Reference : Patent office governance and patent examination quality
E-prints/Working papers : Already available on another site
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12866
Patent office governance and patent examination quality
English
Picard, Pierre M. mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance (FDEF) > Center for Research in Economic Analysis (CREA) >]
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno [> >]
Aug-2013
Elsevier Science
Yes (verified by ORBilu)
0047-2727
Lausanne
Switzerland
[en] Patent system ; Quality ; Intellectual property ; Public firm organization
[en] The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent examination process from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination process. A higher effort in the examination process enhances the patent holders' protection in the judicial system and strengthens the screening of innovations with small inventive steps. We compare the quality of the examination process for various objectives of patent offices. Patent examination quality is the highest in an office maximizing incentives to innovate and the lowest in that maximizing the number of granted patents. A rent-seeking patent office can provide good incentives to innovate if it does not set too high markups on fees.
Researchers ; Students
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12866
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272713000947

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