

## Some questions ...

# Disaggregation of bipolar-valued outranking relations

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What is a **bipolar-valued** outranking relation?

What data is **underlying** a bipolar-valued outranking relation?

Can we **help** the decision maker to determine the parameters of the model?

## Structure of the presentation

- Introduction
- Models for the bipolar-valued outranking relation
- Disaggregation of bipolar-valued outranking relation
- On the rank of a bipolar-valued outranking relation
- Illustrative examples
- Usefulness in MCDA: inference of model parameters

### Introductive considerations

## Notation and facts ...

- $X$  is a finite set of  $n$  **alternatives**
- $N$  is a finite set of  $p$  **criteria**
- $g_i(x)$  is the **performance** of alternative  $x$  on criterion  $i$
- $w_i \in [0, 1]$ , rational, is the **weight** associated with criterion  $i$  of  $N$ ,  
s.t.  $\sum_{i \in N} w_i = 1$
- $q_i, p_i, wv_i$  and  $v_i$  are **thresholds** associated with each criterion  $i$  to model local or overall *at least as good as* preferences

## Notation and facts ...

- $xSy \equiv$  “ $x$  **outranks**  $y$ ”
- **Classically:**  $xSy$  is assumed to be validated if there is a **sufficient majority** of criteria which support an “*at least as good as*” preferential statement and there is no criterion which raises a **veto** against it
- $\tilde{S}(x, y) \in [-1, 1]$  is the **credibility of the validation** of the statement  $xSy$
- $\tilde{S}$  is called the **bipolar-valued** outranking relation

## Goals

### Primary objective

**Disaggregate** the bipolar-valued outranking relation to determine how the underlying data looks like

### In other words:

Given  $\tilde{S}(x, y) \forall x \neq y \in X$ , determine the **performances** of alternatives  $g_i(x) \forall x \in X, \forall i \in N$ , the **weights**  $w_i \forall i \in N$  and the **thresholds**  $q_i, p_i, wv_i, v_i \forall i \in N$ .

### 3 different models:

- $\mathcal{M}_1$ : Model with a single preference threshold
- $\mathcal{M}_2$ : Model with two preference thresholds
- $\mathcal{M}_3$ : Model with two preference and two veto thresholds

## Goals

### Secondary objective

**Infer** model parameters based on **a priori** knowledge provided by the decision maker

### In other words:

Given the **performances**  $g_i(x) \forall x \in X \forall i \in N$  and some **a priori** info from the decision maker, determine the values of the thresholds and the weights

### Usefulness in Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA):


Help to elicit the decision maker's **preferences** via questions on his domain of expertise

## $\mathcal{M}_1$ : Model with a single preference threshold

A local “at least as good as” situation between two alternatives  $x$  and  $y$  of  $X$ , for each criterion  $i$  of  $N$  is represented by the function  $C_i : X \times X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  defined by:

$$C_i(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } g_i(y) < g_i(x) + p_i; \\ -1 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where  $p_i \in ]0, 1[$  is a constant **preference threshold** associated with all the preference dimensions




## $\mathcal{M}_2$ : Model with two preference thresholds

A local “at least as good as” situation between two alternatives  $x$  and  $y$  of  $X$ , for each criterion  $i$  of  $N$  is represented by the function  $C'_i : X \times X \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1\}$  s.t.:

$$C'_i(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } g_i(y) < g_i(x) + q_i; \\ -1 & \text{if } g_i(y) \geq g_i(x) + p_i; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where  $q_i \in ]0, p_i[$  is a constant **weak preference** threshold associated with all the preference dimensions.



## $\mathcal{M}_1$ & $\mathcal{M}_2$

### Bipolar-valued outranking relation

$$\tilde{S}'(x, y) = \sum_{i \in N} w_i C'_i(x, y) \quad \forall x \neq y \in X$$

### Recall:

$\tilde{S}'(x, y) \in [-1, 1]$  represents the credibility of the validation of the outranking situation  $xSy$

### Meaning of $\tilde{S}'$ :


- $\tilde{S}'(x, y) = +1$  means that statement  $xSy$  is **clearly validated**.
- $\tilde{S}'(x, y) = -1$  means that statement  $xSy$  is **clearly not validated**.
- $\tilde{S}'(x, y) > 0$  means that statement  $xSy$  is **more validated than not validated**.
- $\tilde{S}'(x, y) < 0$  means that statement  $xSy$  is **more not validated than validated**.
- $\tilde{S}'(x, y) = 0$  means that statement  $xSy$  is **indeterminate**.

## $\mathcal{M}_3$ : Model with two preference and two veto thresholds

A *local veto* situation for each criterion  $i$  of  $N$  is characterised by a veto function  $V_i : X \times X \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1\}$  s.t.:

$$V_i(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } g_i(y) \geq g_i(x) + v_i; \\ -1 & \text{if } g_i(y) < g_i(x) + wv_i; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where  $wv_i \in ]p_i, 1[$  (resp.  $v_i \in ]wv_i, 1[$ ) is a constant **weak veto threshold** (resp. **veto threshold**) associated with all the preference dimensions



## $\mathcal{M}_3$

Bipolar-valued outranking relation

$$\tilde{S}''(x, y) = \min \left\{ \sum_{i \in N} w_i C'_i(x, y), -V_1(x, y), \dots, -V_n(x, y) \right\}.$$

### Note:

The min operator translates the **conjunction** between the overall concordance and the negated local veto indexes for each criterion

## How?

### Objective

**Disaggregate** the bipolar-valued outranking relation to determine how the underlying data looks like

## Disaggregation of the outranking relation

## How?

By **mathematical programming**!

$\Rightarrow$  Given  $\tilde{S}$ , determine  $g_i(x)$  ( $\forall i \in N, \forall x \in X$ ),  $w_i$  ( $\forall i \in N$ ) and  $q_i, p_i, wv_i, v_i \forall i \in N$ .

# Disaggregation of $\mathcal{M}_1$ by mathematical programming

## Minimise the number of **active** criteria

### MIP1:

#### Variables:

$$\begin{aligned} g_i(x), w_i &\in [0, 1] & \forall i \in N, \forall x \in X \\ W_i, C_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ w'_i &\in [-1, 1] & \forall i \in N \\ p_i &\in ]\gamma, 1[ & \forall i \in N \end{aligned}$$

#### Parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{S}(x, y) &\in [0, 1] & \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \delta &\in ]0, 1[ \\ \gamma &\in ]\delta, 1[ \end{aligned}$$

#### Objective function:

$$\min \sum_{i=1}^n w_i$$

#### Constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n w_i &= 1 \\ w_i &\leq W_i & \forall i \in N \\ -w_i &\leq w'_i(x, y) & \forall x \neq y \in X, \forall i \in N \\ w'_i(x, y) &\leq w_i & \forall x \neq y \in X, \forall i \in N \\ w_i + C_i(x, y) - 1 &\leq w'_i(x, y) & \forall x \neq y \in X, \forall i \in N \\ w'_i(x, y) &\leq -w_i + C_i(x, y) + 1 & \forall x \neq y \in X, \forall i \in N \\ \sum_{i=1}^n w'_i(x, y) &= \tilde{S}(x, y) & \forall x \neq y \in X \quad (b) \\ -2(1 - C_i(x, y)) + \delta &\leq g_i(x) - g_i(y) + p_i & \forall x \neq y \in X, \forall i \in N \\ g_i(x) - g_i(y) + p_i &\leq 2C_i(x, y) & \forall x \neq y \in X, \forall i \in N \\ p_i &\geq \gamma & \forall i \in N \end{aligned}$$

# Disaggregation of $\mathcal{M}_1$ by mathematical programming

## Minimise the number of **active** criteria

OK, but what if there are some slight **errors** in the given  $\tilde{S}$  ?

# Disaggregation of $\mathcal{M}_1$ by mathematical programming

## Minimise the number of **active** criteria

### If no solution exists:

- The selected maximal number  $n$  of criteria is too **small**
- The model with a constant preference threshold ( $\mathcal{M}_1$ ) is **too poor** to represent the given  $\tilde{S}$
- ...

### MIP1bis:

#### Variables:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon &\geq 0 & \forall i \in N, \forall x \in X \\ g_i(x), w_i &\in [0, 1] & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ W_i, C_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N \\ w'_i &\in [-1, 1] & \forall i \in N \\ p_i &\in ]\gamma, 1[ & \forall i \in N \end{aligned}$$

#### Parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{S}(x, y) &\in [0, 1] & \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \delta &\in ]0, 1[ \\ \gamma &\in ]\delta, 1[ \end{aligned}$$

#### Objective function:

$$\min \varepsilon$$

#### Constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i=1}^n w_i &= 1 \\ \dots \\ \sum_{i=1}^n w'_i(x, y) &\leq \tilde{S}(x, y) + \varepsilon & \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \sum_{i=1}^n w'_i(x, y) &\geq \tilde{S}(x, y) - \varepsilon & \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \dots \end{aligned}$$

## Disaggregation of $\mathcal{M}_1$ by mathematical programming

Minimise the maximal gap between the given and the calculated  $\tilde{S}$

### Motivations:

- By construction,  $\tilde{S}(x, y)$  is **rational** in  $[-1, 1]$
- If the decimal expansion of a rational number  $r \in [-1, 1]$  is **periodic**, then  $r$  is hardly representable as a float
- Consequently, the value stored for  $\tilde{S}(x, y)$  might be an **approximation**
- In such a case, **MIP1** might have **no solution**

### Discussion:

- If  $\varepsilon = 0$ , then there exist  $g_i(x)$  ( $\forall i \in N, \forall x \in X$ ) and associated weights  $w_i$  ( $\forall i \in N$ ) and thresholds  $q_i, p_i, wv_i, v_i; \forall i \in N$  generating  $\tilde{S}$  via  $\mathcal{M}_1$
- Else there exists no solution to the problem via the selected representation, and the output of **MIP1bis** is an approximation of  $\tilde{S}$  by  $\mathcal{M}_1$

## Disaggregation of $\mathcal{M}_2$ and $\mathcal{M}_3$

Similar as  $\mathcal{M}_1$  via mixed integer programs by minimising  $\varepsilon$

### MIP2:

#### Variables:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon &\geq 0 \\ g_i(x) &\in [0, 1] & \forall i \in N, \forall x \in X \\ w_i &\in ]0, 1[ & \forall i \in N \\ \alpha_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \beta_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \alpha'_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \beta'_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ w_i''(x, y) &\in [-1, 1] & \forall i \in N, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ z_i(x, y) &\in \{0, 1\} & \forall i \in N \cup \{0\}, \forall x \neq y \in X \\ q_i &\in [\gamma, p_i[ & \forall i \in N \\ p_i &\in ]q_i, wv_i[ & \forall i \in N \\ wv_i &\in ]p_i, v_i[ & \forall i \in N \\ v_i &\in ]wv_i, 1] & \forall i \in N \end{aligned}$$

#### Parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{S}''(x, y) &\in [0, 1] & \forall x \neq y \in X \\ \delta &\in ]0, 1[ \\ \gamma &\in ]0, 1[ \end{aligned}$$

#### Objective function:

$$\min \varepsilon$$

#### Constraints:

:

## On the rank of the outranking relation

### On the rank of a bipolar-valued outranking relation

#### Definition

The **rank** of a bipolar-valued outranking relation is given by the minimal number of criteria necessary to construct it via the selected model.

#### Practical determination:

- **MIP1**: the objective function gives the rank of  $\tilde{S}$ .
- **MIP1bis, MIP2, MIP3**:
  - $n := 0$ ;
  - do {
    - $n := n + 1$ ;
    - solve the optimisation problem;
  - } while  $\varepsilon > 0$ ;
  - **rank** =  $n$ ;

**Note:** The algorithm might never stop, if  $\tilde{S}$  cannot be constructed by the chosen model

## Illustrative examples

## Illustration

**MIP1 & MIP1bis** ( $\delta = 0.001$ ,  $\gamma = 0.1$ ,  $n = 5$ ):

$\tilde{S}_1$	$a$	$b$	$c$
$a$	.	0.258	-0.186
$b$	0.334	.	0.556
$c$	0.778	0.036	.

	$g_1$	$g_2$	$g_3$	$g_4$
$a$	1.000	0.000	0.100	0.000
$b$	0.500	0.000	0.000	1.000
$c$	0.000	0.000	0.200	0.100
$w_i$	0.111	0.296	0.222	0.371
$p_i$	0.500	1.000	0.100	0.100

**MIP1:** there exists an optimal solution for 4 criteria

**MIP1bis:**

- for  $n \geq 4$ : optimal solution with  $\varepsilon = 0$
- for  $n < 4$ : optimal solutions with  $\varepsilon > 0$

$\Rightarrow \text{rank}(\tilde{S}_1) = 4 \text{ under } \mathcal{M}_1$

## Illustration

**MIP2 & MIP3** ( $q = 0.1$ ,  $p = 0.2$ ,  $wv = 0.6$  and  $v = 0.8$ ,  $\delta = 0.001$ ,  $n = 5$ ):

$\tilde{S}_2$	$a$	$b$	$c$	$g_1$	$g_2$
$a$	.	0.258	-0.186	0.290	0.000
$b$	0.334	.	0.556	0.100	0.100
$c$	-1.000	0.036	.	0.000	0.01
$w_i$				0.704	0.296
$q_i$				0.100	0.100
$p_i$				0.200	0.200

**On the inference of model parameters**

**MIP2:** for  $n = 5$ : opt. sol. with  $\varepsilon = 0.593$

**MIP3:**

- for  $n \geq 4$ : optimal solution with  $\varepsilon = 0$
- for  $n < 4$ : optimal solution with  $\varepsilon > 0$

$\Rightarrow \text{rank}(\tilde{S}_2) = 4 \text{ under } \mathcal{M}_3$

**Note:** Veto between  $c$  and  $a$  on criterion 4  
 $(\tilde{S}(c, a) = -1)$

MIP3	$g_1$	$g_2$	$g_3$	$g_4$
$a$	0.600	0.690	0.000	0.420
$b$	1.000	0.000	0.200	0.210
$c$	0.800	0.890	0.100	0.000
$w_i$	0.186	0.222	0.370	0.222
$q_i$	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100
$p_i$	0.200	0.200	0.210	0.220
$wv_i$	0.410	0.900	0.310	0.320
$v_i$	0.510	1.000	0.410	0.420

## Usefulness in MCDA: inference of model parameters

In real-world decision problems involving multiple criteria:

- Performances  $g_i(x)$  ( $\forall i \in N, \forall x \in X$ ) are **known**
- Weights and thresholds are usually **unknown**

### Objective

Show how these parameters can be determined from **a priori** knowledge provided by the decision maker

## A priori information

In our context, the **a priori** preferences of the decision maker could take the form of:

- a partial weak order over the credibilities of the validation of outrankings;
- a partial weak order over the importances of some criteria;
- quantitative intuitions about some credibilities of the validation of outrankings;
- quantitative intuitions about the importance of some criteria;
- quantitative intuitions about some thresholds;
- subsets of criteria important enough for the validation of an outranking situation;
- subsets of criteria not important enough for the validation of an outranking situation;
- etc.

## A priori information: constraints

- the validation of  $wSx$  is strictly more credible than that of  $ySz$  can be translated as  $\tilde{S}(w, x) - \tilde{S}(y, z) \geq \delta$ ;
- the validation of  $wSx$  is similar to that of  $ySz$  can be translated as  $-\delta \leq \tilde{S}(w, x) - \tilde{S}(y, z) \leq \delta$ ;
- the importance of criterion  $i$  is strictly higher than that of  $j$  can be translated as  $w_i - w_j \geq \delta$ ;
- the importance of criterion  $i$  is similar to that of  $j$  can be translated as  $-\delta \leq w_i - w_j \leq \delta$ ;

where  $w, x, y, z \in X, i, j \in N$  and  $\delta$  is a non negative separation parameter.

## A priori information: constraints

- a quantitative intuition about the credibility of the validation of  $xSy$  can be translated as  $\eta_{(x,y)} \leq \tilde{S}(x, y) \leq \theta_{(x,y)}$ , where  $\eta_{(x,y)} \leq \theta_{(x,y)} \in [-1, 1]$  are to be fixed by the DM;
- a quantitative intuition about the importance of criterion  $i$  can be translated as  $\eta_{w_i} \leq w_i \leq \theta_{w_i}$ , where  $\eta_{w_i} \leq \theta_{w_i} \in [0, 1]$  are to be fixed by the DM;
- a quantitative intuition about the preference threshold  $p_i$  of criterion  $i$  can be translated as  $\eta_{p_i} \leq p_i \leq \theta_{p_i}$ , where  $\eta_{p_i} \leq \theta_{p_i} \in [0, 1]$  are to be fixed by the DM;
- the fact that the subset  $M \subset N$  of criteria is sufficient (resp. not sufficient) to validate an outranking statement can be translated as  $\sum_{i \in M} w_i \geq \eta_M$  (resp.  $\sum_{i \in M} w_i \leq -\eta_M$ ), where  $\eta_M \in [0, 1]$  is a parameter of *concordant coalition* which is to be fixed by the DM.

**MIP3-MCDA:***Variables:*

$$\begin{aligned}
 \varepsilon &\geq 0 \\
 w_i &\in ]0, 1] \quad \forall i \in N \\
 q_i &\in ]0, p_i[ \quad \forall i \in N \\
 p_i &\in ]q_i, 1[ \quad \forall i \in N \\
 wv_i &\in ]p_i, 1[ \quad \forall i \in N \\
 v_i &\in ]wv_i, 1[ \quad \forall i \in N \\
 \tilde{S}''(x, y) &\in [0, 1] \quad \forall x \neq y \in X \\
 \dots
 \end{aligned}$$

*Parameters:*

$$\begin{aligned}
 g_i(x) &\in [0, 1] \quad \forall i \in N, \forall x \in X \\
 \delta &\in ]0, q[
 \end{aligned}$$

*Objective function:*

$$\min \varepsilon$$

**MIP3** (some of them linearised)
 $\dots$ 
*Constraints of a priori information (informal):*

$$\begin{aligned}
 \tilde{S}(w, x) - \tilde{S}(y, z) &\geq \delta && \text{for some pairs of alternatives} \\
 -\delta &\leq \tilde{S}(w, x) - \tilde{S}(y, z) \leq \delta && \text{for some pairs of alternatives} \\
 w_i - w_j &\geq \delta && \text{for some pairs of weights} \\
 -\delta &\leq w_i - w_j \leq \delta && \text{for some pairs of weights} \\
 \eta_{(x,y)} &\leq \tilde{S}(x, y) \leq \theta_{(x,y)} && \text{for some pairs of alternatives} \\
 \eta_{w_i} &\leq w_i \leq \theta_{w_i} && \text{for some weights} \\
 \eta_{p_i} &\leq p_i \leq \theta_{p_i} && \text{for some thresholds and some weights} \\
 \sum_{i \in M} w_i &\geq \eta_M && \text{for some subsets } M \text{ of weights} \\
 \sum_{i \in M} w_i &\leq -\eta_M && \text{for some subsets } M \text{ of weights}
 \end{aligned}$$

**Illustration****Starting point:**

	$g_1$	$g_2$	$g_3$	$g_4$
$a$	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
$b$	0.400	0.100	0.090	0.590
$c$	0.200	0.290	0.000	0.000

**Unknown:**

- $w_i \quad \forall i \in N$
- $q_i, p_i, wv_i, w_i \quad \forall i \in N$

**A priori preferences:**

$\tilde{S}_3$	$a$	$b$	$c$
$a$	.	$\in ]0, 0.5]$	$\in [-0.5, 0[$
$b$	$\in ]0, 0.5]$	.	$\in ]0.5, 1]$
$c$	$= -1$	$\in [-0.1, 0.1]$	.

**Illustration****Output of MIP3-MCDA:**

$\tilde{S}_3$	$a$	$b$	$c$
$a$	.	0.500	-0.010
$b$	0.500	.	1.000
$c$	-1.000	0.000	.

	$g_1$	$g_2$	$g_3$	$g_4$
$w_i$	0.120	0.380	0.250	0.250
$q_i$	0.970	0.270	0.000	0.000
$p_i$	0.980	0.280	0.090	0.410
$wv_i$	0.990	0.290	0.990	0.590
$v_i$	1.000	0.300	1.000	0.600

Table:  $\tilde{S}_3$ Table: Model parameters for  $\tilde{S}_3$  via  $\mathcal{M}_3$ **A few words on the implementation**

**Note:**  $\tilde{S}_3(c, a) = -1$  (resp  $\tilde{S}_3(c, b) = 0$ ) results from a veto (resp. weak veto) situation on criterion 4.

# On the implementation

- Implemented in the **GNU MathProg** programming language
- Simple examples of this presentation have been solved on a standard desktop computer with **Glipsol**
- Harder examples are solved with **ILOG CPLEX 11.0.0**
- **Very** time consuming!

**That's all folks**