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A World without Fathers? Fictions of Authority around 1920

§ 1

In 1947, only two years after the end of World War II, the linguist Jost Trier publishes an article on the etymology of the word “father” in the *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*. The final section of this text reveals that Trier is not only for linguistic reasons interested in this word. According to Trier, speaking about the father always means to remember a fallen political world order. Trier’s main thesis says that “the indo-european concept of the father has a political core, which is his true essence”.¹ The political power of the father is lost in modernity, however, and since then the notion of the father has experienced a fundamental crisis, writes Trier. The emergence of the nuclear family during the 18th century may have “unsettled” the image of the father, but its core of power hasn’t been completely destroyed. Trier observes a far more fundamental and dangerous crisis of the father in his own time:

“The rebellion of the youth in the 18th century unsettled the father not more and in same way as it did with the Christian God and the State, i.e. the princes. All three authorities received the shock together and survived it together. They have been able to do so, because they have been connected by something that may be called the “paternal” (“das Vaterhafte”). The current crisis, however, is determined by the fact that an extremely unpaternal state has begun to consume the earthly as well as the heavenly Father and seems to be strong-willed to inherit

¹ Jost Trier, “Vater. Versuch einer Etymologie”, *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 65 (1947), pp. 232-60: 259: Der “Vaterbegriff von Indogermanen [hat] einen politischen Schwerpunkt, einen Kern von Macht [...], der sein eigentliches Wesen ausmacht”.

both as the only remaining force. More and more tasks, services and dominions of the father are given to the offices of state mechanisms."²

These few sentences draw something like a sketch of a cultural history of fatherhood. Trier develops a pessimistic perspective on the disappearance of the traditional paternal "authority" in favor of state "violence" in modernity. According to Trier, the essence of the "father" is not a biological act of procreation of a son or a daughter, and also not the pedagogical task of educating them. Fatherhood is described as a political role that reaches far beyond the nuclear family. The neologism "das Vaterhafte" can be regarded as a loan translation of the Latin "paternal", and the political order ruled by Trier's "fatherhood" can be interpreted as a patriarchy. The political order of patriarchy is built on three pillars – the family, the church, the state – , which are in an analogous relation to each other. They all are united by their principle of masculine, paternal rule, and they all legitimize the others. Thus, the *paterfamilias* is defined by a political principle: This explains, why Trier describes a crisis of political order as the end of paternity in general.

Trier's description of the crisis is rather vaguely, and thus it cannot easily be located in a concrete historical time. Given the historical context of the year 1947, one might argue that the "highly unpaternal state" could only be the Nazi state, but obviously that isn't Trier's idea. Trier speaks in the present tense, he describes a "current" crisis of fatherhood. Therefore, the "unpaternal" government probably means the bio-political state of modernity in general, which is described by a lot of historians as competitive towards the patriarchal father. In Trier's text, the father is destroyed by the state in a violent, cannibalistic act: Without patriarchy, without the authority of the father, only utter violence and barbarism are left on the stage of the

² Ibid., 259-60: "Denn der Aufstand der Jugend im 18. Jahrhundert erschütterte den Vater nicht mehr und auf eine nicht wesentlich andere Weise als den christlichen Gott und den Staat, d.h. den Fürsten. Alle drei Autoritäten empfangen den Stoß gemeinsam und überstanden ihn gemeinsam, konnten es, weil sie durch etwas verbunden waren, was man wohl das Vaterhafte nennen kann. Die gegenwärtige Krise ist dagegen dadurch bestimmt, dass ein äußerst unvaterhafter Staat den irdischen wie den himmlischen Vater zu verzehren begonnen hat und ersichtlich entschlossen ist, als einzig verbliebene Gewalt beide zu beerben. Mehr und mehr werden Aufgaben, Leistungen und Herrschaftsgebiete des Vaters den Büros staatlicher Mechanismen preisgegeben."

political. Thus, the principle of fatherhood represents a pre-modern type of exercising power. Whereas modern politics have an affinity to violence, the paternal authority doesn't need to be violent, because it is always already accepted and legitimated.

In the perspective of cultural studies, this apocalyptic tone may be modified. The philosophical discourses on “fatherlessness” and the “fatherless society” since the enlightenment can be regarded as attempts to produce “transformations of the father”,³ new interpretations of paternity rather than its disappearance. Since paternity (even more than maternity) has always been a cultural construction,⁴ it has always been open to new interpretations and transformations. Trier's cultural critique, however, formulates an equation of a historical particular understanding of paternity with the term “the father” in general.

§2

Thus, the objection that authority and paternity have come to a definite ending, seems unfounded. However, a specific historical constellation between these terms (which have legitimized each other for centuries) seems to have lost discursive plausibility in the 20th century. In the perspective of cultural studies, then, it can be said that fatherhood may not have been “consumed” and finished. But modernity has generated a disruption in the symbolic order in which paternity has been central for a long period of time. “Theories of power [...] have been enmeshed with theories of fatherhood, which functions as the model and master trope of both legitimate and benign power”,⁵ as Silke-Maria Weineck puts it. Following (to name just one major theorist of this concept) Hannah Arendt, this specific understanding of power can be called “authority”.⁶ In the tradition of political philosophy, the term authority refers to

³ See Dieter Thomä, “Statt einer Einleitung: Stationen einer Geschichte der Vaterlosigkeit von 1700 bis heute”, Thomä (ed.), *Vaterlosigkeit. Geschichte und Gegenwart einer fixen Idee*, Berlin 2010, pp. 11-64: 11.

⁴ See Silke-Maria Weineck, *The Tragedy of Fatherhood: King Lear and the Politics of Paternity in the West*, New York/London 2014, 82: “Even before paternal certainty can become an issue, the relationship between coitus, pregnancy, and birth itself needs to be constructed. Fatherhood, in other words, needs institutions to legitimize not simply the sons but *itself*. In other words, it needs a theory.”

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶ See Hannah Arendt, “Was ist Autorität?” [1957], *Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Übungen im politischen Denken I*, ed. by Ursula Ludz, München/Zürich 2012, 159–200.

a form of power that is necessarily recognized as “legitimate” and that precisely for this reason is able to be “benign” and doesn’t need the use or threat of violence.⁷

The “paternal triad”⁸ of paternal, royal and divine authority can be called a “legal fiction”, not merely in the sense that it is invented by the legal apparatus, but also in the sense that by the fiction of the paternal triad the law and politics have been legitimized. Not only Lacan has conceived the father as the “figure of the law”.⁹ In James Joyce’s *Ulysses*, paternity appears as a “mystery”. It is on “that mystery [...] that the church is founded and founded irremovably [...]. Paternity may be a legal fiction”.¹⁰ The political fiction of paternity represents a political order, which is characterized by a legitimized and reasonable distribution of power from the top to the down: From God as creator of the world via the prince as the master of a nation to the father as master of his home. According to Weineck, the paternal triad of authoritative father figures has been explicitly articulated in the Book of Genesis in the Old Testament.¹¹ God speaks to Abraham, the “founding father of Israel”:

“Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham (= father of masses); *for a father of many nations have I made thee*. And I will make thee exceeding fruitful, and I will make nations of thee, *and kings shall come out of thee*. And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee.” (Gen 17, 5-7).

All three elements of the “paternal triad” are introduced and legitimized here: God speaks to Abraham as a father, as a creator and father of whole “nations”: Abraham’s role as a father is linked to the claim of political power and of religious loyalty.

The “paternal triad”, which plays a key role in the political theory and history at least in Europe, is ultimately shaped by a link with the legal concept of authority.

⁷ See Leonard Krieger, “The Idea of Authority in the West”, *The American Historical Review* 82/2 (1977), pp. 249–270: 251.

⁸ Weineck, *The Tragedy of Fatherhood*, 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰ James Joyce, *Ulysses*, Harmondsworth 1965, 207.

¹¹ See Weineck, *The Tragedy of Fatherhood*, 71.

Originated from the roman private law, the concept of *auctoritas* gets important in the description of the royal powers and privileges in Late Antiquity. The *Codex Justinianus* not only tames the boundless dimensions of roman law into fifty books, but also determines the imperial authority to legislate and to interpret laws. Since only the emperor is allowed to legislate and to comment laws, his authority is defined by the power to eliminate ambiguities about the interpretations of the law: *ex auctoritate Augusta manifestetur, cui soli concessum est leges et condere et commentari*. This definition results, as Manfred Schneider emphasizes, immediately from “the knowledge and the office of the emperor, who is God’s vicar”.¹² Since the emperor legislates by divine authorization, he alone can grant the authority to comment and interpret the laws. This logic of authorization and representation explains the legal sense of the phrase “ex auctoritate”. Therefore, the *Codex Justinianus* legally codifies the transfer of political power to the progenitor of a nation and its princes by god in the text of Genesis in juridical terms. Authority, in this sense means authorization and empowerment, which is exercised as a means of extension and dissemination of valid power from a subject to another. Thus, the term can become synonymous with legitimate power in general.

The discourses of authority in modern times tie into the specifications of the biblical myths and roman laws. In this process, three characteristic transformations appear. First of all, the triad of God the Father, the prince and the father of the household, as it is formulated in the Old Testament, is amalgamated with the concept of authority derived from the tradition of roman law. Since then, authority can be regarded as a product of the triadic order.¹³ In this sense, the wording of the “paternal triad” served as the ideological legitimization of the absolut monarchy in the 17th century.¹⁴ Second, since the concept of authority leaves the frame of roman law, it becomes a subject to a variety of discourses: There are discourses of authority in theology, legal theory, moral philosophy, philosophy of history, pedagogy, philology, and political philosophy. In this respect, the concept of authority has already been a subject of interdisciplinary studies for a long time. Third, the discourse of authority in

¹² Manfred Schneider, “Der König im Text. Autorität in Recht und Literatur”, *Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte* 3/1 (2009), pp. 48-63: 50.

¹³ See Avital Ronell, *Loser Sons: Politics and Authority*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield 2012, 44.

¹⁴ See Carl Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre* [1928], Berlin 2003, 283.

modernity is always a discourse on the *crisis* of authority. The “paternal triad” seems to be under increasing pressure. In his influential book “The Family” (1855), the cultural historian Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl calls for the restoration of the lost authority:

“Currently, one demands more urgent than ever before the recognition of the authority of the prince, the administration, the legislation, the church, on the whole of all public powers. [...] This spirit of respect for authority can only be inserted into the masses, when the house feels again the full authority of the family.”¹⁵

The “paternal triad” seems to torn apart here, since the lost authority of the princes and of the church should be restored through the remaining authority of the “family”, i.e. of the father. The harmonious analogy between the instances of the triad now is replaced by various hierarchical distinctions: “public” authority of the princes and the church vs. “private” authority of the family, “cultural” vs. “natural” authority.

§ 3

After the end of World War I, the problem of authority receives an increased political and social relevance. In the historiographical research of the recent years, the time after the end of the World War is described as a time of crisis, which faces the loss of traditional strategies of political legitimation. According to Jan-Werner Müller, “traditional conceptions of legitimacy as well as the principles of dynastic decent had become widely discredited”.¹⁶ Therefore, the “justifications for political rule had to become different”.¹⁷ Important political concepts of the 19th century have lost their credibility: both the “optimistic liberal view of the world” and its “authoritarian alternative”, the belief in “dynasticism and divine right”,¹⁸ have been put into question.

¹⁵ W[ilhelm] H[einrich] Riehl, *Die Familie* [1855], Stuttgart 1861, 153-4: “Man begehrt gegenwärtig wieder dringender als vorher *Anerkennung der Autorität* des Fürsten, der Verwaltung, der Gesetzgebung, der Kirche in Summa aller öffentlichen Lebensmächte. [...] Bei den Massen zieht dieser Geist des Respects vor der Autorität nur ein, wenn das Geschlecht *die volle Autorität der Familie wieder durchempfunden hat.*”

¹⁶ Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*, New Haven 2011, 3.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 16.

According to Müller, in this historical period the “democratic era” begins, in which only the reference to “democratic ideas” – especially the promise of a substantial equality of all citizens and their “genuine inclusion in a political community”¹⁹ – promises political legitimacy.

A look into the history of the concept of authority reveals that the years after the end of World War I indeed mark an incision. The discourses of authority are intensified considerably in this time. However, it would be a mistake to assume that these discourses only respond to the political upheaval after the World War. On the contrary, I want to formulate the thesis that the radical loss of legitimate power has been prepared in the discourses on the crisis of authority already before 1914. The nature of this crisis can be described precisely: It is a break-up of the “paternal triad” that still reverberates in Jost Trier’s text.

This can be shown in the genealogical analysis which Sigmund Freud devoted to the “paternal triad,” in particular in “Totem and Taboo” (1912). Freud’s mythical narration is well known and quickly retold. According to Freud, in the “earliest state of society” there is only the despotic rule of “a violent, jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away the growing sons”.²⁰ By murdering and eating the father together, the sons end the despotic state of nature and push societal development. The “father horde” has been replaced by a “brother clan”,²¹ but this step marks only an intermediate stage. Without the overpowering father, the brothers fear Hobbesian “fight of each against the other”,²² and at the same time they begin to feel remorse for the murder of the father. As a consequence, the brothers begin to worship a totem animal as a “surrogate for the father”,²³ and in “subsequent obedience”²⁴ to the will of the dead father, they prohibit incest and murder as first elements of “morality”. Thus, the dead father becomes more powerful than the living

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics*, transl. by A. A. Brill, New York 1918, 233.

²¹ Ibid., 241.

²² Ibid., 237.

²³ Ibid., 236.

²⁴ Ibid., 236.

has ever been: The “fatherless society gradually” changes “into a patriarchal one”,²⁵ and the “revenge of the deposed and reinstated father [...] culminated in the dominance of authority”.²⁶

In this way, just two years before the outbreak of World War I Freud develops a genealogical theory of the origin of the patriarchal system. According to Freud, not only the totemic religions from the early days of human history, but also all the other “later religions”²⁷ – including the monotheistic religions of our time – as well as “the godlike kings”²⁸ – and thus the monarchies still dominating the political world of 1912 – are derived from the re-erection of paternal power by the guilty brothers. All of these authorities are nothing but “surrogates for the father”. Freud, too, thinks authority primarily as a principle of extension and substitution of valid power. Analogous to Nietzsche’s genealogical narratives, Freud’s theory performs the delegitimization of a political order by reconstructing the genesis of its legitimacy. Freud’s punch lines are: First, the religious and political “father deities” of modernity derive from a dead father, not from a living. Freud’s theory revolves around fantasmatic paternity, in which no actual living father can ever be found.²⁹ Second, and perhaps more importantly, the adored father is anything but a kind and wise patriarch, but in his origin a despotic and infinitely greedy tyrant whose sexual disposition on the female members of his clan knew no limits. Thus, the idea of authority – in other words, the idea of legitimate hierarchy and domination – is at its historical origin based on complete illegitimacy, on naked violence and despotism. By giving a highly speculative history to the genesis of the paternal triad, Freud cancels its claim for political and social legitimacy.

After the end of World War I, Freud’s student and private secretary Paul Federn develops – in his essay “The psychology of revolution: the Fatherless society” (1919) – an attempt to use psychoanalytical theory as an instrument of sharp criticism of political authority. Federn shows a clear sympathy with the “revolutionary thirst for

²⁵ Ibid., 246.

²⁶ Ibid., 247.

²⁷ Ibid., 239.

²⁸ Ibid., 247.

²⁹ See Weineck, *The Tragedy of Fatherhood*, 174.

freedom”,³⁰ and calls for the “social and political fight in favor of democracy and against the dictatorship of the proletariat”.³¹ He tries to disclose the “mental processes”,³² in order to explain the political upheavals of 1918 with the terms and theories of psychoanalysis. Hereby the concept of authority plays an important role, because it explains the transfer from the children’s attachment to the father to subordination of the citizen under the state. Thus, for Federn the concept provides a central link between individual and collective psyche. As a result of the Oedipus complex, says Federn, every child experiences an “inner disappointment”³³ and emotional distancing from the real father, followed by a search of new substitute fathers in the “teacher, the priest, the mayor, the king and the emperor”.³⁴ In this perspective, these political powers are legitimized neither by tradition or skills nor by something like “charisma”, but only by the fact they act as representatives of “mental father images” (*psychische Väterbilder*).³⁵ Therefore, all the “individual sons are united as subjects of the paternal authoritative state” (*väterlicher Autoritätsstaates*).³⁶ Federn now undertakes a somewhat violent short circuit between psychoanalytic theory and political reality: For Federn, Freud’s mythical narrative of the murder of the primal father becomes the foil for the overthrow of the monarchy in Austria in 1918. Federn describes the citizens as “a crowd of fatherless fellows” who are forced to “create a fatherless society”.³⁷ Analogously, the workers councils (soviets, *Räte*) are interpreted as “clan of brothers”, the promise of a new social organization based upon “a fraternity of equals”.³⁸ Taking Freud’s theory as departure, it isn’t easy to come to the idea that it is sufficient to kill a father to erase the rule of patriarchy. Freud’s myth tells precisely the story that, conversely, the beginning of patriarchy is marked by parricide. His student Federn is also not a naive optimist, as one might think at first glance: The

³⁰ Paul Federn, “Zur Psychologie der Revolution: Die vaterlose Gesellschaft”, *Der österreichische Volkswirt* 11 (10.5.1919), pp. 571–4, 595–8: 572.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 571.

³³ Ibid., 573.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 574.

³⁸ Ibid., 595.

brother's victory over the dead father appears deeply ambivalent, since it bears the revenge of authority. According to Federn, the problem is that by "growing up in the family the individual is prepared only to live in a patriarchal society."³⁹ Since the political structures follow family structures, a revolutionary change of the father rule is not foreseen in the psychoanalytic theory. As the revolution of 1918 in Federn's perspective nevertheless rejects the authority of the father, the psychoanalyst describes it as a danger for social organization regardless of all of his sympathy: Federn considers that since the revolution "probably a common inner grip"⁴⁰ in the society is lost. By remaining loyal to Freud's theoretical frame and modifying it at the same time, Federn develops a theory of revolution as well as a theory of counter-revolution. He stresses that it would be "overhasty to conclude that the current brotherhood movement is doomed to fail",⁴¹ although this is exactly the conclusion every reader of his text can draw. While the regime of "brotherhood" remains fragile, only a new paternal authority can restore the social and political cohesion.

Thus, a theoretical setting is formulated, which still significantly affects the perception of the concept of authority. Already in 1919, Federn's theory of the "fatherless society" is able to explain the transition from a democratic revolution to a fascist regime. While Freud describes a mythical parricide which institutes the "paternal triad" and the dominance of authority, Federn interprets the end of monarchy in 1918 as a revolutionary parricide, which abolishes the "paternal triad" and political authority in general, resulting in a new "longing for the father" (*Vatersehnsucht*),⁴² a desire for a strong political leader. Hence, the concept of authority has often been used to explain the rise of fascism in the 1920s. For example, the Frankfurter Institut for Social Research has developed in the 1930s a massive joint project, published as the "studies on authority and the family", *Studien zu Autorität und Familie* (1936). How the enlightenment "fights against dependence on authority could

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 572.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, 244.

suddenly turn into the glorification of authority as such in recent times”,⁴³ is now the key research topic of the group led by Max Horkheimer. In *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), Theodor W. Adorno will find a handy answer to this question, which will be decisive for the fate of the concept of authority. Working both with theoretical and empirical analysis, Adorno suggests the “fascism (F) scale” as measure for authoritative personality. The latter is characterized by “authoritarian aggression”, which describes a particular displacement of aggression against “ingroup authorities [...] onto outgroups”⁴⁴ (following the model of the “scapegoat”).

For the psychiatrist Bertram Schaffner, the concept of authority is the key to the German national character. Schaffner undertakes his empirical study *Fatherland: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family* (1948) immediately after the end of World War II in order to determine the prospects of re-educating the Germans. Schaffner remains skeptical: The Germans are so fixated on authority, that they are not even able to *think* a revolution: “[I]t is difficult for Germans even to think in terms of revolution”, Schaffner writes: “The superficiality of the so-called ‘revolution’ in 1918 is common knowledge; Hitler’s ‘revolution’ was not directed at loosening the authoritarian pattern of German life, but at reviving and intensifying it on a larger scale than ever before.”⁴⁵ Thus, the “German father” is central to Schaffner’s study. For Schaffner, an American father would be an authority because he feels responsible for his family, whereas the German father worries about his purely abstract authority for its own sake:

“The German father [...] fights to maintain his authority for its own sake in order to assert and retain his role, may even force the family to accept decisions which are later proved unwise. He conceives himself as responsible for maintaining the tradition of abstract authority.”⁴⁶

⁴³ Max Horkheimer, “Allgemeiner Teil”, *Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung*, Paris 1936, pp. 3-76: 30.

⁴⁴ R. Nevitt Sanford, T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and Daniel J. Levinson, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York 1950, 51.

⁴⁵ Bertram Schaffner, *Father Land: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family*, New York 1948, 13-4.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, S. 15-6.

As different as these psychoanalytical, sociological and psychiatric diagnoses of authority are: they share key assumptions: They try to reconstruct the “paternal triad” out of the close-up range of the family. “Political mysticism [...] is exposed to the danger of losing its spell or becoming quiet meaningless when taken out of its native surroundings, its time and its space”,⁴⁷ as Ernst Kantorowicz melancholically puts it with regard to the figure of the “King’s two bodies”, and his sentence also applies to the paternal triad of god the father, prince and father. The triad emigrates from the arsenal of political mythology into the grid of empirical psychiatry and national stereotypes. At least when speaking about the authority of the father or of father figures, the concept of authority loses its basic meaning as foundation of legitimacy, and instead represents an increasingly dysfunctional mindset which still believes that law and order are represented by strong “father figures”.

§ 4

A central theoretical question for the “law and literature”-studies concerns the relationship between legal and literary fictions.⁴⁸ Accordingly, it seems worthwhile to ask whether and how the crisis of the legal fiction of the “paternal triad” is treated in the medium of literary texts. Modern literature – taking Kafka’s texts as example – revolves around the relationship between father and son, characteristically in the perspective of the rebellious son. The father often remains silent and absent in these texts.⁴⁹

As an example from the depths of the literary canon, we may chose Ernst von Salomon’s novel *The Cadets (Die Kadetten)* (1933). The author Salomon is not uncontroversial, to put it mildly. During the 1920s, he was a member of the militant nationalist scene in Germany, and has been sentenced to five years in prison for his involvement in the assassination of Walter Rathenau. Salomon’s affinity for militarism and nationalism is reflected also in his novel *Die Kadetten*. This makes the text a document of the reformulation of the concept of authority in its time. The novel is

⁴⁷ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton 1997, 3.

⁴⁸ See Christian Biet, “Judicial Fiction and Literary Fiction: The Example of the Factum”, *Law and Literature* 20/3 (2008), pp. 403-22.

⁴⁹ Weineck, *The Tragedy of Fatherhood*, p. 4-5.

devoted to the idea of authority already due to its genre: *Die Kadetten* is a boarding school novel (*Internatsroman*), a popular genre in German literature at this time since Herman Hesse's *Unterm Rad* and Robert Musil's *Young Törless* (both 1906). In Salomon's novel, authority plays an important role. The narrator doesn't attend any boarding school, but he is accepted at the Royal Prussian cadet corps, the "nursery of the Prussian officer corps"⁵⁰ exactly on November 9, 1913. Here, the students are told to learn a special lesson: "You have the ultimate goal in mind, that there is on this earth [...]. You are here to learn to die," *Oberstleutnant* Kramer welcomed the cadets with "dreadful seriousness".⁵¹ This is now known since ancient times as the definition of philosophy in general,⁵² but in the Prussian cadet school this aim is taken very concretely. The cadets have to learn to withdraw from civic life, comparable to the monastic retreat offered by the church: "The cadets, seminarians of the army, are subjected to secular exercises (*Exerzizien*) not different to the spiritual ones of the church", Salomon writes. "The young souls set under discipline (*Zucht*) are shaped by principles that do not aim at education (*Bildung*) but on instruction (*Ausbildung*), not on a job (*Arbeit*), but on service (*Dienst*), not non success but on the office (*Amt*)."⁵³ Learning to die therefore means the renunciation of bourgeois individuality, and an integration into a higher unity. The concept of authority plays a key role in this process. Salomon uses the term in the context of the "instruction about ranks and rank insignia" and of teaching the "rules": "A simple homage turns into a symbol of submission under an *authority* binding both parts of the interaction. Out of this submission the expression of physical and mental ready-to-die (*todesbereit*) discipline arises."⁵⁴ At this point, authority is coined completely new.

⁵⁰ Ernst von Salomon, *Die Kadetten*, Hamburg 1957, p. 22.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 28.

⁵² See Hannah Arendt, *Das Urteilen. Texte zu Kants Politischer Philosophie*, transl. by Ursula Ludz, München 1998, pp. 36-7.

⁵³ Salomon, *Die Kadetten*, p. 53: "Die unter Zucht gesetzten jungen Seelen unterlagen Formungsprinzipien, die nicht auf Bildung zielten, sondern auf Ausbildung, nicht auf die Arbeit, sondern auf den Dienst, nicht auf den Erfolg, sondern auf das Amt."

⁵⁴ Ibid.: "Aus einer einfachen Ehrenbezeugung entwickelt sich das Symbol der Unterwerfung unter eine beide Teile verpflichtende Autorität mit ihrer fruchtbaren Wechselwirkung, aus dem langsamen Schritt, Tempo hundertzehn, der körperlich-geistige Ausdruck todesbereiter Disziplin."

A "paternal triad" is no longer to be found here, authority has no contact with 'fatherhood' anymore. Instead of paternal values occur new values, which – to some extent – already announce the *Dictionary of Inhumanity*, the semantics of the Nazi state: "ruthlessness", "genuine hierarchy", "service and sacrifice," "community," "law". The bourgeois institution of the family is explicitly rejected by this conception of authority: "A deep gap separated me from the habits and customs of the so-called parental home, which I neither desired nor forced to skip."⁵⁵

I'd like to conclude with two theses:

First: The reformulation of authority in the sense of separation of authority from the patriarchy and a redefinition as a purely immanent state authority takes place not only in Salomon's novel but in a same way also in Carl Schmitt's work. Schmitt's reference to the concept remains ambivalent: Schmitt repeatedly points out how crucial it is to sharply distinguish between *auctoritas* and *potestas* (*authority* and *power*).⁵⁶ However, Schmitt frequently cites Hobbes' phrase "*Auctoritas non veritas facit legem*",⁵⁷ which can be regarded as definition of his decisionism: This sentence ultimately identifies authority and power with one and another.⁵⁸ Whereas the traditional concept of authority offers no place for decisionism, the new conceptual design allows this fusion.

Second: The Nazi State is not at all linked directly to the patriarchal tradition of "authority", like many authors write until today.⁵⁹ On the contrary, one could in some ways even call Nazism anti-authoritarian, at least if so "old authorities" are meant – and not *the* new authority, which ultimately then can only be in the singular. The National Socialist movement "can not worry about outdated authority of outdated

⁵⁵ Salomon, *Die Kadetten*, p. 56: "Eine tiefe Kluft trennte mich von den Sitten und Gebräuchen des sogenannten Elternhauses, die ich zu überspringen weder Lust noch Zwang verspürte."

⁵⁶ See Carl Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols* [1938], Stuttgart 1982, S. 68.

⁵⁷ See Schmitt, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität* [1922], 7. Aufl., Berlin 1996, S. 55.

⁵⁸ See also Sternberger's critique of Schmitt's notion of authority: Cf. Dolf Sternberger, "Autorität, Freiheit und Befehlsgewalt", *Ich wünschte ein Bürger zu sein. Neun Versuche über den Staat*, Frankfurt a. M. 1967, pp. 68-92: 85.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., John Borneman, "Gottvater, Landesvater, Familienvater: Identification and Authority in Germany", in: Borneman (ed.), *Death of the Father: An Anthropology of the End in Political Authority*, New York, Oxford 2004, pp. 63-103: 80-1.

professors",⁶⁰ explicitly states Andreas Feickert's text *Studenten greifen an* (1934). Although the concept of authority can not alone explain the emergence of fascism, its history forms a major chapter in the interpretation of political fictions in modernity.

⁶⁰ Andreas Feickert, *Studenten greifen an. Nationalsozialistische Hochschulrevolution*, Hamburg 1934, 31-2: "Die junge studentische Generation [...] wird die Hochschule diszipliniert angreifen, wie die nationalsozialistische Bewegung diszipliniert angegriffen hat. Aber sie kann sich in dieser Zeit um veraltete Autorität veralteter Professoren nicht kümmern."