Reference : Improving Remote Voting Security with CodeVoting
Parts of books : Contribution to collective works
Engineering, computing & technology : Computer science
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/10285
Improving Remote Voting Security with CodeVoting
English
Joaquim, Rui mailto [Inesc-ID and Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa - IPL > GSD and Instituto Superior de Engenharia de Lisboa - ISEL]
Ribeiro, Carlos [Inesc-ID and Universidade Técnica de Lisboa - UTL > GSD and Instituto Superior Técnico - IST]
Ferreira, Paulo [Inesc-ID and Universidade Técnica de Lisboa - UTL > GSD and Instituto Superior Técnico - IST]
2010
Towards Trustworthy Elections
Chaum, David
Jakobsson, Markus
Rivest, Ronaldl
Ryan, Petery A.
Benaloh, Josh
Kutylowski, Miroslaw
Adida, Ben
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
310-329
Yes
978-3-642-12979-7
[en] Remote voting; Internet voting; vote manipulation; uncontrolled voting platform; insecure voting platform
[en] One of the major problems that prevents the spread of elections
with the possibility of remote voting over electronic networks, also
called Internet Voting, is the use of unreliable client platforms, such as
the voter’s computer and the Internet infrastructure connecting it to
the election server. A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to
viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, malware and other threats that can
compromise the election’s integrity. For instance, it is possible to write
a virus that changes the voter’s vote to a predetermined vote on election’s
day. Another possible attack is the creation of a fake election web
site where the voter uses a malicious vote program on the web site that
manipulates the voter’s vote (phishing/pharming attack). Such attacks
may not disturb the election protocol, therefore can remain undetected
in the eyes of the election auditors.
We propose the use of CodeVoting to overcome insecurity of the client
platform. CodeVoting consists in creating a secure communication channel
to communicate the voter’s vote between the voter and a trusted
component attached to the voter’s computer. Consequently, no one controlling
the voter’s computer can change the his/her’s vote. The trusted
component can then process the vote according to a cryptographic voting
protocol to enable cryptographic verification at the server’s side.
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/10285
10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_19
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_19
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
6000

File(s) associated to this reference

Fulltext file(s):

FileCommentaryVersionSizeAccess
Open access
JRF2010.pdfPublisher postprint299.41 kBView/Open

Bookmark and Share SFX Query

All documents in ORBilu are protected by a user license.