

A Probabilistic and Timed Verification Approach of SysML State Machine Diagram

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Abstract—Timed-constrained and probabilistic verification approaches gain a great importance in system behavior validation. They enable the evaluation of system behavior according to the design requirements and ensure their correctness before any implementation. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic and timed verification framework of State Machine diagrams extended with time and probability features. The approach consists on mapping the extended State Machine diagram to its equivalent probabilistic timed automata that is expressed in PRISM language. To check the functional correctness of the system under test, the properties are expressed in PCTL temporal logic. We demonstrate the approach efficiency by analyzing performability properties on a Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) case study.

Keywords—*State Machine Diagram, MARTE, Probabilistic Timed Automata, Model Checking, PCTL*.

I. INTRODUCTION

Constraints on system design in terms of functionality, performance, availability, reliability and time to market are becoming more stringent. Therefore, the design and implementation of successful systems, represent the prime concerns of systems engineering (SE) but reveals several challenges[9]. Indeed, from one side the systems are becoming increasingly complex, in the other side the market pressure for rapid development of these systems makes the task of their designs a challenge. Thus, the evaluation and the correctness of systems at early stage of design reduce the design cost such as maintenance time and effort. Recently, automated verification techniques gain more popularity and especially to cope with errors that can occur when the system is running. The quantitative approach using model checking gives more accurate observations on systems that exhibit real time characteristics., as the avionic and automotive systems operating under timing constrains. The UPPAAL model checker [4] seems to be suitable to represent a timed automaton but more real time systems exhibits a probabilistic behavior like system failure, communication error that can be managed by probabilistic model checking [3].

Model checking is an automated technique that, given a finite-state model of a system and a formal property, automatically checks whether this property holds or not for that model. The model checking focuses on qualitative or quantitative properties [3]. The qualitative properties assert that certain event will happen surely or not. The quantitative properties are based on the probability or expectation of certain events (e.g.

the probability of the system failure in the next 5 times units is 0.85). Probabilistic model checking is an effective technique to probabilistically verify the satisfiability of a given property. In our paper we use PRISM model checker [15] for probability and time verification.

In System Engineering, System Modeling Language (SysML) is a standard language [1] used for specification, analysis, design and verification of a broad range of complex systems (e.g. Hardware, software, information workflow). SysML reuses a subset of UML2 artifacts (Unified Modeling Language) and provides additional extensions to specify requirements such as probability. Behavioral specification is achieved in SysML using three diagrams: State Machine, Communication and Activity Diagram. State Machine diagram is particularly studied in our paper.

The execution time of behavior in SysML depends generally on resource availability. This may result in a variation of total time completion. Thus, if an state behavior terminates within a bounded time interval then, a probability distribution for terminating the state behavior can be established with respect to the execution time interval. This paper proposes a probabilistic and timed verification of SysML state machine diagrams that are guarded with time constraints. We use MARTE time annotation on the top of state machine nodes that specifies the estimation of time duration of an action (behavior) execution. Moreover, the time annotation are only specified for states nodes in the form of time interval $I =]min, max[$, where min, max are integer values. Time value min represents the earliest value for execution completion of the corresponding state's behavior and time value max is the latest. Furthermore, the state's time duration can be omitted if the execution time is negligible. The semantic interpretation of state machine diagram is encoded into the input language of a probabilistic symbolic model checker (PRISM) to produce the satisfiability of the PCTL property on state machine diagram. For the verification efficiency, the constructed models can be either multi-terminal binary decision diagram (MTBDD), sparse matrices, as well as a hybrid of these two. In addition, PRISM supports the reward operator that can be used to specify a wide range of measures of interest (e.g. The total energy consumed by the system, the time that the system is operational). A comprehensive comparative study of probabilistic model checkers can be found in [18]. The kernel of the framework is based on transforming the state machine diagram to its equivalent Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA)




Figure 1: Verification framework for SysML state machine diagram

expressed in PRISM language. Finally, PRISM model checker produces the satisfiability results of PCTL properties on the mapped model. These properties depend on the functional requirements and performance specifications of the system. The proposed framework is depicted in Fig.1.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses the related work. Section III and IV describe and formalize SysML state machine diagrams and PRISM model, respectively. Section V provides a mapping mechanism of state machine diagrams into PRISM. Section VI illustrates the application of our framework on a case study. Section VII draws conclusions and lays out the future work.

II. RELATED WORK

In this section, we present the recent works related to the verification of behavioral models then we compare them with our proposed approach.

Doligalski and Adamski[6] propose a verification and simulation of UML State Machine. For this purpose, two mapping mechanisms are defined. The first consists on mapping the original model to Petri network for verification according the requirements. When the requirements are satisfied, the second mapping occurs to generate VHDL or Verilog description for simulation. The data on each transition is considered as a trigger for a new state but probability and time verification are not considered. Huang et al.[11] propose a verification of SysML State Machine Diagram by extending the model with MARTE [17] to express the execution time. The tool has as input the State Machine Diagram and as output Timed automata expressed in UPPAAL syntax [4]. UPPAAL uses CTL (Computational Tree Logic) properties to check if the model is satisfied with liveness and safety properties. Ouchani et al. [19] propose a verification framework of SysML activity diagram. The authors address a subset of SysML activity diagram artifacts with control flow. The different artifacts have been formalized and a verification algorithm has been proposed for mapping these artifacts to PRISM language. The transformation result is a probabilistic automata to be

checked by PRISM. Timing verification is not considered in this paper. Jarraya et al. [12] propose a probabilistic verification of SysML activity diagram where the execution time of actions are formalized as constraints (i.e. A note artifact in SysML Activity diagram). The diagram is translated to its corresponding DTMC and use PRISM model checker for performance evaluation using PCTL. The approach is restricted on a subset of SysML activity diagram constructs with control flow (data flow is missing). Kaliappan et al. [13] propose a verification approach for system work-flow especially in communication protocol. The approach takes as input three UML diagrams: state machine diagram, activity diagram and sequence diagram. state machine diagram or activity diagram is converted into PROMELA code as a protocol model and its properties are derived from the sequence diagram as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Lasnier et al. [16] develop a framework for automatic generation of embedded real time applications in C/C++/ADA. The input is AADL language (Architecture Analysis and design Language) with typed software components (e.g. threads, data) and hardware components (e.g. processor, bus, memory). In addition, the design model is enriched with time execution properties (e.g. computation time, priority, deadline and scheduling algorithms). For timing estimation and optimization, a scheduling tool is used based on software components timing constraints. After time optimization, the framework generates C/C++/ADA code that can be simulated. Pajic et al.[20] develop a framework for verification and generation of real time applications either in C/C++/code for software or in Hardware description language (HDL) like VHDL or Verilog. The focus of the work is a development of model translation tool UPPAAL[4] to Stateflow (UPPASF). The checked UPPAAL model is translated to Stateflow using Simulink which provides full support for C/C++, VHDL and Verilog code generation for simulation purpose. Ando et al. [2] propose a verification approach of SysML state machine diagram. The diagrams are translated to communication sequential process description (CSP) and they apply the PAT[21] model checker to check the CSP models against the LTL properties. The paper proposes a mapping rules of different state machine

artifacts. However, time and probability are not addressed in the paper. Knorre et al. [14] develop a framework for timing verification of real time system specification incorporating a combined UML, SysML diagrams and customized profile. Each block diagram and its state machines are converted to a corresponding automata in UPPAAL syntax. The properties are derived from parametric diagram as Computational Tree Logic (CTL). Elmansouri et al. [7] propose a mapping approach of UML activity diagram to CSP by using a graph transformation called ATOM tool. For this purpose, the authors propose a meta-model for activity diagram and graph grammars that performs automatically the transformation of activity diagram. Probability and time are not addressed in this paper.

Compared to the existing few works, our contribution improves the verification of SysML State Machine diagram by extending State Machine with elements of UML MARTE profile to support time and probability. In addition, we use PRISM model checker to verify the satisfiability of different performance requirements expressed in PCTL properties.

III. STATE MACHINE DIAGRAM

SysML State Machine diagram is a graph-based diagram where states nodes are connected by edges(transitions)[8]. Figure 2 shows the set of interesting artifacts used for verification in our framework. The behavior of a state machine is specified by a set of regions, each of which defines its own set of states. The states in region are exclusive; that is, when the region is active, exactly one of its substates is active. A region starts executing when it initial pseudostate becomes active. When a state is activated, an (optional) entry behavior is executed. Similarly on exit, an optional exit behavior is executed. While in a state, a state machine can execute a do behavior (Activity, State machine, Interaction, Opaque Behavior). A region also has a final pseudostate that, when active, signifies that the region has completed. Change of state is effected by transitions that connect a source state to a target state. Transitions are defined by triggers, guards, and effects. The trigger indicates an event that can cause a transition from the source state, the guard is evaluated in order to test whether the transition is valid, and the effect is a behavior executed once the transition is triggered. Triggers may be based on a variety of events such as the expiration of a timer, or the receipt of a signal. In addition to initial and final pseudostate, control nodes supports a junction, choice, join, fork, terminate and history pseudostate node. A junction nodes are used to chain together multiple transitions. A single junction can have one or more incoming, and one or more outgoing transitions, a guard can be applied to each transition. A junction which splits an incoming transition into multiple outgoing transitions realizes a static conditional branch, as opposed to a choice pseudo-state which realizes a dynamic conditional branch. Initially, when a state machine diagram is invoked, its initial node is activated. Then, the activation of any other node (states or pseudostates) depends only on the deactivation of its predecessor node and the guard satisfaction of its input edge.

A. Probability and Time Expression using the elements of SysML/MARTE

In this sub section, we try to depict the existing ways to express the time in SysML state machine diagram. MARTE is




Figure 2: A subset of State machine diagram artifacts

a UML profile standardized by OMG [17] aims to replace the UML profile SPT (Profile for Schedulability, Performance and Time). MARTE was defined to make quantitative predictions regarding real-time and embedded features of systems taking into account both hardware and software characteristics. The core concepts are design and analysis parts. The design parts are used to model real time embedded systems. On the other hand, the analysis parts provide facilities to support the resources analysis such as probability, execution time, energy and memory usage. In our paper, we use probability and execution time for quantitative verification. Figure 3 illustrates how the probability value is specified on the outgoing edges of the choice nodes testing their corresponding guards. In addition, the transition leaving choice nodes are annotated with the `<< GaStep >>` stereotype, specifying the probability (`prob`) of traversing one of the conditional branches. The time is specified by applying the stereotype `<< resourceUsage >>` with element `execTime` to specify the maximum and the minimum value of the time duration written as (value, unit, max). The state "TurnOn" requires exactly 2 units of time to terminate; State "AutoFocus" terminates within the interval $]1,2[$. The state "TakePicture" execution time is negligible. To model probabilistic systems, the probabilities are assigned to edges emanating from decision nodes where the assigned values should sum up to 1. For instance, the choice node testing the guard "memFull" has the following semantic interpretation: the probability is equal to 0.2 that the outcome of the choice node will be (memFull=true) and the corresponding edge traversed.

IV. PRISM MODEL CHECKER

In this section, our formalization focus on probabilistic timed automata (PTA) that extends the standard probabilistic automata (PA) considered as appropriate semantic model for SysML Activity Diagram [19]. The PRISM model checker supports the PTA with the ability to model real-time behavior by adding real-valued clocks (i.e. clocks variable) which increases with time and can be reset (i.e. updated).

A Timed Probabilistic System (TPS) that represents a PRISM program (P) is composed of a set of "m" modules ($m > 0$). The state of each module is defined by the evaluation of its local variables V_L . The global state of the system is defined as the evaluation of local and global variables: $V=V_L$




Figure 3: Digital camera state machine diagrams [12]

$\cup V_G$. The behavior of each module is described as a set of statements in the form of: $[act]guard \rightarrow p_1 : u_1 + p_n : u_n$ Where act is an (optional)action labeling the command, the $guard$ is a predicate consists of boolean, integer and clock variables and propositional logic operators , p is a probability. The update u is a set of evaluated variables expressed as conjunction of assignments $(V'_j = val_j) \&.. \& (V'_k = val_k)$ where $V_j \in V_L \cup V_G$ and val_j are values evaluated via expressions denoted by "eval" eval: $V \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{True, False\}$. The formal definition of a command is given in Definition 1.

Definition 1

A PRISM command is a tuple $c = \langle a, g, u \rangle$.

- "act" is an action label.
- "guard" is a predicate over V .
- " $u = \{(p_i, u_i)\} \exists m > 1, i < m, 0 < p_i < 1, \sum_i^m p_i = 1$ and $u = \{(v, eval(v)) : v \in V_l\}$.

The set of commands are associated with modules that are parts of a system and it definition is given in Definition 2.

Definition 2

A PRISM module is tuple $M = \langle V_l, I_l, Inv, C \rangle$, where:

- V_l is a set of local variable associated with a module,
- Inv is a time constraint of the form $v_l \bowtie d \bowtie \forall \in \{\leq, \geq\}$ and $d \in \mathbb{N}$,
- I_l is the initial value of V_l .
- $C = \{c_i, 0 < i \leq k\}$ is a set of commands that define the module behavior.

To describe the composition between different modules, PRISM uses CSP communication sequential process operators [10] such as Synchronization, Interleaving, Parallel Interface, Hiding and Renaming. Definition 3 provides a formal definition of PRISM system.

Definition 3

A PRISM system is tuple $P = \langle V, I_g, exp, M, CSPexp \rangle$, where:

- $V = V_g \coprod_{i=1}^m V_{li}$ is the union of a set local and global variables.
- I_g is initial values of global variables.
- exp is a set of global logic operators.
- M is a set of modules composing a System.
- $CSPexp$ is CSP algebraic expression.

The structure of our temporal logic supported by PRISM model checker is expressed by the following BNF grammar:

A. Property specification for PTAs

The syntax of our logic is given by the following grammar:

$$\varphi ::= \text{true} \mid ap \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \neg \varphi \mid P_{\bowtie p}[\psi] \mid R_{\bowtie q}[\rho],$$

$$\psi ::= \varphi \cup^k \varphi \mid \varphi \cup \varphi,$$

$$\rho ::= I^{=k} \mid C^{\leq k} \mid F \varphi$$

Where "ap" is an atomic proposition, P is a probabilistic operator and R is a reward. Operator $P_{\bowtie p}[\psi]$ means that the probability of path formula ψ being true always satisfies the bound $\bowtie p$, $p \in [0, 1]$. Two paths formulas are included bound until $\varphi_1 \cup \varphi_2$ and time-bound until $\varphi_1 \cup^k \varphi_2$. Bound until means that a state satisfying φ_2 is eventually reached and that, at every time-instant prior to that, φ_1 is satisfied. The time-bounded variant has the same meaning, where the occurrence of φ_2 occur within time k . $R_{\bowtie q}[\rho]$ means that the expected value of reward function ρ meets the bound $\bowtie q$, $q \in \mathbb{Q}$. " \bowtie " $\in \{<, \leq, >, \geq\}$. " \wedge " represents the conjunction operator and " \neg " is the negation operator. The reward operator $I^{=k}$ refers to the reward of the current state at time instant k , $C^{\leq k}$ refers to the total reward accumulated up until time point k , and $F \varphi$ to the total reward accumulated until a state satisfying φ is reached, e.g:

- $R_{\max=?}[F \text{ TurnOff}]$: what is the maximum expected time to take a picture and turn off ?.

V. MAPPING STATE MACHINE DIAGRAMS INTO PRISM

In this section, we propose the translations rules of state machine diagram artifacts to their equivalent PRISM commands.

A. Start State Machine




Figure 4: Start State Machine

A non composite states (Fig.4, Listing.1) are represented by a Boolean variable set to false except the initial state. The clock variable is reset to 0 when the triggered state contains a time interval.

```

1 start : bool init true;
2 TurnOn :bool init false;
3 login : [0..5] init 0;
4 .....
5 [start] start->(initializing'=true)&(start'=false);
6 [initializing] initializing ->(login'=0);
7 [do] initializing & login=0 ->(login'=login+1);
8 [exit] initializing & login>0 ->(login'=login-1)
9   &(initializing'=false);

```

Listing 1: Start State Machine

B. Setting the Invariant (maximum execution time)




Figure 5: Time invariant

For each non composite state (Fig.5, Listing.2) having an execution time interval, we generate its specific clocks variable. The maximum value of the generated clock is set within invariant clause to impose the different values of clock variable.

```
1 invariant (TurnOn=true -> x <= 2) endinvariant
```

Listing 2: State Invariant

C. State transition




Figure 6: State transition

The transition has the form: trigger[guard]/behavior (Fig.6, Listing.3), the trigger specifies events that may induce state transition, the guard is a transition condition and behavior may be a data update. In the case when the trigger is time event either that a given time interval has passed since the current state was entered (after), or that a given instant of time has been reached (at) the resulting command guard that corresponds to the minimal time transition. We support data update in our paper as a resulting behavior.

D. Junction pseudostate

The junction pseudostate (Fig.7, Listing.4) splits an incoming transition into multiple outgoing transitions according the static conditional branch. A junction pseudostate is like an initial pseudostate, as a filled circle.

```

1 [loggedOn] loggedOn & loggedIn=1 → (loggedOff'=true)
2 & ( loggedOn'=false)& ( loggedIn'= loggedIn-1);
3 [loggedOff] loggedOff → (loggedOn =true)
4 & ( loggedOff'=false)& ( loggedIn'= loggedIn+1);

```

Listing 3: State transition




Figure 9: Fork pseudostate




Figure 7: Junction pseudostate

```

1 [N1] N1 → (Junction11'=true)& ( N1'=false);
2 [N2] N2 → (Junction12'=true)& ( N2'=false);
3 [Junction11] Junction11 & (g1=true) →
4 (N3'=true)& ( Junction11'=false);
5 [Junction12] Junction12 & (g2=true) →
6 (N4'=true)& ( Junction12'=false);

```

Listing 4: Junction pseudostate

F. Fork pseudostate

A fork node (Fig.9, Listing.6) has a single incoming transition and many outgoing transitions. When an incoming transition is taken to the fork pseudostate, all of the outgoing transitions are taken.

```
1 [fork] fork → (N1'= true)& (N2'= true)& (fork'= false);
```

Listing 6: Fork pseudostate

G. Join pseudostate




Figure 10: Join pseudostate

The join node (Fig.10, Listing.7) represents a special case, it has to wait for a locus of control on each incoming edge in order to be traversed. we are obliged to decompose the join node in a set of nodes to realize a synchronization.

```

1 [join1] N1 → (join1'= true)& (N1'= false) ;
2 [join2] N2 → (join2'= true)& (N2'= false) ;
3 [join] join1 & join2 → (join'= true)& (join2'= false)
4 & (join1'= false);

```

Listing 7: Join pseudostate




Figure 8: Choice pseudostate

```

1 [N1] N1 → (choice'=true)& (N1'=false);
2 [choice] choice → p1: (lg1'=true)& ( choice'=false)
3 + p2: (lg2'=true)& ( choice'=false);
4 [lg1] lg1 & g1→ (lg1'=false)& ( N2'=true);
5 [lg2] lg2 & g2→ (lg2'=false)& ( N3'=true);

```

Listing 5: Choice pseudostate

H. Terminate pseudostate




Figure 11: Terminate pseudostate

```
1 [Terminate] N → (N'= false) ;
```

Listing 8: Terminate pseudostate

If a terminate pseudostate (Fig.11, Listing.8) is reached, then the behavior of the state machine terminates. The minimal clock value indicates the condition that enables the transition.

E. Choice pseudostate

A choice node (Fig.8, Listing.5) has multiple incoming transitions and outgoing transitions. The output flow is typically established by placing mutually exclusive guards on all outgoing flows and offering the token to the flow whose guard expression is satisfied. We add probability feature at the outgoing edge. Each token can only traverse one edge, with the specified probability.

I. Final State




Figure 12: Final State

The final state (Fig.12, Listing.9) indicates that a region has completed execution and all existing states variables will be set to false.

```
1 [End] N → (N' = false) & ..... & (Ni' = false);
```

Listing 9: Final State

VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In the following, we present a case study [5] related to a SysML based design describing an automated teller machine (ATM). We perform the verification of this design with respect to predefined properties. Listing.10 is the corresponding generated code.

The ATM interacts with a potential customer (user) via a specific interface and communicates with the bank over an appropriate communication link. A user that requests a service from the ATM has to insert an ATM card and enter a personal identification number (PIN). Both pieces of information (the card number and the PIN) need to be sent to the bank for validation. If the credentials of the customer are not valid, the card will be ejected. Otherwise, the customer will be able to carry out one or more transactions (e.g., cash advance or bill payment). The card will be retained in the ATM machine during the customers interaction until the customer wishes for no further service. Fig.13 shows the SysML state machine diagram of the ATM system.

ATM state machine encloses four substates: IDLE, Verification, Eject, and Operation. The IDLE state, wherein the system waits for a potential ATM user, is the default initial substate of the top state. The Verification state represents the verification of the cards validness and authorization. VerifyCard and VerifyPin substates have interval time $]3s,5s[$, $]4s,5s[$ respectively (s for seconds). The probability to get pin and card validated is 0.7 and 0.8, respectively. The Eject state depicts the phase of termination of the users transaction. The Operation state is a composite state that includes the states that capture several functions related to banking operations. These are the *Selectaccount*, *Payment*, and *Transaction*.

When the state *Selectaccount* is active, and the user selects an account, the next transition is enabled and the state *Payment* is entered. The *Payment* state has two substates, respectively, for cash advancing and bill payment. It represents a two-item menu. Finally, the *Transaction* state captures the transaction phase and includes three substates: *CheckBal* for checking the balance, *Modify* for modifying the amount, if necessary, and *Debit* for debiting the account.

Each one of the *Payment* and *Transaction* states contains a shallow history pseudostate. If a transition targeting a shallow




Figure 14: Property1

history pseudostate is fired, the most recently active substate in the composite state containing the history connector is activated.

In order to check the correctness of the ATM system, we propose to verify two functional requirements. They are expressed in PCTL as follows:

1. The maximum probability value to get the card and pin validated after k time units.

$$Pmax = ?[F^{\leq k}(CardVALID \& PinVALID)] \quad (1)$$

2. The maximum probability value that the modification occurs during the Bill Payment after k=5 time units.

$$Pmax = ?[F^{\leq k}(BillPAY \& Modify)] \quad (2)$$

The maximum probability value for the modification occurs during the Bill payment is equal to 0.3 when k equal to 5 (time units). The verification results of the first property are shown in Fig 14. After 4 time units (seconds), the verification results converge to 0.3.

```

1 pta
2 module ATM
3 start : bool init true; IDLE :bool init false;
4 Join11 :bool init false; Join12 :bool init false;
5 Join1 :bool init false;
6 M11 :bool init false; M12 :bool init false;
7 M13 :bool init false; M1 :bool init false;
8 Eject :bool init false; Final : bool init false;
9 [start] start -> (start'=false) & (IDLE'=true);
10 [IDLE] IDLE-> (IDLE'=false) & (Fork'=true);
11 [Fork] Fork-> (Fork'=false);
12 [exit11] (Join11=false =>true) ->(Join11'=true);
13 [exit12] (M11=false =>true) ->(M11'=true);
14 [exit21] (Join12=false =>true) ->(Join12'=true);
15 [exit22] (M12=false =>true) ->(M12'=true);
16 [join] Join11 & Join12 ->(Join1'=true) & (Join11'=false)
17 & (Join12'=false);
18 [M11] M11 -> (Eject'=true);
19 [M12] M12 -> (Eject'=true);
20 [M13] M13 -> (Eject'=true);
21 [fin] (Eject=false =>true) -> (Eject'=true);
22 [final] Eject -> (Eject'=false) & (IDLE'=false)
23 & (Join11'=false) & (M11'=false) & (Join12'=false) &
24 (M12'=false) & (Join1'=false);
25 [Join1] Join1 -> (Join1'=false);
26 endmodule
27
28 module CheckCard
29 start2 : bool init false; VerifyCard : bool init false;
30 C1 : bool init false; CardOK : bool init false;
31 NotCardOK : bool init false; CardVALID : bool init false;
32 CardNOTVALID : bool init false; x1: clock;
33
34 invariant (VerifyCard=true =>x1<=5) endinvariant
35 [Fork] (VerifyCard=false =>true) - (VerifyCard'=true);
36 [VerifyCard] VerifyCard & x1>= 3-> (VerifyCard'=false)
37 & (C1'=true);
38 [C1] C1 -> 0.6: (C1'=false) & (CardOK'=true)

```




Figure 13: ATM state machine diagram

```

39 +0.4:(C1'=false) & (NotCardOK'=true);
40 [CardOK]CardOK-> (CardOK'=false) & (CardVALID'=true);
41 [NotCardOK]NotCardOK-> (NotCardOK'=false)
42 & (CardNOTVALID'=true);
43 [exit11] CardVALID ->(CardVALID'=false);
44 [exit12] CardNOTVALID ->(CardNOTVALID'=false);
45 endmodule
46
47 module CheckPin
48 start3 : bool init false;VerifyPIN : bool init false;
49 C2 : bool init false;PinOK : bool init false;
50 NotPinOK : bool init false;PinVALID : bool init false;
51 PinNOTVALID : bool init false; x2: clock;
52
53 invariant (VerifyPIN=true =>x2<=5) endinvariant
54 [Fork] (VerifyPIN=false =>true)->(VerifyPIN'=true);
55 [VerifyPIN]VerifyPIN & x2 >=4->(VerifyPIN'=false) & (C2'=true)
56 [C2] C2 -> 0.5:(C2'=false) & (PinOK'=true) +
57 0.5:(C2'=false) & (NotPinOK'=true);
58 [PinOK]PinOK-> (PinOK'=false) & (PinVALID'=true);
59 [NotPinOK]NotPinOK-> (NotPinOK'=false) & (PinNOTVALID'=true);
60 [exit21] PinVALID ->(PinVALID'=false);
61 [exit22] PinNOTVALID ->(PinNOTVALID'=false);
62 endmodule
63
64 module Operation
65 start4 : bool init false;SelectAccount: bool init false;
66 History1: bool init false;History2: bool init false;
67 fin :bool init false;
68 [Join1] (start4=false =>true) -> (start4'=true);
69 [start4] start4 -> (start4'=false) & (SelectAccount'=true);
70 [SelectAccount] SelectAccount -> (SelectAccount'=false);
71 [BillPAY] (fin=false =>true) -> (fin'=true) ;
72 [BillPAY] (History1=false =>true) -> (History1'=true);
73 [History1] History1 -> (History1'=false);
74 [Debit] (History2=false =>true)-> (History2'=true);
75 [History2] History2 -> (History2'=false);
76 [fin] fin -> (fin'=false);
77 endmodule
78
79 module Transaction
80 start6 : bool init false;Modify : bool init false;
81 CheckBal : bool init false;Debit : bool init false;
82 M21 : bool init false;M22 : bool init false;
83 [History1] (start6=false =>true) | start6 ->
84 (start6'=(Modify | CheckBal|Debit)?false:true);
85 [start6] start6 -> (M21'=true) & (start6'=false);
86 [M21] M21-> (CheckBal'=true) & (M21'=false);
87 [M22] M22-> (CheckBal'=true) & (M22'=false);
88 [CheckBal] CheckBal-> (Modify'=true) & (Debit'=true)
89 & (CheckBal'=false);
90 [Modify] Modify -> (M22'=true) & (Modify'=false);
91 [Debit] Debit -> (Debit'=false);
92 endmodule
93
94 module Payment
95 start5 : bool init false;CashADV : bool init false;
96 BillPAY : bool init false;
97 [History2] (start5=false =>true) | start5 ->
98 (start5'=(CashADV | BillPAY)?false:true);
99 [SelectAccount] (start5=false =>true)-> (start5'=true);
100 [start5] start5 -> (start5'=false) & (CashADV'=true);
101 [CashADV] CashADV -> (CashADV'=false) & (BillPAY'=true);
102 [BillPAY] BillPAY -> (BillPAY'=false) ;
103 endmodule

```

Listing 10: The general code for ATM state machine diagram

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented a formal verification approach of systems behavior modeled by using state machine diagram. The state machine diagrams are transformed to PRISM input language. For this purpose, We proposed the translation rules to generate the PRISM code proper to state machine diagram. In addition, we have shown the effectiveness of our approach by applying it on a case study representing an ATM state machine diagram where time and probability are evaluated using PCTL properties. The presented work can be extended in the following three directions. First, we intend to extend our approach to support more behavioral diagrams such as sequence diagram. Second, we want to transform our behavioral diagram to its equivalent HDL (hardware description language)

code for RTL verification. Finally, we want to validate our approach on different case studies and real system models.

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