Reference : What do we know about audit oversight regulation? – A literature synthesis of 30 year...
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Unpublished conference
Business & economic sciences : Accounting & auditing
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17496
What do we know about audit oversight regulation? – A literature synthesis of 30 years of research on the external quality assurance mechanisms of U.S. audit firms.
English
Löhlein, Lukas mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Muessig, Anke mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
28-Sep-2013
How can high-quality statutory auditing of financial statements be assured? One course of action is to implement oversight systems over statutory auditors. In fact, regulators in the U.S. have introduced a series of initiatives to improve audit quality. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) from 2002 established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the audits of public companies and replaced the profession’s self-regulatory peer review system with direct control by a governmental agency. Since the U.S. regulatory framework serves as a role model for global accounting regulators, a multiple of other countries reformed their legal system and introduced a system of public oversight. However, whether the reform was successful is still open for debate. This paper contributes to the controversial debate by reviewing for the first time thirty years research on U.S. audit oversight regulation. The empirical findings of the studies are analyzed and arranged along the categories of the framework. In the framework, audit quality depends on three factors: The validity of the evaluation, the recognition of evaluation outcomes by financial actors and the audit firm itself. These factors form the framework for the literature analysis in order to answer the question: Does scientific evidence legitimize the need for change from self-regulation to public oversight? The analysis of the academic findings demonstrates that: (1) the shift from self-regulation to government oversight cannot be explained or supported by scientific findings: The monitoring system’s assumed predominance has yet to be proved. (2) To date, there is no scientific evidence for the ability of government oversight to significantly reduce the risk of large accounting scandals. This literature synthesis is important in representing the historical development of the regulatory framework, assessing and comparing the findings of the former self-regulatory peer review (1977 – 2002) with the current public oversight system (2002 – 2013) and identifying unnoted but important issues for further research. Overall, the study contributes to the literature on public oversight of the auditing profession in the U.S.
Yes
International
EARNet Symposium 2013
27-09-2013 to 28-09-2013
University of Trier
Trier
Germany
Centre for Research in Econcomis and Management
University of Luxembourg - UL
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17496

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