Reference : Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue
Scientific congresses, symposiums and conference proceedings : Paper published in a book
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/10586
Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue
English
Coron, Jean-Sébastien mailto [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
Christophe, Giraud [Oberthur Technologies, France]
Emmanuel, Prouff [Oberthur Technologies, France]
Soline, Renner [Oberthur Technologies, France]
Matthieu, Rivain [CryptoExperts, France]
Praveen Kumar, Vadnala [University of Luxembourg > Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication (FSTC) > Computer Science and Communications Research Unit (CSC) >]
2012
Proceedings of COSADE 2012
Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012
69-81
Yes
978-3-642-29911-7
Third InternationalWorkshop, COSADE 2012
May 3-4, 2012
Darmstadt
Germany
[en] To guarantee the security of a cryptographic implementation against Side Channel Attacks, a common approach is to formally prove the security of the corresponding scheme in a model as pertinent as possible. Nowadays, security proofs for masking schemes in the literature are usually conducted for models where only the manipulated data are assumed to leak. However in practice, the leakage is better modeled encompassing the memory transitions as e.g. the Hamming distance model. From this observation, a natural question is to decide at which extent a countermeasure proved to be secure in the first model stays secure in the second. In this paper, we look at this issue and we show that it must definitely be taken into account. Indeed, we show that a countermeasure proved to be secure against second-order side-channel attacks in the first model becomes vulnerable against a first-order side-channel attack in the second model. Our result emphasize the issue of porting an implementation from devices leaking only on the manipulated data to devices leaking on the memory transitions.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/10586
7275/2012
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

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