Reference : The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in ...
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
Finance
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/36423
The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?
English
Howarth, David mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE) >]
Quaglia, Lucia mailto [University of Bologna > Political Science > > Professor]
Aug-2018
Journal of Economic Policy Reform
Routledge
21
3
Reforming Banking Union
190-209
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
1748-7870
[en] European Banking Union ; deposit guarantee schemes ; European deposit insurance scheme ; moral hazard ; banking systems
[en] The German Government refused to accept the development of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Banking Union member states. Publicly, the German Government was preoccupied with the creation of a moral hazard that common funds would create for banks in those participating countries that had weak banking systems. This paper argues that to understand German moral hazard concerns it is necessary to look beyond the ideational – notably concerns stemming from German Ordo-liberalism – and focus on the existing national institutional arrangements that the German Government sought to protect. German moral hazard concerns stemmed from the fear that well-funded German deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) – especially those of small savings and cooperative banks – could be tapped to compensate for underfunded (and largely ex post funded) DGS in other member states. We thus demonstrate that the difficulties facing the construction of an EDIS owe to the weakness of the previously agreed harmonization of national DGS. This failure to harmonize schemes beyond a low minimal standard can be explained through an analysis focused on national systems. Different existing national DGS stem from the different configuration of national banking systems, the longstanding relationships among national banks and well-entrenched regulatory frameworks.
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/36423
10.1080/17487870.2017.1402682
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17487870.2017.1402682

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