References of "Pieretti, Patrice 50002855"
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See detailDoes tax competition increase disparity among jurisdictions?
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Review of International Economics (2018)

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See detailImmigration, occupational choice and public employment
Marchiori, Luca; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique = Annals of Economics and Statistics (2017)

This paper investigates the theoretical effects of immigration in an occupational choice model with three sectors: a low-skilled, a high-skilled and a public sector. The originality of our approach is to ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates the theoretical effects of immigration in an occupational choice model with three sectors: a low-skilled, a high-skilled and a public sector. The originality of our approach is to consider (i) inter-sectoral mobility of labor and (ii) public employment. The combination of these two features yields a new mechanism by which immigration can have positive effects. The model demonstrates that immigration increases wages in the high-skilled and the public sectors, provided that the immigrant workforce is not too large and the access to public jobs is not too easy. The average wage of natives may also increase accordingly. Moreover, immigration may improve workers’ welfare in each sector. Finally, the mechanism underlying these results does not require complementarity between natives and immigrants. [less ▲]

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See detailON THE DESIRABILITY OF TAX COORDINATION WHEN COUNTRIES COMPETE IN TAXES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Economic Inquiry (2017)

The paper contains two distinct messages. First, when jurisdictions compete in two independent strategic variables, the decision to coordinate on one variable (a tax rate) induces a carry-over effect on ... [more ▼]

The paper contains two distinct messages. First, when jurisdictions compete in two independent strategic variables, the decision to coordinate on one variable (a tax rate) induces a carry-over effect on the unconstrained instrument (infrastructure expenditures). Consequently, classical results of the tax coordination literature may be qualified. A second message is that the relative flexibility of the strategic instruments, which may depend on the time horizon of the decision-making, does matter. In particular, tax coordination is more likely to be detrimental (in terms of revenue and/or welfare) when countries can compete simultaneously in taxes and infrastructure, rather than sequentially. The reason is that simultaneity eliminates strategic effects between tax and non-tax instruments. [less ▲]

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See detailTax havens compliance with international standards: a temporal perspective
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; pulina, giuseppe

E-print/Working paper (2016)

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See detailDoes tax competition increase disparity among jurisdictions?
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2015)

This paper investigates whether a less-developed economy can catch up with a more developed one when they compete for foreign direct investments. The main message of the paper is that jurisdictional ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates whether a less-developed economy can catch up with a more developed one when they compete for foreign direct investments. The main message of the paper is that jurisdictional competition can enable the lagging country to catch up if capital mobility is sufficiently high and the productivity gap is not too large. Further, we show that size asymmetry reinforces (weakens) the productivity catch-up resulting from interjurisdictional competition when the lagging economy is small (large). Finally, we demonstrate that the development gap widens when capital becomes less mobile, which is at odds with previous findings. [less ▲]

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See detailTax havens under pressure: How do they react?
Pieretti, Patrice UL; Pulina, Giuseppe UL

Scientific Conference (2014, July)

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See detailAsymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach
Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL et al

in Journal of Public Economics (2014)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country’s economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public services and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

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See detailDoes size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?
Han, Yutao UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Economics Letters (2014), 122

Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the ... [more ▼]

Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition. The aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no general validity, if we consider that countries compete not only in taxes, but also in the provision of infrastructure. The simple model we develop for this purpose demonstrates that the effect of size disparity on efficiency depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility. [less ▲]

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See detailOffshore financial centres and bank secrecy
Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Thisse, Jacques

E-print/Working paper (2014)

Detailed reference viewed: 64 (6 UL)
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See detailImmigration, occupational choice and public employment
Marchiori, Luca; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2014)

This paper investigates the theoretical effects of immigration in an occupational choice model with three sectors: a low-skilled, a high-skilled and a public sector. The originality of our approach is to ... [more ▼]

This paper investigates the theoretical effects of immigration in an occupational choice model with three sectors: a low-skilled, a high-skilled and a public sector. The originality of our approach is to consider (i) intersectoral mobility of labor and (ii) public employment. We highlight the fact that including a public sector is crucial, since omitting it implies that low-skilled immigration unambiguously reduces wages and welfare of all workers. However, when public employment is considered, we demonstrate that immigration increases wages in the high-skilled and the public sectors, provided that the immigrant workforce is not too large and the access to public jobs is not too easy. The average wage of natives may also increase accordingly. Moreover, immigration may improve workers’ welfare in each sector. Finally, the mechanism underlying these results does not require complementarity between natives and immigrants. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 53 (6 UL)
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See detailThe Dynamics of Firms Location: A Revisit of Home Attachment under Tax Competition
Han, Yutao UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

in Economics Letters (2013), 121

In this short note we extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) to allow the study of tax competition in a dynamic framework when international business relocation ... [more ▼]

In this short note we extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) to allow the study of tax competition in a dynamic framework when international business relocation occurs over successive periods. The dynamic framework we propose also helps to understand why tax rates may change over time. Our modified home-attachment rule is illustrated by a simple model of dynamic tax competition in discrete time. [less ▲]

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See detailFrom tax evasion to tax planning
Bourgain, Arnaud UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

Scientific Conference (2013)

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated tax planning. Two ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲]

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See detailFrom tax evasion to tax planning
Bourgain, Arnaud UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

E-print/Working paper (2013)

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank secrecy can impact tax revenues and banks'profitability, assuming that offshore centers are able to offer sophisticated but legal, tax planning. Two alternative regimes are considered. A first, in which there is strict bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. Moreover, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may reduce or increase the onshore country's tax revenue. [less ▲]

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See detailOffshore financial centers: Tax havens or safe havens
Thisse, Jacques; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

E-print/Working paper (2013)

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See detailThe Dynamics of the Location of Firms– A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition
Han, Yutao UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2013)

We revisit the investment home-bias situation of firms and extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) into a dynamic framework. We locate firms based on their home ... [more ▼]

We revisit the investment home-bias situation of firms and extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) into a dynamic framework. We locate firms based on their home attachment preferences, which is also changing over time based on some updated spillover information. Some applications, in static and dynamic tax competition, are presented following our home-attachment principle. [less ▲]

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See detailOn the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures
Han, Yutao UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2013)

In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure ... [more ▼]

In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in the quality of their institutions. If tax revenue is used to gauge the desirability of coordination, our model shows that imposing a uniform tax rate is Pareto-inferior to the non cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures. This result is completely reversed with pure tax competition if countries are not too uneven in size. If a minimum tax rate lying between those resulting from the non-cooperative equilibrium is set, the low tax country will never be better off. Finally the paper shows that the potential social welfare gains from tax harmonization crucially depend on how heterogeneous the competing countries are. [less ▲]

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See detailFinancial openness, disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries
Bourgain, Arnaud UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL

in Emerging Markets Review (2012), 13(3), 283-300

In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk-taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home country to the more protective system of a developed economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management. Finally, we test the relationship between disclosure, financial openness and bank risk-taking for a panel of 258 banks from the MENA region and Turkey. [less ▲]

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See detailOn the long run economic performance of small economies
Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL; Zou, Benteng UL

E-print/Working paper (2012)

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we analyze the long run economic performance of a small economy open to foreign investments. Policy instruments used to attract investments are taxes and attractive public infrastructures, whereas the policy choices of the rest of the world are taken as given. Applying the Pontryagin’s maximum principle, we first show that there exists one long run optimal size of the small economy which is saddle-point stable. The transitional path is two-dimensional, if the small economy is patient enough. Then, we show that the share of tax income allocated to the infrastructure expenditures plays an important role in attaining such a steady state. However, a deviation from this policy path can lead to an eventual economic collapse. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 56 (11 UL)
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See detailAsymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach
Han, Yutao UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL; Zanaj, Skerdilajda UL et al

E-print/Working paper (2012)

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public goods. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public infrastructure and with the degree of international openness. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 90 (9 UL)
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See detailBank secrecy, illicit money and offshore financial centers
Picard, Pierre M. UL; Pieretti, Patrice UL

in Journal of Public Economics (2011), 95(7-8), 942-955

International and national institutions regularly put pressure on offshore financial centers and their clients to enforce compliance with anti-money laundering regulations and that in spite of the ... [more ▼]

International and national institutions regularly put pressure on offshore financial centers and their clients to enforce compliance with anti-money laundering regulations and that in spite of the existence of bank secrecy. This paper discusses the winners and losers of such policies. Surprisingly, aggregate profits and tax revenues can increase under those policies. In addition, we show that offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of the investor's identity and the origin of his/her funds when the pressure creates sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to this investor. Nevertheless, the efficient pressure policy is dichotomous in the sense that a social planner chooses zero pressure or the pressure that just entices offshore banks to comply. By contrast, the implementation of those pressure policies on an onshore institution may be inefficient. Finally, we show that deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center while it also gives better incentives for delegated organizations to effectively induce compliance. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 184 (21 UL)