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National Pride among Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups in Europe. A Comparative Evidence from the European Values Survey

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INTRODUCTION

The international system is made from sovereign nation-states which are seen as legitimate entities structured around a dominant nationality. Secure national states however do not only need legitimacy and power to enjoy stability, they also need a sense of national pride widely shared by most of its citizens. This idea was frequently underlined across scholar work (see for example Stern 1995; Sidanius, Feshbach et al. 1997; Dowley and Silver 2000). In the last two decades we constantly witnessed community tensions resulting from inter-ethnic discrepancies all other Europe. Since the dissolution of the communist regimes, there has been a boosting increase in the formation of new nations in Eastern Europe. Within these regions, there was a constant effort to keep national loyalty and conflict between different ethnies at a reasonable peaceful level. At the same time, many ethnically heterogeneous nations in Western Europe have also experienced tensions with minorities' demands threatening national integrity (e.g. the Basque and Northern Irish movements). Given this problematic trend in national affection, there is a constant need to further explore the interface between national attachment and one's association with a particular ethnicity.

A strong national belonging is relevant in the context of Benedict Anderson's idea of an "imagined community" – a shared value of a common national affinity for all members of the nation. Within a multiethnic society, it gives a sense of harmony, where all members understand and trust each others. Especially, for many members of an ethnic minority group, living their daily life in a multi-ethnic community rise problems related to national belonging, acceptance and unity. Being surrounded by a dominant culture, ethnic minorities with different ethno-cultural background, pose questions related to psychological and socio-cultural accommodation of their group values in the national context (Ward 1996). The most vulnerable minorities are those who are, or perceive themselves as being discriminated in the country. The perception of group discrimination leads to tensions and weak satisfaction with the society they are living in. Instead of identifying themselves with the national-state, many discriminated minorities tight the cohesion around their own ethnic group and thus become inclusive in their behavior. By default, discrimination is often associated with weak incentives toward national cohesion which makes higher levels of national pride very unlikely.

Ethnic diversity can be considered harmonious only in the case when both minority and majority groups are bounded together by a common sense of national unity and cohesion. This is however hardly ever the case and widely depends on how successful the nation-states are in creating thriving interethnic links of shared purpose which are able to collapse all regional and group

values into a single one, national-wide identity. States which fail to create this unifying project are more open to experience intergroup tensions and even to be at risk for ethnic secession.

It is argued in this paper that a strong feeling of national pride is a relevant measure for the idea of interethnic cohesion. Previous research has found that strong sentiments of national pride have a positive effect on state stability by making their citizens to be more involved in the nation (Evans and Kelly 2002, Smith and Jarkko 1998, Tilley and Heath 2007). Once the opinion of pride increases, the resulting feelings might turn to claims of superiority against "others" within the nation or against "others" outside the state (Brubaker 1996; Hjerm 1998). Since national pride is associated with both positive and negative outcomes, the need to understand its distribution across ethnic groups seems legitimate.

In this study we empirically analyze whether or not national identity values have the same resonance across ethnic minority and majority groups in 24 European countries. To make this analysis more comprehensive we will examine what civic and socio-demographic factors have an impact on individuals' level of national pride. Several questions will serve as our primary focus and will be therefore employed in this analysis: Do ethnic minority groups share the same national pride values as the majority population in the country? Does the discrimination status matter? To what extend the empirical evidence holds the same pattern across European regions? What individual characteristics and beliefs impact stronger on national pride values among both ethnic minority and majority groups in Europe? All these questions will be assessed in a comparative framework by using the European Values Survey (EVS) as our empirical pipeline.

Due to the relative recent availability of data on values and attitudes, we can now go beyond the theoretical inputs and test the determinants of national pride empirically. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to data-analyze the majority-minority relationship by including it in the national pride equation. The main contribution of this paper is set to provide valuable data-proof insights on the magnitude and resonance of the intergroup cohesion applied to the idea of ethnicity.

In the first place, we will briefly introduce the theoretical concepts of ethnicity, minority and majority groups. After that, some ideas of nationalism and national identity will be reviewed. Then, the target population, data and the measurement framework will be defined. The descriptive and the empirical results will follow while the conclusion section will resume this paper.

ETHNIC GROUPS: MINORITY AND MAJORITY

Defining ethnicity and ethnic groups: Theory

Before going any further with the analysis, we should first define the meaning of an ethnic group and the sense of minority and majority status. Anthony Smith (1987) regards an ethnic group as being a community of individuals which are able to identify with each other based on a presumed or real common heritage. The ethnic legacy is linked with primordial feelings and is composed of similar cultural, linguistic, religious or biological traits. Apart from the self-perceived ethnic

uniqueness, there should be a general accepted recognition from other communities of a group's distinctiveness (Eriksen 2001; 261).

Ethnicity is considered as being a relatively recent concept. It was used for the first time in David Riesman's work in 1953 (see Glazer and Moynihan 1975; 1). This notion is seen as one of the most powerful and dynamic elements in the nationalism studies nowadays. It is generally understood as a belief in a putative descent which usually takes the form of a faith rooted in something which could be real or not (Conversi 2002; 2). Usually it is referred as a constructed reality, made from myths of a common ancestry. According to Connor (1997; 33) ethnicity as a perception stands at the core of identity formation since only rarely a feeling of ethnic belonging draws entirely its legitimacy from real facts.

Several theories might be identified in the literature which explicitly target ethnicity and ethnic groups. Amongst them, we identified three approaches, seen as the most appropriate to understand the concept of ethnicity in the context of our project. These concepts are: primordialism, perrenialism and constructivism.

Primordialism holds the idea that ethnicity and ethnic groups are part of the natural and historical order (Kohn 1967 [1944]; van den Berghe 1978; Pearson 1993). The roots of all ethnic communities reside in the far past and are linked by kinship and biological features. Each ethnic population, having their own specific cultural distinctiveness (language, religion, race), is a proof of a primordial biological and historical continuity. According to Clifford Geertz the main facet of primordialism is that it sees ethnicity and identity as mainly assumed by all ethnic communities. Once ethnic identity is acquired it becomes immutable for further questioning both within group and by others (Geertz 1967).

The primordialist theory however, does not sufficiently explain the inter-group connections and the emergence of the multi-ethnic societies (Smith 1999; 13). Some scholars go even further and stipulate that ethnicity is less primordial but more embedded in the idea of how human nature perceives its experience of the world (Geertz 1967). The explanatory power of primordialism is nevertheless of a great relevance for our study since it shapes the understanding of group identity and ethnic belonging. Even so, we need to carefully distinguish between the supra-group primordial phenomena such as biological continuity and the in-group primordialist features like blood, language, religion, territory or general historical determinants. The first category is seen by theorists as very important since it provides reasons for ethnic continuity. The second, in-group features, are mainly important at the individual level, because it provides relevant reasons for people's beliefs to anchor their ethnic identity. For our paper, we tend to use more the last approach and analyze those individual and group primordial features which make people to have strong attachments for national pride.

Perrenialism rejects the idea that ethnicity is part of the natural order but keeps the historical continuity as the rooting factor of group identity (Fishman 1980; Connor 1994). The main argument emerges around the perception of temporal change and holds that ethnic groups are not constant over time. They emerge, transform and vanish throughout the history. Ethnicity is therefore seen more as a political notion which is used to control and eventually manipulate the actions of members of the group. Donald Noel stipulates that exactly perrenialist values stand on

the roots and lead to ethnic stratification. Particularly, the fixed group characteristics such as religion, nationality, race etc., are taken into account in assigning certain social positions (Noel 1968).

Based on the perrenialist argument, when several ethnic groups collide, it is a natural perrenialist tendency to assign a stratification status, sometime discriminatory, to an ethnic community. A stratified multiethnic society is usually characterized by tensions and hostility which finally might lead to conflict (Lawrence and Hutchings 1996). In such context, there hardly can be a perfect sense of unity on the national level. We see the perrenialist process as a challenge to the idea of national pride. It can be the case when ethnic groups are more prone to fight for their place in the process of ethnic stratification than focusing to acquire a common sense of national unity.

Constructivism, with Max Weber as the leading scholar, sees ethnic groups as artificial constructed communities (Künstlich) which creates a strong belief in a shared community ("Gemeinschaft") (Weber [1922]1978; 389). Many ethnic groups claim a longstanding continuity and a strong credence in their ethnogenesis. Scholars have documented however that the majority of these beliefs and practices, which bounds ethnic communities over time, are of a recent invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] 1992). The constructed nature of ethnic diversity was further stressed by Fredrik Barth who believes that ethnicity was continuously negotiated by both external ascriptions and internal self-determination (Barth 1969). The group identities are thus continuously constructed and modified according to particular ethnic needs. A specific national identity could decline over time but certainly, new, hybrid identities will take their place (Hall 1992).

Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups

Defining the border between a nation and its composing minority and majority groups have been a constant dilemma amongst modern scholars in the field of nationalism and identity. Many major thinkers across history saw a conflicting situation when two or more nationalities share the same state. John Stuart Mill made an explicit statement by referring to the idea that "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities" (Mill 1998; 428). To understand however the true sense of the minority-majority relationship, we should first define what each of the categories means in the framework of this analysis.

This study regards both minority and majority groups in the context of a unified society by assuming that all these communities are part of the nation-building project. A standard definition of a minority group is given by the United Nation Committee for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities. Enunciated in 1985, this definition sees an ethnic minority as "a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in

law"[1]. This definition fits the European context and has to do with the political power and ruling process at the state level[2].

During the analysis, a strong emphasis will be credited to the discrimination status of ethnic minorities. According to Louis Wirth a discriminated minority can be considered "a group of people who, on the grounds of their physical or cultural characteristics in comparison to others in the society, are subject to differentiating, unequal treatment and who regard themselves as [potential] subjects of collective discrimination" (Wirth 1945; 347). Generally, discrimination is perceived as a danger for minority group identity. Thus, ethnically distinct individuals tend to resemble themselves more with their particular ethnic community and less with the broad society they are living in (Branscombe, Schmitt et al. 1999). By attaching the discriminatory tag to an ethnic minority, the individuals become aware of their status and tend to close their community for other members of the state. In time they disconnect from the unifying values of the nation and unless assimilation or accommodating policies are implemented, they prefer to stay marginalized and alienated in the society. The case of Gypsy minority in Eastern Europe stays as a relevant example of this phenomenon.

Assuming the presence of an ethnic minority we logically presume the existence of a corresponding ethnic majority. Very often the majority group is associated with the dominant status which comprise different, usually higher, social hierarchy and more civic privileges (Wirth 1945). In the context of this study, an ethnic majority will be understood as a subset of a group which counts for more than half of the entire population. This proportion is usually referred also as a simple majority. The majority groups can be accommodating (inclusive) in relation to ethnic diversity or may choose to be exclusive toward other ethnic communities. Usually, the perceived actions of tolerance and inclusion attitudes, coming from the majority groups, are decisive to build cohesive policies and integrate ethnic minorities in the society. (Berry 2001, Vedder et al. 2006). There can be cases however when majority population restrain the area of communication within their ethnic community and refuse the interaction with other ethnic groups. Exclusiveness is actually the main practice leading to discrimination within many societies worldwide. Further studies have shown that national pride is greater among the majority group and lower among ethnic minorities (Smith and Kim 2006; 4, Dowley and Silver 2000; 361). Since the majority groups have usually stronger numerical and cultural attachments with the nation, this statement can be logically conceived as a standard hypothesis.

NATIONALISM, IDENTITY AND RELATED CONCEPTS

The classical idea of nationalism, is viewed by Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1990) or Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991) as closely interrelated with the notion of ethnicity and culminates with the formation of the nation-state. An ideal scenario is considered when a nation

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[1] E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, paragraph 181, from the United Nations Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 1985 meeting, quoted in Gyurcsík, I. (1993). New Legal Ramifications of the Question of National Minorities. Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issues. I. M. Cuthbertson and J. Leibowitz, Westview Press: 19-50. at 22

[2] There are cases however, when the majority population within the state is not always in the position of the governing group, as it was till recently the case of Rwanda (Hutu vs. Tutsi) , South Africa (Black vs. Whites) or even Kazakhstan (Kazakh vs. Russians).

is mono-ethnic and its boundaries coincide with the borders of the state. This is however almost never the case. Nation-states usually include populations which are not part of the majority ethnic group. From one reason or another, these minorities often feel underrepresented, discriminated and even excluded from the general political, cultural or economical life of the nation. In such cases, there will be inevitable demands for social inclusion and actions toward autonomy or even complete separation from the state. The intensity of these actions is usually more persistent when the protesting minorities identify themselves with neighboring communities which have a state by their own. The main concern of a nation-state is therefore to give its citizens a feeling of common emotional unity which should pertain among both ethnic minority and majority groups. This process might be approached in one of the following two ways.

The first one sees the role of society and individual progress as essential in the formation of national identity (Habermas 1984; 75-110). In order for this process to be successful, it is necessary for all ethnic, racial or national identities to be neglected and the legitimacy of the nation-state should be based on the political rights and individual freedoms of all its citizens. Being based on the universal principle of equality before the law, this process has, as its primary target, the political and social integration of all individuals in the structural life of the nation-state. Amongst others, Pye (1971), stipulates that the drawbacks resulting from ethnic diversity can be solved though "assimilation" or "accommodation" policies.

Assimilation means that all minorities should be fully integrated into the main population stream by giving them full citizen rights and making sure that the minority's descendents will be free of their own culture by the end of the assimilation process (Glazer 1997). The politics of assimilation was practically applied by many political regimes. Especially, the European nations have deliberately and intensely applied politics of assimilation in order to homogenize their populations. Charles Tilly (1992), Ernest Renan (1996), Anthony Smith (1991) and James Fearon (2003) have widely discussed the European assimilation policies and their activation reasons. An example of aggressive assimilation practices can be seen also the "sovietization" process initiated by the Soviet Union and expected to lead to assimilation of its numerous ethnicities. By creating a soviet, supra-national identity, the ultimate goal was to achieve uniformity, where the ideological sense of belonging was supposed to replace the local, ethnic distinctiveness.

Accommodation, on the other hand, is a more recent and malleable political approach. It is mainly used by the European Union as a strategy to promote the democratic integration of its ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. This concept presupposes that ethnic communities should try to adjust with each others. The scope is to create a feeling of national unity where different ethnic groups are prone to bound together based on the common European cultural, economic and political linkages.

The second way to approach ethnic diversity is mainly supported by Will Kymlicka (2000). It is primarily favorable to the idea of recognizing ethnic diversity by giving extensive rights to those minorities living within the boundaries of the nation-state. Daniele Conversi (2002) also believes that a process of nation-building which is not sensitive to ethnic nuances, irreversible imply a parallel process of nation-destroying, especially among ethnic minorities. This neglected, leads

to widespread confusion across minority communities which start questioning the sense of civic consciousness and national loyalty (Conversi 2002; 3). In its successful scenario however, the identity formation leads to a process which Walker Connor (1994; 168) calls "ethnonationalism". It reveals the idea of devotion which an ethnic minority, adopts in the context of national unity. The true value of ethnonationalism reflects thus the harmonious relationship and the national attachment between a minority group and the majority population.

DATA AND SAMPLE

Description of Data

The data used in this paper comes from the European Values Survey (EVS).This database is an individual-level, multi-country, cross sectional and time series survey which comprises the majority of the European countries. The EVS registers information about individuals' political values, social attitudes, behavior and beliefs. Each country participating in this survey designs its sample in a random manner by having a known inclusion probability of all persons which might be eligible for the survey. The data was collected by means of face-to-face interviews in all targeted countries. Only individuals aged 15 and over are asked to be part of the sample. In order to correct for possible distortions resulting from the applied sampling techniques in different European countries, we will use a specific weighting variable in EVS which was explicitly designed for this purpose.

In our analysis we include 23 European states[3] divided in three clusters: Western European democracies, Former Soviet European countries and South Eastern/Balkan states. For reasons of sample consistency, the timeframe for analysis is set to integrate the last two extensive waves available in EVS – from 1994 to 1998 and from 1999 to 2004[4].

Sampled Population

In analyzing our target population we make a distinction between ethnic minority and majority groups within all countries under analysis. Despite the fact that the analyzed data is registered at the individual level, we grouped, in a first stage, all respondents in ethnic clusters/groups. The following sorting variables were used: Country of the respondent (EVS code – s003), ethnic group/declared ethnicity (EVS code – x051), language spoken at home (EVS code – g016) and the region where the interview was conducted (EVS code – x048). For example, respondents from Spain, interviewed in the Basque region declared the language spoken at home as being Basque we assign them to this particular ethnic community. Similarly, those respondents, interviewed in Georgia, and declaring to have Russian as the only language spoken at home,[5] they were considered as being part of the Russian minority. The majority groups were clustered based on the same selection procedures.

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[3] A number of sub-state entities are also included in EVS. From them, we will use in our analysis two such sub-national territorial entities: Northern Ireland and Republic of Srpska.
[4] Each country has defined their sample and conducted their surveys only one time within the extensive wave period.
[5] There were an insignificant number of respondents having more than one language spoken at home. We excluded them from the analysis.

Clustering all individuals in specific ethnic groups is very important in the context of this study. So far we have limited empirical data to assess how ethnic values change among ethnic groups in Europe. The existing research is particularly scarce in comparative studies which tackle the pride values among both minority and majority groups. From our knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically analyze the national pride in Europe by considering ethnic diversity in the country.

In order to reflect the discriminatory status of ethnic diversity, the minority groups will be split into two categories: ethnies "at risk" for discrimination and minorities "not at risk" of being disadvantaged. In identifying the discrimination status, we will make use of the classification criteria available from the "Minorities at Risk" (MAR) project. This project developed by Tedd Gurr at Maryland University tracks those ethnic minorities which are more prone to a discriminatory treatment in the society. The criteria to which this status is assigned follow two main well documented rules[6]: A minority group should "collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society" and the group "is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests." In order for these criteria to be applied, the minority should represent at least 1% of the country total population excluding all refugees and/or immigrants. In total, we identified in EVS, 76 ethnic groups from which 24 majority groups and 53 ethnic minorities. From these minorities, based on the MAR database we identified 30 minority groups which are classified as "at risk" for discrimination. The remaining 23 minorities are considered not endangered by a discriminatory treatment.

MEASUREMENTS

Dependent Variable

National pride can be considered as part of the state collective identity. It can be understood as the positive link of an ethnic community with its nation. When correlated with ethnic diversity, the national pride might serve as a relevant indicator to measure the standards of patriotism and national cohesion among different ethnic groups in the country. What we need to capture is therefore the intensity to which individuals of both minority and majority groups are attached to their nationality.

The level of national pride is an excellent measure for our study since it captures the substance of both primordialist and perrenialist feelings among ethnic communities. Maykel Verkuyten (2005) has documented and concluded that ethnic identity, as a value, is more important to ethnic minorities than to the majority groups. Ethnic minorities seem to attach more value to their ethnogenesis and to feel more as belonging to their group ethnicity. This devotion for the intra-group feelings do not allow, however much room for sensing positively about their supra-group, national identity. We might expect therefore that national pride should be stronger among majority groups than among ethnic minorities. The majority populations are regarded also to be both the main actors and the main beneficiaries of the nation-state projects. Individuals, members of an ethnic minority group, will report as being proud of their nationality only if they sense that

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[6] Taken from the Minority at Risk IV Dataset: Users Manual 030703", version 2003, 117, at 5, Accessed January 2009, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm

their ethnic values have been assimilated or accommodated into the national scheme. Higher pride values will thus signal a close emotional connection with the state of which citizenship they hold.

Since the accommodation and assimilation practices widely vary across different ideological regimes, we expect different trends in pride values in each of the group of countries under analysis. Western democracies are more experienced in nation-building and integrating ethnic minorities. Here, it is expected that minority groups should have practically similar pride values as the majority groups. On opposition, former communist countries had applied more aggressive policies of assimilation and uniformisation which forced many minority communities to feel discriminated. Since discrimination is supposed to be negatively correlated with national pride, we believe that ethnic minorities in former communist countries will have lower pride values than the majority populations.

The indicator measuring the level of national pride in EVS is represented by the following question: "How proud are you to be [country nationality]?" A limited number of scholars used this measurement to target several economic and cross-governance topics by using the same question from the World Values Survey (WVS) and International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Among them, Schulman (2003) explored how economic wealth influence national pride values. Before that Dowley and Silver (2000) initiated a cross national project measuring the attachment to the individual ethnic group and loyalty to the larger country. Smith and Kim (2006) used the ISSP to correlate national pride with several socio-demographic factors in a temporal view. More recently, Ahlerup and Hansson (2008) conducted research on how government effectiveness impact national pride and ethnic diversity.

In EVS, the national pride question offers four options for an answer: 1 = very proud, 2 = quite proud, 3 = not very proud, 4 = not at all proud. To make our results more clear for analysis and interpretation, we have reversed the order of response in the sense of having a high degree of pride assigned to higher scores. Thus we give a value of 0 for "not at all proud" and the maximum value of 3 for "very proud". We keep this structure during our descriptive part by calculating the average mean values for every group sample. For our empirical model however, we build an ordinal three-scale variable by merging the negative pride values in one category. The commenced scale will have as result the following structure: 0 for "Not proud", 1 for "quite/relatively proud", and 2 for "very proud". Since we are interested to observe the variation in pride at its peak levels, we consider this structure as optimal for our analysis.

In this paper we analyze the national pride values among different ethnic groups in 23 European countries. A comparative perspective will be however employed at two levels. First, this study will analyze the pride values among ethnic minority and majority groups. Second, the empirical results will be structured to analyze pride levels across three different nationalistic environments in Europe: former Soviet Union countries, Balkans and Western European democracies. We strongly believe that national pride is widely shaped by specific societal, ideological and historical circumstances existing in each country. By splitting our sample into three distinct regions, we hope to better observe and compare the explicit particularities in pride values at the European level.

Independent Variables

Diversity creates feelings of threat correlated with negative out-group orientation and less trust and social cohesion (Delhey and Newton 2005; Letki 2008). Ethnic diversity is further associated with potential problems, such as poor economic performance and week political agreement (Easterly and Levine 1997). Paolo Mauro (1995) claims that ethnic diversity is a stimulator for corruption which in turn negatively impacts on public goods and economic growth. By building a strong sense of national pride is widely seen as a good way to moderate some of these negative effects of ethnic diversity.

However, particular insights about national pride are still rather scarce in the literature. Previous research has focused on different incentives which form the sense of national pride, but only a few looked on specific indicators which could predict pride values. From the existing studies, a correlation can be observed between a strong sense of national pride and the feeling of too much diversity in the country. Furthermore, the feeling of too many "others" is directly linked with the advancing age, lower education levels, a tendency towards 'materialism' and right wing political preferences (Saggar and Drean 2001; 9).

Individuals have more other criteria, based on which they evaluate their attachment with the group-ethnicity and their loyalty to the larger nation. Drawing from identity, ethnocentrism[7] and trust studies, we try to identify which particular variables are suitable for strong effects on pride values. Prior studies show a relatively weak and variable differences that gender has on national pride, with men usually expressing stronger national pride values than women do (Smith and Kim 2006; 3). The literature reveals however that women are more trusting and less ethnocentric then men are (Scheepers, Felling et al. 1992).

Based on the generational replacement theories older people are proved to be more proud of their nationality than are younger individuals (Abramson and Inglehart 1992) This aspect however widely vary, depending of the particular national domain targeted (Evans and Kelley 2002; 323-324). Age also has proved to have a positive effect on trust and ethnocentrism values (Scheepers, Felling et al. 1992; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Stolle 2001). Education is one of the factors which are expected to have a direct effect on how people think of their national resemblance. In his post-modernization theory, Ronald Inglehart (1997) stipulates that highly educated individuals tend to be more cosmopolitan in thinking and thus less attached to their nations. Research done by Tilley and Heath (2007), but also by (Evans and Kelley 2002) has found similar correlation patterns. Higher levels of education provide people with more mobility and international openness. They will be hence less tempted to connect with a particular national environment and are expected to report lower levels of national pride.

Given the extended research on civic values done by John Brehm and Wendy Rahn (1997), we also know that income stable and religious people are more prone to trust and oriented toward

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[7] Ethnocentrism is closely related to identity and inter-ethnic studies. It relates to thinking that a group cultural heritage is superior to others and all the judgments related to other groups' values are viewed from these stereotypical lenses.

accepting ethnic diversity. Especially, researchers have found that national pride is very much affected by the way people are attached with religion (Inglehart 1997; 83, Tilley and Heath, 2005; 16). The intertwined connection between national beliefs and religiousness is expected to hold a strong causality in our study as well. Particularly, in former communist countries, the absence of a strong democratic leadership, made religious institutions to be the intermediate link through which national identity is formed and disseminated. For western Europe there is also evidence that the decline in religious and cultural traditions goes in parallel with the decline in national pride (Tilley and Heath 2007; 662).

Further in the literature it is shown that a strong sense of community is given by the idea of equality of the membership within the nation. This equality promotes solidarity across rich and poor and between left and right on the political scale (Hylland-Eriksen 2002 [1993]). Stephen Shulman (2003) find out that, in many countries, low income people have greater levels of national pride than the rich, upper classes. These results however hold mainly in industrialized democracies where social welfare is omnipresent and all individuals are considered to be equal and treated as such. Ronald Inglehart (1997) also has observed that satisfaction with the national pride is inversely linked with the level of economic development of the country. At the individual level however, rich people are expected in general to be more proud of their nationality by virtue of the country allowing them to acquire more wealth. Even though the literature have mixed findings regarding this correlation (see (Shulman 2003; 43), we believe that poor people tie their status with feelings of social injustice and thus they tend to be more unsatisfied with their nationhood.

Similarly, left-right political partisanship is also included as a control variable because of the assumption that more political extreme preferences will have a stronger impact on national pride. The link between extreme political preferences and pride attitudes has been weakly explored in the literature. Only few traces can be observed in the scholar work. In western Europe the decrease in left-right wing views among recent generations appear to go along with a decline in national pride (Tilley and Heath 2007; 669). Sidanius, Fleshbach and his colleagues (1997) also believe that strong nationalism can be mainly labeled as a "right-wing" form of patriotism. Throughout the history it can be observed that right wing political preferences were associated mainly with great national pride and therefore, we will consider this causality as such.

Economic performance and life satisfaction are usually strong positive predictors for any pride values. People satisfied with their life as a whole have proved to attach higher weight for nationalistic support (Shulman 2003; Verkuyten 2008, Lewis and Bratton 2000; 9). The existing research tends to find lower life satisfaction among ethnic minorities than within majority populations (Andrews and Withey 1976; Verkuyten 2008). Hence, it can be expected that ethnic minorities, being less satisfied with their life in the country will be also tempted to adopt weaker pride values within the same society.

This study also acknowledge for the shifting attitudes toward authority resulting from both postmodernism and globalization (Western Europe) or by ideological regime change (Eastern Europe). Once these changes occur, the observations show that individuals seek the security of strong leaders and powerful institutions (Inglehart 1999; 10). Further evidence indicates that respect for authority is declining in the advanced democracies with possible negative

consequences on patriotism and national pride beliefs. Research has also shown that desire for strong authority breeds intolerance for cultural change and adversity for different ethnic groups (Inglehart 1999; 5).

Ethnic diversity usually produces less harmonization across values and believes, and thus ethnic minorities proved to have lower feelings of ethnocentrism and social cohesion (Soroka, Johnston et al. 2005). Discrimination proved to be a drawback factor which leads ethnic minorities toward within-group inclusiveness and less devotion to the nation (Verkuyten 2008; 401). The discriminatory practices limit the general access of minority groups to resources which restrict their ability to integrate as full members in the nation. It also emphasized the idea of "otherness" among people and significantly reduces their attachment to the nation (Hjerm 1998). The tensions resulting from discrimination produce disunification and lessen the pride feelings in the nation. Consequently we expect lower loyalty to the nation among "at risk" minorities compared with both the majority groups and privileged minorities. All variables used in this study are further documented in Appendix I.

Empirical Method

The method used to analyze our empirical model is a discrete choice technique in the form of ordinal probit. The reason behind this choice is well-grounded in the nature of our dependent variable. We use a hierarchical ordinal scale indicator to measure the level and the intensity of national pride. A typical measurement in such context is to apply an ordinal probit. It allows us to assess the magnitude of national pride at each level of the scale while controlling for potentially relevant indicators. The analysis will be conducted in the following manner. First, we estimate the general ordinal probit model. The raw model will reveal the general tendencies of all indicators in connection to the scale of the dependent variable. The estimation of the raw equation can be visualized as follows:

$$P_i = \beta_1 k_i + \beta_2 x_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (i=1 \ldots N)$$

Where P_i is the intensity of the National Pride coded as 0—for negative pride, 1—for relative/neutral pride and 3—for strong national pride; k_i stands for a handful of socio-demographic variables at the individual level i; x_i relates to some control variables quantifying values and believes (e.g. life satisfaction, left-right preferences, respect for authority etc.) which are measured at the individual level i; Accordingly, e_i is equal to the individual specific error term.

The raw probit results however, do not clearly show the direction of causality applied to the hierarchy of each value of our national-pride scale. According to William Greene (2000; 876) the interpretation of the coefficients of a raw ordered probit model is widely unclear in the literature and thus it is considered to be irrelevant in drawing any conclusions. Subsequently, a specific technique should be applied to calculate the marginal effects[8] applicable to each value of the ordinal dependent variable. The marginal effects assess the specific impact that each indicator

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[8] In calculating marginal effects we will make use of the "mfx2" command in STATA 10.

has on every hierarchical value of the dependent variable. The interpretation of the final results will be also done in terms of the marginal effects.

RESULTS

We first show the summary statistics for all indicators employed in this study; then graphically display the national pride mean values across European regions and among minority and majority groups. In order to fully capture the true effects of national belonging we need also to focus on some specific indicators which potentially have a causal relationship on national pride intensity. As specified in the previous section, we use a probit regression analysis to model the predictors of national loyalty.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all indicators used in this study. The dependent variable *Pride* has a mean of 2.2 and a standard deviation of 0.8. Taking into consideration that the respondents referred to as quite proud = 2 and very proud =3, we conclude that, on average, individuals seems to be more than quite proud of their nationality. These facts however are supposed to vary across time and within different parts of Europe. Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 will further explore the *Pride* dimension across the analyzed period and within three different European regions.

Discrimination status is assigned to more than half (M = 0.68, SD=0.46) of the sampled minorities. Generally, the analyzed individuals include, on average, more medium educated people (M = 1.86, SD = 0.71), relatively wealthy (M = 1.96, SD 0.79), and quite religious (M = 1.67, SD = 0.47). The mean scores for left-right political preferences are situated at a moderate value of 0.98 (SD = 0.58). Similarly, the values reflecting respect for authority were situated at a positive level (M = 1.6, SD = 0.73). For life satisfaction, respondents declared to have, on average, a moderate perception of their everyday existence (M = 1.09, SD 0.77).

Table 1 Summary Statistics

| Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Pride	68141	2.209	0.831	0	3
Discrimination Status*	6920	0.684	0.465	0	1
Gender	72668	1.536	0.499	1	2
Age	72514	2.133	0.765	1	3
Education	70988	1.868	0.713	1	3
Income	61390	1.966	0.798	1	3
Religiosity	67156	1.671	0.470	1	2
Left-right	55414	0.980	0.585	0	2
Authority	68042	1.614	0.730	1	3
Life satisfaction	71934	1.095	0.778	0	2

*Applied only for ethnic minorities

National pride is meant to be a changeful value across time. While analyzing both majority and minority groups we are particularly interested to see if time dimension impact differently on the

slope measuring national patriotism. Figure 1 graphically displays the pride tendencies across the two employed extensive waves which reflect the time period between 1994 up to 2004.

The picture shows two different patterns in pride development among majority and minority groups. When considering ethnic minorities, there can be observed a general decreasing tendency in the cumulative trend of patriotism in Europe. The values of "not proud" increased significantly in the analyzed period. There is also sizeable increase in the relative means of national pride while the strong values of national patriotism stay at a lower level among minority groups. Less pride during the observed decade followed the deep transitional period of the new established democracies in central and Eastern Europe, but also the increased ethnic activism in the Western world. According to Donald Horowitz (2000), ethnic mobilization is more powerful in the process of transitional institutional chaos that place national values under a significant pressure. National minorities are the most affected since they see transitional chaos as an opportunity to enforce their ethnic demands which subsequently may result in weaker attachment with the national state they are part of.

Figure 1. Cumulative National Pride Values over Time

Among the majority populations, the pride tendencies are more straightforward. The cumulative pattern of national patriotism shows a consistent temporal stability. Strong values of national pride stay at the highest level with a slight increasing pattern over time. Only a small proportion of the dominant groups are not proud of their nationality and this trend is shown to be constant across time.

Further we present the pride values across three European regions while taking into account the discrimination status of minority groups. Figure 2 graphically displays the national pride values distributed among both ethnic minority and majority groups in South Eastern European countries (Balkans). From a first sight it is important to observe that almost all minority groups in the region are considered to be "at risk" for discrimination. Only two minority groups in FYROM (Vlahs and Turkish) are categorized as being free of a discriminatory treatment[9]. As expected, members of majority groups in all Balkan countries have higher and positive pride values compared with minority populations. On average, all majority groups have remarkable patriotism values situated above the "quite proud" level. It reveals a strong sense of nationalism and country loyalty among all majority groups within Balkans.

Figure 2

National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups
South Eastern European Countries

Note: The majority groups have blue font color. The discriminated minorities are listed in red font color. Non-discriminated minorities have a neutral/black font color

The pride level among Balkan minority groups exhibits a rather diverse picture. Members of only few minorities declared to have, on average, high values of national pride (at the level of

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[9] This status however might be relative and resulting from a weak political organization of these two minorities. Since the classification of being "at risk" heavily relies on the condition of political mobilization we cannot fully assess if this status is indeed immune for discrimination practices.

"quite proud" and more). Serbians in the Muslim part of Bosnia, Gypsies in Bulgaria and members of almost all minority groups in FYROM have declared of being relatively proud of their countries' nationality. Macedonia seems to have a relatively harmonized pride structure across all its minority communities. The results reflect the evident progress towards integrating minorities and reducing the discriminatory acts against all ethnic groups in FYROM. Except for Albanians, all ethnic minorities have a strong bound with the Macedonian national identity. Being the result of a relatively recent process (after 1945), Macedonian identity was widely disillusioning, not made explicitly for the majority group, but structured around all ethnic groups within society (Poulton 1991; 49).

The low levels of national pride among Balkan minorities reflects however the tumultuous intergroup relations in this region in the past two decades. Many ethnic minorities have been involved, passively or actively, in the conflicting actions which followed the dissolution of the communist regimes in the 1990s. The interethnic movements are still active in this region which positively connects with low pride values across many minority groups. The recent separation of Kosovo Albanians from Serbia serves as a pertinent example of how poorly integrated minorities with weak bounds of national identity might successfully demand and obtain severance from the hosting nation.

Figure 3 shows the average results in pride across ethnic groups within former soviet east European countries. Three groups of countries can be easily recognized as having different patterns of national loyalty within this region.

The first group comprises the Caucasian states – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Here we can observe a strong sense of pride among both majority and minority groups. More than half of the observed minorities are not "at risk" for discrimination and many of them share higher pride standards than the majority population. This compact trend reflects a strong sense of patriotism and national cohesion within Caucasian societies. In the Clifford Geertz's view (1963; 153-154) it makes perfect sense since he believes that there is a gradual shift of primordial loyalties from small minority groups to majority population which may produce parallel attachments to more than one group or ethnicity.

Several other factors could explain the strong attachments with the nation of this mountainous region. First, because of the sovietization policies many ethnic minorities are well integrated in the host societies and mixed marriages are very common (Bremmer and Taras 1993). Second, with small exceptions, all ethnic groups share the same religious identity within country. Thus, the tension rooting the religious nationalism is kept at a minimum level. Third, almost all listed minorities are not territorially concentrated, making their ethnic identity to weaker and group mobilization difficult to achieve. The geographical dispersion of many minorities makes assimilation to be an easy target for majority population. Monica Toft (1996, 2003) has extensively researched the influence which territorial location could have on ethnic mobilization and changing identities. The Caucasus region is a high mountainous area which makes mobilization across dispersed minorities logistically impossible. In such environment, a radical change in identity might happen only in territorial compact communities. As it is the case of Ossetians, Abkhazians, Adzhars in Georgia, or like the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, only territorial condensed communities are prone to strong nationalism and violent actions in defense

of their group identity. Unfortunately, our data does not cover these territorial and secessionist minorities which widely restrain our capacity of a full comparison.

The second group of countries clusters three former USSR East European states – Estonia, Latvia and Moldova. This group of countries cumulates important Slavic minorities and was, during the Tsarist and Soviet times, a favorite target for massive Russian immigration. Against our expectations, these countries exhibits, on average, low levels of national pride across both majority and minority groups. Soviet assimilation policies and massive Slavic immigration extensively undermined the national feelings of many native populations. This in turn led to weak cohesive stimulus within many former communist societies (Wozniakowski 1997).

Figure 3

National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups: Former USSR

Note: The majority groups have blue font color. The discriminated minorities are listed in red font color. Non-discriminated minorities have a neutral/black font color

All three countries also experienced conflicting situations with heir Slavic minorities during the 1990s and 2000s. Being concentrated in distinct urban or regional locations, Slavic populations had continuously reinforced their desire for autonomy or greater political rights and strongly resisted to integrate in the hosting societies. Their mutinies ranged between a violent civil war in Moldova in spring of 1992 to the recent 2007 rallies in Estonia related to the attempt to remove a

Russian soldier statue. Tensions still exists nowadays in these divided societies[10], where both minority and majority leadership are widely reluctant to make decisive steps toward harmonizing their interethnic problems.

The third comparative group is composed from two states – Ukraine and Belarus. In both countries the majority groups have, on average, high pride values while ethnic minorities low pride standards. These countries resembles similar pattern as in the Balkan case. Especially Ukraine has a significant gap between the majority population and its Russian minority[11]. The existing gap reflects the deep division which historically subsists between these two communities. Russian minority has a strong sense of its own group identity, and is very well politically organized by receiving a constant support from the Russian motherland. Recently, many minority Russian leaders started demanding increased autonomy and even separation of Russian speaking regions from Ukraine. Apart from weak patriotism, these facts translate in constant tensions within the Ukrainian society and possible future conflicting actions between the two communities.

Belarus, on the other hand, treats its minorities in a more privileged way, which reflects the close attachment and strong affinity of this country with their neighboring Slavic nations. Many Russians and Ukrainians have been in a privileged position during the soviet era and kept their status till nowadays. Even though small tensions still exist between Belarusian majority and its ethnic minorities, these anxieties are kept salient by the authoritarian regime of the president Lukashenko. The differences in pride between the majority and minority groups might in fact reflect more the authoritarian political structure of the Belarusian society rather than the discrepancies between their true pride beliefs.

Figure 4 further explores the national pride across ethnic groups in western European democracies. The evidence shows that, on average, pride attitudes among both minority and majority groups are situated around the "quite proud" level. The expected exception is provided by the Basque population in Spain which considerably stays behind the others' pride perceptions. It reflects the strong Basque identity and the tough nationalism movement existing in the region.

It is worth mentioning that many majority groups have lower pride values than their corresponding minority group(s) in the country. Many scholars believe that the extended social changes from the last decades resulted in a constant decline of national pride attitudes across

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[10] Baltic States has been criticized of having restrictive citizenship law toward their Slavic minorities. This situation restricts Slavic population of owning land, voting, being employed and extensively participate into the political realm of their hosting countries. Similarly, Moldova has been heavily criticized by the Council of Europe of giving to much autonomy in 1994 to its Gagauz minority but being hesitant to do the same for the mainly Slavic Transnistrian region.

[11] We treat Russians in Crimea as a separate minority from other Russians in Ukraine because, constitutionally, Crimea holds autonomy which results in a dissimilar status of this community compared with their ethnic counterparts from the Ukrainian mainland.

western European societies (Dogan 1994; Inglehart 1997). The obtained results show that this decline is, to a certain extent, real. Flemish in Belgium, Spanish majority, Germans in Switzerland and to a certain extent, English in Great Britain, all have, on average, lower pride attitudes within their countries.

Figure 4

National Pride for Minority and Majority Groups
Western European Countries

Note: The majority groups have blue font color. The discriminated minorities are listed in red font color. Non-discriminated minorities have a neutral/black font color

Even though, there are a number of minority groups at risk for discrimination in Western Europe, the strong democracy practices make these communities to be relatively comfortable with their pride status. In Figure 3 we notice the existence of a relative small gap between the average pride values of majority and minority groups. Stephen Shulman (2003, 45-46) argues that across democracies the construction of the national identity can be seen as an equalizer factor across society. In strong democracies, the well established practices offer a comfortable framework to all minorities for accommodating their needs and considering their ethnic distinctiveness. This means that the country elites have the tendency to treat ethnic minorities on the equal basis by the virtue of a common citizenship, myths, symbols, religion, language etc. (Shulman 2003; 45). In turn, the accommodation practices usually provide strong psychological incentive for minority groups to invest more in positive national pride attitudes. It may be seen as a rewarding behavior toward the good practices of the hosting nation-state.

Empirical Evidence

A probit regression analysis was conducted to predict the effect of various factors on national pride. The results are shown in the form of marginal effects and only for positive pride attitudes (quite proud and very proud). The tables are structured to show the predicted effects across all ethnic minorities (Table 2) and majority groups (Table 3).

Results for Ethnic Minorities

Table 2 shows those structural characteristics and believes which in theory and literature have proved to affect individuals' feelings of national pride. Surprisingly, many predictors included in this table proved to be not significant.

Controlling for the discrimination status, the results are in line with our expectations. Ethnic minorities considered "at risk" to receive a discriminatory treatment are less likely to feel proud of their countries. In Western Europe however, the sample of disadvantaged minorities show a significant probability to be "quite proud" of their nationality. Gender differences are modest, quite diverse and at a lower significance level. When they appear however, men express more national pride in former Soviet countries and western democracies. Minority women prove to be very proud in Balkan countries and more relatively proud in western democracies than minority men do.

In the literature, age and education proved to be important predictors for pride values. For minority population however, these indicators are weakly significant. In former USSR countries and in Western Europe, the results follow past research and reveal a decline in national pride among the youngest generation. Older cohorts have higher probability to have feelings of strong national pride. Education has no significant results among ethnic minorities in former communist countries. In Western Europe however, the data confirms the proposed association by Inglehart's post-modernization theory, that less educated individuals have higher probability to be more proud of their nationality. Especially highly educated minority citizens, are almost 20 percentage points less likely to have strong national pride values.

Similarly, being a minority member and having a good financial situation is negatively related with national loyalty in Eastern Europe. The findings follow Stephen Shulman's (2003; 45) appreciation that a strong national identity is perceived as an equalizer factor within society where the poorer classes might have higher levels of national pride than the upper, richer segments of the population. Unfortunately, there are no significant results connecting the income and minority status in Western Europe where this particular pattern was expected to be strong.

Table 2 **Determinants for National Pride Values among *Ethnic Minorities* in Europe. Marginal Effects of the Ordinal Probit regression**

Quite Proud	Other Communist/Balkans		Former Soviet Union		Western Democracies	
Discriminated (ref. Not discriminated)	-0.00865	(0.00543)	-0.00107	(0.00880)	0.0218***	(0.00658)
Gender (ref. Male)	0.0112	(0.00694)	-0.0115**	(0.00494)	0.0163**	(0.00806)
Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)	0.000368	(0.00833)	0.000181	(0.00560)	-0.00240	(0.0106)
Seniors (50>) (ref. young 15-29)	0.00217	(0.00868)	0.0106**	(0.00493)	-0.0228*	(0.0125)
Middle level education (ref. low)	-0.00526	(0.00780)	0.00954	(0.00764)	0.0279***	(0.00907)
High level education (ref. low)	-0.0199	(0.0169)	0.00152	(0.00714)	0.0119	(0.0118)
Medium income (ref. low)	-0.00710	(0.00941)	-0.0118*	(0.00697)	-0.000229	(0.00958)
High income (ref. low)	-0.0245*	(0.0132)	-0.01000	(0.00734)	-0.0181	(0.0129)
Religious person (ref. not religious)	-0.0264***	(0.00996)	0.0231***	(0.00651)	-0.0314***	(0.00918)
Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)	-0.00167	(0.00823)	0.00831	(0.00680)	-0.0143*	(0.00802)
Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)	-0.0137	(0.0151)	0.00947**	(0.00477)	-0.0427	(0.0277)
Respect for authority – relative (ref. positive))	-0.0263***	(0.00792)	-0.0203***	(0.00783)	0.0212***	(0.00647)
Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)	-0.0703**	(0.0312)	-0.0785***	(0.0280)	0.00720	(0.00945)
Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.0197**	(0.00811)	0.0119***	(0.00441)	-0.0255	(0.0198)
Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.0147***	(0.00526)	0.00656	(0.00584)	*-0.0297***	(0.0137)
Very Proud	**Other Communist/Balkans**		**Former Soviet Union**		**Western Democracies**	
Discriminated (ref. Not discriminated)	-0.104	(0.0757)	-0.220***	(0.0262)	-0.0901***	(0.0280)
Gender (ref. Male)	0.0483*	(0.0287)	-0.0475**	(0.0189)	-0.0555**	(0.0255)
Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)	0.00159	(0.0360)	0.000748	(0.0232)	0.00811	(0.0354)
Seniors (50>) (ref. young 15-29)	0.00964	(0.0394)	0.0523*	(0.0272)	0.0752**	(0.0381)
Middle level education (ref. low)	-0.0227	(0.0335)	0.0371	(0.0281)	-0.104***	(0.0304)
High level education (ref. low)	-0.0634	(0.0416)	0.00649	(0.0313)	-0.192***	(0.0311)
Medium income (ref. low)	-0.0289	(0.0359)	-0.0425**	(0.0215)	0.000780	(0.0326)
High income (ref. low)	-0.0844**	(0.0358)	-0.0362	(0.0230)	0.0569	(0.0366)
Religious person (ref. not religious)	-0.114***	(0.0363)	0.0953***	(0.0210)	0.107***	(0.0266)
Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)	-0.00726	(0.0362)	0.0319	(0.0238)	0.0553	(0.0350)
Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)	-0.0479	(0.0431)	0.116***	(0.0358)	0.108*	(0.0565)
Respect for authority – neutral (ref. positive))	-0.137***	(0.0304)	-0.0658***	(0.0193)	-0.0907***	(0.0261)
Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)	-0.143***	(0.0366)	-0.129***	(0.0249)	-0.0277	(0.0414)
Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.0913***	(0.0335)	0.0569***	(0.0212)	0.0792	(0.0560)
Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.117***	(0.0441)	0.128***	(0.0336)	0.110**	(0.0523)
	N 685		N 1389		N 1168	
	adj. R-sq 0,04		adj. R-sq 0,07		adj. R-sq 0,05	

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As predicted, religiousness is shown to be an important and strong connector between ethnicity and national pride. The religiosity factor shows the great importance people give to their religious values when evaluating their national loyalty. The results show that minorities in Balkan countries do not mix patriotism with their religious beliefs. People which are not believers are 11 times more probable to develop strong or moderate national pride values. Religious diversity in this region makes it hard to impose faith as the leading sense toward national loyalty among minority groups. The longstanding conflict between Muslims and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia serve as a relevant example of how sensitive religion is in many of the Balkans societies. Religious diversity in this region still makes many minorities to place their group-religion above their feelings of nationhood which in turn weaken pride solidarity. For Max Weber (2003) this would be a traditional or religion-oriented view toward national values which contrast with the modern, rational-legal worldview (which is seen mainly as an appendage of the Western societies).

On opposite, minorities which are pious in former USSR or in western European democracies are up to 10 times more likely to have strong feelings of national pride than non-religious individuals. This disparate causality reflects the diverse role that religion could play in modeling minorities' attachment with their nations. Given the fact that religion has not been very frequently included in previous empirical research of national pride, these results recommend it for further investigation.

Radical political views are usually regarded as strong incentives to boost nationalism in the country. It is indeed the case but only in former Soviet and Western European countries. Those minorities with right-wing preferences are more prone to develop strong national pride attitudes. The general tendency is also to give an increased credit to strong leadership values. Minorities who have greater respect for authority/leadership proved to be highly attached to their nationality. This result seems unsurprisingly considering the massive decline in trust in authority worldwide (Inglehart 1999; 1). It was unpredictable however to find this trend among ethnic minorities since from a strong leadership the most gained are usually the majority groups. The results also indicate that, among minorities, respect for authority is higher in former communist societies. As Robert Samuelson (1997) and Ronald Inglehart (1999) believe, there is not a straightforward answer for why this could be the case. We can speculate the transition chaos in which many of former communist countries entered after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Ineffectiveness of the existing government, corruption, poverty – all these could make minority groups to start supporting strong leadership as the only viable solution to their everyday problems.

The individuals' life-being is also an important adherent factor predicting pride attitudes. Despite the existing evidence showing that usually minorities have lower life satisfaction than the majority groups, they still show a strong link between the acquired positive life satisfaction and their perceived pride values. This causality holds across all three European regions.

Results for Majority Groups

Table 3 further explores the empirical relationships between national pride and the selected predictors, by taking the majority groups as the target population.

Among members of the majority groups, men prove to be more proud of their nationality in former communist states while women adopt more moderate pride values in the same countries. Age cohort is strongly related to national pride across majority population in Europe. The results significantly vary across the analyzed European regions. Older cohorts show a significant positive relation with national pride in former communist societies. The under-30 cohort show just "quite proud" values in the same environment but prove to be more loyal in Western Europe. These results can be regarded as cohort effects (Smith and Jarkko 1998) with younger generations feeling less pride than previous generations. In former communist societies, the values of low pride amongst young generation could be triggered in general by the transition process and by feelings of seeing themselves as being a disadvantaged generation. The negative causality between advance age and pride in Western Europe contradicts some of previous findings (see Tilley and Heath 2007). This could have an explanation in growing globalization and increasing European integration which in turn proved to decrease pride across all age-cohorts (Smith and Kim 2006; 4).

In line with previous research, we found out that less education is positively related with strong national pride. In two of the analyzed regions, Balkans and Western Europe, those with only basic education have the most pride feelings while those with medium and high education have only relative, "quite" pride considerations. The coefficients in former soviet countries are not significant and thus, we can not speculate the underlined pattern over this region. Some scholars have argued that the positive relationship between low education and stronger pride is due to lower levels of schooling of earlier generations (Smith and Kim 2006; 5). We had stipulated however that the increased education lead to more cosmopolitanism and internationalization of individuals. Given the same causality pattern among both minority a majority groups we tend to believe that this is indeed the case.

Data shows that poor people are also more likely to have strong pride values in former communist countries. This causality is especially highly significant in the former Soviet region. According to Schulman (2003; 46), within transition countries, poor individuals have higher psychological incentives to invest more in a positive national identity than those in stable, rich countries. Middle-income individuals are more inclined to pride in Western Europe. Only a relative value of loyalty is attached to richer classes in Eastern Europe and to poor individuals in Western Europe. According to Hylland-Eriksen (2002 [1993]), strong nationalism promote solidarity amongst rich and poor. When it comes to majority groups and pride however, the equalizer factor seems to work better in former communist societies than in western European democracies. This confirms the claims of John Dunn (1995; 63) of an increasing crisis of national identity in Western Europe. This crisis reinforces social problems and weakens national solidarity.

Majority-group believers have strong pride bounds with their nations all other Europe. Almost all European countries are made by mono-religious majority groups. The shared religious values

represent a gluing factor for the majority community and a strong provider for national pride. It may also correspond to the generation effect, meaning that older cohorts tend to be more proud but also more religious than younger generations (Tilley and Heath 2007; 667).

There is a notably diversity of how majority-group individuals link their pride and political preferences across Europe. Against our expectations, in Balkans, left-wing supporters prove to have 10 times higher probability to be very proud of their nationality then the right-wing supporters. At the same time, right wing followers tend to have only a "quite" pride attachment with the nation. During the transition period, politicians with strong left-wing political background have been constantly ruling within Balkan nations. They usually appealed and attracted their voters with patriotic emotions toward national unity which can explain left-wing partisanship and support for national pride among majority population/voters. This scenario also might explain why ethnic minorities proved to have an insignificant causality between extreme political preferences and their pride attachment.

In Western Europe however, the results are in line with our expectations. Here, as in the case of minority populations, right-wing political preferences are significantly associated with strong national pride. In a democratic environment, minority and majority groups benefit from equal political opportunities which make the expression of their pride sentiments unproblematic. For former Soviet countries the results are not significant and thus, logical conclusions cannot be drawn.

Scholars believe that there is a steep decline in the deference to authority in all modern societies (Inglehart 1999; 1). Our data shows however a strong causality between national pride and support for greater leadership. The direction of this association has similar patterns among both minority and majority groups. The results indicate that individuals need a strong sense of leadership to anchor their pride beliefs, a conclusion which extends across all ethnic groups in Europe. In line with our initial expectations, we also found a strong, positive and significant causality between high life satisfaction and high pride attitudes among majority-group populations. When compared with the obtained findings from the minority models, we see similar positive patterns linking life satisfaction and pride values. The general life satisfaction goes beyond the ethnicity factor and proves to be a strong link to national belongingness.

Table 3 **Determinants for National Pride Values among *Ethnic Majority* Groups in Europe. Marginal Effects of the Ordinal Probit regression**

Quite Proud	Other Communist/Balkans		Former Soviet		Western Democracies	
Gender (ref. Male)	0.0220***	(0.00719)	0.0175***	(0.00528)	-0.00647	(0.00651)
Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)	-0.0210**	(0.00880)	-0.0170***	(0.00644)	0.0208**	(0.00825)
Seniors (50>) (ref. young 15-29)	-0.0503***	(0.0105)	-0.0424***	(0.00831)	0.000303	(0.00914)
Middle level education (ref. low)	0.0369***	(0.00920)	-0.00156	(0.00858)	0.0705***	(0.00737)
High level education (ref. low)	0.0633***	(0.00957)	0.00577	(0.00926)	0.0720***	(0.00510)
Medium income (ref. low)	0.0168*	(0.00869)	0.0184***	(0.00583)	-0.0281***	(0.00904)
High income (ref. low)	0.00464	(0.0102)	0.0222***	(0.00604)	0.00377	(0.00907)
religious person (ref. not religious)	-0.0537***	(0.00792)	-0.0493***	(0.00627)	-0.0185***	(0.00697)
Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)	0.0571***	(0.00943)	0.0108	(0.00820)	-0.0150*	(0.00823)
Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)	0.0498***	(0.0104)	-0.00369	(0.00966)	-0.0326**	(0.0142)
Respect for authority – relative (ref. positive))	0.0466***	(0.00739)	0.0396***	(0.00491)	0.0428***	(0.00642)
Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)	0.0746***	(0.00888)	0.0446***	(0.00344)	0.0567***	(0.00607)
Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	-0.0451***	(0.00816)	-0.0429***	(0.00605)	-0.0348**	(0.0146)
Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	-0.0755***	(0.0115)	-0.125***	(0.0130)	*-0.0505****	(0.0123)

Very Proud	Other Communist/Balkans		Former Soviet		Western Democracies	
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.0422***	(0.0137)	-0.0420***	(0.0125)	0.0133	(0.0134)
Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)	0.0402**	(0.0167)	0.0401***	(0.0150)	-0.0436**	(0.0175)
Seniors (50>) (ref. young 15-29)	0.0933***	(0.0187)	0.0942***	(0.0170)	-0.000625	(0.0189)
Middle level education (ref. low)	-0.0705***	(0.0174)	0.00374	(0.0206)	-0.153***	(0.0159)
High level education (ref. low)	-0.136***	(0.0230)	-0.0140	(0.0228)	-0.204***	(0.0178)
Medium income (ref. low)	-0.0325*	(0.0169)	-0.0455***	(0.0147)	0.0567***	(0.0178)
High income (ref. low)	-0.00897	(0.0199)	-0.0560***	(0.0160)	-0.00781	(0.0188)
religious person (ref. not religious)	0.103***	(0.0149)	0.118***	(0.0142)	0.0381***	(0.0143)
Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)	-0.107***	(0.0170)	-0.0255	(0.0190)	0.0317*	(0.0177)
Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)	-0.105***	(0.0241)	0.00874	(0.0227)	0.0625**	(0.0254)
Respect for authority – neutral (ref. positive))	-0.0905***	(0.0142)	-0.103***	(0.0132)	-0.0961***	(0.0153)
Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)	-0.179***	(0.0282)	-0.160***	(0.0199)	-0.136***	(0.0164)
Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.0863***	(0.0153)	0.100***	(0.0134)	0.0694**	(0.0283)
Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.134***	(0.0186)	0.233***	(0.0196)	0.108***	(0.0272)
	N 4655		N 5371		N 4949	
	adj. R-sq 0,035		adj. R-sq 0,034		adj. R-sq 0,41	

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have analyzed the relationship between ethnicity and national pride while at the same time emphasizing the importance of analyzing national attachment in a comparative perspective. Such framework is relevant since it better judges the discrepancies in values and beliefs across ethnic and regional diversity. The assessment of national pride varies markedly across ethnic groups and among European regions. A range of economic, ideological and social changes in the last two decades have influenced the way both ethnic minorities and majority populations exhibit their national loyalty in many European societies.

In the analyzed decade, minority groups have in general a decreasing pattern in national pride. Majority groups, on opposite, have a more stable and stronger pride values across time. There is a powerful sense of nationalism in Balkans. The evidence show high pride values among all majority groups in this region. Almost all ethnic minorities in the area, on opposite, have a weak attachment with their nation. Looking in the former Soviet communist states, we can distinguish three distinctive pride patterns among the observed ethnic groups. In Caucasus, we found remarkably high pride sentiments across both minority and majority groups. Inversely, the Baltic States and Moldova exhibits low pride values among both minority and majority populations. The Slavic nations – Belarus and Ukraine, have, on average, high pride values for the majority populations but rank relatively low on pride among ethnic minorities. Western democracies provide comparatively homogenized attitudes of national pride among both minority and majority groups.

This study reiterates the idea of considering pride and ethnic diversity always in connection with the discrimination status of the analyzed minorities. There is a strong, positive and significant effect between the "at risk" status and the minorities' feelings of national pride. All other Europe, disadvantaged minorities have lower desire and lower probabilities to be proud. National pride also varies across groups when associated with structural and socio-demographic characteristics. Minority members that are more likely to feel loyal to their country are men (except for Balkans); older people; poor, religious (except Balkans) and less educated individuals; having right wing preferences; high respect for authority and satisfied with their everyday life. These patterns slightly differ across European regions given many reasons we can see from their ideological and social background.

Comparatively, majority-group individuals standing more loyal to their nations are men and adult citizens (except for Western Europe); less educated and religious; poor or middle class; left wing supporters in Balkans and right-wing and moderate followers in Western Europe; attached to strong leadership and satisfied with their general life condition.

This analysis however suggests the need for further investigation of some interesting correlations. Because religiousness proves to be a strong, yet a diverse predictor of national pride, the role of religion should be further investigated in relation to nationalism and patriotism. The relation between different pride levels and the choice of minority groups to engage in political mobilization may also serve as an idea for future research. With further availability of time series data, more sensitive tests might be conducted to discern differences in pride attitudes in a temporal perspective.

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Appendix I

Variable description

Discrimination status: Dummy for those ethnic minorities which are classified to be at risk for discrimination. Source: Minority at Risk Project (www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/). Minorities where clustered in groups which are "Not at risk" for discrimination (0) and minorities which are officially recognized as being "at risk" to be discriminated (1).

Gender: Was originally dummy-coded in EVS with males as the comparison group.

Age: We use the EVS structured indicator "x003r2". Three intervals are established: Young (15-29), Adults (30-40), and Seniors (50 and more).

Education: Three levels of education were established (EVS code - x025r). The coding was based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The Low level of education commences the thirst three ISCED stages: 0 for less than primary education, 1 for primary and 2 for lower level of secondary education. Medium education comprises the next two ISCED levels: 3 for upper-secondary education and 4 for post secondary but non-tertiary education. Higher education includes the last two levels of ISCED scale: 5 for the first stage of tertiary (BA level) and 6 for the second stage of tertiary education (post graduate).

Income: The original code in EVS is "x047r". This indicator registers the wealth status of the surveyed individuals. It has three levels: Low, medium and high income. Based on the particular wealth characteristics, each country has established their own criteria assessing the income status under which all interviewed persons are positioned.

Religiosity: This indicator is structured on the perceived belief of each responded whether or not they consider themselves a religious person. The original variable in EVS (f034) has three categories: A religious person, Not a religious person, and a Convinced atheist. Since the last two values register practically the same non-religious values, we matched them together. We use therefore a dichotomous variable: 1. Not religious vs. 2. Religious.

Left-Right Political Views: The original code in EVS is "e033".   The question asks people to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale, positioned from 1 (far left) to 10 (far right). We recoded this scale into three categories: Leftist preferences (1-3), Moderate Views (4-7) and Rightist preferences (8-10).

Respect for authority: This variable measures the attitudes toward authority. Individuals were asked to express their opinion whether they think that a possible increase in respect for authority would be a good thing (1), do not mind (2) or bad thing (3).

Life satisfaction: Registers the perception of life as a whole. The measurement is placed on a 1 to 10 scale with lower values quantifying dissatisfaction and higher values satisfaction. We recoded this scale into three categories: I. - Rather dissatisfied with life (1-4), II. Moderate satisfaction (5-7), III. - Rather satisfied (8-10).