

Optimal mix of funded and unfunded pension systems: The case of Luxembourg

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- a theoretical model based on a diversification principle

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$$L = \frac{1}{\sigma} \prod_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^r \pi_j \prod_{t=1}^T \phi \left(\frac{y_{i_t} - \beta^j x_{i_t}}{\sigma} \right). \quad (1)$$

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Software:

SAS-based Proc Traj procedure

by Bobby L. Jones (Carnegie Mellon University).

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PROC TRAJ DATA=TEST OUTPLOT=OP OUTSTAT=OS OUT=OF  
OUTEST=OE ITDETAIL;
```


```
    ID ID; VAR O1-O20; INDEP T1-T20;
```

```
    MODEL CNORM; MAX 8000; NGROUPS 6; ORDER 4 4 4 4 4 4;
```

```
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Results for 9 groups

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
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$$\tau_1 = \frac{S_0 + \dots + \frac{S_T}{(1+d)^T}}{\frac{k}{(1+d)^{T+1}} P_{T+1} + \dots + \frac{k}{(1+d)^{T+T^*}} P_{T+T^*}}.$$

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
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Systemic risk

Modelisation based on portfolio type risk management principles

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	Market risk	Demographic risk
Repartition	Negligeable	Extreme
Capitalization	Extreme	Negligeable

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
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measures the gain of sustainability of the mixed system with respect of the PAYG system.

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Theorem. The value $x = x^*$ for which the utility function U attains its maximum under the sustainability constraint

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Moreover the individual needs a constant annual saving amount

$$a^* = \sqrt{\frac{G^* K}{\text{var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*)}},$$

where $K = \text{Var}\left[\frac{S_j}{a_j(i-\lambda_j)} i^{\frac{(1+i)^T - (1+\lambda_j)^T}{(1+i)^T - 1}}\right]$ depends on the salary trajectory.

Example

An individual worker wants to divide by 2 the variability of his PAYG sustainability constraint needs to save annually at least the following amount (depending on his salary evolution subgroup):

Groupe	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5	G6	G7	G8	G9
Annuité	4466 €	713 €	1448 €	5231 €	220 €	6364 €	2809 €	743 €	3140 €