Reference : On Key Recovery Attacks against Existing Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/18106
On Key Recovery Attacks against Existing Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
English
Chenal, Massimo mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
Tang, Qiang mailto [University of Luxembourg > Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SNT) > >]
2014
Progress in Cryptology - LATINCRYPT 2014, Florianópolis 17-19 September 2014
Yes
No
International
The third International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Latincrypt 2014
from 17-09-2014 to 19-09-2014
Florianópolis
Brazil
[en] Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption ; Key Recovery Attack ; IND-CCA1 Security
[en] In his seminal paper at STOC 2009, Gentry left it as a future work to investigate (somewhat) homomorphic encryption schemes with IND-CCA1 security. At SAC 2011, Loftus et al. showed an IND-CCA1 attack against the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme presented by Gentry and Halevi at Eurocrypt 2011. At ISPEC 2012, Zhang, Plantard and Susilo showed an IND-CCA1 attack against the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme developed by van Dijk et al. at Eurocrypt 2010.

In this paper, we continue this line of research and show that most existing somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes are not IND-CCA1 secure. In fact, we show that these schemes suffer from key recovery attacks (stronger than a typical IND-CCA1 attack), which allow an adversary to recover the private keys through a number of decryption oracle queries. The schemes, that we study in detail, include those by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan at Crypto 2011 and FOCS 2011, and that by Gentry, Sahai and Waters at Crypto 2013. We also develop a key recovery attack that applies to the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme by van Dijk et al., and our attack is more efficient and conceptually simpler than the one developed by Zhang et al.. Our key recovery attacks also apply to the scheme by Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan at ITCS 2012, and we also describe a key recovery attack for the scheme developed by Brakerski at Crypto 2012.
SnT, University of Luxembourg
National Research Fund, Luxembourg
Researchers ; Professionals ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/18106

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