Reference : Strategic Delegation and Collusion: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?
E-prints/Working papers : First made available on ORBilu
Business & economic sciences : Finance
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/9530
Strategic Delegation and Collusion: Do Incentive Schemes Matter?
English
Guigou, Jean-Daniel mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Luxembourg School of Finance (LSF) >]
de Lamirande, Patrick []
Lovat, Bruno []
2011
Yes
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/9530

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