Reference : Does the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Accounting & auditing
Finance
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/28821
Does the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms
English
Derouiche, Imen mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Boubaker, Sabri [Champagne School of Management, Groupe ESC Troyes, France]
Nguyen, Duc Khuong [IPAG Lab, IPAG Business School, France]
May-2015
Journal of Management & Governance
Springer Science & Business Media B.V.
19
2
341-370
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
International
1385-3457
[en] Board of directors; Agency costs; ; Corporate governance; ; Cash holdings
[en] Prior studies show that agency conflicts are important in explaining corporate financial policies and that the board of directors is central to corporate governance. In this study, we examine the role of this governing body in the accumulation of cash reserves. Using a sample of 597 French listed firms during 2001–2007, we find that firms with boards deemed to be effective in mitigating agency problems—that is, those appointing independent directors and splitting chief executive officer and chair positions—accumulate less cash reserves than those with less effective boards. Moreover, two-tier boards are more efficient in mitigating the agency costs of free cash flow, leading to less corporate cash hoarding. These findings support the idea that agency conflicts influence cash management policy and that effective boards of directors play an important disciplinary role in a concentrated ownership setting.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/28821

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