Reference : Growth-Friendly Dictatorships
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Business & economic sciences : Social economics
Growth-Friendly Dictatorships
Da Luca, Giacomo mailto [University of York > Economics]
Litina, Anastasia mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
Sekeris, Petros mailto [University of Namur > Center for Research in the Economics of Development]
[en] Dictators ; Growth
[en] In this paper we show that in highly unequal societies, different societal groups may support a rent-seeking dicator serving their interests better than the median voter in a democratic regime. Importantly, it is the stakes of dictator in the economy, in the form of capital ownership, that drives the support of individuals. In particular, in highly societies ruled by a capital-rich dictator endowed with the power to tax and appropriate at will, the elites support dictatorial policies that generate higher growth rates than the ones obtained under democracy. Such support arises despite the total absence of checks and balances on the dictator.

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