Reference : Sovereign debt default and banking in a currency union
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Unpublished conference
Business & economic sciences : Macroeconomics & monetary economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17940
Sovereign debt default and banking in a currency union
English
Perego, Erica mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Pierrard, Olivier mailto [Central Bank of Luxembourg > Economics and Research]
27-May-2014
Yes
International
14th Belgian Financial Research Forum, Louvain la Neuve
27/05/2014
[en] Sovereign default ; Banking ; Currency Union
[en] This paper analyzes the role of banking in the transmission of sovereign debt default within a currency union. We build a 2-country (core and periphery) new-Keynesian model with an endogenous possibility of default on the periphery public debt. We introduce alternative banking representations, going from full integration to fragmentation. We calibrate the model on euro area data and show that the best fit to empirical data arises when we introduce some degree of fragmentation. However, we observe that a well integrated banking sector would reduce the negative consequences of default at the EA aggregated level and limit the welfare cost of stabilizing policies.
Researchers ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17940

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