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See detailTweaking a block cipher: multi-user beyond-birthday-bound security in the standard model
Cogliati, Benoît-Michel UL

in Designs, Codes and Cryptography (2018)

In this paper, we present a generic construction to create a secure tweakable block cipher from a secure block cipher. Our construction is very natural, requiring four calls to the underlying block cipher ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we present a generic construction to create a secure tweakable block cipher from a secure block cipher. Our construction is very natural, requiring four calls to the underlying block cipher for each call of the tweakable block cipher. Moreover, it is provably secure in the standard model while keeping the security degradation minimal in the multi-user setting. In more details, if the underlying blockcipher E uses n-bit blocks and 2n-bit keys, then our construction is proven secure against multi-user adversaries using up to roughly 2n time and queries as long as E is a secure block cipher. [less ▲]

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See detailOn the Power of Rewinding Simulators in Functional Encryption
De Caro, Angelo; Iovino, Vincenzo UL

in Designs, Codes and Cryptography (2016)

In a seminal work, Boneh, Sahai and Waters (BSW, for short) [TCC'11] showed that for functional encryption the indistinguishability notion of security (IND-Security) is weaker than simulation-based ... [more ▼]

In a seminal work, Boneh, Sahai and Waters (BSW, for short) [TCC'11] showed that for functional encryption the indistinguishability notion of security (IND-Security) is weaker than simulation-based security (SIM-Security), and that SIM-Security is in general impossible to achieve. This has opened up the door to a plethora of papers showing feasibility and new impossibility results. Nevertheless, the quest for better definitions that (1) overcome the limitations of IND-Security and (2) the known impossibility results, is still open. In this work, we explore the benefits and the limits of using {\em efficient rewinding black-box simulators} to argue security. To do so, we introduce a new simulation-based security definition, that we call {\em rewinding simulation-based security} (RSIM-Security), that is weaker than the previous ones but it is still sufficiently strong to not meet pathological schemes as it is the case for IND-Security (that is implied by the RSIM). This is achieved by retaining a strong simulation-based flavour but adding more rewinding power to the simulator having care to guarantee that it can not learn more than what the adversary would learn in any run of the experiment. What we found is that for RSIM the BSW impossibility result does not hold and that IND-Security is {\em equivalent} to RSIM-Security for {\em Attribute-Based Encryption} in the {\em standard model}. Nevertheless, we prove that there is a setting where rewinding simulators are of no help. The adversary can put in place a strategy that forces the simulator to rewind continuously. [less ▲]

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See detailMore differentially 6-uniform power functions
Blondeau, Céline; Perrin, Léo Paul UL

in Designs, Codes and Cryptography (2014), 73(2), 487-505

Detailed reference viewed: 89 (6 UL)