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The Determinants of National Pride of Ethnic and Immigrant Minorities in Europe

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This article focuses on the determinants of national pride in relation to ethnic diversity. Using pooled cross-sectional data from the World/European Values Survey (N = 43,909), a multilevel analysis method is applied to examine the impact of discrimination, poverty, and self-perceived social status on the feelings of national pride of individuals who belong to ethnic and immigrant minorities in Europe. Results show that, while national pride is generally low among minorities, it peaks when individuals who are members of ethnic and immigrant minorities are poor and when they themselves adopt discriminatory attitudes. These findings imply that the context of discrimination and poverty, when combined with the status of the ethnic and immigrant group in the country, serve as important mediating factors for the way minorities choose to identify with the nation.

INTRODUCTION

Multicultural societies are embedded in contemporary nation-states, which are structured around a dominant nationality. A secure nation-state, however, not only needs legitimacy to enjoy stability; it also needs a sense of national unity widely shared by most of its residents. This idea is frequently mentioned in the literature.¹

The biggest challenge to national unity, however, is represented by discrimination and deprivation, two characteristics that distinguish “us” from “them.” Discrimination in its various forms is a biosocial phenomenon,² meaning it evolved around the instinctual desire of humans to live in

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close-kin communities while reluctantly approaching contacts with outsiders. Consequently, throughout human history, discriminating against those perceived as having loyalties outside the group, as being culturally or ethnically distinct from “us,” has been a constant and persistent reality. At the same time, it is not unusual that those discriminated against respond by showing prejudice towards others as well.³ After all, victims of discrimination inflict on others what they themselves experience.⁴ Coming full circle, those discriminated against sometimes choose to discriminate against others in order to boost their self-confidence and to protect the unity of their own kin-community.⁵

Identification with a nation could be affected by deprivation, whether social or economic. More specifically, individual vulnerability to poverty, in the form of low income, provides fuel for interethnic grievances and conflict.⁶ Minorities in precarious economic conditions regard their status as problematic and are reluctant to consider any form of diffuse support for the nation. Moreover, minorities with a certain social status may perceive out-group members as a threat to their condition and are more prone to showing greater levels of hostility toward foreigners.⁷ According to this rationale, socially and income deprived minorities are less likely to identify themselves with other impoverished minorities, because of this inferior status and the stigma attached to it, and are more willingly to identify themselves with the nation instead. In support for this claim, research into attitudes linked to ethnic diversity consistently suggests the need for testing the effects of deprivation on national identity.⁸

Despite the importance and the longstanding interest in the issue of support for the nation, existing scholarship only marginally tackles the conditions of discrimination and deprivation in relation to national pride. Some research linking discrimination and nationalistic sentiments has been conducted⁹ but has failed to consider the complexity of the discrimination that attaches to the status of being part of an ethnic and immigrant minority. Similarly, empirical and theoretical models for measuring income inequality and nationalistic behavior have been tested¹⁰ but failed to reach uniform conclusions.¹¹ Hence, more evidence is needed to support the existing theoretical and empirical lines. This study intends to empirically test the question of whether discrimination, poverty, or self-perceived social condition, all linked to minority group status, drive the way minorities feel attached to their nations in Europe.¹² This article differentiates between discrimination practices at both group and individual levels and includes measurements of income deprivation and self-assessed social consciousness and how they relate to feelings of national pride among ethnic and immigrant minorities in Europe. The analysis is based on multilevel, mixed-effects models to account for the average variation between individuals, groups, and countries in the sample.

DISCRIMINATION, POVERTY, SOCIAL STATUS, AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT

Discrimination is usually perceived at two levels. The first one matches the general perception in the country of a particular group being “at risk” of discrimination.¹³ The status “at risk” is generally applied to all group members, is systematic towards the group, is distinct in relation to other groups in the country, and is generally acknowledged as such by both members of the discriminated group and by external observers.¹⁴ The perception of group discrimination leads to tensions and a low level of satisfaction with the hosting nation. Instead of identifying with the nation, many discriminated minorities strengthen the cohesion around their own group and thus become inclusive in their behavior. By default, group discrimination is often associated with weak incentives toward national loyalty, which thus makes higher levels of national pride unlikely.¹⁵

The second source of discrimination comes from the cognitive perception of individuals relative to each other. In other words, individuals value their in-group status by comparing themselves with out-group members in the country.¹⁶ In line with primordial feelings, people are used to favoring their in-group to the detriment of a relevant out-group. According to the paradigm of *social discrimination*, discriminatory attitudes are subjective feelings, usually disadvantageous towards out-group members so that the latter, or other outsiders, would find them unjust.¹⁷ According to Muzafer Sherif, there is a functional utility in the way groups perceive discrimination.¹⁸ The discriminatory attitudes toward out-groups are likely when there are net gains for the in-group (we look good if they look bad). Conversely, positive attitudes are possible when there is a common gain for both the in-group and the out-group (we look good if they look good). Hence, discrimination can be viewed as an attempt of in-groups to establish positive distinctions in relation to out-groups. In this context, national pride can be seen as the channel for the functional utility of the subjective discriminatory feelings of in-group members.

However, the utility of belonging to an in-group comes from the perceived distance between the individual and the primordial values of that group.¹⁹ People feel closer to the group if the community is more homogeneous in values such as ethnicity, religion, language, etc. Conversely, individuals tend to distance themselves from the group if there is great diversity among its members. A phenomenon that impacts directly on the diversity in society is the presence of migrants. Hence, immigration and the presence of migrants boost the intergroup relations in the country and affect the intergroup consciousness directly.²⁰ Additionally, migrants usually congregate and form distinct communities on their own.²¹ As a distinct community, migrants contribute to the multicultural richness of the hosting nation by ex-

posing sentiments towards the national realm as well. Consequently, issues related to migration such as integration, discrimination, tolerance, and deprivation have found their way onto the national agenda, spurring debates, cleavages, and attitudes in the political and social spaces of the hosting society. As a result, migrants have become a constituent part of the national realm, contributing, directly or indirectly, to opinions and loyalties towards the hosting nation just like any other segment of the traditional population.

Deprivation and its relationship with nationalistic sentiments have caught the attention of scholars in recent years. According to the self-interest paradigm, people's vulnerability to economic (low income, poor living conditions) and social (deteriorating social status) deprivations was found to weaken interethnic cohesion in the country.²² Deprived minorities are more likely to perceive out-group members as a threat and, in consequence, show higher levels of hostility towards members of other ethnic groups. A recent study by Moses Shayo²³ further helped in understanding the relationship between income inequality and nationalistic sentiments in multicultural societies. According to Shayo's *social identification theory*, income inequality raises the nationalistic feelings of deprived individuals. More precisely, deprivation was found to decrease the perceived utility individuals experience from belonging to a vulnerable segment of the population. According to this theory, individuals who belong to ethnic or immigrant minorities would avoid seeing themselves as part of a group whose status and reputation were depreciating. In consequence, the identification with the nation proves more practical for those minorities that are subject to economic and social deprivation. At the same time, according to Shayo,²⁴ if the income or social condition of individuals who belong to a minority group improves, then they will take more pride in their ethnic identification and feel less attachment to the nation. More recently, Shayo's models were adjusted and tested further,²⁵ attesting to the mediating effects of income levels, among other things, in relation to national identification. Despite thorough testing of the economic components and nationalistic sentiments, this scholarship failed to consider one key element of intergroup relations: discriminatory attitudes found at the group and individual levels. Therefore, this article introduces an important feature that influences the dynamics of national consciousness in relation to ethnic diversity: the discrimination felt by group members and the discrimination shown by group members towards others.

This study employs the concept of pride in one's own nation as the dependent variable. National pride²⁶ reflects the emotional affection of individuals towards their native or their host country.²⁷ In other words, national pride reflects the collective identity of the state. It manifests itself in the form of a "we-feeling," a common identification that goes beyond the individual or their group membership.²⁸ The concept of national pride has been used extensively in the literature to measure various facets of nationalistic sentiments, attesting to its utility and reliability.²⁹

Based on various dimensions of discrimination and deprivation, as well as the cognitive perception towards others as outlined by both the social discrimination paradigm and social identification theory, combined with the concept of national pride that reflects the comfort of collective identity in a multicultural society, this study assumes that discrimination and deprivation have a lasting effect on the national pride of minority groups as outlined by the following hypotheses:

H_{1a}: Individuals who belong to a disadvantaged minority have less national pride than do individuals who belong to a national ethnic majority within the country.

H_{1b}: Individuals who belong to immigrant minorities have less national pride than do individuals who belong to the national ethnic majority.

H_{1c}: Individuals who belong to a nondisadvantaged minority show no difference in levels of national pride compared to individuals who belong to the national ethnic majority within the country.

H₂: Individuals who belong to ethnic and immigrant minorities have increased feelings of national pride when they exhibit discriminatory attitudes themselves.

H₃: The national pride of ethnic and immigrant minorities increases when they face a decline in income or a low self-perceived social status.

METHOD

Data and Sample

The data come from the World/European Values Survey. The World/European Values Survey data register information about the political and social values and beliefs of individuals. The data are collected by using random sampling methods and include individuals aged 15 and over. The sample employed in this study includes individuals from 21 European states³⁰ (see Table 1). Although the units of analysis are individuals, all respondents are clustered to reflect their ethnic group³¹ and immigrant status.³² The resulting three levels of clustering of observations are accounted for in the analytical strategy that employs a multilevel modeling design.

The ethnic group status comprises two distinct categories: ethnicities “at risk” of discrimination and minorities not “at risk” of being disadvantaged in the country. In identifying the “at risk” status, this study used the classification criteria from the “Minorities at Risk” (MAR) project. This project was initiated by Ted Robert Gurr at the University of Maryland in 1986 to track and document ethnic minorities that were targeted by consistent discrimination practices within the country.³³ The criteria to which the status “at risk” are assigned are based on two main conditions. A minority group that “collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment *vis-à-vis* other groups in a society” and the group as a whole “is the

TABLE 1 National Pride among Ethnic National Majority, Ethnic Minorities “at Risk,” Ethnic Minorities Not “at Risk,” and Immigrant Minorities, Percentages by Country (%).

Country	Ethnic majority	N	Minorities “at risk”	N	Minorities not “at risk”	N	Immigrants	N
Albania	94.1	1957	73.4	24	—	—	—	—
Azerbaijan	95.2	1664	91.7	116	90.3	185	93.7	35
Armenia	83.3	1750	—	—	59.1	38	79.7	211
Belarus	91.1	571	74.9	1211	65.8	8	62.4	301
Bosnia	93.3	1162	61.5	1080	—	—	78.8	121
Bulgaria	86.5	891	70.5	254	—	—	76	30
Estonia	73.8	581	47.8	147	—	—	45.4	292
Finland	92.4	1908	—	—	81.8	33	86.7	37
Georgia	94.1	1510	92.3	209	97.8	175	89.8	124
Italy	90.2	598	83.3	40	—	—	82.3	17
Latvia	77.5	652	38.8	275	57.1	31	41.8	238
Lithuania	70.8	852	63.5	56	—	—	65.7	70
Macedonia (FYROM)	92.8	1479	45	482	78.8	53	85.7	36
Moldova	71.7	2267	59.1	536	60	27	55.2	137
Romania	85.5	2796	84.2	155	—	—	85.7	21
Serbia	80.8	2305	43.7	244	—	—	85.9	176
Slovakia	90.4	975	47.1	60	—	—	89.7	33
Spain	95	2933	76.6	363	97.2	177	90.5	107
Srpska (Republic of)	61.1	1162	78.5	1080	—	—	—	121
Switzerland	75.8	897	—	—	88.9	205	80.2	514
Ukraine	84.3	2085	37.4	494	—	—	43	401
United Kingdom	91.6	1804	89.9	229	90.7	101	—	—
<i>Column N</i>		32,799		7,055		1,033		3,022

Notes. Share of individuals that are quite or very proud of the nation. Pooled data across three waves: 1994 to 2008.

basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.”³⁴ In order for these criteria to be applied, the minority should count at least 100,000 members or represent at least 1% of the country’s total population. In total, individuals belonging to 73 European ethnic groups have been identified in the data, divided into members of 22 majority groups ($n = 31,637$), members of 20 minorities not “at risk” of discrimination ($n = 1,033$), and members of 31 ethnic minorities “at risk” of discrimination ($n = 5,975$).

Immigrant status was established based on the foreign status (country of birth) and the family background (mother immigrant and/or father immigrant) of individuals. In other words, the immigrant sample employed by this study comprises both first- and second-generation foreigners as well as foreign-born individuals who are eventually naturalized by the host country ($n = 2,901$). Although desired, it was not possible to filter the sample for noncitizens because of the absence of this information in the data. It is therefore acknowledged that the immigrant sample used by this study may have a measurement error problem because it does not capture the complex status of migrants based on their nationality, ethnicity, and citizenship. The analysis included filters to avoid collisions between the immigrant and the traditional ethnic minority samples.³⁵

The timeframe for analysis was set to integrate data across three waves that spanned from 1994 to 2008 (depending on the country). These waves are used due to the availability of indicators employed by this study.

Measurements

NATIONAL PRIDE

The dependent variable is operationalized from the following question: “How proud are you to be [country nationality/resident]?”³⁶ The analysis uses this question for the following reason. The national pride in the data is part of survey questions capturing the effects of a “general” national support.³⁷ Unlike questions of pride capturing the “domain specific” national support (in the area of democracy, welfare, sports, etc.) that are prone to the influence of contextual factors,³⁸ the question on national pride captures people’s general national support without any regard for contextual factors. Hence, the use of the national pride question provides the proper framework to measure nationalistic sentiments across individuals with different ethnic backgrounds.

A number of scholars have used the measurement of national pride to analyze an array of topics. Among them, Stephen Shulman³⁹ explored the link between economic wealth and national attachment. Before that, Kathleen Dowley and Brian Silver⁴⁰ explored the relationship between ethnic identity and national loyalty. Tom Smith and Seokho Kim⁴¹ correlated national pride measurements with sociodemographic characteristics in a

temporal view. More recently, Shayo⁴² and Kyung Han⁴³ discussed the relationship between income inequality, individual income levels, and national pride. Mark Bühlmann and Miriam Hänni analyzed the impact of different institutions on the diffuse national support of ethnic minorities.⁴⁴ Finally, Hoi Jeong empirically explored the link between national pride and attitudes towards immigrants and found a positive association between the two.⁴⁵ The diversity of studies using national pride measurements points to the reliability of this indicator in the literature.

MEASURING DISCRIMINATION

The status of group discrimination is captured by the *minorities "at risk"* condition as emphasized above. The data provide several measurements that capture individual discrimination attitudes from different angles. Discriminatory attitudes are negative feelings towards individuals or groups of individuals that are perceived as different from the group to which one belongs.⁴⁶ Four statements comprising discriminatory attitudes toward people of a different background⁴⁷ have been combined by this study into a binary index measuring a form of *selective discrimination* based on race, foreign background, and language. As an alternative, this study also employs an indicator measuring negative attitudes towards foreigners.⁴⁸ Here discrimination is limited to include only opinions towards *welcoming more foreigners* into the country irrespective of their ethnocultural background. By default, the adoption of discriminatory attitudes is often associated with feelings of superiority, which positively correlates with higher levels of national pride.⁴⁹ Since it promotes the idea of "otherness," it can be adopted by individuals of all ethnic backgrounds alike. To capture the combined effects of discrimination and minorities on national pride, two sets of interactions are employed: one that captures effects of interaction between selective discrimination and ethnic groups and another that combines the effects of rejecting foreigners and ethnic groups.

POVERTY AND THE SELF-PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS

Deprivation is shown by inequalities in the distributional system of a society. The "poor" are often treated in derogatory ways, are perceived as an "underclass"⁵⁰, and have greater difficulties in finding moral support within the nation. Income deprivation is more persistent among minorities who are traditionally perceived as discriminated against (for example, the Romani minority) and among those who have a vulnerable economic status in the country (for example, illegal migrants). In fact, the norms and stereotypical views associated with deprivation limit the access of individuals and groups

to resources, which would normally improve their ability to move out of poverty and thus to alleviate their condition.

A number of studies have analyzed the relationship between various forms of deprivation and the values of national attachment. Developing an economic theory of nationalistic sentiments, Shayo⁵¹ assumed that individuals mainly identify with two entities in the country: class and nation. The category of class has two main subcomponents: the poor and the rich. National identification is further based on the function of utility, the status of the group to which the individual belongs, and the perceived economic or social condition of the individual in relation to the other group members.⁵² Thus Shayo implies that deprivation makes poor people more nationalistic because being part of the “poor” is less “appealing” than being part of the nation.⁵³ The latter provides a greater utility for the poor by providing a symbolic path for escaping the deprived status in which they are trapped. Shayo’s assumption was challenged and amended by Frederick Solt⁵⁴ who advanced a diversionary hypothesis stipulating that the state promotes nationalistic sentiments, with an equal impact on the rich and the poor, to counterbalance the threat of unrest posed by economic inequality.

This study adds to Shayo’s assumptions, using one measurement for *poverty*⁵⁵ and another measurement for self-perceived *social status*.⁵⁶ Based on Shayo’s research, it is expected that poor individuals and those with an inferior social status are likely to increase their national attachment. These effects are expected to be more pronounced when reinforced by the status of being a migrant group and by the status associated with minorities “at risk.”

CONTROL VARIABLES

The diffuse support for the nation may be influenced by a handful of factors. In the literature, the sociodemographic factors such as gender,⁵⁷ age,⁵⁸ education,⁵⁹ and employment⁶⁰ status are presented as controls for nationalistic sentiments. Finally, a measurement of new democracies⁶¹ is also included in the analysis. According to Tom Smith and Lars Jarkko,⁶² individuals in young democracies would have lower levels of national pride because of the difficulties associated with transition and of their distrust in government efforts to invest in the national realm. Descriptive data are available for all indicators upon request.

Analytical Strategy

The first two hypotheses (H_{1a}, and H_{1b}) of this study imply that immigrants and ethnic minorities “at risk” would show lower levels of national pride when compared to individuals belonging to the national ethnic majority. The status “at risk” of discrimination, from the Minorities at Risk project (Table 2,

TABLE 2 Minorities, Discrimination, Poverty, and Social Status Effects on National Pride

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Odds ratios = exp(β)		Odds ratios = exp(β)		Odds ratios = exp(β)		Odds ratios = exp(β)	
	OR	[95% CI]	OR	[95% CI]	OR	[95% CI]	OR	[95% CI]
<i>Fixed effects</i>								
Female	1.10**	[1.02, 1.17]	1.10**	[1.03, 1.18]	1.08*	[1.00, 1.16]	1.08*	[1.00, 1.16]
Age: \geq 50 years	1.55***	[1.43, 1.68]	1.55***	[1.43, 1.69]	1.46***	[1.34, 1.59]	1.46***	[1.34, 1.59]
Tertiary education	0.73***	[0.67, 0.79]	0.73***	[0.67, 0.79]	0.73***	[0.67, 0.79]	0.73***	[0.67, 0.80]
Active employment	0.97	[0.91, 1.05]	0.98	[0.91, 1.06]	1.00	[0.92, 1.09]	1.00	[0.92, 1.08]
New democracies	0.47*	[0.26, 0.85]	0.47*	[0.26, 0.85]	0.51*	[0.27, 0.97]	0.51*	[0.27, 0.97]
Discrimination: race/foreigners/language	1.05	[0.97, 1.14]	1.08	[0.98, 1.18]	1.08†	[0.99, 1.18]	1.05	[0.96, 1.15]
Prohibit foreigners	1.05	[0.98, 1.14]	1.06	[0.97, 1.15]	1.09*	[1.02, 1.19]	1.07	[0.98, 1.16]
Poverty	1.02	[0.95, 1.11]	0.98	[0.89, 1.07]	0.99	[0.92, 1.08]	1.00	[0.91, 1.09]
Low social status	0.82***	[0.74, 0.91]	0.87*	[0.77, 0.98]	0.84**	[0.76, 0.94]	0.86**	[0.76, 0.96]
<i>Ethnic minorities</i>								
Minorities not "at risk" (MNaR)	0.75	[0.43, 1.32]	0.87	[0.34, 2.18]				
Minorities "at risk" (MaR)	0.27***	[0.19, 0.40]	0.32***	[0.21, 0.51]				
Discrimination: race/ foreigners/language \times MNaR			0.99	[0.49, 2.01]				
Discrimination: race/ foreigners/language \times MaR			0.86	[0.70, 1.07]				
Prohibit foreigners \times MNaR			2.83**	[1.43, 5.59]				
Prohibit foreigners \times MaR			0.91	[0.76, 1.09]				
Poverty \times MNaR			0.95	[0.50, 1.79]				
Poverty \times MaR			1.23*	[1.03, 1.47]				

Low social status × MNaR	0.61	[0.28, 1.32]			
Low social status × MaR	0.78 [†]	[0.60, 1.02]			
<i>Migrant minorities</i>					
Migrants			0.41***	[0.36, 0.46]	0.39*** [0.29, 0.54] [1.08, 2.01]
Discrimination: race / foreigners/language × Migrants					1.27* [1.01, 1.64]
Prohibit foreigners × Migrants					0.97 [0.77, 1.23]
Poverty × Migrants					0.88 [0.64, 1.22]
Low social status × Migrants					10.38*** [5.82, 18.50]
Constant	11.84***	[6.65, 21.08]	11.42***	[6.39, 20.40]	10.31*** [5.78, 18.39]
<i>Variance – Random effects</i>					
Group/year level	2.13***	[1.79, 2.52]	2.142***	[1.80, 2.55]	
Country/year level	1.57***	[1.25, 1.99]	1.57***	[1.24, 1.98]	2.08*** [1.71, 2.54]
<i>Model properties</i>					
Individuals	27019		27019		23714
Groups/years	112		112		
Country/years	37		37		29
<i>Log likelihood</i>		-10856.8		-10845.3	
					-9488.8
					-9482.9

Note. Odds ratios (OR) reported; 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Model 1), and the immigrant status of respondents (Table 2, Model 3) are employed to test these assumptions. The subsequent hypothesis (H_{1c}) hints at comparable national pride levels for ethnic minorities that are not “at risk” of discrimination when compared to ethnic majority groups (Table 2, Model 1). The last two hypotheses (H_2 and H_3) stipulate that the national pride of minorities increases when they themselves adopt discriminatory attitudes and when they are locked into economic and social deprivation. Interaction terms between discriminatory attitudes and minority group status, between self-perceived social status and minority group status, and between poverty and minority group status are employed to test these assumptions (Table 2, Models 2 & 4).

The data include individual-level observations that are nested at the group level and the group-level observations are nested in the country/year context. Thus the cluster observations violate the assumption of independent error terms and need to be analyzed in a multilevel manner. The analysis specifies three-level random-intercept logit models for nationalistic support with individuals nested in ethnic groups who are nested in country/years (Models 1 & 2). Furthermore, two-level random-intercept logit models are specified for migrant individuals nested in country/year level (Models 3 & 4). The analysis runs in Stata 13. A more detailed discussion of the multilevel statistical method is deferred because of space limitations but a reference to the relevant literature is provided.⁶³ All indicators in the analysis were tested for multicollinearity and none was found: The variation inflation factors (VIF) were distributed normally (1 – 1.1), and the tolerance values were good (0.8 – 0.9).⁶⁴

RESULTS

Table 1 shows the general support for the nation for majority groups and ethnic and immigrant minorities in each country of this study. According to the data, most individuals are “quite proud” or “very proud” of their (hosting) nation. Yet a significant variation can be observed between countries and between groups in a given country. Overall, the picture reveals that in most countries, ethnic and immigrant minorities, especially those “at risk” of discrimination, are less proud of their hosting nation than the ethnic national majority populations. Exceptions are Georgia, Serbia, the Republic of Srpska, and Switzerland, where people of some minority groups show greater degrees of national attachment than their majority fellow nationals. Moreover, it can be seen that in some countries—Azerbaijan, Romania, Finland, or the United Kingdom—the gap in national pride across groups is quite small, whereas in other countries, the gap is significantly larger, as in Belarus, Bosnia, Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia (FYROM), or Ukraine.

However, the descriptive pattern presented in Table 1 is informative only up to a certain point. Since the variation in national pride is prone to

the influence of conflicting factors, the next step is to control for a number of conditions and interactions so that the stated hypotheses can be answered.

Table 2 presents the main results of this study. Model 1 tests the first hypotheses and confirms that belonging to a minority group “at risk” of discrimination does indeed reduce the level of national pride of individuals. The same pattern is confirmed when including the immigrant minority in Model 3, hence endorsing Hypothesis 1_b. More precisely, *ceteris paribus*, the two models predict that the odds⁶⁵ of denying national identification is 73% higher for the disadvantaged minorities than for ethnic majority nationals (Model 1), whereas the odds of feeling less proud in the hosting nation is 59% higher for immigrants than for natives (Model 3). No significant effects were found for those ethnic minorities not subject to discrimination in their country.

Models 2 and 4 of Table 2 show the results of the second step of this investigation. The two models test the second and the third hypotheses and do so by using data interactions. The second hypothesis tests whether discriminatory attitudes adopted by minorities have a positive effect on national pride. Similarly, the third hypothesis assumes that poverty and the self-perceived social status positively impact the national attachment of individuals who belong to ethnic and immigrant minorities. When looking at the interaction terms between the discriminatory attitudes adopted (based on race, migrant origin, religion, and language) and the minority status, there are positive and significant effects on national pride for the immigrant sample only (Model 4). In other words, the odds for feeling more proud of the nation are 47% higher for migrants who adopt selective discrimination opinions towards others than for the native majority population who hold similarly discriminatory opinions themselves. There are no significant effects to support the same statement for other ethnic minorities (Model 2).

Looking at the interaction term between adopted attitudes towards prohibiting foreigners from coming into the country and the group status, there are significant positive effects for both ethnic minorities and immigrants (Models 2 & 4). The odds of feeling more proud of the nation are 183% higher for ethnic minorities who are not disadvantaged but who dislike the idea of having more foreigners coming into the country than among majority nationals with similar discriminatory attitudes. Similarly, the odds are just 27% higher for immigrants when adopting attitudes towards prohibiting more foreigners from coming into the country. These results largely confirm the third hypothesis.

The coefficients of the interaction term between poverty (that is, income level) and minority status show that there is a significant interacting effect for the ethnic minorities “at risk.” In other words, poorer members of minorities with a history of discrimination show more national pride than do rich individuals in the same ethnic community. Contrarily, members of minorities who are “at risk” and who have a low self-declared social status

show negative odds for more national pride, although this result did not quite reach significance ($p > .10$). No difference is found between the level of national pride among poor immigrants and that of rich immigrants, as well as among immigrants with low and high social status. The functional effect of deprivation and group status on national pride is thus partially confirmed in connection to the third hypothesis.

In general, the associations between control indicators and national pride show significant patterns. The results reveal that females and old people are positively related to more national pride. On the contrary, national attachment is lower among individuals with tertiary education and among those living in emerging democracies.

DISCUSSION

Building on the social discrimination paradigm⁶⁶ and on social identification theory,⁶⁷ this study looks into variations in the national pride of members of ethnic and immigrant minorities by considering the conditions of poverty, self-declared social status, and discrimination. This study is able to distinguish between different dimensions of discrimination, at the group and individual levels, and to link them to national pride feelings.

Overall, it was found that immigrant communities and those minorities with a history of discrimination in a country generally have low propensities towards national identification. National allegiance in multiethnic societies mainly depends on whether minorities feel that their group values are protected and respected by the hosting nation. Minorities always have the tendency to calculate what they have to gain or lose from living in a multiethnic environment and are able to adapt their nationalistic behavior accordingly. If one group is ill-treated, then members of that group feel excluded from the national project and subsequently tend to distance themselves from any form of national allegiance.⁶⁸ This finding points to the notion that integration of minorities is both the source and the solution to solving the problem of increasing the national attachment of vulnerable minorities. After all, the accommodation of ethnic diversity is still one of the most pressing issues in democracies today.⁶⁹

The findings of this study also provide leverage for thinking about discrimination in ways that go beyond the usual, for considering the possibility that discriminatory behavior is entered into by minority groups to level-up their status in the country by showing positive levels of national pride. Results reveal that, under certain conditions, minorities do discriminate against others and, in doing so, their degree of national pride rises. Minorities discriminate and show national allegiance because, as a result, they sense a functional utility for their in-group members.⁷⁰ Perhaps the desire to avoid being the target of discrimination themselves lies behind the odds that

minorities are likely to develop a defense mechanism that stigmatizes others while slotting into the mainstream nationalistic sentiment. However, this defense mechanism proves efficient for minorities who are already fortunate, precisely for those with no prior discrimination history in the country and for those with a recent immigrant status. By contrast, as shown by findings of this study, minorities with a proven history of discrimination in the country do not feel compelled to show national allegiance, even when they adopt discriminatory attitudes towards others as well. The literature speculates that victims of discrimination often inflict on others what they themselves experience.⁷¹ Yet, as this study shows, the preexistent status of discrimination annihilates the vehicles of national pride for those minority members who fall victim to prejudice themselves. If the goal of minorities who are “deprived of power and status” is to “feel power and status,”⁷² then, as this study compellingly concludes, it is unlikely to be achieved through the adoption of more nationalistic values.

The national pride of poor members of minority groups increases, particularly within those groups with an active history of discrimination in the country. No such effects were found for immigrants in the sample, mainly because their presence creates “a social grouping that cuts across economic classes” and because “their presence can facilitate contact between different classes by placing a ladder between them.”⁷³ This finding adds a nuance to the social identification theory of Shayo⁷⁴ in the sense that the poorer people of some minority groups prefer to identify with a national-level status rather than to see themselves as part of the poor class in the country.

Interestingly enough, no similar conclusion can be drawn when considering the status of social deprivation (that is, self-perceived social standing) of minorities in relation to national pride. This discrepancy implies that individuals perceive nationalistic sentiments differently depending on whether deprivation takes on an economic or a social value. Overall, poverty drives this tendency to a greater extent because it has a greater impact on people’s lives and thus also provides more visibility in measuring the perceived distance between the poor and the nonpoor in a specific community. Self-perceived social status, on the other hand, is more porous when it comes to differentiating between people from different social backgrounds. Previous studies based on European survey data revealed that individuals with higher social standings from one ethnic group are likely to have more vibrant social connections with people in the lower social echelons of another ethnic community,⁷⁵ hence indicating that social status and ethnic diversity are not mutually exclusive. If individuals from different ethnic and social backgrounds are able to interact more, it would make the search for an alternative national identity less feasible.

Some limitations of this study ought to be mentioned. First, despite documenting the effects of poverty, social status, and discrimination of ethnic and migrant minorities on national pride, this study fails to include other

proxies for national identification in the analysis. National pride captures important aspects of nationalistic sentiments, such as national identity and nationalism⁷⁶ and, yet, it is only one proxy among others. Therefore, given the limitations inherent in the data, it cannot be assumed that this article provides full testing of the different features of nationalistic sentiments. Second, the snapshot nature of data imposes caution when interpreting results that are prone to change as time elapses. So far, there is no panel data available that would match the richness and the reliability of the indicators analyzed in this study. Third, the data only capture the nationalistic sentiments of immigrants who are naturalized and, therefore, have a longer duration of residence in the country. This implies that immigrants with shorter periods of stay (that is, those who are not naturalized) are not represented in this study. Future research must target the duration of residence in the country as a covariate for association with the nationalistic sentiments of migrant minorities. Also, the diversity in the profile of minorities makes it difficult to advance an overarching model that would be definitive for the evidence across all tested groups in all countries. Nevertheless, even in its modesty, this study may provide insights for further development of ideas in an increasingly important and complex field of national-identity research.

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NOTES

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11. Solt, “Diversionary Nationalism,” 828.
12. This article focuses on “national pride” in its analysis. The term “national pride” is used in close association with the term “nationalistic sentiment” and “national attachment.” National pride might not fully cover these terms but it is acknowledged to cover their essential parts. See Han, *Income Inequality*, 503.
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25. Solt, "Diversionary Nationalism"; Han, "Income Inequality."
26. The use of national pride as a proxy for national identification spurs active debates in the literature. Scholars believe that national pride and national identity reinforce each other; Evans and Kelley, "National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data," 305. Also, there is an ongoing debate differentiating national identity and patriotism, Smith and Kim, "National Pride in Cross-National and Temporal Perspective," 127. Yet the literature points to national pride as being the only indicator in the cross-country surveys that can be used to measure the emotional connection with the national community regardless of one's ethnic identity; see Mark Bühlmann and Miriam Hänni, "Creating a 'We-feeling' in Heterogeneous Nations: A Cross-Country Investigation of the Impact of Inclusion and Autonomy on the National Pride of Ethnic Minorities," *Comparative Sociology* 11(3): 329 (2012).
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28. David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5(4): 435 (1975).
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30. One substate entity—Republic of Srpska—was sampled separately in the WVS/EVS data and taken as such in the current analysis.
31. The list of groups is available upon request. Ethnic groups were coded based on the combined information from the following indicators: S003: Country; X051: Self-assessed ethnic status/declared ethnicity (list of ethnic denominations); G015: Which ethnic status best describes you (list of ethnicities); and G016: What language do you normally speak at home? The declared ethnic denominations and the mentioned languages were assigned to the respective ethnic group in each country.
32. Immigrant status was extracted and coded based on the following indicators: G017: Country of birth; G026: Mother is immigrant; and G027: Father is immigrant. An individual was assigned immigrant status when one was born in a foreign country, one's mother was an immigrant or one's father was an immigrant or any of the three options combined.
33. For more information, please visit the Minorities at Risk Web site. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp> (accessed 12 Feb. 2012).
34. MAR, "Minority at Risk IV Dataset: Users Manual," retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/margene/mar-codebook_040903.pdf (accessed 12 Feb. 2012), 5.
35. There are cases when the distinction between the traditional ethnic minority and the immigrant minority is porous. It is difficult to distinguish, for example, between members of the traditional Russian minority and members of the recent Russian immigrant community in former Soviet Union countries. In this study, ethnic Russians who are foreign-born and/or have immigrant parents are labeled as immigrants. To avoid the overlap with the traditional Russian ethnic group, this study excludes those cases that fulfill the immigrant criteria from the traditional sample of ethnic minorities, even though they are, sometimes, of the same ethnic origin.
36. G006: 1 = not at all proud; 2 = not very proud; 3 = quite proud; 4 = very proud. Further recoded as binary: 0 = not very proud/not at all proud; 1 = quite proud/very proud. The choice for recoding the dependent variable as binary was motivated by our intention to better capture the variation in the dichotomy of being proud and nonproud in the nation.
37. Smith and Kim, *National Pride*, 127.
38. Shayo, "A Model of Social Identity," 158.
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41. Smith and Kim, "National Pride," 131.
42. Shayo, "A Model of Social Identity," 157.
43. Han, "Income Inequality," 503.
44. Bühlmann & Hänni, "Creating a 'We-feeling,'" 348.
45. Jeong, "Do National Feelings?," 1461.
46. Mikael Hjerm, "National Identities," 341.
47. I would not like to have as my neighbors: A124_02: people of a different race (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned); A124_06: immigrants/foreign workers (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned); A124_43: people who speak a different language (1 = mentioned, 0 = not mentioned). This information was coded in an indexed measure where at least one mentioned condition in any of the indicators was coded as 1 = discrimination. The absence of attitudes in all conditions was coded as 0 = no discrimination.
48. E143: How about people from other countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do? Where 1 = let anyone come, 2 = as long as jobs are available, 3 = strict limits, 4 = prohibit people from coming. Further recoded as 0 = let anyone come/as long as jobs available and 1 = strict limits/prohibit people from coming.
49. Mikael Hjerm, "National Identities," 341.
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51. Shayo, "A Model of Social Identity," 168.
52. *Ibid.*, 149.
53. *Ibid.*, 168.
54. Solt, *Diversionsary Nationalism*, 829.
55. X047: Scale of Income, where 1 = lowest income level, through 10 = highest income level. Further recoded as binary with the income level of five as the cutoff point.
56. X045: Self-reported social status. Would you describe yourself as belonging to 1 = upper class, 2 = upper middle class, 3 = lower middle class, 4 = working class, 5 = lower class. Further recoded as binary: 0 = Higher status (upper class/upper middle class/) and 1 = Lower status (lower middle class/working class/lower class).
57. X001: Gender where 0 = male, 1 = female; Smith and Kim, "National Pride," 129.
58. X003R: You are __ years old. Based on the generational replacement theories older people are more proud of their nationality than younger individuals. Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight West European Countries," *British Journal of Political Science* 22(2): 183–228 (1992); Joane Nagel, "Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21(2): 242–269 (1998). Thus, this study includes a dummy variable for older individuals (≥ 50 years).
59. X025R: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? Highly educated people are more cosmopolitan, mobile, and less attached to the national realm; Tilley and Heath, "The Decline of British National Pride," 667; Mikael Hjerm, "National Identities," 338; Hidde Bekhuis, Marcel Lubbers and Maykel Verkuyten, "How Education Moderates the Relation between Globalization and Nationalist Attitudes," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 26(4): 487–500 (2014). Therefore, a dummy variable for tertiary education is included in the analysis.
60. X028: Are you, yourself, gainfully employed now? Employed individuals usually show higher levels of support for national values. Hence, a dummy variable for the active employment status is included in the analysis; Georgios Kavetsos, "National Pride: War Minus the Shooting," *Social Indicators Research* 106(1): 173–185 (2012).
61. The European states that started their democratization process in the last two decades were coded as new democracies. See Solt, *Diversionsary Nationalism*, 825.
62. Smith and Jarkko, *National Pride*, 16.
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65. The effects presented in Table 2 are odds ratios. The interpretation of odds ratios revolve around the value 1.00, which reflects a null parity of the stated category in relation to the reference category on the dependent variable. An odds ratio above 1.00 reflects a positive impact, whereas values below 1.00 show a negative impact of the stated category on the dependent variable.

66. Mummendey and Wenzel, "Social Discrimination," 159.

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72. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, 153.

73. Han, *Income Inequality*, 4.

74. Shayo, "A Model of Social Identity," 150.

75. Han, *Income Inequality*, 17.

76. Mikael Hjerm, *National Identities*, 342.

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