Reference : The Grand Chamber’s Take on Composite Procedures under the Single Supervisory Mechanism
Scientific journals : Article
Law, criminology & political science : European & international law
Law / European Law
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/40647
The Grand Chamber’s Take on Composite Procedures under the Single Supervisory Mechanism
English
Demkova, Simona mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Law Research Unit >]
1-Sep-2019
Review of European Administrative Law
Paris Legal
12
1
Accountability and Control of European Multilevel Administration Editorial: Accountability and control across a changing, multilevel administration
209-220
Yes
International
1874-7981
1874-7973
Zutphen
Netherlands
[en] composite procedures ; judicial review ; Single Supervisory Mechanism
[en] The recent landmark judgment of Berlusconi (Fininvest)1 reaffirms the Union Courts’ initial stance regarding the division of jurisdiction for matters arising from composite procedures.2 Remarkably, however, in Berlusconi, the CJEU for the first time offers a conceptual discussion on the long discussed issue of jurisdiction in composite matters, and does so in the new context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In this respect, the Court first clarifies that where an EU institution enjoys discretion in the final decision-making under the arrangement of a composite procedure, the Union Courts shall have an exclusive jurisdiction over the procedure as a whole. Consequently, Member State courts are prevented from reviewing any steps leading to the adoption of a final decision, regardless of the legal effects thereof in the domestic legal order or the domestic procedural rules allowing for such a review. While seemingly logical, the binary approach to judicial vompetence opens more doors to uncertainty, than it closes. One key concern is regarding the appropriate conduct of review under exclusive jurisdiction; concretely whether and how the Union Courts are competent to review preliminary acts taken under national law. Generally, where interpretation of the respective national rules is clear, such a review would consist of a verification of compliance with the essential procedural guarantees by the Union institution or body, which took the final decision. This approach seems to apply also in cases where the Union institution has a limited discretion to review the national preliminary acts when taking the final decision. The following discussion identifies that despite the black-and-white understanding of discretion developed by the Court in Berlusconi, under more general jurisdiction, the Union Courts will always verify that decisions of the Union institutions are taken with all due care.
Researchers ; Professionals ; General public
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/40647
10.7590/187479819X15656877527269 1874-7981 2019
https://www.uitgeverijparis.nl/en/tijdschriften-online/review-of-european-administrative-law-realaw

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