References of "Prieur, Fabien"
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See detailClimate politics: how public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance
Prieur, Fabien; Zou, Benteng UL

in Mathematical Social Sciences (2019)

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for ... [more ▼]

This paper aims at studying the impact of public persuasion, through information dissemination, on environmental and economic performance. A differential game in which opposite interest groups compete for bringing the majority’s environmental concern closer to their views is developed. The results show a strong asymmetry in the impact of public persuasion. It may bring the median voter economy closer to the social optimum in the long run, thereby reducing environmental and economic distorsions. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people are initially closer to the industrialists’ views. By contrast, economies where industrial groups are powerful and strongly opposed to environmental protection never benefit from the outcome of the game of persuasion. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 73 (1 UL)
See detailInstitutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach
Boucekkine, Raouf; Prieur, Fabien; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2015)

We propose an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by the means of a stochastic differential lobbying game with two main ingredients. The rst one is uncertainty inherent in the ... [more ▼]

We propose an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by the means of a stochastic differential lobbying game with two main ingredients. The rst one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second one has to do with the crucial role of resource windfalls in economic and political outcomes, shaping lobbying power and adding a second source of uncertainty. First, we focus on uncertainty surrounding the institutional process only and show that its main consequence is the existence of multiple equilibria with very distinct features: symmetric equilibria which lead the economy to reach almost surely a stable pointwise institutional steady state in the long run even in the absence of the retaliation motive put forward by the deterministic lobbying literature, and asymmetric equilibria which only show up under uncertainty and do no allow for stochastic convergence to a steady state. Second, when accounting for the two sources of uncertainty together with resource revenue-dependent lobbying power, we show that revenue volatility tends to stabilize institutional dynamics compared to the deterministic counterpart. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 38 (8 UL)