References of "Howarth, David 50002009"
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See detailThe democratic deficit and European Central Bank crisis monetary policies.
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Howarth, David UL

in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019)

This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the ... [more ▼]

This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the argument – defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik – that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to the international financial crisis, the ECB’s monetary policies were shaped entirely by the interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty provisions. [less ▲]

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See detailReinforcing Supranational Bank Regulation, Supervision, Support and Resolution in Europe: Introduction
Howarth, David UL; Schild, Joachim

in Journal of Economic Policy Reform (2019)

A decade on since the outbreak of the worst international financial crisis since the late 1920s, the effective design of EU bank regulation, supervision, support and resolution remains hotly contested, in ... [more ▼]

A decade on since the outbreak of the worst international financial crisis since the late 1920s, the effective design of EU bank regulation, supervision, support and resolution remains hotly contested, in both academic and policy-making circles. European Banking Union (BU), one of the most important developments in European integration since the Maastricht Treaty and the launch of Monetary Union, still ranks very high on the European Union’s reform agenda. Some reform proposals, such as the creation of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), have been placed on the backburner given German government concerns regarding the state of bank balance sheets in some euro area member states — and, specifically, bank holdings of nonperforming loans — and that incentives for future risk-taking have not been sufficiently reduced. Other reforms affecting all EU member states have met the determined opposition of a number of national governments and powerful bank interests, including the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on Bank Structural Reform (BSR), which was dropped by the Commission in late 2017. However, there are also a range of other legislative and institutional reforms designed to reinforce EU bank regulation and supervision which have either been proposed and / or adopted. The main objectives of these reforms are to make banking safer— and specifically to diminish the systemic effects of losses resulting from high risk bank activities — and to reinforce the ability of supervisory authorities to monitor effectively bank activity. By shedding light on a number of difficult issues facing these topics, the articles of this special issue seek to provide contributions that are helpful to both academics and policy makers. [less ▲]

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See detailAccountability in Post‐Crisis Eurozone Governance: The Tricky Case of the European Stability Mechanism
Howarth, David UL; Spendzharova, Aneta

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2019)

Established at the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has, potentially, considerable influence over decisions on the provision of loans ... [more ▼]

Established at the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has, potentially, considerable influence over decisions on the provision of loans to Eurozone member state governments and on the recapitalization of banks. Legally and organizationally, the ESM is an international financial institution and thus its accountability can be compared to that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions. However, the ESM’s governance structure and decision-making procedures show that it is deeply embedded in the Eurozone governance architecture, resulting in a dual institutional embeddedness. Focusing on vertical and horizontal accountability combined with a learning perspective on accountability, this article presents an assessment of the accountability mechanisms applicable to the idiosyncratic ESM and how these mechanisms work in practice. [less ▲]

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See detailThe European Investment Bank as Policy Entrepreneur and the Promotion of Public-Private Partnerships
Howarth, David UL; Liebe, Moritz

in New Political Economy (2019), Early View

This paper focuses on the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the European Union’s promotion of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). We first demonstrate the relative importance of the ... [more ▼]

This paper focuses on the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the European Union’s promotion of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). We first demonstrate the relative importance of the EIB in relation to the European Commission on the promotion of PPPs. We then argue that the activism of the EIB on PPPs can be explained in terms of the bank’s operation as a policy entrepreneur. The paper further explains that the entrepreneurial role of the EIB with regard to PPPs relied massively on the presence of a small number of, principally British, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who actively promoted the PPP concept and the specific norms that supported it within the EIB. While there are indications that the EIB operated as a rational actor in its promotion of PPPs, we argue that ideas ultimately drove the pro-PPP activism of both individual EIB officials and the institution collectively. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Parliamentary Scrutiny of Euro Area National Central Banks
Högenauer, Anna-Lena UL; Howarth, David UL

in Public Administration (2018)

European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) involves several core principles for the organization of participating national central banks (NCBs / CBs), including their independence from political ... [more ▼]

European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) involves several core principles for the organization of participating national central banks (NCBs / CBs), including their independence from political institutions. Early studies show that the level of national parliamentary scrutiny over euro area NCBs varied (Lepper and Sterne 2002). In this context, our article examines the extent to which parliaments make use of four distinct control mechanisms to hold CBs accountable. We explain the very different levels of parliamentary scrutiny over NCBs in Germany, France and Belgium during the 2013-2016 period. We find that the level of scrutiny depends principally on the presence of a longstanding tradition of CB independence — and specifically the manner in which independence has been politicized and interpreted by the political class. We argue that the strength of the parliament can also explain some variation. [less ▲]

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See detailThe difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of Economic Policy Reform (2018), 21(3), 190-209

The German Government refused to accept the development of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Banking Union member states. Publicly, the German Government was preoccupied with the creation of ... [more ▼]

The German Government refused to accept the development of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Banking Union member states. Publicly, the German Government was preoccupied with the creation of a moral hazard that common funds would create for banks in those participating countries that had weak banking systems. This paper argues that to understand German moral hazard concerns it is necessary to look beyond the ideational – notably concerns stemming from German Ordo-liberalism – and focus on the existing national institutional arrangements that the German Government sought to protect. German moral hazard concerns stemmed from the fear that well-funded German deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) – especially those of small savings and cooperative banks – could be tapped to compensate for underfunded (and largely ex post funded) DGS in other member states. We thus demonstrate that the difficulties facing the construction of an EDIS owe to the weakness of the previously agreed harmonization of national DGS. This failure to harmonize schemes beyond a low minimal standard can be explained through an analysis focused on national systems. Different existing national DGS stem from the different configuration of national banking systems, the longstanding relationships among national banks and well-entrenched regulatory frameworks. [less ▲]

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See detailBrexit and the battle for financial services
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucial

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(8), 1118-1136

This paper analyses the policy developments concerning the Single Market in finance in the context of Brexit. Theoretically, we engage with two bodies of work that make contrasting predictions on European ... [more ▼]

This paper analyses the policy developments concerning the Single Market in finance in the context of Brexit. Theoretically, we engage with two bodies of work that make contrasting predictions on European financial market integration and the development of European Union (EU)policies on financial regulation: on focused upon a neo-mercantilist ‘battle’ amongst member states and the other stressing the importance of transnational financial networks (or coalitions). Empirically, we find limited evidence of the formation of crossnational alliances in favour of the United Kingdom (UK) retaining broad access to the EU Single Market in financial services, the presence of which would have aligned with the expectations of analyses focused upon transnational networks. By contrast, the main financial centres in the EU27 and their national authorities competed to lure financial business away from the UK — what we explain in terms of a ‘battle’ amongst member states and their national financial centres. [less ▲]

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See detailThe policy narratives of European capital markets union
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(7), 990-1009

This paper examines the ‘making’ of Capital Markets Union (CMU) through the theoretical lens of ‘actor-centred constructivism’, by considering the ‘policy narratives’ that bureaucratic actors have ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the ‘making’ of Capital Markets Union (CMU) through the theoretical lens of ‘actor-centred constructivism’, by considering the ‘policy narratives’ that bureaucratic actors have employed strategically to promote the project. It is argued that two main narratives were articulated by the European Commission in order to mobilize the political support necessary to push forward CMU and reduce potential opposition to it. The first narrative was to boost the size and internal and external competitiveness of European Union capital markets. The second narrative was the increased funding to the real economy, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructural projects. The Commission used these narratives instrumentally in ‘framing’ CMU as a positive-sum game, rather than a zero-sum game with potential winners and losers. [less ▲]

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See detailSpecial edition on constructing Banking Union: Introduction
Howarth, David UL; Schild, Joachim

in Journal of Economic Policy Reform (2018), 21(2), 99-110

European Banking Union arguably represents the most important step in European economic integration since the launch of Monetary Union. Little wonder, then, that this major deepening of integration ... [more ▼]

European Banking Union arguably represents the most important step in European economic integration since the launch of Monetary Union. Little wonder, then, that this major deepening of integration sparked a lively academic debate and triggered an ever-growing number of publications from different disciplinary backgrounds. The first wave of publications on European Banking Union (BU) provided us with overviews on the legal changes; they discussed at length the economic rationale underpinning BU; and they traced the political dynamics of establishing BU discussing key explanatory factors. This literature reflected BU’s foundational phase between 2012 and 2014 when the major texts enshrining BU in law were negotiated and adopted. This special issue is located at the intersection of this first phase and a second stage of research covering different topics as regards to the functioning of BU. New research questions are triggered by the — so far still limited — experiences regarding BU’s implementation and current operation. Based on this empirical evidence, contributions to this second wave of BU-related research try to identify potentially dangerous lacunae and design faults, contributing to the ongoing reform debates. Taken together, the contributions to this special issue provide us with a nuanced picture of Banking Union’s construction problems, lacunae, and governance structure design faults. Banking Union resembles an unfinished cathedral. Given its problematic architecture, there remain important stability risks. [less ▲]

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See detailEnforcing the European Semester: the politics of asymmetric information in the excessive deficit and macroeconomic imbalance procedures
Howarth, David UL; Savage, James

in Journal of European Public Policy (2018), 25(2), 193-211

The European Semester is an information-driven surveillance system that relies upon budgetary and economic statistics collected from the European Union’s member states and analyzed by the European ... [more ▼]

The European Semester is an information-driven surveillance system that relies upon budgetary and economic statistics collected from the European Union’s member states and analyzed by the European Commission. This is true for both the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). This article employs Principal–Agent theory to analyze the politics of asymmetric information in the EDP and MIP. The study explores how the statistical requirements of the Six-Pack have been enforced by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council to strengthen the EDP, even as the statistical integrity of the MIP received less protection. The article examines how the misrepresentation of statistics by Spain’s Autonomous Community of Valencia provoked the first financial sanction in the history of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the Commission’s unsuccessful efforts to strengthen the reliability of MIP statistics. [less ▲]

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See detailBrexit and the Single European Financial Market
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2017), 55(S1), 149164

Brexit raises a set of important questions with reference to the Single Market, especially in financial services. What are the implications of Brexit for the UK and its financial industry; and what are ... [more ▼]

Brexit raises a set of important questions with reference to the Single Market, especially in financial services. What are the implications of Brexit for the UK and its financial industry; and what are the implications of Brexit for the EU and the single financial market? This topic is examined in four consecutive steps. We first discuss the UK’s influence in the development of the single financial market, including EU financial regulation, over the past two decades – and thus both prior to, and after, the international financial crisis. This overview is necessary in order to grasp the potential implications of Brexit for the UK, the EU and their financial industries – examined in the second step. We then examine the so-called safeguards secured by the UK government from the EU in the run up to the Brexit referendum and the position of the UK’s financial industry during the Brexit campaign and after the referendum. Finally, we review the post-Brexit options available to manage the relationship between the UK and the EU, specifically with regard to finance. It is argued that that the UK has been a key player in the development of the single financial market, especially prior to the international financial crisis, and has greatly benefited from it. The – at times considerable – British influence made EU financial regulation more market-friendly and open to third countries than it would have been otherwise. The EU–UK agreement signed prior to the Brexit referendum contained several clauses concerning economic governance, including non-discrimination provisions for the financial industry based in the UK. However, these provisions mainly reflected the status quo and re-stated existing commitments. The City of London and British financial industry were mostly in the pro-Remain camp during the referendum campaign – albeit there were some noteworthy financial sector supporters of Brexit. Following the June referendum, the City unsuccessfully mobilized in order to retain full access to the single financial market – the alternative options were considerably less appealing for the UK financial industry. [less ▲]

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See detailFrance and European macroeconomic policy coordination: from the Treaty of Rome to the euro area sovereign debt crisis
Howarth, David UL; Schild, Joachim

in Modern & Contemporary France (2017), 25(2), 171-190

French support for European (EC/EU)-level macroeconomic policy coordination has been driven by remarkably consistent preferences since the 1950s. With the exception of the de Gaulle decade (1958–1968 ... [more ▼]

French support for European (EC/EU)-level macroeconomic policy coordination has been driven by remarkably consistent preferences since the 1950s. With the exception of the de Gaulle decade (1958–1968), French governments have sought European-level mechanisms for balance of payments support. This article sets out to explain these remarkably stable French preferences on European-level macroeconomic policy coordination over time through a combination of an interest-based analysis referring to structural and competitive weaknesses of the French economy and an ideational explanatory analysis focused upon French Keynesian thinking on symmetrical adjustment of both deficit and surplus countries. French preferences align largely with the concept of ‘embedded liberalism’. This article also interprets a number of developments in EU-level economic governance in response to the banking and sovereign debt crises that provided a policy window for France to move European-level mechanisms and institutions towards long-held French preferences. [less ▲]

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See detailPushing the Boundaries. New Research on the Activism of EU Supranational Institutions
Howarth, David UL; Roos, Mechthild

in Journal of Contemporary European Research [=JCER] (2017), 13(2), 1007-1024

This contribution introduces the concept of ‘activism’ to the study of EU supranational institutions and their role in EU policy making and European integration. While long present in studies of the Court ... [more ▼]

This contribution introduces the concept of ‘activism’ to the study of EU supranational institutions and their role in EU policy making and European integration. While long present in studies of the Court of Justice of the EU, ‘activism’ has rarely been examined systematically in the context of analyses of other supranational institutions. This contribution offers a definition of ‘supranational institutional activism’, examines its analytical usefulness in relation to other concepts such as ‘entrepreneurship’ and through the lens of a number of political science and EU integration theories and analytical approaches. The specific analytical insights derived from the disciplines of political science, history and legal scholarship of the twelve articles of this special edition on ‘supranational institutional activism’ are also considered. While the powers and roles of EU supranational institutions have been examined in numerous studies, this article presents a concept that can contribute to a more systematic and comprehensive understanding of the contribution of these entities to EU policy making and European integration. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Politics of Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe
Howarth, David UL; Macartney, Huw

Book published by Routledge (2017)

Europe’s sovereign debt crisis and the accompanying national bank crises in the European Union brought bank regulation and supervision to the top of the EU policy agenda. In a few short years, we have ... [more ▼]

Europe’s sovereign debt crisis and the accompanying national bank crises in the European Union brought bank regulation and supervision to the top of the EU policy agenda. In a few short years, we have witnessed a ‘great leap forward’ for European integration marked by over a dozen pieces of EU legislation shaping the operation of banks, rules on bank capital, reconfigured supervisory agencies, and Banking Union. The significance of these measures lies however, in the fact that they constitute the most dramatic transfer of policy-making powers to the European level since the start of Economic and Monetary Union in 1999. This volume addresses the three main political battles behind the adoption of these new regulatory and supervisory policies. First, it examines divisions among states, both according to their domestic institutional structures, including distinct financial systems, as well as their creditor or debtor status in the crisis. Second, it studies the battle over national versus supranational jurisdiction. Third, it explores the conflictual process of policy learning and the activation of epistemic communities who claim competence to address the crisis. [less ▲]

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See detailPushing the Boundaries. New Research on the Activism of EU Supranational Institutions
Herzog, Mechthild UL; Howarth, David UL

in Journal of Contemporary European Research [=JCER] (2017), 13(2), 1007-1024

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See detailThe Political Economy of European Banking Union
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

Book published by Oxford University Press (2016)

The establishment of Banking Union represents a major development in European economic governance and European integration history more generally. Banking Union is also significant because not all ... [more ▼]

The establishment of Banking Union represents a major development in European economic governance and European integration history more generally. Banking Union is also significant because not all European Union (EU) member states have joined, which has increased the trend towards differentiated integration in the EU, posing a major challenge to the EU as a whole and to the opt-out countries. This book is informed by two main empirical questions. Why was Banking Union - presented by proponents as a crucial move to 'complete' Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) - proposed only in 2012, over twenty years after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty? Why has a certain design for Banking Union been agreed and some elements of this design prioritized over others? A two-step explanation is articulated in this study. First, it explains why euro area member state governments moved to consider Banking Union by building on the concept of the 'financial trilemma', and examining the implications of the single currency for euro area member state banking systems. Second, it explains the design of Banking Union by examining the preferences of member state governments on the core components of Banking Union and developing a comparative political economy analysis focused on the configuration of national banking systems and varying national concern for the moral hazard facing banks and sovereigns created by euro level support mechanisms. [less ▲]

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See detailRaymond Barre: Modernising France through European Monetary Cooperation
Howarth, David UL

in Dyson, Kenneth; Maes, Ivo (Eds.) Architects of the Euro Intellectuals in the Making of European Monetary Union (2016)

The true significance of Barre as an architect of European Economic and Monetary Union should be seen in terms of his economic convictions. They led him - far earlier than most of his compatriots, and ... [more ▼]

The true significance of Barre as an architect of European Economic and Monetary Union should be seen in terms of his economic convictions. They led him - far earlier than most of his compatriots, and against many detractors within French political, policy making and academic circles — to support the three main macro-economic stepping stones to EMU: macro-economic convergence based on low inflation; exchange-rate targeting (through an external exchange-rate regime) to reinforce domestic efforts to bring down inflation; and capital liberalization. As European Commissioner, and then as French prime minister from 1976 to 1981 with a concurrent stint as Finance Minister from 1976-1978, Barre maintained his consistent support for these three policy goals, although without the telos of a single currency by way of official justification. Prior to the Delors Report, Barre never publicly stated his support for the creation of a single European currency emitted by a European central bank. Barre repeatedly claimed that he was a European by conviction, but his Europeanism remained one in which Member States retained control. Barre was no fan of supra-nationalism. Domestic economic concerns and the competitiveness of the French economy were always his priorities. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Political Economy of European Capital Markets Union
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia UL; Liebe, Moritz UL

in Journal of Common Market Studies (2016), 54(S1), 185203

In September 2015 the European Commission put forward an Action Plan for Capital Markets Union (CMU) and two legislative proposals concerning securitization. Further legislative activity was to follow ... [more ▼]

In September 2015 the European Commission put forward an Action Plan for Capital Markets Union (CMU) and two legislative proposals concerning securitization. Further legislative activity was to follow. This contribution undertakes a preliminary investigation of the ‘making’ of the CMU project, explaining what CMU is, its economic and political objectives, as well as its main drivers and obstacles. It is argued that the likely winners and losers of the project – both financial groups and specific Member State governments – largely formed the constituencies for and against CMU. The organization of national financial (and specifically banking) systems largely directed Member State government preferences on CMU. The potential winners were also influential in promoting a specific form of CMU, or at least specific priorities in the construction of CMU. The centrality of banks in EU national financial systems explains the priority attached to securitization in the first stage of the CMU project. [less ▲]

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See detailInternationalised banking, alternative banks and the Single Supervisory Mechanism
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia

in West European Politics (2016), 39(3), 438-61

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB ... [more ▼]

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks. [less ▲]

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See detailThe ‘ebb and flow’ of transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking
Howarth, David UL; Quaglia, Lucia UL

in Journal of Banking Regulation (2016)

Do financial crises promote or hamper transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking? This article argues that financial crises have an impact upon the alignment of regulatory preferences of the United ... [more ▼]

Do financial crises promote or hamper transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking? This article argues that financial crises have an impact upon the alignment of regulatory preferences of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), causing an ‘ebb and flow’ in transatlantic cooperation. When EU-US preferences are broadly aligned in periods of financial stability, transatlantic regulatory cooperation is intense. It is relatively easy for the EU and US to agree on market-friendly regulation promoted by banks. When preferences are different, especially in the context and aftermath of the exogenous shock of financial crises, transatlantic cooperation is more problematic because crises re-assert the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation. [less ▲]

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