Reference : Understanding Android App Piggybacking
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Poster
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/30027
Understanding Android App Piggybacking
English
Li, Li mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Li, Daoyuan mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Bissyande, Tegawendé François D Assise mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Klein, Jacques mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Le Traon, Yves mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Lo, David [Singapore Management University]
Cavallaro, Lorenzo [Royal Holloway, University of London]
May-2017
Yes
No
The 39th International Conference on Software Engineering
from 20-05-2017 to 28-05-2017
[en] The Android packaging model offers adequate opportunities for attackers to inject malicious code into popular benign apps, attempting to develop new malicious apps that can then be easily spread to a large user base. Despite the fact that the literature has already presented a number of tools to detect piggybacked apps, there is still lacking a comprehensive investigation on the piggybacking processes. To fill this gap, in this work, we collect a large set of benign/piggybacked app pairs that can be taken as benchmark apps for further investigation. We manually look into these benchmark pairs for understanding the characteristics of piggybacking apps and eventually we report 20 interesting findings. We expect these findings to initiate new research directions such as practical and scalable piggybacked app detection, explainable malware detection, and malicious code location.
SnT
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students ; General public ; Others
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/30027

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