Reference : Commodity taxation and regulatory competition
E-prints/Working papers : Already available on another site
Business & economic sciences : International economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/2984
Commodity taxation and regulatory competition
English
Moriconi, Simone [> >]
Picard, Pierre M. mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Zanaj, Skerdilajda mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
2012
Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg
No
[en] Regulation; commodity tax; strategic interactions; fiscal federalism
[en] This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-2008.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/2984
http://ideas.repec.org/p/luc/wpaper/12-15.html
CREA Discussion Paper Series
http://ideas.repec.org/p/luc/wpaper/12-15.html

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