Reference : Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: A differential game approach
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Special economic topics (health, labor, transportation…)
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17646
Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: A differential game approach
English
Bertinelli, Luisito mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Camacho, Carmen []
Zou, Benteng mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
2014
European Journal of Operational Research
Yes
[en] Transboundary pollution ; Carbon capture and storage
[en] We study the strategic behavior of two countries facing transboundary CO2 pollution under a differential game setting. In our model, the reduction of CO2 concentration occurs through the carbon capture and storage process, rather than through the adoption of cleaner technologies. Furthermore, we first provide the explicit short-run dynamics for this dynamic game with symmetric open-loop and a special Markovian Nash strategy. Then, we compare these strategies at the games’ steady states and along some balanced
growth paths. Our results show that if the initial level of CO2 is relatively high, state dependent
emissions reductions can lead to higher overall environmental quality, hence, feedback strategy leads to less social waste.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17646

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