Reference : Epistemic virtues and values
Parts of books : Contribution to collective works
Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12702
Epistemic virtues and values
English
Hofmann, Frank mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Language and Literature, Humanities, Arts and Education (FLSHASE) > Identités, Politiques, Sociétés, Espaces (IPSE) >]
2013
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
Knowledge, Virtue, and Action
Henning, Tim
Schweikard, David
Blackwell
119-139
No
Oxford
[en] knowledge ; virtue ; value
[en] Plato’s Meno problem is the problem of why knowledge is better than true belief which is not knowledge. The paper studies the account of this surplus value of knowledge that recent reliabilist virtue epistemologists like John Greco and Ernest Sosa have proposed: knowledge is true belief from epistemic virtue. I reconstruct the master argument which subsumes the epistemic case under the general case of success from virtue. Five accounts of (epistemic) virtue are presented and discussed critically. The result is that only the fifth account – the refined dispositionalist account of virtue, based on an idea of J.J. Thomson – is viable, for the purposes of accounting for the surplus value of knowledge along the lines of the master argument. However, there is at least one remaining question, namely, of why success from virtue has surplus value in general.
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/12702
also: http://hdl.handle.net/10993/24931

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