²⁹³ Website, Ukrainian Heraldry Society, <http://uht.org.ua/ua/aboutsite/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

²⁹⁴ *Postup*, ‘The Flag of the Ukrainian People’ (May 1989, no. 2): 2–3.

to this present day.²⁹⁵ More specifically, according the Hrechylo, the Soviet authorities have propagated the perception that the trident and the blue-yellow flag could not be considered a part of all-Ukrainian ethnic culture, but only a Western Ukrainian phenomenon, that has been discredited by the ‘Bandera movement’ emerging from L’viv in the 1930s. The ‘Bandera movement’ was a fraction of the political party Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a Ukrainian party that was established 1929 in L’viv with a radical fraction of the party headed by Stepan Bandera since 1932.²⁹⁶ The OUN under Bandera formed a military alliance with Nazi-Germany during the German occupation of Western Ukraine in 1941 to fight against the Soviet Army. Most prominent were the military operation ‘Nachtigall’ and the division ‘Roland’. From 1943 to 1944, an ethnic cleansing of minorities took place mostly in Western Ukraine. The OUN and their then para-military unit UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) in collaboration with the Nazis were responsible for the murder approximately 90.000 identified Poles, Jews and Ukrainians who did not side with the nationalists, on Western Ukrainian territory.²⁹⁷ In Soviet historiography, the Bandera movement was continuously framed as a pure fascist organisation located in the Western Ukrainian regions.

To deconstruct the Soviet narrative about the blue-yellow flag, Hrechylo first noted, that the OUN opted for ‘black and red’ colours as their organisation flag on the Second Great Assembly of the OUN in April 1941 and not blue and yellow.²⁹⁸ Hrechylo then argued that the colour combination of blue and yellow is rooted in the historical legacy of several Ukrainian regions, and not spatially bound to Western Ukraine. Accordingly, its history derived from the historical legacy of Galicia a region that in 1989 corresponded to the territory of Soviet Ukraine’s western regions; from the history of the Cossack’s, that were mainly located in the regions that corresponded to Central and Eastern Soviet Ukrainian regions and from Carpatho-Ukraine corresponding to South-Western regions in Soviet Ukraine. In the historical legacy of Western Ukraine, the flag’s colours could be traced back to ‘the coat of arms of the Galicia-Volhynia

²⁹⁵ *Postup*, ‘The Flag of the Ukrainian People’ (May 1989, no. 2): 3.

²⁹⁶ Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist* (Ibidem, 2014), 170–172.

²⁹⁷ Per Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths,” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*: 11–12. Rudling states in this context that the total number of solely Polish victims could amount to 130.800, if the number of unknown victims is added. See *ibid.*, 50, footnote 117.

²⁹⁸ In fact, the OUN-B opted for a black-red flag and did not provide any further details regarding the colour combination. See, OUN v svitli postanov Velykych Zboriv, konferencyj ta inšych dokumentiv z borot’by 1929–1955 r., o. O., 1955, 44. The historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe interpreted the colour combination as a fascist interpretation of the organisation. Accordingly, the colours red and black imply the proto-fascist German ideology of ‘blood and soil’, and thus the inseparability of the race or people (red) from the living space (black). See, Rossoliński-Liebe, “Bandera,” 181.

principality,' featuring 'a golden lion on a blue field.' After these colours were abolished following the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, when Galicia fell under Austrian rule, they re-emerged as a 'symbol of the awakening of national consciousness and the struggle for social and national rights' for the Ukrainian liberation movement during the 1848 revolutions in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In western Ukrainian cities such as 'L'viv, Drohobychi, Stryi, and Yavoriv, national guard units were formed under these banners.' In Eastern Ukraine, Hrechylo places the flag into Cossack history. The colour combination of blue and yellow were featured 'on various Cossack flags of the 17th and 18th centuries from Kyiv, Lubny, Chernihiv, and other regions.' And in southwestern Ukraine, the blue-yellow flag was proclaimed state flag in 1939 in Carpatho-Ukraine, under the 'Law No. 1 of the First Sejm of Carpatho-Ukraine', that was formed after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. To underline his argument, that the flag is spatially rooted in the national history of Ukraine and not only in the regional history of western Ukraine, he additionally stated that the colour combination was also widely adopted by Ukrainians in emigration after World War II.²⁹⁹

By reconstructing the flag's history from several Ukrainian regions across different periods, Hrechylo not only deconstructed the Soviet narrative in which the flag was spatially and temporally allocated solely to Western Ukraine in the 1930s, but also emphasized its deep-rooted connection to all-Ukrainian culture and heritage. In doing so, the author aimed to break any limitations that could prevent Ukrainians in 1989 from recognising the blue-yellow flag as anything else than an enduring symbol of all-Ukrainian identity. By exposing Soviet attempts to suppress the meaning and function of the flag, Hrechylo also emphasizes the flag's persistence and calls for all Ukrainians to embrace it as a symbol of national identity during the political developments Ukraine endured in 1989. This is underlined in Hrechylo's last paragraph of his article, in which he stated that the blue-yellow national flag of Ukraine was 'recognized by all Ukrainians, regardless of their political party' in the past and that the flag 'embodies the age-old aspirations of our people for peace and glorifies work, country, and the wealth of the native land.'³⁰⁰

While Hrechylo's most detailed descriptions about the historical legacy of the flag are placed in western Ukraine, citing instances such as the Galicia-Volhynia principality and the 1858 Ukrainian liberation movement, his attempt to nationalize history through the historical

²⁹⁹ *Postup*, 'The Flag of the Ukrainian People' (May 1989, no. 2): 2–3.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

analysis of the flag and therewith creating an all-Ukrainian identity under the blue-yellow banner for his readers, tracing the flag's historical roots in other Ukrainian regions, is coherent. As outlined before, the author not only creates a historic continuum of the flag in Western Ukrainian history, but also in Eastern Ukrainian regions, referencing Cossack history, in southwestern Ukraine, referencing Carpatho-Ukraine, a region that had its own historical liberation struggle throughout the centuries,³⁰¹ and in, even if only briefly mentioned, the Ukrainian diaspora, so beyond Soviet Ukrainian state borders.

Moreover, his deconstruction of the myth surrounding a connection between the blue-yellow flag and Bandera's OUN-fraction can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain an all-Ukrainian incorporating narrative, given that the Soviet narrative about the OUN as a purely fascist organisation and 'Nazi-collaborators'³⁰² was predominantly strong among Eastern Ukrainians. Because other than their fellow Ukrainians in the West, Eastern Ukrainians 'fought for the liberation of Soviet Ukraine against the Nazis together with the Russians'³⁰³ during the Second World War, as political scientist Zhurzhenko has stated. Hrechylo, who was born and educated in L'viv, despite his attempt to propagate for a unified blue-yellow Ukraine argues from a point of view that is more commonly found in western Ukraine, which becomes explicitly notable in his anti-Soviet stance in 1989. While such an approach may have resonated with *Postup's* readers in L'viv and its region at the time, it might have taken away agency from Ukrainians in other regions, such as Eastern Ukraine, who not necessarily perceived the Soviets solely as a threat but also as a part of their own historiography.³⁰⁴ Both, Hrechylo's attempt to justify the blue-yellow flag as a symbol for all Ukrainians without spatial limitations to Western Ukraine and his negative attitude towards the Soviet authorities become even more explicit in his second article.

The second article was published in *Postup's* issue no. 14 in November 1989. Hrechylo again sought to debunk a claim propagated by the communist authorities in Kyiv that the blue and yellow colour combination is not rooted in all-Ukrainian history, but solely in the regional

³⁰¹ Paul Robert Magocsi, *With Their Backs to the Mountains. A History of Carpathian Rus' and Carpatho-Rusyns* (Central European University Press, 2015).

³⁰² For the development of the Soviet narrative of OUN, the UPA and Bandera see, Trevor Erlacher, "Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–85," *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 2 (2) (2013): 289–316; Volodymyr Kravchenko, "Fighting Soviet Myths: The Ukrainian Experience," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 34 (14) (2016/2015): 447–484.

³⁰³ Zhurzhenko, "The Myth."

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

history of Western Ukraine during the rise of Ukrainian nationalism.³⁰⁵ By November 1989, when Hrechlo's article was published, raising the blue-yellow flag was no longer an isolated matter, but a constant companion among L'viv's protestors and beyond.³⁰⁶ The flag was also no longer spatially bound to L'viv but transcended the city's administrative borders. It had been, for example, raised in Kyiv, which was slowly catching up with L'viv as Kenney has noted, on 22 May 1989 during a rally in front of the Taras Shevchenko monument.³⁰⁷ Eventually, discussions surrounding the usage of the flag throughout the country reached the communist leadership in Kyiv. In July 1989, the Commission on Patriotic and International Education and International Relations of the Ukrainian SSR released an official report, stating that 'there was no legitimate history to consider blue and yellow the national colours of Ukraine' and that 'all community, political, and cultural events in Ukraine could display only the red flag.'³⁰⁸ In light of the new revolutionary atmosphere in Ukraine, the decision of the Central Rada and its attempt to dismiss the historic meaning of the blue and yellow flag through official media channels, ignited nation-wide interest and debates on the origins of the blue and yellow colours.³⁰⁹ Hrechlo's second article published in November 1989 was one contribution to this debate.³¹⁰

Arguing that the commission's decision was a result of its 'low level of development of heraldic and vexillology' and its 'tendentious approach to [...] discredit national symbolism and not to clarify it,'³¹¹ Hrechlo's again focused his argumentation on the historic origin of the colour combination rooted in various Ukrainian regions. Similar to his first article from May 1989, Hrechlo first identified the origin of the blue-yellow colours in the historical legacy of Galicia corresponding to the western territories of Soviet Ukraine, referring to the coat of arms of the Galicia-Volhynia principality and the Ukrainian national liberation movement in the 19th century, as well as in Eastern Ukrainian history, in Cossack propaganda during the 16th to 18th

³⁰⁵ *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (November 1989, no. 14): 4.

³⁰⁶ From an article written by Klymentii Darmohgrai and published in *Postup* in July 1989 it can be reconstructed that the blue-yellow flag was more commonly present in L'viv in the summer of 1989. In her article, Darmohgrai called on the democratic forces in L'viv to instead of 'waving the national flag almost every day, whether necessary or not' to 'deal with really urgent matters' such as 'organizing a network of NRU [Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny – the official name for Rukh] groups, developing a concrete program of its activities in the near future, actively discussing the draft Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Elections, [...] and preparations for the elections themselves.' See, *Postup*, 'Constructivism and Inadmissibility' (July 1989, no. 7): 2.

³⁰⁷ Kenney, 'L'viv's', 310.

³⁰⁸ Cited as in Bohdan Krawchenko, "National Memory in Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 12 (1) (1990): 6–7.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (November 1989, no. 14): 4.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

centuries. However, this time, he expanded on the historical usage of the blue-yellow flag beyond western Ukraine in the early 20th century. The author argued that the blue-yellow flag in the early 20th century was considered a national symbol of Ukraine not only in Western Ukraine, but also further East, under the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). The UNR was a short-lived independent state that existed with interruptions from 1917–1921 and encompassed 'nine former [Russian] imperial provinces: Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Taurida (excluding the [sic!] Crimea)',³¹² that correspond to modern Central, Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine. According to Hrechylo, shortly after the February Revolution in 1917 in Russia the blue-yellow flag occurred side by side with the 'red flag', in which blue and yellow were considered 'national' and the Soviet red flag 'revolutionary', during mass rallies in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukrainian cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sevastopol and Odesa. And shortly after the Bolshevik revolutions, the UNR was proclaimed in November 1917, with a celebration accompanied by both flags. Following the independence of the UNR from the Bolsheviks in January 1918, both flags were raised again.³¹³ Additionally, to expose the commission's sloppy argumentation, Hrechylo elaborated on the significance of the 'azure colour' stripe on the state flag of the Ukrainian SSR, arguing that in 1949, 'during the peak of Stalinism' an 'azure stripe was arbitrarily added to the Ukrainian SSR flag without proper historical justification' making it also 'debatable whether this flag [of the Ukrainian SSR] can be considered a symbol of revolution or national identity'³¹⁴ (See Figure 13).

With his second article, Hrechylo directly responded to the decision made by the communist authorities in Kyiv to ban the usage of the flag, which since the First of May demonstrations in L'viv in 1989 had spread throughout Ukraine. Again, the approach in his response was to spatially place the historical origin of the flag into various Ukrainian regions to clarify its all-Ukrainian character. However, this time, his focus was put on the historic presence of the blue-yellow flag alongside the red Soviet flag in Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine in the early 20th century, therewith granting the blue-yellow flag the same status and level of significance as the red Soviet flag. While the key message in Hrechylo's second article published in November 1989 was not particularly different from the one in his first article from May 1989, it may have

³¹² Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine. Land and Its People* (Paperback, 2010), 509.

³¹³ *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (November 1989, no. 14): 4.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

reached a wider audience, considering the increasing interest in the historic origin of the flag among Ukrainians in late 1989.



Figure 13 Flag of the Ukrainian SSR from 1949 to 1991. Source: Wikipedia. Copyright: Public Domain.

In contrast to Hrechylo's argumentation, who propagated the flag as a symbol of unity, that goes beyond the spatial borders of L'viv and its region, the author of the third article, Klymentii Darmohgrai, disregarded such a focus, spatially placing the flag's historic significance solely into the western territories of Ukraine. Darmohgrai's article titled 'Constructivism and Inadmissibility' was published in July 1989, shortly after the commission's official reports that declared a ban on the flag. Even though the article does not offer the same level of depth to its historization of the flag as Hrechylo provided, it still attempts to centralize the flag's historic origin in the regional history of L'viv. Darmohgrai declared the commission's decision to ban the blue-yellow flag nationwide as unfair, arguing that it would be dismissive of the historical national identity of Ukrainians in the west: 'Of course, there may be people in the Dnipro region who consider the blue-yellow flag to be nationalist. But how could the commission ignore the opinion of 10 million people in the West of Ukraine, who perceive the flag as truly national?'³¹⁵ According to Darmohgrai, the prohibition of the flag would ignite a complex debate over national symbols and identity, especially in the western regions of Ukraine, that has a history of resistance and liberation movements in which the flag served as a symbol of national and social liberation struggle since the revolutions of 1848. The flag was the banner under which the riflemen of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) fought in 1918–1919 against Polish claims on Galician territory, a conflict that culminated in September 1939.³¹⁶

³¹⁵ *Postup*, 'Constructivism and Inadmissibility' (July 1989, no. 7): 2.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

By contrasting the views of some ‘people in the Dnipro region’³¹⁷ who may see the flag as nationalist with the sentiment of Western Ukrainians who view it as a ‘truly national symbol’, the author on the one hand, acknowledged the existence of diversified understandings of Ukrainian national identity, depending on the spatial background of the inhabitants, and on the other hand reinforced, what Kasianov described as, cultural exclusivity. Darmohgrai’s argumentation fails to address the sentiments of individuals from Eastern Ukraine regarding the blue-yellow flag, nor does the author engage in a comprehensive analysis of the factors contributing to regional differences in interpreting the flag, dismissing the Eastern Ukrainian perspective with a single sentence.

With the beginning of the year 1990, interest in historicising the blue-yellow flag in *Postup* disappeared, potentially because the usage of the flag was legalised in L’viv following the Ukrainian Supreme Council elections in March 1990. After the majority of local council seats were won by the *Democratic Bloc*, the city council signed a resolution that recognised a legitimate use of the blue-yellow flag during state and public political events in the city of L’viv, stated to raise a blue-yellow flag on top of the L’viv city council building within the L’viv Oblast and ensured to address the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainians SSR with a proposal to legitimize its use as a Ukrainian national symbol. The resolution was drafted by none other than Andrii Hrechko on behalf of the city council.³¹⁸ For the first time, the blue-yellow flag was raised above the roof of the L’viv city council building on 3 April 1990. L’viv therewith followed into the footsteps of other Western Ukrainian cities, that had already installed the flag on top of their city council buildings, such as Stryi on 14 March 1990³¹⁹ and Ternopil on 23 March 1990.³²⁰ Interestingly, these events were not regarded noteworthy for the editors of *Postup* and were not mentioned in the newspaper.

Ukraine’s Long Path for Independence and Ukrainian Nationalism

³¹⁷ The Dnipro region corresponds to the contemporary south-eastern oblast of Dnipropetrovsk.

³¹⁸ Andriy Kvyatkovskiy, ‘Прапор на вежі’ *Збрус* (03.04.2015), <https://web.archive.org/web/20150928223218/http://zbruc.eu/node/34632> (last accessed 26.01.2024).

³¹⁹ ‘Цей день в історії: 3 квітня 1990 року над Ратушею Львова підняли синьо-жовтий прапор’ *Високий Замок* (03.04.2019), <https://wz.lviv.ua/news/387888-tsei-den-v-istorii-3-kvitnia-1990-roku-nad-ratusheiu-lvova-pidnialy-syno-zhovtyi-prapor> (last accessed 26.01.2024).

³²⁰ Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, ‘Історія формування українського державного символу’ *Солом’янська районна в місті Києві державна адміністрація. Офіційний інтернет-портал* (23.08.2021), <https://solom.kyivcity.gov.ua/news/10889.html> (last accessed 26.01.2024).

Apart from historical analyses of the blue-yellow flag, *Postup* in 1989 also published five articles that discussed or mentioned the development of Ukrainian nationalism in the early 20th century in Western Ukraine, five articles dedicated to that topic.³²¹ The temporal focus in these articles was put on two periods: before the First World War, elaborating on the formation of a Ukrainian liberation movement and the broader implications for Ukrainian statehood and independence, and on the interwar period, discussing the formation of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1930s. Only the three articles fully dedicated to the topic of Ukrainian Nationalism were analysed, since they were the only articles that were completely dedicated to a historical analysis of its development. Meaning to L'viv was applied differently in these articles. While the first article, written by Mykhailo Kosiv, spatially placed the origin of Ukrainian Nationalism into western Ukraine, more specifically into historical Galicia with L'viv at its centre, the other two articles approached the connection between L'viv and Ukrainian Nationalism with a more nuanced tone. To these authors (both historians), L'viv (and Galicia) became important when the political thought of the national in Ukraine shifted from democratic values to nationalistic values. Unlike Kosiv, the other two authors also did not demonstrate a nationalization of L'viv's regional history, but only contributed to a revival of its history. Kosiv, on the other hand, clearly drew a continuation from the history of L'viv and its region to Ukraine's path for democratic restructuring in its 1990 present. He achieved that by placing L'viv at the centre of the western Ukraine's liberalization struggle in the early 20th century and creating a continuation of that struggle to Soviet Ukraine's struggle for independence in 1990. In the following these articles will be delineated in further detail, beginning with Kosiv, and followed by the historians' articles.

The first article, whose content is temporally placed before the First World War and spatially placed in Galicia with L'viv as its capital city, that discussed the historical events surrounding the creation of Ukrainian nationalism, was written by Mykhailo Kosiv, who later would run as a local candidate of the *Democratic Bloc* in the Ukrainian Supreme Council in March 1990. His article titled 'And we have a red viburnum...' was published in a total of three full pages over the course of three newspaper issues, *Postup* 1989 no. 10, 11 and 13.³²² The headline of this article resembles the title of the Ukrainian folk song and anthem of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen called 'Oh in the meadow, red viburnum'. The Ukrainian Sich Riflemen were a military unit

³²¹ Three articles can be found in *Postup* 1990, issues no. 10, 11, 13 and 17, and the two remaining articles in *Postup* 1990, issue no. 14.

³²² *Postup*, 'And we have a red viburnum...' (*Postup* 1990, no. 10): 2; (*Postup* 1990, no. 11): 4; (*Postup* 1990, no. 13): 3.

of 2.500 Ukrainian mostly young men that was created in L'viv at the beginning of the First World War and fought on the side of Austria-Hungary against tsarist Russia.³²³

Ой у лузі червона калина похилилася,
Чогось наша славна Україна зажурилася.
А ми тую червону калину підіймемо,
А ми нашу славну Україну, гей-гей, розвеселимо!

Марширують наші добровольці у кривавий тан,
Визволяти наших українців з московських кайдан.
А ми наших братів-українців визволимо,
А ми нашу славну Україну, гей-гей, розвеселимо!

Гей, у полі ярїї пшенички золотистий лан,
Розпочали стрільці українські з москалями тан!
А ми тую ярю пшениченьку ізберемо,
А ми нашу славну Україну, гей-гей, розвеселимо!

Як повіє буйнесенький вітер з широких степів,
То прославить по всій Україні січових стрільців,
А ми тую стрілецьку славу збережемо,
А ми нашу славну Україну, гей-гей, розвеселимо!

Oh, the red viburnum bent over in the meadow,
Our glorious Ukraine was saddened by something.
And we will raise that red viburnum,
And we will cheer up our glorious Ukraine, hey-hey!

Our volunteers are marching in a bloody dance,
to liberate our Ukrainians from Moscow's shackles.
And we will liberate our Ukrainian brothers,
And we will cheer up our glorious Ukraine, hey-hey!

Hey, in a field of spring wheat, a golden meadow,
Ukrainian marksmen and Muscovites have started a dance!
And we will pick that spring wheat,
And we will cheer up our glorious Ukraine, hey-hey!

When the wild wind blows from the wide steppes,
That will glorify the Sich Riflemen throughout Ukraine,
And so, we will preserve the glories of these riflemen,
And we will cheer up our glorious Ukraine, hey-hey!



Figure 14 On the left: The lyrics of the folk song 'Oh in the meadow, red viburnum' published in *Сто Умовлених Пісень, Київ 'Музична Україна' 1992p* (Library of the International School of Ukrainian Studies), 14. On the right: Translation of the lyrics of the folk song 'Oh in the meadow, red viburnum' offered by author of this thesis.

The anthem's origins are debated, with Stepan Charnetsky (1881–1944), a poet, public, and cultural figure, often credited as its creator who draw inspiration from the last couplet, a satirical stanza poem with refrain and political content of a 17th century Cossack song. However, other figures such as playwright Vasyl Pachovsky, composer Mykhailo Hayvoronsky, and theater director Yosyp Stadnyk have also been suggested as possible contributors to its creation. The song's adaptation to reflect contemporary realities dates back to 1914, as for example in a play by Vasyl Pachovsky titled 'The Sun of Ruins,' presented by the Lviv theatre of the 'Ruska Besida' society and directed by Stepan Charnetsky. This drama focused on the turbulent 'Ruins' period in the mid-17th century, a time marked by the fall of Ukrainian statehood, embedding the song within a context of national tragedy and resistance.³²⁴

³²³ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 340.

³²⁴ Oleh Kashperskyi and Darya Kashperska, "«Оу у лузі червона калына» як маркер новыkh наратыvотvорчыkh трансформатыи мустетскойи оствы в умовakh шырокомасштабной аhресыи RF", *Education* 11 (2022), 78. The song gained international significance in the year 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, after it was performed and recorded by the lead singer Andriy Khlyvnyuk of the Ukrainian band 'Boombox' in Kyiv. It was subsequently sung, reinterpreted, and translated into numerous languages worldwide, as for example, in an English version by the British rock band Pink Floyd in collaboration with Khlyvnyuk titled 'Hey, Hey, Rise

In his article, Kosiv provides a historical overview of Ukrainian political and military activities in the Western Ukrainian region Galicia with L'viv at its centre, leading up to and during the First World War, putting emphasis on the efforts towards Ukrainian independence and political separatism from tsarist Russia. In his descriptions the author nationalised through the usage of spatial arguments three elements of the history of Ukrainian nationalism in particular: the importance of the youth in L'viv, the remembrance of the western Ukrainian Sich riflemen as symbols of Ukrainian independence and the victimization of Ukraine due to the Russian oppression of Galician culture and intellectualism. With his article, Kosiv attempts to create a historic continuum from Galicia's struggle for independence against tsarist Russia in the past, towards Ukraine's struggle for independence from Soviet influence in the present.

Spatially, Kosiv's article concentrates on the Western Ukrainian border region Galicia with L'viv at its centre. The first element of Ukrainian nationalism that Kosiv focuses on is the foresight of the western Ukrainian youth in L'viv in the early 20th century, who, according to Kosiv, inspired by the doctrines of intellectual figures, such as Dmytro Dontsov, were pushing for political separatism and military youth education. The L'vivian youth, 'no matter how poorly organised it was', was rallying its forces in anticipation of future events, notably through a congress of Ukrainian Students in L'viv in 1913. The aim of the consolidation of youth forces was 'overcoming Moscow's influence in Austria-based Ukraine and promoting political separatism from Russia abroad, as well as a military education of the youth.'³²⁵ According to Kosiv, the youth in L'viv foresaw the growing national tensions and identified a need for Ukrainian separatism early on. The author portrayed the L'vivians as Galicians who were caught in-between two empires due to the international climate leading up to the First World War, specifically mentioning 'the Austro-German-Russian antagonism', in which Galicia was seeking territorial-national autonomy within Austria-Hungary against Russian influence.³²⁶ To the east, Galicians observed the 'Russian bourgeoisie's' treatment of 'Ukraine as its colony', which offered 'no hope' for Ukraine's 'peaceful and normal development within the borders of the Russian Empire'.³²⁷ Galicians also experienced a growing political influence from tsarist Russia. To the west, Galicia was part of Habsburg Austria, which, moving towards 'a federation

up!'. The purpose of this collaboration was to raise money for a Ukrainian charity. See Kory Grow, 'Pink Floyd's First New Recording in Nearly 30 Years Was Inspired by a Lone Ukrainian Musician', *Rolling Stone Magazine* (7 April 2022), <https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/pink-floyd-hey-hey-rise-up-1334338/>.

³²⁵ *Postup*, 'And we have a red viburnum...' (*Postup* 1990, no. 10): 2.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

of free nations' presented a more favourable political environment for Ukrainians. He outlined how this international tension contributed to the mobilization of Ukrainian liberation forces, such as the General Ukrainian Council, a political entity of western Ukrainian elite actors, and the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, a military organisation whose goal was to fight for the proclamation of a Ukrainian state, and who were joined by 25.000 volunteers 'mostly students and pupils from gymnasiums', with the beginning of the First World War.³²⁸ Focusing on the involvement of the Ukrainian youth in their role on the early recognition of the need for political separatism and military mobilization as part of the 1913 congress, as well as their participation in the Sich riflemen army, Kosiv constructs a narrative where the younger generation in western Ukraine is seen as the driving force of national consciousness and independence. Given the fact that Kosiv published his article in the western Ukrainian youth newspaper *Postup*, this focus could serve to create a continuation of national mobilization for independence that is rooted in the foresight of the western Ukrainian youth, thus nationalizing the history of youth movements.

The second element of Ukrainian nationalism in western Ukraine which Kosiv underlines in his descriptions was the formation and the military activities of the Sich riflemen. Kosiv provides a detailed chronology of the military events that took place on Western Ukrainian territory between tsarist Russia and the western Ukrainian military units, after Russian troops entered L'viv in September 1914. In descriptions of a battle in Stryi, the author states that 'although the combat value of the weakly armed hundreds was small, [...] and most of them were in battle for the first time, the young Ukrainian army turned out to be a reliable combat element' because they were 'giving their lives for Ukraine.'³²⁹ Glorifying the heroic battles of the Sich riflemen, as well as arguing that the Sich riflemen were the only significant outcome of the ideas of the Ukrainian political forces before the First World War,³³⁰ and Kosiv's approach to give his article a name that resembles the Sich riflemen's anthem title, clearly glorifies the military unity as heroes of Ukrainian independence.

The third element in his descriptions of the development of Ukrainian nationalism, was the Russian oppression of Galician culture. Without specifying the exact time frame, Kosiv described the consequences of the Russian occupation of Ukraine for Galicians, detailing the

³²⁸ *Postup*, 'And we have a red viburnum...' (*Postup* 1990, no. 10): 2.

³²⁹ *Ibid*, 4.

³³⁰ *Ibid*, 3. 'Yes, parliamentarism brought Ukrainian Nationalism, the political experience was needed, but it gave few real results. The most significant of them was the formation of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen.'

closure of Ukrainian newspapers, the confiscation of cultural artifacts, the conversion of Ukrainian churches to Russian Orthodoxy, and the deportation of Ukrainian intelligentsia. In this context he also notes that the General Ukrainian Council, that until 1915, was primarily concerned with the political needs of Galicia, expanded its representation beyond Galician interest, to all Ukrainian interest.³³¹ The declaration emphasized the necessity of Ukraine's independence from the tsarist empire and expressed solidarity with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy until independence could be achieved. By explicitly noting that the declaration 'did not say a single insulting word about the Russian people' and that 'the Ukrainian liberation struggle was not anti-Russian, but anti-autocratic,' Kosiv contributed to the victimization of Ukrainians, by constructing a narrative in which Ukraine fell victim to Russian oppression, despite offering any reasons for hostilities.³³²

Kosiv has used arguments based on geographical and territorial considerations to emphasize the national significance of the above-mentioned three elements, that serve as a glorification of western Ukraine's historic struggle for sovereignty against foreign oppression. By framing Galicia's, and particularly L'viv's, political struggle in the past as a conflict between Ukrainian aspirations for freedom, spatially placed within the Austro-Hungarian narrative, and a Russian attempt for political hegemony, Kosiv proposes a binary view of Galicia's political struggle, in which its geopolitical tendency leans towards the Austria-Hungary against imperial influences from the Russian Empire. In descriptions of Russia's efforts to oppress Galician culture and intellectualism, Kosiv identifies Galicia's clear oppressor, tsarist Russia. Explicitly noting that the declaration of the General Ukrainian Council was not 'anti-Russian', which however did not prevent tsarist Russia from oppressing Ukrainian culture, amplifies Kosiv's definition of a Russian oppressor and portrays Ukraine as a victim of historical injustices, legitimating its struggle for independence as a just cause. Kosiv clearly positions pre-First World War Galicia with L'viv at its centre on a side that is striving for territorial autonomy of Ukraine within the Austro-Hungarian empire and against tsarist Russia. The glorification of the L'vivian youth and their efforts to fight against 'Moscow's influence', the military activities of the Sich riflemen against tsarist Russia, as well as Kosiv's descriptions of the cultural oppression of Galicians from Russia, enhance Kosiv's spatial understanding of Galicia and L'viv as an anti-Russian region in the early 20th century. Whether deliberately or not, the author leaves out historical discussions around the ambiguous character of the Ukrainian elite before the First World War.

³³¹ *Postup*, 'And we have a red viburnum...' (*Postup* 1990, no. 13): 3.

³³² *Ibid.*

As the historian Hrytsak has noted, the Ruthenian (later Ukrainian) elite under Austrian rule, whose goal since 1848 was the separation of Galicia into Polish dominated west and a Ruthenian dominated east, was initially not pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian, but ‘fragmented into pro-Russian, pro-Polish and pro-Ukrainian orientations.’³³³ The Ukrainian elite in Galicia that strived for a liberation of Ukraine before the First World War was also not solely born out of the dissatisfactions of L’viv’s youth and the region’s elite actors, as implied in Kosiv’s argumentations. A pro-Ukrainian perspective in Galicia took prominence over pro-Russian and pro-Polish sentiments when the leaders of Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian Empire moved their base from ‘Russian Kyiv’ to ‘Austrian L’viv’ in the latter half of the 19th century. In 1978 the Shevchenko Scientific Society which promoted the development of the Ukrainian language and literature was founded with the financial support of Ukrainians from the Russian Empire. By 1897 the society headed by Mykhailo Hrushevskyi until 1913 flourished and during this period, L’viv emerged as the capital of Ukrainian nationalism, witnessing the rise of the first Ukrainian political parties.³³⁴ So even though Galicia with L’viv at its centre was central to the birth and development of Ukrainian nationalism since 1848, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant contributions of Ukrainians from beyond Galicia’s administrative boundaries to the strengthening of Ukrainian national thought.

Kosiv’s glorification of the Ukrainian youth and the Sich riflemen of early 20th century Galicia, his explicit critique of tsarist Russian policies towards Ukraine and his descriptions of Ukrainian political and military efforts for independence in the past, can be read as a nationalization of regional history, in which western Ukraine, despite having been a victim of Russian aggression in the past, is on a continuous path for independence. To publish an article during the transformation from communism to post-communism in 1989 in the western Ukrainian city of L’viv that glorifies the struggle for independence of western Ukraine against tsarist Russia in the early 20th century, can be interpreted as an attempt to create a historic continuum between these two periods. The article evokes sentiments for western Ukraine’s struggle for independence, in which specifically the western regions of former Galicia but also all of Ukraine are portrayed as the victim of foreign rule. Such a historic narrative feeds into a narrative of Ukraine in 1989, in which the country was politically and culturally suppressed by Soviet rule, a perception that was dominant in western Ukraine as it was considered one of the ‘least

³³³ Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Lviv: A Multicultural History through the Centuries,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24 (2000): 56.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

sovietized regions of Ukraine' and served as the capital city of Ukrainian culture and intellectualism.³³⁵

Apart from Kosiv's article, that represented a glorified nationalization of the regional history of Ukrainian nationalism, stretching across three newspaper issues, two additional articles written by two historians and published in *Postup* in 1989, offered a historical analysis of Ukrainian nationalism in the first half of the 20th century. In the same way as Kosiv's article, the two articles, that were written by the historians John Paul Himka and Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, are spatially placed into the context of Galicia in Western Ukraine. In contrast to Kosiv who focused on time before the First World War, the other two article temporally discussed the interwar period, tracing the development of Ukrainian nationalism. Other than Kosiv's approach, Himka and Rudnytsky did not engage in the nationalization of Ukraine's western regional history but contributed to a nuanced and complex understanding of Ukrainian nationalism. The editors' decision to publish articles with historical content produced by professional historians, can be interpreted as a strategy to increase the credibility of the newspaper, as well as to balance out glorifications of Ukrainian nationalism, as demonstrated in Kosiv's article.

The Ukrainian-Canadian historian John-Paul Himka (Ivan-Pavlo Himka) wrote an article titled 'The Great Transformation' that was published in *Postup* in October 1989, issue no. 13.³³⁶ The article focused on the development of political thought in Galicia in Western Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s. Himka, who since 1976 frequently visited L'viv, collaborated with L'vivian universities and became a renowned historian on Ukrainian nationalism and Galician history,³³⁷ identified in his article a shift in Galician political thought from a predominantly democratic and socialist orientation to a more nationalist and anti-democratic stance. In contrast to Himka's article, the article written by Ukrainian historian Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky titled 'Nationalism' and published in *Postup* in December 1989, was not specially prepared for the newspaper.³³⁸ Rudnytsky, a Viennese-born Ukrainian historian, who had studied and taught in L'viv, Berlin, Prague, Geneva and New York, had died five years prior, in 1984. In remembrance of the five-year anniversary of his death, *Postup's* editors decided to publish an

³³⁵ Hrytsak, "Lviv," 59–60.

³³⁶ *Postup*, 'The Great Transformation' (October 1989, no. 13): 6–7.

³³⁷ Jacqueline Janelle, "The History of Dr. John-Paul Himka," *Folio News Story* (University of Alberta, Canada) (8 February 2002, <https://sites.ualberta.ca/~publicas/folio/39/11/05.html> (last accessed 06.02.2024).

³³⁸ *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (December 1989, no. 17): 4–6.

abbreviated version of his article 'Nationalism' that had been published in the 'Encyclopedia of Ukraine' in 1966. Rudnytsky's article focused on the ideological shifts of Ukrainian nationalism, its organisational development, and the challenges it faced.

Both articles centralize the historical development of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia, arguing that Galicia was its centre. Unlike Kosiv however, whose descriptions implied that Ukrainian nationalism was a Galician phenomenon, Himka specifically mentions, that his analysis of Ukrainian nationalism focuses on Galicia, because it represented the centre of Ukrainian nationalism during the transformation from democratic thought to nationalist thought. He also states that it is 'not appropriate' to talk about any political thought in Soviet Ukraine, implying that either he does not perceive himself as knowledgeable to talk about that, or that Soviet Ukraine was fully dominated by communism, and therefore not note-worthy to mention any other political movements in the 1930s.³³⁹ Rudnytsky specified that his article concentrated on the shift to nationalist political thought, with its spatial centre in Galicia, embodied through the OUN, and argues that Ukrainian nationalism did not permeate through to Soviet Ukraine. However, he allocated similar significance to the role of the diaspora, as for example in Prague, to the formation of Ukrainian nationalism.³⁴⁰

Tracing the historic roots of Ukrainian nationalism to the early 20th century and its development through the 1930s until the end of the Second World War, both authors identify a transformation of Ukrainian political thought from a predominantly democratic and socialist orientation to a more nationalist and anti-democratic stance in the 1930s, which they identify as evident in the formation of the OUN.³⁴¹ The two articles also emphasize the critical role of the OUN as the nationalist movement, focusing on its foundation, ideological basis, split into factions, and activities during the Second World War, that was accompanied by racist ideology,

³³⁹ *Postup*, 'The Great Transformation' (October 1989, no. 13): 6. 'In this article, the main focus will be on Galician Ukraine, because Galicia was the main center of Ukrainian political thought when the aforementioned transformation took place. It is not appropriate to speak of any political thought in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s.' The interpretation of this sentence is ambiguous. The original Ukrainian 'не годиться говорити' (eng. 'It is not appropriate to talk about') implies both, a general and a personal statement.

³⁴⁰ *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (December 1989, no. 17): 5. 'From the founding of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists to the outbreak of the Second World War nationalism grew to become the most dynamic political force in the Ukrainian world outside the Soviet Union. It managed to transcend regional boundaries and extend its influence among Ukrainians in Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, among the political émigrés in Western Europe, and even among those in North America. It nevertheless remained centered in Galicia and, despite repeated efforts, did not manage to spread into Soviet Ukraine.'; *Postup*, 'The Great Transformation' (October 1989, no. 13): 6–7.

³⁴¹ *Postup*, 'The Great Transformation' (October 1989, no. 13): 6; *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (December 1989, no. 17): 4.

antisemitism, and collaborations with Nazi-Germany. They achieve that in articulations about the impact of external political forces on the development of Ukrainian nationalism, including the policies in Soviet Ukraine, the repressions of Galicians under Polish rule, and the broader European political climate, including the rise of fascism and Nazism in European countries. Here Himka and Rudnytsky's both argue, that, even though Ukrainian nationalism was not free of antisemitism and racism, these aspects were not the primary focus of its ideology. Himka cautions against oversimplifying a connection between Nazi-ideology and Ukrainian nationalism, by stating that 'the main aspect of Nazi ideology is racism' while this aspect only comes 'in third place in Ukrainian nationalism.'³⁴² Rudnytsky was less specific, and argued that even though Ukrainian nationalism shared some ideological characteristics with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which he did not clarify, its closer counterparts are found among other nationalist movements in less economically developed regions of Eastern and Central Europe, such as in the fascist 'Ustasha' movement in Croatia, the Romanian far-right movement 'Iron Guard', the para-military wing of the Slovak People's Party 'Slovak Hlinka's Guard' and the Polish nationalist organisation 'Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny'.³⁴³

While Rudnytsky's article provides a more detailed chronological narrative of the rise and ideological evolution of Ukrainian nationalism, including its adoption of integral nationalism, rejection of democracy and socialism, and the adoption of a more militaristic and revolutionary stance, Himka, while addressing these ideological shifts, focuses more on the historical analysis of the ideological shifts in Ukrainian political thought. He offers a broader analysis by focusing on the impact of Stalinism, the global economic crisis in the 1930s, and the general disillusionment of Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia with the idea of democracy that emerged in European countries in the inter-war period. Himka's article also offered a more critical perspective on the transformation of Ukrainian political thought, questioning why such a drastic shift towards anti-democracy and pro-Hitler sentiments occurred. It also considered the necessity of re-evaluating Ukrainian nationalism from a contemporary perspective, suggesting that it remains a vital part of Ukraine's struggle for freedom but requires a nuanced understanding of its historical context, perceiving it as a 'product of a specific historical moment.'³⁴⁴ Similarly, Rudnytsky implicitly argued for a critical reassessment of Ukrainian nationalism, by stating that it that 'had great difficulties, caused by his own ideological heritage,

³⁴² *Postup*, 'The Great Transformation' (October 1989, no. 13): 7.

³⁴³ *Postup*, 'Nationalism' (December 1989, no. 17): 5.

³⁴⁴ *Postup*, 'The Great Transformation' (October 1989, no. 13): 7.

confrontation with the Western world and the question of the attitude towards the people in different lands.’³⁴⁵

Both historians refrain from biased glorifications of Ukrainian nationalism, that was visible in Kosiv’s argumentation. Instead, they provide a critical and nuanced analysis of its development, challenges, ideological shifts, and the complex spatial and temporal contexts under which it evolved. Even though critical articulations regarding aspects of antisemitism, fascism and racism among Ukrainian nationalists remain superficial, they have been addressed by both historians as existent, unlike in Kosiv’s text.³⁴⁶ Additionally, rather than advocating for historic continuum from the past to the present, both articles place Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia within the specific historical context of its time. This historical contextualization helps to understand Ukrainian nationalism as a product of its time, influenced by its events, ideologies, and geopolitical realities. In doing so, the authors also caution against uncritically adopting historical narratives to serve potential contemporary agenda, more implicit in Rudnytsky’s articulations, and more explicit in Himka’s article. While Himka’s article was specifically written for *Postup* in 1989 – unlike Rudnytsky’s text which was published in 1966 – his warning of an uncritical reflection of the history of Ukrainian nationalism, could have been addressed at the re-emergence of such narratives in 1989. Therewith, the authors do not only aim to avoid the creation of a one-sided historical narrative of Ukrainian nationalism, but also raise awareness of a critical engagement with regional history. Even though the historians did not engage in a nationalization of L’viv’s regional history, they did contribute to a revival of Galicia’s past.

Considering that both authors are historians by profession, could explain their more neutral reading of Ukrainian nationalism. Another aspect is the physical distance of both authors to Soviet Ukraine. Even though they both have Ukrainian roots, they had a spatial distance to Soviet Ukraine since they lived and taught in western societies. It is plausible to suggest that this distance also contributed to their more impartial understanding of Ukrainian nationalism in the early 20th century. While the historians’ perspective provides a multi-faceted and nuanced examination of Ukrainian nationalism, it is particularly interesting to pose the question why *Postup* in 1989 made the editorial decision to publish these two historical

³⁴⁵ *Postup*, ‘Nationalism’ (December 1989, no. 17): 6.

³⁴⁶ Given that Rudnytsky article was published in the 1960s raises also questions about the authors access to archival source material.

interpretations of Ukrainian nationalism in their newspaper. Given that in 1989, the above-mentioned articles were the only historical essays about Ukrainian nationalism, this editorial decision indicates that *Postup* had an interest in presenting a nuanced discourse on the topic in addition to teleological perceptions as demonstrated in Kosiv's article. The purpose could have been to engage *Postup*'s readers in a complex and in-depth understanding of the past, that proposes different angles of how they could perceive their region's history. Articles written by historians usually are well-researched and adhere to certain academic standards. Moreover, the reasoning behind the choice to include these articles could have been motivated by the fact that it raised the overall quality of the newspaper and enhanced its credibility.

1990

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army

With the year 1990, historical essays on the formation of Ukrainian nationalism intensified, this time by specifically resetting the focus to the history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which is embedded in the political struggle for independence from the interwar period to the Second World War. This increasing focus of Ukrainian history on the period before and during the Second World War in *Postup* is not surprising, at least according to an oral history interview conducted with Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, one of the main activists of the 1990 student hunger strike in Independence Square and founding member of the Student Brotherhood at the Polytechnic Institute in L'viv in 1990. According to Ivashchyshyn, the history of the Second World War, which encompasses the activities of the UPA and the OUN, was of great interest to many inhabitants from the region of L'viv in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the interview conducted in 2018, Ivashchyshyn mentioned how the memory of an independent Ukraine in western Ukraine, which he refers to as Galicia, was preserved through memories of Ukraine's struggle for independence in the early 20th century:

Like most families in Galicia, we were keeping our traditions and memories of the Second World War. In Ukraine, likewise in my father's family which comes from the area near Lviv, we kept the memory that there is a Ukraine ... and there is a fight for Ukraine.³⁴⁷

Ivashchyshyn drew a connection between his participation in the student hunger strike in Kyiv 1990 and his understanding of the collective memory in the former eastern territories of Galicia

³⁴⁷ Interview with Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 75.

(today's administrative boundaries of western Ukraine) on Ukraine's fight for independence. The 'fight' refers in the context of the Second World War to the activities of the OUN and the UPA, and their failed attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state.

The UPA was a military wing of the Bandera fraction of the OUN (OUN-B), the main driver of Ukrainian nationalism in western Ukraine in the first half of the 20th century. The UPA can be classified as a phenomenon that occurred on the territories of today's western Ukraine, which found support among ethnic Ukrainians.³⁴⁸ Formerly, the UPA was formed as a partisan group in Volhynia under the name Polis'ka Sich led by Taras Bul'ba Borovets' until it was forcefully incorporated into the structures of the OUN-B.³⁴⁹ Historians who have researched the OUN-B and the UPA in the past differ in their assessment about the formation, ideology, and goals of both groups. Historian David R. Marple, for instance, has analysed the works of several historians, such as John A. Armstrong, Viktor Koval', V. P. Troshchyns'kyi, Viktor Poliszczuk and Mykhailo Koval', and has assessed that they all differ in their understanding of the timeline of the UPA's formation, the motivational factors for its formation and the role of external events. Some historians date the year of the UPA's formation back to 1942, others to 1943. For that they identify different motivational factors, that stretch from direct military responses to ideological opposition or to strategic shifts due to external threats, such as German attacks or Soviet partisan raids. What the authors according to Marples agree on is that the OUN-B played a significant role in leading and organising the UPA in the 1940s.³⁵⁰

Another aspect that continues to be debated among historians is the assessment of the OUN-B and UPA's ideology, particularly regarding claims of fascism. However, defining a coherent overall political-ideological framework for the OUN and UPA is challenging. The movement emerged from a coalition of diverse nationalist forces, exhibiting a wide spectrum of radicalism. Moreover, the OUN underwent significant structural changes throughout its history, which further contributed to the diversity of its ideological positions. What can be stated is that the influence of the propagandist Dmytro Doncov on the OUN was undeniable, although its

³⁴⁸ See for example, John-Paul Himka, "The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: Unwelcome Elements of an Identity Project," *Ab Imperio* 4 (2010), 83–101, 91; Yuliya Yurchuk *Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991-2016)*, in *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus*, ed. Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko, Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, 2017, 107–137, 110.

³⁴⁹ Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (Yale University Press, 2003), 164.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

precise nature remains a subject of ongoing debate among historians. While Doncov never formally joined the OUN, his 1926 work, *Nacionalizm* became a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalist ideology, as historian Frank Golczewski points out.³⁵¹

Golczewski determined several key Doncovian concepts that resonated deeply within the OUN: the rejection of uncertainty in the struggle for Ukrainian independence, the necessity of self-reliance and the avoidance of dependence on external powers, the embrace of the *Führerprinzip*, and the importance of a clear and unwavering ideological foundation. These ideas, as Golczewski argues, significantly shaped the OUN's development and its emphasis on decisive action.³⁵² Furthermore, Doncov's translations of works by Mussolini, Hitler, Goebbels, Rosenberg, and Franco into Ukrainian contributed to the intellectual climate within the OUN. While his influence on Ukrainian nationalism is undeniable, so too is his affinity for fascist dictatorships.³⁵³ This raises the crucial question of the role of fascism in OUN ideology, which remains a subject of ongoing debate among scholars.³⁵⁴ Doncov himself addressed the question of fascism in his 1923 article 'Are we fascists?' published in the L'viv magazine *Zahrava*. He argued that while Ukrainian nationalism shared certain characteristics with Italian Fascism, it was a distinct national phenomenon.³⁵⁵ However, this seemingly dismissive stance may not have reflected a fundamental rejection of fascist ideas. As Golczewski points out, Doncov later declared, 'If this is the program of fascism, then we are fascists for that matter!'³⁵⁶

While some scholars choose to allocate the concept of 'integral nationalism' over fascism to Ukraine, which focuses on fact that the OUN(-B)-UPA fought for the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian state, which was not the case in other European fascists movements,³⁵⁷ others, like historian Franziska Bruder, highlight the OUN-B's 'fascist character,' pointing to its explicit references to Italian Fascism and its positive reception of certain aspects of National Socialism.³⁵⁸ Historian Per Rudling further supports Bruder's view, identifying parallels between the OUN and Italian Fascism, Nietzschean thought, and National Socialism,

³⁵¹ Golczewski, *Deutsche*, 548.

³⁵² Ibid., 517–518.

³⁵³ Rudling, „The OUN,“ 3.

³⁵⁴ Golczewski, *Deutsche*, 573.

³⁵⁵ Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: the ideological origins and development of Ukrainian nationalism 1919–1929* (Columbia University Press, 1980), 113–114.

³⁵⁶ Golczewski, *Deutsche*, 573–574.

³⁵⁷ John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (Columbia University Press, 1955), 279; Motyl, *Turn*, 166–167; Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 597.

³⁵⁸ Franziska Bruder, 'Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!'. Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948 (Metropol Verlag, 2007), 35.

emphasizing a combination of extreme nationalism, terrorist tactics, corporatism, and the *Führerprinzip*.³⁵⁹ And Golczewski, despite the lack of explicit self-identification as a fascist movement in official OUN texts, argues that numerous indications suggest that the OUN-B was influenced by the ideological structures of fascism and National Socialism.³⁶⁰ This inconsistencies among scholars reflects the complexity of defining the OUN's and UPA's ideology.

Against this background, determining whether the OUN(-B)-UPA can be definitively labelled as a fascist movement remains challenging, also due to the lack of a universally accepted definition of fascism.³⁶¹ However, despite a lack of agreement regarding the OUN's and UPA's ideology, it is crucial to acknowledge their involvement in numerous atrocities in the 20th century.³⁶² From 1943 to 1944, the UPA, under the command of Roman Shukhevych, engaged in widespread violence, including the 'ethnic cleansing' of Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian populations who did not support the nationalist agenda of the OUN-B. The UPA mobilized the population against both the Nazi-German occupation and Soviet partisan units, while also collaborating with Nazi-Germany at times.³⁶³ According to Rudling, historians estimate the number of Jewish victims of the UPA differently, at around 1,000 to 2,000 (Grzegorz Motyka) to several thousand (John-Paul Himka) and the documented number of Polish victims killed by the OUN(-B)-UPA totals 88,700.³⁶⁴ Despite a purported shift towards democratic principles within the OUN(-B)-UPA and a break with Nazi-Germany, following the Nazi-German defeat at Kursk in July 1943 against the Soviet Union,³⁶⁵ pogroms against Jews and Poles continued until 1944.³⁶⁶

Postup published two articles in total that discussed the historical events surrounding the UPA, one in *Postup* 1990 no. 4 titled 'From today's point of view'³⁶⁷ and a second one that stretched across multiple issues titled 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' published in *Postup*

³⁵⁹ Rudling, „The OUN,“ 3.

³⁶⁰ Golczewski, *Deutsche*, 591.

³⁶¹ Roger Griffin, *Faschismus. Eine Einführung in die vergleichende Faschismusforschung* (Ibidem Verlag, 2020), 27–28.

³⁶² Irina Pavlenko, „Die Ukrainische Aufständischenarmee (UPA). Ein Abriß der Geschichte ihres Widerstandes,“ *Militärgeschichte Zeitschrift* 61 (2002): 73–90, 78.

³⁶³ Golczewski, „Geschichtsnarrative,“ 54. For more details of this collaboration progressed in detail see, Mick, *Lemberg*, 314–315.

³⁶⁴ Rudling, „The OUN,“ 11–12. For a more detailed description of the history of UPA and Jews see John-Paul Himka, *Ukrainian Nationalists and the Holocaust: OUN and UPSs Participation in the Destruction of Ukrainian Jewry, 1941–1944* (Ibidem Verlag, 2021).

³⁶⁵ Bruder, *OUN*, 155.

³⁶⁶ Mick, *Lemberg*, 321.

³⁶⁷ *Postup*, 'From Today's Point of View' (March 1990, no. 4): 4–6.

no. 6, 7, 9, and 10.³⁶⁸ Only the second article will be discussed in detail. The first article, similar to *Postup*'s approach in 1989, which was to publish texts written by western scholars with Ukrainian roots, most likely to enhance credibility, was a reprint and translated version (into Ukrainian) of the Canadian-Ukrainian historian Orest Subtelny's text on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, first published in his book 'Ukraine: A History' in 1988.³⁶⁹ In a paragraph before the reprint of Subtelny's article, *Postup*'s editors explained their intention for publishing the historian's text. Apparently, the newspaper *Ukrainian Youth*, that was published by another youth association from the western Ukrainian city Stryi, had previously published the same text by Orest Subtelny, claiming to be a translation but allegedly distorting the original content significantly. The editors of *Postup* implied that the version presented in *Ukrainian Youth* introduced interpretations and elements that could not be found in Subtelny's work, but that represented glorifications of the OUN/UPA, pointing at a 'red-black/extremely nationalistic trend that is spreading among parts of the Ukrainian youth', therefore misrepresenting Subtelny's scholarly output. *Postup* criticized this practice for potentially misleading readers regarding historical facts and interpretations about the UPA:

The editorial office of 'Postup' is ready to pay a bonus of 1,000 rubles to those who, according to 'Ukrainian Youth', will find the following statement in Orest Subtelny's work: 'The people of Bandera by force then, at that time it was necessary, united the efforts of Borovets and Melnyk into a single force...'. Or try to find in 'Ukraine: A History' passages like 'the Greek Catholic Church became the most important component of the consolidation of all progressive forces, including the UPA' or 'whether it was until the end of the first half of the 50s that the shots did not stop, the heroic, doomed, but so necessary struggle for the freedom of Ukraine continued.' Everything sounds beautiful, the only problem is that all these 'pathos' has nothing to do with the book of Orest Subtelny. After all, to enable readers to see what was in the original; we present a fully relevant fragment from Subtelny's work in a translation that we prepared for publication independently of the editorial office of 'Ukrainian Youth'.³⁷⁰

With the 'new' translated and 'original' version of Subtelny's text, *Postup* called for a comparison with Subtelny's original work to expose the discrepancies and to ensure that readers are provided with accurate historical information.³⁷¹ Interestingly, Subtelny himself was later called out for indicating pro-nationalist sentiments in his publication from 1988. In a book review of his work written by Canadian historian Frances Swyrypa in 1990 it is said that 'Subtelny's personal sympathies with the non-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist position are obvious.'³⁷² The

³⁶⁸ *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (April 1990, no. 6; May 1990, no.7; July 1990, no. 9; September 1990, no. 10).

³⁶⁹ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto University Press, 1988).

³⁷⁰ *Postup*, 'From Today's Point of View' (March 1990, no. 4): 4.

³⁷¹ *Postup*, 'From Today's Point of View' (March 1990, no. 4): 4–6.

³⁷² Swyrypa, Frances, "Ukraine: A History by Orest Subtelny," *The Canadian Historical Review* 71 (1) (1990): 134–135, 134.

historian Yuliya Yurchuk identified pro-nationalist sentiments in Subtelny's descriptions of the UPA massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in his revised Ukrainian edition of the book from 1993. She pointed out that Subtelny's analysis was conducted in a 'rather cursory fashion, underlining the reciprocal character of the mass killings.'³⁷³ The use of 'rather cursory' and 'reciprocal' suggests that the treatment of this topic was somewhat quick or limited, focusing only on the basic facts or highlights, and particularly pointing out the mutual nature of the mass killings between Poles and Ukrainians. However, she mentions that any sort of referencing the 1940s mass killings between Poles and Ukrainians 'was revolutionary for its time' and that Subtelny, 'of course, was writing at a time when it was very difficult to access archives in Poland and Ukraine.'³⁷⁴

Reading Subtelny's book edition from 2012, it is obvious why Yurchuk made her claims. What immediately catches the reader's eye is the length of his articulations. Subtelny dedicated only half a page to the massacres between Poles and Ukrainians in his almost 700 page long (English edition) publication. After a short overview of the numbers of Polish and Ukrainian victims and providing dates and locations of some of the massacres, Subtelny finishes his paragraph by concluding that both, Ukrainians and Poles, were involved: 'it is clear that both Ukrainian and Polish armed units engaged in wholesale slaughter, bringing to a bloody climax the hatred that had been increasing between the two peoples for generations.'³⁷⁵ What to me, is most striking, is Subtelny's portrayal of Poles in Eastern Galicia. In his paragraph he emphasized that 'many' of the Poles that the UPA tried to 'drive out' of the territories of Volhynia, Polissia and Kholm were former 'colonists from the interwar period,' implying justification for the actions of the UPA. Referring to Poles as 'colonists from the interwar period', without offering any historical contextualisation, can be interpreted as a sign of diminishing Polish history in Eastern Galicia during the interwar period.³⁷⁶ So, while *Postup's* editors criticised the translation of Subtelny's text published in *Ukrainian Youth* as representing a nationalistic and misleading description of the OUN-UPA, their version of the translation of the text, which was supposed to reflect Subtelny's original text accurately, ended up being later critiqued by other scholars for similar reasons. Although Yurchuk's and Swyrypa's criticism did not accuse Subtelny's version of being

³⁷³ Yurchuk, "Reclaiming the Past," 115.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., footnote 3.

³⁷⁵ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 474–475.

³⁷⁶ For an example of Polish peasant in Eastern Galicia see, Olga Linkiewicz, "Peasant Communities in Interwar Poland's Eastern Borderlands: Polish Historiography and the Local Story," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 109 (2014): 17–36.

nationalistic per se, they did assert that it was pro-nationalist, indicating a more moderate form of bias.

The second article ‘What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?’ was published across four different newspaper issues in a total of 9.5 pages. Given that each of these four issues are composed of 8 pages, the historical article on the UPA covered approximately 30 percent of these issues, taking up a rather huge part of the publications. From the newspaper issues it is not entirely certain, who wrote the lengthy article. Two names appear in context with the articles, once in *Postup* issue no. 7, an author with the name ‘S. Andrienko’, and once at the end of the series article in *Postup* no. 10, with the name ‘S. Pakholkiv’. Svyatoslav Pakholkiv has been listed as one of *Postup*’s editors.³⁷⁷ Most likely, the articles were co-written by multiple authors. The text provides a comprehensive overview of the UPA and its historical context, that is spatially concentrated on several regions in Ukraine but focused on the western regions and temporally focuses on the 1940s. The authors claim to provide an unapologetic, historical representation of the UPA’s activities. However, the text holds several historical inaccuracies about the UPA. These historical inaccuracies occur in the form of overemphasizing specific attributes of the UPA, such as focusing on the military actions against Nazi-Germany and the Red Army while downplaying the OUN-UPA’s military collaboration with the Germans, as well as by leaving out major military executions, for example, the massacres of Poles, pogroms against Jews and executions of Ukrainians, who did not side with the nationalists. Even though, revisiting the historical sources and literature to refute *Postup*’s claims in detail is not the primary aim in this chapter, it is still important mentioning the existence of these inaccuracies. This is especially the case because this historical article represents the only one that was written by *Postup*’s writers, and not western historians, that cites historical sources, which allows to get insights into their analytical work with historical source material.

The authors published their historical essay in 1990, a time, when access to archival material was slowly opening up.³⁷⁸ The sources cited in their article reflect, for example, personal accounts written by former OUN and UPA members, such as the memoirs of Mykola Lebed, the leader of the OUN-B following Bandera’s imprisonment, or of the UPA veteran Ivan Dmytryk and his novel ‘In the Forests of the Lemko Region’, that depicts the authors memories

³⁷⁷ Субота, ‘Як починалося Товариство Лева’ (20 October 2022), <https://subota.online/iak-pochynalosia-tovarystvo-leva/> (last accessed 25.02.2024).

³⁷⁸ Maryna Paliienko, ‘The role and importance of archives in the transformation of modern Ukrainian society,’ *Atlanti+* 29 (1) (2019): 19–25, 20.

during his life in the UPA from 1944 to 1947.³⁷⁹ Another source collection that is frequently cited are the documents published in the volume series *Litopys UPA*. *Litopys UPA* is a series of 53 volumes that contains primary sources, memoirs and reprints of maps and official documents that inform about the history of the UPA and the armed underground from 1941 to 1959. According to data provided by the official website of the series, by 1990 it had published 18 volumes.³⁸⁰ *Postup* consistently cites (7 times) three volumes in their text, 1, 6 and 8,³⁸¹ indicating that they had access to these publications. Whether the authors had access to volumes beyond those, remains unclear. The historian John A. Armstrong inspected the scope, limitations, and strengths of the *Litopys UPA* volume series in a review published in 1990. Arguing that the series represents ‘an indispensable data base for anyone interested in recent Ukrainian affairs, and one which will serve as a model for scholars trying to document other complicated aspects of East European history during World War II’ he had also cautioned anyone who interacts with the series to distinguish between ‘its inspirational, mythic elements as well as its ‘purely historical’ aspects.’³⁸²

Whether the representation of historical inaccuracies, such as those mentioned above, was conducted by *Postup*’s writers intentionally, or if they, as non-professionals, fell for the inspirational and mythic element in the volume series that Armstrong pointed out, is difficult to assess definitively. However, there is evidence that indicates an uncritical treatment of sources. If the writers had access to the full extent of, for example, volume 6 of the *Litopys UPA* series, it would be plausible to suggest that the authors cited specific sources that corresponded to *their* story of the UPA, neglecting evidence that potentially would create a more complex representation of the para-military force. To illustrate this point further, I will provide one example. In the article published in *Postup*, the authors portray the military activities between the Poles and the Ukrainians in the 1940s as a conflict that was mainly initiated by Polish actors and the UPA allegedly only responded with military counteractions. Apparently, the first of such counterattacks only happened in 1946, after the Polish para-military organisation Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej (ORMO) ‘committed a robbery in the village

³⁷⁹ Ivan Dmytryk, *In the Forests of the Lemko Region. Memoirs of a Soldier in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army* (Sucasnist, 1976).

³⁸⁰ Website, *Litopys UPA*, Main Series, <https://litopysupa.com/book-series/main-series/> (last accessed 25.02.2024).

³⁸¹ *Chronicles of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army*. Toronto: ‘*Litopys UPA*.’ Volumes 1 (1978, rev. ed. 1989), Volyn and Polissia: The German Occupation; Volumes 6 (1983, 253 pp.), The UPA in Light of German Documents, 1942–1945; Volumes 8 (1980, 319 pp.), The Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council. Documents, official publications, materials.

³⁸² John A. Armstrong, “Review: The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14 (1/2) (June 1990), 171–175, 171, 175.

Vyslo' in which '33 farms were burned to the ground' and about 50 people were wounded and 19 killed. The UPA responded with 'retaliatory actions' by demolishing 'stone houses in one of the cities with a predominantly Polish population', but due to the 'higher command' of the UPA, they retreated from destroying a 'Polish nunnery' that was made from stone bricks. As a source, the authors referenced the book by former UPA veteran Dmytryk *In the Forests of the Lemko Region*.³⁸³ However, as we can find in *Litopys UPA* volume 6, several German intelligence documents exist, that report on the atrocities committed by UPA soldiers on the Polish population before 1946, as for example in 1944, when German sources described how in a single month, in April 1944, at least 645 Poles were officially killed in a village by the UPA.³⁸⁴ Given that the writers of *Postup* cited German intelligence sources on one occasion in their UPA article, we can assume that a language barrier did not represent an obstacle.³⁸⁵ Of course, the documents created by the German intelligence service during the Second World War should not be taken for granted and require a historical analysis on its own. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that *Postup*'s writers did come across these documents, and deliberately chose neither to engage with them on an analytical level, nor to incorporate them into their assessment of the UPA.

As I said before, the aim here is not to refute the claims made by the authors of *Postup* regarding the activities of the UPA as mentioned in the article. For that a much deeper analysis of *Postup*'s text regarding statements made towards, to name a few, the role of Jews in the UPA army, the OUN-UPA's collaboration with Nazi Germany, and the conflict between Poles and Ukrainians is necessary, as well as an analysis of what other parts of UPA history were left out, considering *Postup*'s access to source material in 1990. However, if the conclusion is correct, that *Postup* deliberately neglected an analysis of certain source material, that could potentially question the narrative they wanted to portray of the UPA, then this supports the main arguments that I have identified by analysing the spatiality in the articulations about the UPA in the context of L'viv and its region, as will be discussed in the following.

³⁸³ *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (September 1990, no. 10): 6.

³⁸⁴ *Chronicles of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army*. Toronto: 'Litopys UPA.' Volumes 6 (1983, 253 pp.), *The UPA in Light of German Documents, 1942–1945*; Bericht über die Bandenlage im Monat April 1944, R 70 Polen/76, 139.

³⁸⁵ *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (April 1990, no. 6; May 1990, no. 7; July 1990, no. 9; September 1990, no. 10): 'German intelligence documents indicate that one of the UPA divisions in Bukovina had approximately 30 fights with Bolshevik partisans and regular units of the Red Army on July 10, 1944. Litopys UPA, vol. 6, p. 43'.

The spatial analysis of the multi-issue article has revealed that the western Ukrainian significance of the UPA is integrated into and reinterpreted within the framework of a national narrative, that emphasizes unity, national identity, and the significance of national struggles. The article thereby contributes to a nationalization of the regional history of the UPA. The regional historical narratives of the UPA in western Ukraine is turned into a symbol of all-Ukrainian significance, drawing a historic continuum for Ukrainians in the past to the present. This process materialises in argumentations in the text revolving around the organisational structure of the UPA and the ethnic and regional diversity of their members, the geographic extent of the UPA's military operations and the UPA's national historical significance for Ukraine's path to independence in the 1990s. Such a portrayal of the UPA is aligned with the argument that *Postup*'s writers could have deliberately left out more critical information about the UPA. A more critical view of the UPA would have collided with *Postup*'s approach of turning the para-military organisation into a heroic symbol for national independence. Critical statements could potentially have raised and underlined already prevailing negative perceptions about the UPA in Ukraine in 1990, as for example the mass killings of Poles and Jews and the collaborations with Nazi-Germany. In the following the above-mentioned spatial analysis will be delineated.

In the context of the organisational structures, the authors have consistently portrayed the UPA as a military unit, even though structurally bound to the OUN-B, with members composed of people from different ethnic and national backgrounds without a spatial limit, who were not necessarily party members of the OUN-B, and whose existence was solely bound to the geopolitical struggle for independence, against the Soviets and Nazi-Germany. The authors overemphasized that the UPA was a military force that fought on the side of all of Ukraine and downgraded the UPA's spatial connection to the western Ukrainian regions or to the party structures of the OUN-B, which elevated the UPA's historical legacy into Ukrainian-wide significance. The authors achieved that in phrases that described the military unit as a 'supra-party, an all-Ukrainian military force' that fought for the 'Ukrainian state', 'in alliance with other enslaved peoples for the independent national states of these peoples on their own lands.'³⁸⁶ The armed forces 'included members of the OUN from Bandera and Melnyk, as well as people without a party or those who considered themselves members or sympathizers of other political parties and organisations.'³⁸⁷ In other articulations the UPA was described as a

³⁸⁶ *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (July 1990, no. 9): 5.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

diverse composition of members, that included people with different professions, such as ‘nurses, mine workers, political educators, and administrators’, people from different regions, such as ‘Ukrainians from the East’ or from ‘Poltava, and Chernihiv’, people with other nationalities such as ‘Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Tatars and Georgians’, as well as Jews, ‘who the UPA saved from the Nazis’ and who functioned as doctors in the UPA units.³⁸⁸ Allegedly, such a diverse set of people from various Ukrainian regions, with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds and allegiances to different political institutions forced the OUN-B in 1943 on the Third Extraordinary General Meetings of the OUN, to change its ‘closed and elitist character’ by introducing social policies and turning democratic.³⁸⁹ The UPA is therefore portrayed as the driver for democratic change within the OUN-B.

In articulations regarding the geographic extent of the military activities of the UPA, *Postup*’s writers bring into focus the multiplicity and diversity of regions in which the UPA divisions were militarily active. The regions did not only encompass the spatial boundaries of Galicia, but also beyond. The authors therewith created a narrative of the UPA, in which they were not only fighting for western Ukraine, but for Ukrainians. First, to illustrate the division of the UPA’s strategic distribution across both Western and Central Ukraine, the writers mentioned how the UPA was territorially divided into groups: ‘UPA-North (covering Volyn, Rivne, and Chaska and Kyiv region), UPA-West (encompassing Zhytomyr, Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and partly Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi oblasts [...]) and UPA-South (parts of Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi regions).’³⁹⁰ What followed were numerous descriptions of military activities that stretched from Galicia, south to the Carpathians and Bukovina, further east to Kyiv.³⁹¹

In Central and Western Ukraine, particularly during May 1943, the UPA’s presence was marked in the Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Kamianets-Podilskyi regions. In this context it was mentioned that one UPA division executed fifteen successful engagements with German police units and Bolshevik partisans during the start of May 1943, across the Zhytomyr Region and the western part of the Kyiv Region. This division managed to defeat a German police force near Chitimir, consisting of 260 policemen, and achieved a significant victory over a

³⁸⁸ *Postup*, Article Series ‘What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?’ (July 1990, no. 9): 5.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*

large group of Germans near the village of Ustinivki in the Pochaiv district on July 25.³⁹² Western Ukraine, specifically Galicia, became a significant operational area for the UPA by June 1943 with the formation of its first detachments. These units engaged in conflicts against Soviet partisan groups, who experiences several defeats against the UPA in Volynia.³⁹³ Additionally, the UPA's had groups stationed in the Kholm and Lemkiv regions. This group focused on 'protecting the Ukrainian population from Polish military and paramilitary formations', highlighting the UPA's supposedly defensive operations against a variety of national forces.³⁹⁴ The authors also underline the UPA's military activities beyond Ukrainian borders. In the Bukovina region under Romanian occupation, the UPA's military operations arrived in April 1944. Military activities there were carried out by the Bukovina Ukrainian Self-Defense (BUSA), which later merged with UPA-West in May 1944, engaging in conflicts against the Red Army and partisans.³⁹⁵ Another example, that was mentioned, was the UPA's manoeuvre in the Carpathians in the summer of 1944, in which two and a half thousand UPA fighters crossed to the other side of the front in the Carpathians.³⁹⁶

In articulations evolving around the UPA's national historical significance for Ukraine's path to independence in the 1990s, the writers of *Postup* reshaped the regional historical legacy of the UPA into a legacy that is relevant on a national level. Through articulations about the UPA members' fate following the Second World War, that for most ended in a Soviet labour camp, *Postup's* writers draw a historic continuum from the fate of the UPA soldiers in the Soviet Gulags to Ukraine's urge for national revival in 1990. The writers argue, that even know little is known about the history of the UPA in the Gulags, the UPA prisoners were responsible for waging riots within the labour camps, due to their long-standing experience of organising themselves.³⁹⁷ This, on the other hand incentivised protests and led to the first human rights movements in the Soviet Union, which then again, influenced the national democratic movement, referred to as the Symonenko generation³⁹⁸ in the 1960s, which represents the

³⁹² *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (July 1990, no. 9): 4.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁹⁷ *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (September 1990, no. 10): 6.

³⁹⁸ Vasyl Symonenko was a prominent Ukrainian poet, writer, and journalist, and part of the literary generation of the 1960s known as the 'sixtiers' who advocated for cultural and artistic freedom in Ukraine. He was a critic of Stalin's repressions, who demanded an analysis of the Soviet historic past, an end of political interference in spheres of culture, and the promotion of the Ukrainian language. Symonenko's activism played a significant role in the cultural revival of Ukraine. See, Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 507.

origin of Ukraine's will for national revival in 1990.³⁹⁹ In providing this conclusion, *Postup*'s writers proposed an answer to the broader question posed in the title of their article: 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?'. They subsequently imply that the UPA's historical legacy is not spatially bound to the activities in western Ukraine or temporally bound to its direct military engagements during the Second World War but is reflected in the spirit of resistance and national revival of Ukraine as a whole in the 1990s.

The authors transformed the history of the UPA, a spatially bound regional phenomenon to western Ukraine, into a historical narrative that implies significance for all of Ukraine. This nationalization of regional history is achieved through *Postup*'s descriptions of the diverse spatial, ethnic and class distribution of the UPA's members, the spatially broad military activities of the UPA beyond western Ukraine, and the creation of a narrative in which the UPA, is at first, separate of the OUN-B, and later incorporated into the OUN-B, when the authors allocated a shift towards democratic ideals in the OUN, in which the UPA is portrayed as the driving force for this change. At last, the nationalization of the UPA into a nation-wide becomes apparent in the authors attempt to frame the activities of the UPA in the Soviet Gulags following the Second World War into the dissident movements of Ukraine in the 1960s and to the struggle for national independence today, therefore creating a historic continuum from the UPA's temporal role in the 1940s to its influence in the 1960s to the political transformation unfolding in Ukraine in 1990.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church

Until Gorbachev's political term, a rather small portion of religious institutions, predominantly the Russian Orthodox Church under the patriarch in Moscow, held functioning parishes in the Soviet Union, of which a third were located in Soviet Ukraine.⁴⁰⁰ With the institutional changes brought forward during Gorbachev's reformation policies in the late 1980s, a renewal of religious institutions and the relation between church and state took place, that in Ukraine in 1989 accumulated in the legalisation of, among others, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Until then, clergymen from the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate had continuously denied the existence of Ukrainian Catholics, even though L'vivians openly celebrated Greek-Catholic public services, as in spring

³⁹⁹ *Postup*, Article Series 'What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?' (September 1990, no. 10): 6.

⁴⁰⁰ Victor Yelensky, "Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era: The Case of Ukraine (with Special References to Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues)," *BYU Law Review* (1) (2002): 453–488, 453.

1989 with 30.000 participants, or protested for the legalisation of the UGCC with about 250.000 participants, as in September 1989.⁴⁰¹ At the end of 1989, three religious institutions dominated the religious discourse in Ukraine, the UGCC under Myroslav Cardinal Liubachivs'kyi in Rome, the UAOC headed by patriarch Myroslav Skrypnyk from New Jersey in the United States and the Russian Orthodox Church under the patriarch Aleksey II in Moscow.⁴⁰² Due to feeling threatened by the renewal of the UGCC and the UAOC, the Russian Orthodox Church renamed its Ukrainian exarchate, the administrative unit of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).⁴⁰³ This formal change was important from the perspective of the Russian Patriarchate to maintain its dominance, since out of approximately 7.000 Russian orthodox parishes within the Soviet Union, more than 4.000 were located on Soviet Ukrainian territory.⁴⁰⁴ The newly established UOC was headed by Filaret Denysenko. With Ukraine's independence in 1991, the Metropolitan Filaret demanded full canonical independence for the reformed UOC from the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow, an attempt that was not only denied by the Russian Orthodox authorities but also demanded of Filaret to step down from his position as head of the UOC. However, the Metropolitan refused to give up his position and instead in 1992, Filaret and his followers merged with the UAOC into a united and independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Kyievan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) headed by the patriarch Myroslav Skrypnyk and Filaret as assistant. Not everyone within the UAOC welcomed the merger, and when the Ukrainian patriarch Skrypnyk died in June 1993, the once united UOC-KP split into UOC-KP and UAOC, leaving the Ukraine with three branches of Orthodoxy.⁴⁰⁵

With the emergence of religious plurality, the religious institutions competed not only for the use of religious buildings⁴⁰⁶ but also for membership numbers and parishes. From 1989 to 1991, parishes of the UAOC and the UGCC became mainly dominant in western Ukraine, while the UOC was dominant in central and eastern Ukraine. Former Russian Orthodox clergymen in western Ukraine joined the renewed UAOC and UGCC. By late 1990, more than 2.000 Greek-Catholic parishes existed in western Ukraine.⁴⁰⁷ With the merger of the UAOC and the

⁴⁰¹ Serge Keleher, "Out of the Catacombs: The Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine," *Religion in Communist Lands* (1991): 251–263, 251–252.

⁴⁰² W. Wasyliv Zenon, "Orthodox Church Division in Newly Independent Ukraine, 1991–1995," *East European Quarterly* *XLI* (3) (September 2007): 305–322, 308.

⁴⁰³ Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 720.

⁴⁰⁴ Zenon, "Orthodox Church," 308.

⁴⁰⁵ Zenon, "Orthodox Church," 308–311.

⁴⁰⁶ Keleher, "Out of the Catacombs," 261.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 255.

UOC, under Filaret, the UAOC dominating role in western Ukraine extended to parishes in central and eastern Ukraine. The original UOC, headed by the patriarch in Moscow (UOC-MP), remained its dominance in eastern and southern Ukraine. When the UOC-KP split, the UAOC, again was primarily dominant in western Ukraine, while the UOC-KP and UOC-MP had most of their parishes in the remaining Ukrainian regions.⁴⁰⁸

Discussion surrounding the re-establishment of the UGCC and the UAOC in Ukraine, reached the editors of *Postup* already in 1989, as showcased in the November issue (no. 15), and publications intensified over the course of 1990.⁴⁰⁹ In 1989, *Postup*, in support for the renewal of the UGCC and the UAOC, published three texts, that are considered as a single article, since they structurally belonged together. Two of these texts were reprints of religious speeches, one given by Andrey Sheptytsky, the Greek Catholic Archbishop of L'viv from the first half of the 20th century, and the second by Myroslav Cardinal Liubachiv's'kyi, who became the archbishop of L'viv and head of the UGCC in the 1980s. The third text published in the same issue, represented an appeal addressed to the people of the western regions and signed by several national democratic organisations, such as the Cultural and Scientific Society of Rukh, the Lion Society or the regional branch of 'Memorial'. With the appeal, the authors, acknowledged the dominance of the UGCC in Galicia, recognized the right of the UAOC to exist in Ukraine independent of the Moscow Patriarchate, condemned the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Orthodox Church and urged the clergy of the UGCC and UAOC not to let past disagreements become a dominating factor in the renewal of their churches today, that could potentially harm national unity and the struggle for Ukrainian national renewal.⁴¹⁰ The message contained in the appeal was consistently reproduced through texts in *Postup* in 1990. In 1990, a total of two articles, two interviews and an excerpt from a text written by one of the interviewees, all of which contained historical elements about the significance of the religious institutions, were published. Resemblances to the appeal can be identified in the two articles and discussions surrounding the two interviews. In the following these four texts will be delineated in further detail.

⁴⁰⁸ Zenon, "Orthodox Church," 308–311.

⁴⁰⁹ *Postup*, January 1990, no. 2; March 1990, no. 4; April 1990, no. 6.

⁴¹⁰ *Postup*, 'Appeal' (November 1989, no. 15): 3–4.

In 1990 a total of four articles were published, of which two were interviews.⁴¹¹ The two articles were published in *Postup* 1990, no. 2 and *Postup*, no. 4. The first text titled ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ was written by one of *Postup*’s editors Svyatoslav Pakholkiv and published in January 1990.⁴¹² The second article titled ‘Monologue’ was written by Ukrainian publicist, participant of the ‘sixtiers’ dissident movement and former Soviet political prisoner Yevhen Sverstiuk.⁴¹³ A deeper analysis of the articles has revealed that both, Pakholkiv and Svestiuk, contributed to a nationalization of the regional significance of the Catholic church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. On the one hand, by applying spatial significance to the two religious institutions, *Postup* justified the right of each religious institution to exist in Ukraine. On the other hand, *Postup* deconstructed regional differences based on religious beliefs – by advocating for the unity of the Catholic and the Orthodox churches on a societal, as well as, on an institutional level – for the broader purpose of a united national revival of Ukraine. While Pakholkiv draw a historic continuum from the significance of the two churches in the past to its meaning in the present, Sverstiuk’s temporal focus was set in the present.

Spatially justifying the existence of the UGCC and the UAOC is achieved in the articles by discussing the significance of the UGCC in the western Ukrainian territories (Galicia, Bukovyna, Transcarpathia) and the significance of Orthodoxy in the regions of Transdnier, Southern Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, and Polissia. Pakholkiv discusses in detail the spatiality of the churches by placing the origins of Orthodoxy and the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine spatially towards Polish and Russian lands. He argued that these two churches emerged as a result of resisting Polish domination and influence in western Ukraine and Russian in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Accordingly, in the west of Ukraine ‘Orthodoxy played a significant role in the struggle against Polish enslavement in the 11th to 13th centuries’ but in the 17th century ‘under the pressure of Russian tsarism, moved from the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Patriarch of Moscow’ which increased ‘the Russification of the peoples annexed to Russia.’⁴¹⁴ The Greek Catholic Church on the other hand, took on a national role

⁴¹¹ *Postup*, ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ (January 1990, no. 2): 3; *Postup*, ‘Monologue’ (January 1990, no. 4): 1–2; *Postup*, Interview with UAOC representatives (January 1990, no. 4): 2–3; *Postup*, Interview with Andrii Chirovsky (April 1990, no. 6): 7–8.

⁴¹² *Postup*, ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ (January 1990, no. 2): 3.

⁴¹³ *Postup*, ‘Monologue’ (January 1990, no. 4): 1–2; Vakhtang Kipiani, ‘Yevhen Sverstiuk’, *Istorychna Pravda* (12 November 2021), <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/eng/dissidents/articles/618e6f0344904/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁴¹⁴ *Postup*, ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ (January 1990, no. 2): 3.

in western Ukraine ‘in a difficult struggle against Polish influence’ in the 19th century, while in the east of Ukraine the church was ‘practically destroyed by Russian tsarism.’⁴¹⁵ While Pakholiv engaged in a historical contextualisation to justify the existence of two Christian churches in Ukraine and explain their spatial divide between the Catholic dominance in western Ukraine and Orthodox dominance in the remaining Ukrainian regions, Svestiuk simply acknowledged the churches’ existence and, with it, the binary spatial perception as a ‘tradition’, without offering a historical context or even questioning their right to persist:

In the east of Ukraine there will be an autocephaly, and in the west - a Catholic one according to tradition [...] Wherever there are communities that want an Orthodox Ukrainian Church, there will be an Orthodox Church, regardless of whether it is in the West or the East. If we have Catholic communities in Kyiv, why not open a Ukrainian Catholic Church.⁴¹⁶

Svestiuk rather addressed the consequences of this ‘tradition’ in his contemporary world.⁴¹⁷ By 1990, the emergence of these two religious institutions reignited narratives, that on the one hand, propagated the re-emergence of the Catholic Church as an attempt to draw western Ukraine under Polish hegemony, and on the other hand, denied Ukrainian Orthodoxy any autonomy, viewing it as an inherent part of Russian Orthodoxy. To contradict these narratives that potentially could fuel a national divide among Ukrainians, Svestiuk downplayed a potential conflict that could arise in Ukraine from two religious institutions – ‘it does not seem to me that this is a significant dispute between Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox,’⁴¹⁸ – and instead underlined the historical significance of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the national consciousness of Ukrainian Catholics: ‘No one will say that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church does not have its own soil. The ground is deeper than any official or authority. And no one will say, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church leads to Polonization, national renunciation. Patriotism of Ukrainian Greek Catholics is an axiom.’⁴¹⁹

Apart from justifying the existence of the churches by revisiting their historical significance in the past and contemporary meaning in the present, both authors also deconstructed regional differences based on religious beliefs to support the idea of a united Ukrainian Church, that encompasses both, the Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox institutions. Throughout the text, both authors refrained from making personal statements about their preferences regarding one Christian institution and denied any dominance of one church over the other. They rather

⁴¹⁵ *Postup*, ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ (January 1990, no. 2): 3.

⁴¹⁶ *Postup*, ‘Monologue’ (January 1990, no. 4): 2.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1–2.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

urged their readers to overcome regional differences based on religious allocation, that both deem crucial for an all-regional national revival in Ukraine. Pakholkiv deconstructed regional difference and advocated for church unity by creating a historic continuum from attempts for unification of Ukrainian Catholics and Orthodox in the past to the present. He specifically referenced historical figures and their efforts towards ecclesiastical unity in the past, and because of that advocated for the contemporary idea of merging the Ukrainian Catholics and the Ukrainian Orthodox under a single entity. He temporally dates back the first attempt of a unified church to the 16th and 17th century by revisiting the activities of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Josyf Veliamyn Rutsky.⁴²⁰ Rutsky was the Metropolitan of Kyiv from 1613 until his death in 1637, who was initially Orthodox but converted to Catholicism. He played a major role in the reformation of the churches in Ukrainian lands during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth following the Union of Brest from 1595 to 1596 and sought to bridge Eastern Orthodox traditions with Roman Catholics. The Brest Union formally established, among others, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as the result of the desire of the Orthodox Metropolitanate of Kyiv to shift from the Patriarchate of Constantinople to the Bishop of Rome.⁴²¹ Stating that back then the ‘idea arose to create the Kyiv Patriarchate, which would unite the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches into a single local church’, Pakholkiv defined the activities of Rutsky as the beginning of church unity in Ukraine.⁴²² He portrayed the national united church as a key element of the Ukrainian people’s struggle for independence and identity, both historically and in contemporary times. Pakholkiv therewith followed a trend that could be observed among political actors of the democratic movement Rukh in 1990, such as Ivan Drach and Viacheslav Chornovil, who both linked the idea of an independent and united Ukrainian church to a united, sovereign Ukrainian state.⁴²³ Moreover, Pakholkiv allocated a special role to the Galicians in the attempt to unite Ukrainian Greek Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox believers. Accordingly, he was of the opinion that the Galicians, which refers to the people located in the contemporary Ukrainian regions of L’viv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, were at the front of the national revival in Ukraine in 1990, and therefore played a pioneering role for all other Ukrainians: ‘Given the avant-garde role that Galicia played in the processes of national revival, it is Galicia that would set an example of religious

⁴²⁰ *Postup*, ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ (January 1990, no. 2): 3.

⁴²¹ Anastacia K. Wooden, “A Brief History of the Union of Brest and Its Interpretations,” in V. Latinovic and A. K. Wooden (eds.), *Stolen Churches or Bridges to Orthodoxy?* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 41–62, 43.

⁴²² *Postup*, ‘Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context’ (January 1990, no. 2): 3.

⁴²³ Michał Wawrzonek, *Religion and Politics in Ukraine: The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches as Elements of Ukraine’s Political System* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 140–141. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uniluebooks/reader.action?docID=3051786>

tolerance on the basis of national solidarity.⁴²⁴ Pakholkiv not only implied that western Ukrainians were ahead of their time and served as a guiding light for the rest of the nation, but also positioned their contribution as central to the struggle for national Ukrainian revival in 1990. Similar to Pakholkiv, Svestiuk also deconstructed regional differences based on religious beliefs and advocated for church unity, however his argumentation was, in contrast to Pakholkiv, concerned with present circumstances. He deconstructed regional differences by pointing out the commonalities between the two religious institutions that he based on Christian values. He urged *Postup*'s readers to 'take each other's hands and do not ask, who is Catholic and who is Orthodox. [...] Catholics and Orthodox, become Christians and Ukrainians.'⁴²⁵ The author addressed all Christians in Ukraine to transcend religious disagreements that are bound to regional differences for the greater cause of Ukrainian unity and sovereignty.

Postup's stance towards the re-establishment of the two church institutions, that is represented through the descriptions delineated above, would also manifest in the two interviews with the church leaders of the UAOC and of the UGCC. Even though, the interviews represent the opinions of church leaders and therefore not directly resemble *Postup*'s perception on the re-emergence of the two churches, editorial notes published along with the interviews allow us to get an idea *Postup*'s view. Similar to the opinions expressed in the articles of Pakholkiv and Sverstiuk, *Postup* advocated for a peaceful co-existence of the Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox churches, that would eventually lead to a united Ukrainian church. This opinion was expressed in an editorial note, in which editors indicated their support for the statements made by the interviewee from the Catholic church.

The first interview was published in March 1990 in issue no. 4. Interviewee were three Ukrainian church figures from the UAOC: Vasyl Bodnarchuk (referred to as Archbishop John), at the time Honorary Chairman of the Diocesan Council, Volodymyr Yarema, who would become Patriarch of Kyiv and all of Ukraine from 1993 to 2000, and Bohdan Rokhakh, chairman of the L'viv Brotherhood of St. Andrew, an Orthodox brotherhood that dates back to 16th century L'viv which was revived under the UAOC in 1989.⁴²⁶ The printed interview does not indicate who of the three interviewees answered which question. Topics of discussions

⁴²⁴ *Postup*, 'Ukrainian Church Problems in the National Context' (January 1990, no. 2): 3.

⁴²⁵ *Postup*, 'Monologue' (January 1990, no. 4): 2.

⁴²⁶ *Postup*, Interview with UAOC representatives (January 1990, no. 4): 2.

evolved around the significance of the UAOC in western Ukraine, which was highly dominated by Catholicism, its potential future recognition by the Eastern Patriarchates, about the disputes between the UAOC and the UGCC concerning religious buildings, and the main problems the UAOC is facing since its re-establishment. Following the publication of the interview, *Postup*'s received a lot of feedback from its readers, stating dissatisfaction with the editor's lack of critical engagement with the interviewees' statements. The editors openly addressed this criticism posed by their readers in *Postup* issue no. 6, by publishing an interview with the founding director of the Sheptytsky Institute and Ukrainian Catholic priest, Andrij Chirovsky, stating that Chirovsky's 'opinions are close to the editor's'.⁴²⁷ Even though, it is not addressed what exactly caused the dissatisfaction among the readers, the analysis of the two interviews indicates that it evolved around statements issued by the three church figures concerning the historical legitimacy of the UGCC and their perception of the UAOC in Soviet Ukraine. During the interview the three Orthodox church figures are questioned by *Postup* to comment on the role of the UAOC in Galicia, asking 'During the last years, Galicia was entirely Greek-Catholic. To what extent are they entitled to the formation of the UAOC?'⁴²⁸ The interviewees used this moment to portray the UGCC as an institution that was not organically adopted by the Ukrainian people but rather imposed through external pressures, particularly from Catholic Poland. This, they argue, becomes apparent in the resistance of various Ukrainian peoples, such as Cossacks, who viewed Catholicism as a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and spiritual independence. They continue to reason that the Orthodox properties and institutions were converted to Greek Catholicism by force and that these actions lacked the consent of the local Ukrainian communities. The interviewees also expressed concerns over the perceived loss of Orthodox identity due to the UGCC's alignment with the Roman Catholic Church. They assured that the UGCC, serves the Vatican, which they imply weakens the UGCC's Ukrainian and Eastern Christian identity. Finally, the UAOC representatives advocated for the restoration of native Orthodoxy and the formation of the UAOC as a mean to reclaim Ukrainian religious and cultural independence. They view the UGCC with scepticism, citing ongoing disputes over church properties and accusing the UGCC of hindering religious unity and autonomy in Ukraine.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ *Postup*, no headline (April 1990, no. 6): 6; *Postup*, Interview with Andrij Chirovsky (April 1990, no. 6): 7–8.

⁴²⁸ *Postup*, Interview with UAOC representatives (January 1990, no. 4): 2.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*

The interviewee from the second interview, Andrij Chirovsky, was directly confronted with the statements posed in the former interview, '*Postup*, no. 4 for this year includes an interview with representatives of the UAOC. How could you comment on this interview?'.⁴³⁰ Chirovsky's responses did neither cite the opinions expressed by the three interviewees specifically, nor directly targeted individual statements, but rather addressed the concerns and criticisms raised in the UAOC interview in a broader sense. Chirovsky attempted to debunk the accusation regarding a full dependency of the UGCC on the Vatican, by mentioning the significant autonomy that the UGCC has enjoyed, especially post-Second Vatican Council. He also criticized the lack of understanding of these developments by some critics, especially those stemming from a lack of theological education and understanding of church history and ecumenism. He suggested that criticisms often rely on misconceptions or incomplete knowledge of the church's role, teachings, and the intentions behind its actions. Other than the church figures from the UAOC, Chirovsky positioned himself as an advocate for unity and understanding, calling for a more informed and respectful dialogue between the UGCC and its critics. He centralized the aspect in his interview, that he acknowledges the legitimacy of the UAOC in Galicia, with L'viv at its centre, and called for reconciliation between the UGCC and the UAOC, so that religious plurality will unite and not divide Ukraine and Ukrainians:

Today, when Greek Catholics and Orthodox on the streets of L'viv open their mouths, mostly pain comes out. A pain that could not be expressed after many decades. Today, all the pain, all the emotions, all those feelings pour into human hearts, which it is not always in the positive form. But I am sure that the pain will go away a little bit, with time passed, the wounds will heal a little bit, if we are careful not to create new wounds, and not until that blessed day of full Ukrainian independence comes, when the interference of foreign states in the Ukrainian national and religious question ends, then one day, understanding will come. Some people want it to be complete at once, in one religious union and one Ukrainian Church. Until we get to that point, we must learn to tolerate each other. First of all, Greek-Catholics must accept the fact that it is possible to be a Ukrainian Orthodox and be a real Ukrainian, and not a Muscophile, and Ukrainian Orthodox must accept the fact that it is possible to be a Greek-Catholic and a real Ukrainian, and not a Polonophile.⁴³¹

It is here, where the statements issued by Chirovsky resemble the opinions expressed in the two earlier articles written by Pakholkiv and Svestiuk. All three authors disseminated the idea of church unity, institutionally and among their followers, to achieve the broader goal of national unity and independence, implying that a division between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, that is bound to regional differences, could potentially hinder a united Ukrainian national revival. Even though, *Postup's* editors explicitly sided with the statements issued by Chirovsky,

⁴³⁰ *Postup*, Interview with Andrij Chirovsky (April 1990, no. 6): 8.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

publishing both interviews can be interpreted as an attempt underline the crucial role of both, the Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox churches, in western Ukraine, as well as an indication for their support for both Ukrainian-led religious institutions for an all-Ukrainian unity.

Concluding Remarks

Considering the years 1989 to 1990, the L'viv appeared on the mental map of *Postup* as a place of historical legacy. The analysis of this historical meaning has revealed that the editors of *Postup* followed a strategy that Kasianov conceptualised as 'nationalizing history.' The extent to which this occurred, however, differed among the writers.

In discussions surrounding the origin of the blue-yellow flag, emphasis was put on two aspects, first, historically justifying the significance of the national flag for the western Ukrainian region, and second, on creating a narrative that proves that the origin of the flag can be found in multiple Ukrainian regions, not just in western Ukraine, and should therefore be regarded as the national flag for all of Ukraine. In historical essays about Ukrainian nationalism, the struggle of the territories, that correspond to the western regions of contemporary Ukraine, against the Soviet Union in the early 20th century was utilized to create a historic continuum to Ukraine's struggle against communism in the present. This strategy can mainly be found in one article, written by Kosiv, while the other two articles on Ukrainian nationalism, written by historians, only served as a revival of western Ukraine's pre-Soviet past. In the multi-issue article on the activities of the UPA from 1990, a narrative was created that turned the Ukrainian paramilitary unit, mainly located in the western territories of today's Ukraine, into an organisation that was significant not only for the liberation of western Ukraine, but for all of Ukraine. Finally, in historical articles about religious institutions, spatial arguments were utilized to justify the right of the Catholic and Orthodox churches to exist in Ukraine, and emphasis was put on deconstructing regional differences based on history by advocating social and institutional unity. While the approach of each of the authors differed, in how western Ukrainian history was nationalized, the purpose of publishing all of these articles was to justify the historical foundation for an independent Ukrainian state.

The Baltics

For this sub-chapter the locations 'the Baltics', 'Estonia' and 'Lithuania' were considered for the analysis. The topic categories in which the locations were referenced were 'State

Development’ and ‘Activism’. The topic category ‘Religion’ did not correspond to any references to either of the three locations. This is mainly due to the fact, that this topic category covered articles that elaborated on the development of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches which were spatially focused on Ukraine. The spatial orientation towards the Baltic countries mainly manifested in the year 1989, as also evident in the heatmap. References to the Baltic countries, encompassing the locations ‘the Baltics’, ‘Lithuania’ and ‘Estonia’ vanished from the list of Top 15 locations from 1990 onwards. The following analysis of these three locations centralizes the year 1989, but also considers the decreasing interest in these locations since 1990. It has revealed that the locations ‘the Baltics’, ‘Lithuania’ and ‘Estonia’ were attributed with political meaning, that contributed to the creation of ‘the Baltics’ as a place of democratic progress.

1989: A Place of Democratic Progress

The Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania experienced a period of significant democratic transformation in the late 1980s to 1991, resulting in the restoration of their independence from the Soviet Union. This period was characterized by a series of events that paved the way for the Baltics’ emergence as sovereign democracies. In Estonia, for example, the proposed construction of a massive oil mining project, which would have had devastating environmental consequences, sparked widespread protests in 1987. These protests successfully delayed the project for two years and marked a turning point in the struggle for Estonian independence.⁴³² In April 1988, the idea of forming an opposition group to accelerate the political restructuring as part of perestroika emerged in Estonia and by October, Estonians had formed its opposition party *Eestimaa Rahvarinne*, also commonly referred to as Estonia’s Popular Front. Similar opposition parties that became known as Popular Fronts emerged in Latvia and Lithuania in the same year. In Latvia, an initial group of the Latvian Popular Front (*Latvijas Tautas Fronte*) already organised in June 1988, and held its official founding congress one week after the Estonians, on 8 and 9 October 1988. Lithuania established its Popular Front *Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis*, known as *Sąjūdis* in June 1988.⁴³³ Following the establishments of opposition parties, democratic processes began to politically materialise in the Baltics. On 17 November 1988, the Estonian Supreme Soviet declared the republic’s sovereignty, followed by

⁴³² Rein Taagepera, “Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists, Centrists and Restorationists,” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 20 (2) (1989): 175–90, 179.

⁴³³ Stefan Hedlung, “The Mice that Roared,” in Charles Clarke (ed.), *Understanding the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1991* (Hurst and Company, 2023), 56–66, 59–60.

Lithuania in May 1989 and Latvia in July 1989.⁴³⁴ This declaration of sovereignty was followed by elections to the national assemblies of all three Baltic republics, which resulted in the victories of the opposition parties. In early 1990, these republics formally announced their intention to transition towards independence,⁴³⁵ and in 1991, officially declared independence.

By 1989, news from the Baltics and their independence movements, especially from Lithuanians and Estonians, had reached L'viv. References to the locations 'the Baltics', 'Lithuania' and 'Estonia' were made in a total of 16 articles. Out of these, 4 articles centralized the location 'the Baltics', while the remaining 12 represent articles in which one of the three above-mentioned locations were referenced. The analysis of the locations within the topic categories 'State Development' and 'Activism' has revealed that the Baltic countries were attributed with political meaning that created them as a place of democratic progress, which unfolded in the writers' articulations on the level of two narratives: 'Inspiration' and 'Cooperation.' These narratives are visualized in the stacked area chart in figure 15. The chart shows the distribution of the narratives' frequencies over time.

The Baltics: Frequency of Narratives in Postup over Time, 1989 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 15 Postup: The Baltics – Frequency of Narratives, 1989–1991.

The first narrative, titled 'Inspiration,' includes articles that highlighted the Baltic states as a source of inspiration for Ukraine's path toward independence. Within this narrative, the authors portrayed the Baltic countries as progressing nations, emphasizing their ongoing democratic processes and advancements. As shown in the stacked area chart, this narrative was

⁴³⁴ Bohdan Harasymiw, *Post-Communist Ukraine* (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2002), 6.

⁴³⁵ Rein Taagepera, "The Baltic States," *Electoral Studies* 9 (4) (1990): 303–311, 303–304.

nearly consistent throughout 1989, with the exception of April, September and December. The narrative peaked in July 1989, a sudden increase not directly linked to any specific event in that month, but associated with *Postup*'s delayed coverage of events in the Baltics from May 1989. This temporal connection is further explored in analysis below.

The second narrative titled 'cooperation' encompasses articles in which the authors highlighted cooperative efforts between different groups of people and individuals from the Baltics and Ukraine. These articles reported on events and meetings involving Ukrainians, such as members of the Lion Society and the Ukrainian democratic movement Rukh, and Baltic citizens. These articles contributed to an understanding that *Postup*'s authors, along with other Ukrainian citizens, were actively engaging with individuals from the Baltics. These articles reported on events, meetings, cultural festivals, protests and international conferences involving Ukrainians, such as members of the Lion Society and the Ukrainian democratic movement Rukh, and Baltic citizens. The stacked area chart shows how this narrative occurred consistently from May to August 1989.

I argue, that these narratives that were identified in articles – which the editors of *Postup* chose and prepared for publication – conveyed to *Postup*'s readers that Ukraine and the Baltic states were engaged in a form of transnational activism. Transnational activism is here defined on the one hand as the 'construction of newly "imagined solidarities" across borders which inspired both new internationalisms and forms of domestic politics,'⁴³⁶ and on the other hand, as 'the cross-border mobilisation of individuals, groups and movements advocating for social and political change'⁴³⁷ In the following I demonstrate how the emphasis on the Baltics as a progressing democratic force within the 'Inspiration' narrative created an image of the Northern republics undergoing similar political processes as the Ukrainians. This contributed to a sense of 'imagined solidarity' between *Postup*'s readers and the people of the Baltics, centred on the shared struggle for independence and resistance against communism. On the other hand, the narrative of 'cooperation' shows the mobilisation of individuals and groups between Ukraine and the Baltics. Here, the editors of *Postup* – by reporting on activities involving Ukrainians and people from the Baltics, and by actively participating in these activities, such as through multiple visits to Vilnius, Lithuania – cultivated the notion that Ukraine and the

⁴³⁶ Maud Anne Bracke and Mark, James, Between Decolonialization and the Cold War: Transnational Activism and its Limits in Europe, 1950s–90s, *Journal of Contemporary History* 50 (3) (2015), 403–417, 403.

⁴³⁷ Thomas Davies et al., Rethinking Transnational Activism through Regional Perspectives: Reflections, Literatures and Cases, *Transactions of the RHS* (2024), 1–27, 2.

Baltics were not only sharing the same struggle but were also actively cooperating with each other to achieve their common goals.

1989: Inspiration

By 1989, Estonia had already formally issued its state sovereignty (1988), while Lithuania and Latvia were on the verge. On paper, such developments seemed far away in Ukraine in 1989, as opposition parties were only then officially establishing and beginning to consolidate their political powers (November 1989).⁴³⁸ While the political parties were rather slowly advancing, the young writers and editors of *Postup* and the Lion Society were already engaging in local acts of democratic restructuring. These democratic practices became apparent in newspaper articles published in *Postup* that have been discussed before, covering, for example, political protests in L'viv or the revival of national historical narratives. Beyond these local acts of activism, I identified patterns of transnational activism in which the writers and editors of *Postup* sought inspiration beyond national state borders, from the ongoing democratic processes in the Baltic countries, to inspire and shape Ukraine's path for independence. These patterns of portraying Baltic states as sources of inspiration appeared in *Postup* 1989, on the one hand, in five articles containing fragments that were frequently spread across various articles published throughout 1989, and on the other hand in four shorter texts here referred to as 'news briefs'. These news briefs differ from articles in their length, detail and purpose, as they are essentially short paragraphs of texts that convey the most important information in a concise format to quickly inform the reader about a wider range of topics.⁴³⁹

Within these texts, an *imagined solidarity* between the Baltics and Ukraine was constructed, where the democratic movements of the Baltic republics and their actions served as a source of inspiration for the democratic movements accompanied by the evolving domestic politics in Ukraine. The references in the short text fragments occurred in articles addressing political themes either explicitly or implicitly. These fragments were concise, typically spanning 1 to 3 sentences, with minimal detail provided. Despite their shortness, the frequent occurrence of

⁴³⁸ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 257. The UHU was formally (re-)established in 1988. The democratic opposition party Rukh was officially founded in September 1989. On 18 November 1989, these two parties and 38 additional informal groups consolidated their political power and merged into the party *Democratic Bloc*.

⁴³⁹ Despite the frequent occurrence of the Baltic countries as an inspirational point of reference, *Postup* did not publish articles that were fully dedicated to elaborating on the significance of the Baltic countries to the Ukrainian path for national restructuring.

such references throughout 1989 established a significant pattern which depicted the Baltic states as exemplars for Ukraine's political transformation.

In these text fragments political meaning was attributed to the Baltics, two of which are found within the July issue of *Postup*, no. 7. Here political meaning was only implied indirectly. These two references share a common theme of portraying the Baltics as regions of progress, both culturally and environmentally, serving as an example for Ukraine. In the first article, the Baltics were referenced as a place in which an emerging rock culture scene can be observed.⁴⁴⁰ According to the author, Yuriy Peretyatko, rock culture played a significant role in the struggle against social injustices, as became evident in the political transformation of Hungary and Poland, where the emergence of rock cultures correlated to the progression of democratic movements. Although the author acknowledges similar cultural formations in the Baltics (and Russia), he determines that in the Ukrainian context 'it is too soon to talk about rock culture or rather it is ironic.'⁴⁴¹ This portrayal positions the Baltics as a place of cultural progress with political impact in contrast to Ukraine's situation where such cultural-political correlations are not yet clearly articulated. The implied superiority of the Baltics appeared in a second article, representing a letter from one of *Postup's* readers.⁴⁴² Signed with M. Chernovok, the reader addresses the editors of *Postup* to raise awareness of the increasing air pollution in L'viv. As an engineer, the reader and some colleagues had measured the air quality in L'viv and concluded that it was at one point in the city 26 and at another 5 times above the maximum permissible concentration. The reader questioned, why nobody felt responsible for the increasing pollution, and why the city council did not prevent cars from driving through L'viv's historic old town, as 'all the civilised cities of the West and some of the Baltics' have done for quite some time.⁴⁴³ It is not specified which 'cities of the West' the reader referred to, but it can be assumed they alluded to a general perception of Western cities prevalent during the Cold War. As discussed earlier, 'the West' was often associated with modernity and industrialization, seen as a model of technological advancement, economic prosperity, and progressive societies. By comparing 'cities of the West' with the Baltics, Chernovok positioned the latter alongside these Western models as leaders in environmental and urban planning. This comparison suggested that the Baltics' were progressive republics that implement policies protecting public health and preserving historical sites, as opposed to L'viv.

⁴⁴⁰ *Postup*, 'A few thoughts after returning from the Ukrainian Song Festival' (July 1989, no. 7), 5: 5.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁴² *Postup*, 'Is the World Green? What Current do we need?' (July 1989, no. 7), 4: 4.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

Two additional short fragments attributing more precisely political meaning to the Baltics can be found in 1990. The first of such fragments appeared in one of *Postup*'s early issues (no. 3). Here a reference to the Baltics occurred in an article discussing the party programme of Rukh.⁴⁴⁴ The article was published to inform about the founding of the regional L'viv branch of Rukh, and the author Mykhailo Kosiv also commented on Rukh's party programme by drawing a direct comparison to the programmes from the Baltics. Specifically, he criticised the limited scope of one point in Rukh's party programme that defined the status of territorial sovereignty of Ukraine, arguing that this point was lacking an economic dimension, which would prevent the Soviet Union from making economic decisions on the territory of Ukraine. The point in Rukh programme was phrased followingly:

To strive for the true sovereignty of Ukraine, like other republics of the USSR, all land, water, air, minerals, energy resources, enterprises, roads, communications of the republic are national property, and they can be used by all-Union or republican departments only with the permissions of the Verkhovna Rada and the government of the Ukrainian SSR.⁴⁴⁵

He argued, that leaving out economic questions of territorial sovereignty in the party programme would 'paralyze the normal development of economy.' Kosiv suggested to draw inspiration from a phrasing 'the programs of the people's fronts of the Baltic republics' had produced, since they included an economic dimension that was 'more clearly and more fairly.'⁴⁴⁶ Other than Rukh's programme, the Latvians made it specific that the territorial sovereignty of the republic is bound to its 'economic independence,' which had been stated as seen in the following:

The NFL [*Latvijas Tautas Fronte*] recognizes the republic's right to ownership of the land and its subsoil, on land and territorial water, the sea, forests and all assets produced with state funds and located on the territory of Latvia. The economic independence of the republic is based on the right of Latvia. The SSR independently owns its property, disposes of and uses it.⁴⁴⁷

The other example in which the Baltics' political progress of their party programmes was perceived as a source of inspiration can be found in an article published in July 1989 titled 'About republican citizenship and territorial formations of military units', again written by

⁴⁴⁴ *Postup*, 'Rukh's People's Progress of Steel' (May 1989, no. 3), 1–4: 1.

⁴⁴⁵ *Postup* 'About republican citizenship and territorial formations of military units' (July 1989, no. 6), 1–2: 1.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

Mykhailo Kosiv.⁴⁴⁸ This time, the article was concerned about the need to restore the right of the republics of the USSR to form independent units based on the territorial principle and about the issue of republican citizenship. Specifically, the article argued that the republics' citizens did not hold any rights to their national citizenship, which became especially evident in the military sector, in which 'young men' were separated for the military service 'from their native land,' causing 'mental trauma.'⁴⁴⁹ Kosiv drew a comparison to the Baltics by introducing his article with the statement that 'such points' were already included in 'the programs of the People's Fronts of the Baltic republics', suggesting that the Baltic republics were further ahead in this regard.⁴⁵⁰

Beyond these two references to the party programmes of the Baltics, these regions were generally perceived as rapidly evolving democratic societies, that influenced the Soviet Union's direction, as evident in an article published by Taras Stetskiv, member of the Lion Society, frequent writer for *Postup* and later politician,⁴⁵¹ A reference to the Baltics occurred in the context of discussing the current state of political transformation in Ukraine. The author argued that the political structures of the Soviet Union were not designed for the evolving transformation Gorbachev had promised with perestroika. In contrary, Stetskiv criticised Ukraine's communist elite for their unwillingness to make political concessions and accused them of 'preparing to win back what they lost' during 'the first years of perestroika.'⁴⁵² The author only identified the party's willingness for concessions in moments, when 'a real threat of losing control' was imminent.⁴⁵³ As an example of such a moment, he pointed out the Baltics, which he perceived as the only regions with a strong democratic movement within the Union. He stated that 'the threat of the Baltic republics to exit the USSR forced the [Ukrainian] Verkhovna Rada to make decisions about their own their economic independence.'⁴⁵⁴ By drawing a connection between the Baltics political progress and transformation processes in Ukraine, Stetskiv portrayed the Baltic states as a catalyst for political change which was not

⁴⁴⁸ *Postup* 'About republican citizenship and territorial formations of military units' (July 1989, no. 6), 1.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴⁵¹ Visit Ukraine, Lion's Society in Lviv: History and Present (16.10.2023), <https://visitukraine.today/de/blog/2751/lions-society-in-lviv-history-and-present> (last accessed 14.03.2024).

⁴⁵² *Postup*, No Title (August 1989, no. 8), 1, 5: 1.

⁴⁵³ This becomes evident in another short fragment towards the end of the same article in which the authors states: Under the conditions of still weak democratic movements (with the exception of the Baltic States) the mafia [refers to communist elites] can deliberately engage in the provocation of riots and destruction. See *Postup*, No Title (August 1989, no. 8), 1, 5: 5.

⁴⁵⁴ *Postup*, No Title (August 1989, no. 8), 5.

spatially bound to the Baltic territories, but also prompted actions for political decisions regarding economic transitions in other parts of the Union, such as Ukraine.

References to the Baltics occurred also frequently in news briefs, specifically in 4 news briefs. These news brief references demonstrate the democratic significance in political narratives. *Postup* consistently aligned the Baltics with democratic advancements. Each reference, whether it includes information about legislative reforms, public opinion shifts, or collective Baltic efforts towards sovereignty and historical reconciliation, follow the pattern of portraying the Baltics as inspirational sources for democratic change. In the July issue no. 6, 1989, *Postup* informed about events from May 1989 in Estonia, such as the revocation of a decree that had banned certain individuals to return to Estonia since 1957, currency reforms, transition of household accounting from the Union's to the republic's jurisdiction, and the results of a public opinion poll that revealed decreasing support for communist leadership in Moscow, and larger support for the Estonian delegation.⁴⁵⁵ In the July issue no. 7, 1989, *Postup* provided information about democratic events from Estonia, and the Baltic Assembly. On May 18, the Estonian council aimed to adopt state budget and public administration laws focused on sovereignty and economic autonomy, emphasizing resource ownership and diverse forms of investment. The session of the Estonian council also called for reevaluating the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to address its detrimental effects on Estonia's sovereignty and the era of Soviet occupation that followed. From 13 to 14 June, the Baltic Assembly, representing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, endorsed documents advocating for rights, economic independence, democratic support, and addressing Stalinism's crimes, signalling a unified move towards addressing historical wrongs and economic collaboration.⁴⁵⁶ In August 1989, *Postup* published an update about electoral reforms in Lithuania, that were about to be introduced to ensure voting rights to temporary residents.⁴⁵⁷ In the last news brief, published in October 1989, *Postup* published information about a decree issued by Lithuanian Supreme Court concerning the military service of its citizens within the Armed Forces of the USSR. The decree represented a reform for the military service, aiming for Lithuania's citizens to serve within the territories of Lithuania or the Baltic Military District from 1990 onwards, with some changes starting immediately. It included, for example, plans to reestablish national military units for Lithuanians and halt the recruitment

⁴⁵⁵ *Postup*, 'Chronicles' (July 1989, no. 6), 6.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁷ *Postup*, No Title (August 1989, no. 9), 4.

into construction units from the Union, and amend laws to offer alternatives to men, who refuse to participate in the military service.⁴⁵⁸

1989: Cooperation

This inspiration sparking from the Baltic countries also materialised in active cooperation between the young L'vivians from *Postup* and the Lion Society and individuals and groups located in the Baltic countries, Lithuania and Estonia. This becomes visible in four articles fully dedicated to a topic centralizing the Baltic countries, and three articles containing text fragments, containing a short reference. From the articles three cooperative practices of transnational activism were identified that encompassed the spheres of culture, politics and media. These cooperative practices propagated a Soviet wide narrative of restructuring and renewal beyond Ukraine's state borders. Cultural cooperative practices underlined the mutual interest in Ukrainian and Baltic national traditions apart from shared Soviet narratives. This in turn, provided a sense of unity among members of Soviet societies, grounded in national interest. Political cooperative practices shifted the focus from national to transnational interests, offering a sense of shared political struggle for independence within the Soviet Unions. This served as an indication that Ukraine was not isolated in its pursuit of democratic revival. Cooperative practices of sharing media articles from the members of the Baltic countries reinforced the notion that Ukraine was not the only Soviet republic undergoing imminent processes of restructuring. It emphasised the need for domestic political revival as a mean to enable Soviet-wide transformation.

Cultural cooperative practices between Ukrainians and the Baltic countries that evoked a sense of cultural unity based on national narratives became apparent in processes of cultural exchanges between the Lion Society and the Lithuanian youth. These practices unfolded in processes of establishing contact with a cultural Ukrainian minority association called *Community of Ukrainians in Lithuania* (hereafter – GUL) in Lithuania, informing about the activities of this group and participating in cultural events organised in Vilnius. Other than the Estonians and Latvians, the Lithuanians played a pivotal role in the developments of the Lion Society and its newspaper, which could be a reason for the close connection between the Lion Society and cultural youth organisations in Lithuania. *Postup* was printed in Vilnius with the help of Vasyl Kapkan, a member of GUL, and illegally transported into L'viv by members of the Lion Society

⁴⁵⁸ *Postup*, No Title (October 1989, no. 13), 8.

(see Ch. 4.2). The first contact between these two groups took place in March 1989, as part of a cultural exchange.⁴⁵⁹ In an article published in *Postup* 1989, no. 5, the editors for the first time reported on the formation of GUL, an association that was founded in December 1988 by members of the Ukrainian minority in Lithuania. GUL was one of the last minority associations to emerge in 1989 in Lithuania. Other associations, such as Polish, Belarusian, Russian and Jewish ones had already begun to establish since autumn 1988. The association engaged in a series of public events throughout 1989, encompassing rock and pop concerts, theatre plays, rallies and commemorations to historical figures.⁴⁶⁰ In March and May 1989, members of the Lion Society were invited by GUL to attend several of these events. On 11 March 1989, members of the Lion Society, for example, performed a theatre play called ‘Shevchenko through the Eyes of Generations’.⁴⁶¹ The play had been written by the Lion Society and already performed several times in the fall of 1988 at the Young Audience Theatre in L’viv. Contextually, the theatre play was written in commemoration of the 175th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko⁴⁶² and encompassed an artistic approach that intertwined historical references to Shevchenko’s texts and the struggle for nationality during the First World War and in the 1920s and 1930s.⁴⁶³ It was during this trip, when first contacts between Kapkan and members of the Lion Society emerged. Another event at which the Lion Society performed followed in May 1989, when members attended the folklore festival ‘Skamba, skamba, kankliai’ in Vilnius, as reported in second article published in *Postup* 1989, no. 5.⁴⁶⁴ The festival exists since 1973 and traditionally takes place every year on the last weekend of May. Since 1979, the festival is held on the grounds of Vilnius University, the convent school and several areas in the Old Town.⁴⁶⁵ *Postup* explained how members of the Lion Society attended the festival in 1989 and performed Ukrainian and local Lithuanian patriotic songs,⁴⁶⁶ gave speeches about the social and cultural activities of the Lion Society, participated in commemorative activities for Taras Shevchenko, visited the facilities of the Lithuanian People’s Front and expressed their solidarity for them.⁴⁶⁷ Publishing articles about how cultural performances with non-Soviet historical elements from Ukraine could be shown on a stage abroad, without fearing repercussions, and implying that

⁴⁵⁹ Kipiani, “Zhyttya u ‘Postupi’.”

⁴⁶⁰ *Postup*, ‘Ukrainians in Lithuania’ (June 1989, no. 5): 4.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶² Taras Shevchenko was a Ukrainian poet, writer and political figure (1814–1861).

⁴⁶³ Kipiani, “Zhyttya u ‘Postupi’.”

⁴⁶⁴ *Postup*, ‘Journey to Vilnius’ (June 1989, no. 5): 1, 4.

⁴⁶⁵ Website, Skamba Skamba Kankliai, <https://www.ssk.lt/en/apie-festivali-skamba-skamba-kankliai> (last accessed 06.03.2024).

⁴⁶⁶ *Postup*, ‘Journey to Vilnius’ (June 1989, no. 5): 1.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

there seemed to be an interest in local Ukrainian traditions outside of Ukraine's state boundaries, served as an encouragement for Ukrainians in Ukraine to continue on its current path for political renewal and created a sense of cultural connectedness.

Similar practices that expressed notions of shared unity between Ukrainians and the Baltic countries also unfolded in political cooperative practices. One of such practices has been reported in *Postup* 1989, no. 5, when Estonian representatives participated in a rally in L'viv on 17 May 1989 to protest the expulsion of the regional candidate Ivan Drach from the all-Union election of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union in 1989. The protest was attended by more than 30.000 people, and participants symbolically showed 'the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag [...] next to the tricolor Estonian flag – as a sign of mutual respect and unity of both peoples in the confrontation with the big-state bureaucratic tyranny.'⁴⁶⁸ Emphasizing the participation of Estonian protestors in L'viv signalled a shared interest in the democratic revival of each other's national republics. Another distinct occasion that is reflective of such political cooperation was a conference held from 30 June to 1 July 1989 in Tallinn, Estonia. In *Postup* 1989, no. 4, the editors announced that the regional L'viv division of Rukh was invited by the democratic movements of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to participate in a conference about secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.⁴⁶⁹ Victor Susak, a member of the regional L'viv branch of the historic association 'Memorial' attended the conference and wrote an article about the historical context of the conference topic as well as the discussion results, that was published in *Postup* 1989, no. 9.⁴⁷⁰ The conference was titled 'Legal Evaluation of the Treaties of Germany and the USSR of August 23, September 28, 1939, and January 10, 1941.' The main objective of the international scientific conference was to discuss the impact of the secret protocols which were signed by Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War on the sovereignty of the three Baltic states.⁴⁷¹ The secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, that subordinated the Baltic countries under Soviet rule,⁴⁷² were published by Gorbachev in 1988, which incentivised several protest within the Baltic

⁴⁶⁸ *Postup*, 'Створене Студентське Брам' (June 1989, no. 5): 2.

⁴⁶⁹ *Postup*, No title (May 1989 no. 4): 2.

⁴⁷⁰ *Postup*, 'What did the Secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Protocols object?' (August 1989, no. 9): 1, 3.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴⁷² Neil Taylor, "A History of the Baltic Region (1860–1991)," in ed. Charles Clarke, *Understanding the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1991* (Hurst and Company, 2023), 23–33, 30. The secret protocols of August 1939 were part of the non-aggression pact between Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union of 1939 and allowed Soviet rule of Latvia and Estonia. The Baltic republic Lithuania was added to the list later in September 1939 in form of a Friendship Pact. See, Jonathan Haslam, "Attaining Baltic Independence. In Search of a Helping Hand," 42–48, 42.

countries demanding sovereignty, and resulted in a series of historical conferences that discussed the historical impact of the documents.⁴⁷³ The conference held in June/July 1989 was part of the series, and its participants concluded that

the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the friendship and border treaty between Germany and the USSR, the ultimatum of the Soviet government, together with Germany's annexation of a number of Eastern European countries violated the USSR's side as well as Lenin's 'Decree on Peace'.⁴⁷⁴

Informing about the participation of the democratic movement Rukh in the international conference in Tallinn and about the conference results, which opposed the legality of the Soviet occupation of the Baltics after the Second World War, underlined the notion of political unity between the Baltics and Ukraine, and exposed a sense of fragility of the political structures of the Soviet Union.

This notion of political unity also unfolded in cooperative media practices. These media practices occurred in the form of publishing texts written by citizens of the Baltic countries as evident in two articles published in *Postup* 1989. One was produced by a member of the Ukrainian minority in Estonia, and another one was written by representatives of the three Baltic democratic movements. Both articles place the fate of the Baltic countries in a broader international setting, implying that only, if the Soviet republics represent a united front against the Soviet Union, national revival can take place within the individual member states. While the first article achieves this in articulations about the situation of Estonia, the latter focuses on all three Baltic republics and their role within the Soviet Union.

The first text was written by a member of the Ukrainian minority in Estonia, referred to as Nina M., and represented a response to a request issued by the Lion Society to comment on the evolvement of the democratic movement in Estonia and the role of minority groups in it. The author argued that the primary goal of the Estonians in 1989 was the establishment of an independent state, a trajectory, that was however hindered by one third of the population, who are not ethnically Estonian, 'do not know their language, are not interested in their culture, and very often treat everything Estonian with disrespect'.⁴⁷⁵ According to the author, against the backdrop of a large Russian-speaking population, that opposes the Estonian language,

⁴⁷³ Stefan Hedlung, "The Mice," 61.

⁴⁷⁴ *Postup*, 'What did the Secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Protocols object?' (August 1989, no. 9): 3.

⁴⁷⁵ *Postup*, No Title (1989, no. 7): 6.

culture and Estonian-led government, the path for independence, united Estonians, including bureaucrats and communist party members. Even though concerned about her own fate in Estonia, being a member of the Ukrainian minority, Nina M. advocated for the importance of developing a version of Ukrainian national identity that stands in solidarity with the Estonian's path for independence. This theme of advocating for unity across nationalities can also be found in a second article published in the October issue of *Postup* 1989, no. 11. The article printed in *Postup* represented an appeal titled 'To the People of the Soviet Union' and was written by representatives of the Baltic Council of the *Popular Front for the Support of Perestroika* of Estonia, Latvia's *Movement for Perestroika* and Lithuanian *Sąjūdis*.⁴⁷⁶ The representatives that produced the appeal accused the Soviet authorities to have launched a 'disinformation campaign in the mass media, on Central television and radio' about the events taking place in the Baltic republics, accusing the three Northern republics of 'national hysteria' and 'national extremism'. The events the Soviet authorities referred to was a peaceful protest in form of a human chain of approximately 2 million people on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, stretching across 671 kilometres across the Baltic countries, that took place on 23 August 1989.⁴⁷⁷ The appeal published in *Postup* mentioned warnings about the fate of the Baltic peoples, suggesting that the central authorities threaten them with harsh consequences, potentially even 'physical destruction', if 'nationalist' leaders in the Baltic Republics achieve their goals. The democratic movements of the Baltic States therefore urged the member republics of the Soviet Union to stay united against the 'Prison of Nations', the Soviet Union, by advocating for 'true internationalism – for compassion, mutual help in difficult times, for not accepting lies and provocations.' Through the personal account of a Ukrainian minority member in Estonia and the unified appeal from Baltic democratic representatives, the significant role of the Baltic countries in the broader struggle for sovereignty and democratic rights within the Soviet Union unfolded. By sharing these voices, *Postup* served as a platform for transnational solidarity, fostering a sense of unity among the republics.

Concluding Remarks

Considering the years 1989 to 1991, *Postups*'s writers and editors attributed political meaning to the Baltic countries primarily in the year 1989. The perception of the Baltic states as democratically progressing faster but equal republics highlighted their importance. References

⁴⁷⁶ *Postup*, 'To the People of the Soviet Union?' (October 1989, no. 11): 5.

⁴⁷⁷ Paula Christie, "The Baltic Chain: A Study of the Organisation Facets of Large-Scale Protest from a Micro-Level Perspective," *Lithuanian Historical Studies* 20 (2015): 183–211, 183–184.

to the Baltics in *Postup*, framed around the narratives of inspiration and cooperation, created a sense of transnational activism. This activism created an ‘imagined solidarity’ between the Baltics and Ukraine on the one hand and showed patterns of cooperation between Ukraine and the Northern republics, on the other hand. This served as a constant reminder for *Postup*’s readers that Ukraine and the Baltics shared the same political struggle, motivating them to continue on the path of political restructuring.

Due to the more advanced political progress in the Baltics, *Postup*’s writers and editors looked towards the Baltic model, drawing connections to their party programs and reporting on political events and policy changes to seek inspiration for Ukraine’s national restructuring. By engaging in cooperative practices between the Baltics and Ukraine, *Postup* emphasized that the solidarity between these regions was not merely imagined but had materialised in reality. This underlined the notion that these republics were not isolated in their aspirations for democracy but were part of a larger movement transcending national boundaries.

At the beginning of the 1990s, interest in publishing articles about the Baltic countries decreased and vanished from the top 15 locations identified in *Postup*. One possible reason for this decline could be a shift in topic focus. In 1990, discussions on religion and religious institutions peaked, while the topic category of ‘State Development’ experienced a slight drop. Additionally, Ukraine held its first semi-free elections in 1990, where the Democratic Bloc won the majority of seats in the L’viv oblast, shifting *Postup*’s focus inward on political developments.

This shift is further supported by the qualitative analysis of the political meaning attributed to the Baltics in 1989. By 1990, *Postup* no longer needed to motivate its readers to pursue political change. The democratic forces had united in November 1989, and with the semi-free elections in March 1990, Ukraine had already embarked on a path of political transition. The earlier role of references to the Baltic countries, which aimed to promote solidarity and justify political progress in Ukraine, had become redundant as political change was already underway. Attention was now increasingly directed towards the implementation and consequences of this political change.

Poland

For this sub-chapter the location ‘Poland’ was considered for the analysis. The topic category in which the location was referenced is ‘State Development’. The location is part of the list of top 15 list of locations from 1989 to 1991. Two consistent patterns of meaning will be delineated

in the following, political and historical, that contributed to the creation of ‘Poland’ a place of democratic guidance and historical reconciliation.

1989 to 1991: A Place of Democratic Guidance and Historical Reconciliation?

The analysis of the location within the corresponding topic of ‘State Development’ showed that the articles in *Postup* applied political and historical meanings to Poland. I identified a total of 17 articles from 1989 and 1991 that contributed to the creation of Poland as a place of democratic guidance and historical reconciliation. This pattern of place creation unfolded on the level of two narratives: ‘Political Guidance’ and ‘Historical Enemy’. The temporal distribution of the narratives’ frequencies throughout different years of the newspaper are illustrated in figure 16. From the chart, we can identify, that both narratives occurred more or less consistently through the years 1989 and 1990. The narrative of ‘historical enemy’ was overall dominant in they year 1990, By 1991, both narratives had decreased in prominence, and only sporadically occurred in June and October.

Poland: Frequency of Narratives in *Postup* over Time, 1989–1991 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 16 *Postup*: Poland – Frequency of Narratives, 1989–1991.

The political meaning that the authors in *Postup* attributed to the locations Poland, which unfolded in the narrative of ‘political guidance’ indicated patterns of transnational activism,

here referred to as cross-borderactivism,⁴⁷⁸ similar to the Baltics, however different in its execution. References to the Baltics created senses of solidarity between the Northern Republics and Ukraine that was utilized to increase motivation among L'vivian society for the cause of democratic restructuring. These solidarities were based on the notion that the Baltics and Ukraine, as Soviet republics were *in the same boat*, pursuing the same goal: sovereignty and independence from the Soviet Union. References to Poland on the other hand, were not primarily based on a sense of a shared struggle. The starting point for Poland to embark on its path for political and economic transition as a Soviet satellite state not directly governed by Moscow, was different than for Ukraine or the Baltics. While Ukraine was still struggling to consolidate its political opposition in 1989, Poland had already semi-free elected democratic government and was concerned with economic changes.⁴⁷⁹ The political meanings applied to Poland had the purpose to navigate the direction of the political restructuring in Ukraine. Based on four articles, I discuss how Poland in 1989 and decreasingly in 1990 and 1991, served as an example, as a lesson to navigate which political and economic paths to take and which not.

Additionally, the political significance of the Polish-Ukrainian relations for Ukraine became also apparent in the historical meaning applied to Poland. From one article published in 1990, we learn that the editors of *Postup* were interested in maintaining good political and economic relations with Poland, instead of discussing in detail their shared pre-Soviet borderland history. This article attributed political and historical meanings to Poland, in which the country was portrayed as an 'historical enemy' but as a contemporary ally. A total of seven additional articles containing historical references to Poland with a similar negative connotation occurred in 1989 and 1990, although these references were larger in the number, they were in most cases short. Nevertheless, I will shortly delineate four of these historical references in addition to the article on the Polish-Ukrainian relations to expose the ambiguity in *Postup's* stance towards Poland.

⁴⁷⁸ Transnational activism and cross-border activism are used interchangeably in the academic literature. I refer to transnational activism in the case of the Baltics and to cross-border activism in the case of Poland to point out the geographic locations of these countries on the map, where the Baltics do not border Ukraine, and Poland borders Ukraine in the west.

⁴⁷⁹ Hartwell, *Two Roads*, 318; Philipp Ther, *Das andere Ende der Geschichte. Über die Große Transformation*, 2nd edition, (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2019), 21.

Poland's political and economic transformation processes, that were accelerated by the political opposition embodied through the Solidarność movement began much earlier than in Ukraine. Solidarność, initially an independent trade union headed by Lech Wałęsa, that emerged out of Polish workers strikes, was officially founded on 17 September 1980. The union quickly developed into a 'mass social movement committed to the democratization of political life, the dismantling of the command economy, and the introduction of autonomous production units.'⁴⁸⁰ By late 1980, the union had more than 8 million members. One year later, the Polish communist government under pressure of the Soviet authorities in Moscow, introduced a state of martial law, arguing that imposing martial law was necessary to prevent a possible Soviet military intervention, which they suggested could happen if the Solidarność movement led to further instability. Poland under martial law led to a crackdown on the movement, which ended in the arrest of 6,000 Solidarność members, among them Lech Wałęsa. The movement did not vanish, but continued to exist in the underground and created a new wave of strikes in 1988. This time however, the Polish communist government responded differently since they could no longer argue that the Soviet Union could potentially intervene militarily. Under Gorbachev's new thinking of perestroika and glasnost, the Soviet Union shifted its policy towards Soviet satellite states, in which it was made clear that it would no longer use military force to intervene in the affairs of its satellite states in Eastern Europe. Without the threat of Soviet military intervention, the Polish government found itself without its previous excuse to suppress the Solidarność movement. This led to a situation in which the Polish communists were forced to engage in negotiations with the opposition, known as the 'round table' talks.⁴⁸¹ As one result of the round table talks, it was agreed to restructure the political system by introducing semi-free elections of the Polish senate and parliament (Sejm) in 1989, in which 65 percent of the parliament seats would be reserved for communist party candidates and only 35 percent for non-party members. The elections were held in June 1989, and 99 out of 100 seats in the Polish senate and all 35 percent (161) of seats in the parliament were won by the Solidarność-backed Civic Committee. These elections marked the end of communist political

⁴⁸⁰ Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, *A Concise History of Poland*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 399.

⁴⁸¹ Lukowski and Zawadzki, "A Concise History of Poland," 398–409.

hegemony in Poland, and in December 1990 resulted in the election of Lech Wałęsa as Polish president.⁴⁸²

Other than Ukraine or the Baltics, Poland in 1989 already had their first semi-free elections which marked the end of communist hegemony in Poland's political system and accelerated the political and economic transformation of the country. As opposed to the Baltics, whose political progress, but not yet fulfilled political transformation, served as a source of inspiration for the young Ukrainians from L'viv due to their shared destiny as Soviet republics struggling for national restructuring, Poland in *Postup* was portrayed as an example of how a political and economic transformation could look like, and what lessons the Ukrainian democratic movement can learn from the advanced Polish model.

In 1989, *Postup* featured an excerpt from an interview alongside an editorial note that focused Poland's political progress as a model for Ukraine to draw lessons from.⁴⁸³ The excerpt was taken from an interview between the Solidarność newspaper 'Volya' and Andrzej Machalski, the regional head of the election bureau of the Civic Committee of Solidarność from the central region of Mazowsze and from 1989 to 1991 senator of the Republic of Poland.⁴⁸⁴ In the excerpt *Postup* published, Machalski expressed concern over Solidarność's significant lack of ability to organise and manage purposeful actions. He described Solidarność as an uncontrolled revolutionary movement that, despite high levels of participation and enthusiasm from the public, struggles to transition into structured, effective activities. According to him, the issue would permeate all levels, from leadership to the mass movement. Machalski concluded with the worrying observation that Solidarność would not have the ability to perform managerial tasks necessary for the movement's future challenges. The publication of the excerpt was accompanied by a one-sentence long editorial note from *Postup*, stating: 'Even more so, we do not have this ability, and it is worth thinking about it more often.' *Postup*'s note seemed to mirror Machalski's assessment regarding the lack of managerial skills of Solidarność, in the assessment of Ukraine's democratic movement, indicated by the pronoun 'we'. The editors acknowledged that the deficiencies in Poland described by Machalski were also present in the Ukrainian

⁴⁸² Józef Fiszer, 'The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Sejm and Senate Elections in 1989. Systemic Transformation in Poland and Its Consequences for Europe and the World', *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna* 2019, no. 3 (2019): 139–163, 151–152.

⁴⁸³ *Postup*, 'No Title' (November 1989, no. 16): 8.

⁴⁸⁴ Machalski, Andrzej, Encyklopedia Solidarności, <https://encysol.pl/es/encyklopedia/biogramy/17405,Machalski-Andrzej.html> (last accessed 20.03.2024).

democratic movement, and to an even greater extent ('even more so'). Publishing an interview excerpt that points out potential limitations in the Polish capability of executing democratic activities can be interpreted as a strategy to proactively identify possible weaknesses within the Ukrainian democratic movement. The reasons why the editors were worried about managerial problems among Ukrainian democratic forces might have been connected to the fragmentation of Ukrainian democratic forces into approximately 40 organisations in 1989. These democratic forces only on 18 November 1989 consolidated their political powers, by forming the *Democratic Bloc*, in the same month the interview excerpt and editorial note were published.⁴⁸⁵ Whether this happened before or after the merger of the democratic forces remains unclear, since we do not have an exact date when this editorial note was written.

A second article, which was published one month prior to the interview excerpt in 1989, was the first indication for *Postup*'s interest in the political and economic development of Poland, that they regarded embodied through the Solidarność movement. *Postup* had a continuing interest in following the events across the border. This article also represented an interview, this time between *Postup* and Bogdan Michał Borusewicz, at the time regional head of the Solidarność movement in the northern Polish city of Gdańsk.⁴⁸⁶ He was one of the co-organisers of the 1989 strike, went into hiding after martial law was introduced in 1981, and was arrested for 9 months in 1986. Later, Borusewicz served a member and then deputy chairman of the Solidarity Trade Union National Committee from 1989 to 1991, as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration from 1997 to 2000, and as deputy marshal and board member of the Pomeranian Province from 2001 to 2005.⁴⁸⁷ The interview was published in the October issue of *Postup* 1989, four months after the semi-free elections in Poland and three months after members of Solidarność had approached economist Jeffrey Sachs to draft a plan for the economic transition of Poland to a market economy (implemented in January 1990).⁴⁸⁸ The interviewer, who remains anonymous, was specifically interested in three aspects of Solidarność: the political evolvement of the Solidarność before and since 1980, Solidarność's

⁴⁸⁵ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 257

⁴⁸⁶ *Postup*, 'Solidarność is a guest at *Postup*' (October 1989, no. 13): 4–5. It remains unclear where the interview was conducted, and if it was conducted face-to-face. The title of the interview ('Solidarność is a guest at *Postup*') suggests that an editor or writer for *Postup* conducted the interview, which could have happened via phone line or would have required travelling. Another possible option is that a connection to somebody in Poland was established who conducted the interview on behalf of *Postup*.

⁴⁸⁷ Website, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, List of Senators, <https://www.senat.gov.pl/en/senators/lista-senatorow/senator.120.9.bogdan-borusewicz.html> (last accessed 20.03.2024).

⁴⁸⁸ Jeffrey Sachs, "Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years," *The Tanner Lectures of Human Values*, University of Utah (6 and 7 April 1994), 270.

plan for economic changes and the time anticipated for an economic transformation, and the perception of Polish society to Solidarność's economic efforts. Even though the interviewee drew no direct comparisons to Ukraine, it can be identified from the questions posed by the interviewer, that *Postup* was interested into portraying to its readers, the Polish movement as an example that can accelerate the political and economic transition, which could potentially apply to Ukraine in the near future.

Interest in the political evolvement of Solidarność is displayed in the interview through the interviewer's question 'You have been in 'Solidarity' since the beginning. What is the difference between the current and the positions back then of 'S.'? What happened?' and the interviewee's answer, that elaborates on how an idea can evolve into social movement that can develop into an impactful political party.⁴⁸⁹ The interviewee explained how an idea can transition into a mass movement when two elements align: a dedicated group of people and a strategic plan of action. The most critical element ought to be a core group of committed individuals, and the right environment for collective action – people must feel the urge and necessity for change, understanding that changes to the status quo are imminent. Past experiences, during the strikes of the Worker's Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników – KOR) of 1976 taught the members of Solidarność the importance of acting with caution and that displays of dissent can lead to violence. He referenced in this context how they have learned that repressions from the communist authorities were limited to short-term detentions and confiscations, as long as protests did not spill onto the streets. The transition to a political party took place when Solidarność recognized that being a trade union was not enough and that they needed to take a part in governance to implement economic changes – a transition that was impacted also by the influence of perestroika in Moscow and developments in Hungary. And despite being organisationally and financially weaker, they became politically significant.⁴⁹⁰

Notions on the economic transition of Poland surfaced in the interviewer's questions 'What does 'S.' plan to do economically?' and 'How many years so you need to solve all problems?'. Borusewicz explained that solving the economic crisis in Poland would take between 5 to 10 years, implying that it was a process that required patience. The movement intended to dismantle monopolies, particularly in the food industry, to incentivise competition and address the issues of inflation and the budget deficit. Solidarność also would follow the strategy to sell

⁴⁸⁹ *Postup*, 'Solidarność is a guest at *Postup*' (October 1989, no. 13): 4.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

state-owned assets to reduce the subsidy burden and tackle inflation, but the enormous national debt, which he amounted to 40 billion dollars, remained an issue.⁴⁹¹ These statements sparked interest in the perception of Polish society to Solidarność's political and economic efforts from the interviewer ('Do people agree to this [the political and economic reforms proposed by Solidarność]?'). The interviewee explained that public's acceptance of these economic changes was connected to the fact that Solidarność resembled a new power structure and to the hope that they had the ability to influence change, despite increasing prices on consumer goods. In the end, 'there is a limit to patience. But if people know, the [communist] party will cease to govern, and Poland will be a democratic country – then it will be tolerated.'⁴⁹²

An indication, that the interview was aimed at offering an example of how Ukraine can benefit from the experience of the political and economic transition in Poland, can be found in an editorial note published alongside another article in *Postup* in 1990. The article offered references to Poland's economic and political developments. It was published in *Postup*'s June issue from 1990, no. 8, in which Valentyn Stetsyuk, an independent journalist, was featured with his work titled 'How to assess the Rubik's cube?', that proposed steps for the economic transformation of Ukraine.⁴⁹³ As part of the authors exploration of potential economic options for Ukraine's future, he cautioned against the economic system the Poland had implemented with the beginning of 1990, arguing that their reforms, though instructive, were risky since 'careless action during the transition to a market system can lead to catastrophic consequences, chaos in the economy, inflation and galloping price growth.'⁴⁹⁴ Alongside the article, *Postup* published an editorial note, written by Ihor Markov, one of *Postup*'s historians, that commented on the Stetsyuk's article.⁴⁹⁵ Specifically, one comment referred to Stetsyuk's statements made towards the Polish economic transition. Markov questioned the author's assessment that Poland's economic system would not be a suitable option for Ukraine, by arguing that the radical economic transition had been accepted by Poles and first observations would indicate improvement:

It is worth noting that the course of the 'Solidarność' government on the privatization of property and the free market met with the support of them people, despite the deterioration of people's financial situation. The majority understood that there is simply no other way. And now news is coming from Poland about market saturation, stabilization, etc., and the emergence of a downward trend in prices.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹¹ *Postup*, 'Solidarność is a guest at *Postup*' (October 1989, no. 13): 5.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*

⁴⁹³ *Postup*, 'How to assess the Rubik's cube?' (June 1990, no. 8): 1–2.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁹⁵ *Postup*, 'From the Editors' (June 1990, no. 8): 2–3.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

The editors therewith implied that Ukraine could follow the Polish model, as it according to *Postup* offered a road to a successful economic transition. Moreover, the information provided here partially reflected what Borusewicz had articulated in the interview with *Postup* published earlier, when he stated that Polish society so far had remained patient regarding the economic changes Solidarność aimed to implement.

In 1991, *Postup* again drew from the Polish experience to navigate the political transformation in Ukraine. *Postup* published an article in its issue from the 23 October (no. 11) discussing the persistent influence of communists in Poland, despite the formal transition away from communist rule, followed by an editorial comment. The article in *Postup* represented an excerpt from an article published in the Polish newspaper ‘Voice’ four months prior to *Postup*’s publication.⁴⁹⁷ In an introduction to the article, *Postup*’s editors noted that the content of the article was relevant for both, Ukraine and Poland. The article cautioned against the persisting influence of the communist party in Poland. It outlined how communists maintained economic, financial, and social-political influence through various means. Economic influence was maintained through managerial roles in state institutions, through the creation of private enterprises and so-called ‘nomenklatura unions’, monopolistic practices, and favourable loans and tax benefits. Socially and politically, communists preserved influence by keeping their personnel in key administrative positions, maintaining social networks, and ensuring dependency from various social groups. Public attitudes indicated that the Polish society was aware of these dynamics, were dissatisfied with the slow economic transition, and felt a disillusionment towards the democratic movement, which was perceived as fragmented, void of moral, national and ideological values, and increasingly dominated by actors, who were more interested in their personal careers, rather than idealists. Below the article excerpt, an editorial comment written by Andriy Kyatokovsky titled ‘Our Commentary’ was published.⁴⁹⁸ Here, the editors suggested, to avoid the development of similar structures in Ukraine, that indicated a fertile ground for neo-communism, by addressing them from the beginning. As possible solutions they offered to hold accountable those responsible for abuses of power, nationalizing the properties of the CPU, and legalizing Marxist and national-communist groups to reduce their underground appeal for the public. The problems Poland faced regarding the persistence of old communist structures, seemed to resonate with *Postup*’s editors. Because in October 1991, when the article was published, Ukraine was already facing the

⁴⁹⁷ *Postup*, ‘The Faces of Post-Communism and ‘Professional Revolutionaries’’ (October 1991, no. 11): 9.

⁴⁹⁸ *Postup*, ‘Our Commentary’ (October 1991, no. 11): 9.

official beginning of its political transformation. The country had declared its state sovereignty from the Soviet Union in July 1990, and independence in August 1991, following the staged a coup against the Soviet leadership in Moscow.⁴⁹⁹ Therefore, peaking across the border to understand what potential challenges Ukraine could face regarding the dominance of communism, seemed an obvious choice. Especially given the fact, that even though the communist party of Ukraine was shortly after independence dissolved, on 30 August 1991, it officially re-emerged under the new name Socialist Party of Ukraine on 26 October 1991 and once again represented the largest party with approximately 30,000 members.⁵⁰⁰

1989 to 1990: Historical Reconciliation?

Postup's authors also applied historical meaning to Poland by making references in articles to Polish history during the time of Galicia, in the interwar period and during and after the Second World War. In these articles, Polish history was mentioned due to its shared borderland history with Ukraine. What emerged in these articles, was a narrative of Poland as an 'historical enemy'. In total I identified in this context three articles in 1989, and in one in 1990. The text passages in the articles from 1989 were short, about one to two sentences long, and embedded in thematic contexts that not primarily discussed Polish history. In these text fragments, the perception of Poland as an 'old enemy' became apparent. The authors, for instance, offered their very own understanding of the role of the Polish community in the history of Galicia following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918. The collapse of the empire had led to a power vacuum in Galicia which led Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia (today's territories of western Ukraine) to consolidate their forces and establish an independent state, the West Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR), which lasted for approximately 8 months. However, also the Poles of former Galicia, who greatly outnumbered the Ukrainians, made territorial claims to Eastern Galicia and wanted to incorporate these territories into the newly established Republic of Poland (Second Polish Republic), resulting in a conflict commonly referred to as the Polish-Ukrainian War. Eventually, the war ended in July 1919, with Galician Ukrainians crossing the Zbruč river to the East.⁵⁰¹ The Entente powers eventually granted the Republic of Poland the 'right to occupy all of Eastern Galicia "in order to protect the civilian population from the dangerous threat of Bolshevik bands."⁵⁰² The

⁴⁹⁹ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 375–376.

⁵⁰⁰ Kuzio, *Perestroika*, 185.

⁵⁰¹ Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 367–370.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 371.

writers of *Postup* made references to this part of Polish-Ukrainian history, describing the role of Poles as ‘occupiers’⁵⁰³, and as rulers under which Ukrainians ‘could fall victim to gendarme’s bullets’.⁵⁰⁴ By determining Poles as ‘occupiers’ *Postup*’s authors implied that they considered Eastern Galicia as inherently Ukrainian territory, validated by the establishment of the ZUNR. This narrative of Poland as an historical enemy was also reiterated in a short article that reported on the history of the OUN in the interwar period. Here, Poland was portrayed as a dominant political power enforcing ‘Polonization’ of and ‘terror’ against Ukrainians in Poland.⁵⁰⁵ What the authors here refer to is the incorporation of Eastern Galicia including, among others, its Ukrainian inhabitants, into the Second Polish Republic after the First World War. Even though these remarks on Poland’s historic role in Ukrainian history are not described in further detail, and only remain side entries, the choice of words to describe Poles and the Polish community indicates that the authors held a persistent grudge against Ukraine’s western neighbour, that is rooted in the complex, historical political relationship between Ukrainians and Poles in the past.

In 1990, text fragments portraying Poland as an ‘historical enemy’ occur more detailed, due to the article series on the UPA, that was already discussed in the previous sub-section on L’viv as a place of historical legacy.⁵⁰⁶ As discussed earlier, this multi-issue article provides a biased and misleading understanding of the atrocities committed by Poles and Ukrainians during and after the Second World War, in which the main fault for the conflict is attributed to Poland. Poland is portrayed as the main aggressor and the UPA’s role as solely reactionary. The perception of Poland as the ‘historical enemy’ becomes apparent in text fragments that again, describe

⁵⁰³ *Postup*, ‘Constructivism and Inadmissibility’ (July 1989, no. 7): 2. ‘For Galicians, Bukovinians and Transcarpathians, the combination of blue and yellow colors is a symbol of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, it is the flag under which our ancestors fought for national and social liberation for 90 years since the revolution of 1848. This is the flag under which tens of thousands of UGA riflemen – the best sons of the Galician peasantry, workers and intelligentsia in 1918–19 abundantly watered their native land with their blood, defending it from the Polish occupiers [...]’

⁵⁰⁴ *Postup*, ‘People’s Assembly-Requiem at Mt. Makivka, located near the village of Holovenko in the Skole district of L’viv region’ (September 1989, no. 10): 4. ‘The battle in the Makivka quarter, during which 42 Ukrainian volunteers of Sich riflemen were beheaded, will forever remain in the people’s memory of the fights as a symbol of our national pride. Many folk songs have been written about Makivka. Residents of nearby villages and towns have always gathered on holidays commemorating the fallen fighters for the freedom of Ukraine, during the time of Polish rule, when it was possible to fall victim to the gendarme’s bullets on the holy mountain and also during Soviet times, when mere mentioning of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen was paid for with social status, freedom or even life.’

⁵⁰⁵ *Postup*, ‘From the unannounced speech at the NRU congress’ (November 1989, no. 14): 8. ‘The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Western Ukraine arose as a reaction to the Polonization, terror, that took place in Poland against Ukrainians.’

⁵⁰⁶ *Postup*, Article Series ‘What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?’ (April 1990, no. 6; May 1990, no. 7; July 1990, no. 9; September 1990, no. 10).

Poland, alongside the USSR, as ‘the largest occupiers of Ukraine’⁵⁰⁷, that highlight again the ‘Polonization of north-western Ukrainian lands’,⁵⁰⁸ that describe the main function of the UPA to ‘protect the Ukrainian population [in the Kholm region and Lemkiv region] from various Polish military and paramilitary formations’⁵⁰⁹ and in descriptions that portray atrocities committed by Poles against the Ukrainian population.⁵¹⁰ This multi-issue article published in 1990 provided the only article that offered more detailed descriptions of the narrative of Poland as an ‘historical enemy’, even though the primary topic of the article series were the formation and activities of the UPA:

Except for these smaller remarks toward the role of Poland in Ukrainian history, *Postup* did not publish a single article that solely centralized aspects of Polish-Ukrainian borderland history. This observations does not mean that the Ukrainian-Polish borderland history was perceived positively by *Postup*’s editors, as there is no evidence that indicates such a viewpoint. Discussions regarding the shared, complex history of Poland and Ukraine, and perceptions of Poland as an ‘oppressive state’ in the past, were rather moved into the background to make room for narratives that put Poland forward as a democratic ally for the ongoing political and economic transformation taking place in Ukraine. This notion is supported by an article published in 1990, which was dedicated to Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1990, including some reference to Polish-Ukrainian history. In the article titled ‘Perspective of Ukrainian-Polish Relations (The Case of Consideration)’, the author Serhiy Lilyk elaborated on the Ukrainian-Polish political cooperation in the context of Ukraine’s and Poland’s shared borderland history. In the article, Lilyk briefly discusses the complex and challenging history between Ukraine and Poland, including conflicts, territorial disputes, and their mutual impact on both nations. Although his

⁵⁰⁷ *Postup*, Article Series ‘What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?’ (April 1990, no. 6): 4.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵¹⁰ Here *Postup* provided descriptions about the Operation Vistula, a military operation that deported approximately 140,000 Ukrainians and Lemkos (ethnic group inhabiting the Lemko region) from the southern and eastern borders of Poland to the western and northern territories. See Krzysztof Persak, “Operation Vistula: An Attempt at Legal Qualification,” in ed. Przemysław Adamczewski, Wojciech Łysek, and Barbara Komorowska, *Poland, Soviet Union, Russia: From Past through Memory to Politics*, (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2020). *Postup* provided, for example, the following statement regarding Poland’s Operation Vistula: ‘the deportation of the Ukrainian population took place [...] according to the following scheme: the [Polish] army attacked the villages several times in a row, robbed and beat the villagers, raped the women. To frighten them [the villagers], the Poles killed several dozen men and women and left them in prominent places. When after all the looting there was nothing left in the village: no livestock, no horses, not even dishes in the houses, the order came to be ready to leave in fifteen minutes. Those who did not make it in time were forcibly dragged out of the house, sometimes tied up and put on carts. All this was accompanied by beatings. Those who did not want to leave their houses were killed.’ See, *Postup*, Article Series ‘What was the UPA in our Liberation Struggle?’ (September 1990, no. 10): 6.

assessment of these events displays a certain bias, favoring Ukraine, Lilyk emphasizes the importance of acknowledging this history not only for an objective study of the past but also as a foundation for future Ukrainian-Polish political cooperation.

Lilyk primarily focuses on the Polish-Ukrainian borderland history of the 1940s, acknowledging the mutual nature of atrocities committed by both Poles and Ukrainians, particularly involving the Polish Home Army (AK – Armia Krajowa) and the UPA during and immediately after the Second World War in what is now known as western Ukraine. Despite his recognition of these crimes, his assessment remains positively biased towards Ukraine. The author commented on the ‘tragic and painful’ shared history that he perceived as unfolding in the ‘bloody terror of the UPA formations against Polish national security in the territory of Galicia and Volhynia, as well as the mass killing of Ukrainians by AK units in the Kholm region and other places on the Ukrainian-Polish border.’⁵¹¹ His portrayal of these events seems skewed, presenting UPA actions as targeted against Polish security forces while depicting Polish crimes as targeting Ukrainian civilians. This bias is more evident when Lilyk, on behalf of the editors, asserts that despite acknowledging mutual crimes, ‘the historical faults of both peoples cannot, in our opinion, be considered balanced. The fact is that the Ukrainian people suffered equally greater losses, because for a long time they were the object of repressive, destructive actions of the Polish state machine [...]’.⁵¹² This suggests that Lilyk, while acknowledging shared guilt, seeks to place greater responsibility for these crimes on the Polish side. Despite his biased perspective on historical events, Lilyk advocates for the necessity of overcoming historical disputes in favour of democratic and economic cooperation. He argues:

Historical mistakes and crimes have no right to be repeated. The Ukrainian and Polish peoples are interested in normal good-neighbourly cooperation in the sphere of economy, ecology, culture, etc. After all, Europe is moving towards a ‘common home’ and this process one way or another, it can’t help but concern us too. For the complete normalization of Ukrainian-Polish relations today, there is another objective prerequisite that did not exist before. It is possible and necessary to condemn Stalin’s arbitrariness in determining the western borders of the Ukrainian SSR, as a result of which part of the historically Ukrainian lands ended up within the borders of the Polish state with tragic consequences for their population. However, the fact is that for the first time in the entire history of our joint relations, the state border of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Republic is simultaneously the ethnic border of the Ukrainian and Polish nations. This situation, together with other factors, creates the objective foundations of the inviolability of the existing state borders as an element of pan-European stability.⁵¹³

⁵¹¹ *Postup*, ‘Perspective of Ukrainian-Polish Relations (The Case of Consideration)’ (May 1990, no. 7): 3, 8.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*

Lilyk underlined the necessity of addressing historical territorial disputes in the western Ukrainian borderlands to fully normalise relations between Ukraine and Poland. He further suggests that condemning Stalin's role in determining the western borders of the Ukrainian SSR, which left part of historically Ukrainian lands within Poland, is crucial for fully normalizing Ukrainian-Polish relations. However, Lilyk does not propose changing the current state borders. Instead, he presents the recognition of these historical issues as essential for stabilizing future relations between Ukraine and Poland.

The historical meaning attributed to Poland, while not forgotten, is deliberately shifted into the background to meet the contemporary political needs in Ukraine in 1990. The primary focus becomes the regional stability in the form of cultural, political, and economic partnership. Concerns about historical disputes in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands become of secondary relevance, and the blame for the disputes is even redirected to a third historical actor: Stalin.

Concluding Remarks

Considering the years 1989 to 1991, Poland in the mental map of *Postup* appeared throughout all three years and was attributed with political and historical meanings. Political significance was attributed to Poland 1989 and decreasingly in 1990 and 1991, while historical meaning played only a significant role in 1989 and 1990. This political and historical meanings created Poland as a place of democratic guidance and historical reconciliation. The progressive political and economic transitions in Poland were perceived as processes to learn from for the unfolding political and future economic transition in Ukraine. Particularly, the development and actions of the Solidarność movement, the economic model adopted by the new Polish government, the perception of the changes in the Polish public as well as the consequences of the changes for the Polish economy and political parties, such as the Polish communist party, were of interest to *Postup*. This became evident in *Postup's* strategy to publish articles and interviews that reflected the situation in Poland and draw connections to the processes in Ukraine within editorial notes.

The historical significance attributed to Poland within the context of 'State Development' emerged primarily in 1989 and 1990, framing the country as a place of historical reconciliation. The phrase 'historical reconciliation' in the sub-chapter's headline is followed by a question mark, a stylistic choice made to reflect the ambiguous nature of the historical meaning assigned

to Poland. On one hand, Poland was occasionally portrayed as a historical ‘enemy,’ though such instances were rare; on the other hand, it was depicted as a democratic ally, despite the longstanding historical antagonism between the two nations. These contrasting narratives coexisted simultaneously.

This observation and the fact that there is a lack of articles from 1989 to 1991 solely discussing the Polish-Ukrainian history in detail, could be an indication that *Postup* deliberately aimed at avoiding this part of history in the newspaper, because they found a political and economic partnership with their western neighbour was more important, than engaging in historical debates on their shared borderland history, that could potentially harm this relationship.

Russia

For the sub-chapter Russia, the location ‘Russia’ was considered. The location was identified in the topic category ‘State Development’ and appeared continuously on the list of top 15 locations from 1989 to 1991. An analysis of the location has revealed that *Postup* attributed political meaning to Russia that created it as a place of democratic comradery in 1989 and 1990 which shifted in 1991 to a place of authoritarian adversary.

1989 to 1991: From a Place of Democratic Comradery to Authoritarian Adversary

The pattern of Russia as a place of democratic comradery that shifted to a place of authoritarian adversary unfolded in political meaning on the level of three narratives that were articulated in the authors’ articles published in *Postup*. These narratives were ‘Unity – Russian Minority’, ‘Unity – Russia’ and ‘Political Foe’ and are illustrated in the stacked area chart in figure 17. The chart shows the distribution of the narrative’s frequencies over time. As can be observed in the chart the narratives emerged in individual years in the articulations of *Postup*’s authors. In 1989, political meaning in *Postup* was not attributed to Russia through its geographic understanding of a place on a map, but through the Russian minority living within the borders of the Ukrainian SSR. This narrative advocated for political unity between Ukrainians and Russians for a united, national revival of Ukraine and unfolded in a total of seven articles. By 1990 *Postup*’s authors had redirected its target by putting its lens on the significance of Russia for the eastern Ukrainian regions, and with that for the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine. The political meaning attributed to Russia demonstrated how *Postup* established a narrative that campaigned for a strategic political alliance with Russia due to a perceived increasing orientation of residents in eastern Ukraine toward Russia’s democratic movement. This

unfolded in 5 articles. In 1991, questions raised by Russian voices about Ukraine's territorial integrity tainted the political perception of Russia in *Postup* in a negative light. Russia, especially under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, was, in April 1991 and increasingly from July 1991 perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine's state borders. This observation can be found in 10 articles. How the political meanings attributed to Russia shifted from 1989 to 1991, is demonstrated in the following.



Figure 17 *Postup*: Russia – Frequency of Narratives, 1989–1991.

1989: Unity of Ukrainians and Russians

In the same way the elections of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union from March to May 1989 resulted in the election of non-communist candidates in western Ukraine advocating for Ukraine's national revival, the elections also enabled the rise of multiple non-communist deputies in Russia. One of those deputies was Boris Yeltsin. Formerly member of the communist nomenklatura, Yeltsin was expelled from the Politburo after a disagreement with Gorbachev in 1987. He re-emerged as an independent candidate for the Moscow region, during the People's Deputies elections in 1989, in which he won with a majority of 89 percent.⁵¹⁴ Following the election, Yeltsin and other deputies joint forces in July 1989 under the name 'International Group'. Another group of deputies that emerged out of the March

⁵¹⁴ Vladislav M. Zubok, *Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union* (Yale University Press, 2021), 39, 71.

elections in 1989, also consolidated their political forces and created the Democratic Platform, later known as Democratic Russia, in January 1990.⁵¹⁵ According to the historian Vladislav Zubok, three major forces pushed for Russian sovereignty in the first half of 1990: Russian nationalists in the communist party, the democratic Russian opposition and Yeltsin's mass populist movement.⁵¹⁶

In February 1990, the Soviet government, introduced the position of a Soviet president to which Gorbachev was elected. This same year, Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and shortly after, Russia declared its state sovereignty on 12 June 1990.⁵¹⁷ On August 19, a group of hard-line communist party members attempted a coup against the Soviet leadership, citing the deteriorating health of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and declaring a state of emergency. The coup was swiftly crushed, with Boris Yeltsin, emerging as an important figure. In the aftermath of the coup's collapse, Yeltsin, declared his intention to assume control of the Soviet military forces on Russian territory, a step, that would mark the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath, the RSFSR recognized the independence of Latvia and Estonia, and several republics declared their independence, such as Ukraine on 24 August, Belarus on 25 August and Moldova on 27 August. Russia became independent on 25 December 1991.⁵¹⁸

In 1989, political meaning attributed to the country 'Russia' under the same name was non-existent. Unlike the great interest in the democratic movements in the Baltics and in Poland, the events of 1989 concerning the Russian non-communist movements were less of a concern to *Postup*'s editors. Instead, *Postup* directed its focus inward and showed interest in the Russian community living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. The emphasis was put on underlining political unity between Ukrainians and Russians within the borders of the Ukrainian SSR to show that Ukrainian national revival was an all-Ukrainian phenomenon despite ethnic differences and ensure multi-ethnic support. This observation will be exemplified based on two article fragments and two full articles.

⁵¹⁵ David R. Marples, *The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991* (Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), 67.

⁵¹⁶ Zubok, "Collapse," 99.

⁵¹⁷ Marples, *Collapse*, 69.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 84–88.

The two article fragments occurred in *Postup* 1989, no. 3.⁵¹⁹ On the 7 May 1989, *Postup* took part in the founding conference of the L'viv Regional Organisation of Rukh, that was attended by members of Rukh and other supporting groups from creative unions, scientific institutions and amateur organisations. *Postup*'s May issue, was almost completely dedicated to print full speeches and summaries of speeches from the conferences, as well as the resolution of the newly established regional branch of Rukh.⁵²⁰ The first of such speeches was delivered by *Postup*'s writer, and later politician, Kosiv on the draft programme of Rukh, which was presented and discussed during the conference. In his keynote speech, Kosiv emphasized Ukrainian support for Russian efforts for political change. The speaker acknowledged the 'international' character of the Rukh draft programme, which he evaluated as a strength, because it addressed all nationalities in Ukraine, unlike the political interests of the communist institutions of the Soviet Union, that did 'not coincide with the interests of citizens of the all-Union republics.'⁵²¹ Kosiv continued to criticise the government structures of the Soviet Union's by imputing that despite their decision to use Russian as the main language of communication, 'they destroy the nature and culture of Russia no less than of the other republics.'⁵²² He underlined the inclusivity of different nationalities in Rukh's aim to enforce perestroika by quoting a chant heard at a recent rally in L'viv, in which participants shouted: 'friends of Russians, Belarusians, Poles, Jews, Armenians! Let's unite for a joint struggle against the bureaucrats based on the ideas of perebudova [Ukr. for perestroika]!'⁵²³

The second article fragment derives from the summary of the speech given by Mykola Sergeyev, the chairman of the L'viv branch of the western Ukrainian and Russian-speaking, organisation 'Friends of Ukrainian Art and Literature'.⁵²⁴ *Postup* summarized Sergeyev's speech that underlined a mutual support for national revival between Ukrainians and Russians. According to *Postup*, Sergeyev argued that 'Russians advocate for Ukrainian national revival in which they see the possibility for a national rebirth of the Russian people.'⁵²⁵ The summary of Sergeyev's speech portrayed Russian support for Ukraine as an act of solidarity and as an

⁵¹⁹ *Postup*, 'Rukh's People's Progress of Steel' (May 1989, no. 3), 1–4.

⁵²⁰ *Postup*, Whole issue, (May 1989, no 3): 1–4. With the exception of a news announcement on the first page of the issue that announced the election of Rotyslav Bratun as People's deputy of the USSR.

⁵²¹ *Postup*, 'Rukh's People's Progress of Steel' (May 1989, no. 3), 1.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Ibid.

⁵²⁴ According to an newspaper article published in 2008, the organisation 'Friends of Ukrainian Art and Literature' was a Russian-speaking organisation founded in western Ukraine but the Russian Sergei Sokurov as a 'friendly gesture in the hope of reciprocity' between Russians and Ukrainians. Russkie.org, 'Гордиться малым' (18 February 2008), <https://russkie.org/articles/gorditsya-malym/> (last accessed 17.04.2024).

⁵²⁵ *Postup*, 'Rukh's People's Progress of Steel' (May 1989, no. 3), 2.

interdependency between the Soviet Union's different nations, and also as a strategic move that could benefit the Russian minority in Ukraine.

Throughout 1989, *Postup* adopted a strategy in which the editors' featured articles from and about the Russian movement 'Friends of Ukrainian Art and Literature'. In an article, featured in *Postup* no. 6 from 1989, written by the chairman Sergeyev,⁵²⁶ the author addressed 'rumours' propagated by 'unknown persons' that were accusing western Ukrainians of 'provoking a massacre of 'Muscovites'.' Sergeyev ensured that these rumours were untrue, and 'circulated by those who are interested in destabilizing the situation in the western regions of Soviet Ukraine, in the country as a whole,' to 'incite national discord between Russians and Ukrainian.'⁵²⁷ Sergeyev blamed the Soviet governing body with Moscow at its centre ('the government, whose centre is located in the capital of Russia, Moscow'), for the existence of these claims, and incentivised the readers of his text to not 'give in to provocations, identify and make public the names of those who spread these rumours'.⁵²⁸ On another occasion, an appeal from the cultural organisation written in Russian, was published in *Postup* 1989 no. 13, that addressed the 'Russians and Russian-speaking population of Ukraine.'⁵²⁹ This text was written by delegates of the organisation and again targeted rumours. The claims that were supposedly propagated in Ukraine characterized the Russian-speaking organisation 'Friends of Ukrainian Art and Literature' as 'anti-Ukrainian'. The appeal neglected these rumours as false and placed their origin into the governing structures of the Soviet Union, this time into the Ukrainian communist government. The appeal argued that this 'false propaganda' was spread by the 'the official press representing the heirs of the Stalinist-Brezhnev rulers of Ukraine'.⁵³⁰ Instead to listen to these rumours, the appeal stressed the need for mutual political understanding between Russians and Ukrainians, by stating that: 'Remember, today the fate of perestroika not only in Ukraine also in the entire country [Soviet Union] largely depends on the unity of the two largest national groups in our country [Soviet Union], Russians and Ukrainians.'⁵³¹

The emphasis on political unity between Russians and Ukrainians was portrayed, on the one hand, as a symbolic gesture of solidarity, and on the other hand, as a necessity conveying

⁵²⁶ *Postup*, 'Russian-Speaking Movement' (July 1989, no. 6), 2.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁹ *Postup*, 'Appeal' (October 1989, no. 13), 8.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

potential consequences for other parts of the Soviet Union. The editors of *Postup* utilized the Russian organisation 'Friends of Ukrainian Art and Literature' as a platform to engage the Russian minority in Ukraine with the country's transformation efforts and spread an understanding of ethnic unity.

1990: Strategic Partnership

By mid 1990, *Postup*'s focus shifted from attributing political meaning to the Russian minority in Ukraine to moving beyond Ukraine's state borders, focusing on the role of Russia for Ukraine's national revival, while considering the fate of eastern Ukrainian residents. Advocating for political unity between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine was substituted by accentuating the necessity of a strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine in order to successfully walk the path of political transformation and ensure territorial integrity. Russia's declaration of state sovereignty in June 1990, with Ukraine's following in July 1990, could have been an explanation for *Postup*'s sudden interest in democratic Russia in the second half of 1990, even though the first article elaborating on Russian-Ukrainian relations was published shortly before Russia turned sovereign. In the following I will exemplify this observation based four articles.

The first article that discussed Russia's significance for the future of a post-Soviet Ukraine was a book excerpt taken from Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky's book 'Between History and Politics: Articles on the History and Criticism of Ukraine'⁵³² from 1973 and published in June 1990.⁵³³ Even though the excerpt was published in the same month as Russia declared its sovereignty, the June issue no. 8 was most likely published before news about Russia's state sovereignty reached Ukraine, as there are no further indications present in the issue, in form of news briefs or articles, that inform about the political changes in the RSFSR.⁵³⁴ The excerpt provided an in-depth historical and political analysis on the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, with a particular emphasis on the impact of Russian policies and dominance on Ukraine's quest for autonomy and national identity from the 1917 revolution through the Soviet era (up to the 1970s).

⁵³² Rudnytsky, Ivan L. (1973). *Між історією й політикою: Статті до історії та критики української*, Munich: Suchasnist.

⁵³³ *Postup*, 'I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky. Against Russia or against the Soviet system?' (June 1990, no. 8), 8.

⁵³⁴ *Postup*'s newspaper issues from 1989 and 1990 do not indicate the exact date of the publication but only provide the month and year.

In the excerpt provided by *Postup*, Rudnytsky hypothesized, how a post-Soviet world could be achieved, and what role Russia and Ukraine played in its creation. Rudnytsky argued that the future of a post-Soviet Ukraine could not exist without Russia. He stated that despite the ‘worldview’ of western Ukrainians, which ‘was formed under the influence of the nationalist movement’, the historical and political ‘close ties’ with Russia, subsequently imply that a ‘post-Soviet Ukrainian cannot hate ‘all Russians’ or deny and reject everything Russian. /.../ There is simply no place for such an attitude in the post-Soviet reality.’⁵³⁵ Pointing out the interdependence of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, Rudnytsky concluded that ‘a deep understanding of the idea of freedom means that, while defending the freedom of the Ukrainian nation, we simultaneously recognize the right to freedom of the Russian nation.’⁵³⁶ *Postup*’s editors utilized the ideas of the historian Rudnytsky from the 1970s, to underline the interdependence between Russia and Ukraine and the necessity for strategic partnership and political unity between these two countries to reach the goal of a post-Soviet world in the 1990s.

In July 1990, the hypothetical idea of Russian and Ukrainian state autonomy from 1989 was turned into a tangible reality. As a result, discussions about what the political and economic future of Ukraine would be, arose, and with that, Russia’s role for Ukraine’s transformation was reassessed. The focus shifted from underlining the necessity and importance of unity toward voicing the reasons why such a unity was necessary. By elaborating on these reasons, a narrative of Russia unfolded, in which the developments of the Russian opposition was perceived as a potential political threat towards Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The reassessment of Russia’s role specifically gravitated around the significance of Russian democracy for residents in eastern Ukraine and as part of that, the territorial integrity of Ukraine’s internal Soviet state borders. We can identify such a tendency in three articles published in *Postup* in July and September 1990. Taras Stetskiv, identifying a ‘significant shift’ toward democracy in Ukraine’s political atmosphere in 1990, assessed that this change was not ‘straightforward.’ He noted after a visit to the Donbas basin, that the Russian ‘control’ of the eastern Ukrainian regions ‘for more than 300 years [...] did not pass without a trace,’ implying that support for Russia in the eastern region was greater than for Ukraine, even though he encountered a few eastern Ukrainian individuals who spoke of ‘Russification.’⁵³⁷ In another article fragment, a

⁵³⁵ *Postup*, ‘I. Lysyak-Rudnytsky. Against Russia or against the Soviet system?’ (June 1990, no. 8), 8.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁷ *Postup*, ‘On the current situation in Ukraine’ (September 1990, no. 10), 1.

response by Hrytsak on behalf of *Postup* to the letter of a reader, the author noted that the national revival of Ukraine needed support from the democratic movement in Russia to secure the territorial integrity of Ukraine's state borders. Hrytsak deemed this a crucial condition due to the political orientation of 'a significant part of the democratic forces in the Donbas/Eastern Ukraine' that was 'oriented toward and gravitates toward democratic Russia.'⁵³⁸ Serhiy Lilyk pointed out a similar perception to Hrytsak, in an article dedicated to the Ukrainian-Russian relations.⁵³⁹ Stating that democratic Russia presented an authoritarian power for Russian minorities living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, of which 'the vast majority' were 'not ready to directly support Rukh,' who were primarily located in the 'eastern and south eastern regions of the [Ukrainian] republic.'⁵⁴⁰ He proposed to introduce new structures into the democratic forces in Ukraine that 'would involve an active part of the Russian minority in the political life, and [...] in finding practical solutions of political, socio-economic, cultural and religious problems,' to ensure their support for the Ukrainian democratic movement, and therefore for the integrity of Ukraine's eastern borders.⁵⁴¹

1991: Political Foe

Even though, on November 19, 1990, the Ukrainian SSR and RSFSR signed a bilateral agreement acknowledging each other's sovereignty and territorial borders,⁵⁴² the sentiment of advocating for strategic partnership, that was visible in 1990, disappeared in articles attributing political meaning to Russia in 1991, and critical voices dominated the narrative in *Postup*. Concerns about the sovereignty of Ukraine and its territory continued to be at the centre of this tension. *Postup's* editor Oleksandr Kryvenko foresaw a threat to the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state from Russia following the results of an all-Ukrainian referendum posed on 17 March 1991 by the communist authorities in Moscow. The referendum was held on the question of the preservation of the Soviet Union as a 'renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed.'⁵⁴³ In July 1991, Kryvenko published an article in *Postup* that elaborated on the outcome of the results.⁵⁴⁴ In the

⁵³⁸ *Postup*, Reply to letter from V. Bondar (July 1990, no. 9): 7.

⁵³⁹ *Postup*, 'On Ukrainian-Russian Perspectives' (July 1990, no. 9), 8.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte*, 251–253.

⁵⁴³ Yurii Voitenki, "Referendums in Ukraine and the Baltic Countries in the First Decade of Independence: Causes and Results," *Krakowskie Studia Matopolskie* 4 (40) (2023), 64–77, 65.

⁵⁴⁴ *Postup*, 'And the Ship is Sailing or Today's Generation of Ukrainians will live in the Empire' (July 1991, no. 7): 3.

referendum, the majority of residents in the Ukrainian SSR (more than 70 percent) voted to remain in the Soviet Union according to the conditions laid out in the referendum. Kryvenko defined the results as a failure for the democratic forces in Ukraine and as a victory for its opponents, that he specified as the ‘military-industrial complex’ that ‘wants control of the lion’s share of our [the Ukrainian] economy’, the ‘nomenclatura of the CPSU’, ‘Democratic Russia’ and affiliated regions of ‘non-democratic Ukraine’ and ‘the Western world’. He elaborated on the consequences of the referendum, in which he hypothesized that Ukraine will be ruled by Russia, as long as the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine are oriented toward Russian democracy. He stated that communism will be substituted by ‘Russian republican democracy’ led by Yeltsin, who will set free ‘non-Slavic countries’ such as the Baltics and Transcaucasia but will not apply the same to Ukraine or Belarus. Instead, ‘Ukrainian statehood will lose to the Russian one’ due to socio-economic facts as well as the ‘absence of a universal national myth’ and ‘the incompleteness of a unified Ukrainian nation.’⁵⁴⁵ One month after Kryvenko’s articles was published, communist hardliners in Russia attempted a coup against the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev on 19 August 1991, which resulted in Yeltsin’s take-over of the Soviet military forces and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Following the coup, the Ukrainian government eventually declared its independence on 24 August 1991, which was ratified in a referendum in December 1991, with approximately 90 percent of the population expressing their support for the independence.⁵⁴⁶ With the collapse of the Soviet Union, question about Ukraine’s territory and borders intensified, especially between Russia and Ukraine. Mainly because the newly independent Russia did not officially agree to any border demarcations with Ukraine until an agreement signed in May 1997, while Ukraine since its independence demanded the recognition of its state borders from its neighbouring countries based on international law.⁵⁴⁷ Specifically disputes about Russian military bases in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet were at the centre of the discussions.⁵⁴⁸

While Russian historian Dmitri Trenin later stated that ‘immediately following the defeat of the August 1991 *putsch*, Boris Yeltsin sent Vice President Alexander Rutskoi to Kiev [...] to reassure the Ukrainian [...] leaders that existing borders between the republics would not being

⁵⁴⁵ *Postup*, ‘And the Ship is Sailing or Today’s Generation of Ukrainians will live in the Empire’ (July 1991, no. 7): 3.

⁵⁴⁶ Nahaylo, *Ukrainian Resurgence*, 375–376; Harasymiw, *Post-Communist Ukraine*, 37–42.

⁵⁴⁷ Taras Kuzio, “Borders, Symbolism and Nation-State Building: Ukraine and Russia,” *Geopolitics and International Boundaries* 2 (2) (1997), 36–56, 39–40.

⁵⁴⁸ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, *Borderlands into Bordered Lands. Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Ibidem-Verlag, 2014), 134.

called into question⁵⁴⁹ and political scientist Zhurzhenko argued regarding the 1997 agreement between Russia and Ukraine, that ‘in a sense, Ukraine was lucky with Yeltsin as the first president of Russia: elected on a democratic platform, Yeltsin stood for a peaceful dissolution of the ‘Soviet Empire’’,⁵⁵⁰ *Postup*’s writers in 1991 were under a different impression regarding Yeltsin and his stance toward Ukraine’s state borders. Instead, *Postup*’s journalist Andriy Kvyatkovskiy, continuously, from August to October 1991 published articles that identified a hypocrisy in Yeltsin’s stance towards the sovereignty of Ukraine’s state borders. Kvyatkovskiy interpreted the reassurance by Russia toward the Ukrainian leadership regarding the status of borders, as mentioned by Trenin, differently. In two articles published in *Postup* no. 8 (August) and 9 (September), Kvyatkovskiy argued that Yeltsin’s Russia was ‘blackmailing’ Ukraine, and that in case Ukraine would not sign a treaty⁵⁵¹ with Russia, the sovereignty of Ukraine’s state borders could be reassessed.⁵⁵² Kvyatkovskiy, specifically referred to the sovereignty of Crimea as a central issue in the Russian debate. While Crimea regained its autonomous status in February 1991, it remained part of Ukraine at the time. The author accused the Russian government of supporting and influencing ‘Crimean Autonomy’. Kvyatkovskiy suggested that Russia’s conditions put on borders, as well as its support for Crimea, were Russian tactics aimed at influencing the outcomes of the upcoming Ukrainian referendum and presidential elections in December 1991 and to regain control over former Soviet territories, potentially escalating to include other areas like Donbas.⁵⁵³

⁵⁴⁹ Dmitri Trenin, *End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization*, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 101.

⁵⁵⁰ Zhurzhenko, “Borderlands,” 134.

⁵⁵¹ The author does not specify which treaty he refers to. The treaty that could be referred to in this context is the Union Treaty of Sovereign States, based on the initiative of Gorbachev, that was signed, however, not signed by Ukraine. See, Marples, *Collapse*, 91–92. The only treaty that was signed between Russia and Ukraine in 1991 was the treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in Minsk in December 1991 (between Ukraine, Russia and Belarus). Countries signing the treaty agreed, for example, to cooperation in spheres of politics, economics, ecology, culture, international security, legal aid, and peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts. See Sergei A. Voitovich, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Emerging Institutional Model,” *EJIL* (1993): 403–417, 409–410.

⁵⁵² In the August article, Kvyatkovskiy based this observation on a quote supposedly articulated by Yeltsin’s press secretary on the status of the borders in the Soviet Union. The quote Kvyatkovskiy referred to was ‘...there is a problem of borders, the irregularity of which is possible and permissible only in the presence of allied relations secured by the relevant treaty. In the event of its termination, the RSFSR reserves the right to raise questions on the revision of borders. This applied to all neighbouring republics, with the exception of the Baltic ones.’ See *Postup*, ‘Let’s say ‘B’ because ‘We do not need another Idol...’ (August 1991, no. 8): 6. In the September article, Kvyatkovskiy based this observation on the opinions of Russian officials published in the Russian press. He states that Moscow’s view was that ‘borders between the republics are inviolable as long as they are in some union (preferably in the Union).’ See *Postup*, ‘Great Manoeuvres According to Someone Else’s Plan’ (September 1991, no. 9): 9.

⁵⁵³ See *Postup*, ‘Great Manoeuvres According to Someone Else’s Plan’ (September 1991, no. 9): 9.

Russia was now viewed as a country similar to the Soviet Union, that was attempting to expand its political influence beyond its state borders. This time however, not by force as during Soviet times, but through indirect political threats. In the October 1991 issue, Kvyatkovskyi elaborated on this idea further in an article that centralized Yeltsin's recent political tactics in Russia. Kvyatkovskyi determined that the political developments in Russia toward authoritarianism could have a positive and negative impact on Ukraine. According to Kvyatkovskyi, Yeltsin was centralizing his political power by issuing a presidential decree that strengthened executive control over the legislative body. Kvyatkovskyi argued that this decree could have both positive and negative implications for Ukraine. On the positive side, the internal turmoil within Russia might lead certain regions in Eastern Ukraine to distance themselves from Moscow, especially if Yeltsin maintains his stance, potentially diverting Russian focus away from Ukrainian affairs. On the negative side, Yeltsin's actions could set a precedent for similar authoritarian tendencies among Ukrainian leaders. Additionally, a strong, centralized Russia under an authoritarian regime could pose a significant threat to Ukraine, particularly if this new leadership in Russia decided to assert more aggressive territorial claims.⁵⁵⁴

Concluding Remarks

Considering the years 1989 to 1991, Russia appeared on the mental map of *Postup* in the form of political meaning. In 1989, *Postup* created narratives that began to use the Russian minority in Ukraine as a mean to assign political significance to Russia. This focus shifted in 1990 and 1991, by extending the focus from Russian minority within Ukrainian territory to Russia itself, so beyond Soviet Ukrainian borders. In 1990, Russia was attributed with political meaning that advocated for a strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine but shifted towards more critical voices and eventually portrayed Russia as a political foe that was threatening Ukraine's territorial sovereignty in 1991. Reasons for this shift can be identified in the unfolding political transformation of Russia and Ukraine in the early 1990s, in which both countries first declared the sovereignty in 1990 and then their independence in 1991. The Soviet Union, which had pushed territorial disputes for decades into the background, was dissolving in 1990 and officially vanished by the end of 1991. While in 1989, *Postup* concentrated on arguing for political unity among Russian and Ukrainian residents in the Ukrainian SSR, in which both were pursuing

⁵⁵⁴ See *Postup*, 'The Parliament Did Not Let Itself be Cornered' (October 1991, no. 10): 2.

political autonomy from the same adversary – the Soviet Union – in mid-1990, democratic Russia emerged as potential alternative to the Ukrainian state, which posed new challenges to Ukraine. *Postup's* focus was now redirected at advocating for a strategic alliance with Russia, in order to circumvent potential threats to Ukraine's southern and eastern territories. This changed however in 1991, when political meaning attributed to democratic Russia was tainted by negative connotations, imposing an authoritarian character on Russia's new government, and turning Russia into a political foe.

5.2 *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*: 1989–1991

The analysis of the newspaper *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna* from 1989 to 1991 has unfolded four patterns of place creation (see Table 7). The locations which I identified that demonstrated significant patterns of place creation were L'viv, Moscow, Russia and Lithuania. These locations appeared within the topic categories for the years 1989 to 1991, which were 'State Development' and 'Region and Youth', and conveyed meanings that occurred consistently. The Sankey diagram in figure 18 offers an overview of the relationship between the locations and topic categories. In total I identified 94 relevant articles that contributed to the creation of places from 1989 to 1991 in *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*. In the following, I will delineate the creation of places corresponding to these locations, by demonstrating how meanings were attributed.

Leninska Molod/Moloda Halychyna 1989–1991: Relationship between Locations
and Topic Categories
number of references




Figure 18 Sankey Diagram: *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* 1989–1991.

Location	A Place...	Year
L’viv	of Revived Regional History	1990 to 1991
Moscow	of Geolocation to Soviet Authority	1989 to 1991
Russia	of Democratic Partnership	1991
Lithuania	of Democratic Support	1990 to 1991

Table 7 List of identified locations and place creation from 1989 to 1991 in *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna*.

L’viv

For the sub-chapter L’viv, the location ‘Lviv’, ‘L’viv oblast’, and ‘Galicia’ was considered for the analysis within the category ‘Region and Youth’. The locations ‘L’viv’ and ‘L’viv oblast’ appeared among the list of Top 15 locations throughout all newspapers from 1989 to 1991 in correspondence to the topic category ‘Region and Youth’, while ‘Galicia’ only appeared on the list of Top 15 locations in *Moloda Halychyna* in 1990 and 1991. The analysis of the locations within the corresponding topic category has revealed that the authors and editors of *Moloda Halychyna* applied historical meaning to L’viv in 1990 and 1991 which I argue resulted in the creation of L’viv as a place of revived regional history.

Moloda Halychyna had long tradition as a regional newspaper, as its first publication under the name *Leninska Molod'* was published in the year 1940. As part of this tradition the newspaper documented regional events and news from L'viv and L'viv oblast. During the times of *Leninska Molod'*, in 1989 and 1990, the restructuring of Ukraine was for example followed and discussed through regional perceptions, views and concerns occurring at the time. This continued under the new name *Moloda Halychyna* and the official break of the L'viv branch of the Komsomol with the Union Komsomol in the spring of 1990. In *Leninska Molod'*, typically, the writers published reports on council meetings, events, speeches, interviews or announcements from the communist party or the Komsomol and about local news from and about L'viv and its oblast, including various topics, from ecological problems to stories about or interviews with local figures or cultural events and results of local sport matches. Such a regional focus also left room to the reporting of critical news. While the economy of the Soviet Union suffered of low growth and high inflation, *Leninska Molod'* also reported on the consequences of the economic decline for its region. Rising concerns about the economic situation of the youth and their low salary⁵⁵⁵, the lack of residential buildings⁵⁵⁶ or the ruinous state of public buildings⁵⁵⁷, but also regional concerns about the environment⁵⁵⁸ were common topics in the newspaper. The young writers of *Leninska Molod'* also occasionally reported on the unravelling changes of their time. The newspaper published, for example, articles on the miners' strike of July 1989 in the Western Ukrainian city Chernovohrad, that emerged as part of a wave of several strikes across the Soviet Union, starting in Kuzbass in Siberia, spilling over to Donbas in the East of Ukraine and finally to Western Ukraine.⁵⁵⁹ The writers also offered articles about the revival of Ukrainian folk traditions such as the Christmas celebrations *vertep* on the streets of L'viv⁵⁶⁰ or discussions about the reintroduction of the study of Ukrainian literature in schools.⁵⁶¹

In *Leninska Molod'*, the writers were still limited by the traditional Soviet-Era style of reporting communist news, and favoured regional news.⁵⁶² In 1989 and at the beginning of 1990,

⁵⁵⁵ *Leninska Molod'*, 'Young Economy – Fiction or Reality?' (March 1990, no. 31): 2.

⁵⁵⁶ *Leninska Molod'*, 'Mandate for Action' (January 1990, no. 3): 2.

⁵⁵⁷ *Leninska Molod'*, 'Move on the spot!' (January 1990, no. 5): 1.

⁵⁵⁸ *Leninska Molod'*, 'We will build a scaffold' (March 1990, no. 31): 2.

⁵⁵⁹ *Leninska Molod'*, 'Strike!' (July 1989, no. 88): 1; Teague, Elizabeth. 'Perestroika and the Soviet Worker.' *Government and Opposition* 25, no. 2 (1990): 191–211, 194.

⁵⁶⁰ *Leninska Molod'*, 'I bring you great joy' (January 1990, no. 4): 1.

⁵⁶¹ *Leninska Molod'*, 'Dive into the Depth of the Word' (July 1990, no. 80): 2.

⁵⁶² Syrota, Hazeta "Lenins'ka Molod," 85–87.

meaning attached to L'viv and its region was not primarily shaped by its historical legacy before communism, as it was the case among their fellow writers at *Postup. Leninska Molod'* first and foremost tried to understand Ukraine by considering the local needs and concerns of the moment. This does not imply that the young writers of *Leninska Molod'* were not aware of the historical legacy and national symbolism attached to their region. On the contrary, when Rukh organised a human chain from Ivano-Frankivsk to Kyiv on 21 January 1990, similar to what the Baltic states did on 23 August 1989, to demonstrate support for the unity and sovereignty of Ukraine, the L'viv branch of the Komsomol demonstrated that they actively choose to distance themselves from any attachments to national symbols. After announcing the event in their newspaper and encouraging citizens of the district and region to participate, they published a statement by the first chairman of the L'viv branch of the Komsomol, Oleksandr Shlapak, acknowledging the event's significance for the youth while also requesting participants to refrain from displaying national symbols (such as flags) during the human chain. He argued that the 'attitude towards national symbols is not the same everywhere as in L'viv.'⁵⁶³ This request was motivated by the perceived sensitivity of certain regions towards national symbols, acknowledging that not all parts of Ukraine shared L'viv's enthusiasm for the displays of national identity, such as the through the re-emerging blue-yellow flag.

With the structural shift of the newspaper from *Leninska Molod'* to *Moloda Halychyna* March 1990 the regional focus remained, which also serves as an explanation for the high scoring of the topic category 'Region and Youth' in both newspapers from 1989 to 1991. But additional meaning attached to L'viv emerged, enabled through the new identity of the newspaper. The year 1990 determined an *awakening* of a regional historical consciousness. One indicator of this is the number of appearances regarding the location 'Galicia' in *Moloda Halychyna* in 1990 and 1991. The emergence of this locations on the list of Top 15 locations is due to two reasons, first, the newspaper name '*Moloda Halychyna*' contains the name 'Galicia' in its title, which is printed on the top of every single page of each newspaper issue, automatically increasing the number of occurrences of the location in the NER database.⁵⁶⁴ The second reason, however, reflects the purpose of this chapter. With the rebranding to *Moloda Halychyna*, the newspaper also experienced a revival of western Ukrainian regional history, increasing the number of

⁵⁶³ *Leninska Molod'*, 'For the Unity of the Ukrainian People, for the Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood' (January 1990, no. 8): 1.

⁵⁶⁴ Reasons why the name '*Moloda Halychyna*' was chosen, has been reflected earlier in this study. See chapter 2.3.1.

occurrences of the location ‘Galicia’ as part of discussing this history. This sub-chapter centralizes the revival of regional history.

Unlike in *Postup*, the authors in the newspaper *Moloda Halychyna* did not engage in the strategy of nationalizing L’viv’s regional history to create a historic continuum from western Ukraine’s past struggle to Ukraine’s activities for political restructuring in the present. In *Moloda Halychyna* in 1990, the main focus was set on reviving its regional history in the historical consciousness of L’viv’s readers, and strategy that almost disappeared in 1991. This strategy unfolded in three different practices that the authors engaged in: (1) writing articles that highlight the importance of regional history, (2) providing information about events and gatherings, centralizing a historical theme, and (3) publishing articles that discussed history connected to the western Ukrainian region with L’viv at its centre. A distribution of these practices as identified in articles can be found in figure 19. An observation that can be made from the graphs is that with the newspaper’s transformation from *Leninska Molod’* to *Moloda Halychyna*, an increase in all three practices becomes visible. The practice of highlighting the importance of regional history disappeared in identified newspaper issues the are available in this study from June 1990 onward, and also the practice of reporting on events that were connected to regional history decreased in 1991, instead articles in which the authors discuss aspects of regional history increased.




Figure 19 MH: L’viv - Frequency of Practices connected to Regional History, 1989–1991.

1990 to 1991: Historical Events and the Importance of Historical Preservation

In 1990, with the shift from *Leninska Molod'* to *Moloda Halychyna*, the editors published regularly on events thematising history. The reports were rather short, and mainly included brief information about the time, date and location of the event. A commonality between these events, however, was that they either centralized aspects of L'viv's regional history or took place in L'viv. The authors, for example, reported on the installation of a monument in L'viv dedicated to Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's renowned cultural and literary figure;⁵⁶⁵ the decision of the L'viv local council to raise the Ukrainian yellow and blue flag on top of the city hall;⁵⁶⁶ an exhibition about Jewish religious art from time of Galicia;⁵⁶⁷ or reported on commemoration practices that were to take place in L'viv, for example, on the 75th anniversary of the Sich Riflemen⁵⁶⁸ or in honour of the victims of Stalinist oppression.⁵⁶⁹ Apart from these short news briefs, that did not entail any detailed information about the significance of the historical events, *Moloda Halychyna* published articles that underlined the significance of reviving the history of L'viv and its region. Even though these articles remained abstract in their descriptions of the historical information that needs to be revived, a common pattern across these articles was the strong emphasis on the necessity to preserve regional and national history and propose solutions how to preserve them.

One example is the reprint of a speech given by Yakiv Pohrebnyak's at a session of the regional council of the People's Deputies. In his speech, Pohrebnyak's illustrated L'viv's historical trajectory from 'oppression of the people, oppression of the national spirit, and the bloody struggle' to a state of democratic progress.⁵⁷⁰ He commended the progress of the L'viv region in reviving national history, while raising awareness for the need to increase historical revival, and he expressed his support by introducing the idea of intertwining the activities with historical content and legislative changes. He specifically stated the idea that in order to incentivise a furthering of the national historical consciousness, legislative measures need to be introduced to officially recognise and support Ukrainian national symbols:

⁵⁶⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'And who is Shevchenko?' (April 1990, no. 40): 3.

⁵⁶⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Flag over Town Hall' (April 1990, no. 41): 1.

⁵⁶⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Jewish Religious Art of Galicia' (June 1990, no. 75): 3.

⁵⁶⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Appeal' (April 1990, no. 49): 2.

⁵⁶⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Appeal to the Citizens of L'viv and Regions' (April 1990, no. 74): 1.

⁵⁷⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Y. Pohrebnyak's Speech at the Session of the Regional Council' (April 1990, no. 44): 3.

in none other of the regions of Ukraine [than in L'viv], more has been done to establish a sense of national self-awareness in people's minds, and to revive historical memory at the same time. [...] we understand that national and cultural revival requires new, more energetic impulses. This applies, in particular, to the need to provide legislative support for Ukrainian national symbols, therefore it is necessary to turn to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.⁵⁷¹

This approach of involving institutions – such as the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, mentioned in Pohrebnyak's speech – to revive the historical memory of Ukrainian society was also echoed in other articles published in *Moloda Halychyna* in 1990. Stepan Dyadyuk, for example, advocated for a permanent exhibition in L'viv to memorialize the victims of Stalinist repression and to highlight Ukrainian experiences under Austro-Hungarian and Polish rule.⁵⁷² Academician Ihor Yukhnovskiy, in a speech at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, stressed the necessity for a revaluation of the Academy's role in a transforming Ukraine. He put forward the idea of integrating Ukrainian science, education, and culture within the system of political governance of Ukraine, and apart from communist control.⁵⁷³ Another article discussed L'viv's archaeological heritage and noted the efforts of the *Yaroslav Pasternak Archaeological Society* to preserve local historical memory.⁵⁷⁴ The article specifically mentioned the significance of protecting the archaeological heritage of ancient cultures in the 'western region of Ukraine,'⁵⁷⁵ including traces of the Scythians and the legacies of various historical periods from the Paleolithic to the Roman Empire and the development of Slavic cultures. It highlighted the need to safeguard these cultural artifacts from external actors, such as 'foreign museums and private collectors' from cities such as 'Vienna, Krakow, Moscow, and Leningrad.'⁵⁷⁶

By publishing articles that raised awareness of cultural-historic events in L'viv, and others, that promoted the integration and preservation of L'viv's regional history and national history into political and legislative processes, *Moloda Halychyna* contributed to a revival of regional historical awareness. This happened in articles in *Moloda Halychyna* that reported on events centred around historical figures, such as the construction of the Taras Shevchenko monument in L'viv and raising of the Ukrainian flag. The articles in *Moloda Halychyna* that discussed institutionalisations, such as Pohrebnyak's demand for legislative support for Ukrainian national symbols, or Yukhnovskiy's proposal to restructure the Academy of Sciences to include

⁵⁷¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Y. Pohrebnyak's Speech at the Session of the Regional Council' (April 1990, no. 44): 3.

⁵⁷² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'The Exhibition must be permanent' (May 1990, no. 63): 4.

⁵⁷³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Sovereign Ukraine-National Academy' (May 1990, no. 64): 2.

⁵⁷⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Врятьуєм Наше Коріння' (May 1990, no. 68): 4.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

awareness for national history in Ukraine's political transformation, advocated for a preservation of L'viv's regional history. This was to preserve regional historical memory and to contribute to the political agenda of historical consciousness.

1990 to 1991: Reviving Regional History

Besides engaging in practices of promoting events on historical topics occurring in 1990 and 1991 in L'viv and its region and emphasizing the importance of developing and preserving regional and national history, *Moloda Halychyna* also participated in a third practice that contributed to a revival of regional history: publishing historical essays about L'viv's regional history. The historical thematic contexts of these historical essays were manifold and spread from discussing the history of youth organisation to essays about the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). In figure 20 a stacked area chart visualizes the frequency of these historical thematic contexts and their distribution in 1990 and 1991. This chart represents the practice 'Historical Themes' (blue area) from the previous figure 19.

L'viv: Frequency of Historical Thematic Contexts in *Moloda Halychyna* over Time, 1989–1991 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 20 MH: L'viv - Frequency of Historical Thematic Contexts, 1989–1991.

The uniting element in the historical essays was their contribution to a revival of L'viv's regional history. Unlike in *Postup*, where the authors nationalised western Ukrainian regional history to create a continuum from western Ukraine's struggle in the past to the nation-wide struggle for independence in the present, the authors of the articles in *Moloda Halychyna* did not explicitly

do so. Rather than focusing on nationalizing regional history through the use of spatial arguments, the authors of these articles revived regional history without imposing the notion that this local history is, or in the past was, important for all of Ukraine. This applied to all articles identified that conveyed historical information about the region, except for one article. This exception was a lengthy article published in 1990 on the activities of the OUN, which is further delineated below. The remaining articles that I identified, were used as a tool to revive Ukraine's western regional history in the historical consciousness of *Moloda Halychyna's* readers. These were the multi-issue articles that informed about the origin of L'viv's street names⁵⁷⁷ and another multi-issue article that proposed new street names,⁵⁷⁸ articles that informed about the history of youth organisations, such as Plast⁵⁷⁹ or the L'viv branch of the Komsomol⁵⁸⁰, articles that reported on the history of the coat of arms of L'viv,⁵⁸¹ articles that provided insights into the burial sides of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army⁵⁸². Although the authors of this article's did not nationalise the regional history of L'viv, one could argue that the decision taken by *Moloda Halychyna's* editors to publish such articles, implicitly contributed to a nationalization of Ukraine's regional history.

Even though only one article was identified that nationalised history, I analyse it in the following, because the approach the author of this article used differed from *Postup's* authors. While in *Postup*, most of the articles on regional history were utilized to draw a connection between western Ukrainian history and Ukraine's political ambitions during the transformation, by emphasizing the significance of western Ukrainian history for all of Ukraine, *Moloda Halychyna* nationalised the history of the OUN to learn from their mistakes for Ukraine's political transformation in 1990.

The article titled 'Bandera, Lebed and others' written by Yuri Pokalchuk, head of the Writer's Union of Ukraine, was published in *Moloda Halychyna*, no. 86.⁵⁸³ It represented a brief history of the activities of the OUN in western Ukraine. Following a historical contextualisation of the OUN, in which the author described the geopolitical situation of Ukraine in the 1940s, the

⁵⁷⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Alphabet of L'viv Streets' (April 1990, no. 44): 4; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Alphabet of L'viv Streets' (April 1990, no. 47): 3.

⁵⁷⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Streets, Streets' (February 1991, no. 17–22): 3.

⁵⁷⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Plast: Return to the Motherland' (April 1990, no. 43): 2.

⁵⁸⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'The Past hurts...what is the future' (February 1991, no. 19–22): 2.

⁵⁸¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Jewels of the Lion City' (June 1990, no. 77): 4.

⁵⁸² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Pikulyczki Mounds' (June 1990, no. 69): 4.

⁵⁸³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Bandera, Lebed and others' (June 1990, no. 86): 3.

collaboration between the OUN and Nazi Germany, even though without specifying any details of this collaboration, the split of the OUN into OUN-B and OUN-M and their fights against the Soviet Union, the author justified the activities of the OUN by stating that ‘planning an active national struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Stalinist occupation was a normal, natural and fair phenomenon’ as well as ‘the hatred that erupted from the Stalinist occupation of the Western Ukrainian people.’⁵⁸⁴ He continued to elaborate how the split of the OUN and the emergence of the UPA, which caused disputes between individuals driven by greed and power, contributed to the fact that the OUN did not achieve its common goal, which was the independence of Ukraine. Noting that ‘all of them wanted good things for Ukraine, but everyone wanted to see themselves wiser, bigger, stronger...’,⁵⁸⁵ he compared the situation of the OUN in the past, to Ukraine’s struggle in the present by implying that similar power struggles provoked by personal ambitions rather than common goals are visible in Ukraine in 1990. He specifically stated:

And in essence – it is sad, because these ambitions are heard even today, this intolerance towards another, a patriot like you, and today this threatens to become the rock on which Ukraine has always slipped when its prime time came, when it was necessary to put everything on one altar, leave everything – surrender, and glory, and ranks and wealth – on the altar of the motherland.⁵⁸⁶

Pokalchuk utilized the regional narrative of the OUN to draw a continuum to Ukraine in the present. He cautioned his readers to not step into similar traps, as the OUN did, and to not lose sight of the common goal, the independence of Ukraine. Although the author concluded his article by specificizing that its purpose was not to ask the readers ‘for any complete identification of their ideas [the OUN’s ideas] with us or with our worldview today,’⁵⁸⁷ he nationalized the regional history of the OUN by turning its internal struggles into a lesson all Ukrainians in 1990 should learn from.

Concluding Remarks

The location L’viv occurred on the mental map of *Moloda Halychyna* as a place of revived regional history mainly in 1990 and 1991. The historical meaning unfolded on the level of three practices: informing about events connected to regional history that took place in L’viv, publishing articles that emphasize the importance of preserving and supporting regional

⁵⁸⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Bandera, Lebed and others’ (June 1990, no. 86): 3.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

history, and publishing articles that discussed regional history. The purpose behind engaging in these three practices was to overall revive regional history in the historical consciousness of *Moloda Halychyna's* readers. All three practices contributed to create L'viv as a place of revived regional history in 1990, and decreasingly in 1991.

In 1991 historical articles that centralized other aspects of Ukrainian history beyond the western Ukrainian regions emerged. I identified, for example, two articles that were published on the history of the Ukrainian People's Republics. One of them was published across five issues in January 1991,⁵⁸⁸ and the second one was published in February 1991.⁵⁸⁹ These articles did not spatially place any significance into the western Ukrainian regions, but discussed the struggle of the Ukrainian People's Republic, spatially placed into central and eastern Ukrainian regions, in the context of the political transformation of Ukraine.

Moscow

For the sub-chapter Moscow, the location 'Moscow' was considered for the analysis. The location was identified in the topic category 'State Development'. An analysis of the location has revealed that in the newspaper *Leninska Molod'* in 1989 and 1990 'Moscow' was solely referenced in its physical form, as a geospatial entity on the map, which changed under the newspapers' new format *Moloda Halychyna* in March 1990 and throughout 1991, when additionally political meaning was attributed to 'Moscow'. These patterns portrayed Moscow as a place that shifted from a geolocation to a place of Soviet authority, which will be demonstrated in the following.

1989 to 1991: From a Physical Place on the Map to the Embodiment of the Soviet Union

The newspaper structures in *Leninska Molod'* in 1989 still resembled the communist reporting standard of publishing reports from communist council meetings, political speeches, law changes, government programs and party announcements. Typically, the writers, on the first page of the four-pages long newspaper, published reports on Soviet council meetings, events, speeches from communist leaders, interviews with communist actors or announcements from the communist party or the Komsomol while the rest of the space was mostly dedicated to local

⁵⁸⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, multi-issue article 'Historical Chronicle of the Second Winter Campaign' (January 1990, no. 2–6): 3.

⁵⁸⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'January State Acts' (February 1990, no. 24): 3, 4.

news from and about L'viv and its oblast. The loyalty toward the communist reporting style and ideology also became evident in the meanings attributed to the location 'Moscow'. In *Leninska Molod'* 1989 and 1990, the location was solely referenced in its geospatial form of a physical place on a cartographic map. In the relevant newspaper issues that correspond to the topic category 'State Development' a total of eight fragments were identified in which geographic meaning was attributed to 'Moscow'.⁵⁹⁰ This meaning purely reflected questions of *where*. The text fragments attributing geographic meaning occurred in articles that informed about gatherings, events or meetings held in Moscow⁵⁹¹ or that indicated when communist deputies from Moscow were present at a meeting.⁵⁹² The question is, why is this significant? While a similar pattern might be observed in other locations, such as L'viv or Ukraine, it holds particular importance in the context of the newspaper *Leninska Molod'*. This is because it reflects a Soviet tradition aimed at drawing non-Russians into the Soviet fold and improving administrative operations among them, promoting a sense of unity and equality among the republics rather than emphasizing Russian centralism.⁵⁹³ By including only articles that reference 'Moscow' in representations of geographic space, *Leninska Molod'* aligned with the broader spirit of the Soviet Union, deliberately avoiding discussions that could raise questions about Soviet centralism linked to Moscow and, by extension, Russia.

In 1990, when *Leninska Molod'* turned into *Moloda Halychyna*, an additional pattern that attributed political meaning to the location Moscow emerged. Moscow was now no longer solely referred to as the place on the map where the Soviet Union held their meetings, but it was personified as the governing body of the Soviet Union. Instead of utilizing the reference in its geographic understanding, articles were printed in 1990 and increasingly in 1991, that equated Moscow with the communist government, that previously had not existed. The stacked area chart in figure 21 displays the distribution of both narratives from 1989 to 1990. This shift can be represented through the following example: instead of phrases such as 'the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has decided in Moscow', more phrases that were reflective of the phrase

⁵⁹⁰ Given the low number of newspaper issues from *Leninska Molod'* in 1989 and 1990 that corresponded to the topic category 'State Development' (4), I analysed the remaining newspaper issue from *Leninska Molod'*, that did not correspond to the topic category 'State Development' according to the exploratory analysis. This step was able to verify that the pattern observed regarding the location 'Moscow' as consistently being addressed as a physical location on a map, was also the case in the remaining issues.

⁵⁹¹ See for example, *Leninska Molod'*, 'On the most Important Stages of Reconstruction' (1989, no. 67): 1.

⁵⁹² See for example *Leninska Molod'*, 'Information Notice on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR' (1989, no. 67): 1. 'First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the CPSU.'

⁵⁹³ Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5 (4) (2003): 82–136, 89.

‘Moscow decided’, were printed. By publishing articles, news briefs and interviews in which patterns of personifying Moscow as the governing body occurred, *Moloda Halychyna* allowed the attribution of political and symbolic meaning to the location, beyond its physical attributes. This kind of personification framed Moscow not just a city but as a central political authority. Reasons for this shift might have been the detachment of *Leninska Molod’* from the limiting structures of the Komsomol reporting style, as well as the unfolding political transformation in Ukraine that resulted in the publication of articles and interviews, reflecting diverse opinions regarding the political and economic situation in Ukraine and Moscow’s role in it. While in 1990, the narrative of Moscow as the embodiment of the Soviet authority occurred only sporadically (three articles) and mostly as part of responses provided in interviews, it was more visible in 1991.




Figure 21 MH: Moscow - Frequency of Narratives, 1989–1991.

Interview examples from 1990, can be found in *Moloda Halychyna* no. 65, when businessmen, Yosyp Bandytskyi, head of a L’viv department of the Ukrainian republican enterprise ‘Ukrburvod’, which was a company performing work on drilling artesian wells for large industrial facilities, water supply to cities and towns, and the development and implementation

of new drilling methods,⁵⁹⁴ was interviewed by one of the editors, Maxim Mishenko. The interlocutors discussed Bandytskyi's professional achievements, including overseeing the construction of a monument to Taras Shevchenko, that was planned for L'viv. As part of the interview, they also discussed economic and political reforms in the Ukrainian SSR, in which Bandytskyi suggested support for the decentralization of economic control and urged for regional economic sovereignty. As one of the reasons for the decentralization and localisation of Ukraine's economy he argued that 'it is simply impossible to manage such a giant as the entire economy of the entire country from Moscow'. Instead of referring to the governing body overseeing the economy of the Soviet Union as the Supreme Soviet, central government or ministry located in Moscow, the interviewee used the location 'Moscow' as a metaphor of centralized control and governance of the Union's and Ukraine's economy. Other examples can be found in an interview with British-Ukrainian journalist Bohdan Nahaylo on the evolvement of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.⁵⁹⁵ In the interview, also conducted with Maxim Mishenko, Nahaylo offered several speech fragments in which he referred to the Soviet government and its actions as 'Moscow'. For example, when he stated that despite the formal decentralization efforts and initiatives aimed at empowering local enterprises, real control and authority over economic affairs remained centralized in Moscow, not in Kyiv, where it would have been if Ukraine were truly sovereign⁵⁹⁶ or when he commented on the role of communist Ukrainian deputy Vladimir Ivashko as oscillating 'between Moscow and Kyiv, between conservatives and Dembloc.'⁵⁹⁷

Political meaning attributed to Moscow equated to the Soviet authority was more evident 1991. I identified a total of 19 articles that used a personification of Moscow that portrayed the locations as the governing body of the Soviet Union. For example, in headlines such as 'Ukraine says to Moscow: 'Do not step on me''⁵⁹⁸, or in statements published on behalf of Ukrainian committees, such as the Committee for Civic Accord, in which Moscow is portrayed as the

⁵⁹⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'A Man in his Place' (May 1990, no. 65): 2. See also, Burvod, 'История развития Группы Компаний 'Бурвод'', Website (2010), <https://burvod.ua/o-kompanii.html> (last accessed 18.04.2024).

⁵⁹⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'The Head of the Editorial Office of Radio 'Liberty' speaks Sovereignty' (June 1990, no. 74): 1 and 4, 4.

⁵⁹⁶ 'Sovereignty, specifically the Ukrainian leadership, entails power and control over the economy. Until now, there was an ironic contradiction. The initiative was given to enterprises, but they were not subordinated to Kyiv, but to Moscow. These attempts at decentralization were particularly noticeable here in 1988. But the republic gained nothing from it, even lost.' *Moloda Halychyna*, 'The Head of the Editorial Office of Radio 'Liberty' speaks Sovereignty' (June 1990, no. 74): 4.

⁵⁹⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'The Head of the Editorial Office of Radio 'Liberty' speaks Sovereignty' (June 1990, no. 74): 4.

⁵⁹⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Ukraine says to Moscow: 'Do not step on me'' (February 1991, no. 16): 1.

central oppressive force in the Soviet Union, representing the centralized power that suppresses democratic developments and national aspirations across the union's republics, for deploying military forces in the republic's biggest cities to enforce control.⁵⁹⁹ Representing Moscow as the centre of Soviet authority did not necessarily always entail an evaluating connotation. Descriptions could be neutral, as for example in sentences like 'Moscow's reaction was favourable'⁶⁰⁰ or more descriptive, as in text fragments such as 'an indicator of the level of opposition in Ukraine to Moscow's brutal intervention in Lithuania was the official reaction of Kyiv, which can be seen as a surprise for Moscow.'⁶⁰¹ Such a shift in the representation of Moscow from a geographic to a political entity increased the depth with which the city was viewed, which might have affected how discussions about it were framed and potentially influenced people's perceptions of Moscow's role within the larger context of the Soviet Union. This shift was the result of unfolding perceptions within Ukraine that centralized questions of *central* versus *local* power dynamics, so 'them' and 'us'. In this framing, Moscow (as the center of power) was viewed as 'them' by those in the Soviet republics who felt dominated or controlled, while 'us' represented the local populations seeking more autonomy and independence.

Concluding Remarks

Considering the years 1989 to 1991, Moscow emerged on the mental map of *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* as a place that shifted from geographic location on a map to the embodiment of the Soviet authorities. In *Leninska Molod'* in 1989 and 1990 the authors attributed solely in geographic meaning to Moscow, and in 1990 and 1991 in *Moloda Halychyna* this meaning was extended by an additional one, political meaning. While influenced by the tradition of communist reporting in 1989 and 1990 in *Leninska Molod'*, meaning attributed to Moscow was purely for geographic purposes. Only with the shift in 1990 to *Moloda Halychyna* this would slowly change and become more dominant in 1991. Moscow was no longer seen as solely the place of the governing body but transformed into the governing body itself. In doing

⁵⁹⁹ 'The decision of the union leadership to deploy troops in regional centres and cities of the empire to strengthen police patrols is nothing but a creeping military dictatorship, demonstrating the escalation of unconstitutional actions by the central authority. All these measures, purportedly aimed at maintaining order and legality, are in fact aimed at suppressing the democratic forces of Ukraine and other colonies of the Moscow empire.' See *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Statement' (February 1991, no. 14): 1.

⁶⁰⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Information service' (February 1991, no. 16): 1.

⁶⁰¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Ukraine says to Moscow: 'Do not step on me'' (February 1991, no. 16): 1.

so, its spatial identity transformed from a place on the map in the heart of the Soviet Union to the centre of political discourse and authority in the Soviet Union.

This transformation can be seen as an indicator how *Moloda Halychyna* perceived their own positions and roles – as part of a marginalized or controlled periphery – in relation to Moscow and the Soviet authorities. Even though, I conclude that this shift from 1989 to 1990/1991 reflected more the break with the communist ideology, that previously limited the writers and editors to specific newspaper structures, rather than it was solely reflective of a sudden shift in the editors and writer's perception toward Moscow. Given the detachment from communist ideology, *Moloda Halychyna* was in a position in which they were freed of external restrictions. Such a condition naturally led to the inclusion of more diverse opinions, for example those, that already made use of the linguistic strategy to equate 'Moscow' with the Soviet authorities.

Russia

For the sub-chapter Russia, the location 'Russia' corresponding to the topic category 'State Development' was considered for the analysis. The locations appeared in the top 15 list of locations and the topic category 'State Development' in the newspaper *Moloda Halychyna* in 1991. The analysis of the references has revealed that political meaning was allocated to Russia. Russia under Yeltsin was delineated as a democratic partner of Ukraine, while Gorbachev's political actions, as president of the Soviet Union, were criticised. This created Russia in 1991 as a place of democratic partnership.

1991: A Place of Democratic Partnership

While toward the second half of *Postup* in 1991, the discourse regarding Russia had developed into a negative perception of the Russian democratic movement, political meaning attributed to Russia in *Moloda Halychyna* in early 1991 demonstrated a rather hopeful understanding of future Russian-Ukrainian relations. Articles that were published in *Moloda Halychyna* attributing political meaning differentiated between Yeltsin's Russia and Gorbachev's Soviet Union.

Russia: Frequency of Narratives in *Moloda Halychyna* over Time, 1991 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 22 MH: Russia - Frequency of Narratives, 1989–1991.

In 1991, Russia’s political transformation was tainted by tensions in the leadership, materialised in the political figures Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev. While Gorbachev advocated for restructuring the government structures of the Soviet Union to meet the challenges posed by the Soviet republics for more political and economic autonomy, Yeltsin’s spoke of renouncing and replacing the Soviet governmental structures with political structures based on democratic principles.⁶⁰² This dichotomy between the Soviet-oriented Gorbachev and democratic-oriented Yeltsin was also reflected in newspaper articles published by *Moloda Halychyna* in 1991. They unfolded in two narratives: ‘Obstacle to Democracy’ and ‘Democratic Partner.’ The distribution of these narrative over time are visualised in the stacked area in figure 22, showing a peak of both narratives in January and February 1991 with decreasing prominence in March. In a total of 9 articles, Gorbachev’s political actions as president of the Soviet Union were portrayed as if his decisions were aiming at maintaining control, suppressing the independence movements, for example in the Baltics, and were influenced by systemic corruption.⁶⁰³ In 8 of these articles these political actions of Gorbachev were juxtaposed with Yeltsin’s idea for Russia

⁶⁰² Herbert J. Ellison, *Boris Yeltsin and Russia’s Democratic Transformation* (University of Washington Press, 2006), 27–28.

⁶⁰³ *Postup*, “Yury Pokalchuk: Militia Wall: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow” (January 1991, no. 4): 2; “56 percent of Kyivians for Full Independence of Ukraine” (January 1991, no. 5): 1; “Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukraine is Separate” (January 1991, no. 9): 2; “Commentary of a Journalist” (January 1991, no. 13): 2; “Ukraine says to Moscow: Do not step on me” (February 1991, no. 16): 1; “Written to us (Prepared by Victoria Andreyeva)” (February 1991, no. 19): 1; “Let’s joke, Brothers!” (February 1991, no. 21): 1; “I will not speak for all of Russia...” (February 1991, no. 22): 1; “The hardest thing about the truth is when everything can be true.” (March 1991, no. 34): 1.

to create the narrative that Yeltsin's views were aligned more with reform and the easing of authoritarian control. Yeltsin's Russia was seen as a potential partner in the transition toward political autonomy and independence for the Soviet republics, rather than Gorbachev's oppressive union. How these two narratives unfolded in detail and why they mainly occurred in January and February 1991 is delineated in detail in the following.

The first article that I discuss was written by Yuri Pokalchuk and published in *Moloda Halychyna* in January 1991. The article titled 'Militia Wall: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow'⁶⁰⁴ elaborates on the role of the Soviet police during Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. Pokalchuk noted how the police was in an ambiguous situation, because on the one hand, they had to obey to the instructions given by the Soviet leadership, that commanded for example to arrest protesters during rallies for democracy in Ukraine, while on the other hand, Gorbachev's policies incentivised expressions of free speech. He compared Gorbachev's utilization of the Soviet police, that influenced the decisions of the communist elite in Soviet Ukraine's, as a return to the Stalin-Brezhnev era.⁶⁰⁵ Without providing any detail, Pokalchuk then juxtaposed these political actions with Boris Yeltsin's ideas for Russia, implying that his voice represents the Russian society who does not want to continue the path of the political imprisonment of citizens. He achieved that in the following statement:

And neither the President of the USSR nor the Ukrainian partocrats hear the language of Russia, which Boris Yeltsin speaks. Because Russia also wants independence, leisure, and most importantly, to be itself, simply Russia, not an empire of camps and prisons, but simply free from everything, an independent Russia, which then everyone will respect and love.⁶⁰⁶

Another example that criticised the use of the Soviet police under Gorbachev and underlined support for Yeltsin, is the article titled 'Ukraine says to Moscow: "Do not step on me"' written by Roman Solchanyk, co-director of scientific research of Radio Liberty and published in *Moloda Halychyna*, no. 16.⁶⁰⁷ The article discusses the events in Vilnius, Lithuania, where the Soviet military intervention under Gorbachev against Lithuanian protestors, was seen as a failure of perestroika and had been identified as illegal based on a lack of constitutional basis for the actions.⁶⁰⁸ In light of these events, the upcoming all-Union referendum planned for

⁶⁰⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Militia Wall: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow' (January 1991, no. 4): 2.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Militia Wall: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow' (January 1991, no. 4): 2.

⁶⁰⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Ukraine says to Moscow: 'Do not step on me'' (February 1991, no. 16): 1.

⁶⁰⁸ In January 1991, Gorbachev sent an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the restoration of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic. After the demands were not met, Gorbachev send Soviet troops into Lithuania which wounded more than 108 citizens and nine deaths. See, Jonathan Haslam, 'Attaining Baltic Independence in

March 1991 and intended by Gorbachev was seen with scepticism. The sincerity of maintaining the USSR as a federation of equal, sovereign republics was doubted.⁶⁰⁹ In contrast, Boris Yeltsin's actions were noted as hopeful, particularly his agreements signed with the Baltic states to recognize their sovereignty and his offer of mutual support in case of threats. Yeltsin's support of the Baltics and his agreements with other Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia, was portrayed as hopeful for the political autonomy from the Soviet Union, since they represented '85 percent of the entire national income of the Soviet Union,'⁶¹⁰ implying that an economic collaboration between these republics could potentially result in political autonomy from the Soviet Union. Yeltsin's actions of creating alliances and mutual support agreements across the Soviet republics were perceived as steps toward dismantling the centralized control of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev.

Similar to these two examples, four more articles can be found in 1991 that juxtapose Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's political actions expressing strong support for the democratic forces under Yeltsin while remaining critical towards Gorbachev.⁶¹¹ Interestingly, these articles were not only published in *Moloda Halychyna* within a short amount of time, but were also all featured on the first page of the newspaper, underlining the significance of this narrative for the newspaper's editors. One of these articles is a collection of letters sent from readers to *Moloda Halychyna*, that were prepared by the newspaper's journalist Victoria Andreyeva and published in 1991 no. 19.⁶¹² These letters do not only serve as an indication that *Moloda Halychyna* supported good political relations with Yeltsin's Russia, but also served as a reflection of Ukraine's citizens perception of Russia. In the letters, support was expressed for the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin's leadership, which was seen as a potential partner in building a free and sovereign future for Ukraine, while the 'Moscow Treaty' led by Mikhail Gorbachev was perceived negatively, as it represented an attempt to maintain or reintroduce oppressive control over Ukraine and other Soviet republics. A letter from a Ukrainian citizen with the name Lidia Laptuta advocated for a free and sovereign Ukraine and expressed support for communication with several neighbouring countries, including the Russian Federation led by

Search of a Helping Hand', in ed. Charles Clarke, *Understanding the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1991* (Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2023), 42–48, 47.

⁶⁰⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Ukraine says to Moscow: 'Do not step on me'' (February 1991, no. 16): 1.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹¹ See *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Let's Joke, brothers!' (February 1991, no. 21): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'I will not speak for all of Russia...' (February 1991, no. 22): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'The hardest thing about the truth is when everything can be true' (March 1991, no. 34): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Written to us' (February 1991, no. 19): 1.

⁶¹² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Written to us' (February 1991, no. 19): 1.

Boris Yeltsin, while opposing the Moscow Treaty led by Mikhail Gorbachev, which she viewed as a ‘continuation of oppression.’⁶¹³ The reader Teofil Petrusevich argued that any new union treaty, such as the one initiated by Gorbachev, would be a ‘betrayal of the Ukrainian heroes who died for independence.’⁶¹⁴ A third letter from a reader, Isak Petruk, questioned the necessity of a new union treaty by mentioning the potential for ‘poverty, hunger, and destruction’ it could bring.⁶¹⁵

Concluding Remarks

Considering the year 1991, Russia had its place on the mental map of *Moloda Halychyna* as a place of democratic partnership. However, despite the enthusiasm expressed in *Moloda Halychyna* toward Boris Yeltsin and Russia’s democratic movement as demonstrated in the above-mentioned articles, it is critical to note that the scope of the newspaper issue from *Moloda Halychyna* in 1991 only extends until June 1991. As demonstrated in the sub-chapter on Russia within the newspaper *Postup*, critical voices toward Russia and Yeltsin appeared in July 1991, after Russia had declared its independence, and questions of Ukraine’s state borders dominated the public debate surrounding Ukrainian-Russian relations. As this study does not have access to newspaper issues from *Moloda Halychyna* beyond June, we cannot determine whether the initial enthusiastic opinions toward Yeltsin was maintained throughout 1991, or if a similar shift, such as in *Postup*, can also be observed in *Moloda Halychyna*.

Lithuania

For this sub-chapter, the locations ‘Lithuania’ and ‘the Baltics’ corresponding to the topic category ‘State Development’ was considered for the analysis. The location ‘Lithuania’ appeared in the Top 15 list of locations and the topic category ‘State Development’ in the newspaper *Moloda Halychyna* in 1990 and 1991, and the location ‘the Baltics’ in 1991. The analysis of the references has revealed that political meaning was allocated to Lithuania that contributed to its creation as a place of democratic support.

⁶¹³ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Written to us’ (February 1991, no. 19): 1.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

1990 to 1991: Democratic Support

From 1990 onward, coverage of the Baltics in *Postup* declined, while *Moloda Halychyna*, following its transformation from *Leninska Molod'*, began reporting on events in the Baltics, particularly focusing on Lithuania. In *Postup*, the Baltic states were attributed political significance and portrayed as centres of democratic progress, creating a narrative of 'imagined solidarity' between the Baltics and Ukraine. This narrative positioned the democratic movements in the Baltic republics as a source of inspiration for Ukraine's own democratic efforts. Similarly, *Moloda Halychyna* also attributed political meaning to the Baltics, emphasizing a narrative of 'imagined solidarity,' however with a focus on Lithuania. This solidarity was expressed through articles reporting on Lithuania's political events, aiming to inform readers and emphasize the need for L'viv to stand in solidarity with Lithuania as part of Ukraine's broader political aspirations for independence. The distribution of these articles over time is presented in Figure 23. Unlike *Postup*, where solidarity was woven into cooperative practices among editors and authors, *Moloda Halychyna's* expression of solidarity remained limited to the publication of supportive articles. The emphasis on Lithuania served to inform the readership and express solidarity.




Figure 23 MH: Lithuania - Frequency of Narratives, 1989–1991.

In 1990, articles in support of Lithuania featured in *Moloda Halychyna* were marginal in contrast to 1991. I identified a total four articles that underlined the support of *Moloda Halychyna* for the political changes occurring in Lithuania, of which I will present two to exemplify how exactly this support unfolded. One example was an article published in *Moloda Halychyna*, on the front page of its issue no. 40, from 3 April 1990.⁶¹⁶ In March 1990, following the Supreme Soviet Election (the legislative bodies of the Soviet republics), that resulted in the overwhelming win of Lithuania's opposition movement *Sąjūdis*, Lithuania formally declared its transition to independence from the Soviet Union. *Moloda Halychyna* reported on a demonstration that took place in L'viv on 31 March 1990, in support of Lithuania's decision to transform to independence. The article provided several photographs from the protest and summarized speeches given by local Ukrainian opposition politicians given during the demonstrations, who expressed their support of Lithuania's transition to independence and expressed the significance of Lithuania's political transition for Ukraine, as it demonstrated that independence from the Soviet Union can be achieved. Another example is an appeal printed from the L'viv branch of Rukh, printed in *Moloda Halychyna* no. 49, on 24 April 1990, that was addressed to the residents of L'viv and asked L'vivians to participate in the upcoming 1st of May demonstrations in L'viv to show support the democratic forces in L'viv as well as for 'the people of brotherly Lithuania and other peoples who selflessly defend the right to independence.'⁶¹⁷

In 1991, reports on the political changes in Lithuania increased. This rising interest of *Moloda Halychyna* in 1991 to mainly feature coverage about Lithuania was due to the ultimatum sent by Gorbachev in January 1991, that demanded the restoration of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic. Lithuania had previously declared its transition to independence in March 1990, but the Soviet Union continued to pressure Lithuania to withdraw from this path which resulted on 12 January 1991 in the tragic events where 108 citizens were wounded and nine died by the military Soviet intervention.⁶¹⁸ Shortly before and following these events in Lithuania, *Moloda Halychyna* expressed increasing support. I identified a total of 14 articles that indicated political support for Lithuania, of which ten were only published in January 1991, as can also be seen on the stacked area chart in figure 23.

⁶¹⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'For our and your freedom' (April 1990, no 40): 1, 4.

⁶¹⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'For the Consolidation of all Democratic Forces – Appeal' (April 1990, no 44): 1.

⁶¹⁸ Jonathan Haslam, 'Attaining Baltic,' 47; Rimantas Vebra, 'Political Rebirth in Lithuania, 1990–1991: Events and Problems' *Journal of Baltic Studies* 25 (2) (1992): 183–188, 185–186.

At this point, *Moloda Halychyna* had adopted the strategy of featuring excerpts from foreign media outlets, such as the German newspaper, *Frankfurter Allgemeine* or the radio stations *International French Radio* and *Radio Liberty*. In January 1991, *Moloda Halychyna* published excerpts from the German newspapers *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *Deutsche Welle*, as well as from the *International French Radio* that commented on the situation in Lithuania by expressing sympathy for Lithuania's desire for self-governance and criticising the Soviet government's actions of threatening the use of force and intimidation tactics as outdated.⁶¹⁹ On the 15 April 1991, *Moloda Halychyna's* journalist Vasyl Tereshchuk reported on the January 12 events in Lithuania, by writing an article about protests that were held in L'viv to protest the Soviet Union's military intervention. Beginning the article by expressing his solidarity with the victims ('Innocent blood was spilled in Vilnius') the author emphasised the significance of the protest in L'viv, by stating that 'Thousands of people came to the protest. After all, the people of L'viv are well aware that the events that are happening today in Lithuania may soon be repeated here, in western Ukraine.'⁶²⁰ The same newspaper issue also included a reprint of the resolution that was written by the initiators of the L'viv protest. The resolution declared the Soviet Union's actions as an 'illegal and unconstitutional act' and expressed their support for Lithuania by stating 'We, the democratic forces of Ukraine, stand in solidarity with the Lithuanian people.'⁶²¹ In the following newspaper issues published in January 1991, article published in reference to Lithuania continued with the same sentiment.⁶²²

Beyond January 1991, *Moloda Halychyna* continued to publish articles with references to Lithuania, and in this context also the Baltics, but with decreasing intensity. These articles were still tainted by the events of 12 January 1991. The military intervention of the Soviet Union into sovereign Lithuania had questioned the Soviet Union's credibility in recognising the sovereignty of its republics. For example, in March 1991, *Moloda Halychyna* published an article from Radio Liberty that reported in the even that Lithuania had filed for recognition of its sovereignty in front of the United Nations, as a result of the January events. In February 1991, this topic was elaborated on in an article by Roman Solchanyk, that has already been discussed in this study in the sub-chapter on Moscow.⁶²³ The article identified that the military

⁶¹⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, three News Briefs from foreign media (January 1991, no. 5): 1. For further news briefs on Lithuania from foreign media, see, for example, *Moloda Halychyna*, News Briefs (January 1991, no. 8): 1.

⁶²⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Hands off Lithuania!' (January 1991, no. 6): 1.

⁶²¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Resolution' (January 1991, no. 6): 1.

⁶²² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Statement Appeal' (January 1991, no. 7): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Who causes trouble on L'viv' (January 1991, no. 8): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, '1991 – A 'General' year?' (January 1991, no. 9): 2.

⁶²³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Ukraine says to Moscow: 'Do not step on me'' (February 1991, no. 16): 1.

intervention in Vilnius was illegal, given the sovereign status of Lithuania, and that this now has accelerated the democratic forces in Ukraine to move toward independence. Another example is an article published in May 1991,⁶²⁴ that discussed a meeting that took place on May 8 between the leaders of the opposition of the Baltic countries – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – and U.S. President George Bush. This meeting was noteworthy as President Bush addressed the January events in the Baltic countries and criticised the Soviet Union government’s military intervention and expressing U.S. support for the Baltic states’ independence efforts. Bush indicated that during his upcoming meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, he would advocate for the Baltic states’ independence. However, the article also mentioned the mixed feelings in Lithuania about the US political ambiguity towards the republic’s transformation path, here referred to as ‘the West’: ‘By the way, Lithuania is no longer very happy about Western promises. Supporting, in principle, the idea of independence, the West at the same time does not want to undermine the current Soviet alliance.’⁶²⁵

Concluding Remarks

Considering the year 1990 to 1991, Lithuania, appeared on the mental map of *Moloda Halychyna* as a place that required democratic support. The political meaning attributed to Lithuania unfolded in articles that reported on the political events in Lithuania and that raised awareness of the significance of Lithuania’s political struggle for the fate of Ukraine. The articles published by *Moloda Halychyna* therewith, as in *Postup*, created an imagined transnational solidarity between Lithuania and Ukraine, that served as a reminder that Lithuania had to be supported in order for Ukraine to successfully continue on its path for political change.

The increased focus on Lithuania, rather than other Baltic republics, was due to the Soviet Union’s military intervention in Lithuania in January 1991. This led to a spike in articles in *Moloda Halychyna* reporting on events occurring in Lithuania and expressing solidarity. Beyond 1991, these events continued to be reported on in *Moloda Halychyna*, reflecting ongoing concerns about the sovereignty of states within the Soviet Union.

VI. Mental Maps 1992–1995: Navigating the Post-Communist Transformation

The second analytical chapter reconstructs the second part of the two mental maps of the regional newspapers *Postup* and *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna*. This chapter examines the

⁶²⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Three ‘little Finlands’ are better...!’ (May 1991, no. 57): 1.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*

meanings attributed to locations and their processes of place creation from 1992 to 1995. As in the previous analytical chapters, the output of the exploratory analyses of the NLP processes navigated the in-depth analysis of how meaning was attributed to frequently mentioned locations in the newspapers, and if and how this meaning evolved from 1992 to 1995. This chapter demonstrates how from 1992 to 1995, spatial perceptions attributed to locations unfolded through a regional, national and European lens.

The spatial meanings attributed to Russia and Europe in *Postup* and *Moloda Halychyna* were marked by a consistent portrayal of Russia as a political and economic threat, and Europe as an aspirational yet unrealized partner. Both newspapers depicted Russia as a hostile neighbour, with *Postup* paying special attention to its threats to Ukraine's territorial and economic sovereignty, while *Moloda Halychyna* highlighted Russia's imperialistic tendencies, reflecting a broader concern about Russian influence over Ukraine. In contrast, Europe was portrayed in both newspapers as a desired future political and economic partner, though it remained solely aspirational in *Postup*'s view and more tangible in *Moloda Halychyna*'s narrative in which Ukraine was portrayed as aligning itself more closely with European values and institutions. *Postup* attributed meanings to the USA as an unreliable partner, particularly in the context of Ukraine's denuclearization, due to a lack of security guarantees and inconsistent support. Meanwhile, *Moloda Halychyna* created a narrative of Poland as a growing strategic partner, which unfolded in descriptions of mutual cooperation in political, economic, and cultural spheres, while acknowledging the complexities of cross-border relations.

6.1 *Postup*: 1992–1995

From 1992 onward, *Postup* underwent significant changes compared to its earlier issues from 1989 and 1990. The newspaper expanded its number of pages per issue, increased the variety of topics covered, and included more advertisements. Originally a small samizdat newspaper written in the student dormitories by *Postup*'s first editors, it transformed into a medium-sized official newspaper company. While articles in 1989 and 1990 were meticulously prepared and curated due to limited resources and space, the newspaper from 1992 onward featured additional content. This included chapter reprints of Ukrainian literature, book and film reviews, erotic stories, horoscopes, and, starting in 1993, TV programs. Consequently, the frequency of location references in the newspaper surged, even though the growth in the number of identified articles did not keep pace proportionally. In an interview, *Postup* journalist Andrii Kvyatkovskyi attributed these changes to Ukraine's economic decline following

independence. As a result, the newspaper had to increase advertising and occasionally publish unwanted content, potentially including the erotic stories.⁶²⁶

The analysis of *Postup*'s newspaper issues from 1992 to 1995 has revealed three patterns of place creation. The exploratory analysis following the digital processing of the newspaper issues guided the thematic focus of each year. As a result, the topic categories 'State Development' and 'Economy' were considered for the analysis in *Postup* from 1992 to 1995, in which the first category was predominantly relevant for the years 1992 to 1993, and the latter was of interest for the years 1994 and 1995. The relationship between the locations and the topics is illustrated in the Sankey diagram in figure 24.

Postup 1992–1995: Relationship between Locations and Topic Categories
number of references




Figure 24 Sankey Diagram: *Postup* 1992–1995.

The locations in *Postup* for the years 1992 to 1995 that indicated consistent patterns of place creation throughout the years included Russia, the United States of America and Europe (see table 8). For the location Russia I identified 173 relevant articles, for the United States of

⁶²⁶ 'But if politics was still relatively lenient to the press then, the economy was ruthless. It forced us to adapt to the situation, to release some cheap and vulgar content, to build up the advertising department, to attract all kinds of 'managers' – often with dirty hands.' See, Kvyatkovsky, "Nevhamovnyi." For more information on the change in number of pages per issue see chapter 3.1.

America a total of 51 and for Europe 34 articles relevant for the creation of places. In the following, I will demonstrate how political and economic meanings were attributed to the locations, which resulted in the portrayal of Russia as a place of a political and economic threat, the United States of America as a place of unstable economic and political partnership, and Europe as a place of wanted but unreachable political and economic partnership.

Location	A Place of...	Year
Russia	Political and Economic Threat	1992 to 1995
United States of America	Unstable Economic and Political Partnership	1992 to 1994
Europe	Wanted but Unreachable Partnership	1992 to 1995

Table 8 List of identified locations and place creation from 1992 to 1995 in *Postup*.

Russia

For the analysis of the meanings attributed to the location ‘Russia’, initially the two locations Russia and Moscow were considered for the analysis. However, in the newspaper articles published in *Postup* from 1992 to 1995, two additional locations, which were also included in the top 15 list of most frequently mentioned locations, appeared in the context of articles referencing Russia. These locations were Crimea and Donetsk, which due to persistent concerns expressed by *Postup*’s writers about the implications of the Russian government’s actions toward these Ukrainian regions frequently occurred. All four locations were identified within the topic category ‘State Development’ and ‘Economy.’ They appeared continuously on the list of top 15 locations from 1992 to 1995, with the exception of Donetsk, which only appeared on that list in 1993. The comprehensive analysis of *Postup*’s issues from 1992 to 1995 revealed that the authors attributed political and economic meanings to the location Russia, portraying it as a place of political and economic threat.

1992–1995: A Place of a Political and Economic Threat

The political and economic meanings attributed to Russia from 1992 to 1995 in *Postup* were determined as an extensive continuation of *Postup*’s stance toward Russia that became visible in the analysis of the newspaper’s issues in 1991. The negative sentiment from 1991, which portrayed Yeltsin’s Russia as a political foe, intensified over the course of 1992 to 1995, turning Russia into a perceived threat for sovereign Ukraine, politically and economically. As already

in *Postup* in 1990 and 1991, the geographic meaning of Russia was utilized to refer to the political and economic actions of the Russian government. In *Postup*'s articles from 1992 to 1994, Russia is portrayed as a political foe based on actions taken by the Russian government that the authors and editors of *Postup* perceived as destabilizing or negatively impacting Ukraine's internal politics, with the potential to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty, political stability, and independent governance. Russia as an economic threat is defined through the actions taken by the Russian government perceived as undermining Ukraine's economic stability, enforce economic dependency or exploit economic interactions with the aim to ensue geopolitical advantages at the expense of Ukraine's transformation.

The narrative of Russia as a political and economic threat persisted throughout 1992 to 1995 in *Postup* and dominated the newspaper's discourse evolving around the political and economic transformation of Ukraine. It appeared across multiple thematic contexts. In total I identified nine thematic contexts (see Figure 25). These thematic contexts were 'Russia's Hegemony within the Commonwealth of Independent States', 'Crimea', 'Denuclearisation', 'Economic Dependency', 'Donbas', 'Energy Dependency', 'Black Sea Fleet', 'Ukrainian Political Ties to Russia' and 'Imperial Russia'. In the following, I will delineate how these patterns of political and economic threat unfolded within the newspaper by discussing three of these thematic contexts in further detail as examples. These are 'Crimea', the 'Donbas' and 'Energy Dependency.' These have been selected for further in-depth discussion because they indicate a high frequency of occurrences, appear under both topic categories (State Development and Economy), and exemplify Russia as both a political and economic threat.

While all three topics were present from 1992 to 1995, their prominence and the depth of discussion varied over time, as illustrated by the changes in area coverage on the stacked area chart (see figure 25). The chart shows how the focus on different topics expanded or decreased in certain years, with specific topics occupying a greater area during periods of increased emphasis. This variation in area coverage reflects the results of the exploratory analysis of the topic model process, which narrowed down the number of issues chosen for in-depth analysis. According to the methodological considerations following the exploratory analysis, the topic category selected for in-depth focus in the years 1992 and 1993 was State Development, encompassing both political and economic topics. In contrast, the years 1994 and 1995 included the topic categories of State Development and Economy (see Chapter 4.2). This shift

resulted in a greater proportion of newspaper coverage dedicated to economic topics from 1994 onward.




Figure 25 Postup: Russia – Frequency of Thematic Context, 1992–1995.

As visualized in the stacked area chart, thematic contexts such as ‘Crimea’ (see figure 25) show a noticeable reduction in area coverage in *Postup*’s content in 1994 and 1995. This reduction indicates that the focus shifted towards economic issues during those years, which did not necessarily address the topic of Crimea, as it was primarily considered a political issue. Therefore, the smaller area representing Crimea in 1994 and 1995 compared to 1992 does not necessarily imply a decline in the newspaper’s overall interest in the topic. Instead, it reflects that more newspaper issues with an economic focus were included for qualitative analysis, while issues potentially focusing more on political topics, such as Crimea, were in this study not analyzed in-depth during those years.

I decided to exemplify how Russia has been perceived as a political and economic threat by selecting thematic contexts that discuss Russia as such from 1992 to 1993 and specifically as an economic threat solely from 1994 to 1995. The thematic context ‘Crimea’ will be discussed regarding Russia as a political threat in 1992, the thematic context of ‘Donbas’ and Russia as an economic threat in 1993, and the theme of ‘Energy Dependency’ will be discussed for Russia

as an economic threat in 1994 and 1995. The distribution of these narratives can be found in a second stacked area chart that encompasses a more detailed temporal timeline (see figure 26).

Russia: Frequencies of Three Thematic Contexts in Postup over time, 1992–1995
(average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 26 Postup: Russia – Frequency of Three Thematic Context, 1992–1995.

As the chart indicates, the thematic context ‘Crimea’ indicates a high coverage area in the year 1992, beginning in May, which is mainly connected to the resolution adopted by the Russian Federation’s Supreme Soviet on 6 May 1992, which declared the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine as illegal.⁶²⁷ This topic is further discussed in the analysis. The year 1993 represents the highest coverage area for the thematic context of ‘Donbas,’ which is primarily related to articles that covered the processes in Ukraine leading up to the Miners’ strike of June 1993 in the Donbas region, as well as related to the strike itself. The year 1994, indicated a consistent coverage of the thematic topic ‘Energy Dependency.’ While this topic also occurred in 1992 and 1993, the coverage was most consistent in 1994 and less so in 1995. In

⁶²⁷ Mykola Turanskyi, “The Impact of pro-Russian Public Organizations and parties on the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation,” *UR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 4(9), 69–88, 71–72. In 1954 Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev transferred the Autonomous Region of Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR as a gesture of solidarity between the ‘Slavic brotherly peoples.’

the following I delineate how each of these thematic contexts contributed to the creation of Russia as a place of political and economic threat.

1992 to 1993: Concerns over Crimea and the Donbas

Already beginning in October 1991, *Postup* attributed meaning to the location Russia, centralizing concerns about Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and Russia's role in it. At the centre of these concerns were the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, predominantly Crimea and the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). The discourse in *Postup* at the time revolved around accusations that the Russian government was supporting the autonomous movements in Crimea, with concerns that such actions could extend to other Ukrainian regions such as Donbas, with the aim to undermine Ukraine's aspirations for independence.⁶²⁸ From 1992 to 1995, a similar sentiment toward Russia and the assessment of its role regarding Ukrainian regions continues. Particularly, Russia's impact in the context of the peninsula Crimea was of interest in *Postup*, that was greatly discussed in 1992.

The topic of Crimea gained enormous significance in the context of Ukrainian-Russian relations with the beginning of Ukraine's independent statehood. Following the December referendum in 1991 Ukraine had publicly ratified its independence from the Soviet Union, which was supported with approximately 54 percent of Crimean residents. However, shortly after, autonomous forces emerged in Crimea, which posed a challenge to Ukraine's newly gained independence. By late 1991 and early 1992, separatist and Russian nationalist forces in Crimea, who promoted an anti-Ukrainian stance, had formed the 'Republican Party of Crimea' (hereafter – RDK).⁶²⁹ On 6 May 1992, the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, adopted a resolution that declared the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine as legally invalid.⁶³⁰ The Crimean Supreme Soviet followed Russia's resolution by declaring independence shortly after and scheduling a referendum for August. Both actions were declared unconstitutional by the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. Despite an increasing dispute with Kyiv, the Crimean parliament drafted a constitution that even though recognized Crimea as part of Ukraine, suggested a significant separation of governmental functions. Eventually, negotiations between the Ukrainian government and Nikolaj Bagrov, a moderate

⁶²⁸ See chapter 5.1 and *Postup*, 'Great Maneuvers According to Someone Else's Plan' (September 1991, no. 9): 9.

⁶²⁹ Jan Zofka, "Halbinsel unter Spannung? Konfliktlage auf der Krim seit dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion," *Ukraine-Analysen* 12 (2006): 2–5, 2.

⁶³⁰ Turanskyi, "The Impact," 71–72.

leader representing Crimea's economically autonomous elites, allowed Kyiv to regain control of Crimea in that same year, leading to the withdrawal of the independence declaration, constitution, and planned referendum.⁶³¹

With the beginning of May 1992, beside reporting on the events occurring in Crimea, *Postup* published numerous articles that analysed the Crimean issue pushing Russia's role into the foreground. Russia was perceived as an active hostile actor that played a significant role in the Crimean aspirations for independence with the aim to gain territorial control on Ukrainian territory and undermine Ukraine's independence. In total I identified 20 articles published in 1992 beginning in May, in which the political actions of the Russian government with regard to Crimea were perceived as politically threatening to Ukraine, posing questions to Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and transformation into an independent state.⁶³² The narrative of Russia in the context of Crimea was consistent and did not change over time. In the following I will present two articles in detail that exemplify how Russia was portrayed as a political threat.

The first article was published in *Postup* 1992, issue no. 16, following the declaration of independence introduced by the Crimea Parliament in May 1992.⁶³³ The author, Oles Danyluk, raised concerns regarding Russia's involvement in Crimea's declaration of independence from May 1992, and its potential plans for Ukraine in the future. Danyluk specifically suggested that a political agreement between the Crimean parliament and the Russian government existed aiming at supporting Crimea's independence and undermining Ukraine's sovereignty. Danyluk argued that the people around the Crimean leader, Nikolaj Bagrov, communicated with the Russian economist and politician Yehor Gaidar, who at that

⁶³¹ Zofka, "Halbinsel," 2.

⁶³² *Postup*, 'Will the Tatars Save Ukraine?' (1992, no. 16): 2; *Postup*, 'And the Blood of the Enemy Will Be Spilled into the Black Sea...' (1992, no. 16): 3; *Postup*, 'In Odessa, Tulka Was Poised Again' (1992, no. 16): 3; *Postup*, 'Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: 'Crimean Independence Will Perish, Like Dew on the Sun' ...Until the Sun is Rising - the Dew Will Eat the Eyes' (1992, no. 17): 3; *Postup*, 'The Last Day of Pompeii' (1992, no. 17): 5; *Postup*, 'When the Peak Comes Out from Under the Mask' (1992, no. 17): 6; *Postup*, 'Shagreen Ukraine' (1992, no. 20): 3; *Postup*, 'Crimea. Sadism Rules the Ball. But Masochism Comes from Underground.' (1992, no. 20): 4; *Postup*, 'Transnistria!!! Crimea!!! Transcarpathia???' (1992, no. 20): 5; *Postup*, 'Transnistria!!! Crimea!!! Transcarpathia???' (1992, no. 21): 5; *Postup*, 'Kravchuk's Backup Airfield' (1992, no. 23): 6; *Postup*, 'Crimean Renaissance' (1992, no. 35): 2; *Postup*, 'Lviv Journalist at RDK Meeting in Crimea: 'I Feel Like Mykluho-Maklay'' (1992, no. 35): 4; *Postup*, 'Anatoly Los Testifies in Court. God Is Him Judge' (1992, no. 36): 4; *Postup*, 'Admiral Kasatonov Cruiser Appeared on the Moscow River' (1992, no. 38): 3; *Postup*, 'Big Fish, or Far from Bishkek' (1992, no. 38): 6; *Postup*, 'You Can Call to Arms, But Oh My God, You're Shooting Boars out of Hunting Season' (1992, no. 38): 7; *Postup*, 'Your Biggest Enemy' (1992, no. 39): 10; *Postup*, 'A Turning Moment in the Fate of Crimea' (1992, no. 44): 5; *Postup*, 'Russian Investigations in Sevastopol, Under the Ground of 'Post Progress'' (1992, no. 46): 5; *Postup*, 'It Would Be Better if Aggressive Neighbors Are Forced Solve Your Own Problems on Your Own Territory' (1992, no. 49): 7.

⁶³³ *Postup*, 'І поллється кров ворожа у Чорне море...' (May 1992, no. 16): 2.

time mainly in charge of Russia's economic transformation, prior to the declaration of independence to assure Russian support following Crimean independence. Furthermore, Danyluk argued that Russia's involvement in Crimean independence aligned with a broader policy of the Russian government to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty. This policy might have involved a military intervention, and guarantees for, both, economic and political support:

Undoubtedly, before becoming independent, [...] Bagrov's men spoke with Yehor Gaidar, and he assured [...] in the event of the declaration of independence, Russia will support Crimea. We became aware of the contents of one of the documents developed by the Russians. In it, the main goal of Russia's policy is not only to prevent the revival of a strong Ukrainian state; it also became known from reliable sources that Russia has already prepared not only a plan for economic aid to Crimea in case of a Ukrainian blockade, but also a plan for military operations.⁶³⁴

Russia's interest in Crimea was determined as a broader strategy to politically threaten Ukraine's transformation independent from Russia, turning Russia into a political threat for Ukraine. This notion continued to become evident in the last paragraph of the article, in which Danyluk argued for the need to stop the political aggression from Russia as Crimea might not be the only Ukrainian region of interest to Russia, implying that similar Russian support for regional independence could spill over to other regions of Ukraine: 'It is necessary to stop the process of disintegration of Ukraine, controlled from Moscow, because Crimea is only its beginning.'⁶³⁵

Another example is an article from *Postup* 1992, issue no. 17, in which the author Oleh Shmid, again underlined the notion that Russia opposed an independent Ukraine, and that Russia's interest in Crimea is a mean to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and promote internal conflict, which could result in wider regional destabilization. He argued that this could threaten other areas like Donbas and Kherson, and potentially reduce Ukraine's territory to the Dnipro River, implying that either those regions could either strive for independence, or would be absorbed by Russia:

I am far from the thought that Russia is delighted with the emergence of the Ukrainian State. Without a doubt, it will weave a web of intrigues until Ukraine has the strength to break free. [...] We must understand that Crimea, on the verge of civil war, is not needed by Russia as a territory associated with eternal troubles and problems, and territorial and economic dependence on Ukraine. Crimea is needed by Russia as a stronghold for the collapse of the Ukrainian State. If we fall for this intrigue and start fighting, we will also have to fight for Donbas, and Kherson, and ancient Cossack Zaporizhzhia. And the outcome of this adventure will be Ukraine up to the Dnipro.⁶³⁶

⁶³⁴ *Postup*, 'І поллється кров ворожа у Чорне море...' (May 1992, no. 16): 2.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁶ *Postup*, 'Останній день Помпеї' (May 1992, no. 17): 5.

In the year 1993, the interest in the activities in Crimea with regard to Russia faded, and other topics, such as the Miner's conflict in the Donbas gained significance. The fading interest in *Postup* was also reflected in the replies given by young L'vivians in a public opinion poll in 1993. A survey conducted in December 1993 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology questioned Ukrainian residents on their opinions and views on political, social and economic aspects of life in Ukraine.⁶³⁷ In a question that asked to answer what the most pressing issue in Ukraine would be, Crimea was not one of them. Approximately 97 percent of all survey participants residing in L'viv oblast and between the age of 18 and 35 stated that the activities in Crimea were not a pressing issue to them (see figure 27). This was similar to the nation-wide perception within the same peer group. Approximately 92 percent of all survey participants (including L'viv oblast) from age 18 to 35 did not find the issue of Crimea to be relevant (see Figure 27).

Ukraine: Which of the problems facing Ukraine today worries you the most? (December 1993)




Figure 27 Results of data from all respondents between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1993, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Source: National Research Bank.

Differences, however, can be identified between the group including all respondents and those from L'viv (in age group 18 to 35) with regard to the same question asked about relations to Russia. While approximately 39 percent of all respondents answered that 'Relation with Russia'

⁶³⁷ The survey included a total of 1868 respondents of which 639 were within the age group 18–35 years. Out of these 639 respondents a total of 29 were tagged as residents of L'viv. The survey sample was collected randomly and in the form of face-to-face interview across the period from 3 December to 12 December 1993. Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1993, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (December 1993), National Research Bank.

were a pressing issue for them, only approximately 3.5 percent of residents from L'viv oblast gave that answer. The majority of young respondents from L'viv (96.55 percent) did not regard relations with Russia as an issue, implying that a relationship of political and economic nature with Russia was most likely not of interest. Instead what respondents from L'viv perceived as the biggest problem for Ukraine at the end of 1993 was the 'state of the economy.' Approximately 90 percent of all respondents gave that answer. Additionally, one third of respondents from L'viv oblast were also concerned with 'ensuring the security of Ukraine' (see figure 28).




Figure 28 Results of data from the respondents from L'viv oblast between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1993, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Source: National Research Bank.

While economic factors remained the biggest concerns for young L'vivans, there was also a perceived fear of issues related to Ukraine's security. From the results of another social survey conducted one month prior, in that same year,⁶³⁸ we can get a closer understanding of what these security related concerns encompasses. When posed the question 'In your opinion, with which countries does Ukraine have the highest risk of military conflict?' a total of 77.65 percent of respondents from L'viv oblast within the age group 18–35 years put a checkmark on 'Russia'

⁶³⁸ Evgenii Golovakha, The current political situation and future political and economic development of Ukraine, November 1993, Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank. A total of 1797 respondents participated in the survey, of which 85 were within the age group of 18-35 years and residents in L'viv. The survey was conducted on the 11 November 1993. The survey sample was random and the survey method was a questionnaire.

(see figure 29).⁶³⁹ The results suggest that young respondents from L'viv oblast were primarily concerned with a military confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, while Poland with 52.94 percent was also highly regarded as a potential for conflict.⁶⁴⁰

L'viv oblast: In your opinion, with which countries does Ukraine have the highest risk of military conflict? (November 1993)




Figure 29 Results of data from all respondents between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: The current political situation and future political and economic development of Ukraine, November 1993, Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank.

The results from the social surveys regarding Russia-related concerns were also reflected in *Postup's* issues in 1993. The narrative of Russia as a political threat to Ukraine's territorial sovereignty from 1992, implying a potential military conflict with Russia, continued to occur in 1993. This time however not with a primary focus on Crimea, but on the Donbas region, with Donetsk at the centre. While in 1992, the fear of Russian influence on other Ukrainian regions, such as the Donbas, encompassing Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast, was hypothetically discussed in the context of Crimea – as for example in the last discussed article⁶⁴¹ – in 1993, the hypothetical idea had developed into a more tangible reality, that additionally portrayed Russia as an economic threat to Ukraine due to its influence in the Donbas region.

⁶³⁹ The respondents were provided a list of multiple options and were instructed to choose a maximum of two countries.

⁶⁴⁰ Evgenii Golovakha, The current political situation and future political and economic development of Ukraine, November 1993, Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank.

⁶⁴¹ Other articles from 1992, that discuss the notion that Russia's influence in Crimea could spill over to the Donbas region are: *Postup*, 'Shagreen Ukraine' (1992, no. 20): 3; *Postup*, 'Decay? Why?' (1992, no. 20): 8; *Postup*, 'Kravchuk's Backup Airfield' (1992, no. 23): 6; *Postup*, 'It Would Be Better if Aggressive Neighbors Are Forced Solve Your Own Problems on Your Own Territory' (1992, no. 49): 7.

By 1993, Ukraine had proven incapable of implementing economic reforms, which led to the fading support of the heavily industrialized Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine, that had initially supported Ukraine's independence in the December 1991 referendum, based on the promise for better economic conditions.⁶⁴² Historian Hiroaki Kuromiya has argued that the miner's in 1991 supported the independence referendum because they felt 'deep alienation' from Moscow and were convinced that they were better off with an independent Ukraine, than with an 'exploiting' Russia.⁶⁴³ However, instead of an economic focus following the 1991 referendum, the Ukrainian government prioritized the institutionalization of the Ukrainian nation, and efforts to preserve an outdated industrial structure were unsuccessful. By the end of 1993, Ukraine's GDP had decreased by over 40 percent, real wages fell to 57.6 percent of their 1991 level, and consumer prices soared. By 1994, Ukraine had made no significant progress in economic reforms, resulting in one of the deepest post-Soviet recessions among transitioning economies. As one of the consequences, the miners and employees of other major industries in the Donbas participated in strikes in June 1993, demanding the regional independence of the Donbas region and a nation-wide referendum on confidence in Ukraine's president and parliament.⁶⁴⁴ In the same way the Donbas miners felt 'exploited' by Moscow, they now began to develop those feelings toward Kyiv, due to the government's lack of economic reform.⁶⁴⁵

For *Postup*, the events in the Donbas implied a stronger political orientation of Donbas toward Russia and therewith greater influence from Russia on Ukraine's economy, painting Russia as not only a threat to Ukraine's territorial sovereignty but also to its economy. This was consistent throughout 1993 and became evident in a total of 7 articles.⁶⁴⁶ One example is an article published by *Postup*'s correspondent from Donetsk, Oleksandr Savitsky in April 1993, published prior to the June strikes of 1993. Savitsky, who was one of the main writers in *Postup* to report and write about the Donbas, discussed a meeting between Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Yuliy Ioffe and representatives of miners' trade unions from Donetsk and Luhansk that had recently

⁶⁴² Hartwell, *Two Roads*.

⁶⁴³ Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas. A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 472.

⁶⁴⁴ Vlad Mykhenko, "State, Society and Protest under Post-Communism: Ukrainian Miners and their Defeat," *Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference* (April 2000): 1–36, 11–13.

⁶⁴⁵ Kuromiya, *Freedom*, 474.

⁶⁴⁶ *Postup*, 'У Донбасі Кравчука годували докорами й вимогами. Але ВІХ не застосовуватиме тортур' (February 1993, no. 6): 7; *Postup*, 'Українська громада Донецчини передчуває: Росія незабаром проковтне Донбас' (March-April 1993, no. 11): 5; *Postup*, 'Юлій Юффе: сьогодні в достатку жити можуть лише шахраї' (April 1993, no. 12): 8; *Postup*, 'Донецьк. Приватизація. Жертв не бракує' (April 1993, no. 14): 8; *Postup*, 'Україна — для неукраїнців' (June 1993, no. 20): 12; *Postup*, 'Донецька бруківка чекає' (June 1993, no. 21): 2–3; *Postup*, 'Рушії страйкового тарану. Хто є хто' (September 1993, no. 34): 5.

taken place in the region. The meeting aimed to address the miners' demands, but it became clear that the government's main goal was to convince the miners of the impossibility of fulfilling all their demands. According to the article, the demands of the miners were to transfer the Social Insurance Fund to union control, which the government agreed to but only after establishing a mechanism for accountability; to index the miners' wages to inflation, which Ioffe acknowledged as fair but unaffordable; and to abolish the state management of miners which the government insisted on maintaining to ensure normal relations between enterprises and their state owner.⁶⁴⁷ In this context, Russia's role in the Donbas was portrayed as a strategic force, that with the help of propaganda influenced public opinion in the region to further fuel political turmoil and eventually economically benefit from the instability by 'swallowing' the Donbas:

In the Donetsk press, the pro-Russian, pro-communist propaganda campaign is intensifying, cleverly using the three-day miners' strike scheduled for April 2. According to objective local economists, neither the government nor the President can address the region's economic crisis, and therefore its political consequences. The Ukrainian community in Donetsk feels oppressed. Pessimists believe that Russia will inevitably swallow Donbas. There are fewer and fewer optimists.⁶⁴⁸

Savitsky suggested that the Miner's strike was not merely the result of economic problems in Ukraine, but a broader geopolitical issue amplified by Russia. He implied that 'pro-Russian' and 'pro-communist' forces would utilize the miners' demands to incentivise political movements toward a future union with Russia.

In another article published by Savitsky in a later issue in April 1993, the economic ties between Russia and the Donbas became a focal point of discussion. The article examined the efforts of regional leaders to create an 'economic and legal experiment' aimed at providing the region with greater autonomy in economic matters and strengthening connections with Russia.⁶⁴⁹ Savitsky noted that the specifics of this experiment were not disclosed to journalists, stating that 'it is only known that an economic and legal experiment project is being developed to grant the region independence in strengthening ties with Russia and justifying certain economic innovations,'⁶⁵⁰ implying that these new economic policies might not align with Ukraine's goal of building an independent state.

⁶⁴⁷ *Postup*, 'Юлій Юффе: сьогодні в достатку жити можуть лише шахраї' (April 1993, no. 12): 8.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁹ *Postup*, 'Донецьк. Приватизація. Жертв не бракує' (April 1993, no. 14): 8.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Savitsky also indicated that smaller businesses in the region supported the experiment, viewing it as a potential relief from their current economic struggles. However, this support appeared to stem more ‘from a desire for any change’ in the economic situation rather than full endorsement of the regional leadership, who stood to be the primary beneficiaries of the ‘economic and legal experiment’ with Russia:

Small entrepreneurs, squeezed by central taxes and local corruption, welcome the upcoming regional experiment. However, this reflects more a desire for any change rather than support for the nomenklatura monopolists, who will undoubtedly take control of all small and medium-sized businesses.⁶⁵¹

In *Postup*, the political positions of the industrial leadership in Donbas and Russia were portrayed as aligned, suggesting that the Donbas industry was run by ‘nomenklatura monopolists’ that preferred economic relations with Russia instead of Ukraine. Following the strikes in June 1993, *Postup* published another article that, this time written by Vadym Frunze, who discussed the socio-political dynamics surrounding the miner’s strikes in Ukraine, and the lack of responsibility taken by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Frunze criticized the Ukrainian leadership for not taking significant actions against the miners’ strikes. In Frunze’s articulations Kravchuk was depicted as indecisive and unwilling to confront the strikers directly, and he therefore offered suggestions of how to handle the situation. Specifically, he argued to introduce harsh measures to handle the situation in Donbas, such as not paying the miners, conducting mass layoffs, or declaring the strike illegal.⁶⁵² Frunze argued, that if Kravchuk would turn the other way, and give in to the demands of the miners, that this could potentially lead to a broader economic union with Russia, undermining Ukraine’s independence:

Moreover, by kneeling before the miners, Ukraine will be forced to enter at least a minimal economic union with Russia, which (according to the miners’ demands) implies the integration of banking, payment, and customs systems, i.e., Ukraine will have a status similar to that of former CMEA⁶⁵³ members. Thus, today’s concession will cost Ukraine, at least, the loss of the Ruble (due to the inflationary spiral that will occur as a result of multiple salary increases, our money will not withstand it), and at most the loss of, de facto, independence.⁶⁵⁴

Frunze finished his article by highlighting what Savitsky had suggested in the previous article, that the main benefactor of the miner’s demands would be the leadership of the industries in

⁶⁵¹ *Postup*, ‘Донецьк. Приватизація. Жертв не бракує’ (April 1993, no. 14): 8.

⁶⁵² *Postup*, ‘Донецька бруківка чекає’ (June 1993, no. 21): 2–3.

⁶⁵³ CMEA members refers to the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). The CMEA was an economic organisation under the leadership of the Soviet Union that included socialist countries in Eastern Europe and other socialist states globally. The organisation was created to facilitate and coordinate the economic development of the Eastern Bloc countries within the framework of the Soviet economic model. See John B. Allcock, “Comecon. International Organization,” *Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Comecon> (last accessed 22.05.2024).

⁶⁵⁴ *Postup*, ‘Донецька бруківка чекає’ (June 1993, no. 21): 2–3, 2.

Donbas and Russia, and beyond that politicians who prefer regional independence of Donbas from Ukraine as well as communist politicians:

It is also obvious that this is utter nonsense. The implementation of the demands will benefit autonomist politicians (who will make a name for themselves), communists (who will achieve the desired referendum with great chances of success in future elections), mine managers (who will receive significant financial concessions and a comfortable existence), and Russia (for obvious reasons).⁶⁵⁵

Frunze and Savitsky demonstrated in detail how the miner's strike played a significant role in the perception of Russia as an economic threat for Ukraine implying that it increased the potential for Russian influence in Ukraine's economic and political transformation. The strikers demanded wage increases and greater control over social funds, which, if agreed to, would have impacted Ukraine's economy and potentially forced it into closer economic ties with Russia. Furthermore, the 'pro-Russian propaganda', as mentioned by Savitsky, in the Donbas intensified the narrative that Russia sought to destabilize Ukraine by exploiting the miners' economic struggles.

The miners' strikes in Ukraine in 1993 eventually ended after political and economic pressure was applied by the strikers. As scholar Stephen Crowley has summarized, the agreement between the government and the miners included economic concessions, such as monthly increases in the miners' wages and authorization for coal companies to sell a portion of their production at market rates.⁶⁵⁶ Despite these economic concessions, the miners initially refused to end the strike until their political demands were addressed. Eventually the pressure led to the parliament calling for pre-term elections for both the president and parliament, although the call for a referendum to measure public confidence in both the parliament and president was declined.⁶⁵⁷

1994 to 1995: Energy Dependency

The narrative of Russia as a place of economic threat for Ukraine continued in articles published in *Postup* in 1994 and 1995. Such a development is also reflected in public opinion polls including young respondents (age 18–35 years) from L'viv oblast in a survey conducted in

⁶⁵⁵ *Postup*, 'Донецька бруківка чекає' (June 1993, no. 21): 3.

⁶⁵⁶ Stephen Crowley, 'Between Class and Nation. Worker Politics in the New Ukraine,' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28 (1) (1995), 43–69, 61–64.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 61–64.

February and March 1994.⁶⁵⁸ Asking respondents to assess how important they believe the role of Russia is in contributing to the current economic difficulties in Ukraine, the survey presented the statement: 'Russia is trying to harm Ukraine.' Of the respondents from L'viv oblast 55.26 percent answered, 'very important' and 26.32 percent stated that it was 'important enough.' Only 2.63 percent stated that it was not important at all. And when young respondents (age 18–35 years) from L'viv oblast were asked in a study from 1995,⁶⁵⁹ how they would in general assess Russia according to the options 'very positive', 'rather positive', 'rather negative' or 'very negative', half of the respondents leaned toward a negative assessment (rather negative = 26.92 percent and very negative = 23.08 percent) while only 3.85 percent had a very positive attitude toward Russia and 30.77 percent a rather positive attitude (15.38 percent voted 'hard to say'). Similarly, one of the oral history interviewees, Mykola Kniazhytskyi (former student in L'viv in the 1990s), expressed his understanding of Russia's influence on Ukraine, when looking back at the years since Ukraine's independence. In his interview, when being told by the interviewer that none of the three revolutions that occurred in Ukraine (1990, 2004 and 2013/2014) have 'achieved their goals,' he responded with: 'No, of course they haven't. Russia kept influencing our people in one way or another. In economic it was through gas, corruption, there are millions of ways.'⁶⁶⁰ Kniazhytskyi confirmed, what young respondents had felt in 1994 and 1995, which was a critical assessment of Russia's influence on Ukraine's economy.

In *Postup* in 1993 and 1994, journalists and writers created a narrative of Russia as an economic threat especially with regard to the energy dependency of the Ukrainian economy on Russia. In the early 1990s, Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia was significant. Political scientist Oles M. Smolansky has stated that during the late 1980s, the USSR consumed around 65 million tons of petroleum annually, with only 10 million tons produced domestically and the rest supplied mainly by Siberia.⁶⁶¹ By the early 1990s, this dependency deepened. In 1991, Ukraine's oil production decreased by 5 million tons, and expected imports from Russia did not meet the required amounts. Moscow guaranteed only 15 million tons of petroleum, with

⁶⁵⁸ Evgenii Golovakha, Political portrait of Ukraine and elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, February - March 1994, Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank. The study was conducted in February and March 1994. The sampling method was random and the method a questionnaire. A total of 1799 people were asked, of which 38 were residents in L'viv and in the age group 18-35.

⁶⁵⁹ Omnibus 1995: views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems. Source: National Research Bank. The study was a random, multi-stage study conducted from 22 September 1995 to 5 October 1995 with a total of 1530 respondents, of which 26 were residents in L'viv and in the age group 18-35.

⁶⁶⁰ Interview with Mykola Kniazhytskyi, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 193.

⁶⁶¹ Smolansky, Oles M., 'Ukraine's quest for independence: The fuel factor' *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1) (January 1995).

additional supplies contingent through trade exchanges, meaning Ukraine would have to trade goods or services instead of using money. Ukraine required ‘60 million tons of crude oil and 115–120 billion cubic meters of natural gas’⁶⁶² annually for economic stability. However, Ukraine’s domestic production could only cover a small portion of these needs, which increased the necessity of imports of ‘over 50 million tons of petroleum and over 100 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 1992 alone.’⁶⁶³ Opinions in Kyiv were divided on how to address the energy crisis. Some officials supported cooperation with Russia and other CIS members, while others advocated for diversifying fuel sources by establishing ties with countries like Kuwait and Iran. Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy posed ongoing economic challenges throughout the 1990s.⁶⁶⁴

In 1993, Russia reduced gas supplies to Ukraine by 25 percent, citing late payments from Ukraine.⁶⁶⁵ This decision did not come as a surprise, since it was already announced by the Russian government in September 1992. This was followed by several negotiations attempts between the Ukrainian and Russian government in the following months, as for example, in January 1993, when Yuliy Ioffe, Ukraine’s vice prime minister, negotiated the delivery of 2 million tons of oil until the end of 1993.⁶⁶⁶

Political scientists Karen Smith Stegan has suggested, that the drop in influx of Russian oil to Ukraine in late 1993 strongly correlated to the upcoming Massandra summit in September 1993, where Ukraine and Russia aimed to continue negotiations regarding the division of the Black Sea Fleet.⁶⁶⁷ Already in the summer of 1992, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia had agreed to divide the fleet equally, and temporarily base the Russian fleet in Sevastopol. This 50:50 division was supported at the Dagomys summit in June 1992 and again at the Yalta summit in August 1992, which was intended to resolve the Black Sea Fleet dispute.⁶⁶⁸ In July 1993, Russia declared the Crimean port of Sevastopol a ‘Russian city’. The Massandra summit then focused on negotiating Russia’s political stance regarding Sevastopol. One week before

⁶⁶² Smolansky, Oles M., ‘Ukraine’s quest for independence: The fuel factor’ *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1) (January 1995).

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Smolansky, “Ukraine’s quest.”

⁶⁶⁵ Karen Smith Stegan, “Deconstructing the ‘Energy Weapon’: Russia’s Threat to Europe as Case Study,” *Energy Policy* 39 (10) (October 2011): 6505–6513, 6509.

⁶⁶⁶ Anastasiya Stelmakh, *Energy Politics of Ukraine: Domestic and International Dimensions*, Doctoral Thesis, Middle East Technical University (Ankara, Turkey), May 2016, 61.

⁶⁶⁷ Stegan, “Deconstructing,” 6509.

⁶⁶⁸ James Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? The Black Sea Fleet Accords,” *Survival* 39 (3) (1997): 33–50, 34–36.

the summit, Russia reduced gas supplies to leverage Ukraine into a new energy deal. Specifically, Russia offered to cancel a significant portion of Ukraine's energy debt in exchange for nearly full control of the Black Sea Fleet. President Kravchuk initially agreed to this deal, but it was not ratified by the Ukrainian parliament.⁶⁶⁹

In 1994 and 1995 the situation regarding gas supply remained complex. In *Postup*, the narrative of Russia as an external threat to Ukraine's economy during the transformation in the context of the energy ties between Russia and Ukraine consisted throughout 1994 and 1995. I identified a total of 13 articles in 1994 and 5 articles in 1995 that portrayed Russia as an economic threat to Ukraine's economy in the context of the energy dependency.⁶⁷⁰ The narrative developed in descriptions that centralized Russia's role in leveraging Ukraine's dependency on its energy resources – particularly natural gas and oil – to enforce economic and political pressure; in descriptions that underlined Russia's impact in the infrastructure, such as pipelines and oil terminals, and in articles that sought alternatives to the Ukrainian energy dependency on Russia in order to remain economically and politically independent.

An example in which Russia's negative influence on the Ukrainian economy in the context of energy resources becomes evident, is the article 'Trading' written by Marijana Chorna and published in *Postup* in August 1995.⁶⁷¹ The article discussed Ukraine's significant economic and energy issues, focusing on gas consumption, debts, and the influence of Russian policies, especially deals between the Ukrainian government and the Russian gas company 'Gazprom' on the Ukrainian economy. It detailed the data on Ukraine's declining gas consumption and economic performance and elaborated on potential corruption in the gas sector, from Ukrainian and Russia side. With direct references in the article to Russia, the country was

⁶⁶⁹ Stegen, "Deconstructing," 6509.

⁶⁷⁰ *Postup*, 'In 1995 all of Ukrainian AEC may stop work' (January 1994, no. 2): B1; *Postup*, 'By-pass in Ukrainian, or how to get rid of the Energy Inferiority Complex' (April 1994, no. 11): B4; *Postup*, 'Oil collector of Ukraine' (April 1994, no. 11): B4; *Postup*, 'Certain positive developments have happened in the matter of the payment of the Ukrainian debt of Gazprom RAT' (April 1994, no. 12): B3; *Postup*, 'The volumes of Ukrainian products under the counter supply of oil are included in the state order' (May 1994, no. 15): B4; *Postup*, 'A friendship of crocodile or a monopoly seller can only be opposed to a monopoly buyer' (1994, no. 20): B4; *Postup*, 'It looks like another eternal song is being born in Ukraine - a song about the terminal' (1994, no. 25): B3; *Postup*, 'August in the Ukrainian market of oil products passes under the banner of price growth. Also in the world' (1994, no. 28): B1; *Postup*, 'In the gas veins of Ukraine, there is more and more Russian blood' (1994, no. 30): A2; *Postup*, 'The supply of Russian gas to Ukraine has been reduced by 30 percent' (1994, no. 34): B1; *Postup*, 'Who and how privatizes 'Ukrzagzprom'' (1994, no. 47): 3; *Postup*, 'By the light of the crescent moon. Circumstances push Ukraine to close up with the Muslim world' (1994, no. 47): 6; *Postup*, 'Oil and Gas Eden' (1995, no. 4): 5; *Postup*, 'Ukraine joins Turkmenistan-Europe construction of gas and water' (1995, no. 6): 4; *Postup*, 'Ukraine is not threatened by atomic energy, but by its lack' (1995, no. 22): 5; *Postup*, 'Trading' (August 1995, no. 27): 7.

⁶⁷¹ *Postup*, 'Компрадорство' (August 1995, no. 27): 7.

portrayed as an untrustworthy, and potentially corrupt, economic partner, that took advantage of Ukraine's dependency on Russian gas. This becomes, for example, evident when Chorna argued, that investigations aimed at finding out how much gas Russia actually supplied to the Ukrainian gas company 'Ukrgezprom' remained impossible, since there was no precise way to determine the exact volume of gas due to a lack of accurate metering equipment:

Well, the esteemed leaders of Ukraine got to the bottom of the phenomenon of almost 100 accounting records of JSC 'Ukrgezprom' in measuring the volume of Russian gas supplies to the Ukrainian network and found that no one can say for sure how much it was, because... there is no meter.⁶⁷²

As a result, the actual amount of gas being delivered and consumed was unclear, implying potential exploitation, since the figures reported in the past might have been unreliable. Moreover, the article portrayed Russia as an economic threat to Ukraine in the context of payments for transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, that the author described as 'never paid adequately according to the world prices.'⁶⁷³ She implied that in the past, Ukraine had not been compensated fairly for the transit services it provided and suggesting an economic disadvantage for Ukraine. Chorna concluded her article by discussing the energy relationship between Ukraine and Russia. She expressed concerns about the agreements signed by the Ukrainian government with Russia's Gazprom, by suggesting that these deals maintain Gazprom's significant influence over Ukraine's gas supply. She pointed out specifically that the government's actions may not have been in the best interest of the Ukrainian citizens, who were carrying the burden of higher gas prices:

However, in paragraph 7, they instructed the mass media to explain the gas problem to the population, and to put it simply, to convince us to humbly accept the increase in gas prices in the interest of 'state interests'. Our people are polite and state-creating. What kind of money is the mass paying? What will our native Ukrainian politicians say? Can the interests of the state be protected by the government, which approves such agreements, carefully protects the right of the management of JSC Gazprom to have a complete monopoly and lack of control over a strategic issue for Ukraine, and stubbornly ignores the great discrepancies in the company's statistics and macroeconomic processes of the country?⁶⁷⁴

An example in which Russia's is depicted as conducting manipulative practices to influence Ukraine's economic stability due to its control over the energy infrastructure was published in May 1994 (author unknown).⁶⁷⁵ This time, Russia was portrayed as utilizing its economic power to reduce the services of Ukrainian oil workers, and thus taking control over Ukraine's

⁶⁷² *Postup*, 'Компрадорство' (August 1995, no. 27): 7.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁵ *Postup*, 'Обсяги української продукції під зустрічні поставки нафти включено у держзамовлення' (May 1994, no. 15): B4.

energy sector. According to the articles this was achieved by reducing the number Ukrainian specialists in Russian oil fields, along with an overall decrease in oil production and funding:

However, the Russian side reduced the number of services provided by Ukrainian oil workers in Western Siberia at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994. According to the Ukrainian State Committee on Oil and Gas, with the reduction of oil supplies from Western Siberia, notably from the Noyabrskneftegaz oil association, the number of Ukrainian specialists involved in the development of Western Siberian fields over the past 10 years has decreased by 50%. By the end of the first quarter of 1994, out of nearly 5,000 Ukrainian oil workers in Tyumen, only 400 remained. During their work at the Noyabrskneftegaz fields, Ukrainian crews established over 3,800 oil wells, allowing the Russian association to extract an additional 8 million tons of oil (almost double Ukraine's annual oil production). Due to the decline in oil production in Western Siberia and lack of funding, Ukrainian oil workers, especially from the Dolynske Drilling Operations Department, faced employment issues, with the number of unemployed specialists continuously rising.⁶⁷⁶

The author of the article implied that the reduction of the Ukrainian workers in Russian oil fields – despite their great work efforts that has led to a beneficial outcome for Russia – was a strategic move from Russia to indirectly influence Ukraine's economic stability, by increasing the number of Ukrainian unemployed oil workers. Russia is thereby portrayed as a strategic actor that utilized its influence in the infrastructure in the energy sector to undermine Ukraine's economy.

Discussions about alternatives to Russian energy supply became, for example, visible in discussions regarding the construction of a transcontinental oil pipeline through the territories of Turkey and Ukraine.⁶⁷⁷ The focus was here put on finding alternative routes to diversify Ukraine's energy supply with the aim to remain independent from Russia. One example is an article written by Hanna Lyuta, published in April 1995,⁶⁷⁸ in which the author discussed the debates among economists and environmentalists regarding the construction of that pipeline at the Black Sea Coast. In the article, the author, despite environmental concerns, regards the construction of the oil terminal and pipeline as beneficial for Ukraine's economy. As a reason, Lyuta acknowledged that the pipeline would diversify Ukraine's energy supply sources, which

⁶⁷⁶ *Postup*, 'Обсяги української продукції під зустрічні поставки нафти включено у держзамовлення' (May 1994, no. 15): B4.

⁶⁷⁷ The author does not provide detailed information about the pipeline she refers to. But there was an agreement signed between Turkey and Ukraine in January 1994 for the construction of a pipeline that planned to transport oil from the Middle East through Turkey to Ukraine. The project was eventually dropped, as the authorities in Odesa had environmental concerns. See, Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu, "Ukraine, Turkey, and the Black Sea Region," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State) (1996): 79–101, 89.

⁶⁷⁸ *Postup*, 'Бай-пас по-українськи, або як позбутися комплексу енергетичної неповноцінності' (April 1994, no. 11): B4.

would in turn reduce dependency on Russia, thereby improving Ukraine's economy and political independence. The new oil terminal would get rid of

the usual dependency on Russia (economically and politically) and [Ukraine] would become a kind of collector [...] For many countries [that receive Russian oil], this will be a Ukrainian bypass (an alternative route in case of disruptions or if they wish to refuse Russian export oil).⁶⁷⁹

Lyuta argued for the construction of their terminal as it would cut dependency on Russian energy, which the 'Ukrainian energy-intensive industries parasitize on' and Russia could arbitrarily manipulate by 'threatening to stop supplies if desired.'⁶⁸⁰ She continued to state that the terminal would not be the final solution to the issue of energy dependency, but it would at least contribute to more energy independence from Russia: 'It is clear that this option is not a panacea for all our troubles. But it is a fully justified and balanced attempt to become an independent country.'⁶⁸¹

Concluding Remarks

For the editors and authors of *Postup*, the negative sentiment toward Russia, which already permeated the Russian discourse in the newspaper in 1991, consisted from 1992 onward. On *Postup*'s mental map, the dominating narrative of Russia was that of an external actor that posed a political and economic threat to the ongoing transformation in Ukraine. The above-mentioned examples are representative of how the Russian government was perceived as such threat across different thematic contexts. They exemplified specifically how Russia's was portrayed as a political threat to the territorial sovereignty in Ukraine – with respect to Crimea and the Donbas – and as an economic threat by utilizing the Miner's strike in the Donbas and Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia to undermine Ukraine's economy.

The discussion of the examples has also shown that the perception of Russia as an economic and political threat, that unfolded *Postup*, was also reflective of the opinion among young people from L'viv oblast. The social surveys indicated that the public stance toward Russia was rather negative, and that Russia was not only viewed as an active harmful actor for Ukraine's economy, but also as a potential military threat.

⁶⁷⁹ *Postup*, 'Бай-пас по-українськи, або як позбутися комплексу енергетичної неповноцінності' (April 1994, no. 11): B4.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

United States of America

For the sub-chapter 'United States of America' the location United States of America was included in the analysis. The location was identified in the topic category 'State Development' and 'Economy' and appeared continuously on the list of 'Top 15' locations from 1992 to 1995. A comprehensive analysis of *Postup*'s issues has revealed that the authors applied political and economic meanings to the location United States of America (hereafter – USA) from 1992 to 1994, that resulted in the creation of the USA as an unstable political and economic partner.

1992–1994: Unstable Economic and Political Partnership

In *Postup*, from 1992 to 1994 I identified a total of 60 articles in which political and economic meanings were attributed to the USA in the context of the categories 'State Development' and 'Economy'. Out of these, a total of 51 articles contributed to the portrayal of the USA as an unreliable political and economic partner.⁶⁸² Similar to the discussion on Russia, this portrayal

⁶⁸² *Postup*, "Drive to the East" (May 1992, no. 16): 7; "White House with Blue and Yellow Sign" (May 1992, no. 16): 5; "Kravchuk knocks on the door" (May 1992, no. 17): 2; "Listen to the words of the leaders. But look at their actions" (May 1992, no. 17): 6; "Americans advise Ukraine to live with everyone in friendly terms, however, do not be friends with anyone in particular" (June 1992, no. 20): 6; "Will Western money flow to Ukraine?" (June 1992, no. 20): 7; "Chornovil and democracy: I gave birth to you" (June 1992, no. 23); "Ukraine-a superpower? Say something funnier" (June 1992, no. 26): 3; "Those who didn't satisfy the White House have nothing to pray for loans" (August 1992, no. 29): 7; "Mariana promised that America will help us if the rich pay in Ukraine. Luis-Alberto did not say anything for this excuse" (September 1992, no. 35): 5; "Will the fresh blood of European nationalism flow into the old vessels of American liberalism?" (September 1992, no. 35): 5; "Americans want to settle the case with nuclear weapons in Ukraine with one restaurant for six people" (October 1992, no. 39): 13; "The optimism of Americans smells cynicism" (October 1992, no. 41): 14; "The USSR stumbled over Ukraine's nuclear toys" (November 1992, no. 43): 3; "Clinton is forming a team. America building hypotheses" (November 1992, no. 43): 2; "The ghost of the third world GATT causes a global crisis" (November 1992, no. 43): 14; "The USA haven't betrayed yet, but the Balts are already jealous" (December 1992, no. 45): 8; "In America there is a tendency to scare children with the heroes of Ukrainian folk tales" (December 1992, no. 48): 10; "Ukraine has shown its teeth. It might also show its wisdom." (December 1992, no. 48): 3; "Ukrainian 'Satan' as a threat to American paradise" (December 1992, no. 48): 10; "Face to harsh realities" (February 1993, no. 6): 10; "Bohdan Gavrylyshyn: 'Health monetary policy — subtle surgery'" (March 1993, no. 7): 11; "American foreign policy after the end of the Cold War" (March 1993, no. 9): 2, 9; "Bill Clinton and the cute dog: Who is better in foreign policy" (March 1993, no. 9): 9; "Floor war in the White House" (April 1993, no. 12): 3; "The United States noticed that START-1 has a double bottom. Ukraine can fit all its missiles into this space." (May 1993, no. 17): 4; "One more such visit, and the US Defense Ministry will know more about the military affairs of Ukraine than Kostyantyn Morozov" (June 1993, no. 20): 2; "Ukraine received the status of a little nuclear state!" (June 1993, no. 20): 4; "American defense program" (September 1993, no. 33): 11; "Ukraine's geo-strategic significance no longer has any significance" (September 1993, no. 33): 10; "Theory and practice of US foreign policy strategy" (September 1993, no. 33): 11; "The West must finally understand: To prevent Ukrainian nuclear toys from firing, they should not be taken out of Mykhailovsky farm. Russia is becoming the main destabilizing factor on the continent" (October 1993, no. 36): A4; "Ukraine - in the nuclear embrace of the superstates" (January 1993, no. 2-3): 6; "There are times when Americans agree to invest money in Ukraine" (February 1994, no. 2): A1; "After sleep this is exactly what a foreign policy disaster looks like" (February 1994, no. 2): A3; "In the sphere of investments, Ukraine is an extreme country for the USA" (February 1994, no. 2): B4; "The Ukrainian President should remember that so far Ukrainians have only managed to surpass Americans in figure skating" (March 1994, no. 5): A2; "The tale of 700 million" (March 1994, no. 6): A2; "Leonid Karwchuk had lunch with Pepsi. Coke shares are falling" (March 1994, no. 6): A1; "Military heritage of the former USSR in Ukraine" (March 1994, no. 6): B6; "The world between the lines of military doctrines" (March 1994, no. 6): A5; "General Radetsky left the American

emerged from multiple thematic contexts. I identified six key contexts: Denuclearisation, Economic Aid, Geopolitics, New President, Preference for Russia, and Trade (see figure 30). The majority of the articles focused on Ukraine's denuclearisation, with 22 out of 51 articles, representing approximately 43 percent of the total.⁶⁸³ The remaining 29 articles were distributed among the other five thematic contexts.

Of the 22 articles on denuclearisation, 13 were double-coded, meaning they also fell under the thematic context of 'Preference for Russia.' Due to the significant number of articles in both thematic contexts ('Preference for Russia' had 21 articles, of which 13 were double-coded) and their consistent coverage throughout the years 1992, 1993, and to a lesser extent in 1994, I chose to focus on these two contexts to exemplify how the USA was depicted as an unreliable partner in the writings of *Postup's* authors.

environment. Now he will be a Red Army" (June 1994, no. 21): A2; "Give me three hundred thousand dollars and I will turn America..." (July 1994, no. 24): A4; "The American Congress has settled a miscellany" (November 1994, no. 41): 4; "Where are we going, dear comrades and gentlemen?..." (February 1995, no. 5): 6; "Ukrainian security and the Chechen crisis" (March 1995, no. 8): 5; "Azerbaijan oil: Big money, a lot of blood" (August 1995, no. 28): 3; "NATO's new tactics: Expand to the East and not anger Russia" (September 1995, no. 29): 5; "Russian nuclear weapons may fall in the hands of terrorists" (September 1995, no. 29): 5; "Russia agreed with the states on the transit of Azerbaijan oil" (October 1995, no. 31): 6; "Ukraine borders Russia in the East, and in the West - with... America" (October 1995, no. 31): 2.

⁶⁸³ *Postup*, "White House with Blue and Yellow Sign" (May 1992, no. 16): 5; "Kravchuk knocks on the door" (May 1992, no. 17): 2; "Americans advise Ukraine to live with everyone in friendly terms, however, do not be friends with anyone in particular" (June 1992, no. 20): 6; "Those who didn't satisfy the White House have nothing to pray for loans" (August 1992, no. 29): 7; "Mariana promised that America will help us if the rich pay in Ukraine. Luis-Alberto did not say anything for this excuse" (September 1992, no. 35): 5; "Americans want to settle the case with nuclear weapons in Ukraine with one restaurant for six people" (October 1992, no. 39): 13; "The USSR stumbled over Ukraine's nuclear toys" (November 1992, no. 43): 3; "In America there is a tendency to scare children with the heroes of Ukrainian folk tales" (December 1992, no. 48): 10; "Ukraine has shown its teeth. It might also show its wisdom." (December 1992, no. 48): 3; "Ukrainian 'Satan' as a threat to American paradise" (December 1992, no. 48): 10; "Face to harsh realities" (February 1993, no. 6): 10; "Floor war in the White House" (April 1993, no. 12): 3; "The United States noticed that START-1 has a double bottom. Ukraine can fit all its missiles into this space." (May 1993, no. 17): 4; "One more such visit, and the US Defense Ministry will know more about the military affairs of Ukraine than Kostyantyn Morozov" (June 1993, no. 20): 2; "Ukraine received the status of a little nuclear state!" (June 1993, no. 20): 4; "The West must finally understand: To prevent Ukrainian nuclear toys from firing, they should not be taken out of Mykhailovsky farm. Russia is becoming the main destabilizing factor on the continent" (October 1993, no. 36): A4; "Ukraine - in the nuclear embrace of the superstates" (January 1993, no. 2-3): 6; "There are times when Americans agree to invest money in Ukraine" (February 1994, no. 2): A1; "After sleep this is exactly what a foreign policy disaster looks like" (February 1994, no. 2): A3; "In the sphere of investments, Ukraine is an extreme country for the USA" (February 1994, no. 2): B4; "The Ukrainian President should remember that so far Ukrainians have only managed to surpass Americans in figure skating" (March 1994, no. 5): A2; "The tale of 700 million" (March 1994, no. 6): A2.

USA: Frequencies of Thematic Contexts in Postup over time, 1992–1995 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 30 Postup: USA – Frequency of Three Thematic Context, 1992–1995.

Within these two contexts, the political and economic meanings attributed to the USA developed in description in which the geographic term ‘USA’ was used to represent the political actions and decisions of the American government. The USA was characterized as an unreliable partner in Ukraine’s denuclearization process, perceived as failing to provide adequate security guarantees, financial compensation, and economic support for Ukraine following disarmament. Additionally, the USA was depicted as prioritizing a political and economic alliance with Russia over Ukraine in the context of denuclearization. In the following section, I will explore these perspectives in greater detail by discussing specific articles as examples.

A False Friend – Denuclearisation and Favouritism of Russia

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which supposedly set an end to the previously established Cold War order, with the USA and the Soviet Union at the centre of the conflict, the question of the strategic Soviet nuclear arsenal became of interest. The USA’s attention to Ukraine’s Soviet arsenal arose already in the summer of 1991, when Ukraine declared its independence. Ukraine encompassed an arsenal of ‘130 older SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 46 newer SS-24 ICBMs and 40 strategic nuclear bombers (for a total of 1800

nuclear warheads) [which] effectively made Ukraine the world's third largest nuclear power.'⁶⁸⁴ At the centre of the negotiations, which lasted from 1992 to 1994, were Ukraine, Russia and the USA. While Russia and the USA called for the complete handover of nuclear weapons and at times exerted considerable pressure on Ukraine, Ukraine perceived denuclearisation as part of its wider political and economic transformation process.⁶⁸⁵ As historian Nadia Schadlow has argued, the Ukrainian government deliberately prolonged the denuclearisation process initiated by the US to negotiate security commitments during its post-communist state-building process that would ensure 'a stronger economy, more stable relations with Russia, and closer ties with the West.'⁶⁸⁶ The denuclearisation process eventually resulted in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signing a treaty known under the name Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (hereafter – START-1), which ensured that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan 'agreed not to have strategic arms deployed on their territories and to join the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] as non-nuclear weapons states.'⁶⁸⁷ Ukraine ratified the treaty in February 1994.⁶⁸⁸

Despite the substantial financial compensation provided by the USA to Ukraine in exchange for its agreement to the START-1 treaty,⁶⁸⁹ *Postup's* authors consistently portrayed the USA as an unreliable negotiation partner throughout 1992 and 1994. One of the primary concerns highlighted in *Postup* was the lack of long-term security guarantees from the USA regarding Ukraine's territorial sovereignty. The USA was depicted as an external political actor focused on disarming Ukraine of its nuclear weapons without ensuring its security, all while seeking closer economic ties with Russia.

One example that is representative of this sentiment is an article published in May 1992, following Leonid Kravchuk's visit to Washington at the beginning of May. The article was written by Roman Kupchinsky, and comments on US-Ukrainian relations following the

⁶⁸⁴ Nadia Schadlow, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 271–287, 271.

⁶⁸⁵ Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem and Roy Suter, "The Denuclearization of Ukraine," in Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff (eds.), *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control* (South Carolina University Press, 1999), 111–156, 115.

⁶⁸⁶ Schadlow, "Denuclearization," 271.

⁶⁸⁷ Thomas Jr. Graham and Damien J. LaVera, *Cornerstones of Security. Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Area* (Washington University Press, 2002), 885–886.

⁶⁸⁸ Graham and LaVera, *Cornerstones*, 887.

⁶⁸⁹ The compensation for Ukraine to agree to the START treaty encompassed a total of \$174m from the USA. See, Christoph Bluth, "American-Russian Strategic Relations: From Confrontations to Cooperation?," *The World Today* 49 (3) (March 1993): 47–50, 49.

meeting of the Ukrainian president and US-American president George H. W. Bush. In the article the author sarcastically underlines that despite an official meeting between the leaders of the two countries, the US was not interested in discussing anything else than the denuclearisation of Ukraine, since their interest remained with Russia.

No matter what they were talking about, Leonid Kravchuk's arrival in Washington became an event. Although, to tell the truth, the Americans did not want it. The reason is simple: the US State Department made and continues to make a bet on Russia as a strong partner, which in addition, will also influence the climate on the territory of the former monster [the Soviet Union]. [...] The American side wanted to talk more about those terrible tactical nuclear missiles in Ukraine, to convince it that, although they are not ready to fully guarantee Ukraine's security, it should still transport them to Russia.⁶⁹⁰

The USA was portrayed as a reluctant partner, that served a self-interest rather than a genuine commitment to supporting Ukraine's security as an independent state, and moreover as an actor that is primarily focused on the broader geopolitical balance between the USA and Russia, rather than on the interests of Ukraine. Kupchinsky summarized Kravchuk's visit to the US as a success for Ukraine, because the Ukrainian president was able to convince the US government that Ukraine needed to become 'a factor in American politics',⁶⁹¹ despite the US reluctance toward it.

This perception of the USA as self-serving partner with a strong security interest in Russia in the context of discussing the denuclearisation efforts was consistent. It continued throughout 1992 and 1993. Another example of this is a printed conversation between Ukrainian political scientist Ihor Markov and American professor Ted Hoff, prepared by Oleh Shmid and published in June 1992 in *Postup*. In the interview, the two interlocutors discussed the geopolitical implications of the Soviet Union's dissolution, and the USA's role in. They elaborated on the USA's neutrality and limited commitment to guaranteeing Ukraine's security, especially in the context of nuclear disarmament. The favouritism of American foreign policy focus on Russia in contrast to Ukraine became evident in the following excerpt from the interview. Even though the American interlocutor Hoff ensured a neutral position of the USA toward Ukraine and Russia, following Markov's question 'What position will they [the USA] take between Ukraine and Russia?' it was articulated that Russia was favoured over Ukraine. This was reflected in Hoff's statement that Russia played a larger role in American foreign policy due to its 'geopolitical influence', than Ukraine did, and was even treated as an 'ally':

⁶⁹⁰ *Postup*, 'Кравчук стукає у двері' (May 1992, no. 17): 2.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*

UKRAINE: Has U.S. foreign policy strategy changed in response to the dissolution of the Soviet empire? I mean, will the mechanism of opposition to the forces that traditionally existed in the world before the collapse of communism be revised in Washington?

AMERICA: American politicians in Washington realize that the world should be divided into several spheres of geopolitical influence, at the center of which will stand Japan, Germany, Russia, and, of course, the USA. Americans agree that Germany and Russia will dominate the spaces of Eurasia. So the strategy has not changed. Only the tactics have. We treat Russia almost as an ally. Russia for us is a factor in maintaining order in Europe. Of course, this was previously unimaginable.⁶⁹²

Another excerpt from the interview in which USA was portrayed as an unreliable political partner in the context of denuclearisation for Ukraine was a reply to the following statement articulated by Markov:

Many Ukrainian political scientists do not accept the version of a non-nuclear Ukraine if the USA does not intend to include it in a system of collective security. If the conflict issues between Ukraine and Russia are to be resolved only by these countries (the USA, as you said, will take a neutral position), doubts arise regarding the advisability of Ukraine's non-nuclear status.⁶⁹³

As a reply to this statement, the American interlocutor Hoff suggests that the US government views its role as ensuring balance in the world rather than offering direct intervention, for example, through military presence in Ukraine:

You are posing a false choice: either Ukraine will be able to protect itself from the Russian threat without nuclear weapons, or it will be a nuclear state. The USA cannot provide defensive guarantees to Ukraine. Nobody here will support increasing American presence at the border. If Americans learned that their government decided to give Ukraine some guarantees against Russia, it would be a political disaster.⁶⁹⁴

The effect of this statement posed by Hoff unfolded skepticism about the USA's interest in guaranteeing security to Ukraine due to US domestic politics. This becomes evident in an editorial note from Shmid, as an addition to the conversation printed at the end of the conversation. Shmid commented on all statements made by Hoff, concluding that the USA was not the desired partner Ukraine's hoped for, but rather the opposite of 'fair and kind', and that an orientation toward other countries, such as those of the European Community was necessary, while not completely neglecting relations with the USA:

The interview allows for a sober look at the results that Kravchuk could not possibly achieve in Washington, and it puts an end to another Ukrainian myth about a fair and kind America that would help oppressed

⁶⁹² *Postup*, 'Американці радять Україні жити з усіма у приязні, однак ні з ким особливо не дружити' (June 1992, no. 20): 6. The journalist Oleh Shmid, prepared the interview for *Postup*, and instead of using the names of interlocutors to indicate the statements made by the individual interlocutors, Shmid clarifies at the end of the printed conversation, that he used the geographic term 'Ukraine' to refer to Ihor Markov and 'America' to refer to Ted Hoff. This decision was made deliberately in order to underline that 'the dialogue not only reproduces the reasoning of the two political scientists but also the differences in socio-political views of two worlds, and the difference in geopolitical interests of two states.'

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

Ukraine build its state. Clearly, the priority of Ukraine's orientation towards the USA cannot be undisputed. This course requires revision. It is worth considering looking for allies within the European community without discounting the American factor. The frankness of our interlocutor, Ted Hoff, allows us to be reassured: in the world, only the strongest are taken into account. Therefore, one should only rely on oneself, because foreign aid is intended for the weak.⁶⁹⁵

Clearly frustrated by the limitations in the US-Ukrainian relationship, Shmid argued that Ukraine would consider a shift in foreign policy. He advocated for building alliances within Europe as a promising alternative to dependence on an uncertain USA. He also highlighted, that focusing on Ukraine's self-reliance was necessary to navigate the international world order with greater autonomy.

Another example in *Postup*, that is reflective of the disillusionment with the USA's political stance toward Ukraine and its favouritism of Russia was published in December 1992.⁶⁹⁶ The article was written by American-Ukrainian political advisor and director of the Washington bureau of the Ukrainian National Union, Yevhen Ivantsev's, on the inconsistent approaches of American politicians towards Ukraine's independence and nuclear disarmament. The author expressed his disappointment over the USA's refusal to provide Ukraine with a security treaty similar to those given to Western Europe. It criticized the USA for focusing on Ukraine's nuclear threat while ignoring other nuclear nations, and therewith suggested inconsistency in US policy. Ivantsev was skeptical of the US belief that regional stability can be maintained by allowing Russia to be the sole nuclear power, almost sarcastically mentioning Russia's history of imperialism and other recent conflicts since independence, such as its remaining military presence in the Baltics:

The government of Ukraine has the right and obligation to guarantee the security of its people. For this purpose, Ukraine officially appealed to the United States with a request for a treaty under which the USA would protect Ukraine from the threat of force by a nuclear state. This guarantee gives nothing more than what was granted to the peoples of Western Europe. The United States refused to conclude such a treaty with Ukraine. It is strange and even amusing that so much attention is given to Ukraine at this time when little or nothing is mentioned about other nations that possess or are developing nuclear weapons: Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, South Africa. Moreover, the United States believes that peace and stability will be guaranteed if Russia, which has a three-hundred-year history of imperialist policy and an extremely unstable government, becomes the only nuclear power in this region. During the first year of Russia's independence, its army engaged in conflicts with at least three foreign countries and is not in a hurry to leave the Baltics, while attacks against the territorial integrity of Ukraine have already become the official policy of Russian state officials.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁵ *Postup*, 'Американці радять Україні жити з усіма у приязні, однак ні з ким особливо не дружити' (June 1992, no. 20): 6.

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

The perception of the USA as an unreliable political partner favouring a relationship with Russia continued in articles identified until October 1993.⁶⁹⁸ The narrative of the USA as an unreliable partner, was amplified by increasing political pressure from the USA and Russia on Ukraine, to ratify the START-I treaty. This becomes for example evident in an article published by Victor Miroshnyk in January 1993.⁶⁹⁹ The author implied that the USA and Russia enforced collaborative pressure on Ukraine to ratify the START-I treaty. According to Miroshnyk, the result of signing the treaty would mutually benefit Russia and the USA. For Russia it would mean the possibility to establish itself as the sole nuclear successor of the USSR. For the USA, it would involve addressing the threat posed by certain types of missiles:

It is known that START-II will not come into effect until Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus ratify START-I. This means that the parties who signed START-II are now openly joining efforts to 'swear in' those who are delaying. Of course, Ukraine will be pushed the hardest. On one side is Russia, which has gained a reliable ally to help it establish itself as the sole nuclear successor of the USSR. On the other side are the United States. And here's why. A key point in the US-Soviet negotiations regarding the reduction of strategic offensive arms has always been discussions around heavy intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads. The USSR, and now Russia, had advantages precisely in those types of missiles that could cause the greatest damage to the opponent. By concluding START-II, America does not intend to ignore the heavy missiles in Ukraine as part of the arsenal that was recently part of the same negotiation process between the two superpowers.⁷⁰⁰

Even though the article does not specifically mention that the USA prefers its foreign relations with Russia, it does reflect a level of strategic alignment between the two countries. In the article fragment the author suggests that the relationship between the USA and Russia with regard to Ukraine is collaborative and self-serving. The pressure enforced from both nations on Ukraine for nuclear disarmament is reflective of a unified front against Ukraine.

The pressure on Ukraine regarding the denuclearisation also becomes evident in a short phrase found in an article from February 1993. *Postup*'s journalist Olena Spulyeva demonstrated that in a summary of a *Financial Times* article written by Edward Balls, on the political post-communist situation in Ukraine.⁷⁰¹ In the article the USA is portrayed as a political power forcing Ukraine into denuclearisation: 'The United States mainly focused on intimidating Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear weapons, while Western European countries watched this with relative indifference.'⁷⁰² Again another example is an article written by Rostyslav Kamianyi and published in May 1993. The author elaborates on the political, technical, and economic

⁶⁹⁸ After October 1993 no more articles were identified in the year 1993.

⁶⁹⁹ *Postup*, 'Україна – в ядерних обіймах наддержав' (January 1993, no. 2–3): 6.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*

implications of Ukraine's ratification of the START-1 treaty, with a focus on dismantling its SS-24 missile silos and the consequences of maintaining or surrendering it. The USA is depicted, again, as pressuring Ukraine into eliminating its nuclear silos. This becomes evident in the following phrase: 'The USA persistently demands the complete elimination of all silos where SS-24 missiles are based, although these silos could be used for launching commercial and reconnaissance satellites.'⁷⁰³ The author also suggested that the USA's motivations were not purely about nuclear disarmament but were also driven by economic interests:

Currently, representatives of the US State Department are focusing on the silos, which indicates powerful lobbying by the US aerospace and military-industrial complex. They need Ukraine to ratify the START-1 agreement not so much for nuclear 'disarmament,' but primarily for space 'disarmament.' (Implementing the project to create a full cycle for servicing nuclear warheads would take much longer than implementing projects for launching space rockets from Ukrainian territory).⁷⁰⁴

Kamianyi implied that if Ukraine would dismantle the SS-24 missile silos as demanded by the USA, it would lose the opportunity to repurpose these silos for launching commercial satellites. This in turn could have impacted Ukraine's economic growth, as it would have eliminated Ukraine's field of aerospace technology as a source of revenue. Hence, the US pressure to denuclearize Ukraine was also perceived as an obstacle for economic development.

With the beginning of 1994, the reasons of portraying the USA as an unreliable partner shifted from security concerns to the issue regarding the USA's promise to financially support Ukraine's economic transformation. In January 1994, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom offered assurances to Ukraine in exchange for its denuclearisation. This agreement, known as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, was a pledge by the USA, Russia, and the United Kingdom to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and existing borders. This commitment was based on principles established in earlier agreements like the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. It essentially meant that these countries would not threaten or use military force against Ukraine, nor would they interfere with its political independence. The Budapest Memorandum was eventually signed by all involved political actors in December 1994.⁷⁰⁵ As part of the negotiations, the USA also offered

⁷⁰³ *Postup*, 'Сполучені Штати помітили, що СНВ-1 має подвійне дно. У цей простір Україна може покласти всі свої ракети' (May 1993, no. 17): 4.

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁰⁵ David S. Yost, "The Budapest Memorandum and Russia's intervention in Ukraine," *International Affairs* 91: 3 (2015): 505–538, 507–508. Eventually the Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed the security of Ukraine's state borders was violated by Russia when it annexed the Ukrainian peninsula Crimea in 2014 and launched a full-scale invasion into Ukraine in February 2022, marking the beginning of the ongoing (as of May 2024) Russian War in Ukraine.

financial to Ukraine for the purpose of denuclearisation and made economic promises to support Ukraine's transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.⁷⁰⁶ In March and February 1994, across three newspaper issues and within a total of five articles, the USA was criticised for its limited economic investment following Ukraine's agreement for denuclearisation.⁷⁰⁷ I exemplify how this criticism unfolded by discussing two articles in detail, that are reflective of the sentiment in the remaining articles.

The first article I will discuss was written by Vyacheslav Pikhovshek and published in February 1994.⁷⁰⁸ The article commented on the visit of a Ukrainian delegation in 1994, headed by Ukraine's Minister for Economy Roman Shpek, to the USA. In his article, Pikhovshek criticised both, the US-American government and its limited financial and economic aid to Ukraine, and the Ukrainian government for their incapability of implementing economic reforms. The article started off with criticism directed at the US-officials, in which the author implied that the USA was not fully committed to helping Ukraine achieve long-term economic stability. Instead, the author suggested that the USA was providing financial aid primarily motivated by its interest in securing nuclear disarmament, rather than by a real desire to support Ukraine economically:

The Ukrainian delegation gave the Americans to understand an important thing: there is no longer any reason for the US to refuse economic assistance to Ukraine. However, Washington is more likely to buy off than really help. They just waved their hands: 'Nuclear disarmament will simply have to be paid for, and even if the money goes down the drain, disarmament is worth it' – this is how an observer, Ukrainian by origin, sincerely interested in helping Ukraine, characterized the visit of Ukrainian officials to the US.⁷⁰⁹

Although acknowledging that Ukraine, in the end, was promised financial aid, despite the Ukrainian government's lack of submitting a 'specific economic reform plan', thereby criticising the latter, the author continued to argue that the budget planned was not sufficient to incentivise any significant economic changes in Ukraine. Instead, the amount of financial

⁷⁰⁶ Throughout the 1990s, the USA financially supported Ukraine with a total of \$2.6 billion. See, Cory Welt, 'Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy,' Congressional Research Service Report, R45008, Version 14 (5 October 2021), 32.

⁷⁰⁷ *Postup*, 'Бувають випадки, коли американці погоджуються вкладати гроші в Схід. Цей випадок – Україна' (February 1994, no. 2): A1; *Postup*, 'У сфері інвестицій Україна для США є крайньою державою' (February 1994, no. 2): B4; *Postup*, 'Після СНВ. Саме так виглядає катастрофа зовнішньої політики' (February 1994, no. 2): A3; *Postup*, 'Український президент повинен пам'ятати, що досі українцям вдавалося перевершити американців тільки у фігурному ковзанні' (March 1994, no. 5): A2; *Postup*, 'Казка про 700 мільйонів' (March 1994, no. 6): A2.

⁷⁰⁸ *Postup*, 'Бувають випадки, коли американці погоджуються вкладати гроші в Схід. Цей випадок – Україна' (February 1994, no. 2): A1.

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

aid would only help ‘keeping the sinking Ukrainian economy afloat’⁷¹⁰ which the USA would be fully aware of. Toward the end of the article, Pikhovshek also raised awareness of the discrepancy between financial aid allocated from the USA to Russia and to Ukraine within the CIS. He implied that Russia was favoured by the US: ‘For the 1994 fiscal year, Russia received 2.2 billion USD out of the 2.5 billion USD promised to the CIS countries. In terms of per capita, this is 14.71 USD in Russia and 2.21 USD in Ukraine.’⁷¹¹ The author also remained critical toward future planned ‘US aid’ to Ukraine, that was promised prior to Kravchuk’s visit to Washington from 3 to 5 March 1994.⁷¹² Pikhovshek concluded that this aid would presumably only encompass technical assistance rather than more financial aid:

The unplanned nature of large-scale US aid to Ukraine, as well as the words of some representatives of the Clinton administration, suggest that the widely advertised aid to Ukraine on the eve of Kravchuk’s visit is likely to be only technical assistance through some projects of the US Agency for International Development.⁷¹³

The article by Pikhovshek suggests that the USA’s financial aid to Ukraine was regarded as insufficient and accuses the USA’s commitment to be driven more by the interest in securing nuclear disarmament than by an interest in supporting Ukraine’s economic transformation. This also unfolded in the implication of favouritism towards Russia, suggesting that the real benefactor of financial support from the US in the post-Soviet space was Russia.

The perception of US-American favouritism toward Russia was also identified in two social surveys.⁷¹⁴ Both surveys posed the same question, reflecting the narrative that the USA favoured Russia, as reported in *Postup*. Conducted in November 1994 and between September and October 1995, the surveys asked participants whether they perceived US policy as being more favourable to Russia, to Ukraine, or equally to both. The specific question was, ‘What is the general US policy towards Ukraine and Russia?’ In both instances, most of the residents aged 18–35 from L’viv oblast perceived a bias favouring Russia over Ukraine. In 1994, approximately 52 percent of respondents held this view, which decreased to about 42 percent

⁷¹⁰ *Postup*, ‘Бувають випадки, коли американці погоджуються вкладати гроші в Схід. Цей випадок – Україна’ (February 1994, no. 2): A1.

⁷¹¹ *Ibid*.

⁷¹² Leonid Kravchuk as the President of Ukraine visited the USA for purposes of work. See, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Visits by Foreign Leaders of Ukraine, <https://history.state.gov/departments/history/visits/ukraine> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁷¹³ *Postup*, ‘Бувають випадки, коли американці погоджуються вкладати гроші в Схід. Цей випадок – Україна’ (February 1994, no. 2): A1.

⁷¹⁴ Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1994, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Source: National Research Bank, and the previously mentioned study, Omnibus 1995: views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems.

in 1995, as depicted in figures 31 and 32. This indicates a noticeable shift in perception from 1994 to 1995, with a drop of around 10 percent in those perceiving US policy as favouring Russia, and an increase in those viewing Ukraine as more favoured, rising from 10 percent in 1994 to 19.23 percent in 1995. Additionally, the preference for the ‘equally’ option decreased in 1995, while the ‘it’s hard to say’ option saw an increase, pointing to a more uncertain public perception of US foreign policy by 1995. One possible explanation for these shifts could have been the increase in financial aid from the USA following Ukraine’s commitment to denuclearisation in 1994, that Pikhovshek, for example, described as ‘widely advertised aid’, implying that the financial compensation has been intensively propagated through the media. Hence it could have reached a wider public, potentially impacting an assessment of the USA positively.⁷¹⁵




Figure 31 Results of data from the respondents from L'viv oblast between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1994, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Source: National Research Bank.

⁷¹⁵ *Postup*, ‘Бувають випадки, коли американці погоджуються вкладати гроші в Схід. Цей випадок – Україна’ (February 1994, no. 2): A1.

L'viv oblast: What is the general US policy towards Ukraine and Russia? (September–October 1995)




Figure 32 Results of data from the respondents from L'viv oblast between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: Omnibus 1995: views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems (September to October), Source: National Research Bank.

Despite the shift from 1994 to 1995, the results of the surveys for both years suggested that the majority of questioned young people from L'viv, politically, perceived a US tendency toward favouring Russia over Ukraine. However, apart from the political sphere of foreign policy, the attitude of young L'vivians toward the USA was overwhelmingly positive. The same social surveys from 1994 and 1995 also asked their respondents to provide an assessment of the USA. The respondents had the option to choose between 'very positive', 'rather positive', 'rather negative', 'very negative' and 'it's hard to say'. In 1994, more than 85 percent of young respondents from L'viv answered positively, of which 52.50 percent were 'very positive'. Only 10 percent of respondents opted for 'rather negative' and none for 'very negative'. In 1995, 34.62 percent of the young respondents from L'viv opted for 'very positive', 57.69 percent for 'rather positive' and 7.69 percent found it difficult to assess. The results indicate, that the perception of the US foreign policy favouring Russia over Ukraine did not result in a negative perception of the USA in general.⁷¹⁶

The second article for discussing *Postup's* sentiment toward the USA was written by Markiyan Bilynskyi, head of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute of Democracy⁷¹⁷, and published in *Postup* in March

⁷¹⁶ Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1994, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Source: National Research Bank.

⁷¹⁷ The Pylyp Orlyk Institute of Democracy is Ukrainian think tank and research institution dedicated to promoting democratic values, practices, and reforms within Ukraine, see Official Website, <https://idpo.org.ua/> (last accessed 22.05.2024).

1994. The article discussed Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and its limited impact on global nuclear policies, as well as Ukraine's need for economic reforms and attracting foreign investment. Starting with the premise that the reasoning propagated by the USA and other Western allies for Ukraine's denuclearisation was flawed, Bilynskyi argued that Ukraine was never a significant obstacle to nuclear disarmament and that the nuclear policies of other countries were never dependent on Ukraine's actions.⁷¹⁸ The author criticised the stance of the USA and western partners toward the denuclearisation of Ukraine, noting that their nuclear policies were 'primarily determined by their own perceptions of military needs – whether defensive or offensive – and not by what Ukraine does,' emphasizing that 'Ukraine neither stood nor stands in the way of eliminating the nuclear standoff between Russia and the United States.'⁷¹⁹

Because of the nuclear disarmament, Ukraine would rely on financial assistance from the USA, which Bilynskyi defined as 'truly a drop in the ocean of Ukraine's needs.'⁷²⁰ He also stated that a huge share of the financial aid for the denuclearisation would finance the disarmament work of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal conducted by American companies, and not benefit Ukraine:

Of the three main sources of economic assistance – bilateral, multilateral aid, and private investments – Ukraine will only have access to the first and least significant source of assistance from the American government. But even here, of the \$175 million from the Nunn-Lugar program⁷²¹ fund allocated as compensation for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, the lion's share will actually go to the pockets of American companies assisting in the disarmament process. The much-publicized doubling of overall state aid from the U.S. government to Ukraine amounts to only \$310 million. This is truly a drop in the ocean of Ukraine's needs, the size of which has not yet been established but is increasing daily.⁷²²

⁷¹⁸ *Postup*, 'Український президент повинен пам'ятати, що досі українцям вдавалося перевершити американців тільки у фігурному ковзанні' (March 1994, no. 5): A2. 'However, thinking that Ukraine has also become an object of American and Western European geopolitical interests would be a mistake. Some in Ukraine see the tripartite statement as a victory for Ukrainian diplomacy, a great historical achievement: claiming that Ukraine is no longer an obstacle to global nuclear disarmament. This is an exaggeration. The myth dissipates as soon as we try to look at the actual state of affairs. It is hard to believe that Ukraine ever was such an obstacle. It is difficult to see the dependence of the nuclear policies of North Korea, Iran, or, say, Israel on what Ukraine did or did not do in this direction.'

⁷¹⁹ *Postup*, 'Український президент повинен пам'ятати, що досі українцям вдавалося перевершити американців тільки у фігурному ковзанні' (March 1994, no. 5): A2.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷²¹ Nunn-Lugar program, officially known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, was established by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar through the Soviet Threat Reduction Act in 1991. Its purpose was to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure in the former Soviet Union states, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. See, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (29 March 2022), 1. <https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-program-2/> (last accessed 25.05.2024).

⁷²² *Postup*, 'Український президент повинен пам'ятати, що досі українцям вдавалося перевершити американців тільки у фігурному ковзанні' (March 1994, no. 5): A2.

As Pikhovshek argued in the above discussed article, also Bilynskyi viewed the financial aid promised to Ukraine for the USA as insufficient to incentivise significant economic changes. It was implied that the aid provided was inadequate and not keeping up with the increasing financial demands in Ukraine, which were at that point not yet foreseeable.

Concluding Remarks

On *Postup*'s mental map from 1992 to 1994, the USA was portrayed as a place of unstable political and economic partnership. This notion unfolded in *Postup* across multiple thematic contexts (Bad Economic Advice, Economic Aid, Geopolitics, New President, Preference Russia and Trade) however with a majority of the articles connected to Ukraine's denuclearisation process. As discussed, the portrayed political and economic instability of the USA as a geopolitical partner in the context of denuclearisation, was primarily concerned with lacking security guarantees and a lack of sufficient financial compensation for disarmaments. In this context also critical voices toward a perceived US foreign policymaking favouring Russia appeared, that was also a perception reflected in public opinion polls among young L'vivian from 1994 to 1995.

Europe

For the sub-chapter 'Europe' the location Europe, Poland and Germany were included in the analysis. The locations were identified in the topic category 'State Development' and 'Economy' and appeared continuously on the list of 'Top 15' locations from 1992 to 1995. Following a comprehensive analysis of *Postup*'s issues from 1992 to 1995 I identified that the authors applied political and economic meanings to the location Europe that resulted in its creation as a place of wanted but unreachable partnership.

1992–1995: Wanted but Unreachable Partnership

The political and economic meaning attributed to Europe in *Postup* from 1992 to 1995 within the topic category 'State Development' and 'Economy' unfolded in a total of 63 articles. Out of these a total of 34 articles alone, contributed to the creation of Europe as a place of wanted but unreachable partnership.⁷²³ In the articles the geographic term 'Europe' was used as a

⁷²³*Postup*, 'Прохідний двір чи золоті ворота?' (May 1992, no. 16): 6; 'Українці творять міфи замість того, щоб робити політику' (May 1992, no. 18): 6; 'Post-Inform' (June 1992, no. 21): 4; 'З новим урядом Україна отримала можливість для ще однієї відставки. Але це буде відставка всієї держави' (November 1992, no. 42): 6; 'Фінансова імперія 'ІНКО': експансія триває...' (November 1992, no. 42): 12; 'Вишеградський трикутник? Усе це вигадки Заходу!' (November 1992, no. 43): 3; 'Будьмо європейськими людьми, панове!' (January 1993,

spatial container representing the European economic market and European political landscape. Other terms that were used to refer to these were European Community (EC)⁷²⁴, European Union (EU), or Western Europe and the West.

по. 4): 9; 'Обличчям до суворих реалій' (February 1993, no. 6): 10; 'До гостин Леоніда Макаровича в Єлизавети Георгіївни' (February 1993, no. 6): 6; 'Хочеш бути сильним – будь ним!' (March 1993, no. 7): 3; 'Зовнішньо-політична концепція України схожа на «Бермудський трикутник». Анатолію Зленкові вдалося довести, що Україна розташована між Росією та Польщею' (March-April 1993, no. 11): 3; 'Срібний чотирикутник' (March-April 1993, no. 11): 6; '«НАТО, НАТО, для мене значиш ти багато...» Польська міжнародна пісня' (1993, no. 17): 6; 'Східну політику міністра закордонних справ Польщі Скубішевського називають «філософією чекання»' (1993, no. 18): 4; 'Польсько-українські стосунки і новий східноєвропейський клімат' (June 1993, no. 21): 6; 'Новий «дранг нах остен» чи «стрибок на захід?»' (June 1993, no. 21): 4, 6; 'Ян Кшиштоф Белецький: Європі бракує уяви, Україні - фундаменту' (October 1993, no. 36): A7; 'Задля української держави президент Кравчук згоден сповідувати три релігії' (January 1993, no. 2-3): 6; 'В Україні визріла ситуація, коли верхи вже хочуть, але не можуть.' (February 1994, no. 2): A4; 'Очоливши ЄС, Греція проводитиме там деструктивну політику' (February 1994, no. 2): A2; 'Якщо Гельмут Коль програє вибори, то Україна тільки виграє' (April 1994, no. 11): A2; 'Росія на розпутьті. Україна в неї на дорозі' (May 1994, no. 14): A3; 'Рожеві сни рожевого інтернаціоналу. Західні соціал-демократи з великим апетитом придивляються до Східної Європи' (May 1994, no. 16): A4; 'Вишеградський процес помре, якщо відійде Словаччина. Словаччина не відійде, якщо підійде Україна' (May 1994, no. 16): A5; 'Українська делегація повернулася з Італії. Якщо й не з важливими досягненнями, то все ж з результатами на кінець.' (July-August 1994, no. 26): A3; 'Леонід Кучма не з того боку Берлінської стіни' (December 1994, no. 44): 3; 'На світло півмісяця. Обставини підштовхують Україну до зближення з мусульманським світом' (December 1994, no. 47): 6; 'Серпом по... вухах' (January 1995, no. 3): 1; 'Доки Росія зав'язла у Чечні, є шанс оббігти її у Європі' (January 1995, no. 3): 9; 'Росія знову зазнала поразки від Дудаєва. Тепер під стінами Страсбурга' (February 1995, no. 5): 2; 'Французький мазок Євросоюз до європейського портрета' (February-March 1995, no. 7): 7; 'Українська безпека і чеченська криза' (March 1995, no. 8): 5; 'Деякі узагальнення з досвіду реформування східноєвропейських економік' (August 1995, no. 26): 5; 'Україна - Рада Європи: шлях до зближення' (September 1995, no. 29): 2; 'Україна шукає «точку опори» в Азії' (September-October 1995, no. 30): 2.

⁷²⁴ The European Community (EC) was an association formed to integrate Europe's economies encompassing the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC; dissolved in 2002), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), collectively known as the 'European Communities.' In 1993, these communities were incorporated into the European Union (EU). This arrangement continued until 2009 when the EU formally succeeded the EC as its institutional successor. See Matthew J. Gabel, 'European Community European economic association', <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association> (last accessed 01.06.2024).

Europe: Frequency of Narratives in Postup over time, 1992–1995 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 33 MH: Europe - Frequency of Narratives, 1992–1995.

The creation of Europe as a place of wanted but unreachable partnership unfolded on the level of two narratives: ‘Desire to Join’ and ‘Incorporation Through other Countries.’ The narrative ‘Desire to Join’ was conveyed in articles in which the authors specifically expressed a desire to establish closer economic and political ties with Europe, which here referred to the EEC and the European political sphere, while also critically addressing the Ukrainian government’s lack of political and economic action in this regard. The narrative ‘Incorporation Through other Countries’ became visible in articles that underlined the importance of economic and political alliances with individual European countries, such as Poland and Germany, to achieve a faster integration into the European economic market. An evolvement of these narratives over time can be seen in the stacked area chart in figure 33. The chart indicates how the ‘desire to join Europe’ narrative dominated the discourse in articles referencing Europe from 1992 to 1995, while the second narratives (blue) was most dominant in 1993 until May 1995. In the following I will exemplify how these narratives unfolded in detail and how they shaped the notion that Europe was a place of desired but unreachable partnership.

The Desire for Economic and Political Cooperation and Incorporation

With Ukraine's independence in 1991, the country needed to establish new political alliances and economic agreements. One of those alliances was the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereafter – CIS). The organisation was created between the former Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, with the goal to secure political, economic and military relations. Many post-Soviet states quickly joined the CIS, and within its first year, the CIS created numerous institutions and signed over 250 documents to define its mission and objectives more clearly.⁷²⁵ Foreign policy interest beyond the post-Soviet space – such as from western European countries or the USA – remained however scarce following Ukraine's independence. As political scientists Olga Alexandrova has argued, western governments, such as in western Europe were primarily interested in the fate of the nuclear arsenal of Ukraine, and western policymakers perceived Ukraine as within Russia's acknowledged sphere of influence and therefore not an important factor in European and international politics.⁷²⁶

A study from 1995 has shown, that participants when asked 'What do you think is the likely future of Ukraine in two to three years?', largely could imagine an integration of Ukraine's economy within the European Community (see Figure 34).⁷²⁷ In L'viv oblast, 50 percent of young respondents (ages 18–35) believed that Ukraine could become part of the 'European Community' within two to three years after 1995. However, only about 30 percent thought this was unlikely. In *Postup*, the expectations for joining Europe from 1992 to 1995 were less optimistic, despite being desired.

⁷²⁵ Kubicek, "The Commonwealth," 237.

⁷²⁶ Olga Alexandrova, "Ukraine and Western Europe," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, 1996): 145–170, 147–148.

⁷²⁷ Omnibus 1995: views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems (September to October).

L'viv oblast: What do you think is the likely future of Ukraine in two to three years?
(September–October 1995)




Figure 34 Results of data from the respondents from L'viv oblast between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: Omnibus 1995: views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems (September to October), Source: National Research Bank.

Despite a lack of interest from western European governments toward Ukraine's political landscape and economic market, in *Postup* the journalists and writers created a narrative that expressed the desire for alliances oriented toward European countries. This notion also aligned with the broader strategy of the Ukrainian government, that sought a pro-European orientation. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko prioritized aligning Ukraine with Europe and distancing it from Russia. For instance, under Kravchuk the CIS was viewed as a temporary measure to ensure a peaceful separation from Russia, focusing Ukraine's involvement on economic matters. Ukraine opposed the creation of supranational structures within the CIS and refused to ratify its Charter, instead focusing on integration with Western and Central Europe.⁷²⁸

One article in *Postup* that represented Ukraine's orientation toward European countries was published in May 1992, written by journalist Volodymyr Samokhvalov. Samokhvalov commented on the strategic position of Ukraine as a transit hub for energy resources, and proposed for Ukraine to change this role by reconsidering its stance on nuclear weapons for

⁷²⁸ Kuzio, "Identity", 2001, 359.

reasons of stability and protection, charge for transit and port services, establish intermediary corporations, and develop processing industries.⁷²⁹ As main reasons for this shift, was the fading hope of Ukraine's economy to enter the European market, as western Europe had no financial capabilities to invest into Ukraine and or establish trade agreements with Ukraine:

Hopes that Ukraine will knock on the door of the European house are premature. Western Europe has already formed an internal market characterized by overproduction of agricultural and metallurgical products. The entry of cheap Ukrainian steel and agricultural products into this market will lead to mass bankruptcies, which is extremely disadvantageous for their trade unions and farmers. Moreover, Western Europe does not have free funds. \$600 billion is planned to be invested in East Germany, another \$24 billion in the Visegrád trio.⁷³⁰

While recognizing and acknowledging existing challenges for Ukraine's immediate economic partnership with Europe, also due to the limited Ukrainian economic sector mainly focused on 'agricultural and metallurgical' industries, Samokhvalov acknowledged a potential for change in American-Ukrainian relations in the future. He specifically stated that with the beginning of 1996, 'high investment capacity'⁷³¹ from western Europe would free up which would benefit Ukraine. Samokhvalov expressed optimism about the potential for European investment for the beginning of 1996, implying that even though European and Ukrainian economic partnership is not yet achievable, there is potential in the future. This contributed to the narrative that an economic alliance with the European market was desired from the perspective of Ukraine. This became also evident, when Samokhvalov offered a political strategy on how to attract foreign investments from Europe. This strategy encompassed to 'seek investments in other parts of the world, particularly in the Persian Gulf and the Far East,' as this would 'stimulate contributions from Europeans and Americans.' He concluded his article by stating that after following his proposed strategy – by 1996 – Ukraine would finally be able to 'hope for friendship and love from the West,' equating 'the West' with 'Europeans and Americans.'⁷³²

An article that underlined Ukraine's political incapability as an obstacle toward a desired political and economic orientation toward Europe, is for example one, written by former *Postup* journalist and then politician Taras Stetskiv. The article was published in November 1992 and discussed the potential of the newly formed government in Ukraine. In October 1992, Leonid Kuchma was appointed prime minister, a position formerly filled by Vitold Fokin.⁷³³ In the article Stetskiv suggested that the political and economic actions taken by the previous cabinet

⁷²⁹ *Postup*, 'Прохідний двір чи золоті ворота?' (May 1992, no. 16): 6.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷³¹ *Ibid.*

⁷³² *Ibid.*

⁷³³ Kappeler, *Kleine Geschichte*, 256.

so far have not been sufficient in achieving ‘the most important outcome’,⁷³⁴ which was the economic integration into Europe. He achieved that by expressing optimism toward the newly formed government. Even though the change in government was only cautiously welcomed by Stetskiiv, as he did not want to be ‘too optimistic’,⁷³⁵ he noted that one of its significant positive outcomes was its orientation toward Europe and not the East (potentially referring to Russia). He reasoned that Kuchma’s election of ‘three deputy prime ministers from Western Ukraine’⁷³⁶ was a sign for this new orientation. In this context he also argued that the election of western Ukrainians would shift Ukraine’s domestic politics toward ‘national priorities,’ implying that national priorities equalled an economic orientation of Ukraine toward Europe and not Russia.⁷³⁷

Stetskiiv’s cautiously expressed optimism toward Kuchma’s stance regarding Europe however faded in *Postup* in the following years, which became especially evident in 1994, when Leonid Kuchma’s was elected new president of Ukraine. In 1994, president Kravchuk announced that the presidential and, for the first time, parliamentary elections were to be held at the same time in the summer of 1994. All citizens of Ukraine over the age of 18 were allowed to take part in the elections. The two main candidates for the presidential elections were Kravchuk and Kuchma. While Kravchuk was extremely successful in the Western oblasti and won the majority in Central Ukraine (L’viv: 93.8 percent, Ternopil: 94.3 percent, Ivano-Frankivsk: 94.5 percent; Kyiv centre 58.3 percent, Kyiv city: 59.7 percent), Kuchma received the majority of votes in Eastern and Southern Ukraine with outstanding results in Crimea, Sevastopol and Luhansk (Donetsk: 79 percent, Luhansk: 88 percent; Dnipropetrovsk: 67.8 percent; Kharkiv: 71 percent; Crimea: 89.7 percent; Sevastopol: 92 percent; Odesa: 66.8 percent and Kherson: 64.6 percent). Eventually, Kuchma was elected president in June/July 1994 with a slight majority of 52.1 percent.⁷³⁸

In *Postup* 1994, Kuchma, was portrayed as moving away from an orientation toward Europe and respectively the EC/EU. In an article published in December 1994 by journalist Oleh Dorozhovets, commenting on the first 6 months of Kuchma’s presidency, Kuchma’s stance

⁷³⁴ *Postup*, ‘З новим урядом Україна отримала можливість для ще однієї відставки. Але це буде відставка всієї держави’ (November 1992, no. 42): 6.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*.

⁷³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁸ Bojcun, “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections,” 239.

toward Europe was summarized as ‘having renounced Europe.’⁷³⁹ In another article, Dorozhovets accused Kuchma of not only moving away from Europe, but also leaning toward more political engagement with Russia. Dorozhovets stated – when critiquing Leonid Kuchma’s diplomatic stance in opposing NATO expansion into Eastern Europe – that ‘Kuchma’s self-isolation from Europe can only be interpreted as a political flirtation between official Kyiv and Moscow.’⁷⁴⁰ *Postup*’s critical assessment of Kuchma’s stance has to be considered in the political atmosphere of the time. Prior to the presidential and parliamentary election in 1994, media outlets in Ukraine, such as the national democratic newspaper *Verkhnyi Kyiv*, had propagated the idea that Kuchma’s election would imply a closer connection of Ukraine toward Russia and eventually lead to a loss of independence.⁷⁴¹ However, political scientist Taras Kuzio has argued, that the accusations against Kuchma in the media and public were due Kuchma’s failed election campaign, rather than to an orientation toward Russia. Specifically, Kuchma ‘fell into a similar trap to that which Kravchuk had faced during his term in office, obscuring his programme by attempting to appeal to everyone at the same time.’⁷⁴² Political scientist Tatiana Zhurzhenko has made a similar assessment. She argued that Kuchma’s political campaign aimed at offering an ‘Eastern’ alternative to the ‘national idea’ of Ukraine, which a huge part of Eastern Ukrainian did not identify with. This ‘Eastern’ alternative concerned for instance ‘keeping the status quo concerning the Russian language, developing a strategic partnership with Russia, and changing the political balance in favor of the Eastern part of Ukraine.’⁷⁴³ Zhurzhenko concluded that this alternative ‘has indeed failed.’ Kuzio summarized this assessment of Kuchma’s failed attempt as in the following:

Kuchma was also accused of a whole multitude of sins, however, including lack of patriotism, a desire to revive the former USSR, lack of interest in Ukrainian statehood, and planning to give away the Crimea and Black Sea Fleet to Russia. In fact, Kuchma on no occasion supported political and military integration with Russia or the CIS, always rejected any suggestion that the former USSR could be revived and supported Ukrainian statehood. His plans for the transfer of the Fleet and the lease of Sevastopol by Russia were backed by Kravchuk at the Massandra summit with Russia in September 1993, when he was accompanied by then Prime Minister Kuchma. His emphasis upon renewing economic ties with Russia and taking an active role in economic affairs within the CIS was one of a series of policies designed to deal with the economic crisis. He stressed that relations with Russia would not distract Ukraine from improving

⁷³⁹ *Postup*, ‘На світло півмісяця. Обставини підштовхують Україну до зближення з мусульманським світом’ (December 1994, no. 47): 6.

⁷⁴⁰ *Postup*, ‘Леонід Кучма не з того боку Берлінської стіни’ (December 1994, no. 44): 3.

⁷⁴¹ According to Taras Kuzio, the newspaper published a headline one day before the elections of 1994 with the title: ‘If we elect Kravchuk, we’ll have what we have now. If we elect Kuchma, we won’t have even what we have now. If we elect Plushch we’ll have the hope that we’ll have something.’ See, Taras Kuzio, “Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 12 (2) (June 1996), 129.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*, 130.

⁷⁴³ Zhurzhenko, “The Myths.”

and expanding ties elsewhere, especially with the West. Kuchma rejected Ukraine's role as a buffer against Russia and one of his election slogans was 'Build Bridges, Not Fences'.⁷⁴⁴

This notion of Kuchma as a pro-Russian president of Ukraine was further amplified following his inauguration speech after he had won the election. In this speech he stated that Ukraine was part of the 'Eurasian' space, and not Europe. This speech led to an outcry among national democratic politicians and members of the civil society, such as the Writer's Union, as this implied that Kuchma was seeking closer alignment with Russia and moving away from Kravchuk's tendency to seek alignment with Europe.⁷⁴⁵ That *Postup*, as a democratic newspaper, therefore published articles that portrayed a similar image of Kuchma approximately 6 months after his speech, could also have been amplified by such sentiments.

In addition to the above exemplified articles, the desire for Ukrainian political and economic integration into Europe became also evident in articles in which the authors advocated for political and economic ties with individual European countries. The narrative conveyed in these articles was that Ukraine's government should establish economic and political ties with European countries to strengthen their relationship with the EC/EU. These countries included EC/EU member states, such as unified Germany, as well as former communist countries like Poland, Hungary, Czechia and the Baltics, which, although not part of the EC/EU at the time, were depicted as gateways to establishing economic relations with the EC/EU.⁷⁴⁶

A European country that was referenced multiple times was Poland. An article written by US-American foreign policy expert Ian Brzezinski published in *Postup* in June 1993 is reflective of the significance of Poland as a gateway for Ukraine's European integration. In the article, Brzezinski specifically discussed the potential and challenges of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation with regard to regional stability and European integration. Without questioning if Ukraine

⁷⁴⁴ Kuzio, "Kravchuk to Kuchma," 129–130.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 136–137.

⁷⁴⁶ *Postup*, 'Post-Inform' (June 1992, no. 21): 4; 'Вишеградський трикутник? Усе це вигадки Заходу!' (November 1992, no. 43): 3; *Postup*, 'Зовнішньо-політична концепція України схожа на «Бермудський трикутник». Анатолію Зленкові вдалося довести, що Україна розташована між Росією та Польщею' (March–April 1993, no. 11): 3; 'Польсько-українські стосунки і новий східноєвропейський клімат' (June 1993, no. 21): 6; 'Новий «дранг нах остен» чи «стрибок на захід»?' (June 1993, no. 21): 4, 6; 'Ян Кшиштоф Белецький: Європі бракує уяви, Україні - фундаменту' (October 1993, no. 36): A7; 'В Україні визріла ситуація, коли верхи вже хочуть, але не можуть.' (February 1994, no. 2): A4; 'Якщо Гельмут Коль програє вибори, то Україна тільки виграє' (April 1994, no. 11): A2; 'Рожеві сни рожевого інтернаціоналу. Західні соціал-демократи з великим апетитом придивляються до Східної Європи' (May 1994, no. 16): A4; 'Вишеградський процес помре, якщо відійде Словаччина. Словаччина не відійде, якщо підійде Україна' (May 1994, no. 16): A5.

desired European integration or not, the author elaborated on how neighbourly relationships between Ukraine and Poland could contribute to such an integration, implying that Ukraine's desire toward Europe was inherent to its transformation as an independent country in which Poland played a significant role:

Poland itself is gradually becoming an economically strong state, strong enough to be increasingly considered part of Western Europe. Poland is the most influential among Eastern European countries. Friendly relations with Poland are absolutely necessary for Ukraine's economic, political, and military integration with the West.⁷⁴⁷

Brzezinski continued to argue that a mutual understanding and collaboration between Poland and Ukraine would not only ensure geopolitical security in Europe, as it would decrease the possibility of Russia developing into a hostile political actor making territorial claims toward Ukraine, potentially turning Poland into a country that 'once again finds itself next to an imperial Russia.'⁷⁴⁸ But also that a strong Polish-Ukrainian strategic alliances would ensure Ukraine's status as an independent country: 'Strengthening Ukraine's independence through close cooperation with Poland will ensure the transformation of Russia into a non-imperial state.'⁷⁴⁹ In other articles published in *Postup*, Poland as a strategic partner for Ukraine's path to Europe was portrayed by the authors through phrases such as 'Poland is a window to Europe,'⁷⁵⁰ or other statements such as one made by Polish business man Longin Frankowski in a short exchange with a *Postup* correspondent: 'As for joining Europe, we [Poland and Ukraine] are already in Europe. There is no need to rush to the West and fall at their feet [...] Because the West is moving eastward. We can take advantage of this. We can make demands. But we cannot do it each on our own.'⁷⁵¹ With his statement, Frankowski challenges the traditional power dynamics associated with 'the West' by asserting that Poland and Ukraine, with their rich histories and cultures, are already inherently European, which is here equated with 'the West'. He rejects the notion of Ukraine and Poland needing to 'rush to the West and fall at their feet,' emphasizing that both countries should pursue European integration on their own terms. By mentioning the eastward movement of Western countries, Frankowski suggests

⁷⁴⁷ *Postup*, 'Польсько-українські стосунки і новий східноєвропейський клімат' (June 1993, no. 21): 6.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁰ Quote taken from an article written by Maxim Myakensky. The phrase was used in the context of describing the foreign policy strategy of the Ukrainian government. *Postup*, 'Зовнішньо-політична концепція України схожа на «Бермудський трикутник». Анатолію Зленкові вдалося довести, що Україна розташована між Росією та Польщею' (March-April 1993, no. 11): 3.

⁷⁵¹ Quote taken from an short exchange between a *Postup* correspondent and Polish entrepreneur Longin Frankowski at a business event in L'viv on 2 June 1992, see *Postup*, 'Вишеградський трикутник? Усе це вигадки Заходу!' (November 1992, no. 43): 3.

a shift in power dynamics, implying that countries such as Poland and Ukraine hold agency and power over their own integration and can even ‘make demands’.⁷⁵²

As Ukraine’s neighbour to the West, Poland played an important role in Ukraine’s political and economic transformation from the beginning, as it was one of the first countries to acknowledge Ukraine’s independence as well as to establish bilateral agreements. Poland’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integration and its pro-European ambitions became a fundamental element of Poland’s foreign policy.⁷⁵³ The first steps toward Ukrainian-Polish relations began even before the official dissolution of the Soviet Union, with the signing of a joint *Declaration on Principles and Basic Directions for Development of Polish-Ukrainian Relations* in October 1990 between Poland and the Ukrainian SSR. Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty in July 1990 allowed the Ukrainian government to adopt – what US-American intelligence research analysis Stephen Robert Burant called – a ‘semi-independent foreign policy.’⁷⁵⁴ The declaration signed by both, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR, acknowledged a commitment to peace, stability, and cooperation in Europe, reflecting a forward-looking approach to bilateral relations grounded in international law and mutual respect. Beside committing to develop ‘mutually beneficial cooperation in political, economic, environmental, scientific-technical, informational, cultural, humanitarian, and other fields’⁷⁵⁵ the declaration also expressed Poland’s support for the desire of the Ukrainian SSR to play a more significant and equal role in the broader European context. In article 13 of the declaration, it was stated that ‘the Ukrainian Side informed about steps aimed at realizing its intention to take a direct equal part in the pan-European process and European structures. The Polish Side declared its readiness to facilitate a positive resolution of this issue.’⁷⁵⁶ In May 1992, Poland’s role for the economic and political development of then independent Ukraine was solidified, following the signing of the *Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation*,⁷⁵⁷ when in article 5 both parties committed ‘to act for political,

⁷⁵² *Postup*, ‘Вишеградський трикутник? Усе це вигадки Заходу!’ (November 1992, no. 43): 3.

⁷⁵³ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Everyday Europeanization and Bottom-Up Geopolitics at the Ukrainian-Polish Border,” *Geopolitics* (04 Jan 2024): 5, as cited in Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (Yale University Press, 2003), 286–290.

⁷⁵⁴ Stephen R. Burant, “Poland, Ukraine and the Idea of Strategic Partnership,” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 1308 (1999), 8.

⁷⁵⁵ Article 5, Декларація про принципи та основні напрямки розвитку українсько-польських відносин, 13 жовтня 1990 р. [Declaration on the Principles and Main Directions of Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations, 13 October 1990, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_176#Text (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁷⁵⁶ Article 13, Декларація про принципи та основні напрямки розвитку українсько-польських відносин, 13 жовтня 1990 р. [Declaration on the Principles and Main Directions of Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations, 13 October 1990, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_176#Text (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁷⁵⁷ Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, sporządzony w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good

economic, ecological, cultural, scientific, humanitarian, and legal cooperation, especially co-creating, developing, and disseminating pan-European standards in these fields' to 'strengthen and further institutionalize the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other pan-European structures.'⁷⁵⁸ The notion expressed by *Postup*'s authors to utilize Ukraine's relationship with Poland as a gateway to Europe was therefore not solely based on a theoretical desire, but part of a broader political strategy of the Ukrainian government.

Beside a focus on Poland, *Postup* also published articles that concentrated on alliances with other European countries, that emerged in 1994. Taras Stetskiv in an interview, for example, argued that a strong economic alliance with the Baltics and Finland could be useful, to get through Finland to Northern Europe and an alliance with the Visegrád countries to break into the economic market of Western Europe.⁷⁵⁹ Another example was Germany. *Moloda Halychyna* published articles in which Germany under Helmut Kohl was perceived as favourable toward Ukrainian relations with Europe, as Kohl advocated for Eastern European integration in general.⁷⁶⁰ The common notion in all of these articles was that Ukrainian economic integration into Europe was a desired outcome, that could be achieved by building strategic alliances and leveraging supportive international environments with individual European countries, which were either striving for the same integration, such as Poland or the Baltics, or which were already part of the EC/EU, such as Germany.

Concluding Remarks

The desire to reach a European-Ukrainian alliance from 1992 to 1995, was expressed throughout all years, and consistently persisted. On *Postup*'s mental map from 1992 to 1995,

Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on May 18, 1992], Journal of Laws of 1993, no. 125, item 573, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19931250573> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁷⁵⁸ Article 5, Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, sporządzony w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on May 18, 1992], Journal of Laws of 1993, no. 125, item 573, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19931250573> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁷⁵⁹ 'I believe that cooperation with the Baltic countries and Finland is of great importance to us. Through them, we reach Northern Europe, whose countries sympathize with Ukraine. [...] The third is cooperation with the Visegrád countries with the prospect of breaking into Western European markets.' See, *Postup*, 'В Україні визріла ситуація, коли верхи вже хочуть, але не можуть.' (February 1994, no. 2): A4.

⁷⁶⁰ 'Of course, the election of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl as the head of the European Commission would be more desirable for Ukraine and Eastern Europe as a whole. Germany and the Christian Democrats are the most progressive among all EU countries. It is Germany that constantly and persistently advocates the admission of the Visegrád Group countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - to the European Union.' See, *Postup*, 'Якщо Гельмут Коль програє вибори, то Україна тільки виграє' (April 1994, no. 11): A2.

Europe was envisioned as a desirable haven that could have significantly influenced Ukraine's economic and political transformation. However, this remained only an aspirational perception, more a product of wishful thinking than a current reality. This aspiration was often accompanied by a frustration toward the Ukrainian government's lack of progress on necessary reforms, to move closer into the direction of Europe. In this context also tendencies toward closer Ukrainian-Russian relation, under Kuchma, were viewed with caution. Additionally, there was an emphasis on the importance of forming political and economic alliances with specific European nations as a strategy to accelerate Ukraine's integration into the European economic market. These alliances can be considered as strategic moves to slowly integrate into the European landscape.

6.2 *Moloda Halychyna*: 1992–1995

In contrast to *Postup*, the newspaper *Moloda Halychyna* did not undergo any radical structural changes. The format of the newspaper as well as the thematic themes of politics, economy, culture and news reports and stories from the region of L'viv persisted. The only change that I identified in matter of the newspaper's structure was an increase in advertisement, from national and international companies from 1992 onward.⁷⁶¹ As a result, the regional focus within the newspaper's articles – which was already visible from 1989 to 1991 – persisted throughout the years 1992, 1993, and 1995. The editors of *Moloda Halychyna* documented Ukraine's transformation by covering its impact on the region of L'viv. This regional emphasis was reflected, for instance, in articles that commented on the political dynamics within L'viv,⁷⁶² the economic progress of regional businesses,⁷⁶³ the activities and development of local cultural organizations,⁷⁶⁴ or regional developments concerning inhabitants, such as a perceived increase in crime.⁷⁶⁵ Coverage also extended to regional educational developments, including updates

⁷⁶¹ The advertisements mostly appeared on the last two pages of the 4-page long newspaper issue. For example, an advertisement of the business union of the 'Zaporizhia Commodity Exchange', operating in Ukraine and Russia (see, *Moloda Halychyna*, No Title (January 1992, no. 4): 3) or an advertisement of the newest stereo system by the Japanese company 'Sony' (see, *Moloda Halychyna*, No Title (July 1992, no. 85): 4).

⁷⁶² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Без надії таки сподіваємось' (January 1992, no. 6): 1, 4.

⁷⁶³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Остап Бендер: «Захід нам допоможе». А нам?' (June 1995, no. 67): 1; 'Україні злидарів автобус - райське благо, або Чи скоро інтернаціональний «ЛАЗ» стане українським?' (July 1993, no. 76): 1–2.

⁷⁶⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Україна з народами Балтики' (October 1992, no. 124): 3.

⁷⁶⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Звернення Союзу Українок до громадськості Львівщини' (March 1992, no.33): 2.

on local universities⁷⁶⁶ and the effects of international student exchanges involving L'viv's academic institutions⁷⁶⁷.

As a consequence of this focus on regional content, less coverage of events or developments outside of L'viv or L'viv oblast existed, as it was for example the case in *Postup*. Articles, in which the author attributed meaning to other locations, did occur but were less prominent and frequent in the newspaper over the years. My analysis of the top 15 locations in the context of *Moloda Halychyna's* articles that were attributed to the topic categories 'State Development' and 'Region and Youth' from 1992 to 1995 unfolded in four patterns of place creation attributed to three different locations. These locations were Russia, Poland and Europe. I identified a total of 252 articles containing 276 references to the locations of Russia, Poland, or Europe, as some articles included references to more than one location.⁷⁶⁸ While the regional focus of the newspaper might have impacted the number of articles, with less articles being identified, it did not impact the meanings attributed to locations that contributed to the creation of various places.

⁷⁶⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Навчальний процес у вузі: проблеми зламу стереотипів' (February 1992, no. 16): 3.

⁷⁶⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Американські українознавці починають любити Україну зі Львова' (August 1995, no. 87): 3; 'Дністер під егідою ЮНЕСКО!' (May 1995, no. 55): 3.

⁷⁶⁸ The number of articles represents all articles identified during the analysis process for the three locations Russia, Poland and Europe within the topic categories State Development and Region and Youth. This means, that not all of these articles contained the narratives that contributed to the creation of places that I identified. Some of them contained a different meaning that was not identified relevant for the place creation. Out of 252 articles identified a total of 216 contributed to the creation of places.

Moloda Halychyna 1992–1995: Relationship between Locations and Topic Categories
 Categories
 number of references




Figure 35 Sankey Diagram: *Moloda Halychyna* 1992–1995.

In total I identified 216 relevant articles that contributed to the creation of places from 1992 to 1995. These articles included 240 references to the locations Russia, Poland and the Baltics within the topic categories ‘State Development’ and ‘Region and Youth’. The Sankey diagram in figure 35 illustrates the relationship between topic categories and locations as identified in articles from *Moloda Halychyna* between 1992 and 1995. The left side of the chart displays the topic categories – State Development and Region and Youth – while the right side shows the locations: Russia, Europe, and Poland.

The chart highlights how frequently each location is associated with each topic category. For instance, State Development is predominantly connected with Russia, indicating that articles referencing Russia occurred predominantly in articles that discussed aspects of Ukraine’s state development. Similarly, connections are drawn between State Development and Europe, although to a lesser extent. The Region and Youth category shows links primarily to Poland.

The distribution of the references between the three locations. The value that is represented in the diagram indicated the number of references (total of 240) which is greater than the number of articles (216). This is due to the fact that some articles contained multiple references, for example, to Poland and to Russia. As the diagram indicated, the majority of references in the

context of the three locations were made within the topic category ‘State Development’ (197) and to lesser extent within ‘Region and Youth’ (43). This observation refers back to what I argued initially that most of the articles with a regional focus contained references to the location ‘L’viv’ and ‘Lviv oblast’. However, the meanings attributed to these two locations in these articles was so versatile, that it was difficult to narrow it down to a specific pattern of place creation. I therefore did not include a sub-chapter on the location ‘L’viv’ in my analysis of *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995.

According to my analysis, the location Russia was attributed with political and economic meaning that created it as a place of economic, political and cultural adversity. Articles referencing Poland unfolded a pattern in which the country was portrayed as a place of neighbourly partnership. At last, the political meaning authors in *Moloda Halychyna* attributed to the location Europe created a pattern of Europe as a place of aspiration and belonging in 1992 and 1993, that had evolved into Europe as a place of closer ties in 1995 (see, table 9).

Location	A Place of...	Year
Russia	Economic, Political and Cultural Adversity	1992, 1993, 1995
Poland	Neighbourly Partnership	1992, 1993, 1995
Europe	Aspiration and Belonging	1992–1993
	Closer Ties	1995

Table 9 List of identified locations and place creation from 1992 to 1995 in Moloda Halychyna.

Russia

Similar to the sub-chapter ‘Russia’ in *Postup*, initially the locations Russia and Moscow from the top 15 list of locations were considered for the in-depth analysis of *Moloda Halychyna*’s issues from 1992 to 1995. As in *Postup*, Crimea was a frequent topic of discussion among *Moloda Halychyna*’s journalists, who examined and commented on the implications of the Russian government’s actions concerning the Ukrainian peninsula. Consequently, Crimea often appeared in articles addressing concerns about Russia’s influence and its impact on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both locations, Russia and Moscow, occurred on the top 15 list of locations from 1992 and 1995 and were mainly referenced within the topic category ‘State Development’, with a marginal number of articles that can be allocated to the topic

category 'Region and Youth.' As in *Postup*, the analysis of these locations within this topic category has revealed that Russia was portrayed as a place of economic and political adversity.

1992 – 1995: A Place of Economic, Political and Cultural Adversity

In 1991, when Russia first appeared on the top 15 list, sentiment toward Boris Yeltsin's vision of a democratic Russia was largely portrayed as positive (until June 1991). However, from 1992 onward, the sentiment in published articles shifted. As within the discourse in *Postup*, *Moloda Halychyna* primarily published articles that attributed meaning with negative sentiment towards Ukraine's neighbour connected to Boris Yeltsin's government from 1992 to 1995. But *Moloda Halychyna* also featured articles with a neutral stance toward Russia. These articles were classified as neutral because they explained or informed readers about specific topics without using persuasive language or expressing the author's opinion.⁷⁶⁹ Such articles included official statements, speeches, and reports from political meetings, continuing a tradition from its time as *Leninska Molod*.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Вивчайте українську!' (March 1992, no. 33): 3; 'Зустріч у Севастополі' (May 1992, no. 54): 1; 'Нота МЗС України' (May 1992, no. 59): 1; 'Про того, хто пам'ятає є пише правду' (June 1992, no. 69): 3; 'Підсумки ялтинської зустрічі' (August 1992, no. 90): 1, 2; 'Шляхи, які нам доведеться обирати...' (September 1992, no. 106): 1; 'Запасайтеся терпінням і, по можливості, харчами' (November 1992, no. 131): 1; 'Грошова реформа. З точки зору вченого-скептика' (November 1992, no. 137): 1, 2; 'Автобусобудівна доктрина' (December 1992, no. 150): 1; 'Тридцять сім звинувачень' (April 1993, no. 49): 1; 'У країні злидарів автобус - райське благо, або Чи скоро інтернаціональний «ЛАЗ» стане українським?' (July 1993, no. 76): 1, 2; 'Якщо ви рішучий - мов Чорновіл, ліберал — мов Гриньов, і ваше прізвище Кравчук, ви — майбутній президент України' (October 1993, no. 127): 2; 'А покуштуйте нашої каші!' (November 1993, no. 137): 2; 'Україна — США: Реалізація пріоритетів' (May 1995, no. 54): 2; 'Українсько-російське комоніке' (June 1995, no. 67): 1; 'Демократії можна навчитись' (June 1995, no. 67): 2; 'АНТК імені Антонова - фірма, яка не втратила стійкості в складних умовах перехідного періоду' (August 1995, no. 99): 2; 'Костянтин Затулін: Якщо Україна бачить центр СНА у Брюсселі, а не у Москві, тоді забудьте про дешеві російські газ та нафту' (September 1995, no. 108): 1; 'Зупинити контрабанду ядерних матеріалів' (October 1995, no. 113): 3; 'Жоден з документів не був підписаний' (October 1995, no. 114): 1; 'Росія планує купувати підприємства СНД' (December 1995, no. 141): 2; 'Українсько-російського держкордону' (December 1995, no. 142): 1; 'Генеральний консул Росії у Львові Анатолій Ковальов: Ми приїхали сюди з добрими намірами' (December 1995, no. 144): 2; 'Президенти обговорили стан і перспективи українсько-російських відносин' (December 1995, no. 146): 1; 'Найбільшим інвестором Львова є Кіпр. А Львів найзавзятіше підтримує господарку Австрії' (December 1995, no. 146): 2.

⁷⁷⁰ That the editors of *Moloda Halychyna* kept this newspaper feature was already visible in 1990 and 1991 as discussed in the sub-section L'viv in chapter 5.2 in this thesis.

Russia: Frequency of Sentiment in Articles in *Moloda Halychyna* per Year (frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 36 MH: Russia - Frequency of Sentiment, 1992–1995.

In total I identified 145 articles from 1992 to 1995, of which 136 could be allocated to the topic category ‘State Development’ and only 9 to the topic category ‘Region and Youth’. Of these 145 articles, I identified 120 portraying Russia negatively (1992: 63, 1993: 18; 1995: 39) and 25 articles portraying it neutrally (1992: 9, 1993: 4, 1995: 12). The bar chart in figure 36 indicates the evolution of these two sentiments over time at a normalized rate. As the bar chart shows, articles with a negative sentiment predominated in *Moloda Halychyna* over the three years. However, the proportion of neutral articles marginally but steadily increased from 1993 to 1995, while the prevalence of negative articles significantly declined from 1992 to 1993, only to rise again from 1993 to 1995. However, it is unlikely that this trend indicates an increasing interest by *Moloda Halychyna* in publishing articles with a neutral tone due to a shift in sentiment towards Russia, as negative coverage still prevailed. Furthermore, the neutral articles were distributed across different thematic contexts, showing no clear indication of a sentiment shift related to a specific theme. Nevertheless, considering the fact that the editors of *Moloda Halychyna* had a tendency to also cover stories with a neutral sentiment towards Russia, indicates that the editors may have been implementing standards of objectivity aimed at providing information rather than focusing predominantly on argumentative articles with the aim to persuade the reader.

The articles with neutral and negative sentiments occurred across multiple thematic topics. In total I identified 13. These were (in descending order of frequencies) Crimea, Black Sea Fleet, Imperial Russia, Economic Dependency (different contexts), Energy Dependency, Russia and the CIS, Russian Politics, (De)nuclearization, Ukrainian Businesses and Russia, History, (Border) Crime, Ukrainian Nationalist Parties and Russia and Comparison (see Figure 37).

Russia: Frequency of Thematic Contexts in Moloda Halychyna per Year, 1992–1995 (frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 37 MH: Russia - Frequency of Thematic Context, 1992–1995.

I decided to only focus on the articles in the in-depth analysis that conveyed a negative sentiment to Russia due to their dominance (120 out of 145) in the data base. These spanned across all thematic contexts outlined above, with most articles found within the themes of Crimea, Imperial Russia, the Black Sea Fleet, Economic Dependency and Energy Dependency (see Figure 38).

Russia: Frequency of Thematic Contexts with Negative Sentiment in *Moloda Halychyna* per Year, 1992–1995
(frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 38 MH: Russia - Frequency of Thematic Context with negative sentiment, 1992–1995.

Taking a closer look at the content of these articles, the analysis has revealed that similar to *Postup*, also in *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995, the authors portrayed Russia as an adversity to the economic and political transformation of Ukraine. Economic adversity is in this context identified through actions by the Russian government and Russian actors that are believed to weaken Ukraine's economic stability, promote economic dependence, or manipulate economic exchanges to achieve geopolitical benefits at the cost of Ukraine's transformation. For example, within the thematic contexts of 'Energy Dependency' and 'Economic Threat' Russia was portrayed as a political actor capitalizing Ukraine's energy dependence to weaken its economy.⁷⁷¹ Similarly, Russia as a political adversity is characterized by political actions taken

⁷⁷¹ *Moloda Halychyna* 'Останній день української Помпеї?' (January 1992, no. 4): 1; 'Цей купон в них грошима зоветься' (January 1992, no. 6): 1; '...І я починаю думати, що Росія, яку ми, за звичкою, вважаємо лінивою, скоро заткне нас за пояс' (February 1992, no. 12): 1, 2; 'Народний рух: нові завдання і перспективи' (February 1992, no. 13): 1, 2; 'Економічний Олімп як дзеркало української дійсності' (March 1992, no. 36): 1; 'Хто боїться незалежної України? (Відкритий лист до редакції журналу «Економіст»)' (April 1992, no. 46): 2; 'Сліпе наслідування дій Росії призведе до національної катастрофи' (May 1992, no. 53): 1; 'Про перебудову структури виробництва в Україні' (May 1992, no. 54): 2; 'Про перебудову структури виробництва в Україні' (May 1992, no. 55): 2; '"Нова Україна": Епізод чи подія?' (May 1992, no. 57): 1; '«Ми зганьбили себе надовго»' (May 1992, no. 59): 1; 'Хто вкладав парашут?' (August 1992, no. 101): 2; '«Промисловий» акцент співдружності' (October 1992, no. 116): 1; 'Україна - СНД. Двобій триває' (November 1992, no. 138): 2; 'Добре поінформований оптиміст' (December 1992, no. 154-155): 1, 5; 'Леонід Кучма: «Влада на місцях повинна бути міцною»' (January 1993, no. 6): 1; 'Ігор Юхновський робить висновки і формулює завдання' (April 1993, no. 41): 2; 'Сірчаникам обіцяють дотації' (August 1993, no. 94): 2; 'Поради Президентів' (October 1993, no. 116): 2; 'Просять не панікувати: якість перезимуємо' (December 1993, no. 142): 1; 'Білорусь плюс Росія і мінус Україна' (May 1995, no. 57): 2; 'За газ Україна може розрахуватися до кінця року. І знову нахапатись боргів' (July 1995, no. 75): 2; 'Мова нашого бізнесу' (July 1995, no. 78): 2; 'УРП: Чужоземному капіталу - червоне' (August 1995, no. 91): 2; 'Куди ж впадає газова

by the Russian government that the authors and editors of *Moloda Halychyna* viewed as destabilizing or negatively affecting Ukraine's domestic politics and political transformation. These actions were seen as attempts to undermine Ukrainian (territorial) sovereignty, political stability, and autonomous governance, and were found, for example, within the thematic contexts of Crimea, Russia and the CIS, and Russian Politics.⁷⁷²

Due to the overlapping meanings and sentiments attributed to Russia in both *Postup* and *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995, I decided to focus the in-depth analysis exclusively on one thematic context. The theme that I chose was 'Russian Imperialism', for two reasons. First, it appeared consistently throughout all three years, making it representative of this period (see Figure 38). Second, the analysis of this thematic context has revealed that the narrative of Russian imperialism was differently utilized in *Moloda Halychyna* compared to *Postup*. In *Postup*, the narrative was primarily confined to its political use. In contrast, *Moloda Halychyna's* authors expanded the narrative of Russian imperialism beyond the political (and economic) spheres to include a cultural dimension. This contributed to the creation of Russia as a place of economic, political and cultural adversity, which will be delineated in the following.

ріка?» (August 1995, no. 93): 1; 'Роль України є унікальною і важливою' (September 1995, no. 102): 1, 2; 'Російський капітал прагне контролювати газопроводи і газосховища' (September 1995, no. 106): 1; 'Залежність України від поставок російського газу занадто перебільшена' (September 1995, no. 106): 2; 'Нафтовий вир' (November 1995, no. 128): 2, 3; 'Цвіт калини в кільцях удава' (November 1995, no. 136): 1.

⁷⁷²*Moloda Halychyna*, 'Україна потребує ін'єкції' (January 1992, no. 9): 1; 'Чи українське українське телебачення?' (January 1992, no. 10): 2; 'Криза жанру. Чи в інтересах України сьогодні зміцнення СНД?' (January 1992, no. 10): 2, 3; 'Заява Верховної Ради України' (February 1992, no. 14): 1; '...А караван іде' (February 1992, no. 15): 1; 'Кто боится украинской армии?' (February 1992, no. 21): 2; 'Ось так і будемо жити?' (March 1992, no. 25): 2; 'Панове, живеться нам погано але СНД тут ні при чому' (March 1992, no. 31): 1; 'Чиї слави місто Севастополь? До історії російського флоту' (March 1992, no. 32): 2; '«Свободу мають ті, хто її вартий»' (March 1992, no. 34): 1; 'УХДП: тріщина стала прірвою' (April 1992, no. 46): 1; 'Хто боїться незалежної України? (Відкритий лист до редакції журналу «Економіст»)' (April 1992, no. 46): 2; 'Будуємо свою державу' (May 1992, no. 54): 1, 2; 'Не поспішайте казати «гоп»' (May 1992, no. 60): 2; 'Все діється за Божим планом?' (June 1992, no. 65): 3; 'Звичайний імперський фашизм' (June 1992, no. 68): 2; '«Нова Україна» застерігає «стару» від катастрофи' (June 1992, no. 71): 1; 'Шляхи, які нам обирають, або збройні сили України: міф чи реальність?' (July 1992, no. 77): 2; '«Вічне підданство?»' (July 1992, no. 78): 1; 'Шляхи, які нам обирають, або збройні сили України: міф чи реальність?' (July 1992, no. 78): 2; 'Битва ідей чи битва людей?' (September 1992, no. 103): 1; 'Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною' (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2; 'Флот нашої держави: вчора, сьогодні, завтра' (September 1993, no. 102): 1, 2; 'Шукаємо те, що роз'єднує?' (October 1993, no. 116): 1; 'Третя смерть' (October 1993, no. 125): 2, 3; 'УНА-УНСО: Готуймося до війни матимемо мир' (May 1995, no. 51): 2; 'Вони попереджали про це три місяці тому' (June 1995, no. 67): 1; 'Китаю повертають острів Даманський' (June 1995, no. 63): 2; 'Леонід Кравчук: Росія з Криму не піде' (June 1995, no. 70): 1; 'Кримськотатарський фактор та антитатарський синдром' (June 1995, no. 72): 2, 3; 'Перспектива одна: реформи і ще раз реформи' (July 1995, no. 76): 2; 'УНА - УНСО поїде розвалювати Росію' (August 1995, no. 99): 2; 'Роль України є унікальною і важливою' (September 1995, no. 102): 1, 2; 'Бішкекський саміт відкриває новий тюркомовний світ. Для України - теж' (September 1995, no. 105): 2; 'Нафтовий вир' (November 1995, no. 128): 2, 3; 'Цвіт калини в кільцях удава' (November 1995, no. 136): 1.

The Narrative of Russian Imperialism

A persistent notion that accompanied the portrayal of Russia as a place of economic, political and cultural adversity from 1992 to 1995 in *Moloda Halychyna* was a narrative of Russian imperialism. I identified a total of 30 out of 145 articles, which represent approximately 21 percent, in which the authors characterized political, economic and cultural actions of the Russian government and Russian actors towards Ukraine as ‘imperial.’ The authors employed various linguistic forms of the word ‘imperial’ alongside different modifiers to articulate the notion of Russian dominance over Ukraine. Examples include phrases such as ‘imperial ambitions’⁷⁷³, ‘Russian imperial forces’⁷⁷⁴, ‘imperialistic fangs’⁷⁷⁵, ‘imperialist state’⁷⁷⁶ or ‘Russian imperialism’⁷⁷⁷. The linguistic usage of the word ‘imperial’ with reference to Russia conveys a negative connotation spanning across all articles.

The area chart in figure 39 shows the evolvement of articles referring to Russia as an ‘imperial’ force across time. The chart suggests that this narrative was continuously used, however the in-depth analysis of the articles has revealed that the ‘imperial’ narrative occurred in various thematic contexts, and therefore the chart is not a suitable source for investigating the occurrence of specific peaks (such as in October 1993) or drops (such as in August 1995). The portrayal of Russia as an imperial force spanned the thematic domains of economy, politics, culture, and history, which will be discussed in the following.

⁷⁷³ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Цвіт калини в кільцях удава’ (November 1995, no. 136): 1.

⁷⁷⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Криза жанру. Чи в інтересах України сьогодні зміцнення СНД’ (January 1992, no. 10): 2, 3.

⁷⁷⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Чи українське українське телебачення?’ (January 1992, no. 10): 2.

⁷⁷⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Про перебудову структури виробництва в Україні’ (May 1992, no. 55): 2.

⁷⁷⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Галичина під німецькою окупацією 1941–1944 років’ (June 1992, no. 69): 3.

Moloda Halychyna: Usage of Word 'imperial' with Reference to Russia over Time, 1992–1995 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 39 MH: Russia - Usage of word "imperial", 1992–1995.

The Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations provides a basic definition of imperialism which is the ‘domination or control by one country or group of people over others.’⁷⁷⁸ The core idea of this simple definition became evident in articles published in *Moloda Halychyna*. The authors of the articles suggested with their references to Russia as an imperialist force that the political and economic actions taken by the Russian government toward Ukraine were strategic tactics to gain control over political, economic, and cultural matters of Ukraine as well as to seize control over Ukrainian territory. For *Moloda Halychyna*’s authors this strategic tactic specifically unfolded in Russian actions of economic and political interference in Ukrainian matters, territorial claims toward Ukrainian territory and the broader post-Soviet space and cultural suppression. In the following I will discuss each of these actions and demonstrate how the authors in their articles utilized the concept of Russian imperialism that contributed to the evolvement of Russia as a place of economic, political and cultural adversity.

Until 1991, the Ukrainian economy was significantly dependent on Moscow, both politically and economically, and was heavily influenced by its economic interconnections, including supply chains, for example for gas and oil, with other former Soviet republics, particularly the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.⁷⁷⁹ Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic dependency between independent Ukraine and Russia remained. Most of Ukraine’s critical industrial outputs were tied to cross-border production chains, and Ukraine’s heavily

⁷⁷⁸ Peter Burnell, “Imperialism,” *A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁷⁷⁹ Rafał Wiśta and Andrzej Nowosad, “Poland – Ukraine. Key Findings,” in Rafał Wiśta and Andrzej Nowosad, eds., *Economic Transformation in Poland and Ukraine* (Routledge, 2020), 246–247.

energy-dependent manufacturing sector was predominantly powered by Russian gas.⁷⁸⁰ This economic dependence was a greatly discussed subject in *Moloda Halychyna* (and *Postup*).⁷⁸¹ The notion that was communicated by *Moloda Halychyna*'s writers was that Russia's economic policies and its political dominance, for example within the CIS, would hinder Ukraine's post-communist transformation and threaten its sovereignty. Russia and its governmental policies were not only portrayed as following an agenda that actively aimed to harm Ukraine's economic and political transformation, but also as a greater Russian tactic to increase Ukraine's economic dependency on Russia and extort control among Ukrainian political elites with the aim to reinstate Russia's hegemony in the post-communist world order. The authors in *Moloda Halychyna* propagated this notion by repeatedly referring to Russia and the actions of the Russian government with the term 'imperial'.

Moloda Halychyna's journalist Oleh Romanchuk⁷⁸² achieved that in an article published in July 1992.⁷⁸³ This article serves as an example of how the notion of Russian imperialism in the context of economic and political interference in Ukraine was an underlying narrative.

During his first visit to Kyiv, Mikhail Gorbachev did not even attempt to hide his pro-imperial stance towards Ukraine. He began one of his conversations with a Kyivan on the street with the words: 'Here, in Russia... I mean the Soviet Union. Abroad, the Soviet Union is often called Russia... Actually, that's how it is..'. In November 1991, the former General Secretary, in an interview with the editor-in-chief of 'Y. S. News and World Report,' anxiously stated: 'It is impossible to even imagine that Ukraine would actually leave the Union.' This passage did not surprise anyone, as all Russian rulers from Alexei Mikhailovich to the Bolshevik leaders in the Kremlin needed this blessed land only as a colony with its industrious but stateless people.⁷⁸⁴

With this paragraph at the beginning of the article, Romanchuk set the stage of what would follow, which was a commentary on how Ukraine's sovereignty and economic independence were compromised by its entangled relationship with Russia. The paragraph served as a reminder for *Moloda Halychyna*'s readers, that Russia throughout time held imperial ambitions toward Ukraine, suggesting a historical continuity of Russia's imperialism in the past and highlighting that these ambitions did not stop with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁸⁰ Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, "Between Dependence and Integration: Ukraine's Relations With Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68 (4) (2016): 680.

⁷⁸¹ Ukraine's energy dependency on Russia in *Postup* has been discussed in the sub-chapter 6.1 in this study.

⁷⁸² Oleh Romanchuk is a Ukrainian journalist and writer, who in September 1990, was appointed as the head of the criticism department at the magazine 'Dzvin'. Later, from 1992 to 1993, he worked as the deputy chief editor of the newspaper 'Dilo' and subsequently as the deputy editor of the newspaper '*Moloda Halychyna*'.

⁷⁸³ *Moloda Halychyna*, '«Вічне підданство?»' (July 1992, no. 78): 1.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid.

Romanchuk identified this Russian ‘pro-imperial stance’⁷⁸⁵ toward independent Ukraine in Russia’s actions of pursuing control over Ukraine’s economic policies and political decisions, undermining Ukraine’s efforts to establish a stable independent state. According to Romanchuk, this manipulation was evident in various strategies, including political meddling in Ukrainian political affairs, strategic political manipulation and control, and economic sabotage.

For example, Romanchuk unravelled Russia’s influence on economic policies in Ukraine by accusing the Ukrainian government under the leadership of Vitold Fokin, the first prime minister of independent Ukraine (until October 1992), of operating under the direction of Russia. Romanchuk specifically argued that ‘the clumsy attempts of the Cabinet of Ministers headed by Vitold Fokin to implement their own economic policy have long been proof that the government actually works for the “older brother.”’⁷⁸⁶ The suggested narrative was that the Ukrainian government was facilitating the imperial economic and political ambitions of Russia (here referred to as the ‘older brother’) due to its reluctance to take up the development and implementation of its own economic reforms policy, which was also visible in other articles.⁷⁸⁷

Indeed, as economist Christopher Hartwell has noted, Ukraine struggled with the implementation of economic reforms.⁷⁸⁸ For example, the reform on prize liberalization, an economic reform that was commonly adapted by post-communist countries to facilitate the shift to a market economy, only occurred in Ukraine in 1994. Prize liberalization meant to substitute state regulated prices on goods with market regulated ones, which Ukraine did not implement until the end of 1994. In contrast, other post-communist countries, such as Poland, implemented price reforms moving towards price liberalization early on. In Poland this took place already in 1982 and 1989, for example, by removing regulated prices on food. So, by the time the Soviet Union officially dissolved, Poland was prepared to fully resolve regulations on consumer and producer goods immediately, thereby accelerating the process towards a liberal trade regime, while Ukraine was only able to catch up with Poland in 1997.⁷⁸⁹ Comparing the

⁷⁸⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘«Вічне підданство?»’ (July 1992, no. 78): 1.

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Свято та будні Української незалежності’ (August 1992, no. 99): 2, 3; ‘Народний рух: нові завдання і перспективи’ (February 1992, no. 13): 1, 2.

⁷⁸⁸ Hartwell, *Two Roads*, 328.

⁷⁸⁹ Hartwell, *Two Roads*, 318–321. See Table 5.1 in Hartwell, *Two Roads*, 320, for statistics on price liberalization in Poland and Ukraine from 1989 to 2000. Hartwell determined that one reason for the delay was Ukraine’s

implementation of economic reforms with other former Soviet republics, Ukraine ranked second-to-last. Only Turkmenistan started later.⁷⁹⁰ In *Moloda Halychyna*, the authors identified one of the reasons for the delay in implementing economic reforms, in the influence of the ‘older brother’ on Ukrainian politics, a relationship Romanchuk deemed imperial.

Romanchuk used the metaphor ‘older brother’ sarcastically when referencing post-communist Russia, placing the phrase in quotes to highlight Russia’s imperialistic role. The metaphor ‘older brother’ refers to the in history rooted concept of ‘brotherly people’ and was initially used during the times of the Russian Empire to promote a shared Slavic identity against external threats. It was adapted by the Soviet Union to emphasize ideological cohesion among diverse ethnic groups, downplaying ethnic ties in favour of shared political goals. In post-Soviet Russia, the term remained and remains significant, especially evident in national symbols like the national anthem, but the focus has shifted towards reinforcing Russian national unity and identity beyond Russia’s state borders, moving away from the broader multicultural emphasis of the past.⁷⁹¹ ‘In Russia, the ideas of the expansionist “Russian World” are represented through the use of the “brotherly people” metaphor and the imperative to “protect” the Russian-speaking population.’⁷⁹²

The fact that Romanchuk’s utilized the metaphor in reference to post-communist Russia pointed out the historical roots of Russia’s imperialistic approach on the one hand and emphasized its manifestation in post-communist Russia on the other hand. The use of the ‘older brother’ metaphor as suggested by Romanchuk was also evident in other articles published in *Moloda Halychyna*. Five other journalists utilized the metaphor in quotes in reference to post-

political situation. Following state independence, Ukraine implemented a semi-presidential system which created ‘two poles within the government, dividing power between the presidential and the parliament and granting leeway to both to enact power.’ Until 1994, tensions between these two power branches arose and dominated the political landscape. On the one hand, Leonid Kravchuk, the last head of state of the Ukrainian SSR and first president of independent Ukraine (until 1994), and on the other side, Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s prime minister from 1992 to 1993 who held power over the parliament. While Kravchuk’s strategy from the beginning of his rule was to shift more power to the presidency, Kuchma attempted to negotiate more power to his cabinet. Hartwell determines this situation as a ‘political stalemate’ that overshadowed the need for a fast implementation of economic reforms. See Hartwell, *Two Roads*, 340.

⁷⁹⁰ Hartwell, *Two Roads*, 328.

⁷⁹¹ Sergey Abashin, “‘Brotherly Peoples’: The System of Kinship in Russian Politics,” *После*, August 31, 2022, <https://posle.media/language/en/brotherly-peoples-the-system-of-kinship-in-russian-politics/> (last accessed 28.08.2024)

⁷⁹² Illia Ilin and Olena Nihmatova, “The ‘Brotherly People’ Metaphor and the Russian-Ukrainian Irredentist War: A Corpus-Based Study,” *Czech Journal of International Relations* (March 2023), 7–41. For an analysis of Russian imperialism in the context of the Russian War in Ukraine since 2022 see, Kseniya Oksamytna, “Imperialism, supremacy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 44 (4) (2023): 497–512.

communist Russia to emphasize the perceived imperial character of Russia and its government on the one hand, and to draw a historic comparison to Russian imperialism in the past and Russian political actions in the present.⁷⁹³

Identifying political manipulation and control, Romanchuk suggested a narrative which described how Russian leadership, through agreements like the CIS founding treaty signed in Minsk in 1991⁷⁹⁴, sought to maintain influence and control over Ukraine. He cited statements by the Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Russian economist Pavlo Bunych about integrating Ukraine into a circle of allied relations or involving it in a union to emphasize Russia's strategic manipulation aimed at keeping Ukraine dependent and subordinate.

Assessing the Minsk Agreement (formation of the CIS), Boris Yeltsin admitted with his characteristic directness: 'This was the only way to bring Ukraine into the orbit of some allied relations on a completely new basis, which means to cool the ardor of our military and national patriots who threatened us with a new putsch, connected with the exit of Ukraine...'. The well-known Moscow economist and politician Pavlo Bunych in December of last year also sincerely admitted that there was no other way to tame Ukraine than involving it in some union. In a word, the situation with the creation of the CIS needs further comments. Sober-minded Ukrainian (and not only) politicians from the very beginning of this cat-and-mouse game of the 'older brother' with the 'younger sister' understood all the dangers that loomed over Ukraine after the euphoria of the December 1 referendum.⁷⁹⁵

Finally, Romanchuk argued that Russian interests have actively sabotaged Ukraine's economic independence. As an example, he discussed Russia's blocking of the introduction of the Ukrainian currency, the hryvnia. This action was portrayed as part of a broader Russian imperial policy to maintain economic dominance over Ukraine. Romanchuk achieved that by quoting an interview fragment published in the newspaper 'Nezavisimost' on 21 February 1992 with Oleksandr Savchenko, a Ukrainian politician:

In an interview with the newspaper 'Nezavisimost' on February 21 of this year, Oleksandr Savchenko stated that the introduction of the hryvnia is completely blocked by those aware: 'I am 100 percent convinced that the imperialists are doing this.'⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Шляхи, які нам обирають. або збройні сили України: міф чи реальність?' (July 1992, no. 77): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, '«Вічне підданство»?' (July 1992, no. 78): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'До питання про національно-визвольні змагання в Україні. періоду другої світової війни: напрями, сили, протидії' (September 1992, no. 110): 2, 3; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Чому Росія боїться НАТО?' (May 1995, no. 59): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Цвіт калини в кільцях удава' (November 1995, no. 136): 1.

⁷⁹⁴ Romanchuk refers to this agreement as the Minsk Agreement. He refers to an agreement signed by the Republic of Belarus, the RSFSR and Ukraine on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The agreement was signed on 8 December 1991 in Minsk, Belarus and, among other matters, guaranteed that the CIS member states mutual recognised and respected each other's state sovereignty and state borders (Article 5).

⁷⁹⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, '«Вічне підданство»?' (July 1992, no. 78): 1.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Savchenko's quote mentioned that the introduction of the hryvnia was completely blocked by those who are described as imperialists (Russia) who are doing everything to delay the production of money. Utilizing this quote, Romanchuk therewith created the picture that there were Russian forces actively working against the economic sovereignty of Ukraine by hindering the introduction of its national currency.

Other authors who published articles in *Moloda Halychyna* provided more examples that illustrated Russia's economic strategies to hinder Ukraine's economic development, always described as 'imperial'.⁷⁹⁷ For example, an article written by Stepan Khmara, People's Deputy and Head of the Ukrainian Republican Party, who noted that Russia 'with imperial ambitions' sought control over strategic sectors of the Ukrainian economy through the gas supply and transit infrastructure.⁷⁹⁸ Khmara described how Russia dominated the Ukrainian economic gas sector through the establishment of joint ventures and companies that appeared neutral but were actually controlled by Russian interests. An example that he provided was the inclusion of the joint stock company (hereafter – JSC) 'Olgas' in the formation of JSC 'Gaztransit' alongside major Russian corporations and individuals with significant ties to Russian capital. Khmara stated that

during the signing of the agreement between JSC 'Ukrgezprom' and JSC 'Gazprom' the Russian side proposed in April 1995 to include JSC 'Olgas' as the third (allegedly neutral) founder of JSC 'Gaztransit' with 10% of the shares, JSC 'Ukrgezprom,' and JSC 'Gazprom' with 45% each. In reality, the founders of the closed industrial-financial company 'Olgas' are: Russian JSC 'Gazprom' (31% of the seats), the supposedly joint Russian-Ukrainian venture 'OLPetroleum System' – 37% (in fact, the owner of the Joint Venture is Oleg Ivanovich Ishchenko⁷⁹⁹ because the founder of 'OLPetroleum System' is the firm 'Farte International Corporation,' where the owner is O. Ishchenko), JSC BBF '21st Century' (the same owner,

⁷⁹⁷ Examples that are described as 'imperial' strategies are the Russian seizure of the USSR's all-Union property, embassies, banks (*Moloda Halychyna*, 'Ось так і будемо жити?' (March 1992, no. 25): 2); discussion on how Ukraine had to follow Russia's price liberalization scheme to prevent the collapse of its economy due to the interconnectedness with the Russian ruble (speech by Leonid Kravchuk in *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Будемо разом - усе подолаємо' (January 1992, no. 1): 1, 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Свято та будні Української незалежності' (August 1992, no. 99): 2, 3) or articles that commented on how Russia aims to hold together the former USSR republics under a single currency, the Russian ruble (*Moloda Halychyna*, 'Панове, живеться нам погано але СНД тут ні при чому' (March 1992, no. 31): 1).

⁷⁹⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Цвіт калини в кільцях удава' (November 1995, no. 136): 1. Another example that suggest that Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia was exploited by Russian authorities for imperial ambitions can be found in *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Про наших будівничих і їх любов до України' (October 1995, no. 115-116): 3, 4.

⁷⁹⁹ Oleg Ivanovich Ishchenko was a Ukrainian businessman (died in 2003) and politician (Rukh). According to a newspaper articles published in 2004, he had a reputation for bringing trouble and eventual ruin to any business sector he entered. He held dual citizenship (Ukrainian and Russian) while being a member of parliament, broke off ties with former banking and gas business partners, and was seen as an opportunistic political player. His actions were often viewed as self-serving and detrimental to broader political and business stability. Ishchenko was also accused of financing efforts to split the Rukh party, which led to internal conflict and the eventual weakening of the party. Oleksandra Pavlova, "Koho ne razhlyadel Vyacheslav Chornovil," *Ukraina Kryminalna*, August 5, 2004, <https://cripo.com.ua/persons/p-2202/> (last accessed 25.08.2024)

Ishchenko), and JSC 'Yugnefteservis' (Moscow, one of the founders of which is also 'OLPetroleum System' of the same Ishchenko).⁸⁰⁰

Khmara perceived this strategic insertion into Ukraine's economic framework as indicative of Russia's subtle method of maintaining economic control over capital, thereby 'endangering Ukraine's national security' and maintaining the country in a state of 'colonial dependence'.⁸⁰¹

The notion that Russia sought economic control over Ukraine and that this was rooted in an understanding of long term 'Russian' hegemony in Ukraine, did also align with survey results from L'viv oblast from a study taken in early 1994. In a poll from February and March 1994, respondents were asked to assess how much importance they would attribute to different causes identified for the economic difficulties Ukraine faced until March 1994. From an earlier analysis of this poll (see sub-section 'Russia' in chapter 6.1), we know that approximately 81 percent of respondents from L'viv oblast (18–35 years) agreed with the statement that 'Russia is trying to harm Ukraine' (either stating 'very important' or 'important enough') was a cause for Ukraine's economic difficulties. The same poll also asked the participants how much importance they would give to the cause 'Long-term Russian rule in Ukraine.' The answer was clear. Approximately 87 percent of all respondents from L'viv oblast aged between 18–35 answered that this was either 'very important' (53 percent) or 'important enough' (34 percent) (see figure 40).

⁸⁰⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Цвіт калини в кільцях удава' (November 1995, no. 136): 1.

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*

L'viv oblast: Below are different opinions about the causes of the current economic situation in our country. Assess how important is their role in the emergence of current economic difficulties? (February–March 1994)




Figure 40 Results of data from all respondents between the age of 18 and 35. Data taken from survey: Political portrait of Ukraine and elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, February–March 1994, Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank.

Beyond suggesting that the impact of Russia's policies and influence on Ukraine's economic development and Ukrainian politics was the result of imperial ambitions, the authors of *Moloda Halychyna* also interpreted Russia's actions in the context of claiming territory beyond post-communist Russian state borders as the result of imperial ambitions.⁸⁰² *Moloda Halychyna's* authors suggested that Russia's actions in the broader post-Soviet space, such as the war in Chechnya, and – in the Ukrainian context – its policies toward Crimea were reflective of imperial ambitions and were also executed in a manner consistent with historical patterns of Russian imperial domination.

In an article from March 1992 written by journalist Volodymyr Ruban⁸⁰³, the author critically addressed Russia's manipulative tactics, specifically pointing towards the attempt to reassert

⁸⁰² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Будемо разом - усе подолаємо' (January 1992, no. 1): 1, 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Панове, живеться нам погано але СНД тут ні при чому' (March 1992, no. 31): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'До питання про національно-визвольні змагання в Україні. періоду другої світової війни: напрями, сили, протидії' (September 1992, no. 110): 2, 3; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Чому Росія боїться НАТО?' (May 1995, no. 59): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Звичайний імперський фашизм' (June 1992, no. 68): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Китаю повертають острів Даманський' (June 1995, no. 63): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Кримськотатарський фактор та антитатарський синдром' (June 1995, no. 72): 2, 3.

⁸⁰³ The journalist's full name is Volodymyr Ruban is a journalist and worked for several Ukrainian newspapers such as 'Molod Ukrainy', 'Soviet Ukraine', 'Moskovskie Novosti', 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' and in 1993 he founded the UNIAN, 'the first and largest independent news agency in Ukraine.' See, UP, "Volodymyr Ruban vidpovidatyme u Yushchenka za presu. Posada pres-sekretarya – vakantna," *Ukrayinska Pravda*, November 26, 2001, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2001/11/26/2985395/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

control over Crimea as a form of punishment for Ukraine's 'disobedience'.⁸⁰⁴ Ruban accused Russia of using economic means ('single currency and army') and political pressure to keep the former Soviet republics under its influence, and as a political force that 'punishes' those countries, that did not adhere to it, such as Ukraine.⁸⁰⁵

Russia, having given up on the Baltic countries, strives to keep the rest together with the help of a single currency and army. Additionally, individual pressure methods are applied to each former Soviet republic. From Ukraine, for example, they are trying to take away Crimea as punishment for disobedience. Perhaps this tactic would be effective if, besides the power arguments, Russia also offered financial subsidies and material aid. But it is as poor as the former outskirts of the empire. There is also no idea uniting its neighbours around Russia. Thus, the empire will not be revived.⁸⁰⁶

An article from June 1992 directly labelled Russia's actions as manifestations of 'imperial fascism'.⁸⁰⁷ Discussing the rise of nationalist voices in Ukraine and in Russia, Leonid Sotnyk, a columnist for *Moloda Halychyna*, defined Russian nationalism as 'imperial fascism'. As a pointer for this claim he identified the Russian parliament's resolution on Crimea from 6 May 1992, in which Russia declared the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine as legally invalid, as a manifestation of fascist and imperial tendencies. He argued that such policies would increase the strength of nationalist forces in Russia, which would lead to more harmful policies toward Ukraine:

I am very serious. And it is not 'Memory' that scares me, it is not our loud nationalists. It is alarming that fascism is starting to creep into state politics today, turning into its tool. And the more the crisis gathers momentum, there will be more purely fascist manifestations in the activities of state institutions. The resolution of the Russian parliament on Crimea is already a purely fascist outburst, it is the first significant victory of nationalists at the state level. It strengthens their position and multiplies their ranks. After this act, we should wait for others, because the process has just started.⁸⁰⁸

In September 1992 an article by Yuriy Pokalchuk article deepened the narrative of Russia's imperial ambitions by contextualizing the struggle of Ukraine against Russian imperialism historically, tying conflicts of the past to present tensions.⁸⁰⁹ The article outlined the historical struggle of Ukraine against Russian (and Polish) imperialism, emphasizing ongoing political resistance and the influence of Bolshevik and later Soviet policies. Pokalchuk discussed the division of what he referred to as Ukrainian lands between Moscow and Poland in the context of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism in the first half of the 20th century. He ended his article by

⁸⁰⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Панове, живеться нам погано але СНД тут ні при чому' (March 1992, no. 31): 1.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Звичайний імперський фашизм' (June 1992, no. 68): 2.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'До питання про національно-визвольні змагання в Україні. періоду другої світової війни: напрями, сили, протидії' (September 1992, no. 110): 2, 3.

summarizing that remembering the past was important as ‘the struggle against Russian imperialism is not over yet’,⁸¹⁰ implying that Russia’s claims toward Ukrainian lands was still ongoing.

Also in 1995, the imperial narrative in the context of Russia’s claims toward other post-Soviet territories occurred.⁸¹¹ Further emphasizing the theme of Russian imperialism, Bohdan Kushnir, a special correspondent for *Moloda Halychyna*, published an article in May 1995 that discussed Russia’s fear of NATO expansion. Kushnir was a frequently occurring journalist in *Moloda Halychyna*, as he was the newspaper’s correspondent for Russia and located in Moscow. In his article published in May 1995, he interpreted Russia’s negative stance toward NATO eastern European expansion as an indication of Russia’s desire to maintain imperial influence over former Soviet territories, such as Ukraine. Kushnir argued that former Soviet countries were moving toward other democracies as a direct result of Russia’s ‘imperial policies.’

Unfortunately, even after the collapse of the USSR, Russians cannot understand one thing: the peoples of Europe fear Russia and its unpredictable policies. They haven’t forgotten how Russians shot their parliament, or how Russians bombed the peaceful population of Chechnya. Such things are not forgotten. The peoples of Europe ask for American troops to remain in their countries as a guarantee of peace and stability. This is something that Russia does not want to understand. They do not want to ponder why even former friends from the Warsaw Pact are fleeing from Russia. The Czech Republic, Poland, and the Baltic peoples are gravitating not towards Russia but towards another democratic superpower, the USA, and leading European countries. Those who remain under Russia’s influence do so not out of free will but because they have no other choice. Russians do not understand this because they continue to think in imperialist terms of the ‘older brother.’ [...] The problem of Russia’s fear of NATO lies in Moscow’s desire to remain not only a superpower but also an empire. However, it lacks the means and resources to do so. Even its rich raw material base no longer saves it. Desperate attempts to keep other nations under its influence end in hysteria not only from the rallying Russian parliament but even from state officials like Mr. Kozyrev, who threatens the use of force. The thesis of protecting Russians in the territory of independent states is a bluff, a mask hiding imperial policies. And then they ask why they are not accepted in Europe, why they are feared in the former USSR territories? Isn’t it clear why?⁸¹²

Kushnir portrayed Russia’s imperial ambitions as rooted in a historical pattern of aggression, a reluctance to adapt to a post-Soviet geopolitical landscape, and a desire to maintain a superpower status. According to Kushnir the Russian nation was unable to let go of its imperial past, striving to reclaim lost glory through aggression, while facing rejection from the international community as a result. Kushnir reiterated his assessment of Russian imperialism in another article published two months later, in June 1995.⁸¹³ In the article he argued that

⁸¹⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘До питання про національно-визвольні змагання в Україні. періоду другої світової війни: напрями, сили, протидії’ (September 1992, no. 110): 2, 3.

⁸¹¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Чому Росія боїться НАТО?’ (May 1995, no. 59): 2.

⁸¹² Ibid.

⁸¹³ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Китаю повертають острів Даманський’ (June 1995, no. 63): 2.

despite the fact that Russia was making territorial concessions to China in 1995, Russia's expansionist mindset toward former Soviet republics continued, due to the historical roots of Russian imperialism: 'Active intervention by our northern neighbour in the Crimean, Abkhazian, Transnistrian conflicts, the war in Chechnya, shows that the imperialist policy still has deep roots. The essence of Russia has not changed and will not change soon.'⁸¹⁴

Moving beyond the political and economic spheres, various authors at *Moloda Halychyna*'s also referenced Russia as an imperial force on the cultural sector of post-communist Ukraine. The narrative occurred in multiple articles that reported on different parts of Ukrainian culture, such as language, sports or minority rights. What the use of the narrative of Russian imperialism in the context of cultural matters of Ukraine achieved, was that Russia was portrayed as an dominant actor that aimed at maintaining and extending its cultural influence over Ukraine and thereby hindering Ukrainian efforts to create a national identity independent of Russia and its Soviet past.

Examples identified in *Moloda Halychyna* were, for instance, the use of the Russian language in Ukrainian television which was portrayed as an act of 'aggressive Russian chauvinism' that was 'baring imperialistic fangs';⁸¹⁵ the meddling of Russian officials in Ukrainian efforts to establish an independent football as a result of which Ukrainian footballers left for Russian clubs allegedly without compensating the Ukrainian side was described as 'imperial ambitions' that were 'difficult to overcome';⁸¹⁶ supposedly, the achievement of the 'Person of the Year – 92' prize from Cambridge University awarded to Ukrainian writer and journalist Mykhailo Osadchy was not mentioned in the Russian press, which according to the awardee, as suggested in an interview, was out of 'imperial sentiment';⁸¹⁷ the romanticization of the Soviet regime in parts of Ukraine, as suggested by the journalist Pavlo Romaniuk, especially in the context of urban spaces (street names and squares), was criticised as post-Soviet historical revisionism and cultural imperialism erupting from Russia;⁸¹⁸ and Russia's reluctance to adopt a law on national minorities or a law on national-cultural autonomy was portrayed as 'imperial-

⁸¹⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Китаю повертають острів Даманський' (June 1995, no. 63): 2.

⁸¹⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Чи українське українське телебачення?' (January 1992, no. 10): 2.

⁸¹⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Рівняння з двома невідомими' (June 1992, no. 63): 4.

⁸¹⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Без надії сподіваюсь...' (November 1992, no. 138): 3. It is important to note that I could not find any additional evidence that suggests that Mykhailo Osadchy indeed was awarded such a prize as described in the newspaper article.

⁸¹⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Третя смерть' (October 1993, no. 125): 2, 3.

chauvinistic tendencies' which deliberately delayed their adoption, 'hoping for the complete Russification of national minorities' in Russia.⁸¹⁹

This notion of Russia's imperial character, that unfolded in articles in *Postup* in articulations about Russia's enforced dominance on aspects of Ukrainian economy, politics, culture, and history, can be summarized by what Natalia Klymovska, one of the oral history interviewees, stated, when looking back at the development of Ukraine since its independence. In her interview with scholar Kateryna Pryscheпа, discussing the three revolutions of Ukraine (1990, 2004, 2013/2014) she stated, when being asked 'Should Ukraine continue to go through changes in such way as protests, as Maidans? Is it an effective form of action?':

No, of course, I think, it would be better, if there were no Maidans (revolutions), and ... we could make reforms in other ways. But I think the fact that Russia never actually made it possible for Ukraine to develop as an independent state, and that for all these years of our independence, Russia had its own control, and controlled Ukraine within, this led to the Maidans because there was no other way to express the protest, right? So, I think that the Ukrainian path is like this because of the Russian influence. And I hope that if we manage to have this independence, these reforms would be carried out in another way.⁸²⁰

Similar to the authors of *Moloda Halychyna*, who articulated the notion of post-communist Russia as an 'imperial' threat to Ukraine throughout 1992, 1993 and 1995, and therewith established a historical continuum from Russia's past to its present, Klymovska also emphasized the ongoing nature of Russia's control over Ukraine. Although, Klymovska does not use the word 'imperial' in her statement, her claim 'Russia had its own control, and controlled Ukraine within' as well as the temporal dimension in her statement, that unfolds in phrases of continuity such as 'never actually made it possible' and 'for all these years', aligns with the imperial ambitions attributed to Russia in *Moloda Halychyna*. Klymovska's reflection points to the perception of Russia's ongoing imperial ambitions by illustrating how Russia's dominance has hindered Ukraine's ability to function independently, which forced the country into repeated cycles of upheaval as it seeks to break free from this influence. This narrative corresponds to the imperial mindset, where a dominant power seeks to retain influence over its former territories, as brought forward by *Moloda Halychyna*'s authors. The narrative that was therefore communicated in the 1990s can also be found in articulations in today's understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, which has been tainted by Russia's role in Ukraine's revolutionary events in the 2000s.

⁸¹⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Перекося московської «демократії»' (July 1995, no. 85): 2.

⁸²⁰ Interview with Natalia Klymovska, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 193.

Concluding Remarks

For the editors and writers at *Moloda Halychyna*, a critical view of Russia, which had not been evident in the newspaper's coverage until June 1991, occurred from 1992 onward. The meanings attributed to Russia now mirrored the sentiments disseminated in *Postup*. On the mental map of *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992, 1993 and 1995, Russia was greatly regarded as a deliberately imposing neighbour, whose actions continuously posed challenges to Ukraine's national interests. Economically and politically, Russia's strategies – such as its control over gas supplies, its role in the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, and its interests in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet – were perceived as consistently threatening Ukraine's sovereignty and political stability.

The occurrence of the narrative of Russian imperialism, amplified the critical view of Russia portrayed in *Moloda Halychyna*. By continuously illustrating Russia as an 'imperial' force, the authors equated post-communist Russia's actions with strategies of expansion, domination, and subjugation of other nations or territories. Applying this term to post-communist Russia implied that its actions were viewed as attempts to extend its sphere of influence – economically, politically and culturally – beyond its borders in a manner reminiscent of historical empires, such as the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. This usage of the narrative by *Moloda Halychyna*'s authors therewith suggested, that they were concerned that post-communist Russia was adopting a continuity or revival of past imperial behaviours and ambitions.

Poland

This sub-chapter focuses on the location Poland, which occurred on the top 15 list of locations of *Moloda Halychyna* in all three years 1992, 1993 and 1995. The location was identified in articles that can be allocated to both topic categories 'State Development' and 'Region and Youth.' That the location Poland occurred in articles within the latter topic category is due to the regional focus of *Moloda Halychyna*, and specifically unfolded in articles that focused on cross-border initiatives between Poland and Ukraine, as well as on topics related to the Polish-Ukrainian border. The analysis of all articles referencing Poland has revealed that the meanings authors attributed to Poland created it as a place of neighbourly partnership.

1992 – 1995: A Place of Neighbourly Partnership

The significance of L'viv as a borderland city in the Ukrainian-Polish region became particularly evident in the way Poland was represented in *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995, although Poland had already frequently appeared in earlier issues. Between 1989 and 1991, in *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna*, early indications of Poland's role as a place of neighbourly partnership began to surface, but they were too infrequent to establish a clear pattern. Articles referencing Poland during this period encompassed a variety of different meanings, such as discussions around Polish priests in the context of the Catholic Church in L'viv⁸²¹, informative news briefs on cultural events, such as a concert visit of a choir from L'viv to the Polish city of Przemyśl⁸²² or the performance of a Polish circus in L'viv⁸²³, articles about Ukrainian history, such as a narration of the second winter campaign of the UNR troops, which included historical references to the Soviet Union and the Second Polish Republic⁸²⁴ or articles about Poland's economic transition, such as a commentary on the advantages and disadvantages of the Polish economic model of 'shock therapy'⁸²⁵. Despite these varied references, no singular or significant pattern emerged during this period that could be linked to the broader context of Ukraine's transformation. The diverse meanings attributed to Poland were sporadic, resulting in a multitude of narratives without framing the country in a specific light. However, in three articles published in 1991, a consistent pattern started to take shape, one that persisted from 1992 onward. The meanings attributed to Poland in these articles laid the groundwork for the more consistent and distinct portrayal that emerged in the years that followed.

In 1991, I identified three articles that discussed the necessity of establishing a future economic, political, and cultural relationship between Ukraine and Poland.⁸²⁶ These articles contributed to the creation of Poland as a place of neighbourly partnership. These articles played a significant role in shaping the perception of Poland as a place of neighbourly partnership. Two of the articles were interviews: one with Professor Bohdan Osadchuk from the Free University of Berlin and Mirosław Czech, editor-in-chief of the Polish magazine 'Spotkania', and the other with U.S. political scientist and advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. The third article was a

⁸²¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, "Навіщо нам чуже кадило?"

⁸²² *Leninska Molod'a*, "Шевченкіана «Мрії»" (July 1989, no. 78), 3.

⁸²³ *Moloda Halychyna*, "Вперше у Львові по 3 липня цирк-шапіто «Варшава»" (June 1990, no. 75), 4.

⁸²⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, "Базар - Історична хроніка другого покликання зимового походу військ УНР" (January 1991, no. 6), 3.

⁸²⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, "Українському ринкові — ринкове" (January 1991, no. 6), 3.

⁸²⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, "Права меншостей Розмова професора Вільного університету в Берліні «Богдана Осадчука і головного редактора журналу «Зустрічі» (Варшава) Мирослава Чеха» (February 1991, no. 17): 1, 2; "Ще раз про «Права меншостей»" (February 1991, no. 22): 2; "Шанси для України" (March 1991, no. 29): 1.

commentary by Polish musicologist Leszek Mazep, who also served as the director of the Association of the Polish Culture of the L'viv Land in L'viv. In his commentary, Mazepa reinforced the views expressed by Osadchuk and Czech, further emphasizing the importance of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. All three texts stressed the importance of Poles and Ukrainians moving beyond historical disputes and building a political, cultural, and economic relationship rooted in cooperation and mutual understanding.⁸²⁷ This perception of Poland as a neighbourly partner became more firmly established from 1992 onward, with 47 articles contributing to the creation of Poland as a place of neighbourly partnership. All three texts stressed the importance of Poles and Ukrainians moving beyond historical disputes and building a political, cultural, and economic relationship rooted in cooperation and mutual understanding. This perception of Poland as a neighbourly partner solidified from 1992 onward, with 47 articles contributing to the creation of Poland as a place of neighbourly partnership.

The fact that such articles were first identified in this study in 1991 and not earlier could be attributed to the limited availability of newspaper issues. For example, the accessible issues cover the period from January to July 1990 and then from January to June 1991. However, official bilateral relations between Poland and Ukraine began in October 1990 and intensified throughout 1991, especially following Ukraine's independence in August 1991. In October 1990, Ukraine (then the Ukrainian SSR) and Poland signed their first bilateral declaration.⁸²⁸ With this declaration, Poland and Ukraine not only recognized the sovereignty of each other's borders but also committed to the cooperation in various sectors, including economy, politics, science, and culture.⁸²⁹ This agreement may have influenced the perception of Poland as a potential political and economic partner in *Moloda Halychyna*, possibly prompting discussions in articles that were not accessible to this study. The emphasis on the need for a neighbourly partnership might have already emerged in articles from the second half of 1990 in *Moloda*

⁸²⁷ For example, Mazepa argued: "After all, fate arranged itself in such a way that we, Poles and Ukrainians, have lived side by side, together since time immemorial. And we will continue to live like this. Therefore, we must live in harmony, in good relations, as good neighbours, as related peoples of the same Slavic blood, which should not be so senselessly shed." See, *Moloda Halychyna*, "Ще раз про «Права меншостей»" (February 1991, no. 22): 2.

⁸²⁸ Burant, "Poland," 8–9.

⁸²⁹ Article 3, "Українська Радянська Соціалістична Республіка і Республіка Польща не мають одна до одної жодних територіальних претензій і не будуть висувати таких претензій у майбутньому." [The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of Poland have no territorial claims against each other and will not make such claims in the future.], in Декларація про принципи та основні напрямки розвитку українсько-польських відносин, 13 жовтня 1990 р. [Declaration on the Principles and Main Directions of Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations, 13 October 1990, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_176#Text (last accessed 25.08.2024)].

Halychyna. Two years after the October 1990 agreement, the initial commitments were further solidified through the signing of the Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations, and Cooperation in May 1992.⁸³⁰ This new treaty reiterated previous commitment to strengthen bilateral ties through political, economic, ecological, cultural, scientific, humanitarian, and legal cooperation, while supporting the development of pan-European standards and institutions.⁸³¹ Additionally, the two neighbouring countries also committed to regulate the operation and management of border checkpoints at the shared Polish-Ukrainian border,⁸³² that with Ukraine's independence opened up, facilitating a space of visa-free cross-border mobility for trade, tourism and migration.⁸³³ The effects of the second agreement unfolded in the perception of Poland in *Moloda Halychyna's* newspaper articles as reflected in the choice of content and the narrative direction taken by the editors.

This understanding of neighbourly cooperation and cross-border mobility unfolded in a total of 47 articles published in *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995.⁸³⁴ Of these 47 articles 31 articles

⁸³⁰ Article 2, Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, sporządzony w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on May 18, 1992], Journal of Laws of 1993, no. 125, item 573, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19931250573> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁸³¹ Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Ukrainą o dobrym sąsiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i współpracy, sporządzony w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on May 18, 1992], Journal of Laws of 1993, no. 125, item 573, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19931250573> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁸³² Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Ukrainy w sprawie przejść granicznych, sporządzona w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of Ukraine on border crossings, signed in Warsaw on 18 May 1992], Journal of Laws of 2003, no. 37, item 530, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WMP20030370530> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁸³³ Already during Gorbachev's perestroika, the state border between Poland and republics of the USSR, including the Ukrainian SSR, had been addressed through an agreement signed between these two political entities in 1987, that aimed at regulating border crossing for borderland inhabitants. See, Katarzyna Stokłosa, "Conflict and co-operation on Polish borders: the example of the Polish-German, Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian border regions," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 42 (1) (2013): 71.

⁸³⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Транзит до адресата не потрапив' (March 1992, no. 34): 2; 'Кордон на замку' (June 1992, no. 71): 3; 'На заході злочинність все-таки вища, ніж у нас...' (April 1993, no. 38): 2; 'Чорнобильський' рейс у Варшаву (November 1993, no. 137): 1; 'Контрабанда: від цукру до антикваріату' (July 1995, no. 76): 1; 'Українсько-польські кримінальні афери на фоні дрібної злочинності' (July 1995, no. 84): 1; 'Контрабанда цвіте і восени' (September 1995, no. 108): 1; 'Польський злочинний «експорт»' (September 1995, no. 110): 2; 'Про наших будівничих і їх любов до України' (October 1995, no. 115-116): 3, 4; '«Прикордонні війська. України для нас є головним партнером на східному кордоні»' (October 1995, no. 117): 2; '«НП» районного масштабу має шанси стати міжнародним скандалом за участю Ватикану' (November 1995, no. 136): 1; 'Обережно: Святий Миколай може з'явитися у вигляді рекетира' (December 1995, no. 144): 2; 'Кордони розминаються товарами' (December 1992, no. 145): 2; 'Найбільший страх поляків' (July 1995, no. 75): 3; 'Економіка України увійшла у стадію гіперінфляції це щось на кшталт пожежі' (October 1992, no. 125): 1, 4; 'У сусіда хата біла. І з приватизацією не є гірше' (November 1992, no. 131): 1; 'Україна повинна обрати свій шлях...' (December 1992, no. 141): 1, 2; 'Польща: Соцзабезпечення у цифрах і фактах' (May 1995, no. 55): 2; 'Україна і Польща: партнери, сусіди, друзі' (May 1992, no. 57): 1; 'Все діється за Божим планом?' (June

fall under the topic category ‘State Development’ and 16 belong to ‘Region and Youth.’ On the one hand, the authors in the articles highlighted friendly relations between Poland and Ukraine. From 1992 to 1995 *Moloda Halychyna*’s authors consistently emphasized the economic and political bond between Ukraine and Poland, creating a narrative of mutual support and co-beneficial interest. This was achieved in 17 articles that reassured its readers that both countries were aiming for strong political and economic relations (see line ‘Emphasis’ in Figure 41). Poland was not only portrayed as a friendly neighbour and a strategic partner for Ukraine’s economic development but also economic and political developments in Poland served as an example for Ukraine to follow. On the other hand, *Moloda Halychyna* published articles that centralized the practical aspects of the mutually agreed upon cooperation. In a total of 30 articles, the authors, while maintaining a generally positive stance toward Poland, discussed opportunities and challenges of the consequences of this new bilateral relationship between Poland and Ukraine (see line ‘Practice’ in Figure 41). Such articles focused on cultural (cross-border) initiatives, economic cooperations as well as shared issues of criminal activities with regard to the Polish-Ukrainian border.

Figure 42 illustrates the distribution and evolvment of these articles over time, excluding data for the year 1994. One key observation from the graph is that articles reporting on cross-border cooperation and mobility increased from 1993 to 1995. In contrast, articles emphasizing the necessity for mutual support and the strong bond between Poland and Ukraine decreased during the same period, after having increased from 1992 to 1993. In this context, no other

1992, no. 65): 3; ‘Латиноамериканізація’ України: Реальність загрози (May 1993, no. 52): 2; ‘Посол-про справи посольські’ (May 1995, no. 55): 2; ‘Польсько-українські відносини: не добре, а дуже добре’ (May 1995, no. 61): 3; ‘Червоний прапор президента Валенсі’ (November 1995, no. 131): 2; ‘Зустріч прем’єр-міністрів України і Польщі’ (January 1993, no. 6): 1; ‘З багатьма проблемами, які ми маємо нині, незабаром доведеться зіткнутися й вам’ (April 1993, no. 40): 1, 2; ‘Мирослав Цеслик: Українсько-польські стосунки можуть тільки поліпшуватись’ (June 1995, no. 70): 2; ‘Збігнев Бжезінський: Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною’ (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2; ‘Даріуш Баран: Польщі вигідний розвиток незалежної України’ (October 1995, no. 126): 3; ‘Старі проблеми нового міністерства’ (July 1993, no. 76): 1, 2; ‘Треба використати шанс...’ Інтерв’ю посла до польського парламенту кореспондентові ‘Молодї Галичини’ (November 1993, no. 136): 1, 3; ‘Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи привід до непорозуміння?’ (June 1995, no. 68): 1; ‘Як би нам не опинитися на узбіччі колії’ (June 1995, no. 64): 2; ‘Феномен добросусідства і злагоди’ (July 1995, no. 78): 3; ‘Не сотворить інформаційного голоду. Прес-конференція у Польському консульстві’ (January 1992, no. 10): 1; ‘Кордони — “прозоріші”, а сусіди — добріші’ (May 1992, no. 60): 1; ‘Фестиваль у Колобжезі’ (July 1992, no. 86): 3; ‘Львів-Перемишль: міцніють контакти’ (October 1993, no. 118): 1; ‘Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму’ (June 1995, no. 65): 1; ‘Єдність - порятунок для довкілля’ (July 1995, no. 82): 2; ‘На порядку денному: економічні, культурні та людські контакти’ (October 1995, no. 117): 1; ‘Також шукали і центр Європи’ (October 1995, no. 117): 1; ‘Погляд молодих: жодних стереотипів’ (November 1995, no. 131): 2; ‘Молоді лідери розробляли план нападу на банк і створювали українсько-польське товариство’ (November 1995, no. 133): 2; ‘Острів українства на берегах Вісли’ (December 1995, no. 143): 3; ‘“Нас використали як дешеву робочу силу”’ (February 1992, no. 16): 1, 4; ‘Чому пан консул б’є тривогу’ (March 1992, no. 27): 2.

articles referencing Poland were detected that could explain the decreasing number of articles stressing the importance of good neighbourly relations, such as a rise in articles opposing such a bilateral relationship between Poland and Ukraine. One possible explanation for this decline could be the agreement signed in March 1994 between Poland and Ukraine, which again committed both countries to mutual support and cooperation, underlining their strategic importance to each other.⁸³⁵ This agreement may have reduced the need for the authors of *Moloda Halychyna* to address the good neighbourly relations in later articles. In favour of this explanation is what political scientist Andrzej Szeptycki has argued which was that despite the multiple bilateral agreements signed between Poland under Lech Wałęsa and Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk, mutual cooperation was not a “top priority” until 1994.⁸³⁶ He argued that it was only after Leonid Kuchma’s election as president in July 1994 that Polish-Ukrainian relations significantly improved, in fields of cultural, political and economic cooperation. According to Szeptycki, this was largely because by 1994, Poland had “secured its access to Western institutions and organizations” and could therefore shift its focus more toward its eastern neighbour, Ukraine.⁸³⁷ Consequently, the need for *Moloda Halychyna* to emphasize good neighbourly relations between Poland and Ukraine might have been greater up until 1993 (and possibly 1994) than in the period that followed. However, this explanation remains speculative, as there is no data available to support or contradict the claim.

⁸³⁵ Andrzej Szeptycki, “Poland-Ukraine Relations,” *UNISCI Journal* 40 (January 2016), 62.

⁸³⁶ Ibid.

⁸³⁷ Ibid., 62–63.

Poland: Frequency of Articles conveying Meanings of Emphasis and Practice in *Moloda Halychyna* over Time, 1992–1995 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 41 MH: Poland - Frequency of Articles for 'Emphasis' and 'Practice', 1992–1995.

A second observation that can be drawn from the graph is that between 1992/1993 and 1995 there was a great increase in articles that centralized aspects of cross-border cooperation and mobility. An explanation for this increase can be found when taking a closer look at the articles that fall under the thematic context of 'Practice'. The stacked area chart in figure 42 illustrates the trend of articles in the thematic contexts of 'Practice' and 'Emphasis' occurring monthly in *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995. The red and blue stacked areas represent articles that fall under the thematic context of 'Practice' and the remaining yellow stacked area chart displays articles from thematic context 'Emphasis'. Conclusions we can draw from chart for the general increase in articles focusing on practices, that there was an overall increase of articles reporting on practices of cooperation and practices of border crime in 1995, making it the year with the highest value for both groups (the thematic context of emphasis of cooperation peaked in 1993). This observation also correlates to what Szeptycki argued, when he stated that with 1994 cooperation between Ukraine and Poland intensified. Months that stand out in 1995 are June and July, as well as October and November. As reported in an article in *Moloda Halychyna* (which will be discussed in detail further below) in 1995, the autumn months (September, October and November) were particularly busy months for border related criminal activities, as Mykhailo

Hupalo, head of the press service of the Western Territorial Customs Administration stated.⁸³⁸ The high number of articles published in *Moloda Halychyna* reporting on border related crimes in during these months in 1995, suggests a similar assessment.

Taking a closer look at the articles, we can see that the increase in articles that centralize practices was connected to, reports on border crime related incidents on the one hand, and to articles that focused on practices of cooperation in various sectors on the other hand, such as educational and leadership programmes for young Ukrainians and Poles, environmental protection projects, Ukrainian cultural festivals in Poland and various cross-border conferences of trade unions, youth forums and democratic development organizations. What the rise of reports on cross-border initiatives as well as border crime related activities between Poland and Ukraine in 1995 indicate is that there seems to have been a greater activity in the border region, that drew the attention of *Moloda Halychyna's* journalists. That *Moloda Halychyna* engaged with increasing coverage in documenting, promoting, and reflecting on cross-border initiatives and activities at the border corresponded with more frequent cooperation efforts. Thus, as cross-border cooperation and activities grew, so too did the volume of articles reporting on these developments.

Poland: Frequency of Narratives in *Moloda Halychyna* over Time, 1992–1995 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 42 MH: Poland - Frequency of Narratives, 1992–1995.

⁸³⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Контрабанда цвіте і восени' (September 1995, no. 108): 1.

What occurred in the 1990s in the western Ukrainian borderlands, that could explain increasing cooperation, was an increase in the establishment of regional initiatives.⁸³⁹ According to geographer Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz, cross-border cooperation in Central Eastern Europe took place on a private level, involving actors such as local businessmen, schools or churches, and on an institutional level, including for example national and international organizations.⁸⁴⁰ The most prominent institutional examples are the establishments of two Euroregions, an initiative in border regions across Europe. The first Euroregion including Ukraine was introduced in the Carpathian region, encompassing border regions of Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Hungary in 1993, followed by a second one in the Bug Euroregion, including the Polish Lublin region, the Belarusian Brest Region and the Ukrainian Volhynia Region. The Euroregions aimed at funding and encouraging collaboration in various areas of regional development, including trade, culture, tourism, education, and agriculture.⁸⁴¹ In *Moloda Halychyna*, the journalists covered practices of cooperation on both levels, private and institutional, even though the Euroregion projects were not explicitly mentioned in the articles.

The increasing cooperation between Poland and Ukraine was significantly facilitated by the opening of the previously strict Polish-Ukrainian border, which enabled visa-free cross-border mobility for trade, tourism, and migration.⁸⁴² The open border simplified cross-border initiatives, such as student exchanges and cultural festivals, tourism or economic cooperation across the border. Ukrainians were able to cross to Poland (and vice versa) for purposes of travelling, buying products not available in Ukraine or even work in Poland. However, this increased mobility also led to a rise in cross-border crime. Journalists from *Moloda Halychyna* began reporting on border-related crime as early as 1992 and 1993, but the highest coverage

⁸³⁹ For an overview of literature on cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, see N. M. Chorna, “Transkordonne spivrobitnytstvo Ukrayiny ta Pol'shchi u vysvitleni ukrayins'koyi istoriohrafiyi,” *Naukovi zapysky* (Vinnyts'koho derzhavnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni Mykhayla Kotsyubyns'koho, *Istoriya* 22 (2014): 270–275.

⁸⁴⁰ Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz, “The changing role of border zones in the transforming economies of East-Central Europe: The case of Poland,” *Fredry* 10 (1998): 207.

⁸⁴¹ Iwona Sagan, “Post-Socialist Transformation, European Neighbourhood and Civil Society Networks between Poland, Russia and Ukraine: A Case of Multi-level Contingency,” *Journal of European Integration* 32 (5) (2010): 445.

⁸⁴² Already during Gorbachev's perestroika, the state border between Poland and republics of the USSR, including the Ukrainian SSR, had been addressed through an agreement signed between these two political entities in 1987, that aimed at regulating border crossing for borderland inhabitants (See, Stokłosa, “Conflict and Co-operation,” 71). The new mobility following Ukraine's independence was regulated, among others, in an agreement signed by Poland and Ukraine during the May 1992 treaty, regulating the operation of border checkpoints between Poland and Ukraine (see, Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Ukrainy w sprawie przejść granicznych, sporządzona w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of Ukraine on border crossings, signed in Warsaw on 18 May 1992], *Journal of Laws of 2003*, no. 37, item 530, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WMP20030370530> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

of such activities occurred in 1995 (see figure 42). Between 1993 and 1995, the number of passengers crossing the border from Ukraine to Poland and vice versa increased by approximately 46 percent, from 6.5 million (Road: 4.5 million; Rail: 2 million) to 9.5 million (Road: 8 million; Rail: 1.5 million).⁸⁴³ In 1995 alone, around 4.5 millions of these passengers were Ukrainians, who primarily crossed for purposes such as tourism, shopping, or visiting family.⁸⁴⁴ For instance, Ukrainian spending on products in Poland increased by 273 percent from 1994 to 1995.⁸⁴⁵

This increased in border crossings, while beneficial for trade and cultural exchange, also contributed to a rise in criminal activities, such as smuggling and the illegal sale of goods. Sociologist Claire Wallace has, for example, noted how some Ukrainian citizens engaged in small-scale trading in Poland, smuggling goods like tools and toys acquired cheaply, sometimes through theft, and selling them at a profit in Poland.⁸⁴⁶ The increase in articles covering border-related criminal activities in *Moloda Halychyna* in 1995 can therefore be attributed to the significant rise in cross-border mobility, which created more opportunities for both legal and illegal activities. This, in turn, might have led to a higher incidence of crime and, as a result, more frequent reporting on these issues.

Emphasis and Reassurance of Mutual Economic and Political Cooperation

With 1992, Ukrainian politicians began to refer to Poland as a ‘strategic partner’,⁸⁴⁷ a notion that was echoed in articles referencing Poland published in *Moloda Halychyna* from 1992 to 1995. Throughout 1992, 1993 and 1995, the journalists of *Moloda Halychyna* created a narrative that portrayed a robust political alliance and economic relationship between Poland and Ukraine. This strategy aligned with Ukraine’s governmental policies aiming to strengthen relations with Poland, and therefore could be interpreted as to be part of a broader strategy to support Ukraine’s national objectives. I identified a total of 17 articles that contributed to the narrative that Poland and Ukraine had a strong and harmonious alliance, whether in the sectors of

⁸⁴³ See Figure 3, in Tomasz Komornicki and Karol Kowalczyk, “Role of Rail in Passenger Border Traffic between Poland and Ukraine – a Dynamic Approach,” *Barometr Regionality* 16 (2) (2018): 138.

⁸⁴⁴ See Figure 7, in *ibid.*, 141.

⁸⁴⁵ Claire Wallace (in association with Oksana Shmulyar and Vasil Bedzir), “Investing in Social Capital: The Case of Small-Scale, Cross-Border Traders in Post-Communist Central Europe,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 23 (4) (1999): 757.

⁸⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 756.

⁸⁴⁷ Ryszard Zięba, “The “Strategic Partnership” between Poland and Ukraine,” *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest* 2:3 (4) (2002): 200.

politics and diplomacy or in terms of economic relations.⁸⁴⁸ These articles occurred throughout 1992 to 1995, but with most occurrence in the year 1993, as has been discussed before.

The authors of these articles offered frequent references to official agreements, events involving politicians from either side of the border, and cited positive statements from political leaders that underlined the strong bond between Poland and Ukraine, potentially with the aim to reassure the public about the stability and productivity of their partnership. For example, in October 1992, when *Moloda Halychyna* only published excerpts from a speech given by US-American political scientist and political advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski at a think-tank event in Washington, that emphasized the importance of Ukraine's western neighbours for Ukraine's future.⁸⁴⁹ Other speeches were not included in the article. While Brzezinski mainly focused on the geopolitical relationship between Russia and Ukraine, he emphasized that Poland, as well as other Central European countries neighbouring Ukraine, played a significant role for Ukraine's political development toward Europe.

In the second case, Ukraine's relations with its neighbours – Poland, Hungary and, in the near future, independent Slovakia, as well as with Romania – will acquire special significance for it. From the point of view of its cultural traditions, Ukraine considers itself primarily a Central European state. In the future, following the accession of Hungary and Poland to the "Common Market"⁸⁵⁰, it will become a respected member of the European Community.⁸⁵¹

Or in an article in 1993, when Leonid Kuchma was cited in short report on a meeting between the Ukrainian prime minister and Polish prime minister Hanna Suchoka in January 1993, emphasizing that Poland was more than just a 'friendly neighbour,' saying 'we consider Poland

⁸⁴⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Україна і Польща: партнери, сусіди, друзі' (May 1992, no. 57): 1; 'Все діється за Божим планом?' (June 1992, no. 65): 3; 'Збігнев Бжезінський: Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною' (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2; 'Економіка України увійшла у стадію гіперінфляції це щось на кшталт пожежі' (October 1992, no. 125): 1, 4; 'У сусіда хата біла. І з приватизацією не є гірше' (November 1992, no. 131): 1; 'Україна повинна обрати свій шлях...' (December 1992, no. 141): 1, 2; 'Зустріч прем'єр-міністрів України і Польщі' (January 1993, no. 6): 1; 'З багатьма проблемами, які ми маємо нині, незабаром доведеться зіткнутися й вам' (April 1993, no. 40): 1, 2; 'Латиноамериканізація' України: Реальність загрози (May 1993, no. 52): 2; 'Старі проблеми нового міністерства' (July 1993, no. 76): 1, 2; 'Треба використати шанс...' Інтерв'ю посла до польського парламенту кореспондентові 'Молодої Галичини' (November 1993, no. 136): 1, 3; 'Польща: Соцзабезпечення у цифрах і фактах' (May 1995, no. 55): 2; 'Посол-про справи посольські' (May 1995, no. 55): 2; 'Польсько-українські відносини: не добре, а дуже добре' (May 1995, no. 61): 3; 'Мирослав Цеслик: Українсько-польські стосунки можуть тільки поліпшуватись' (June 1995, no. 70): 2; 'Даріуш Баран: Польщі вигідний розвиток незалежної України' (October 1995, no. 126): 3; 'Червоний прапор президента Валенси' (November 1995, no. 131): 2.

⁸⁴⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Збігнев Бжезінський: Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною' (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2.

⁸⁵⁰ The term 'Common Market' here refers to the European Economic Community (EEC).

⁸⁵¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Збігнев Бжезінський: Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною' (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2.

our strategic partner.’⁸⁵² And again in a short article from 1995 published by Ivan Lun, a second-year university student, on the visit of Ukraine’s Ambassador to the Republic of Poland, Petro Sardachuk, with students from the Faculty of International Relations at Ivan Franko National University of L’viv to discuss Polish-Ukrainian relations. Lun published text fragments of Sardachuk’s speech that reinforced the notion that the Polish-Ukrainian relations were strong. These speech fragments mentioned that despite high crime rates in Poland involving Ukrainian citizens, ‘the cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian diplomats is well-established and friendly. Polish diplomacy supports Ukraine at all levels.’⁸⁵³ By consistently publishing positive articles stressing the relations between Ukraine and neighbouring Poland, *Moloda Halychyna* potentially helped to reinforce the government’s diplomatic efforts with regard to Poland and promote the benefits of these relationships to the public.

This reassurance of political stability between Poland and Ukraine was further amplified in articles that compared Ukraine’s economic developments to Poland’s, portraying the latter as an example to learn from. Reasons for that were Poland’s further advanced transformation process. As already discussed earlier in this study, Poland’s political and economic transformation began much earlier than in Ukraine. In the academic literature, Poland has been referred to as the ‘poster child’ of shock therapy, an economic plan initially introduced as the Balcerowicz Plan (named after Poland’s prime minister and finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz) in 1989.⁸⁵⁴ The plan encompassed to

greatly reduce the runaway rate of inflation (which was as high as 50% per month); decontrol most prices; eliminate shortages; make the Polish currency convertible into other currencies at market rates; cease the subsidization of state enterprises; and remove most restrictions on foreign trade.⁸⁵⁵

Poland by 1992 therefore had already experienced the consequences of their ‘shock therapy’ model and ‘led the way again,’⁸⁵⁶ as it had previously done as the first country to transition from socialism. This time, the Polish model was an example of economic decline, political uncertainty and frustration among society. Poland’s economy declined more than expected:

the gross national product fell by 18 percent in the years 1990 and 1991, and industrial production dropped by almost a third. Inflation was not as easy to control as had been hoped, and capped wages (also intended

⁸⁵² *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Зустріч прем’єр-міністрів України і Польщі’ (January 1993, no. 6): 1.

⁸⁵³ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Посол-про справи посольські’ (May 1995, no. 55): 2.

⁸⁵⁴ Hartwell, Two Roads, 324.

⁸⁵⁵ Simon Johnson and Gary W. Loveman, “Starting Over: Poland After Communism,” *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1995, <https://hbr.org/1995/03/starting-over-poland-after-communism>.

⁸⁵⁶ Ther, Europe, 80.

to fight inflation) additionally dampened demand. Moreover, legions became unemployed: in 1992, 2.3 million Poles, or 13.5 percent of the adult working population, were without a job.⁸⁵⁷

This also resulted in a greater frustration among Polish society, which showed at the polls of the 1993 parliamentary elections, when former Polish communist party members were re-elected for government.⁸⁵⁸ The consequences of the Polish experience served as an example in articles published in *Moloda Halychyna* of what effect the orientation toward a market economy can have on the economic development and everyday life of post-communist societies. The articles conveyed the complexities of economic reforms, with both the positive and negative outcomes of Poland's shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. The articles reflected commentaries and discussions on economic reforms introduced in Poland to draw lessons for Ukraine.⁸⁵⁹

One article that is reflective of Poland's role as an example, was a discussion published with Leszek Balcerowicz, during a visit to L'viv in October 1992. The article, prepared by *Moloda Halychyna's* journalist Bohdan Balkovy, appears to be a summary of an interview with Balcerowicz, who attended conversations with members of the L'viv regional state administration and gave a press conference at an unspecified university in L'viv. The format of the article includes an interview-like structure between Balcerowicz and potentially multiple interviewers about Balcerowicz's view on Ukraine's economic situation, the lessons that might be drawn from Poland's experience, and his advice on implementing economic reforms in Ukraine. These questions asked were (among others): 'Mr. Balcerowicz, can Ukraine transition from socialism, relying on Poland's experience?'; 'What ideological measures were taken during the privatization in Poland to alleviate social tension?'; 'Can the level of corruption in Poland be compared to that in Ukraine?'; 'What would you warn Ukrainian officials about? What steps by Prime Minister Balcerowicz do you regret?'; 'Where is the Achilles' heel of the voucher risk?'; 'How could one evaluate the social system in Poland: post-socialism, pre-capitalism, or full-blooded capitalism?'⁸⁶⁰ The questions and answers that were chosen to be published by Balkovy indicated a clear interest in learning from Poland's challenges and successes to avoid

⁸⁵⁷ Ther, *Europe*, 81–82.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Економіка України увійшла у стадію гіперінфляції це щось на кшталт пожежі' (October 1992, no. 125): 1, 4; 'У сусіда хата біла. І з приватизацією не є гірше' (November 1992, no. 131): 1; 'Україна повинна обрати свій шлях...' (December 1992, no. 141): 1, 2; 'Польща: Соцзабезпечення у цифрах і фактах' (May 1995, no. 55): 2.

⁸⁶⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Економіка України увійшла у стадію гіперінфляції це щось на кшталт пожежі' (October 1992, no. 125): 1, 4.

potential future pitfalls for Ukraine's economic reforms, which could have similar social consequences.

Balcerowicz addressed the questions posed to him, that evolved around the challenges and considerations of transitioning from a centrally planned to a market-based economy, objectively. While he mainly focused on the success of the reforms in Poland (according to Balcerowicz: successful privatization of stores and small enterprises through auctions; introduction of market competition; improvements in the agricultural sector due to foreign investment; improvements in the efficiency in coal transportation where plants increased the coal concentration, which reduced unnecessary costs associated with transportation), he also pointed at the negative consequences of Poland's approach. These included a rise in social tension and unemployment rates, hyperinflation at the initial phase of the reforms, a general decline in the economy as the Poland adjusted to the new economic policies (such as a drop in the sale of food products by 20 percent), and the emergence of corruption, which was difficult to control and required careful policy attention. Drawing parallels to Ukraine's economic reforms, Balcerowicz offered advice, suggesting that Ukraine should implement radical reforms quickly to address hyperinflation, should not hold political elections at the beginning to maintain political stability, and finally, should implement policies to attract foreign capital.⁸⁶¹

Interviews with Polish experts, that considered the Polish experience to draw lessons from for Ukraine – such as the one with Balcerowicz – occurred multiple times in *Moloda Halychyna*.⁸⁶² Publishing these interviews, supported the notion of a strong political cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, as the interviewees served as a source of credibility, that Poland, represented by its experts, was genuinely supportive of Ukraine succeeding in its economic transition. This credibility especially unfolded in the experts' willingness to critically assess Poland's economic and political development, in which they admitted shortcomings and challenges, exposing obstacles that could potentially also hinder Ukraine's transformative path.

⁸⁶¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Економіка України увійшла у стадію гіперінфляції це щось на кшталт пожежі' (October 1992, no. 125): 1, 4.

⁸⁶² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Україна і Польща: партнери, сусіди, друзі' (May 1992, no. 57): 1; 'Збігнев Бжезінський: Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною' (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2.; 'Економіка України увійшла у стадію гіперінфляції це щось на кшталт пожежі' (October 1992, no. 125): 1, 4; 'Україна повинна обрати свій шлях...' (December 1992, no. 141): 1, 2.; 'З багатьма проблемами, які ми маємо нині, незабаром доведеться зіткнутися й вам' (April 1993, no. 40): 1, 2.; 'Мирослав Цеслик: Українсько-польські стосунки можуть тільки поліпшуватись' (June 1995, no. 70): 2.

In December 1992, another of such interviews occurred between Professor Jacek Pietras Zemovit, director of the Institute of International Relations of the University of Lublin in Poland, and *Moloda Halychyna* correspondent Yurii Nikorak. The interlocutors discussed the dynamics of post-communist nationalism and economic reforms in Eastern Europe, but specifically in Poland. The professor emphasized the rise of nationalism as a significant trend following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, explaining how it often emerges stronger in times of economic uncertainty or pessimism. He offered a critical perspective of Poland, particularly the paradox in Poland's economic situation where despite significant privatization and employment in the private sector, there remained a sense of dissatisfaction among the Polish population, which was paving the way for a rise in 'post-communist nationalism'.⁸⁶³ After being questioned by Nikorak about a potential threat of nationalism to Ukraine ('Does the radical nationalism pose a threat to Ukraine right now?'),⁸⁶⁴ Zamovit acknowledged a rise in nationalism but did not assess an immediate threat to Ukraine's political path. He rather advocated for a strategic nuclear disarmament of Ukraine to enhance its security, implying that maintaining nuclear warheads would pose a much greater threat to Ukraine's transformation. Zamovit argued that nuclear disarmament would benefit Ukraine's standing internationally, especially within the European Community and among NATO member states.⁸⁶⁵

The intent behind publishing articles in 1992, 1993 and 1995, that reassured positive Polish-Ukrainian relations on the one hand and articles that offered a critical but credible assessment of Poland's economic reforms by Polish actors on the other hand, reinforced the narrative of a harmonious relationship between Poland and Ukraine. This approach coincided with the Ukrainian government's foreign policy approach toward Poland and could therefore have served as a media strategy to build public support for governmental policies, encourage economic and cultural exchanges, and strengthen geopolitical alliances. Such an approach by *Moloda Halychyna* in the 1990s appeared especially important when considering cultural tensions based on historical events in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland that re-emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union – which will be part of the discussion in the next section.

⁸⁶³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Україна повинна обрати свій шлях...' (December 1992, no. 141): 1, 2.

⁸⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

Opportunities and Challenges of (Cross-Border) Cooperation

While the post-communist central Ukrainian and Polish governments promoted the establishment of cooperation between their two countries, the reality in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands was more complex. The early 1990s marked a period of democratic change in Ukraine and Poland, transforming social and value systems, alongside economic and political instability. This newly gained freedom to express religious and national beliefs often led to conflicts over ethno-religious activities, and efforts to preserve, for example, cultural heritage and memorial sites.⁸⁶⁶ Even though, local administrations from the borderland, such as in L'viv and the Polish borderland city Przemyśl, often drew from these historical symbols and narratives to foster cross-border cooperation and promote their regions internationally, they also rekindled historical conflicts for political purposes by taking advantage of local population's feelings of injustice and frustration stemming from domestic and international issues.⁸⁶⁷

Cultural points of tension in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland were for instance the conflict regarding the ownership of the former Greek Catholic cathedral in Przemyśl. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic community, suppressed during the Soviet era, sought the restitution of the cathedral in Przemyśl following the collapse of communism. This cathedral had been an important symbol and center for the Greek Catholic community before it was appropriated by the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. With Ukraine's independence, there was an expectation among Ukrainian Greek Catholics that they would be able to freely practice their faith and reclaim their religious properties. However, both communities – the Ukrainian Greek Catholics and the Polish Roman Catholics – saw the cathedral as a symbol of their right to exist and practice their faith freely in a region where their presence has been contested in the past. Eventually, the handover of the cathedral was successfully stopped by Polish nationalists.⁸⁶⁸ As Tatiana Zurzhenko has argued, this particular conflict from Przemyśl, paired with other forms of 'anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland' impacted decisions of the L'viv local administration regarding Polish cultural heritage in Ukraine. For example, the L'viv council 'opposed the restoration of the Eaglets memorial in its original form'⁸⁶⁹, a memorial located at the Lychakiv cemetery in L'viv. The Eaglets memorial was a burial site for soldiers that had died during the

⁸⁶⁶ R. Chmelyk and L. Khakhula, "Ukrainian-Polish Intercultural Communication in the Border Areas (the end of the 20th – the beginning of the 21st century)," *Shkhidnoievropeiskyi istorychnyi visnyk* 23 (2022): 218.

⁸⁶⁷ Zhurzhenko, "The border as pain," 218.

⁸⁶⁸ Christopher Hann, "Religion, Trade and Trust in South-East Poland." *Religion, State and Society* 26 (3–4) (1998): 235–249.

⁸⁶⁹ Zhurzhenko, "The border as pain," 253.

‘Ukrainian-Polish and the Polish-Soviet wars.’⁸⁷⁰ The council refused the inclusion of ‘some symbolic elements of the memorial (the lions and the sword) as well as the wording of the inscription (“To the unknown soldiers who died defending Lviv and the southeastern borderlands”).’⁸⁷¹

In *Moloda Halychyna*, border related practices materialised in articles that centralized both, practices of (cross-border) cooperation and practices of criminality at the border. Out of the 30 identified articles that discussed border practices between Poland and Ukraine, a total of 16 centralized cross-border initiatives, events and exchanges, and a total of 14 centralized practices of border related crime.⁸⁷² Most of the articles centralizing practices of cooperation emphasized the cooperative nature of between Poland and Ukraine and did not overfocus on negative aspects, such as the rising cultural tensions in Przemyśl, even though it was discussed (see further below). Of these 16 articles, only four articles included a critical sentiment toward Poland, meaning that the authors attributed critical meaning to groups of Polish actors while underlining a positive assessment of Polish authorities and the general Polish community.⁸⁷³

Practice of Cooperation

In the majority of the articles the authors reported positively on initiatives involving Ukrainians and Poles, such as cultural exchanges and festivals, cross-border initiatives and educational and youth initiatives. These articles occurred mostly in 1992 and 1995, with only one occurrence in 1993. The emphasis in these articles was put on providing detailed information about the

⁸⁷⁰ Oksana Vynnyk, “War Commemorative Rituals, Funerals, and the Construction of Collective Memory in Interwar Lviv,” in V.F. Verstyuk, ed., *Problemy vyvchennya istoriyi Ukrayins’koyi revolyutsiyi 1917–1921 rokiv. Zbirnyk naukovykh statey*, vol. 12 (Instytut istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny, 2016), 179.

⁸⁷¹ Zhurzhenko, “The border as pain,” 253.

⁸⁷² *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Транзит до адресата не потрапив’ (March 1992, no. 34): 2; ‘Кордон на замку’ (June 1992, no. 71): 3; ‘На заході злочинність все-таки вища, ніж у нас...’ (April 1993, no. 38): 2; ‘Чорнобильський’ рейс у Варшаву (November 1993, no. 137): 1; ‘Контрабанда: від цукру до антикваріату’ (July 1995, no. 76): 1; ‘Українсько-польські кримінальні афери на фоні дрібної злочинності’ (July 1995, no. 84): 1; ‘Контрабанда цвіте і восени’ (September 1995, no. 108): 1; ‘Польський злочинний «експорт»’ (September 1995, no. 110): 2; ‘Про наших будівничих і їх любов до України’ (October 1995, no. 115-116): 3, 4; ‘«Прикордонні війська. України для нас є головним партнером на східному кордоні»’ (October 1995, no. 117): 2; ‘«НП» районного масштабу має шанси стати міжнародним скандалом за участю Ватикану’ (November 1995, no. 136): 1; ‘Обережно: Святий Миколай може з’явитися у вигляді рекетира’ (December 1995, no. 144): 2; ‘Кордони розминаються товарами’ (December 1992, no. 145): 2; ‘Найбільший страх поляків’ (July 1995, no. 75): 3; ‘“Нас використали як дешеву робочу силу”’ (February 1992, no. 16): 1, 4; ‘Чому пан консул б’є тривогу’ (March 1992, no. 27): 2.

⁸⁷³ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘“Нас використали як дешеву робочу силу”’ (February 1992, no. 16): 1, 4; ‘Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи привід до непорозумінь?’ (June 1995, no. 68): 1; ‘Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму’ (June 1995, no. 65): 1; ‘Чому пан консул б’є тривогу’ (March 1992, no. 27): 2.

initiative and on their outcome. The coverage spanned a wide range of different fields, including cultural events,⁸⁷⁴ diplomatic relations,⁸⁷⁵ educational programs,⁸⁷⁶ and environmental initiatives.⁸⁷⁷ The way these initiatives were portrayed – as important and valuable efforts – leads to the conclusion that *Moloda Halychyna* was committed to creating a positive narrative of the relationship between Ukraine and Poland. Reporting on a diverse field of cooperation practices ensured that *Moloda Halychyna*'s readers were informed that cooperation between Poland and Ukraine was not limited to political agreements between state actors, but was already part of the everyday life in the region.

While the majority of the articles focusing on border practices between Poland and Ukraine centralized the positive aspects, some articles also offered a critical assessment with regard to Poland. However, the authors of these articles adopted a strategy that portrayed their criticism in a nuanced perspective by directing their criticism toward individual Polish actors, rather than making broad conclusions for Poland as a whole. In total, I identified 4 articles in which this strategy was adopted.⁸⁷⁸ Even though the number of articles is low, in contrast to the articles expressing positive sentiment, I will address the criticism posed toward Polish actors by *Moloda Halychyna*'s journalists, to demonstrate nuances in their portrayal of Poland. For that I will discuss two articles in greater detail, that were written by Andryi Bolkun, the special correspondent for *Moloda Halychyna* located in Poland, who frequently published articles on everything related to Poland (11 out of all 47 articles were written by Bolkun⁸⁷⁹).

⁸⁷⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Фестиваль у Колобжезі' (July 1992, no. 86): 3; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Феномен добросусідства і злагоди' (July 1995, no. 78): 3; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Острів українства на берегах Вісли' (December 1995, no. 143): 3.

⁸⁷⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Не сотворить інформаційного голоду. Прес-конференція у Польському консульстві' (January 1992, no. 10): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Кордони — "прозоріші", а сусіди — добріші' (May 1992, no. 60): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Львів-Перемишль: міцніють контакти' (October 1993, no. 118): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Як би нам не опинитися на узбіччі колії' (June 1995, no. 64): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'На порядку денному: економічні, культурні та людські контакти' (October 1995, no. 117): 1.

⁸⁷⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Також шукали і центр Європи' (October 1995, no. 117): 1; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Погляд молодих: жодних стереотипів' (November 1995, no. 131): 2; *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Молоді лідери розробляли план нападу на банк і створювали українсько-польське товариство' (November 1995, no. 133): 2.

⁸⁷⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Єдність - порятунок для довкілля' (July 1995, no. 82): 2.

⁸⁷⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, "Нас використали як дешеву робочу силу" (February 1992, no. 16): 1, 4; 'Чому пан консул б'є тривогу' (March 1992, no. 27): 2; 'Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму' (June 1995, no. 65): 1; 'Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи привід до непорозумінь?' (June 1995, no. 68): 1.

⁸⁷⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Старі проблеми нового міністерства' (July 1993, no. 76): 1, 2; 'Феномен добросусідства і злагоди' (July 1995, no. 78): 3; 'Чорнобильський' рейс у Варшаву (November 1993, no. 137): 1; 'Найбільший страх поляків' (July 1995, no. 75): 3; 'Українсько-польські кримінальні афери на фоні дрібної злочинності' (July 1995, no. 84): 1; 'Польський злочинний «експорт»' (September 1995, no. 110): 2; 'Червоний прапор президента Валенсі' (November 1995, no. 131): 2; 'Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму' (June 1995, no. 65): 1; '«НП» районного масштабу має шанси стати міжнародним скандалом за участю Ватикану' (November 1995, no. 136): 1; 'Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи

Bolkun published two articles in *Moloda Halychyna* that commented on rising tensions between Polish and Ukrainian community members in the borderland city Przemyśl.⁸⁸⁰ The first article titled ‘Przemyśl – A Town of Polish Idiotism’ published in June 1995, centralized the contentious relationship between Poles and Ukrainians in the Przemyśl region.⁸⁸¹ Referencing past tensions in Przemyśl regarding the Greek Catholic cathedral, Bolkun commented on another cultural issue that arose between Poles and Ukrainians in that region. He specifically criticized ‘a handful of people, speaking about Polish-Ukrainian relations’, which he described as members of ‘ultra-nationalist’ and ‘so-called lovers of L’viv, veterans, and invalids from the Przemyśl region’, for igniting conflict between Poland and Ukraine.⁸⁸² He argued that these groups of Polish citizens had handed in an official appeal at the provincial court in Warsaw with the aim to ‘delegitimize the public organization “Association of Ukrainians in Poland”’.⁸⁸³ Bolkun interpreted these actions as tactics ‘to sow panic and nervousness, satisfy private political ambitions, and thrive on public unrest, pretending to be defenders-saviours of the Polish nation, prophets of the nation who saved the people from the Ukrainian “element”’.⁸⁸⁴

While Bolkun accused some Polish citizens from the region of Przemyśl of using manipulation, and scare tactics to provoke conflict to undermine efforts towards reconciliation and peace between Poles and Ukrainians, he highlighted that the broader Polish society supported peaceful coexistence and dialogue with Ukrainians: ‘Today, our two nations live in peace and good neighbourliness.’⁸⁸⁵ As specific examples he noted how two Polish organizations, the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine and the World Union of Armia Krajowa Veterans, spoke out against the actions of the Polish ultra-nationalists in Przemyśl.⁸⁸⁶ Despite the title he chose for his article (‘Przemyśl – A Town of Polish Idiotism’), addressing Polish citizens of Przemyśl as ‘idiots’, he offered a much more nuanced perspective of the issue

привід до непорозумінь?’ (June 1995, no. 68): 1; ‘Обережно: Святий Миколай може з’явитися у вигляді рекетира’ (December 1995, no. 144): 2.

⁸⁸⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму’ (June 1995, no. 65): 1; ‘Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи привід до непорозумінь?’ (June 1995, no. 68): 1.

⁸⁸¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму’ (June 1995, no. 65): 1.

⁸⁸² Ibid.

⁸⁸³ The *Association of Ukrainians in Poland* (Об’єднання українців у Польщі) is a non-governmental organization established in February 1990, succeeding the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Association. It operates through 10 regional and numerous local branches, focusing on supporting the Ukrainian minority in Poland, promoting Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, and fostering civil society. The Union’s main goals are to preserve the cultural identity of the Ukrainian community in Poland and enhance cooperation and friendly relations between Poland and Ukraine, through various cultural, educational, and civic initiatives aimed at reconciliation and integration. See, Ob’yednannya ukraintsiv u Pol'shchi, 2024, <https://ukraincy.org.pl/uk/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁸⁸⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму’ (June 1995, no. 65): 1.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid.

between Polish and Ukrainian community members in his text. Juxtaposing the actions of some Poles in the region of Przemyśl with an assessment of the broader Polish society, Bolkun offered an informed commentary on Polish-Ukrainian relations in Poland, rather than drawing conclusions of criticisms for a whole nation from the actions of a few.

This approach to express criticism and concern toward the behaviour of some Polish citizens toward Ukrainian culture became also visible in another article published by Bolkun. The article, titled ‘Festival of Ukrainian Culture in Przemyśl: A Chance for Neighbourly Harmony or a Cause for Misunderstandings?’ was published only a few days after the one discussed above.⁸⁸⁷ Again, Bolkun informed the readers of *Moloda Halychyna* about tensions between Polish and Ukrainian community members in Przemyśl, and again his criticism was directed toward a specific group of Polish citizens, that he described as members of ‘patriotic organizations’.⁸⁸⁸ In his article, Bolkun discussed controversies surrounding the organization of the *Festival of Ukrainian Culture* in Przemyśl. Initially established in the 1960s to celebrate Ukrainian culture and maintain the ethnic and cultural identity of Ukrainians in Poland, the festival faced governmental restrictions during the communist era and was not allowed in Przemyśl. It was relocated to the Polish city Sopot at the Baltic Sea but plans to return the festival to Przemyśl emerged in the 1993. Bolkun stated how despite initial approval and financial support from the Polish Ministry of Culture and local authorities, the festival’s preparations in Przemyśl had been interrupted by some local ‘patriotic organizations’.⁸⁸⁹ According to Bolkun, these organization conducted an anti-festival campaign, which included the distribution of anti-Ukrainian posters and acts of vandalism to the office of the *Association of Ukrainians in Poland*, actions he referred to as ‘anti-Ukrainian hysteria’.⁸⁹⁰

Again, Bolkun juxtaposed the behaviour of broader Polish society – here represented through the official institutions – with the actions taken by a specific group of the Polish community, the patriotic organizations. Official Polish authorities supported the re-emergence of the festival in Przemyśl, even presenting the project to ‘the Council of Europe describing the festival as an exemplary cultural event for the country’s national minorities’,⁸⁹¹ while certain organizations

⁸⁸⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Перемишль - Центр Польського Ідіотизму’ (June 1995, no. 65): 1.

⁸⁸⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи привід до непорозумінь?’ (June 1995, no. 68): 1.

⁸⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Фестиваль української культури в Перемишлі: шанс для злагоди сусідів чи привід до непорозумінь?’ (June 1995, no. 68): 1.

opposed it. In both articles, Andriy Bolkun, ensured that his criticism was directed to individual groups in Poland, and did not impose judgement on the broader Polish society. It appears that as the official correspondent for Poland, Andriy Bolkun was particularly engaged in offering a balanced view of conflictive events occurring in Poland and involving Ukrainians, a strategy he maintained throughout all his articles published in *Moloda Halychyna*.

Practices of Border Crime

The rise in criminal activities related to the Polish-Ukrainian border was also visible in the news coverage of Poland in *Moloda Halychyna* in 1992, 1993 and 1995. Out of the identified 45 articles a total of 14 articles⁸⁹² were solely related to criminal activities related to the Polish-Ukrainian state borders. At the centre of these articles were, criminal activities discovered at different border checkpoints.⁸⁹³ The reports included descriptions of criminal activities of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian and other nationals, while the first group made up for most reports. Such criminal activities included smuggling of different goods,⁸⁹⁴ such as radioactive material,⁸⁹⁵

⁸⁹² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Транзит до адресата не потрапив' (March 1992, no. 34): 2; 'Кордон на замку' (June 1992, no. 71): 3; 'Кордони розмиваються товарами' (December 1992, no. 145): 2; 'На заході злочинність все-таки вища, ніж у нас...' (April 1993, no. 38): 2; 'Чорнобильський' рейс у Варшаву (November 1993, no. 137): 1; 'Найбільший страх поляків' (July 1995, no. 75): 3; 'Контрабанда: від цукру до антикваріату' (July 1995, no. 76): 1; 'Українсько-польські кримінальні афери на фоні дрібної злочинності' (July 1995, no. 84): 1; 'Контрабанда цвіте і восени' (September 1995, no. 108): 1; 'Польський злочинний «експорт»' (September 1995, no. 110): 2; 'Про наших будівничих і їх любов до України' (October 1995, no. 115-116): 3, 4; '«Прикордонні війська. України для нас є головним партнером на східному кордоні»' (October 1995, no. 117): 2; '«НП» районного масштабу має шанси стати міжнародним скандалом за участю Ватикану' (November 1995, no. 136): 1; 'Обережно: Святий Миколай може з'явитися у вигляді рекетира' (December 1995, no. 144): 2.

⁸⁹³ In the May 1992 agreement between Poland and Ukraine the following border-checkpoints were agreed upon: Rail: Dorohusk – Jagodzin, Hrubieszów – Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Przemyśl – Mostyska; Road: Dorohusk – Jagodzin, Hrebenne – Rava-Ruska, Medyka – Shehyni. See, Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Ukrainy w sprawie przejść granicznych, sporządzona w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of Ukraine on border crossings, signed in Warsaw on 18 May 1992], Journal of Laws of 2003, no. 37, item 530, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WMP20030370530> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁸⁹⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Транзит до адресата не потрапив' (March 1992, no. 34): 2; 'Контрабанда: від цукру до антикваріату' (July 1995, no. 76): 1; 'Контрабанда цвіте і восени' (September 1995, no. 108): 1; '«Прикордонні війська. України для нас є головним партнером на східному кордоні»' (October 1995, no. 117): 2.

⁸⁹⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'На заході злочинність все-таки вища, ніж у нас...' (April 1993, no. 38): 2; 'Чорнобильський' рейс у Варшаву (November 1993, no. 137): 1.

violent crimes, such as racketeering or robberies,⁸⁹⁶ and other illegal activities such as counterfeit of currency operations,⁸⁹⁷ espionage,⁸⁹⁸ corruption⁸⁹⁹ and illegal border crossing.⁹⁰⁰

The portrayal of Poland in these articles that either involved the criminal activity of a Polish citizen or the effective border control measures implemented by Polish border guards, was neutral. The descriptions provided were factual and maintained an objective tone, refraining from imposing any judgement. Two examples can be found in two reports written by Andriy Bolkun (6 out of the 14 articles on border crime were written by Bolkun. In an article involving the criminal activities of a Polish citizen, Bolkun communicated the incident as follows: 'Janusz P. was transporting 500 liters of alcohol through the [Ukrainian] Rava-Ruska customs checkpoint in a specially equipped hidden compartment in his "Renault" car. The alcohol was confiscated, and the smuggler was fined 60 million karbovanets.'⁹⁰¹ In the second example, focusing on the efforts of the Polish border guards, Bolkun reported on an incident of radioactive material smuggling from Ukraine to Poland:

On Tuesday, around 12:00 noon, the regular bus "Lviv-Warsaw" successfully passed the Ukrainian customs and border inspection and was entering Polish territory. The "Ikarus" bus passed the gate and barrier, but it was not meant to get past the radiation control system (RCS) installed on the road. Upon the bus's appearance, the devices went off the scale, raising an alarm and causing some shock among the Polish border guards. The chief of the checkpoint in Hrebenne, Major Zenon Golka, reported that since February 1993 (when the RCS was installed at a cost of 200 million zlotys), this was the first such significant and dangerous attempt to smuggle radioactive substances.⁹⁰²

The tone of his article as well as his choice of words referring to the Polish border guards remained neutral and descriptive, when he reported how a regular bus traveling from L'viv to Warsaw was found to be smuggling radioactive substances. According to Bolkun, the incident occurred when the bus triggered alarms at a radiation control system (RCS) checkpoint in Hrebenne, Poland.⁹⁰³ As a consequence, a thorough examination of the bus was conducted by

⁸⁹⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Найбільший страх поляків' (July 1995, no. 75): 3; 'Польський злочинний «експорт»' (September 1995, no. 110): 2; 'Обережно: Святий Миколай може з'явитися у вигляді рекетира' (December 1995, no. 144): 2.

⁸⁹⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Кордони розмиваються товарами' (December 1992, no. 145): 2; 'Українсько-польські кримінальні афери на фоні дрібної злочинності' (July 1995, no. 84): 1.

⁸⁹⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, '«НП» районного масштабу має шанси стати міжнародним скандалом за участю Ватикану' (November 1995, no. 136): 1.

⁸⁹⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Про наших будівничих і їх любов до України' (October 1995, no. 115-116): 3, 4.

⁹⁰⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Кордон на замку' (June 1992, no. 71): 3.

⁹⁰¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Польський злочинний «експорт»' (September 1995, no. 110): 2.

⁹⁰² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Чорнобильський' рейс у Варшаву (November 1993, no. 137): 1.

⁹⁰³ Such radiation control systems were implemented at Polish border check-points beginning in 1990, funded by local administrations. The aim was to detect imports with elevated radiation levels. By 1998, 103 devices were operational at various entry points, including roads, railways, airports, and harbours, primarily covering the eastern border with Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia. See, Genowefa Smagala, "Combating Illegal

Polish border officials, revealing a small source of radiation hidden in the seat behind the bus driver, with no bus passenger claiming ownership.⁹⁰⁴

In both examples, Bolkun demonstrated an objective take on reports on border crimes involving Polish actors. This approach toward portraying border crimes was not only found among Bolkun's articles with regard to Poland, but seemed to have been a general strategy that also appeared in articles on border crime by other journalists, that did not involve Polish actors.⁹⁰⁵ For instance, an article written by the Mykhailo Hupalo, head of the press service of the Western Territorial Customs Administration for *Moloda Halychyna*, titled 'Smuggling Thrives in Autumn' detailed a persistent issue of smuggling and customs violations at the Polish-Ukrainian border during the early autumn period of 1995.⁹⁰⁶ Hupalo stated how despite a decrease in vehicle queues at customs checkpoints, the incidence of smuggling and customs violations remained high. Each day, customs officers detected numerous cases of individuals attempting to smuggle valuable items from Ukraine to Poland, especially foreign currencies, such as the US-Dollar, but also other valuable items such as precious metals or alcohol, by hiding them in personal items or clothing.⁹⁰⁷

The descriptive reporting style on such cross-border criminal activities involving both, Polish and Ukrainian citizens, as well as other nationals, and Ukrainian and Polish border guards, suggests that *Moloda Halychyna's* rationale behind publishing such articles was to inform and update its readers about current criminal activities in the borderland and to raise awareness regarding local security concerns, rather than making a judgement on the involved parties. Moreover, the publication of consistently objective reports on border crimes could have shaped perceptions of law enforcement and security, potentially raising awareness of strict border measurement as well as increasing the reliability in border security measures in the public's eye. By not including a personal judgment of the authors in these articles, the newspaper avoided taking sides or influencing public opinion, especially in a historically sensitive area such as the Polish-Ukrainian borderland.

Nuclear Traffic – Poland's Experience, International Atomic Energy Agency," *IEAE-CN-70/60*, Report Number IAEA-TECDOC—1045 (1998): 255.

⁹⁰⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Чорнобильський' рейс у Варшаву' (November 1993, no. 137): 1.

⁹⁰⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Контрабанда: від цукру до антикваріату' (July 1995, no. 76): 1; 'Контрабанда цвіте і восени' (September 1995, no. 108): 1; 'Прикордонні війська. України для нас є головним партнером на східному кордоні' (October 1995, no. 117): 2.

⁹⁰⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Контрабанда цвіте і восени' (September 1995, no. 108): 1.

⁹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

Concluding Remarks

On the mental map of *Moloda Halychyna*, the editors and writers suggested a portrayal of Poland from 1992 to 1995 as an increasingly important neighbour and strategic partner for Ukraine. Poland, as Ukraine's neighbour, was from 1991 onward becoming more and more important for the editors of *Moloda Halychyna*, while they were still trying to figure out which narrative they wanted to present about their western neighbour. By 1992, a clear strategy emerged: Poland was consistently framed as a supportive partner in areas like economic transition, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. This portrayal, while overall positive, was accompanied by reports on shared Polish-Ukrainian challenges, such as cross-border crime and or cultural tensions between Polish and Ukrainian community members. However, the writers addressed these complexities without imposing broad judgments on Poland's society, instead presenting a nuanced assessment of the involved individuals. This approach toward Poland was reflective of an increasing importance *Moloda Halychyna* attributed to Poland in its narrative, that was focused on the potential for cross-border cooperation and the practical challenges of Polish-Ukrainian relations during this transformative period, rather than engaging in debates on cultural and historical tensions.

Europe

The location 'Europe' occurred on the top 15 list of locations of *Moloda Halychyna* in all three years 1992, 1993 and 1995 within the topic category 'State Development' and 'Region and Youth'. The analysis of articles referencing Europe has revealed that the authors in *Moloda Halychyna* applied political meaning to Europe that created it as a place of aspiration and belonging from 1992 to 1993 which shifted to a place of closer ties with Ukraine in 1995.

1992–1995: From a Place of Aspiration and Belonging to a Place of Closer Ties

The pattern of Europe as a from a place of aspiration and belonging to a place of closer ties of unfolded on the level of four narratives about Europe that unfolded in the articulations of authors who published in *Moloda Halychyna*: Ukraine is European, Ukraine as an asset to Europe, desired partnership and Ukraine is getting closer to Europe. In total I identified 48 articles, of which 30 can be attributed to the topic category 'State Development' and 18 to the topic category 'Region and Youth'. The distribution of the frequencies of these narratives are illustrated in figure 43. The first three narratives contributed to the creation of Europe as a

place of aspiration and belonging, while the latter supported the notion of Europe as a place of closer ties.

Several observations can be drawn from the chart for each narrative. First, considering the cumulative prominence of each narrative throughout all years, 'Ukraine is an Asset to Europe' appears the most, followed in decreasing order by 'Ukraine is European', 'Desired Partnership' and 'Ukraine is getting closer to Europe'. In 1992 overall, the narratives 'Ukraine is European' (green) and 'Ukraine as an Asset to Europe' (yellow) dominate the discourse with regard to Europe in *Moloda Halychyna*. These narratives suggest that during 1992, there was a strong emphasis on positioning Ukraine as a part of Europe and highlighting its importance or value to Europe. The narrative of 'Desired Partnership' (red) is also present, emerging in May 1992 and again toward the end of the year in September, October and December, but not as dominant. It suggests that while Ukraine's desire to be part of Europe was recognized, it was not as heavily emphasized as Ukraine's European value. In 1993, the trend continues with the 'Ukraine is European' and 'Ukraine is an Asset to Europe' narratives remaining prominent, particularly in the first half of the year and peaking in April. However, the overall emphasis on both narratives seems to have diminished compared to 1992. The narrative 'Desired Partnership' again appears sporadically, in December. By 1995, a significant shift is visible. While the 'Ukraine is European' and 'Ukraine as an Asset to Europe' narratives remain, the 'Desired Partnership' narrative (red) becomes much more prominent, especially from April to June and again from August to November. Additionally, a new narrative, 'Ukraine is getting closer to Europe' (blue), emerges and becomes quite significant in 1995. This suggests a shift from merely identifying Ukraine as European or valuable to actively recognizing its progress in forming closer ties with Europe. This becomes especially evident in the second half of the year, with a particularly strong presence of the blue (Ukraine is getting closer to Europe) narrative.

Europe: Frequency of Narratives in *Moloda Halychyna* over Time, 1992–1995 (average frequency per newspaper issue)




Figure 43 MH: Europe - Frequency of Narratives, 1992–1995.

To summarize, the stacked area chart shows how the different narratives articulated in *Moloda Halychyna* about Ukraine’s relationship with Europe not only shifted in prominence over time but also how the overall volume of discussion evolved. The early 1990s were marked by discussions around Ukraine’s value for Europe and emphasis was put on Ukraine’s European character. By 1995, however, the focus had shifted toward Ukraine’s tangible steps toward European integration, with the narrative ‘getting closer to Europe’ becoming more dominant as part of a broader discourse, while ‘desired partnership’ also gained prominence. In the following I will discuss these narratives in detail and demonstrate how the focus shifted from portraying Europe as a place of aspiration and belonging to a place of closer ties with Ukraine.

1992–1993: Political Interdependence: Europe needs Ukraine and Ukraine needs Europe

For the period 1992 to 1993 I identified a total of 24 articles within the topic category ‘State Development’, containing references to Europe and contributing to its creation of a place of aspiration and belonging. Out of these 10 contained the narrative ‘Ukraine is European’, 9 corresponded to ‘Ukraine is an asset to Europe’ and 5 to ‘Desired Partnership’.

As already discussed in this study in the sub-section ‘Europe’ in *Postup* from 1992 to 1995, following Ukraine’s newly gained independence in 1992, the country’s government was interested in forming new political and economic alliances, and for that turned their focus

toward Europe. In *Postup*, the narrative surrounding Europe centered on Ukraine's desire to establish political and economic ties with the European community/EU and individual European countries, such as Poland and Germany, to facilitate faster integration into the European market. In contrast, the narratives about Europe in *Moloda Halychyna* were more diverse and slightly differed. In 1992 and 1993, *Moloda Halychyna* emphasized portraying Ukraine as an inherently European country that upholds European values, while also playing a crucial role in Europe's geopolitical stability and economic prosperity. Additionally, the authors published articles that reinforced the narrative that Ukraine was eager to integrate politically and economically into Europe. As a result, a pattern of place creation formed that was based on the notion that Europe was as politically necessary and desirable for Ukraine, as Ukraine was for Europe, a notion that was not a pattern in *Postup*. In the following, I analyse how this was achieved in articles published by various writers in the *Moloda Halychyna* by presenting example articles of each narrative group.

The narrative 'Ukraine is European' occurred in a total of 10 articles and unfolded in articulations that on the one hand, discussed Ukraine's 'European' character deeply rooted in its history, and on the other hand, in articles that made passing references describing Ukraine as European, when discussing political and cultural contexts.⁹⁰⁸ The references made by the authors of the articles, or in case of interviews, the interviewees, vary from political and diplomatic connections to cultural and historical integration, but they all serve to position Ukraine within the broader European context, justifying Ukraine's European character.

For example, in a critical analysis of Ukraine's independence written by political scientist Yuriy Shveda, Ukraine in a sidenote is referred to as 'a kind of harem republic with a population of 50 million in the center of Europe.'⁹⁰⁹ In a letter from a L'vivian reader, Petro Bortnyk, published in October 1993, Ukraine is described as an 'independent European country.'⁹¹⁰ The letter specifically offered advice to President Kravchuk on how to assert Ukraine's independence from Russia. Bortnyk suggested that Ukraine should seek resources and

⁹⁰⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Українську державу визнали ще в 1918 році' (April 1992, no. 45): 2, 3; 'Бі-бі-сі говорить українською' (June 1992, no. 68): 1, 2; 'Історія не дає політичних рецептів' (July 1992, no. 81): 3; 'Свято та будні української незалежності' (August 1992, no. 99): 2, 3; 'Меморандум. Про голод в Україні, поданий до урядів і поширений серед впливових осіб' (September 1992, no. 101): 3; 'Україна з народами Балтики' (October 1992, no. 124): 3; 'Музика художнього слова' (November 1992, no. 131): 3; 'Наші пісні любили і в Парижі' (December 1992, no. 144): 3; 'Я громадянин... чого?' (April 1993, no. 43): 2; 'Поради Президентів' (October 1993, no. 116): 2.

⁹⁰⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Свято та будні української незалежності' (August 1992, no. 99): 2–3, 2.

⁹¹⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Поради Президентів' (October 1993, no. 116): 2.

partnerships from other countries, such as Romania, Japan, and Western nations, rather than relying on Russia, which was seen as a potential source of new oppression. The letter also called for Ukraine to establish its own borders, seek justice for historical crimes committed by the Soviet Union, and avoid agreements that could undermine Ukraine's sovereignty.⁹¹¹ Moreover, in two additional articles a European character was attributed to Ukraine on a regional level. In an interview published in June 1992 with two BBC employees, Andrew Tassing and David Morton, the interviewees noted how L'viv was 'an absolutely European city, a western city in every sense of the word.'⁹¹² In a second article written by journalist Yaryna Koval, in which the author described the opening of a literary museum in L'viv, Koval framed Lviv's role within a European and a Ukrainian spiritual center, referring to 'Lviv as a European center.'⁹¹³

Authors of articles that established or were involved in the creation of an inherent relationship between Ukraine and Europe based on Ukrainian history, can for example be found in a July 1992 issue. The article represents a conversation between *Moloda Halychyna's* journalist Ihor Hurhula and historian – and at the time director of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine – Yaroslav Isayevych.⁹¹⁴ In the conversation Hurhula sought to answer the question what the identity of the Ukrainian people is rooted in, and therefore posed question ('So, what were our great-great-grandfathers like, what did they live for, what did they dream about, what concerned them the most?'; 'So, from what point can we talk about the beginnings of the Ukrainian people? After all, it was believed that Ukrainians formed no earlier than the 14th century.') that turned the conversation into a discussion on topics of Ukrainian identity, history and the challenges of state-building.⁹¹⁵ Isayevych placed Ukraine into European historiography by beginning his articulations with an anecdote on how 'the first man in Europe was found precisely on the territory of Ukraine', in the region of Transcarpathia, and moreover, highlighted that Ukrainian culture is rooted in a 'combination of Western and Eastern cultures', drawing from both 'the traditions of Renaissance Europe and medieval Byzantium.' However, he was cautious about the idea to trace Ukraine's post-communist national identity back to the ancient origins of the Ukrainian people who lived on the territory that is now called Ukraine. Isayevych warned against trying to establish the idea of a nation based on tracing its ancient roots, stating that this was 'naive and ridiculous',

⁹¹¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Поради Президентів' (October 1993, no. 116): 2.

⁹¹² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Бі-бі-сі говорить українською' (June 1992, no. 68): 1–2, 1.

⁹¹³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Музика художнього слова' (November 1992, no. 131): 3.

⁹¹⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Історія не дає політичних рецептів' (July 1992, no. 81): 3.

⁹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

questioning the reasoning behind these processes ‘Who will say: one thousand, two thousand years is old age or youth for a nation?’ and expressing concern about developments in Ukraine trying to justify national identity based on history, ‘I am concerned about the desire to argue today’s politics with the historical past.’⁹¹⁶ While emphasizing his caution multiple times, Isayevych underlined his argument by stating that the Ukrainian people did not emerge from a single ‘Rus’ people’ but rather from a combination of different ‘tribes that inhabited these territories [contemporary state borders of Ukraine].’⁹¹⁷ While the interviewee was cautious not to succumb to Hurhula’s questions aimed at justifying Ukraine’s existent as an independent state by tracing its roots in ancient history, he nevertheless situated Ukraine within the broader context of European history and culture. He achieved this by acknowledging the blend of Eastern and Western influences in Ukrainian culture, thereby emphasizing Ukraine’s historical efforts to align with European traditions.

In other articles published in *Moloda Halychyna*, attributing a European identity to Ukraine based on its history was more straightforward, than Isayevych’s articulations. In these articles, either the authors or interviewees emphasized the European character of Ukraine by explicitly describing it as European.⁹¹⁸ One example is, for instance, an article published by journalist Gustav Zvengrosh that discussed the recognition of the Ukrainian People’s Republic by European countries such as the French Republic in the early 20th century.⁹¹⁹ Zvengrosh elaborated on the diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the French Republic, implying that the Ukrainian People’s Republic was regarded as an equal part of the European state system. He ended his article with referring to the Ukrainian People’s Republic (and France) as a ‘great European nation’:

French diplomatic documents attest to the undeniable historical truth that at the critical juncture of 1917–1918, the Ukrainian state was the first to be de facto recognized by the French Republic, this recognition strengthened the mutual literary, artistic, and cultural interest between the two great European nations.⁹²⁰

The notion of the Ukrainian People’s Republic as the beginning of Ukrainian statehood re-emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the public memory of Ukraine. Commemorative practices occurred for instance on 21 January 1990, when the opposition party Rukh organised

⁹¹⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Історія не дає політичних рецептів’ (July 1992, no. 81): 3.

⁹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁸ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Меморандум. Про голод в Україні, поданий до урядів і поширений серед впливових осіб’ (September 1992, no. 101): 3; ‘Музика художнього слова’ (November 1992, no. 131): 3; ‘Наші пісні любили і в Парижі’ (December 1992, no. 144): 3.

⁹¹⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Українську державу визнали ще в 1918 році’ (April 1992, no. 45): 2–3.

⁹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

a ‘human chain’ event in Ukraine to commemorate the anniversary of the 1919 reunification of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic, arguing that ‘the ideals of the Ukrainian People’s Republic’ were also ‘our ideals’ referring to the Ukrainian people in 1990.⁹²¹ Inspired by a similar even in the Baltics, the chain was intended to stretch between L’viv and Kharkiv, symbolizing unity between western and eastern Ukraine. However, due to logistical challenges, it was shortened, to stretch from L’viv to Kyiv, with estimations ranging between 450.000 to 1 million participants forming a line along the Kyiv-Lviv-Ivano-Frankivsk highway. According to historian Kasianov, the event highlighted a political contrast between the ‘authentic’ Ukrainian statehood represented by the 1919 republics and the ‘fake’ Ukrainian SSR, marking a clear distinction between national and Soviet histories and emphasizing the ongoing struggle for Ukraine’s independence.⁹²²

Therefore, Zvengrosh’s strategy of placing the formation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic within the broader context of European historiography – by his portrayal of the republic as a sovereign state recognized by another European republic (France) in the early 20th century and described as a ‘great European nation’ – can be interpreted as an attempt to deliberately create a temporal continuum from Ukrainian statehood in the past to post-communist Ukraine, justifying Ukraine’s statehood and its place within Europe.

Trying to understand the reasoning of *Moloda Halychyna*’s editors to publish articles that continuously emphasized Ukraine’s deep historical as well as political and cultural ties to Europe, even if these ties were only mentioned in passing or expressed by interviewees, might be connected to the political discourse in Europe and Ukraine at the time. While western European countries were struggling to position Ukraine on the newly emerged post-Cold War map, the Ukrainian political discourse, as has been discussed before, was clear in this regard: Ukraine is Europe.⁹²³ Similarly, the editors perceived and portrayed Ukraine within this framework, not only in terms of politics, but also across fields of culture and history, where questioning whether Ukraine belonged to the European space or not did not seem to be debateable. From the oral history interviews with two former students (in the early 1990s) from L’viv, we learn that the idea of being European was deeply embedded in the collective

⁹²¹ Taken from a leaflet distributed by Rukh, as cited in Georgiy Kasianov, *Ukraina 1991–2007: ocherki noveishei istorii* (Nash Chas, 2008), 23.

⁹²² Ibid., 22–23.

⁹²³ Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity, EU Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus,” *Alternatives* 23 (1998): 406.

understanding of the youth. Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, who was part of the Student Brotherhood in L'viv in the 1990s and also engaged in activities with the Lion Society, stated 'In the student circles, there was an aspiration for development, to be more Western and European.'⁹²⁴ The head of the Komsomol in Kyiv, Mykola Kniazhytskyi, has emphasized multiple times with regard to the independence movement in the early 1990s: Ukraine was fighting for its place in Europe. This unfolded in the interview in statements such as, 'In Ukraine we had a movement for independence, but also for European values at the same time',⁹²⁵ and 'The demonstrations in Lviv, in which tens of thousands of people took part, on the other hand, were conscious rallies for a European country. And this didn't happen only in L'viv. I remember demonstrations in Kyiv, when I was still at university.'⁹²⁶ To summarize, to the journalists and writers of *Moloda Halychyna*, discussing and referring to Ukraine as part of Europe might have seemed more natural than not doing so.

This conclusion is further supported by an article the editors published in April 1993,⁹²⁷ which reported on the results of public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine.⁹²⁸ Alongside a summary of the findings, the editors posed the question, 'So, who are we?...' – reflecting a sense of confusion regarding the report's results, which revealed that Ukrainians did not necessarily feel a strong European identity. The report initially begins by discussing the results of a survey that examined whether Ukrainians feel a sense of citizenship and national belonging after the country gained independence. Despite the official status of Ukrainian citizenship, the survey revealed that a significant portion of the population did not strongly identify as citizens of Ukraine. The report then continued to address the sense of European belonging, which is similarly weak across Ukraine. Although there was a general desire to join the European community, only 14 percent of respondents felt a sense of European identity. The report also indicates regional disparities in this regard, with the L'viv region showing the highest sense of European belonging at 20 percent, while Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv show much lower figures:

To what extent do we feel our belonging to Europe, given that Ukraine strives to join the European community? If we rely on survey data, the population of Ukraine desires this. However, it turns out that despite our actual geographical position, we do not feel our European belonging at all. Only 14 percent of

⁹²⁴ Interview with Markiyan Ivashchyshyn, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 82.

⁹²⁵ Interview with Mykola Kniazhytskyi, in Kowal, Mink, and Reichardt, eds., *Three Revolutions*, 184.

⁹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁹²⁷ The report does not specify an author, instead it says in brackets 'Our own Information', suggesting that the editors themselves have published the report. See, *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Я громадянин... чого?' (April 1993, no. 43): 2.

⁹²⁸ The little information given about the poll were that it was taken some time at the end of 1993 and conducted in cooperation of three 'Institutes of Sociology in the Dnipropetrovsk, Lviv, and Kyiv regions.' See, *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Я громадянин... чого?' (April 1993, no. 43): 2.

respondents remember their European belonging and consider it important. The most were found in the Lviv region, 20 percent, followed by 11 percent in Dnipropetrovsk, and 10 percent in Kyiv. Accordingly, 47 percent in Lviv, 64 percent in Kyiv, and 65 percent in Dnipropetrovsk do not feel European and do not consider it important. So, who are we?...⁹²⁹

The confusion suggested by *Moloda Halychyna*'s editors regarding the lack of Ukrainians priority toward a feeling of 'European belonging' might imply that to the editors, the notion of Ukraine as an integral part of Europe, was more significant than it was to the larger part of society in Ukraine. This strategy of *Moloda Halychyna*'s editors and writers to emphasize Ukraine's European character historically, as well as politically and culturally was aligned in the broader approach of the Ukrainian government under Kravchuk to shift Ukraine's focus to Europe.

On top of the narrative that Ukraine was inherently European, the editors and writers brought forward another narrative in 1992 and 1993 that highlighted the necessity and the benefits for Europe, if Ukraine would join European economic market and the political sphere. Therewith, the authors not only justified historically and culturally, that Ukraine was already European and for that alone deserved a place at Europe's table, but also underlined that it was in the best interest for Europe to establish well-connected links with Ukraine. This unfolded in articles that were grouped under the narrative 'Ukraine as an Asset for Europe.'

The perspective the authors articulated in these articles encompassed mainly two aspects: first, Ukraine's value for Europe's economy. The authors consistently emphasized Ukraine's agricultural potential and resource wealth, Europe could benefit from, describing Ukraine as a 'large and rich'⁹³⁰ country, that is 'rich in natural resources,'⁹³¹ and 'has the best black soil in Europe.'⁹³² Future predictions made were that Ukraine could potentially turn into one of the main produces and exporters of agricultural products in Europe.⁹³³

The second argument the journalists and authors made about Ukraine was its significance as a political player in the Eastern European regions, as such it would influence the new geopolitical

⁹²⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Я громадянин... чого?' (April 1993, no. 43): 2.

⁹³⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Українці самі знають, що мають робити' (July 1992, no. 84): 1.

⁹³¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Через 500 літ після відкриття Америки Європа відкриває Україну – велику і нужденну бурякову державу' (October 1992, no. 121): 2.

⁹³² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Хто боїться незалежної України? (Відкритий лист до редакції журналу "Економіст")' (April 1992, no. 47): 2.

⁹³³ As of April 2023, Ukraine is the third biggest import source of agricultural products to the European Union. See, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, "Good performance of EU agri-food trade in 2022 despite challenges," European Commission, April 13, 2023, https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/news/good-performance-eu-agri-food-trade-2022-despite-challenges-2023-04-13_en.

world order and bring stability to Europe. How this influence would unfold in practice, was not always made explicit. For example, London-based Ukrainian scholar Sviatomyr M. Fostun,⁹³⁴ in a patriotic text about his home country, described that Ukraine with its independence had emerged as a ‘great European state on the world stage’ that would challenge the ‘status quo’ of Eastern Europe which until now has been in favour of ‘the West’.⁹³⁵ Fostun argued that ‘in this new structure, our homeland, Ukraine, will play one of the main roles’ but did not specify what such new role would entail in detail. In some other cases the authors were more precise and argued that Ukraine represented some sort of ‘buffer zone’ to Russia, which with Ukraine as an independent state would guarantee political stability in Europe.⁹³⁶ For instance, in one article journalist Volodmyr Ruban, expressed his opinion about the geopolitical implications of Ukraine’s potential exit from the CIS. In this context, he argued that the Ukrainian ‘state (due to its geographical location, people, economic capabilities, etc.)’ was ‘able to protect prosperous Europe from unstable Russia. But in order for Ukraine to cope with this role, it needs to break away from the Euro-Asian Commonwealth and become a European state, get closer to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.’⁹³⁷

The narrative of ‘Ukraine is European’ and ‘Ukraine is an Asset of Europe’ was also accompanied by the notion of ‘desired partnership’ with Europe, a narrative that already emerged within the discourse around Europe in *Postup* from 1992 to 1995. *Moloda Halychyna* followed here the same approach as their colleagues at *Postup* did, which aligned with the broader political strategy of the Ukrainian government under Kravchuk (see chapter 6.1). The main notion that the authors articulated in this context was that Ukraine should economically and politically integrate into Europe.⁹³⁸ The narrative articulated in the articles put emphasis on the fact that Ukraine needed to move away from post-Soviet influence and toward deeper integration with European countries, such as through the Council of Europe. For that the authors of the articles argued that Ukraine needed to implement economic reforms,⁹³⁹ agree to

⁹³⁴ Sviatomyr M. Fostun was a scholar based in London and part of the Ukrainian diaspora. He frequently published in Ukrainian newspapers, such as the London-based Ukrainian newspaper *Ukrains'ka Dumka*. In 2016, his texts on the former UPA general Roman Shukhevych published in the 1960s and 1980s have been criticised by historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe for glorifying Shukhevych and the UPA without mentioning the pogroms committed against the Jewish community by the UPA. See, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Holocaust Amnesia: The Ukrainian Diaspora and the Genocide of the Jews,” *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* 1 (2016): 136.

⁹³⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Історичний Рубікон Україна вже перейшла’ (January 1992, no. 7): 1.

⁹³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁹ *Moloda Halychyna*, ‘Погляд на відносини між Росією й Україною’ (October 1992, no. 116): 1, 2.

the denuclearisation of Ukraine,⁹⁴⁰ encourage Ukrainian businesses to engage with European businesses,⁹⁴¹ adopt a new constitution and hold democratic elections.⁹⁴²

1995: Approaching European Integration

In 1995, the narratives of 'Ukraine is European', 'Ukraine as an asset to Europe' and 'Desired Partnership' remained, even though they occurred less frequent. The decreasing portrayal of Ukraine as a European country and of its economic value for Europe, as well as the focus on a desired integration into European structures, could be explained by a shift in focus toward a fourth narrative. What instead dominated the discourse regarding Europe and Ukraine's state development was a narrative of 'Ukraine's enhanced relationship with Europe.' This narrative unfolded in a total of 10 articles, in which the authors presented a relationship between Ukrainian and European institutions, academic and non-governmental European organisations and governmental institution of Central European countries, such as Poland and Hungary. As part of the narrative emphasis by the authors of the articles was now put Ukraine's different practices of cooperation between Ukraine and European structures, such as the integration of Ukraine into a European fiber-optic communication system,⁹⁴³ or the modernisation of Ukraine's railway system.⁹⁴⁴ But also the cooperation between European and academic communities and Ukrainian intellectuals,⁹⁴⁵ as well as Ukraine's participation in EU programmes for democracy and human rights.⁹⁴⁶

However, at the centre of this narrative, was Ukraine's admission process to the Council of Europe, which Ukraine eventually joined on 9 November 1995.⁹⁴⁷ The council of Europe is one of the oldest European institutions and was established in 1949. The main goals of the Council are promoting and upholding democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across its member states. It works to standardize social and legal practices, foster a shared European

⁹⁴⁰ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Будуємо свою державу' (May 1992, no. 54): 1–2; 'Україна повинна обрати свій шлях...' (December 1992, no. 141): 1, 2.

⁹⁴¹ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Україна пнеться в Європу. Але стоїть до неї спиною' (September 1992, no. 102): 1.

⁹⁴² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Їхала шляхом червона фіра' (December 1993, no. 149): 2.

⁹⁴³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Чую вас відмінно...' (May 1995, no. 61): 1.

⁹⁴⁴ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Як би нам не опинитися на узбіччі колії' (June 1995, no. 64): 2.

⁹⁴⁵ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Перспектива одна: Реформи і ще раз реформи' (July 1995, no. 76): 2.

⁹⁴⁶ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Демократії можна навчитись' (August 1995, no. 87): 2.

⁹⁴⁷ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'МЗС визначає пріоритети програма нового уряду України передбачає нарощування темпів багатовекторної дипломатії' (September 1995, no. 104): 1; 'Два дні важкої праці' (October 1995, no. 113): 1; 'Прийняття України до Ради Європи' (October 1995, no. 113): 1; 'Новий указ Єльцина оприлюднив Шандрук' (October 1995, no. 117): 1; '«Без України карта Європи була неповною», - вважає президент Парламентської Асамблеї Ради Європи Мігель Анхель Мартінес' (October 1995, no. 120): 2; 'Дай руку, "Демосфене"' (November 1995, no. 133): 1.

identity, and support countries in their efforts to implement political, legal, and constitutional reforms.⁹⁴⁸ Other than the European Economic Community and later the EU, which shared a common economic market, the Council of Europe was based on the idea of a greater European community, that relied on the ideals of promoting and upholding democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across its member states. Member states of the Council of Europe therefore go beyond the borders of the EU, with a total of 46 member states (status: August 2024), in contrast to the EU's 27 member states.⁹⁴⁹ As historian Birte Wassenberg has argued in her book on the history of the Council of Europe, from 1989 to 2009, at the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Council opened 'its doors to the formerly Soviet-Bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe', among them, Ukraine, and evolved into a 'pan-European organisation.'⁹⁵⁰ Ukraine's integration into the Council of Europe was the second step taken toward a Ukrainian-European relationship. A year prior, Ukraine had joined the Partnership for Peace Programme and alongside signed the Partnership and Peace Agreement.⁹⁵¹

The Council of Europe within the narrative of 'Ukraine's enhanced relationship with Europe' was portrayed as a crucial institution for Ukraine's integration into European political, legal and civil society structures. In the articles its roles ranged from facilitating human rights education and supporting democratic development to symbolizing Ukraine's recognition and inclusion in the broader European community. In *Moloda Halychyna*, the idea of Ukraine's membership of the Council represented a sense of opportunity and progress for Ukraine in the context of its international relationships and economic prospects. The authors viewed Ukraine's admission to the Council as a step closer toward Europe. Journalist Tetiana Kovalevska made that clear that in her article published in September 1995, when she stated 'our country now has a real chance to gain full membership in the Council of Europe this year. As is well known, this, in turn, will significantly expand the prospects for Ukraine's economic cooperation with other countries.'⁹⁵² Also journalist Iryna Voronyak portrayed Ukraine's admission to the council as 'extremely important and absolutely necessary' as it would be 'a sign that we

⁹⁴⁸ Council of Europe, 2024, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/the-council-of-europe-at-a-glance> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

⁹⁴⁹ Birte Wassenberg, *History of the Council of Europe* (Council of Europe Publication, 2013), 4.

⁹⁵⁰ Wassenberg, "History of the Council," 5.

⁹⁵¹ Iryna Solonenko, "The European Union as Democracy Promoter: The Case of Ukraine," *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 2 (2005): 58.

⁹⁵² *Moloda Halychyna*, 'МЗС визначає пріоритети програма нового уряду України передбачає нарощування темпів багатовекторної дипломатії' (September 1995, no. 104): 1.

[Ukraine] are recognized as a full-fledged European state' which 'will allow us to more actively pursue our interests.'⁹⁵³

Despite the optimism expressed in articles from *Moloda Halychyna* about Ukraine's admission to the Council of Europe which were accompanied by a sense of enthusiasm about the anticipated economic benefits this could bring, the European Union's perception of Ukraine during the 1990s remained ambivalent. As political scientist Iryna Solonenko has argued, until the late 1990s, the EU was not interested in developments of democracy or promoting democracy in Ukraine. Solonenko determines that the reason for the EU's hesitance was due to Ukraine's membership in the CIS, which was perceived as a substitute for the Soviet Union, Ukraine's potential for social unrest, especially in the context of Crimea, and due to the delayed denuclearisation process, which Ukraine only formally agreed to in early 1994.⁹⁵⁴ Political scientist Marko Bojcun made a similar assessment, arguing the EU prioritized its relationship with Russia over any potential deepening of ties with Ukraine. The EU did not seriously consider the possibility of Ukraine joining as a full member (as of August 2024, Ukraine has not become a member state of the European Union), largely due to the expectation that Ukraine would eventually be absorbed into Russia's sphere of influence.⁹⁵⁵

In 1995, a noticeable shift in the portrayal of Europe can be identified in the articles published in *Moloda Halychyna*. On one hand, there was an increased emphasis on events and initiatives involving both Ukrainian and European institutions, which suggests a deliberate effort to raise public awareness and build support for Ukraine's integration into European structures. This new approach was further reinforced by a narrative that not only emphasized the aspiration for closer ties with Europe but also presented an image of Ukraine as already aligning with European values and standards. The positive depiction of Ukraine's potential admission to the Council of Europe could have played a significant role in strengthening the public's perception of Ukraine's European identity, making the idea of closer integration with Europe more appealing. Finally, the editorial choice to highlight these themes might also be influenced by external factors, such as changes in political leadership. The positive coverage could be aimed at countering notions that favour closer ties with Russia, and instead promoting a vision of Ukraine as an integral part of Europe.

⁹⁵³ *Moloda Halychyna*, 'Прийняття України до Ради Європи' (October 1995, no. 113): 1.

⁹⁵⁴ Iryna Solonenko, "The European Union as Democracy Promoter: The Case of Ukraine," *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 2 (2005): 58.

⁹⁵⁵ Marko Bojcun, "Russia, Ukraine and European Integration," *EUI Working Paper HEC* 4 (2001): 5–6.

The articles were published at a time when Leonid Kuchma was the elected president of Ukraine. As already discussed in this study, Kuchma's presidency was accompanied by a perception of his government as wanting to return to a closer relationship with Russia. Therefore, portraying closer alignment with European structures, whether through reporting on cooperation practices or expressing enthusiasm about Ukraine's admission to the Council of Europe, might have been part of a strategy to balance concerns about Kuchma's potential pro-Russian inclinations. This editorial approach could have been intended to reassure the public of Ukraine's commitment and accomplishment to European integration, emphasizing Ukraine's orientation to the West.

Concluding Remarks

Moloda Halychyna's portrayal of Europe from 1992 to 1995 reflects a shift in how Europe emerged on the newspaper's mental map. Initially, the writers and editors presented Europe as a place of aspiration and belonging, from 1992 to 1993, in which they emphasised Ukraine's European identity, by unravelling historical connections and placing Ukrainian history into broader European history. Beyond the emphasis on Ukraine's European character, the writers and editors also created a narrative that Ukraine was not only part of Europe historically and culturally but also held strategic and economic value for Europe, therefore emphasizing the reciprocal benefits, closer ties between Ukraine and Europe could mean for both.

By 1995, the focus shifted to presenting Ukraine's growing integration with European institutions and alignment with European values, portraying a relationship that had materialised. The newspaper focused on initiatives involving Ukrainian and European collaboration, aiming to build public support for closer European ties and reinforce Ukraine's European identity. The positive coverage of Ukraine's potential admission to the Council of Europe could have played a role in making European integration more appealing to the public. Such an editorial approach in *Moloda Halychyna* may have been influenced by political factors, such as a need to counter perceptions of closer ties with Russia and thus promote achievements that showed Ukraine closer European integration.

VII. Concluding Chapter – Mental Maps in Transformation

This dissertation reconstructs the mental maps of two groups of young borderland inhabitants from the western Ukrainian city of L'viv during the transformation from communism to post-communism, based on the content produced in their respective newspapers. The first group consists of members of *Tovarystvo Leva* (Lion Society) and their newspaper, *Postup*, which was later renamed *Post-Postup*. Under its new name, the newspaper was published separately from the society but remained under the same editorship. The second group is the L'viv branch of the communist youth organization and its newspaper, *Leninska Molod'*, which was renamed *Moloda Halychyna* in March 1990. During this time, the youth group also underwent changes, eventually becoming the Democratic Youth Union of L'viv. It focuses on the collective meanings the members of these youth groups, in their roles as editors and writers, attributed to geographic places between 1989 and 1995, as expressed in their newspapers. By centring on the perspective of these two groups of young people, as they unfolded in the newspapers' contents, this dissertation tells a local story of mental maps and its evolvement over time. It unravels how young borderland inhabitants have spatially placed themselves in the world and what socio-political and socio-economic processes of Ukraine's post-communist transformation shaped their mental maps.

For that purpose, I combine a computational approach with traditional forms of historical research. With the help of two digital processes from the field of Natural Language Processing, Named-Entity Recognition and Topic Modeling, I expose the most frequent locations and topics referenced in the newspapers for each year. An exploratory analysis of both digital outcomes unravels the most relevant locations and topic categories, and subsequently narrows down the data set considered for in-depth analysis in this dissertation. Considering the relationship between the locations and the topic categories within the newspaper articles from 1989 to 1995, I investigate based on a historical content analysis the most relevant locations and topic categories. As a result, I identify that each location has been attributed with different meanings. Patterns of the same meanings for each location are grouped and analysed according to how they contributed to the construction of meaningful places. The sum of all these meaningful places compiled the mental maps.

This mixed-method design, that is based on combining quantitative with qualitative methods, has proven useful for approaching the spatial imaginaries as displayed in the newspapers from

a bottom-up perspective. It has enabled me to consider in an initial step all 629 newspaper issues and understand, which locations the young borderland inhabitants were drawn to from 1989 to 1995 on the one hand, and what topics concerned them during this period on the other hand. This allowed me to focus on the locations and topics most relevant to the young residents of L'viv without imposing any pre-defined assumptions. The historical content analysis of these locations and topics within the corresponding newspaper issues, has then revealed patterns of meaningful place creation that constructed the two mental maps: one mental map based on the content generated and composed by *Postup*'s editors and writers, and one mental map drawing from the articulations printed and written by the editors and writers in *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna*.

What this dissertation shows, in the analytical chapters 5 and 6, is that the young editors and writers of the newspapers, from 1989 to 1995, attributed political, historical, economic and geographic meanings to the locations L'viv, Russia, Moscow, the Baltics, Lithuania, Poland, United States of America and Europe, that resulted in the creation of meaningful places that go beyond viewing these locations as merely geographic spatial containers. I demonstrate how the different meanings compile the meaningful places and how they change, remain, or disappear from 1989 to 1995, depending on the socio-economic and socio-political situations at the time in Ukraine. The summaries of all of these meaningful places, that occur at different moments in time, form the mental maps.

To gain a better overview of how the individual meaningful places form the mental maps, I visualize them in two conceptual maps.⁹⁵⁶ These conceptual maps represent visual summaries of the analysis that I demonstrate in chapter 5 and 6. These visualizations serve as a visual anchor that guide my reflection and are intended to support the reader's understanding. Before I start with my concluding reflections, I want to provide an understanding of how these conceptual maps should be read.

The maps are visualized in map 3 and 4 and represent illustrations of the analytical chapters 5 and 6. Map 3 illustrates the mental map of *Postup* from 1989 to 1995 and map 4 corresponds to *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna*. The visualizations are plotted based on a data humanist approach, which focuses on the human aspect in data. In these maps, the human aspect is

⁹⁵⁶ The conceptual maps have been plotted with the data visualization tool Flourish, <https://flourish.studio/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

reflected in the data collection process. What this means is that the data for the maps is generated from the historical content analysis that I conduct on the newspaper issues. Consequently, these maps are distinct from those that could be generated through digital methods, such as Natural Language Processing techniques. This also means that the maps offer an understanding of the analytical chapters that does not correspond to raw data. The maps should be read as a story. Instead of paying attention to the number of data points and their exact location on the x-axis, the reader should focus on the evolvement of those points, the different colours and the annotations.

Each of the conceptual maps represents one mental map from one newspaper. The first map is compiled of the analysis results for *Postup*, as can be found in chapters 5.1 and 6.1. The second map corresponds to the analysis results for *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna* as demonstrated in chapters 5.2 and 6.2. The maps should be read from the left to the right and only focus on the data displayed on the x-axis. The legend on the left side of the map represents the individual locations that were identified as part of the historical content analysis. These locations have been attributed with patterns of different meanings that formed meaningful places. The meaningful places are displayed on the maps in form of annotations. For example, the location 'the Baltics' on *Postup*'s map has been attributed meanings that portrayed the location as a meaningful place of 'Democratic Progress.' The position of the annotations on the maps are crucial, as it corresponds to the circles. The x-axis indicates the different years that are investigated in this dissertation: 1989 to 1995. Each circle on the map represents one month in a given year. The size of the circle indicates the number of articles (per month), with larger circles representing more articles per month, and smaller circles representing less articles per month. Only articles, in which a specific meaning was identified belonging to a pattern of meaningful places are displayed on the maps. The circles correspond to the meaningful places that are displayed through the annotations. This means, for example, referring again to the example of 'the Baltics' in *Postup*, that all circles (green) immediately displayed above the annotation 'Democratic Progress' contributed to the portrayal of the Baltics as a place of democratic progress. The colour of the circles represents the sentiment that I identified. The different colours offer an idea on what sentiment the editors and writers of the newspapers applied to each location. They do not always exactly correspond to their precise position on the x-axis. For example, the locations 'Russia' on the mental map of *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna* shows two sets of sentiments in the year 1993 and 1995 in a narrow cluster of circles. The position of the first sentiment 'neutral' (beige) at the beginning of the year 1993, does not

indicate that all articles found in this month showed a neutral sentiment in their portrayal of Russia. The cluster should rather be read as a stream: for the year 1992, 1993 and 1995, articles existed that included neutral sentiment toward Russia, while articles with negative sentiment dominated the discourse.

I will now turn to the concluding part of this chapter, which I begin by reflecting on how the editors and writers have spatially placed themselves in the world as expressed through their newspapers and how the mental maps have evolved over time, before delving into the question of what an analysis of these mental maps offers for an understanding of the social dimension of transformation research.

How have *Postup* and *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* spatially placed themselves in the world?

Considering the visualizations of the conceptual mental maps in this study (maps 3 and 4), indicates that during the transformation period of 1989 to 1995, the editors and writers of *Postup* and *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* initially appeared to orient themselves toward outward, beyond Ukraine’s state border, to external actors such as Europe, Russia and Moscow, Poland, the Baltics and Lithuania, and the USA. Both mental maps exhibit this tendency. However, the analysis of the mental maps shows that the meanings attributed to these locations not only highlighted differences in how each newspaper assigned significance but also suggested that young borderland inhabitants did not primarily position themselves within a world focused outside of Ukraine’s borders. The spatial understandings of these external locations, as articulated in the newspapers from a Ukrainian perspective, predominantly demonstrated that young borderland inhabitants positioned themselves within a world that was, oriented inward – toward Ukraine – framing their perception of the world within a national narrative, and toward the region of L’viv, framing their perception within a regional narrative, as well as placed outward – toward Europe. Both newspapers approached these perspectives differently, which I will reflect on in the following discussion.

Postup’s writers and editors interpreted and defined the meanings attributed to the locations L’viv, the Baltics, Poland, Russia and the USA – based on how they align with or impact Ukraine’s concerns, aspirations, and struggles, shaping how they are understood and portrayed within the national context. Only with the year 1992, *Postup’s* inward-orientation was

complemented by a spatial dimension that sought to establish a narrative of Ukraine beyond its national state borders, situating Ukraine within a broader European context while still maintaining an inward focus.

Postup's national, inward-oriented mental map unfolded in the historical, political, and economic meanings its writers and editors attributed to the locations L'viv, the Baltics, Poland, the United States of America and Russia from 1989 to 1995. These meanings shaped meaningful places that drew from a national perspective. *Postup's* approach of nationalizing history of L'viv and its region (a place of historical legacy) in 1989 and 1990 – which means to frame the history of what today encompasses the territories of western Ukraine into a narrative that was relevant for all of Ukraine – aimed at establishing a national history that was distinct of its Soviet past, with the goal to awaken a national (historical) consciousness among its readers and to justify the political movements for restructuring at the time.

Applying meaning to locations through a national lens was not limited to L'viv; it extended to other locations beyond Soviet Ukraine's borders from 1989 to 1991, and later beyond post-communist Ukraine's state borders. *Postup's* strategy of seeking allies in the democratic movements of the Baltics (a place of democratic progress) and drawing political inspiration from both the Baltic republics and Poland (a place of democratic guidance) aimed to support Ukraine's political and economic transformation. The Baltics were viewed as fellow allies who, despite being further along in their democratic restructuring process, shared, as Soviet republics, the same goal of achieving political independence from the Soviet Union. The collaboration between *Postup's* editors and individuals from the Baltics, including attending shared events like cultural festivals and conferences, reinforced the idea of a shared destiny between the Baltics and Ukraine, transforming their common struggle from a theoretical concept into a tangible reality. The national perspective in the attributed political meaning to Poland, was also evident in the role it was given by *Postup* for Ukraine's political and economic transformation. After its 1989 parliamentary elections, Poland had officially moved beyond its communist past and was thus portrayed as a political role model that Ukraine could look to for guidance in its own transformation. The deliberate decision by *Postup* to avoid discussions of the complex Polish-Ukrainian borderland history in the early 1990s, which could have led to differences between Polish and Ukrainian communities, in favour of portraying positive Polish-Ukrainian relations and portraying Poland as a role model for Ukraine's transformation, further reflects how *Postup's* representation of Poland was influenced by a national perspective.

Also, Ukraine's neighbour to its east appeared on the mental map of *Postup*, framed within a national perspective. *Postup*'s portrayal of Russia through a national lens is evident in how the narrative shifted from initial cooperation to increasing opposition, which reflected *Postup*'s evolving national interests and concerns about Ukraine's sovereignty. In 1989, Russia was initially framed in the context of the Russian minority within Ukraine, which emphasized shared political autonomy efforts against the Soviet Union. The picture that was portrayed was, that similar to the Baltics, Russia and Ukraine shared the same goal which was independence from the Soviet Union. However, as Ukraine and Russia declared their sovereignty in 1990 and moved closer towards independence, *Postup*'s portrayal of Russia shifted. Russia was no longer seen merely as a country with an influential minority in Ukraine but was increasingly depicted as an external political entity that could pose challenges to Ukraine's national and territorial integrity, a depiction of Russia that intensified in the years following. The common 'enemy' which was the Soviet Union had shifted, now turning Russia the new 'enemy'. From 1991 onward, Russia was consistently depicted as a political and economic threat to Ukraine's transformation. By framing Russia as an external actor that posed a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity, particularly with regard to Crimea and the Donbas, *Postup* reinforced a narrative that positioned Russia as an adversary to Ukraine's national interests. The portrayal of Russia as an economic threat, such as in the context of the Miners' strike in the Donbas in 1993 and Ukraine's dependency on Russian energy, further reinforced that idea, as added the economic dimension in the narrative of Ukraine's as a threat. This progression – from a shared struggle against a common adversary to a depiction of Russia as a political foe and economic threat – demonstrates how *Postup*'s portrayal of Russia was rooted in a national framework that prioritised Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity above all else.

The last location that was framed on *Postup* mental map from a purely national perspective was the USA. This becomes evident in how the newspaper critically assessed the United States as an unstable political and economic partner, especially in the context of Ukraine's denuclearization. The narrative focused on perceived shortcomings in the USA's commitment to Ukraine's security and lack in sufficient financial compensation for nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the critical view of US foreign policy, particularly the perception that it favoured Russia, aligns with national concerns about external influences on Ukraine's political landscape.

Only with the emergence of Europe on *Postup*'s mental map from 1992 onward, *Postup* spatially placed itself in a world, that moved beyond Ukraine's post-communist state border. The spatial positioning of the newspaper had shifted toward including a European orientation. *Postup* portrayed Europe as a place that Ukraine desired to align with, and therewith moved beyond its inward-looking framework, by actively seeking to place Ukraine within the European context, rather than being influenced by its Soviet past or ties with Russia. By depicting Europe as a desirable haven and emphasizing the importance of political and economic alliances with other nations located in Europe, such as Poland and Germany, *Postup*'s portrayal goes beyond a purely national view.

In *Leninska Molod'*/*Moloda Halychyna*, the spatial perception of the world was predominantly formed through both, an inward-looking national and regional lens, which unfolded in the meanings the writers and editors attributed to L'viv, Moscow, Russia, Lithuania, and Poland. Similar to *Postup*, this inward-orientation was extended by an outward-orientation beginning in 1992, when spatial perceptions attributed to Europe emerged.

Moloda Halychyna's regional focus on its mental maps became evident in the spatial meaning attributed to L'viv. Similar to *Postup*, this also unfolded in narrations that were concerned with L'viv's regional history. These emerged following the shift from *Leninska Molod'* to *Moloda Halychyna* in March 1990, and were representative of the newspapers break with its Soviet past. This was also reflected in the new name of the newspaper, indicating that the former L'viv Komsomol wanted to rebrand themselves within a context truer to the atmosphere of their time. However, other than *Postup*, *Moloda Halychyna*'s primary concern for attributing historical meaning to L'viv was the goal to revive regional history, which occurred in articles that reported on events linked to regional history in L'viv, emphasised the importance of preserving regional history, and discussions on aspects of L'viv's regional history through essays and reports. *Postup* engaged in a strategy of nationalising western Ukrainian regional history to create an all-Ukrainian historic continuum from the past to the present and seek justification in history for Ukraine's political restructuring in 1989/1991. *Moloda Halychyna* instead maintained a distinctly regional focus, that emphasised the unique historical context of L'viv and western Ukraine without positioning it as central to Ukraine's national identity.

Moloda Halychyna's regional focus is also evident in the spatial meanings it attributed to Poland. Starting in 1991 and growing stronger in the following years, the newspaper framed its

understanding of Poland from the perspective of their shared borderland. This view was expressed through perceptions of Poland as a supportive neighbour, by cross-border initiatives such as cultural exchanges between L'viv and Polish border cities like Przemyśl, and through cooperative efforts addressing shared challenges, such as crime along the Ukrainian-Polish border. It was particularly of interest how *Moloda Halychyna* addressed cultural tensions that emerged in the Polish and Ukrainian communities in the shared borderland. Instead of drawing broad negative conclusions from individual incidents, such as disputes surrounding a Ukrainian cultural festival in Poland, the newspaper maintained an objective stance, offering a balanced analysis that criticized the actions of specific individuals rather than extrapolating these tensions to entire communities. This regional focus stands in contrast to *Postup*'s portrayal of Poland, which was framed through a national lens, that emphasised Poland's significance for Ukraine's broader political and economic transformation until 1991. While *Moloda Halychyna* also occasionally highlighted Poland's economic transformation as both a model and a cautionary example for post-communist Ukraine, the primary meaning attributed to Poland remained rooted in the regional context.

The way *Moloda Halychyna* framed its understanding of Russia, Moscow and Lithuania, the latter standing representative for the Baltics, is similar to what I identified among *Postup*'s authors and editors: through the national lens. Meaning attributed to Moscow through the national lens toward Moscow unfolded in the shift from *Leninska Molod'* to *Moloda Halychyna* from 1989 to 1990. The break of the newspaper *Leninska Molod'* with its communist past was reflected in the spatial meaning attributed to the former centre of the Soviet governing body. Under *Leninska Molod'* seen merely as a geographic location, Moscow's transformation in the portrayal in *Moloda Halychyna*, into a symbol of Soviet authority mirrored a growing sense of Ukrainian self-awareness and detachment from Soviet authority. This suggest that the writers and editors began to formally embrace the new interests and concerns of Ukraine. Meaning attributed to Russia through the national lens meant to reflect on Russia's negative role for Ukraine's evolving national interests and concerns about sovereignty. In *Moloda Halychyna*, Russia was until mid 1991, was depicted as a potential partner, especially under Boris Yeltsin's leadership, which was seen as a more favourable option compared to Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of maintaining a union. This nuanced view of Russia under Yeltsin as a potential cooperative partner in 1990, was distinct from *Postup*, which had already begun to criticize both Gorbachev and Yeltsin by mid 1991, framing Russia as a political and economic threat. However, the absence of *Moloda Halychyna*'s articles beyond mid 1991 limits a full understanding

of how their perception of Russia may have evolved. This gap suggests that their portrayal of Russia could have shifted in the latter half of 1991, and therefore align with *Postup*'s position earlier than visible on the mental map. Also, *Moloda Halychyna*'s portrayal of Lithuania was shaped through the national lens, similarly to *Postup*'s spatial perception of the Baltics. While *Postup*'s portrayal of the Baltics included a broader sense of partnership across all three Baltic states, *Moloda Halychyna* placed particular emphasis on Lithuania, due to the Soviet military intervention in January 1991. Within this focus Lithuania was framed as a key in the struggle for sovereignty of Soviet republics, a perception that also unfolded in *Postup*, where the Baltics were seen as part of a broader regional movement toward independence that aligned with Ukraine's own goals.

Finally, *Moloda Halychyna*'s spatial perception of Europe, was as in *Postup*, also framed from a national perspective and within a broader European perspective, so an outward orientation. Both newspapers shared an outward-oriented perspective, viewing Europe as an aspirational space that Ukraine sought to connect with politically, economically, and culturally. Nuances can be found in the way how *Postup* and *Moloda Halychyna* framed Ukraine within the European context. While *Postup* assessed Ukraine's desire to join Europe, hindered by internal political issues which made this integration difficult, *Moloda Halychyna* presented a more impactful narrative, placing Ukraine confidently within the European context. *Moloda Halychyna*'s portrayal of Europe served as a strategy to connect Ukraine's historical and cultural ties to the broader European context. The authors and writers portrayed Ukraine as inherently European rather than as an outsider trying to gain acceptance. This unfolded from 1992 to 1993 in narrations that drew historical connections between Ukrainian and European history, that framed Ukraine as already belonging to Europe, and in the portrayal of closer European integration in 1995.

How have these mental maps evolved over time?

Focusing on the temporal dimension in assessing the mental maps, this research demonstrates that how borderland inhabitants spatially positioned themselves in the world – meaning their understanding and definition of their position within a socio-cultural space – depended on the political and economic developments in Ukraine, L'viv, and its region at various points in time. This suggests that their spatial perception they relate to places shifted, evolved, changed, or even disappeared over time. Considering the visualizations of the mental maps (map 3 and 4)

we can see, that in the early days of the transformation, Russia was perceived by both newspapers as a democratic ally, a perception that shifted in 1991 due to the emerging tensions between post-communist Russia and Ukraine following their independence. This led to a transition from a hopeful, positive stance towards Russia to an anti-Russian rhetoric. The meaning attributed to L'viv from 1989 to 1990, and to a lesser extent in 1991 in *Postup*, was expressed through the use of L'viv's regional history as a tool to awaken national consciousness among its readers. This practice diminished as Ukraine moved closer to independence in 1991. Similarly, the Baltics and Lithuania held significant political importance in 1989 in *Postup* and from 1990 to 1991 in *Moloda Halychyna*, as they supported each other's democratic independence movements. However, this was also a temporary practice that ended once its purpose was fulfilled. In *Leninska Molod'* and *Moloda Halychyna*, there was a notable shift in geographic meaning attributed to Moscow. Until 1990, under *Leninska Molod'*, Moscow was presented in the traditional communist reporting style as the center of Soviet authority. This perception changed due to the evolving socio-political climate, reflecting how the editors, who had officially broken with their Soviet past by renaming the newspaper to *Moloda Halychyna* and the L'viv branch of the Komsomol to Democratic Youth of L'viv, aimed to portray Moscow under their new identity. What this shows is that the mental maps from the young borderland inhabitants in L'viv during the transformation were dynamic, implying that there is not one truth set in in a single time-space.

What does the analysis of mental maps of young people from the borderland city L'viv during the transformation period reveal about the social dimension in historical transformation research?

First, I will begin by briefly reflecting on the methodology used in this study and reflect on its usage for further research in the field of historical transformation research and border studies. The mixed-method design employed in this dissertation allowed me to explore the perceptions of two groups of young people in L'viv through an approach that is initially data-driven, followed by a traditional historical analysis. This approach enabled the data to guide the research while I maintained a critical reflection on the digital process. Combining this with an in-depth, qualitative historical content analysis ensured that the locations and topic categories examined in this study reflected what the two groups of young people considered important in their newspapers during the transformation period from 1989 to 1995. It also minimized the risk of approaching the perceptions of western Ukrainians with preconceived notions about

their mental maps. As digital humanities continue to grow within historical research, I argue that more research projects in border studies and historical transformation research that focus on the perceptions and experiences of specific groups could greatly benefit from such a synergistic approach.

Second, this thesis has contributed to the social dimension of academic research on historical transformation from communism to post-communism by unravelling the complex and evolving spatial perceptions of groups of society members during the transformation in Ukraine. By examining the mental maps of *Postup* and *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna*, the study reveals how these editors and writers through their newspapers positioned themselves within a rapidly changing socio-political landscape. The analysis on mental maps has shown that two groups of young borderland inhabitants of L'viv have spatially placed themselves in the world by including a regional, national and an outward perspective, that in this study was toward Europe. The mental maps demonstrate that the transformation from communism to post-communism was perceived and assessed through these three spatial angles. What this confirms is, that as Kubik has already argued in his framework from the discipline of political science toward post-communist transformation research,⁹⁵⁷ that a study in the field of historical transformation research, should consider a multiplicity of spatial angles in its analysis of the social dimension. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that even when focusing on the perceptions of two youth groups from the same location, during the same period, with overlapping connections and emerging from similar peer circles, their underlying mental maps differ. This reveals the heterogeneity within societies undergoing transformation on the one hand and underlines the necessity to consider multiple perspectives within social transformation research, to avoid assumptions of uniformity in how the transformation impacts different groups.

For an understanding of the role of the youth during the transformation, this research has shown that the young borderland inhabitants central to this study may have started their journey as active participants in Ukraine's transformation in the student dormitories of their universities or within the halls of the Komsomol, when they first chose to change their newspaper. However, the analysis reveals that their involvement in the ongoing transformation extended beyond the moment Ukraine gained independence. The editors and writers from L'viv remained active participants throughout the post-communist transformation, shifting

⁹⁵⁷ Kubik, "Contextual Holism," 49–51.

their focus from critiquing communist structures to addressing challenges posed by the newly established Ukrainian government and external actors, e.g., Russia. Through their articles, they also actively shaped a perception of Ukraine that positioned it within a wider context of Europe, therewith proposing the path Ukraine should follow in the future. Both the editors of *Moloda Halychyna* and *Postup* continued to influence the transformation of their country by shaping the spatial perceptions of their readers through their narratives.

Final Remarks


Finally, I want to address the limitations of this study, which, while shaping my methodological approach – including the use of digital tools – also constrained the extent to which this thesis can contribute to a more complex understanding of the social dimension in historical transformation research. The first limitation concerns the restricted access to archival source material, largely due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic at the beginning of my PhD in March 2020 and the subsequent Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which made archival research trips to Ukraine impossible. As a result, I had to rely on international archives outside of Ukraine, limiting the scope and diversity of the archival material available. This shortage of primary sources led to a more constrained analysis and reduced the depth of insights that could be drawn from original Ukrainian archives.

This lack of sources, for instance, disrupted a more in-depth analysis focusing on the temporal dimension of the mental maps beyond what has already been presented. Missing issues from certain years, such as 1994 in *Moloda Halychyna*, could have provided a more detailed understanding of how spatial perceptions evolved during critical moments of the transformation. These missing pieces might have further unravelled shifts in attitudes and priorities, offering a clearer picture of how spatial perceptions of young borderland inhabitants adapted to and engaged with the ongoing socio-political changes.


Additionally, the reliance on alternative data sources and digital methods, while innovative, also introduced challenges in maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the local context and the lived experiences of those directly involved in the transformation. Despite these constraints, the findings still offer valuable contributions by unravelling the underlying spatial perceptions in two youth newspapers from L'viv during the transformation. These insights help to shed light on how young people navigated and understood their changing world. However,

future research with broader access to archival materials could enrich this analysis, providing an even more detailed and nuanced understanding of the social dimension in historical transformation studies from the perspective of mental maps.

Map 3 Conceptual Mental Map - Postup



Map 4 Conceptual Mental Map - Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna



Bibliography

Archives

Widener Archive, Harvard University

Collections for Postup

Postup: informatsiyni visnyk tovarystva Leva. (1989). [ZUNR].

Fond “Moloda Ukraïna.” (1990). *Post Postup*. [s.n.]

Collections for Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna

Moloda Halychyna: molodizhna orhanizatsiia drohobytskoho viddilennia rukhu. Truskavets: [s.n.], 1990-.

Demokratychna spilka molodi l'vivshchyny. (1940). *Moloda Halychyna.* Vyd-vo “Vil'na Ukraïna.”

Electronic Archives and Sources

Електронний архів Українського визвольного руху. Website. <https://avr.org.ua/>

Deklaratsiia pro prynsyipy ta osnovni napriamky rozvytku ukrains'ko-pol'skykh vidnosyn, 13 zhovtnia 1990 r. [Declaration on the Principles and Main Directions of Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations, October 13, 1990]. Accessed August 25, 2024. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_176#Text.

Internet Archive. *About*. 1996–2023. Accessed August 15, 2023. <https://archive.org/about/>.

Traktat miedzy Rzeczapospolita Polska a Ukraina o dobrym sasiedztwie, przyjaznych stosunkach i wspolpracy, sporzadzony w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on May 18, 1992]. *Journal of Laws* 1993, no. 125, item 573. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19931250573>.

Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Ukrainy w sprawie przejść granicznych, sporządzona w Warszawie dnia 18 maja 1992 r. [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of Ukraine on border crossings, signed in Warsaw on 18 May 1992]. *Journal of Laws* 2003, no. 37, item 530. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WMP20030370530>.

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Website. 1994–2023. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://www.rada.gov.ua/>.

Social Surveys

Omnibus 1995: views of the population of Ukraine on economic and political problems. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, September 22-October 5, 1995. National Research Bank.

Golovakha, Evgenii. *Political portrait of Ukraine and elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.* February - March 1994. Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank.

Golovakha, Evgenii. *The current political situation and future political and economic development of Ukraine.* November 1993. Democratic Initiatives Fund. Source: National Research Bank.

Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1993. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, December 3–12, 1993. National Research Bank.

Opinions and Views of the Residents of Ukraine: December 1994. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, December 1994. National Research Bank.

Oral History Interviews

Kowal, Paweł, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt, eds. *Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity.* Ibidem Verlag, 2019.

Literature

Abashin, Sergey. “‘Brotherly Peoples’: The System of Kinship in Russian Politics.” *После* [After], August 31, 2022. Accessed August 28, 2024. <https://posle.media/language/en/brotherly-peoples-the-system-of-kinship-in-russian-politics/>.

Agnew, John. “Space and Place.” In *The SAGE Handbook of Geographical Knowledge*, edited by John Agnew and David N. Livingstone, 316–31. SAGE Publications, 2011.

Alexandrova, Olga. “Ukraine and Western Europe.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 145–70.

Allcock, John B. “Comecon.” *Britannica*. Accessed May 22, 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Comecon>.

Al-Rfou, Rami. *Polyglot: A Massive Multilingual Natural Language Processing Pipeline.* PhD Dissertation, Stony Brook University, 2015. Accessed November 8, 2023. <https://sites.google.com/site/rmyeid/projects/polyglot-ner>.

Amar, Tarik Cyril. *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv. A Borderland City between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists.* Cornell University Press, 2015.

Andrukhovych, Yurii. *Engel und Dämonen der Peripherie.* Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*. Aunt Lute, 1987.

Armstrong, John A. “Review: The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, no. 1/2 (June 1990): 171–75.

Armstrong, John A. *Ukrainian Nationalism*. Columbia University Press, 1955.

Banditt, Christopher. “Quantitative Erforschung der ostdeutschen Transformationsgeschichte.” *Zeitgeschichte*, March 18, 2019. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/quantitative-erforschung-der-ostdeutschen-transformationsgeschichte>.

Benwell, Bethan, and Elizabeth Stokoe. *Discourse and Identity*. Edinburgh University Press, 2006.

Berdahl, Daphne. *Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Berend, Iván T. *From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union: The Economic and Social Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Bernauer, Thomas, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine.” In *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control*, edited by Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, 111–56. University of South Carolina Press, 1999.

Bialasiewicz, Luiza, and John O’Loughlin. “Re-ordering Europe’s eastern frontier: galician identities and political cartographies on the Polish-Ukrainian border.” In *Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context*, edited by Paul Ganster, Littlefield Publishers, 2002.

Bluth, Christoph. “American-Russian Strategic Relations: From Confrontations to Cooperation?” *The World Today* 49, no. 3 (March 1993): 47–50.

Böhler, Jochen, Włodzimierz Borodziej, and Joachim von Puttkamer, eds. *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Volume 4: *Violence*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

Bojcun, Marko. “Russia, Ukraine and European Integration.” EUI Working Paper HEC 4 (2001).

Bojcun, Marko. “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of 1994: The Politics of Confusion.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 2 (1994): 237–53.

Borodin, Yevgeniy. “Youth Work in Ukraine: from Soviet model to international integration.” In *The History of Youth Work in Europe*, edited by Howard Williamson and Jim McKechnie, 175–90. Routledge, 2019.

Borodziej, Włodzimierz, Joachim von Puttkamer, and Ferenc Laczó, eds. *The Routledge Twentieth Century History Handbooks*. Volume 3: *Intellectual Horizons*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

Borodziej, Włodzimierz, Joachim von Puttkamer, Stanislav Holubec, Sabina Ferhadbegović, Ferenc Laczó, and Jochen Böhrer, eds. *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Volume 2: *Statehood*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

Borodziej, Włodzimierz, Stanislav Holubec, and Joachim von Puttkamer, eds. *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. Volume 1: *Challenges of Modernity*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

Bracke, Maud Anne, and James Mark. “Between Decolonialization and the Cold War: Transnational Activism and its Limits in Europe, 1950s–90s.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (2015): 403–17.

Bruder, Franziska. *Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!?. Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948*. Metropol Verlag, 2007.

Brückweh, Kerstin, and Kathrin Zöller. “Transformation Research as a Field of Dialogue: Discussing the Long History of the ‘Transformation’ in German.” *Comparativ* 30, no. 1 (2020): 66–89.

Brückweh, Kerstin, Clemens Villinger, and Kathrin Zöller. *Die lange Geschichte der Wende. Geschichtswissenschaft im Dialog*. Ch. Links Verlag, 2021.

Brückweh, Kerstin. “Wissen über die Transformation. Wohnraum und Eigentum in der langen Geschichte der ‘Wende’.” *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History* 16 (2019): 19–45.

Bunout, Estelle, and Milan van Lange. “Nibbling at text: identifying discourses on Europe in a large collection of historical newspapers using topic modelling.” Blog Post, June 21, 2019. <https://www.c2dh.uni.lu/thinking/nibbling-text-identifying-discourses-europe-large-collection-historical-newspapers-using>.

Burant, Stephen R. “Poland, Ukraine and the Idea of Strategic Partnership.” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* 1308 (1999): 1–29.

Burnell, Peter. “Imperialism.” In *A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations*, 4th ed. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Cardazone, G., and R. Tolman. “Data visualization.” In *Handbook of Methodological Approaches to Community-Based Research*, edited by L. A. Jason and D. S. Glenwick, 293–311. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. *The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program*. March 29, 2022. Accessed May 25, 2024. <https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-program-2/>.

Charlotte, Lisa. “Introducing heatmaps for Datawrapper tables.” *Datawrapper*, 2020. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://blog.datawrapper.de/heatmaps-for-tables/>.

Chmelyk, R., and L. Khakhula. “Ukrainian-Polish Intercultural Communication in the Border Areas (the end of the 20th – the beginning of the 21st century).” *Shkhidnoievropeiskyi istorychnyi visnyk* 23 (2022): 249–60.

Chorna, N. M. “Transkordonne spivrobitnytstvo Ukrayiny ta Pol'shchi u vysvitlenni ukrayins'koyi istoriohrafiyi” [Cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Poland in the light of Ukrainian historiography]. *Naukovi zapysky* (Vinnyts'koho derzhavnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni Mykhayla Kotsyubyns'koho, Istoryiya) 22 (2014): 270–75.

Christie, Paula. “The Baltic Chain: A Study of the Organisation Facets of Large-Scale Protest from a Micro-Level Perspective.” *Lithuanian Historical Studies* 20 (2015): 183–211.

Chronicles of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Vol. 6, *The UPA in Light of German Documents, 1942–1945.* Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1983.

Council of Europe. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/the-council-of-europe-at-a-glance>.

Cox, Michael, ed. *Ukraine: Russia's War and the Future of the Global Order.* LSE Press, 2023.

Creswell, John W. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches.* 4th ed. Sage Publications, 2013.

Crowley, Stephen. “Between Class and Nation: Worker Politics in the New Ukraine.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28, no. 1 (1995): 43–69.

Curran, James. “Rethinking Internet History.” In *Misunderstanding the Internet*, edited by James Curran, Natalie Fenton, and Des Freedman, 40–71. Routledge, 2012.

Danto, Ann. *Historical Research: The Basics.* Routledge, 2013.

Davies, Thomas, et al. “Rethinking Transnational Activism through Regional Perspectives: Reflections, Literatures and Cases.” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 34 (2024): 1–27.

De Coning, Cedric, and Mateja Peter, eds. *Ukraine in Histories and Stories: Essays by Ukrainian Intellectuals.* Internews Ukraine, 2019.

De Munter, André. “The Enlargement of the Union.” European Union. April 2024. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/167/the-enlargement-of-the-union>.

Department of State. Office of the Historian. “Visits by Foreign Leaders of Ukraine.” Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://history.state.gov/departments/history/visits/ukraine>.

Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftlicher Dienst. “Zum ukrainischen ‘Regiment Asow’ und zur möglichen Verstärkung durch deutsche Freiwillige aus dem rechtsextremistischen Milieu Ausgewählte Quellen und Faktenübersicht.” Dokumentation WD 2 - 3000 - 025/22 (21 April 2022), 1–27.

Deutschlandfunk. ‘Rechtsextremisten in der Ukraine und ihr Einfluss im Land’. <https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/asow-regiment-stepan-bandera-ukraine-100.html> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Didelon, Clarisse, Sophie de Ruffray, and Claude Grasland. “Mental Maps of Students.” *HAL* 1 (2011): 1–34.

Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development. “Good performance of EU agri-food trade in 2022 despite challenges.” European Commission. April 13, 2023. Accessed August 25, 2024. https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/news/good-performance-eu-agri-food-trade-2022-despite-challenges-2023-04-13_en.

Diuk, Nadia. *The Next Generation in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan: Youth, Politics, Identity, and Change*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.

Diuk, Nadia. “Youth as an Agent for Change: The next Generation in Ukraine.” *Demokratizatsiya* 2 (2013).

Dmytryk, Ivan. *In the Forests of the Lemko Region: Memoirs of a Soldier in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army*. Sucasnist’, 1976.

Dragneva, Rilka, and Katarzyna Wolczuk. “Between Dependence and Integration: Ukraine’s Relations With Russia.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 4 (2016).

Ellison, Herbert J. *Boris Yeltsin and Russia’s Democratic Transformation*. University of Washington Press, 2006.

Erlacher, Trevor. “Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–85.” *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 2, no. 2 (2013): 289–316.

Fainsod, Merle. “Zur Geschichte des Komsomol.” *Ost-Probleme* 3, no. 31 (August 1951): 937–51.

Fiszer, Józef. “The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Sejm and Senate Elections in 1989: Systemic Transformation in Poland and Its Consequences for Europe and the World.” *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna* 2019, no. 3 (2019): 139–63.

Fomina, Joanna. “Language, Identity, Politics – the Myth of Two Ukraines.” Bertelsmann Stiftung – Policy Brief, 2014.

Gabel, Matthew J. “European Community.” *Britannica*. Accessed June 1, 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association>.

Galasińska, Aleksandra, and Michał Krzyżanowski, eds. *Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Gerst, Dominik, and Hannes Krämer. “Methodologie der Grenzforschung.” In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, edited by Dominik Gerst, Maria Klessmann, and Hannes Krämer, 121–40. Nomos, 2021.

Golczewski, Frank. *Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914–1939*. Schöningh, 2010.

Golczewski, Frank. “Unterschiedliche Geschichtsnarrative zur Ukraine im Kontext der Aktuellen Kris.” In *Kampf um die Ukraine: Ringen um Selbstbestimmung und Geopolitische Interessen*, edited by Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, 35–60. Studien Zur Friedensethik 61. Aschendorff Verlag, 2018.

Götz, Norbert, and Janne Holmén. “Introduction to the Theme Issue: ‘Mental Maps: Geographical and Historical Perspectives’.” *Journal of Cultural Geography* 35, no. 2 (2018).

Graham, Thomas, Jr., and Damien J. LaVera. *Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era*. University of Washington Press, 2002.

Griffin, Roger. *Faschismus. Eine Einführung in die vergleichende Faschismusforschung*. Ibidem Verlag, 2020.

Grow, Kory. “Pink Floyd’s First New Recording in Nearly 30 Years Was Inspired by a Lone Ukrainian Musician.” *Rolling Stone Magazine*, April 7, 2022. <https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/pink-floyd-hey-hey-rise-up-1334338/>.

Hackmann, Jörg. “Baltic national movements, 1986-1992: Origins, trajectories, agendas.” *Studies on National Movements* 6 (2020): 1–26.

Hann, Christopher. “Religion, Trade and Trust in South-East Poland.” *Religion, State and Society* 26, no. 3–4 (1998): 235–49.

Harasymiw, Bohdan. *Post-Communist Ukraine*. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2002.

Hartwell, Sarah. *Two Roads Diverged: The Transition Experience of Poland and Ukraine*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Haslam, Jonathan. “Attaining Baltic Independence: In Search of a Helping Hand.” In *Understanding the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1991*, edited by Charles Clarke, 42–48. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2023.

Hedlung, Stefan. “The Mice that Roared: The Baltic States’ Strategies for Independence.” In *Understanding the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1991*, edited by Charles Clarke, 56–66. Hurst and Company, 2023.

Himka, John-Paul. “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: Unwelcome Elements of an Identity Project.” *Ab Imperio* 4 (2010): 83–101.

Hladík, Radim. “A Theory’s Travelogue: Post-Colonial Theory in Post-Socialist Space.” *Teorie Vědy/Theory of Science* 33, no. 4 (2011): 561–90.

Holmén, Janne. “Mapping Historical Consciousness: Mental Maps of Time and Space among Secondary School Students from Ten Locations around the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.” *Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies* 1, no. 1 (2017): 46–75.

Hrytsak, Yaroslav. Interview by *The Ukrainians*. April 2024. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://theukrainians.org/yaroslav-hrytsak/>.

Hrytsak, Yaroslav. "Lviv: A Multicultural History through the Centuries." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24 (2000).

Hulicka, Karel. "The Komsomol." *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (1962): 365–68.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Ilin, Illia, and Olena Nihmatova. "The 'Brotherly People' Metaphor and the Russian-Ukrainian Irredentist War: A Corpus-Based Study." *Czech Journal of International Relations* (March 2023): 7–41.

"Istoriia formuvannia ukrains'koho derzhavnoho symbolu" [History of the formation of the Ukrainian state symbol]. Solom'ians'ka raionna v misti Kyievi derzhavna administratsiia. Ofitsiinyi internet-portal [Solomianskyi District State Administration in the City of Kyiv. Official Internet Portal], August 23, 2021. Accessed January 26, 2024. <https://solom.kyivcity.gov.ua/news/10889.html>.

Janelle, Jacqueline. "The History of Dr. John-Paul Himka." *Folio News Story* (University of Alberta, Canada), February 8, 2002. Accessed February 6, 2024. <https://sites.ualberta.ca/~publicas/folio/39/11/05.html>.

John Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches (Sage Publications, 2013), 38. Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, (SAGE Publications, 2019), no page, online: <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/content-analysis-4e> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Johnson, Simon, and Gary W. Loveman. "Starting Over: Poland After Communism." *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1995. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://hbr.org/1995/03/starting-over-poland-after-communism>.

Kappeler, Andreas. *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine*. C.H.Beck Paperback, 2009.

Karácsonyi, Dávid, Károly Kocsis, Katalin Kovály, József Molnár, and László Póti. "East-West Dichotomy and Political Conflict in Ukraine - Was Huntington Right?" *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* 63, no. 2 (2014): 99–134.

Kashperskyi, Oleh, and Darya Kashperska. "Oy u luzi chervona kalyna' yak marker novykh naratyvotvorchykh transformatsiy mystetskoyi osvity v umovakh shyrokomasshtabnoyi ahresiyi RF" ["'Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow' as a Marker of New Narrative-Creating Transformations of Art Education in the Context of Russia's Full-Scale Aggression"]. *Education* 11 (2022): 78–87.

Kasianov, Georgiy. "The 'Nationalization' of History in Ukraine." In *The Convolutions of Historical Politics*, 141–74, 2012.

Kasianov, Georgiy. *Ukraina 1991–2007: ocherki noveishei istorii* [Ukraine 1991–2007: Essays on Recent History]. Nash Chas, 2008.

Kazdobina, Julia, Jakob Hedenskog, and Andreas Umland. “Why the Donbas War Was Never ‘Civil’.” *SCEEUS Report* 6 (2024).

Keleher, Serge. “Out of the Catacombs: The Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine.” *Religion in Communist Lands* 19, no. 3 (1991): 251–63.

Kenney, Padraic. *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989*. Princeton University Press, 2003.

Kenney, Padraic. “Lviv’s Central European Renaissance, 1987–1990.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24 (2000): 303–312.

Khromechuk, Olesya. “Foreword. Where Is Ukraine? How a Western Outlook Perpetuates Myths about Europe’s Largest Country.” In *Ukraine’s Many Faces: Land, People, and Culture Revisited*, edited by Olena Palko and Manuel Férez Gil, 21–27. New Europes 1. transcript, 2023.

Kind-Kovács, Friederike, and Jessie Labov. “Samizdat and Tamizdat: Entangled Phenomena?” In *Samizdat, Tamizdat, and Beyond: Transnational Media during and after Socialism*, edited by Friederike Kind-Kovács and Jessie Labov, 1–23. Berghahn Books, 2013.

Kind-Kovács, Friederike, and Machteld Venken. “Childhood in times of political transformation in the 20th Century: An Introduction.” *Journal of Modern European History* 19, no. 2 (2021): 155–165.

Kipiani, Vakhtang. “Zhyttya u ‘Postupi’” [Life at ‘Postup’]. Interview with Oleksandr Kryvenko. *Ukrayinska Pravda*, April 31, 2002. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://web.archive.org/web/20111002190129/http://www.kipiani.org/samizdat/index.cgi?245>.

Klymovska, Natalia. Interview. In *Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity*, edited by Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt, 193.

Kniazhytskyi, Mykola. Interview. In *Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity*, edited by Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink, and Iwona Reichardt, 184. Ibidem Verlag, 2019.

Knott, Eleanor. “Identity in Crimea before Annexation: A Bottom-up Perspective.” In *Russia Before and After Crimea*, by Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, 282–305. Edinburgh University Press, 2018.

Knott, Eleanor. “The Securitised ‘Others’ of Russian Nationalism in Ukraine and Russia.” In *Ukraine: Russia’s War and the Future of the Global Order*, edited by Michael Cox, 103–105. LSE Press, 2023.

Kollmorgen, Raj. “Postsozialistische Transformationen des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts.” In *Handbuch Transformationsforschung*, edited by Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener, 421–42. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015.

Kollmorgen, Raj, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener. “Transformation Und Transformationsforschung: Zur Einführung.” In *Handbuch Transformationsforschung*, edited by Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener, 11–27. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015.

Kolosov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, and Marek Więckowski. “Border Changes in Central and Eastern Europe: An Introduction.” In *Border Changes in Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kolosov and Marek Więckowski, 6. Geographia Polonica, 2018.

Kolosov, Vladimir. “Phantom borders: the role in territorial identity and the impact on society.” *Belgeo* 2 (2020). Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://journals.openedition.org/belgeo/38812#quotation>.

Komornicki, Tomasz, and Karol Kowalczyk. “Role of Rail in Passenger Border Traffic between Poland and Ukraine – a Dyanmic Approach.” *Barometr Regionality* 16, no. 2 (2018): 133–50.

Krapfl, James. *Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989–1992*. Cornell University Press, 2013.

Kravchenko, Volodymyr. “Fighting Soviet Myths: The Ukrainian Experience.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 34 (2016).

Krawchenko, Bohdan. “National Memory in Ukraine.” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 12, no. 1 (1990).

Krippendorff, Klaus. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. 4th ed. SAGE Publications, 2019. No page. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/content-analysis-4e>.

Kubicek, Paul. “Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post-Soviet Democratisation: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 4 (2002): 603–24.

Kubicek, Paul. “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Example of Failed Regionalism?” *Review of International Studies* 35 (2009): 237–56.

Kubik, Jan. “From Transitology to Contextual Holism: A Theoretical Trajectory of Postcommunist Studies.” In *Post-Communism from Within: Social Justice, Mobilization, and Hegemony*, edited by Jan Kubik and Amy Linch, 27–94. New York University Press, 2013.

Kührer-Wielach, Florian, and Sarah Lemmen. “Transformation in East Central Europe: 1918 and 1989. A Comparative Approach.” *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 23, no. 4 (2016): 573–79.

Kuźelewska, Elżbieta, Adam R. Bartnicki, and Ryszard Skarżyński. “Origins of and Perspectives for the Future for the Visegrád Group.” In *Ten Years of the Visegrád Group Member States in the European Union*, edited by Agnieszka Piekutowska and Iwona Wrońska, 145–47. Oficyna Wydawnicza Aspra, 2015.

Kuzio, Taras. “Borders, Symbolism and Nation-State Building: Ukraine and Russia.” *Geopolitics and International Boundaries* 2, no. 2 (1997): 36–56.

Kuzio, Taras, ed. *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.

Kuzio, Taras. “Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 12, no. 2 (June 1996): 129–59.

Kuzio, Taras. “National Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Ukraine.” *Nationalities Papers* 29, no. 2 (2001): 347–65.

Kuzio, Taras. *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

Kuzmenko, Oleksiy. “Ukrainian Far-Right Fighters, White Supremacists Trained by Major European Security Firm,” Bellingcat (30 August 2018), <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/08/30/ukrainian-far-right-fighters-white-supremacists-trained-major-european-security-firm/> (last accessed 12.12.2024).

Kvyatkovsky, Andriy. “Nevhamovnyi.” *Ukrayinska Pravda*, May 19, 2003. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://web.archive.org/web/20111002185331/http://www.kipiani.org/samizdat/index.cgi?492>.

Kvyatkovskiy, Andriy. ‘Прапор на вежі’ [Flag on the Tower]. *Збруч*, April 3, 2015. Accessed January 26, 2024. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150928223218/http://zbruc.eu/node/34632>.

Kyiv Post. “68 Years Ago Today – First Radio Liberty Broadcast to Ukraine.” *Kyiv Post*, August 16, 20.

Lane, David. “Divergent Social and Economic Consequences of Transformation in Post-Communist States.” In *Crises in the Post-Soviet Space*, edited by Felix Jaitner, Tina Olteanu, and Tobias Spori, 39–60. Routledge, 2018.

Lane, David. “Post-Communist States and the European Union.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23, no. 4 (December 2007): 470.

Laruelle, Marlene. “The Three Colors of Novorossiia, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2016): 55–74.

Lawson, Konrad Mitchell, Riccardo Bavaj, and Bernhard Struck. *A Guide to Spatial History: Areas, Aspects, and Avenues of Research*. Olsokhagen Publishing, 2022.

Leutloff-Grandits, Carolin. “Die zeitlichen Dimensionen von Grenzen und Grenzüberquerungen.” In *Grenzforschung: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium*, edited by Dominik Gerst, Maria Klessmann, and Hannes Krämer, 419–35. Nomos, 2021.

Levchuk, K. I., and L. M. Spiridonova. “Development of youth organizations of Ukraine under the influence of socio-political transformations (1985–2000).” *Colloquium-Journal* 31, no. 83 (2020): 14–16.

Liikanen, Ilkka, James W. Scott, and Tina Sotkasiira. “The End of Wider Europe? The EU, Changing Borders and Spatial Imaginaries of Post-Soviet Space.” In *The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Migration, Borders and Regional Stability*, edited by Ilkka Liikanen, James W. Scott, and Tina Sotkasiira, 5. Routledge, 2016.

Linkiewicz, Olga. “Peasant Communities in Interwar Poland’s Eastern Borderlands: Polish Historiography and the Local Story.” *Acta Poloniae Historica* 109 (2014): 17–36.

List of Senators Poland. Accessed March 20, 2024. <https://www.senat.gov.pl/en/senators/lista-senatorow/senator,120,9,bogdan-borusewicz.html>.

Litopys UPA. Main Series website. Accessed February 25, 2024. <https://litopysupa.com/book-series/main-series/>.

Lukowski, Jerzy, and Hubert Zawadzki. *A Concise History of Poland*. 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Lupi, Giorgia. “Data Humanism, The Revolution will be Visualized.” *Giorgialupi*. Accessed August 25, 2024. <http://giorgialupi.com/data-humanism-my-manifesto-for-a-new-data-world>.

Machalski, Andrzej. *Encyklopedia Solidarności* [Encyclopedia of Solidarity]. Accessed March 20, 2024. <https://encysol.pl/es/encyklopedia/biogramy/17405,Machalski-Andrzej.html>.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*. 2nd ed. University of Toronto Press, 2010.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. *With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus’ and Carpatho-Rusyns*. Central European University Press, 2015.

Mansouri, Alireza, Lilly Suriani Affendey, and Ali Mamat. “Named Entity Recognition Approaches.” *International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security* 8, no. 2 (2008): 339–44.

Marple, David R. *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*. Central European University Press, 2007.

Marples, David R. *The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985–1991*. Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.

McCallum, Andrew. “Mallet: MACHine Learning for Language Toolkit.” *Mallet*, 2002. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://mimno.github.io/Mallet/index>.

Meigniez, Guillaume. “Data Humanism – A Case Study.” *Medium*, May 14, 2019. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://medium.com/nightingale/data-humanism-a-case-study-c16d0efef533>.

Melnikov, Andrii, Iryna Ignatieva, and Katerina Nastoyasha. “An Empirical Application of Mental Mapping to Analyze National Identity Among Ukrainian Students.” *SAGE Open* 14, no. 1 (January 2024).

Melnyk, Ihor. “Persha demonstratsiia z syno-zhovtymy praporamy” [The First Demonstration with Blue and Yellow Flags]. *Zbruc*, May 1, 2014. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://zbruc.eu/node/21879>.

Mick, Christoph. *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv, 1914–1947: Violence and Ethnicity in a Contested City*. Purdue University Press, 2016.

Mishchenko, M. V. “*Moloda Halychyna*” [Young Galicia]. *Encyclopedia of Modern Ukraine*, 2019. Accessed August 20, 2024. <https://esu.com.ua/article-69003>.

Mishkova, Diana. “Spatial Configurations. Regional Intellectual Imageries in Twentieth-Century Central and Eastern Europe.” In *The Routledge History Handbook of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Włodzimierz Borodziej, Joachim von Puttkamer, and Ferenc Laczó. Volume 3: Intellectual Horizons, 1. The Routledge Twentieth Century History Handbooks. Routledge, 2020.

Motyl, Alexander J. *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism*. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993.

Motyl, Alexander J. *The Turn to the Right: the ideological origins and development of Ukrainian nationalism 1919–1929*. Columbia University Press, 1980.

Muravskyi, Oleh. “L'viv Informal Youth Organisations’.” *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність* 27 (2015): 364–365.

Muravskyi, Oleh. “Neformal’ni? Molodizhni Orhanizatsii L'vova: Osoblyvosti Stvorennia, Napriamy Diial’nosti (1987–1990).” *Україна: kul’turna spadshchyna, natsional’na svidomist’, derzhavnist’* 27 (2015): 363–69.

Mykhnenko, Vlad. “State, Society and Protest under Post-Communism: Ukrainian Miners and their Defeat.” *Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference*, April 2000.

Nahaylo, Bohdan. *The Ukrainian Resurgence*. C. Hurst & Co, 1999.

Nerus. Website. Accessed November 8, 2023. <https://github.com/natasha/nerus>.

Neumann, Iver B. “European Identity, EU Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus.” *Alternatives* 23 (1998).

Nominatim. Website. Accessed November 8, 2023. <https://nominatim.org/release-docs/develop/api/Overview/>.

Ob'yednannya ukrayintsiv u Pol'shchi. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://ukraincy.org.pl/uk/>.

Samytna, Kseniya. "Imperialism, supremacy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine." *Contemporary Security Policy* 44, no. 4 (2023): 497–512.

O'Loughlin, John, Gerard Toal, and Vladimir Kolosov. "The Rise and Fall of 'Novorossiya': Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2017): 124–44.

Onuch, Olga. *Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Ukraine and Argentina*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Paliienko, Maryna. "The Role and Importance of Archives in the Transformation of Modern Ukrainian Society." *Atlanti+* 29, no. 1 (2019): 19–25.

Panagioditis, Vlassis. *Postsowjetische Migration in Deutschland*. Beltz Juventa, 2020.

Pavlova, Oleksandra. "Koho ne razhlyadel Vyacheslav Chornovil." *Ukraina Kryminalna*.

Pavlenko, Irina. "Die Ukrainische Aufständischenarmee (UPA). Ein Abriß der Geschichte ihres Widerstandes." *Militärgeschichte Zeitschrift*, no. 61 (2002): 73–90.

Peng, Sheng. *Making a New World? China and the end of the European Cold War, 1979–1991*. Research Project. <https://www.recet.at/our-team/detail/sheng-peng>.

Pfoser, Alena. "Between Russia and Estonia: Narratives of Place in a New Borderland." *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 2 (2014): 269–85.

Plokyh, Serhii. *The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine*. Basic Books, 2015.

Plokyh, Serhii. *Ukraine and Russia. Representations of the Past*. University of Toronto Press, 2008.

Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation*. Beacon Press, 2001.

Polokhalo, Volodymyr, ed. *The Political Analysis of Postcommunism: Understanding Postcommunist Ukraine*. Eastern European Studies 6. Texas A&M University Press, 1997.

Putin, Vladimir. "Address by the President of the Russian Federation." Kremlin.ru, February 21, 2022. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Putin, Vladimir. "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin." Kremlin.ru, April 17, 2014. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Putin, Vladimir. "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." Kremlin.ru, July 12, 2021. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Pylyp Orlyk Institute of Democracy. Accessed May 22, 2024. <https://idpo.org.ua/>.

Rachman, Gideon. “Ukraine’s nationalists and the Azov battalion. Why has Russia repeatedly claimed to be fighting neo-Nazis?” *Financial Times*, May 19, 2022. <https://www.ft.com/content/9f9a7ace-04e7-45ce-871c-f5d157e08d08> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Accessed 25 August 2024. <https://www.rferl.org/>.

Region, Nation and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconsideration of Ukraine. Interactive Map. University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, 2022. <http://mapsukraine.ch/> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Riordan, Jim, ed. *Soviet Youth Culture*. Palgrave Macmillan London, 1989.

Risch, William Jay. *The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv*. Harvard University Press, 2011.

Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz. “Holocaust Amnesia: The Ukrainian Diaspora and the Genocide of the Jews.” *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* 1 (2016).

Rossoliński-Liebe, Grzegorz. *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist*. Ibidem, 2014.

Rudling, Per Anders. “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths.” *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies*, no. 2107/2108 (2011): 1–120.

Rudnytsky, Ivan L. *Mizh istoriieiu i politykoiu: Statti do istoriyi ta krytyky ukrains'koi istoriohrafii* [Between History and Politics: Articles on the History and Critique of Ukrainian Historiography]. Suchasnist', 1973.

Ryabchuk, Mykola. “Two Ukraines?” *East European Reporter* 5, no. 4 (1992): 18–22.

Sachs, Jeffrey. “Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years.” The Tanner Lectures of Human Values. University of Utah, April 6 and 7, 1994.

Sagan, Iwona. “Post-Socialist Transformation, European Neighbourhood and Civil Society Networks between Poland, Russia and Ukraine: A Case of Multi-level Contingency.” *Journal of European Integration* 32, no. 5 (2010).

Sasse, Gwendolyn. “Ukraine: The Role of Regionalism.” *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (2010).

Schadlow, Nadia. “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukrainian Security.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 271–87.

Schenk, Frithjof Benjamin. “Mental Maps: Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung.” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002).

Schenk, Frithjof Benjamin. “Mental Maps: The Cognitive Mapping of the Continent as an Object of Research of European History.” *European History Online* (2013).

Schmid, Ulrich, and Oksana Myshlovska. *Regionalism without Regions: Reconceptualizing Ukraine's Heterogeneity*. Leipzig Studies on the History and Culture of East Central Europe, vol. 5. Central European University Press, 2019.

Segert, Dieter. *Transformationen in Osteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert*. utb, 2013.

Seliverstova, Oleksandra. “‘Consuming’ National Identity in Western Ukraine.” *Nationalities Papers* 45, no. 1 (January 2017): 61–79.

Serczyk, Wladyslaw. “Die sowjetische und die polnische Ukraine zwischen den Weltkriegen.” In *Geschichte der Ukraine*, edited by Frank Golczewski, 202–23. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1993.

Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. “Ukraine, Turkey, and the Black Sea Region.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 79–101.

Sharnagat, Rahul. “Named entity recognition: A literature survey.” *Center For Indian Language Technology* (2014): 1–27.

Shekeryak, Yana. “Mykhailo Batih: ‘Zhurnalist mozhe i povynen buty patriotom. Osoblyvo u suchasni kryzovii sytuatsii.’” *Lysty do pryiateliv*, January 18, 2019. Accessed April 20, 2024. <https://lysty.net.ua/batig/>.

Sherr, James. “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? The Black Sea Fleet Accords.” *Survival* 39, no. 3 (1997): 33–50.

“Skamba Skamba Kankliai” [The Kanklės Ring] website. Accessed March 6, 2024. <https://www.ssk.lt/en/apie-festivali-skamba-skamba-kankliai>.

Smagala, Genowefa. “Combating Illegal Nuclear Traffic - Poland’s Experience.” *International Atomic Energy Agency* IEAE-CN-70/60, Report Number IAEA-TECDOC—1045 (1998).

Smart, Charlie. “How the Russian Media Spread False Claims about Ukrainian Nazis.” *The New York Times*, July 2, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/07/02/world/europe/ukraine-nazis-russia-media.html> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Smith, Graham, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, eds. *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Smolansky, Oles M. “Ukraine’s Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 1 (January 1995): 7–25.

Smoor, Lodewijk. “Understanding the Narratives Explaining the Ukrainian Crisis: Identity Divisions and Complex Diversity in Ukraine.” *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: European and Regional Studies* 11, no. 1 (2017): 63–96.

Snyder, Timothy. *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999.* Yale University Press, 2003.

Solonenko, Iryna. "The European Union as Democracy Promoter: The Case of Ukraine." *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 2 (2005).

spaCy. Website. Accessed November 8, 2023. <https://spacy.io/usage/spacy-101#whats-spacy>.

Stasyuk, Olena. "Cemetery and church: Art environment and spiritually-functional symbiosis." *Architectural Studies* 6, no. 1 (2020): 18–25.

Stegen, Karen Smith. "Deconstructing the 'Energy Weapon': Russia's Threat to Europe as Case Study." *Energy Policy* 39, no. 10 (October 2011): 6505–13.

Stelmakh, Anastasiya. *Energy Politics of Ukraine: Domestic and International Dimensions.* Doctoral Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, May 2016.

Stepanenko, Victor. "Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework of Corrupted Sociality?" *East European Politics and Societies* 20, no. 4 (2006): 1–27.

Stephan, Johannes. *Economic Transition in Hungary and East Germany.* Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.

Stokłosa, Katarzyna. "Conflict and co-operation on Polish borders: the example of the Polish-German, Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian border regions." *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 42, no. 1 (2013).

Stokłosa, Katarzyna. "Neighborhood relations on the Polish borders: the example of the Polish-German, Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Russian border regions." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 27, no. 3 (2012): 245–55.

Stromer-Galley, Jennifer. "This is What Campaign Websites Looked Like in 1996." *Politico*, March 20, 2014. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/campaign-websites-1996-104827/>.

Stryjakiewicz, Tadeusz. "The Changing Role of Border Zones in the Transforming Economies of East-Central Europe: The Case of Poland." *Fredry* 10 (1998): 207–16.

Subota. "Як починалося Товариство Лева." October 20, 2022. <https://subota.online/iak-pochynalosia-tovarystvo-leva/> (accessed February 25, 2024).

Subtelny, Orest. *Ukraine: A History.* University of Toronto Press, 2009.

Suslov, Mikhail. "The Production of 'Novorossiya': A Territorial Brand in Public Debates." *Europe-Asia Studies* 69, no. 2 (2017): 202–21.

Swyrypa, Frances. "Ukraine: A History by Orest Subtelny." *The Canadian Historical Review* 71, no. 1 (1990): 134–35.

Syrota, L. “*Hazeta Leninska Molod'*: osoblyvosti problematyky publikatsii 1940–1941 rr.” [Newspaper *Leninska Molod'*: features of the problems of publications in 1940–1941]. *Zbirnyk prats Naukovo-doslidnoho instytutu presoznavstva* [Collection of Works of the Research Institute of Press Studies] 1 (2011): 85–101.

Szeptycki, Andrzej. “Poland-Ukraine Relations.” *UNISCI Journal* 40 (January 2016).

Szmagalska-Follis, Karolina. *Building Fortress Europe: The Polish-Ukrainian Frontier*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

Szul, Roman. “Poland and Ukraine against the background of changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.” In *The EU's New Borderland: Cross-Border Relations and Regional Development*, edited by Andrzej Jakubowski, Andrzej Miszczuk, Bogdan Kawałko, Tomasz Komornicki, and Roman Szul, 6–57. Routledge, 2017.

Taagepera, Rein. “Estonia in September 1988: Stalinists, Centrists and Restorationists.” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 20, no. 2 (1989): 175–90.

Taagepera, Rein. “The Baltic States: Elections to the Supreme Soviets.” *Electoral Studies* 9, no. 4 (1990): 303–11.

Taylor, Neil. “A History of the Baltic Region (1860–1991).” In *Understanding the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1991*, edited by Charles Clarke, 23–33. Hurst and Company, 2023.

Ther, Philipp. *Das andere Ende der Geschichte: Über die Große Transformation*. 2nd ed. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2019.

Ther, Philipp. *Europe since 1989: A History*. Princeton University Press, 2016.

Tikkannen, Amy. “Komsomol.” *Britannica*, 2009.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Komsomol>.

Torget, Andrew J. “Mapping Texts: Examining the Effects of OCR Noise on Historical Newspaper Collections.” In *Digitised Newspapers - A New Eldorado for Historians?: Reflections on Tools, Methods and Epistemology*, edited by Estelle Bunout, Maud Ehrmann, and Frédéric Clavert, 49–60. De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023.

Trappmann, Vera. “Externe Transformationsanker.” In *Handbuch Transformationsforschung*, edited by Raj Kollmorgen, Wolfgang Merkel, and Hans-Jürgen Wagoner, 541–46. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2015.

Trenin, Dmitri. *End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.

Tuminez, Astrid S. “Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 4 (2003): 82–136.

Turanskyi, Mykola. “The Impact of pro-Russian Public Organizations and parties on the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation.” *UR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 4, no. 9 (2022): 69–88.

Ukrainian Heraldry Society. Website. Accessed August 25, 2024. <http://uht.org.ua/ua/aboutsite/>.

Ukr-Models. Website. Accessed November 8, 2023. <https://huggingface.co/datasets/ukr-models/Ukr-Synth>.

Vailyev, Valerii. “Leninska komunistychna spilka molodi Ukrainy” [Leninist Communist Youth League of Ukraine]. *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* [Encyclopedia of History of Ukraine], 2009. Accessed August 25, 2024.

Vakhtang Kipiani, “Zhyttya u ‘Postupi’,” Interview with Oleksandr Kryvenko, Ukrainian Truth (31 April 2002), <https://web.archive.org/web/20111002190129/http://www.kipiani.org/samizdat/index.cgi?245> (last accessed 25.08.2024).

Vebera, Rimantas. “Political Rebirth in Lithuania, 1990–1991: Events and Problems.” *Journal of Baltic Studies* 25, no. 2 (1992): 183–88.

Veira-Ramos, Alberto, Tetiana Liubyva, and Evgenii Golovakha. *Ukraine in Transformation: From Soviet Republic to European Society*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

Viola, Lorella. *ChronicleItaly 2.0. A Corpus of Italian American Newspapers Annotated for Entities, 1898-1920*. Utrecht University, 2019.

Viola, Lorella. “The Humanities in the Era of Digital Text and Data.” In *Debates in the Digital Humanities 2019*, edited by Matthew K. Gold and Lauren F. Klein, 82–101. University of Minnesota Press, 2019.

Visit Ukraine. “Lion’s Society in Lviv: History and Present.” October 16, 2023. Accessed March 14, 2024. <https://visitukraine.today/de/blog/2751/lions-society-in-lviv-history-and-present>.

Voitenki, Yurii. “Referendums in Ukraine and the Baltic Countries in the First Decade of Independence: Causes and Results.” *Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie* 4 (40) (2023): 64–77.

Voitovich, Sergei A. “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Emerging Institutional Model.” *EJIL* (1993): 403–17.

“Volodymyr Ruban vidpovidatyme u Yushchenka za presu. Posada pres-sekretarya – vakantna” [Volodymyr Ruban will be responsible for the press under Yushchenko. The position of press secretary is vacant]. *Ukrayinska Pravda*, November 26, 2001. Accessed August 25, 2024. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2001/11/26/2985395/>.

von Hirschhausen, Béatrice, Hannes Grandits, Claudia Kraft, Dietmar Müller, and Thomas Serrier, eds. *Phantomgrenzen: Räume und Akteure in der Zeit neu denken*. Wallstein, 2015.

von Löwis, Sabine. *Das Phantom der Alten Grenze am Zbruč Kontinuitäten und Brüche Sozialräumlicher Strukturen in der Westukraine.* Wallstein, 2017.

von Löwis, Sabine, ed. *Umstrittene Räume in der Ukraine: Politische Diskurse, literarische Repräsentationen und kartographische Visualisierungen.* Wallstein Verlag, 2019.

von Löwis, Sabine. “Phantom Border in the Political Geography of East Central Europe: An Introduction.” *Erdkunde* 69, no. 2 (2015): 99–106.

von Löwis, Sabine. “Post-Soviet Borders: A Kaleidoscope of Shifting Lives and Lands: An Introduction.” In *Post-Soviet Borders: A Kaleidoscope of Shifting Lives and Lands*, edited by Sabine von Löwis and Beate Eschment, 1–8. Routledge, 2023.

Vynnyk, Oksana. “War Commemorative Rituals, Funerals, and the Construction of Collective Memory in Interwar Lviv.” In *Problemy vyvchennya istoriyi Ukrayins’koyi revolyutsiyi 1917–1921 rokiv. Zbirnyk naukovykh statey* [Problems of Studying the History of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921: Collection of Scholarly Articles], vol. 12, 173–90. Instytut istoriyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny [Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine], 2016.

Vysokyi Zamok, April 3, 2019. Accessed January 26, 2024. <https://wz.lviv.ua/news/387888-tsei-den-v-istorii-3-kvitnia-1990-roku-nad-ratusheiu-lvova-pidnialy-syno-zhovtyi-prapor>.

Wallace, Claire, and Christian Haerpfer. “Three Paths of Transformation in Post-Communist Central Europe.” *IHS Sociological Series* 28 (May 1998).

Wallace, Claire, in association with Oksana Shmulyar and Vasil Bedzir. “Investing in Social Capital: The Case of Small-Scale, Cross-Border Traders in Post-Communist Central Europe.” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 23, no. 4 (1999).

Wassenberg, Birte. *History of the Council of Europe.* Council of Europe Publication, 2013.

Wawrzonek, Michał. *Religion and Politics in Ukraine: The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches as Elements of Ukraine’s Political System.* Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014. Accessed August 31, 2024. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unilu-ebooks/reader.action?docID=3051786>.

Wayback Machine. Accessed August 15, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/19990801000000*/https://www.rada.gov.ua/.

Welt, Cory. “Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy.” *Congressional Research Service Report*, R45008, Version 14 (October 5, 2021).

Wilson, Andrew. *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation.* Yale University Press, 2000.

Wilson, Andrew, and Artur Bilous. “Political Parties in Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 4 (1993): 693–703.

Wilson, Andrew, and Valeriy Khmelko. “Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine.” In *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, edited by Taras Kuzio, 60–80. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.

Wiśła, Rafał, and Andrzej Nowosad. “Poland – Ukraine: Key Findings.” In *Economic Transformation in Poland and Ukraine*, edited by Rafał Wiśła and Andrzej Nowosad, 246–47. Routledge, 2020.

Wojnowski, Zbigniew. “An Unlikely Bulwark of Sovietness: Cross-Border Travel and Soviet Patriotism in Western Ukraine, 1956–1985.” *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 1 (2015): 82–101.

Wooden, Anastacia K. “A Brief History of the Union of Brest and Its Interpretations.” In *Stolen Churches or Bridges to Orthodoxy?*, edited by V. Latinovic and A. K. Wooden, 41–62. Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.

Woo, Wing Thye, Stephen Parker, and Jeffrey Sachs, eds. *Economies in transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe*. MIT Press, 1997.

Yelekchyk, Serhy. *The Conflict in Ukraine. What Everyone needs to Know*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

Yelensky, Victor. “Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era: The Case of Ukraine (with Special References to Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues).” *BYU Law Review*, no. 1 (2002): 453–88.

Yndigegn, Jonas. “Between debordering and rebordering Europe: Cross-border cooperation in the Øresund region or the Danish-Swedish border region.” *Eurasia Border Review* 2, no. 1 (2009): 47–59.

Yost, David S. “The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine.” *International Affairs* 91: 3 (2015): 505–38.

Yurchak, Alexei. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton University Press, 2006.

Yurchuk, Yuliya. “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN-UPA Memory Politics and Nation-Building in Ukraine (1991-2016).” In *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus*, edited by Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 107–37. Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, 2017.

Zabirko, Oleksandr. “Russkij Mir Und Novorossija. Theologische und Nationalistische Konzepte Russier (Außen-)Politik.” In *Kampf um die Ukraine: Ringen um Selbstbestimmung und Geopolitische Interessen*, edited by Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, 63. Studien zur Friedensethik 61. Aschendorff Verlag, 2018.

Zajcew, Orest Wasyl. *Rukh: The Social Construction of Protest 1988–1992*. PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1998.

Zenon, W. Wasyliw. “Orthodox Church Division in Newly Independent Ukraine, 1991–1995.” *East European Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (September 2007): 305–22.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. *Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine.* Ibidem-Verlag, 2014.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “Borders and Memory.” In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, edited by Doris Wastl-Walter. Routledge, 2011.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “Everyday Europeanization and Bottom-Up Geopolitics at the Ukrainian-Polish Border.” *Geopolitics*, January 4, 2024. As cited in Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 286-290.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “The border as pain and remedy: commemorating the Polish–Ukrainian conflict of 1918–1919 in Lviv and Przemyśl.” *Nationalities Papers* 42, no. 2 (2013).

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. “The Myth of Two Ukraines. A Commentary on Mykola Riabchuk’s “Ukraine: One State, two Countries?”” *Eurozine* (2002).

Zięba, Ryszard. “The “Strategic Partnership” between Poland and Ukraine.” *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest* 2:3, no. 4 (2002).

Zofka, Jan. “Halbinsel unter Spannung? Konfliktlage auf der Krim seit dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion.” *Ukraine-Analysen* 12 (2006): 2–5.

Zubok, Vladislav M. *Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union.* Yale University Press, 2021.

Appendix

Appendix 1 – Topic Modeling. List of Keywords, Topic Name and Topic Categories in *Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna* and *Postup*

	Topic_Number	Keywords_Ukrainian	Keywords_English	Topic_Name	Topic_Category
Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna	00	жінка шлюб чоловік зріст сім'я мужчина любов любити вік освіта сіль борошно риба цукор забезпечений дружина характер середній познайомитися масло	woman marriage man height family man love to love age/era education salt flour fish sugar provided wife character average to meet butter	00 Family and Social Dynamics in Ukrainian Culture	Life
	01	унсо вибори повідомлення факс громик водій новина реклама зіло дрогобицький бензин посольство квартал передрука передплат дрогобич посилення никорак хворий дубас	UNSO elections message fax Gromyk driver news advertisement Zilo Drohobychian gasoline embassy quarter reprint subscription Drohobych reference Nikorak sick Dubas	01 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	02	купон давимук чоло держадміністрація рух генштафт ретрансляція телефонувати кафедра статут ключковський валютний крайовий делегат читач могила радеківський делегація бодетаун холодний	coupon Davimuk forehead state administration movement gendarme retransmission to call department statute Kluchkovsky foreign regional delegate reader grave Radekhivian delegation Bodetown cold	02 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	03	карпата нива дніпро металург динамо шахтар чорноморець таврія торпедо кремін матч буковина кривбас м'яч зоря металіст темп волинь малс ворота	Carpathian field Dnipro metallurgist Dynamo miner Black Sea resident Tavria torpedo flint match Bukovina Kryvbas ball Zorya metallist tempo Volyn MALs gates	03 Sports Teams and Competitions in Ukraine	Sports
	04	україна президент львів міністр держава державний ціна область росія фірма справа карбованець відсоток крба тисяча банк підприємство працівник український інформація	Ukraine president Lviv minister state state price region Russia company case karbovanets percent karbovanets thousand bank enterprise worker Ukrainian information	04 Economic Policies and Developments in Ukraine	State Development
	05	український рср народ гунчак республіка рада львов воля урср телефільм історія карпати кдб можний	Ukrainian RSFSR people Hunchak republic council Lviv will USSR telefilm history Carpathians KGB possible CPSU society USSR land connection song	05 Historical and Political Dynamics in Ukraine	Politics

		кпрс суспільство срср земля звязок пісня			
	06	концерт сцена фестиваль травень музикант виступ театр пісня вистава виконавець диск група альб публіка альбе музика платівка співачка зірка співак	concert scene festival May musician performance theater song show performer disk group album audience album music record singer star singer	06 Cultural and Entertainment Events in Ukraine	Culture
	07	програма градус долар проект реклама європа температура польський вночі кучма богдан удень розвиток млн мороз субсидія хмельницький сертифікат православний ліги	program degree dollar project advertisement Europe temperature Polish at night Kuchma Bohdan during the day development million frost subsidy Khmelnitsky certificate orthodox leagues	07 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	08	фільм програма новина комсомол з'їзд депутат срср партія урср орган організація молодь партійний комсомольський місто концерт молодіжний секретар влксм гімнастика	film program news Komsomol congress deputy USSR party USSR organ organisation youth party Komsomol city concert youth secretary VLKSM gymnastics	08 Komsomol and Communist Activities	Soviet Youth
	09	україна робота організація рада новий український проблема питання голова національний сила політичний право стати великий держава львівський влада повинний економічний	Ukraine work organisation council new Ukrainian problem question head national power political right become great state Lvivian power must economic	09 Governance and Policy Challenges in Ukraine	State Development
	10	рух снд олімпіада україни демократичний зимовий крба чоло только ссср колгосп россии лице кафедра україне ректор чтобы україна армії пам'ятник	movement CIS Olympics of Ukraine democratic winter karbovanets forehead only USSR collective farm of Russia face department in Ukraine rector to Ukraine army monument	10 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	11	фільм демократичний союзний союз республіка референдум газета програма радянський срср військовий телебачення сша новина ньюс урср ранковий гімнастика хедлайн договір	film democratic union union republic referendum newspaper program Soviet USSR military television USA news news USSR morning gymnastics headline treaty	11 Information about Political Events	State Development

	12	ціна господарство тонн гектар млн газ зерно сірка вугілля виробництво млрд фермер купон корма паливо хліб продукція долар центнер молоко	price farm tons hectare million gas grain sulfur coal production billion farmer coupon feed fuel bread production dollar centner milk	12 Agricultural Economics and Issues in Ukraine	Agriculture
	13	фільм серіал програма новина худ світ дитина день мультсеріал канал мультфільм спа вікно тиждень концерт музичний анонс журнал спорт огляд	film series program news fine world child day animated series channel cartoon USA window week concert musical announcement magazine sport review	13 Media and Cultural Content	Media and Entertainment
	14	фільм програма худ серіал тиждень мультфільм день мама канал студія музичний телеярмарка неділя дитина сприятливий п'ятниця субота четвер експрес діловий	film program fine series week cartoon day mom channel studio musical TV fair Sunday child favourable Friday Saturday Thursday express business	14 Media and Cultural Programmes	Media and Entertainment
	15	львів програма народний рада день дитина мама народ мова львівський область район життя обласний спорт школа дати ванна карбованець село	Lviv program folk council day child mom people language Lvivian region district life regional sport school to date bath karbovanets village	15 Educational and Cultural Activities in Lviv	Region and Youth
	16	новорічний різдвяний різдво ялинка ілліч вертеп хата горілка святковий колядка трест лисенко лялька багач миколая подарунок наконечний вежа бігти брежне	New Year's Christmas (adj) Christmas Christmas tree Ilyich nativity scene house vodka festive carol trust Lysenko doll rich man Nicholas gift Nakonechny tower run Brezhnev	16 Traditional Celebrations and Cultural Customs	Culture
	17	львівський день український львів місто дитина стати знати молодий місце слово культура новий казати річ життя світ жити великий працювати	Lvivian day Ukrainian Lviv city child become know young place word culture new say thing life world live great work	17 Elements of Life in the Region	Region and Youth
	18	навчання училище учень спеціальність львів освіта середній довідка адреса школа телефон робота мова документ прийом крба місяць клас слюсар навчальний	education vocational school student specialty Lviv education average reference address school phone work language document reception karbovanets month class locksmith educational	18 Educational Systems and Institutions in Lviv	Education
	19	державний допомога приватизація дитина стаття підприємство дохід розмір орган виплата особа податок	state help privatization child article enterprise income size organ payment person tax amount property citizen	19 Social Welfare and Public Administration in Ukraine	Social Welfare

		сума майна громадянин право закон організація об'єкт україна	right law organisation object Ukraine		
	20	дерево сорт ґрунт рослина сад картопля плід кущ город грядка пагін інвалід насіння сантиметр помідор електрон листя крон брунька капуста	tree variety soil plant garden potato fruit bush garden bed shoot disabled seed centimeter tomato electron leaves crown bud cabbage	20 Plant Cultivation	Agriculture
	21	український українець військовий армія флот російський крим офіцер колишній україна уряд чорноморський оун упа снд президент збройний кримський націоналізм росія	Ukrainian Ukrainian military army fleet Russian Crimea officer former Ukraine government Black Sea OUN UPA CIS president armed Crimean nationalism Russia	21 International Relations with Russia	Politics
	22	церква ікона собор храм митрополит громада православний угкц грецький католицький уапц церковний пам'ятка синод упц століття андрей кардинал музей священик	church icon cathedral temple metropolitan community Orthodox UGCC Greek Catholic UAOC ecclesiastical monument synod UOC century Andriy cardinal museum priest	22 Religious Institutions and Cultural Heritage	Religion
	23	фільм програма новина дитина день мультфільм концерт канал телесеріал спорт панорама добраніч росія світ реклама україна студія вечірній мова година	film program news child day cartoon concert channel TV series sport panorama good night Russia world advertisement Ukraine studio evening language hour	23 Media and Entertainment in Ukraine	Media and Entertainment
	24	бандура куліш татарин павлусь інструмент загадка фабрика кінь покарання герасименко почесний купон коломийка іванович мустаф позбавлення костювич павлуся гвардія хлопчик	bandura kulish Tatar Pavlus instrument riddle factory horse punishment Herasymenko honorary coupon kolomyika Ivanovich Mustaf deprivation Kostyukovych Pavlusya guard boy	24 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
Postup	Topic_Number	Keywords_Ukrainian	Keywords_English	Topic_Name	Topic_Category
	00	україна крба травень сша ціна придністровья банк дол українець снд молдова крим рейтинг український хмара горинь експерт біржа кредит фрау	Ukraine karbovanets May USA price Transnistria bank dollar Ukrainian (noun) CIS Moldova Crimea rating Ukrainian cloud Horyn expert stock exchange credit frau	00 Stock Exchange	Economy
	01	тге вистава стрес золото анд видавець	TGE performance stress gold and publisher	01 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR

		психотерапія церква срібло друкарня психотерапевт препарат фільм готель режисер театр фільм камінь книжка ліки	psychotherapy church silver printing house psychotherapist drug film hotel director theater felt stone book medicine		
	02	кучма енергія снд макси мафія статут тренер енергетичний подина арт держадміністрація маршал збірна мерце рад біженець www монополія присяг труд	Kuchma energy CIS maxi mafia statute coach energetic Podina art state administration marshal national team merce council refugee www monopoly oath labor	02 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	03	товариство оун чорновол лев братство только обласний крба вивих молодіжний власник конфлікт федеральний бель союзний товар чорновола студент магазин керрі	society OUN Chernovol lion brotherhood only regional karbovanets dislocation youth owner conflict federal linen union goods Chernovol's student shop carry	03 Youth and Student Movements	Activism
	04	система комп'ютер мережа зв'язок станція сун дані apple сервер користувач програмний windows масінтош комп'ютер модель телефонний машина робочий мороз плющ	system computer network connection station Sun data Apple server user software Windows Macintosh computer model telephone machine working frost ivy	04 Technology Computers and the Internet	Technology
	05	щур податковий полковник капітан очок застава фокіна ухдп кредитор рейтинг лукіянин лановий робін ніко фокін податок міля сез міф правий	rat tax colonel captain glasses pledge Fokina UHDP creditor rating Lukiyenin Lanovy Robin Niko Fokin tax mile Sez myth right	05 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	06	двері декрет кучма гаррі тварюк том елен країна дем'янюка пластик мілошевич кімната комплекс вправа нафта донецький пластика мерце сербський мертвий	door decree Kuchma Harry creature Tom Helen country Demjanjuk plastic Milosevic room complex exercise oil Donetsk plastic merce Serbian dead	06 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	07	м'я юрко чорний роза крба обліконкий чорновіл джоння чорновол винничук рубль юрка король пиво житло базіва зачати винничука руба публікація	Mya Yurko black rose karbovanets Okhokonkiy Chernovil Johnny Chernovol Vinnichuk ruble Yurka king beer housing Baziva conceive Vinnichuk ruble publication	07 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR

	08	україна новий стати український президент уряд справа світ росія день останній країна слово пост великий голова місце політика економічний російський	Ukraine new become Ukrainian president government matter world Russia day last country word fasting large head place politics economic Russian	08 Political and Economic Transition of State and International Relations with Russia	State Development
	09	україна банк українець підприємство державний крба млн ціна ринок фонд фірма російський український компанія росія міністр питання діяльність приватизація акція	Ukraine bank Ukrainian (noun) enterprise state karbovanets million price market fund firm Russian Ukrainian company Russia minister question activity privatization share	09 Ukraine's Economy and Industry	Economy
	10	лев народ вибори день перебудова товариство урсп політ робота рух народ програма прапор екологічний апарат виборчий секція товариство кандидат місто	lion people elections day restructuring society USSR policy work movement people program flag ecological device electoral section society candidate city	10 Political Reconstruction and Elections	State Development
	11	травень грузинський виставка декрет грузія повноваження бжезінський шеварднадзе абхазський мас туліп масінтош космічний сбо сухум доктрина бірж інтел абхазія старт	May Georgian exhibition decree Georgia authority Brzezinski Shevardnadze Abkhaz mass tulip Macintosh space SBO Sukhumi doctrine stock exchange Intel Abkhazia start	11 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	12	програма новина фільм панорама реклама серіал передач сеплан фірма мультфільм блок худ сепіан худфільм партія вибори дитина день США ринок	program news film panorama advertisement series broadcast Cepian firm cartoon block Hud Cepian Hudfilm party elections child day USA market	12 TV Programme	Entertainment
	13	пан жінка рука знати око чоловік газета немати казати жити редакція дівчина любити бачити думати мусити життя молодий кравчук тіло	sir woman hand know eye man newspaper lack say live editorial girl love see think must life young Kravchuk body	13 Relationships Family and Everyday Life	Society
	14	кучма генштаф жінка марьян прем'єр луїс запах шахтар бето март федор прем'єра пльберто парфуми шкіра клінтон вивих коханець вольський меджліс	Kuchma general staff woman Marian premier Louis scent miner Beto March Fedor premiere Plberto perfumes skin Clinton dislocation lover Volsky Mejlis	14 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	15	фонд крба усд ліцензія усда засновник статутний операція	fund karbovanets USD license USDA founder statutory operation FDM	15 Legal and Governance	Legal and Governance

		фдм початковий україна довірчий житло отримати приватизаційний інвестиційний обслуговувати млн директор сертифікат	initial Ukraine trust housing receive privatization investment service million director certificate		
	16	упа церква оун православний католицький польський галичина грецький східний російський радянський західний коновалець визвольний католик німець армія утвр наказ українського	UPA church OUN Orthodox Catholic Polish Galicia Greek eastern Russian Soviet western Konovalets liberation Catholic German army UHVR order Ukrainian	16 The Role of Religion	Religion
	17	пинзенник бюджет декрет курс плющ нардеп ядерний нбо юхновський партія купон кндс клінтон кпа підприємець фронт клінтон уряд урп поезія	Pinzenyk budget decree rate ivy MP nuclear NBO Yukhnovsky party coupon KNDS Clinton CPA entrepreneur front Clinton government URP poetry	17 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	18	фільм худ новина телефільм мультфільм канал вісто концерт програма дитина гімнастика плакати музичний останкіно лановий фокін казка багатий ранок итг	film Hud news telefilm cartoon channel Visto concert program child gymnastics posters musical Ostankino Lanovy Fokin fairy tale rich morning ITG	18 TV Programme	Entertainment
	19	шахтар масельський донецький парта дол хвильовий гравець ріс пропорційний шахта відставка руцький увс упц страйк вибори куб страйка укра уусб	miner Maselsky Donetsk desk dol wave player rise proportional mine resignation Rutsky UVS UPC strike elections cube strike Ukraine UUSB	19 Miner's Strike	Activism
	20	мільйон банк усд тисяча карбованець фільм складати роман сертифікат тело усда інфобанк дитина мільярд відсоток факс львівський готель чай століття	million bank USD thousand karbovanets film consist novel certificate body USDA Infobank child billion percent fax Lviv hotel tea century	20 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR
	21	політичний партія україна український рада влада національний народ рух організація державна народний член державний питання сила повинний	political party Ukraine Ukrainian council power national people movement organisation state folk member state question force must democratic Lviv Lvivian	21 Political Movements for Democracy	Activism

		демократичний львів львівський			
	22	програма фільм худ серіал фільм новина оголошення мультфіль канал реклама поч передач україна день анонс огляд студія дитина мультсеріал телесеріал	program film Hud series film news announcement cartoon channel advertisement start transmission Ukraine day preview review studio child animated series TV series	22 TV Programme	Entertainment
	23	україна млн виробництво вибори тис обсяг газ усда усд тонн нафта український травень будівництво проект завод кубометр поставка кандидат млрд	Ukraine million production elections thousand volume gas USDA USD tons oil Ukrainian May construction project plant cubic meter supply candidate billion	23 Production and Energy Sector	Environment
	24	усда ядерний програма вул итг смоп усд твп жириновський збереження зброя вбудований фільм ітн лисенко тютюновий номенклатура вечір хиа руба	USDA nuclear program street ITG CMOP USD TVP Zhirinovsky preservation weapon built-in film ITN Lysenko tobacco nomenclature evening Xia ruba	24 UNCLEAR	UNCLEAR

Appendix 2 – List of Top 15 Location Frequencies in *Leninska Molod’/Moloda Halychyna* and *Postup* (1989–1995)

Locations_English	LM_1989	LM_1990	MH_1990	MH_1991	MH_1992	MH_1993	MH_1995	POSTUP_1989	POSTUP_1990	POSTUP_1991	POSTUP_1992	POSTUP_1993	POSTUP_1994	POSTUP_1995	Total
Ukraine	113	62	530	1343	6546	4517	5708	646	323	422	5183	5015	7149	3560	41117
Lviv	304	200	626	1167	3518	2590	2756	344	87	197	1405	1197	1281	974	16646
Russia		8		179	1151	804	874	82	54	89	1643	1690	1761	1103	9438
USA	39	36	96	409	1022	808	1479			55	1045	1083	1014	707	7793
Kyiv	29	16	97	229	1016	652	994	52	20	60	1016	1207	1260	642	7290
Poland	30	23	48	162	551	508	651	38	55	41	425	419	452	199	3602
Moscow	41	11	73	175	399	280	311	56	33	62	616	515	553	422	3547
Lviv oblast	40	38	115	238	747	611	815	46		37	184			150	3021
Europe	27				351	333	452		24	31	480	432	449	317	2876
USSR	197	46	135	419	357	145		166	58	68	362	312	316	148	2729
Crimea					492	145	255				397	267	522	229	2307
France	33		57		349	235	389				246	225	224	219	1977
Germany				67		269	321		31	23	335	356	384	168	1954
Carpathians	64	30	55		518	363	545	26	16						1617
Galicja			69	195	473	291	308	68	90	35					1529
Odesa							212			11	189	215	376		814
Kharkiv					462			34				256	237		716
Dnipro	15														477
Ukrainian SSR	25	33	75	89				88							310
Lithuania			63	166				50							279
Drohobych						235						228			235
Doneisk															228
England	21	11	53	137									217		222
Turkey										12	183				217
Canada														181	195
Temopil														161	181
Ivano-Frankivsk															161
Baltics				56				28							84
Italy		11	64					40							75
Estonia															40
Styri	15	11								11					37
Donbas										27					27
Nagorno-Karabakh									26						26
Armenia									25						25
Volhynia									23						23
Azerbaijan									20						20
Western Ukraine	17														17
Moldova										11					11
Holmshchyna		11													11
Federal Republic of Germany		8													8

Appendix 3 – Names of Topic Categories and Number of Topics per Category

<i>Categories in Postup</i>	<i>Number of Topics per Category</i>	<i>Categories in Leninska Molod' / Moloda Halychyna</i>	<i>Number of Topics per Category</i>
State Development	2	Agriculture	2
Activism	3	Culture	2
Culture	1	Education	1
Economy	2	Media and Entertainment	3
Entertainment	3	Politics	2
Legal and Governance	1	Religion	1
Society	1	Social Welfare	1
Technology	1	Soviet Youth	1
Unclear	9	Sports	1
		State Development	3
		Life	1
		Region and Youth	2
		Unclear	5