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See detailGranting votes: Exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within-between specification for panel data
Glaurdic, Josip UL; Vukovic, Vuk

in Public Choice (2017), 171(1-2), 223-241

Instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities, intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors’ political goals. This study uses a unique panel dataset on the level of more than 500 Croatian ... [more ▼]

Instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities, intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors’ political goals. This study uses a unique panel dataset on the level of more than 500 Croatian municipalities over a twelve-year period to uncover to which extent grant distribution is biased due to grantors’ electoral concerns. Instead of the default fixed effects approach to model panel data, we apply a novel within-between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation, focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities. We find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocation both within and between municipalities, particularly when it comes to local-level electoral concerns. The paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically-biased grant allocation using panel data, particularly in cases where they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time-variant and time-invariant factors, or when they cannot apply a quasi-experimental approach due to specific circumstances of the given institutional context. [less ▲]

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See detailMaking the first move. A two-stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation
Bäck, Hanna; Dumont, Patrick UL

in PUBLIC CHOICE (2008), 135(3-4), 353-373

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move-the formateur party-will determine the bargaining outcome. Most ... [more ▼]

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move-the formateur party-will determine the bargaining outcome. Most empirical studies of parliamentary coalition formation have paid surprisingly little attention to the formation process. In this paper we model government formation as a two-stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects this process. The first step involves the selection of a formateur party, and the second involves the choice of partners by the predicted formateur. We evaluate several hypotheses for the two stages, using a data set of all cabinets formed in the Western European countries from 1970 to 2006. In our analyses of formateur selection, we find that party size is clearly the dominant feature. In the second stage, we show that when predicting government composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis. [less ▲]

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