

Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence from Eastern and Western Europe

VICTOR CEBOTARI

Introduction

Perhaps the most prominent issues of interest in social studies of the recent decades have been ethnicity, religion and nationalism. Particularly in Europe, they have been for centuries the traditional pillars of the modern nation-states¹. Solid national identities have been formed upon these values which shaped the borders of Europe in many ways during the last century. The biggest challenge to the secular Europe however, was posed by the communist ideology which dominated the Central and Eastern Europe for more than half a century. During that time, some of the traditional supports of the old state-societies have been removed or changed radically making the entire set of values to weaken consistently.

The most affected pillar was religion which has been officially banned in most of the communist regimes. On these grounds, willingly or reluctantly, artificial identities were forced upon nations in order to represent clusters of ethnics and populations as it was the case of the Soviet, Yugoslavian, Czechoslovakian and other socialistic entities. After 1989, new national feelings have emerged in a mass effort to build a consistent post-communist identity, free of the past ideological heritage. At the same time, the former atheist way of perceiving the inter-societal relations has disappeared and the resurgence of the traditional religious practises has been very active in many of the former communist countries. In such context, numerous ethnic groups started being faced with serious national identity problems, many of them along religious lines which sometime escalated to violence.

¹ Mattei Dogan, "The Decline of Traditional Values in Western Europe. Religion, Nationalism, Authority." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 40 (1999): 77-90, at 77.

Arguable, religion is usually seen as a value in itself and the interrelation between the process of identity formation and religious consciousness has produced new nationalist feelings. Tilley and Heath have found that religion plays a significant role in the decline of national identity.² The connection between religion and patriotism is important at both individual and group levels. Individuals who are more religious tend to be highly involved in their local or regional community and thus, their civic feelings are more tighten with the nation.³ This causality becomes more complex when considering members of ethnic minority groups in relation with members of the majority populations. Those who have the same religious denomination as the majority group may feel more tighten to the society and thus their pride attitudes should be as similar as the ones of the dominant group. Throughout the history, religion has served as an important criterion for the in-group demarcation among members of the same nation. Thus religion can be seen as an important cultural marker which may underline feelings of pride among members and non-members of an ethnic community.

Therefore, it is argued in this paper that a strong feeling of national pride is a relevant measure for the idea of interethnic and interreligious cohesion. The investment in the people's attachment with the nation proves to have rational consequences for the development of an affective nationhood. This was the main target of any state aspiring to last for long. Previous research has clearly shown that strong sentiments of national pride have a positive effect on the state stability by making their citizens to be more involved in the nation.⁴ Therefore, we imply that states are actively involved in creating cohesive socializing policies for bridging national loyalty across different ethnicities in order to obtain this diffuse support from its citizens.

Following this reasoning, we would like to capture in our study different degrees of national pride among both minority and majority groups. Religious denomination was set up to play an extensive explanatory role in measuring the level of patriotism among different European nations. This is a relatively new area of research in social

2 James Tilley, Anthony Heath, „The Decline of British National Pride.” *The British Journal of Sociology* 58/4(2007): at 668.

3 Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2000).

4 M.D.R. Evans, Jonathan Kelley, „National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data From 24 Nations.” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 14/3 (2002): 1-36.

sciences and limited scholar work has included religion and pride as measures or controls.

Several questions will serve as our primary focus and will be therefore employed in this analysis: Is national pride perceived the same across different religious communities in Eastern Europe? Do both ethnic minority and majority groups, with different or similar religious denomination, share common pride values within a state? Does the discrimination status of a religious minority group matter when it comes to national loyalty? All these questions will be measured descriptively and empirically. In doing so, a set of explanatory indicators will be employed in measuring the causality between various socio-demographic factors and different pride dimensions. A comparative perspective will be further employed at two levels: across minority and majority groups and along religious lines. This comparative angle is chosen in order to better reflect the direction of causality of the dependent variable but also to maximum explore the utility of the analysed data.

In the first section a brief introduction of the data and the sampling procedures are described. The dependent and independent indicators are further presented in the second section. The empirical method is further presented in a third place. The forth section proceeds with the descriptive and empirical analysis itself. The main conclusions stemming from the analysis complete this study.

Data and the Sampled Population

In order to consider the feelings of national pride in relation to religious denomination, we use data from the European Values Survey (EVS) by pooling the last two extensive waves, from 1990 to 2004. This period captures the main ideological transformation which Europe undertook after the end of the Cold war era. The data is configured as an individual level, cross-sectional survey which encloses information about political values, social attitudes and beliefs.

There will be analyzed 20 European countries⁵ which for the purpose of comparison will be divided in three main clusters: Western European democracies, Former Soviet European countries and ex-communist South Eastern/Balkan states.

5 A number of sub-state entities are also included in EVS. We will use in our analysis two such sub-national territorial entities: Northern Ireland (The United Kingdom) and Republica Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The sampled population is separated into two main categories, ethnic minority and majority groups. Since the EVS data is structured at the individual level, we made use of several sorting variables to cluster all respondents in distinct ethnicities. The following delimiting criteria were applied: Country of the respondent (s003), declared ethnicity (x051), language spoken at home (g016)⁶ and the region where the interview was conducted (x048).

Further, we chose to split the sampled minority groups into two categories: ethnies "at risk" of being discriminated and minority groups "not at risk" for being disadvantaged. The classification of minority groups in one of these two groups follows the guidelines of the "Minorities at Risk" (MAR) project developed by Tedd Gurr at Maryland University. The status "at risk" for discrimination is considered since many European minorities are traditionally the target of substantial discrimination in the societies they are living in.

This status is assigned following two main documented rules: A minority group should "collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society" and the group "is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests."⁷ Based on the EVS sample, we identified a total number of 62 ethnicities, from which 20 majority groups and 42 ethnic minorities. Following MAR classification, there are 27 minority groups classified "at risk" for discrimination.

The reason behind splitting our sample into minority-majority groups is straightforward: Previous studies have found that minority groups are very reluctant to develop strong ties at the state level and rely more on the group-level communities.⁸ Among others, this reality is reinforced by religious beliefs which are seen as powerful incentives to tighten the bounds with local communities and less with national state. Such reality strongly advocates considering group-level attitudes instead of individual beliefs.

⁶ There were an insignificant number of respondents having more than one language spoken at home. We excluded them from the analysis.

⁷ Taken from the Minority at Risk IV Dataset: Users Manual 030703", version 2003, 117, at 5, Accessed January 2009, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm>.

⁸ Tom Smith, Lars Jarkko, *National Pride: A Cross National Analysis* (Chicago, IL, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1998).

Measurements and Expectations

National pride can be considered as part of the state collective identity. It can be understood as the positive link of an ethnic community with its nation. When correlated with ethnic diversity, the national pride might serve as a relevant indicator to measure the standards of patriotism and national cohesion among different ethnic groups in the country. What we need to capture is therefore the intensity to which individuals of both minority and majority groups are attached to their nationality.

The level of national pride is an excellent measure for our study since it captures the substance of primordialist feelings among ethnic communities. As a value, ethnic identity has proved to be more important to ethnic minorities than to the majority groups.⁹ Ethnic minorities seem to attach more weight to their ethnogenesis and to feel more in terms of group identity.

However, this devotion for the intra-group feelings do not allow much room for sensing positively about the supra-group, national identity. We might expect therefore that national pride should be stronger among majority groups than among ethnic minorities. The dominating communities are regarded also to be both the main actors and the main beneficiaries of the nation-state projects. Individuals, members of an ethnic minority group, will report being proud of their nationality only if they sense that their ethnic values have been assimilated or accommodated into the national scheme. Higher pride values will thus signal closer emotional connection with the hosting state.

Since the accommodation and assimilation practices widely vary across different ideological regimes, we expect different trends in pride values in each of the group of countries under analysis. Western democracies are more experienced in nation-building and integrating ethnic minorities and thus, it is expected that in such environments minority groups will have practically similar pride values as the majority groups. On opposition, former communist countries had applied more aggressive policies of assimilation and uniformisation which forced many minority communities to feel discriminated. Since discrimination is supposed to be negatively correlated with national pride, we believe that ethnic minorities in former communist countries will have lower pride values than the majority populations.

⁹ Maykel Verkuyten, "Life Satisfaction Among Ethnic Minorities: The Role of Discrimination and Group Identification," *Social Indicators Research* 89/3 (2008): 391-404.

The indicator measuring the level of national pride in EVS is represented by the following question: "How proud are you to be [country nationality]?" It offers four options for an answer: 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, and 4 = very proud. Individuals are assigned also a religious denomination with which the majority of members in a group identify themselves. In doing so, we use a direct question surveyed in EVS asking the respondents whether they identify themselves as a Muslim, Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox Christians.

From the existing literature, a correlation can be observed between a strong sense of national pride and the feeling of too much diversity in the country. Furthermore, the feeling of too many "others" is directly linked with the advancing age, lower education levels, a tendency towards 'materialism' and right wing political preferences.¹⁰

Individuals have more other criteria, based on which they evaluate their attachment with the group-ethnicity and their loyalty to the larger nation. Drawing from identity, ethnocentrism¹¹ and trust studies, we try to identify which particular variables are suitable for strong effects on pride attitudes. Prior studies have shown relatively weak and inconsistent differences that gender has on national pride, with men usually expressing stronger national pride values than women do.¹² The literature reveals however that women are more trusting and less ethnocentric than men are.¹³

Based on the generational replacement theories, older people have proved to be more proud of their nationality than younger individuals, although this aspect widely varies, depending of the particular national domain targeted.¹⁴ Age also has proved to have a positive effect on trust and ethnocentrism values.¹⁵ Education is also one of the factors which are expected to have a direct effect on how people think of their national resemblance. In his post-modernization theory, Ronald Inglehart stipulates that highly educated individuals tend to be more

10 Shamit Saggarr and Joanne Drean Saggarr, *British Public Attitudes and Ethnic Minorities* (London, Performance and Innovation Unit, Cabinet Office 2001), at 9.

11 Ethnocentrism is closely related to identity and inter-ethnic studies. It relates to thinking that a group cultural heritage is superior to others and all the judgments related to other groups' values are viewed from these stereotypical lenses.

12 Smith and Kim, *op.cit.* note 25, at 3.

13 Peer Scheepers, Albert Felling, Jan Peters, "Anomie, Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism: Update of a Classic Theme and an Empirical Test," *Politics and the Individual* 2/1 (1992): 43-60.

14 Evans and Kelley, *op.cit.* note 7, at 323-324.

15 Dietlind Stolle, "Clubs and Congregations: The benefits of Joining an Association" in *Trust in Society*, ed. K. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 202-44.

cosmopolitan in thinking and thus less attached to their nations.¹⁶ Research done by Tilley and Heath,¹⁷ but also by Evans and Kelley¹⁸ has found similar correlation patterns. Higher levels of education provide people with more mobility and international openness. They will be hence less tempted to connect with a particular national environment and are expected to report lower levels of national pride.

Researchers have also found that national pride is very much affected by the way people are attached with religion.¹⁹ The intertwined connection between national beliefs and religious denomination is expected to hold a strong causality in our study as well. Particularly, in former communist countries, the absence of a strong democratic leadership, made religious institutions to be the intermediate link through which national identity is formed and disseminated. For Western Europe there is also evidence that the decline in religious and cultural traditions goes in parallel with the decline in national pride.²⁰

Given the extended research on civic values done by John Brehm and Wendy Rahn,²¹ we also know that income-secured people are more prone to trust and oriented toward accepting ethnic diversity. This can be widely accepted because a strong sense of community is given by the idea of equality of the membership within the nation. This equality promotes solidarity across rich and poor and between left and right on the political scale.²² Stephen Shulman²³ has found that, in many countries, low income people have greater levels of national pride than the rich, upper class individuals. Ronald Inglehart also has observed that satisfaction with the national pride is inversely linked with the level of economic development of the country.²⁴ At the individual level however, rich people are expected in general to be more proud of their nationality by virtue of the country allowing them to acquire more wealth. Even though the literature has mixed findings regarding this

16 Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997).

17 Tilley and Heath, *op.cit.*

18 Evans and Kelley, *op.cit.*

19 Inglehart, *op.cit.*

20 Tilley and Heath, *op.cit.*

21 John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 999-1023.

22 Thomas Hylland-Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2002).

23 Shulman, *op.cit.*

24 Inglehart, *op.cit.*

correlation,²⁵ we believe that poor people tie their status with feelings of social injustice and thus they tend to be more unsatisfied with their nationhood.

Economic performance and life satisfaction are usually strong positive predictors for any pride values. People satisfied with their quality of life proved to attach higher weight for nationalistic support.²⁶ The existing research has found lower life satisfaction among ethnic minorities than within majority population.²⁷ Hence, it can be expected that ethnic minorities, being less satisfied with their life in the country will be also tempted to adopt weaker pride values within the same society.

This study also acknowledge for the shifting attitudes toward authority resulting from both postmodernism and globalization or by ideological regime change (mainly in Eastern Europe). Once these changes occur, the observations show that individuals seek the security of strong leaders and powerful institutions.²⁸ Further evidence indicates that respect for authority is declining in the advanced democracies with possible negative consequences for national pride. Research has also revealed that desire for strong authority breeds intolerance for cultural change and adversity for different ethnic groups.²⁹

Finally, an indicator measuring the degree of discrimination among ethnic minorities will be taken into consideration. Discrimination proved to be a drawback factor which leads ethnic minorities toward within-group inclusiveness and less devotion to the nation.³⁰ Many groups perceive discrimination as an act of political injustice³¹ and therefore, they are reluctant to be part in the process of consolidating national identity.

By default, discrimination is often associated with weak incentives toward national cohesion which makes higher levels of national pride very unlikely. The discriminatory practices further limit the general access of minority groups to resources which restrict their ability to integrate as full members in the nation. It also emphasized the idea of "otherness" among people and significantly reduces their attachment

²⁵ See Shulman, *op.cit.*

²⁶ Peter Lewis and Michael Bratton, "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria," *MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa* 56 (2000): 1-56, at 9.

²⁷ Frank M. Andrews and Stephen. B. Withey, *Social Indicators of Well-Being: America's Perception of Life Quality* (New York: Plenum Press, 1976).

²⁸ Inglehart, *op.cit.* note 38, at 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, at 5.

³⁰ Verkuyten, *op.cit.* note 22, at 401.

³¹ Tedd Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," *International Political Science review* 14/2 (1993): 161-201.

to the nation.³² For that reasons, minorities considered to be "at risk" for discrimination are expected to reject more intensely the national pride values.

Method

The method used to analyze our empirical model is a discrete choice technique in the form of ordinal probit. The reason behind this choice is well-grounded in the nature of our dependent variable. We use a hierarchical ordinal scale indicator to measure the level and the intensity of national pride. A typical measurement in such context is through discrete choice modeling techniques. This approach avoids treating the differences between pride levels as uniform, as it is in the case of a least-squares regression. It allows us to assess the magnitude of national pride at each level of the scale while controlling for potentially relevant indicators.

Since this study uses a pooled data, some problems might arise in terms of individual heterogeneity. In order to control for this limitation, we consider a procedure to "de-mean" the data in accordance to a technique established by Yair Mundlack in 1978. This technique controls for the fixed effects in the model by considering the within means of the regressors.³³ The equation of our model can be visualized as follows:

$$P_i = \beta_1 k_i + \beta_2 x_i + \alpha_i + \epsilon_i \quad (i=1, \dots, N) \quad (1)$$

Where P_i is the intensity of the national pride coded as 0—for negative pride, 1—for moderate pride and 3—for strong national pride; k_i stands for a handful of socio-demographic variables at the individual level i ; x_i relates to some control variables quantifying values and beliefs which are measured at the individual level i ; α_i is a group specific and time-invariant component which controls for the systematic fixed effects associated to our data. Accordingly, ϵ_i is equal to the individual specific error term that is presumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the control variables.

However, the general probit model shows only an ambiguous causality and do not clearly identify the causal effects on each level of

³² Mael Hjerm, "National Identities, National Pride, and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries," *Acta Sociologica* 41 (1998): 335-347.

³³ Yair Mundlack, "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross-Section Data," *Econometrica* 81/1 (1978): 69-85.

the ordinal scale of the dependent variable. The raw results are considered to be irrelevant in drawing any conclusions since the literature is widely unclear when it comes to the interpretation of the coefficients of a raw ordinal probit model.³⁴ To circumvent this limitation we will estimate the marginal effects of the probit model which will assess the impact that every particular variable has on each hierarchical value of the dependent variable. The analysis is conducted in STATA which calculates the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables by using the prediction associated with the previous ordinal probit estimation command. The final results and also the interpretation of the obtained model will be presented in terms of marginal effects.

Results


This section describes the general trends in pride values across minority and majority groups in three distinct regions in Europe.

Figure 1 presents the mean pride values, distributed both among ethnic and religious denominations. The picture comprises Balkan countries and includes the discrimination status of the measured groups. There can be observed that almost all ethnic minorities in the region are perceived of being "at risk" for discrimination. There is also an amalgam of religious diversity among both majority and minority groups. On average, dominant communities share higher pride feelings as compared to ethnic minorities. Almost all majority groups, irrespective of their religion denomination, have on average 'quite proud' attitudes or higher. Generally, the correlation between the main religion of the country and being member of the majority community provide higher values for national pride. It is the case of Muslim Albanians and Bosniaks, orthodox Romanians, Macedonians and Serbians: all sharing strong feelings of patriotism in their native countries.

Ethnic minorities having the same religious denomination as the majority groups have also higher feelings of national belonging. Minority communities sharing different religious denominations, have on opposite, lower pride feelings in the country. Notably, the two ethnic minorities classified as being 'not at risk' for discrimination,

³⁴ William H. Greene, *Econometric Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000), at 876.

Turkish and Vlah communities in FYROM, have higher pride attitudes, closer to those of the majority groups.



Source: European Values Survey.


Note: The names of the majority groups are written in capital letters. Minorities "at risk" are marked with a "+".

Figure 1: National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups in Former Balkans: Denominated by Minority-Majority Group and Religion

Figure 2 further presents the average pride values in the former Soviet, East European states. The fall of the USSR has led to the formation of new group identities which unlike the Balkan case, have been less influenced by violent religious nationalism. The Soviet epoch has been characterized by a widespread atheist environment which to a certain extent succeeded to neutralize the religious power across ethnic lines.

As result, when transition to democracy started the religious beliefs did not have sufficient boosting power to influence major inter-group tensions. Besides, all Eastern European states are relatively homogenised in terms of religious denomination, where both minority and majority groups are traditionally part of one or another sect of Christianity. Jonathan Fox has stated that violent religious nationalism has developed mainly in those former Soviet republics with a

significant Muslim population.³⁵ In these countries, strong feelings have been placed around Muslim practices which were acting as cultural differentials to the former Soviet and, later on, Russian Orthodox dominance.



Source: European Values Survey

Note: The names of the majority groups are written in capital letters. Minorities "at risk" are marked with a "+".

Figure 2: National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups in Former USSR States: Denominated by Minority-Majority Group and Religion


On average, the pride attitudes in Eastern Europe are relatively weak in intensity. The evidences shown in Figure 2 reveal that stronger values of pride can be seen mainly among majority groups. Ethnic minorities, in general, have significantly lower levels of national pride. Unlike in the Balkans, ethnic minorities having similar religion denomination as the majority groups do not share the same levels of patriotism.

There is also no evidence which can link the discrimination status with lesser feelings of patriotism. This can be explained from the

³⁵ Jonathan Fox, "The Future of Religion and Domestic Conflict," in *Religion, International Relations, and Development Cooperation*, ed. B. K. Goldewijk (Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2007), 129-152, at 129.

perspective of the transition process undertaken by these countries. In the time of regime change, the baseline for loyalty is weakening within the society. This process equally affects pride feelings of all ethno-religious groups in the country. Almond and Verba describe these attitudes as "system affected" feelings which temporarily may bias the true national beliefs of a certain population.³⁶

In an extensive study on the declining of traditional values in Western European democracies, Mattei Dogan has found that many people are still proud of their nationality but in a very 'narcissistic' way, which mainly reflects the high standard of living, democracy performance or country's economic achievements.³⁷ However, the author concluded that despite of high levels of patriotism there are an increasing number of individuals which start declaring negative pride values in all Western European countries.



Source: European Values Survey. Note: The names of the majority groups are written in capital letters. Minorities "at risk" are marked with a "+".

Figure 3: National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups in Western Europe: Denominated by Minority-Majority Group and Religion

In our study, we took over these results and tried to identify pride beliefs among different ethnies in Western Europe. According to findings presented in Figure 3, we see that indeed, on average, pride intensity stays on a fairly "quite proud" level. With a few exceptions,

³⁶ Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (London: Sage Publications, 1989).
³⁷ Dogan, *op.cit.* note 1, at 82.

the pride feelings are not significantly different between ethnic minority and majority groups. In a number of countries, ethnic minorities have even higher pride feelings than the majority population. It is the case of Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden and to a certain extent the United Kingdom. This situation is unique yet not surprisingly if compared with the findings from other regions in Europe. The high standards of democratization guarantee extensive rights for many Western European minorities which in turn elevate their national feelings.

The religious landscape in Western Europe is also characterized by a high degree of religious homogeneity. The traditional ethnic minorities embrace, in many cases, the same religious denomination as the majority group in the country. Similarly, there are only few minority groups prone for discrimination. Their pride feelings stay relatively close to the national average which also can be linked with the way democracy deals with ethnic diversity in Western European countries.

Empirical Evidence

The second part of our analysis is disclosing the empirical evidence of an ordinal probit regression. One objective of this study is set to observe the impact and influence which different socio-economic characteristics have on the positive levels of national pride. Therefore, the presented results in Table 1 show the causality only for the 'quite proud' and 'very proud' levels of our dependent variable. The results are presented in terms of marginal effects and comparatively for both minority and majority groups.

Generally, the model underlines several interesting results. The first examination confirms our initial suppositions that the impact of the employed indicators is significantly different when comparing the two hierarchical levels of pride. The second general observation reveals important differences in the pride values between majority and minority groups. The obtained results are further described in detail.

In the literature, discrimination proved to be a very powerful explanatory factor linked with the minority status. When controlling for this aspect, the results are in line with our expectation, minorities considered to be 'at risk' for discrimination have higher probability to feel less proud of the nationality of their host country.

The influence of gender on national pride proved to be not significant for minority groups but highly significant for majority populations. Moreover, this indicator has different causality patterns

for each of the two analyzed pride scales, with women proving to be more 'relatively proud' of their identity while men have higher probability to be 'very proud' of their nationality.

The relationship between different age-cohorts and national pride is more diverse: older cohorts are considerably more proud of their nationality across both minority and majority groups. Within the majority population, the younger cohort has still a relative value of national pride which widely confirms the stipulations from past research – that there is an outgoing declining trend in national pride among younger generations.³⁸ These results can be regarded as cohort effects³⁹ with younger generations feeling less proud than older generations. Within former communist societies, the low values of pride amongst younger generations could be triggered by the transition process and by feelings of seeing themselves as being a disadvantaged generation.

In the process of nationhood awareness, many states are developing special policies for building links of national socialization among its citizens. One of the mechanisms used to promote such policies are through education systems where historical, national, religious and linguistic symbols are learned and further promoted in a continuous process described as a 'banal nationalism'.⁴⁰ The relationship between education and national pride provides some compelling results: within both minority and majority groups, highly educated people are less proud of their nationality. Highly educated individuals show only a relative degree of proudness within the majority population. These results confirm the proposed association of Inglehart's post-modernization theory – that less educated citizens have higher probability to be more proud of their nationality.

Generally, some scholars have also argued that the positive relationship between low education and stronger pride is due to lower levels of schooling of earlier generations.⁴¹ We believe however that more educated individuals tend to be more cosmopolitan and internationalized in their behaviour which by definition weakens the identification with national values. Given the same causality pattern among both minority and majority groups we tend to believe that this could be indeed the case.

Wealth is another important factor which was expected to significantly influence the pride attitudes in Europe. Our empirical results reveal that less wealthy people have stronger pride feelings all

38 Tilley and Heath, *op.cit.* note 5.

39 Smith and Jarkko, *op.cit.* note 21.

40 Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

41 Smith and Kim, *op.cit.* note 25, at 5.

over Europe. In an extensive study on ethnicity and nationalism, Hylland-Eriksen has concluded that strong identity beliefs promote solidarity amongst rich and poor⁴² (see Table 1).

Stephen Shulman's work⁴³ has also shown that a strong national identity is perceived as being an equalizer factor across different segments of the society, where poorer individuals proved to be more attached to their nationality than the richer segments of the population. Especially in the transition countries where prosperity is not prevailing among large masses of populations, poor individuals might have additional psychological incentives to invest more in a positive national pride.

The data further shows that ethnic minorities in former USSR countries are very unlikely to be proud of their nation while minority groups in Western Democracies have higher probability to be highly patriotic. The results for majority groups hold insignificant causality.

Table 1: Marginal Effects of the Ordinal Probit with Fixed Effects (Mundlack Terms)

Relatively Proud	Minority Groups		Majority Groups	
'At risk' for discrimination (ref. 'Not at risk')	-0.00307	(0.00317)		
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.00130	(0.00146)	0.00999**	(0.00427)
Adults (30-49) (ref. young 19-29)	0.00162	(0.00162)	-0.0210***	(0.00542)
Seniors (50+) (ref. young 19-29)	0.00412**	(0.00185)	-0.0553***	(0.00640)
Middle level education (ref. low)	-0.00202	(0.00191)	0.0286***	(0.00578)
High level education (ref. low)	-0.00674	(0.00488)	0.0387***	(0.00610)
Medium income (ref. low)	-0.00244	(0.00220)	0.0116**	(0.00504)
High income (ref. low)	-0.00667*	(0.00364)	0.0208***	(0.00562)
Former USSR (ref. other communist)	-0.0310***	(0.00983)	-0.00481	(0.0212)
Western Democracies (ref. other communist)	0.00283	(0.00455)	-0.0419	(0.0314)
Orthodox (ref. Muslims)	-0.0267*	(0.0162)	0.102***	(0.00965)
Protestant (ref. Muslims)	-0.0436	(0.0330)	0.00658	(0.0182)
Roman catholic (ref. Muslims)	-0.0212*	(0.0118)	0.0522***	(0.0159)
Respect for authority - neutral (ref. positive)	-0.0109***	(0.00358)	0.0548***	(0.00433)
Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)	-0.0249**	(0.0118)	0.0620***	(0.00530)
Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.00358**	(0.00167)	-0.0576***	(0.00550)
Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.00276	(0.00234)	-0.109***	(0.00763)

42 Hylland-Eriksen, *op.cit.* note 44.

43 Shulman, *op.cit.* note 23, at 45.

Very Proud	Minority Groups		Majority Groups	
'At risk' for discrimination (ref. 'Not at risk')	-0.117***	(0.0220)		
Gender (ref. Male)	-0.0132	(0.0142)	-0.0185**	(0.00790)
Adults (30-49) (ref. young 19-29)	0.0180	(0.0190)	0.0387***	(0.00986)
Seniors (50+) (ref. young 19-29)	0.0551***	(0.0210)	0.0990***	(0.0110)
Middle level education (ref. low)	-0.0201	(0.0179)	-0.0529***	(0.0106)
Very Proud	Minority Groups		Majority Groups	
High level education (ref. low)	-0.0427**	(0.0216)	-0.0770***	(0.0130)
Medium income (ref. low)	-0.0218	(0.0171)	-0.0217**	(0.00947)
High income (ref. low)	-0.0479***	(0.0186)	-0.0396***	(0.0109)
Former USSR (ref. other communist)	-0.166***	(0.0338)	0.00891	(0.0390)
Western Democracies (ref. other communist)	0.149***	(0.0451)	0.0756	(0.0553)
Orthodox (ref. Muslims)	-0.120***	(0.0443)	-0.200***	(0.0202)
Protestant (ref. Muslims)	-0.121**	(0.0476)	-0.0123	(0.0346)
Roman catholic (ref. Muslims)	-0.165**	(0.0701)	-0.106***	(0.0357)
Respect for authority - neutral (ref. positive)	-0.0775***	(0.0154)	-0.106***	(0.00862)
Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)	-0.0878***	(0.0226)	-0.136***	(0.0143)
Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.0463**	(0.0187)	0.104***	(0.00964)
Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)	0.0839***	(0.0234)	0.186***	(0.0119)
	N 2911 adj. R-sq 0,07		N 14609 adj. R-sq 0,06	

Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the case of regime change there is a transition period where institutional settings are redefined and readapted to correspond to the new expectations of the citizens in the country. This process however has a certain impact on the individuals' feelings toward the nation, being regarded as a tendency from the state authorities to monopolize patriotism and "revise" the official version of the nationhood.⁴⁴ In fact, the main objective of political authorities is to maintain the constitutional structures of the nation by mobilizing all individuals around patriotic feelings and trying avoiding radical change.⁴⁵ This is a complex process and may be not completely well understood or

44 Jordi Muñoz, „From National-Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism? Democratization and Reconstruction of National Pride: The Case of Spain (1981-2000),” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32/4 (2009): 616-639, at 618.

45 David Easton, „A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-457, at 437.

accepted by the entire population, a reality which our data tend to confirm as well.

There is a growing literature which focuses extensively on the specific relation between religion and national identity. The importance of religion for national values is usually negotiated within society,⁴⁶ especially when a multiethnic and multi-religious environment is involved. Being part of a religious majority or on the contrary, having a religious minority denomination act as a form of in-group demarcation which in turn shapes the attitudes of the adopted identity.

The data presented in Table 1 show that Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic minorities have lower probability to be proud with their nations. Comparatively, the results on majority groups are more diverse. The dominant Orthodox and Catholic populations show only a relative confidence with their national pride, yet a negative correlation with stronger standards of patriotism. Generally, powerful religious beliefs are found in the European periphery, where church still has retained its influence on some traditional functions in the society, such as schools, social welfare, culture etc.⁴⁷

The results however, seem pessimistic about the role and impact of religion on national pride in the future. Several scholars pointed out on the continuous decreasing role of religious practices and beliefs, especially in the Western and Central Europe.⁴⁸ One can think of the weakening of the traditional religious values in a post-modernist society to which Europe is driving nowadays. This reasoning is supported by the fact that there is a significant negative correlation between religion denomination and high levels of national pride across both minority and majority groups all around Europe.

Closely linked with religion, the belief in authority is one of the main traditional pillars of the European state-societies.⁴⁹ Some scholar work however has documented that there is a continuous decreasing trend in the authority trust worldwide.⁵⁰ The data employed in our study shows a strong and significant causality between negative attitudes toward authority and lower pride values across both minority

46 Robert M. Kunovich, "Relative Group Size and Religious Nationalism in Europe," Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA (2003): 1-21, at 2.

47 Dogan, *op.cit.* note 1, at 81.

48 *Ibid.*; Sabato Acquaviva, *The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).

49 Dogan, *op.cit.* note 1, at 77.

50 Ronald Inglehart, "Postmodernization, Authority and Democracy," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 1.

and majority groups. Once again this denotes the close interrelation between positive attitudes toward authority and high pride standards.

The empirical evidence obliges us to make a clear separation between national pride and the legitimacy of the authority. Many former communist East European countries are more challenged in terms of having weak institutions or irregular rates of trust in political leadership. On the other hand, many western European countries have traditionally lower rates of confidence in the institutional and political authority. However, the legitimacy of the regime is not challenged since the virtue of democracy is to provide a reasonable framework for peaceful change of the political game.⁵¹ The strong correlation between attitudes towards authority and national pride prompts us to give a consistent credit to leadership values. Drawing from the literature, our results rely on the existing idea that in the nowadays Europe, individuals still need to anchor their pride values to a strong sense of authority.

Finally, in line with our initial expectations, we found a positive causal link between life satisfaction and strong national pride across all ethnic groups. There always has been a constant support for the argument that the satisfaction with the general life-being is an important predicting factor for positive pride values. Commonly, the correlation between life satisfaction and pride feelings goes beyond the ethnicity factor and proved to be a significant indicator for national cohesion.

Conclusions

The purpose of this analysis was set to explore the substance of national pride by applying a comparative perspective at two levels: among ethnic lines and across religious denominations. We started this study by considering the fact that people usually build cultural barriers around their beliefs and tend to see the reality around them through these particular lenses. Thus, when someone is guided by faith and is about to make a choice at the level of personal values and beliefs, there can be seen little space for compromise or negotiation. The rigidity of people's values can be widely seen all the way across pride feelings and ethnic lines while further presenting the obtained outcomes.

We have observed a constant tendency among majority groups to feel more pride with the nation in all European countries. The exception is provided by some west European democracies where minority groups seem to be well integrated in their host societies by

51 Dogan, *op.cit.* note 1, at 87.

showing greater than average feelings of national pride. We might carefully stipulate that higher feelings of pride among these minority groups could be the direct results of the alternative nation building processes set up by the local autonomous governments in many European developed democracies.

Similarly, a homogenous religious denomination within one country, which is cross-bordering ethnic lines, seems to increase the average national pride feelings. The exception to this trend is made by the former Soviet East European countries where ethnicities with similar religious denomination denote negative trends in terms of average pride feelings. One possible explanation for these findings can go as far as the state of transition undertaken by many East European states. The change in the political realm correlated with the hardship and uncertainties of the everyday life may consistently weaken people's moral comfort in the nationhood.

In our analysis we have found also that the status of perceived discrimination at the group level seems to lower the feelings of patriotism. All over Europe, the common feature of the disadvantaged groups is to have weaker feelings of national pride than the average standards in their countries. The constant negative relationship between being "at risk" for discrimination and frail pride feelings, prompts us to think that further tensions at the level of interethnic relations are still possible in Europe. Despite decades of democracy and efforts toward tolerance, discrimination has nonetheless profound roots in many European societies. In order to improve the idea of national cohesion, additional research is recommended to deeply analyse the way the attachment to the nation could be mediated along discrimination lines.

Overall this study has also shown the importance of targeting national pride in connection with other socio-economic characteristics. The results of the analysis have roughly confirmed our initial expectations. The existing literature constantly considers national pride in its general conception. However, we have analysed the degree of pride as several hierarchic values and tested the impact of the employed characteristics on each of them. Thus we have found that individuals perceive differently the two positive national pride feelings: being "relatively proud" and "very proud". Many independent indicators show different causality patterns as we go up on the pride scale. Once more, these results prove the volatility of the people's beliefs in nationhood. The surprising configuration of the obtained outcomes gives additional incentives for considering further research on patriotism feelings all along the pride scale.

As such, attachment with the nation proves to have strong primordial links by involving strong causality between cultural values and beliefs. It proves also to be a social construction, given the influence which many socio-economic factors have on individuals' pride feelings. Unfortunately, we could not analyse the developments of pride attitudes in a temporal perspective. The way people change their national feelings across time would be by far the biggest academic challenge but also an impressive achievement for identity studies.