

# REGULATING LIBRA & OTHER STABLECOINS

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Based on *Zetsche/Buckley/Arner*, *Regulating LIBRA*, *Oxf. J. Leg. St.*, *forthcoming*,  
pre-print available at: [www.ssrn.com/abstract=3414401](https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3414401)

## Regulating Libra and other Stablecoins

- What could SCs deliver?
- Regulatory assessment
- Individual perspective: eg. where GSC refers to basket need to hedge against volatility (devel. countries)
- E.g. Libra as large-scale global basket could find appeal among multi-nationals

# § 1

*What could SCs deliver?*

## § 1.1. 'Stable Coins'

- Stability matter of perspective and design
- Less so in developed, more so in developing countries
- Individual perspective: eg. where GSC refers to basket need to hedge against volatility (devel. countries)
- E.g. Libra as large-scale global basket could find appeal among multi-nationals

## § 1.2. Financial Inclusion

- Cash-in, cash-out (+) if a consortium ensures acceptance
- Liquid currency for the unbanked? But:
  - illiquidity of scarcely traded currency
  - clients to pay the illiquidity bill

### § 1.3. Cost Savings


- Remittances to exceed global development assistance
- Costs of remittances 5-15% of wired amount
- Uber: 800 million reasons for a GSC
- Who does save the costs?
- How will the money get back on the ground? (agents?)

## § 1.4. Disruptive Potential

- SCs as such do exist for several years
- Scale as 'game changer: e.g. Libra's link to Facebook
- Banks to loose out against BigTechs for lack of scale and data
- BigTech to develop TechFin-Ecosystems instead of FS

# § 2

## Regulatory Assessment: Services




# Libra's Set-up

## § 2.1. SC provider as payment system? – The example of Libra

- Libra applied for payment systems license in Switzerland (10/09)
  - Swiss Finma (11/09/19):
    - PS for stablecoins (+) subject to certain conditions (eg. Libra holders do not participate in the pool, but pool functions as guarantee fund)
    - PS provider subject to additional requirements re Libra Reserve, risk man't etc.
- ⇒ Switzerland does not have a PSD2 framework
- ⇒ Applies CPMI/BIS Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMI)
- ⇒ Advantage: harmonized global approach

## § 2 Licensing – the services

- If GSC provider = Payment System => CEX, Wallet Providers?
  - US: Money transmitter (US)
  - EU: Payment Service Provider or E-money institutions
  - Non-US/EU often: bank
  
- And: bank or credit institution *if accepting deposits*



## § 2.2. Services: GSC as Collective Investment Schemes

- Where SC holders participate in « pool of assets » (i.e bear risk of asset / risk management): CIS.
- Example of Libra (6/19):
  - No 'hard balance sheet' between Libra holder and Reserve
  - Language to indicate some participation
  - Holders seem to bear some of the risks relating to reserve management⇒ EU: UCITS under the UCITSD and MMF regulation

# § 3

## Regulatory Assessment: Coin Characteristics

### § 3.1. Licensing – coin characteristic

- Categorizing a stable coin?
- Money?
- Currency?
- Securities?
- Commodities?
- (Financial) Derivatives?
- Financial instrument?

Uncertainty remains  
≈ ICOs

## § 3.2. Example of Libra

- **US**: speculating on increase in value?
  - 'security' subject to Howey test? (+) if benefitting from others' work
  - 'proceeds' from the Libra reserve? (+)
  - 'functional' view (+): cross-currency stability as 'benefit'?  
[replaces currency hedges, and currency hedges would qualify as derivative)
  - isolated view (?)
- **EU**: 'financial instrument' (+), since link (as derivative) to financial instruments through participation in the Libra reserve (unless Libra Association group takes all risks with own balance sheet)

# § 4

## Regulatory Assessment: Reserve Management & Capital Requirements

## § 4.1. Reserve Management (Asset & Risk Management)

- ⇒ A GSC as cash equivalent requires many daily NAV calculations
- ⇒ GSC reserve concept does not work if fragmented, either due to regulation or due to factual reasons (infrastructure etc.)
  
- AM/RM of GSC reserve challenging
- MiFID/AIFMD/UCITSD firm if service to clients
- Safekeeping to clients: credit institutions, MiFID firms
  
- ⇒ And what about tech risk?

## § 4.2. Capital Requirements

- Main concern: Op Risk and financial currency risks
  - *If GSC reserve diversifies* through currency baskets (eg. Libra): most currency risk in the IMF basked is likely to even out
  - Substantial Op Risk to be covered by GSC provider
- ⇒ PSP, fund manager licenses do not come with significant capital requirements; MiFID investment firms => CRR
- ⇒ Capitalization of Tech Risk?  
(GSC as Core of Financial Ecosystem?)

### § 3.5. Disclosures

- Money transmitter / PSP disclosures patchy at best
- Investment-style disclosures justified: portfolio of Libra reserve, exposures to single currencies, hedging costs, use of proceeds, cost and fee allocation, agent reimbursement etc.
- Ensured if Libra qualifies as MMF.

### § 3.6. Other concerns

- Identity & AML, in particular re DCs; Libra ID = new official ID?
- Monetary regulators (central banks) to lose some influence over monetary policy; major concern in non-US countries; crisis management measures (capital controls? Global custodians: US control?)
- Data Protection
- Tax
- ...

# § 5

## *Crossborder Supervision*

## § 4.1 – Need for Crossborder Harmonization


- Global cooperation in regulating Libra a ‘must have’ for cross-regional interoperability and global risk management (TBTF)
- Libra reserve concept does not work if fragmented, either due to regulation or due to factual reasons (infrastructure etc.)

## § 4.2 – Crossborder Supervision

- Recognition of foreign licenses across the globe limited to
  - financial derivatives
  - Globally SIFI Payments Systems under CPMI/BIS accord
- Equivalence-based substituted compliance only in EU

## § 4.3 – Regulatory Fragmentation: What license?

### Regulatory frameworks that could apply to stablecoins



# § 6

*Some results*

## § 6 – Some results

- Libra's expected growth: towards «too large too fail» within seconds
- Licensing depends on interpreting vague documentation; Libra 'outsources' assessment to regulators; more than PS; Libra as MMF? Depends on Libra holders' position vis-a-vis Libra Reserve.
- New test case for global collaboration; fragmentation as barrier
- Libra: the unfair lady
  - EU/D: very restrictive approach likely for monetary policy reasons
  - US: less friendly reception ensured.
- Libra as door-opener for more successful clones by more welcome later movers? (Alibaba, Apple, Google & the likes)

# AFTER BITCOIN & LIBRA: TOWARDS CBDCs


Based on *Didenko/Zetsche/Buckley/Arner, After Bitcoin & Libra, forthcoming*

## Where do we stand?

- Purely private CCs do not work (or face resistance to ensure they do not work)
  - Purely public CCs?
    - Disintermediate the banking sector?
    - State / CBs not better at managing millions / billions of retail accounts and their woes
    - CBs could employ private sector for operations, but: liability?
- ⇒ Purely public CCs do not work either

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
- Purely private CCs do not work (or face resistance to ensure they do not work)
  - Purely public CCs do not work either
- ⇒ Cooperation necessary
- ⇒ How much public and how much private?




Second level CBDC model

Trusted  
Inter-  
mediary

2<sup>nd</sup> Lvl  
Inter-  
mediary



Two layer CBDC model



## Con

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- ⇒ Cooperation necessary
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## Conclusion & Thesis

- Stablecoins have given the CBDC thinking new motivation
- Intermediary with CB access likely to persist due to liability shielding, investment and technology guidance through competition
- CBs to replace intermediary vis-a-vis client handling only where intermediary level dysfunctional (e.g. DCs, antitrust)
- Intermediaries with CB access likely to increase by numbers and include all licensed financial intermediaries with account functions; CBs to ensure operational efficiency through tokenization? Possible.
- Rents from CB access to sink. CBs need to deal with more intermediaries.
- Main Issue of two-layer-CBDC systems: ensure interoperability; SEPA for CBDCs?

## Readings on FinTech

TechFin / Data-driven Finance

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=2959925](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2959925)



Regulatory Sandboxes

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3018534](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3018534)



FT4FI Roadmap

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3245287](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3245287)



Corporate Technologies (AI etc.)

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3392321](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3392321)



Regulating Libra

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Future of Data-Driven Finance

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3359399](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3359399)



Rise of Tech Risk

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3478640](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3478640)



ICO Gold Rush

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3072298](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3072298)



Distributed Ledgers / Blockchain

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3018214](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3018214)



eID / KYC Utilities

[www.ssrn.com/abstract=3224115](http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3224115)




# Thanks!

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A high-angle, blurred photograph of a crowd of people walking on a light-colored pavement. The motion blur gives a sense of a busy, public space.

  
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